On desktop platforms, using the OS crypto services to encrypt stored data protects the data against an attacker who has access to the drive where the data is stored (e.g. by removing the drive, or booting the computer into a different OS), but does not have access to the user account that owns the data.
On modern versions of Android (and on many devices with older versions) all the user data stored on the device's internal storage is already transparently encrypted by the OS and so there's no need for apps to also apply their own encryption to data stored there. Android relies on that instead of providing a similar OS crypto service to the desktop platforms.
Also, for most purposes on Android the security boundary is individual apps, not the user: each app's private data directory on the internal storage is only accessible to that specific app, so it's not possible for another app to access the stored files at all even if it's running as the same user, which is more restricted than even the data protected by OS crypto services.