We introduce a mechanism that allows an application to opt-in to exposing certain information to other applications which are video-capturing it. This allows collaboration between capturing and captured applications. For example, a VC application that's video-capturing a tab where a presentation application lives, could expose user-facing controls in the VC tab for navigating the presentation in the captured tab.
Display-capturing applications can offer the user improved functionality if they know what they are capturing, assuming the captured application collaborates. This is already possible using steganography. We offer a simpler, more reliable and more secure mechanism, by which an application may advertise select information - origin, handle, ID, etc. Additionally, the mechanism we propose allows the captured application to select the audience - the entire web or select origins. Finally, our mechanism offers some confidence in the capturer that certain parts of the message, if included, are not spoofed: 1. Only the top-level application can set the capture-handle, whereas steganography-based methods are exposed to messages being displayed by embedded content. 2. The browser provides the origin of the captured application (if it opts-in to exposing it).
None
Contact emails
elad...@chromium.orgExplainer
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1oSDmBPYVlxFJxb7ZB_rV6yaAaYIBFDphbkx5bXLnzFg/edit?usp=sharingSpecification
NoneSummary
We introduce a mechanism that allows an application to opt-in to exposing certain information to other applications which are video-capturing it. This allows collaboration between capturing and captured applications. For example, a VC application that's video-capturing a tab where a presentation application lives, could expose user-facing controls in the VC tab for navigating the presentation in the captured tab.
Blink component
Blink>GetUserMedia>TabMotivation
Display-capturing applications can offer the user improved functionality if they know what they are capturing, assuming the captured application collaborates. This is already possible using steganography. We offer a simpler, more reliable and more secure mechanism, by which an application may advertise select information - origin, handle, ID, etc. Additionally, the mechanism we propose allows the captured application to select the audience - the entire web or select origins. Finally, our mechanism offers some confidence in the capturer that certain parts of the message, if included, are not spoofed: 1. Only the top-level application can set the capture-handle, whereas steganography-based methods are exposed to messages being displayed by embedded content. 2. The browser provides the origin of the captured application (if it opts-in to exposing it).
Initial public proposal
https://github.com/w3c/mediacapture-screen-share/issues/166TAG review
None
TAG review status
PendingRisks
Interoperability and Compatibility
None
Gecko: No official signal. Some resistance voiced over the argument that this makes getDisplayMedia "too attractive" and could hinder adoption of getViewportMedia. (There are no current plans to deprecate getDisplayMedia.)
WebKit: No official signal, but they contributed ideas to early revisions and seemed generally positive.
Web developers: Google Meet very interested. Additional developers will be approached soon.Is this feature fully tested by web-platform-tests?
NoFlag name
CaptureHandleTracking bug
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=1200910Launch bug
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=1200907Link to entry on the Chrome Platform Status
https://chromestatus.com/feature/4854125411958784This intent message was generated by Chrome Platform Status.
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