Alas, it is not true that the cipher suites using HMAC-SHA-1 are unnecessary, as a small but still non-trivial portion of traffic still uses them. It would be good to get rid of them, but we're probably a ways off for now. (
SHA-1 server signatures are also a higher priority use of our breakage budget for now.)
Regardless, HMAC-SHA-1 is not the problem with those ciphers. As you note, HMAC-SHA-1 is still fine. The real problem with those ciphers is actually CBC. All CBC mode ciphers suites in TLS are broken because they ordered encryption and MAC incorrectly, making them vulnerable to the
Lucky 13 attack. There's no sense in adding the CBC + HMAC-SHA-2 cipher suites when they're vulnerable to the same problems. We would want to deprecate them later in favor of AES-GCM anyway. Between CBC per-record IV and the large MACs, they're also the highest bandwidth overhead ciphers in all of TLS.
David