Comment #16 on issue 181671 by
gespenst...@gmail.com: Create a policy to
Same as for thomas, it triggers our IDS/breach detection tools.
Random-looking DNS is otherwise pretty robust way to detect malware
attempting to communicate back to command & control and DL malicious
payload and/or newer versions/attacking modules for lateral movement.
I totally understand that it can be a PITA to change complicated and
low-level code for this, seemingly minor incident that most end users don't
complain about (because of, well, being end users), but in enterprise it is
a major PITA for us, security guys, to have users who use Chrome.
What we currently do is we tune random-looking DNS indicator to not produce
alerts if there aren't "too many" queries, but fact is, it makes us blind
to malware that's not too arrogant in using DGA trying to talk to C&C and
still sometimes we get false positives for computers where chrome gets
launched/closed several times in a row. Hopefully malware will be caught by
other indicators, but it makes us think do we really need Chrome in
enterprise or not.
In the light of recent events the industry is introducing stricter security
controls and deploying more tools that alert on malicious activity in
active breach phase. I believe that this change will make chromium much
more usable in enterprise environment where I don't see it much and
chromium will get more positive votes from security teams.
Anyways, thanks for at least arguing on that.