Proposal: Ignore Strict-Transport-Security headers for Localhost responses

[Eric Lawrence]

CL: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/5923046?tab=comments

Today, if a https://localhost:* response sets Strict-Transport-Security, HTTPS upgrades will be applied to all subsequent http://localhost requests, regardless of port. 

Localhost is inherently a secure context, and Strict-Transport-Security response headers received on https://localhost responses can cause problems because they are not isolated by port. This leads to compatibility problems for end-users who use software packages that commonly spin up localhost webservers for ephemeral reasons (e.g. communication of an auth token from a web login to a local software package).

This is also a source of friction for web developers who test their applications locally for the same reason.

I propose we resolve this problem by matching Firefox's behavior and ignoring HSTS headers on responses returned from localhost URLs.

As requested, I've proposed an errata for RFC6797 to add the following to section 8.1.1:

If the substring matching the host production from the Request-URI (of the message to which the host responded) syntactically matches the string "localhost" or ends with ".localhost", then the UA MAY choose not to note this host as a Known HSTS host.

[Mike Taylor]

Should this be an Intent to Ship?

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[Alex Russell]

It's a good proposal and if it is reformulated as an I2S, I'll approve.

Erik: lmk if i can help with paperwork there.

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