Seminário remoto "Lógicos em Quarentena" 23/09/2021 (quinta-feira) 16:00h
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Bruno Lopes
Sep 20, 2021, 7:00:59 AM9/20/21
to Lista acadêmica brasileira dos profissionais e estudantes da área de LOGICA
Numa iniciativa conjunta da Sociedade Brasileira de Lógica e do Grupo de Interesse em Lógica da Sociedade Brasileira de Computação, gostaríamos de convidar a todos a participarem do Seminário "Lógicos em Quarentena". Trata-se de um seminário remoto com apresentações informais por membros da comunidade e espaço para perguntas no fim. As apresentações usualmente são gravadas e disponibilizadas na página do evento http://lq.sbl.org.br (com a agenda completa).
Data: 23 de setembro de 2021 (quinta-feira)
Horário: 16:00h GMT-3
Apresentador: Luis Felipe Bartolo Alegre (Sociedade Peruana de Epistemologia e Lógica)
Título: Can we test inconsistent empirical theories?
Resumo: This lecture discusses the logical possibility of testing inconsistent empirical theories. The main challenge for answering this affirmatively is to avoid that the inconsistent consequences of a theory both corroborate it and falsify it. I answer affirmatively by showing that we can define a class of empirical sentences whose truth would force us to abandon such inconsistent theory: the class of its potential rejecters. Despite this, I show that the observational contradictions implied by a theory could only be verified (provided we make some assumptions), but not rejected. From this, it follows that, although inconsistent theories are rejectable, they cannot be rejected qua inconsistent.
A apresentação ocorrerá pelo Google Meet através do link público http://meet.google.com/njo-jkah-hjz .
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Data: 23 de setembro de 2021 (quinta-feira)
Horário: 16:00h GMT-3
Apresentador: Luis Felipe Bartolo Alegre (Sociedade Peruana de Epistemologia e Lógica)
Título: Can we test inconsistent empirical theories?
Resumo: This lecture discusses the logical possibility of testing inconsistent empirical theories. The main challenge for answering this affirmatively is to avoid that the inconsistent consequences of a theory both corroborate it and falsify it. I answer affirmatively by showing that we can define a class of empirical sentences whose truth would force us to abandon such inconsistent theory: the class of its potential rejecters. Despite this, I show that the observational contradictions implied by a theory could only be verified (provided we make some assumptions), but not rejected. From this, it follows that, although inconsistent theories are rejectable, they cannot be rejected qua inconsistent.
A apresentação ocorrerá pelo Google Meet através do link público http://meet.google.com/njo-jkah-hjz .
Bruno Lopes
Professor Adjunto
Instituto de Computação
Universidade Federal Fluminense
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