Rob - thanks this was very helpful. So, according to the comments in "web_request_permissions.cc" it looks like all URLs hosted at domains
clients[1-9].google.com are "back-door" URLs that bypass the webRequest API and all extension based on it, for the purpose of ensuring that "internal services" -- which I interpret to mean mechanisms that ensure the correct operation of the Chromium ecosystem -- are affected by webRequest extensions themselves. The comments mentioned extension update, extension blacklisting, safe-browse, etc. All that makes sense.
However, I've got all these options turned off (the six checkboxes under "Privacy" in settings from "Use a web service ..." to "Enabled phishing protection ..." etc.), and still I see all kinds of requests going out to
clients[1-9].google.com which are thwarting my attempt to use webRequest to scrub the outbound headers per below.
On more analysis, it appears that specifically that if my extension user is signed into Gmail (a Web service unrelated to the operation of the Chromium software ecosystem, but happens to be operated by Google), then Gmail makes numerous requests to
clients[1-9].google.com, so that those domains would appear to be used both for Chromium software purposes as well as Google's commercial services. Some examples:
responds w/ an HTML document containing embeded Javascript:
function apsl() { (new Image).src = "//clients2.google.com/availability/...." + (new Date).getTime() + "......." } This then fetches a small 35-byte GIF hosted at
clients2.google.com and which bypasses webRequesting filtering. This looks like a tracking GIF.
responds w/ an HTML document containing embeded Javascript:
responds w/ a JavaScript document containing:
So basically, the Web sites serving up the Google apps and services appear to be making regular use of these back-door domains that are entirely bypassed by any extension using webRequest which tries to limit data sent out (extra User-Agent stuff in my case, but it will render ineffective any Cookie blocker or other privacy tool).
Are Chromium developers aware of this? My first reaction is to surmise that if Google is acting both as the custodian of Chromium software integrity as well as a participant in the competitive market for Web-delivered services, it should try to avoid even the appearance of potentially using these back-door domains for any purpose related to the Web services, the reason being that could be seen as a way to get a leg up on the competition as far as ability to capture tracking data from users who try not to disclose it.
It seems that this could be fixed by having the Chromium code hide only those URLs known to implement the various software integrity functions mentioned in the comments in "web_request_permissions.cc" while leaving all other URLs hosted at the
clients[1-9].google.com back-door domains still within the scope of the webRequest API.
Ideas? Leaking the unwanted private header info to
*.google.com defeats my extension's purpose and the only ways to proceed I can think of are to patch Chromium or shut off access to those domains which I would imagine would break the Google services.
Thanks for your help!
John Hinsdale