Dear Chrome Developers,
We hope this e-mail finds you well. We are security researchers and we have been working on the File System Access (FSA) API for some time. We first thank you all very much for your hard work for developing and maintaining this great API. In this email, we would like to share our findings related to the security of this API and discuss our findings on the pertinent issues.
Even though the FSA API can be used to develop powerful web applications, it can extend the attack surface of web applications. We found that it can be abused by adversaries to develop a novel ransomware strain. As also briefly discussed in the security model of the API [1], such an attack would effortlessly be performed by an adversary who designs a seemingly benign web application and uses malicious tactics (i.e., phishing, malvertisement) to trick the user to grant access to their sensitive portions of the local file system. Afterwards, the malicious application can encrypt the files and overwrite the original files with their encrypted versions and demand a ransom payment. As of now, we have found no evidence of any abuse of the FSA API in the wild, nor have we encountered any literature presenting it as a possible attack vector that the adversaries can utilize to perform browser-based ransomware attacks.
Having said this, we have developed a proof-of-concept browser-based ransomware to analyze the impact of this new type of ransomware strain. Our extensive analysis with 3 different OSs, 23 file formats, 29 distinct directories, 5 cloud providers, and 4 antivirus solutions show that such a ransomware is capable of encrypting numerous types of files that can possess users' sensitive information. In addition, although the security model of the FSA API restricts access to some of the critical system directories (e.g., file system root, user's home, operating system), our experiments reveal that it can encrypt files in user directories, data partitions (i.e., D:/), external storage devices such external HDD and flash drives, shared network volumes, and cloud-integrated directories. Furthermore, we have found that while cloud providers such as Dropbox, Google Drive, and Microsoft OneDrive have file versioning features that store multiple versions of a file for backup purposes, popular cloud solutions such as Apple iCloud and Box Individual can be severely affected by browser-based ransomware as they do not implement this feature. Therefore, browser-based ransomware’s effect is permanent on the files that are stored in Apple iCloud and Box Individual which can pose a severe security risk as these platforms have millions of users. Also, it goes without saying, if versioning does not work on cloud-providers (i.e., Dropbox, Google Drive, and Microsoft OneDrive) with versioning features, they are also severely impacted. Furthermore, we have analyzed the effectiveness of existing ransomware defense solutions and full versions of several Antivirus softwares against this new type of ransomware and we have found that they fall short of detecting it due to its distinct features such as not requiring installation, running on the browser and so on. Thus, we were also interested in providing a solution and also implemented a lightweight defense solution.
Again, we thank you for your hardwork in your developing efforts. This is for sure a great community effort. With this email, we kindly wanted to bring these issues to your attention before they are exploited by adversaries. Please let us know if you need more details about these issues. We also would like you to let you know about our defense solution and discuss the possible integration of this solution to the FSA API or Chromium. Also, we are in the process of reporting this to other software vendors (e.g., antivirus softwares, cloud products ) that are not aware of the presence of this kind of new type of ransomware attack.
Thank you very much.
Harun Oz
Graduate Research Assistant
PhD Computer Engineering Student, Florida International University
Cyber-Physical Systems Security Lab
10555 W Flagler St, Miami, FL 33174