Public Discussion of Cybertrust Japan / JCSI CA Inclusion Request

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Chris Clements

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May 10, 2024, 9:06:20 AMMay 10
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All,

This email commences a six-week public discussion of Cybertrust Japan / JCSI’s request to include the following three (3) certificates as publicly trusted root certificates in one or more CCADB Root Store Operator’s program. This discussion period is scheduled to close on June 21, 2024.


The purpose of this public discussion process is to promote openness and transparency. However, each Root Store makes its inclusion decisions independently, on its own timelines, and based on its own inclusion criteria. Successful completion of this public discussion process does not guarantee any favorable action by any Root Store.  


Anyone with concerns or questions is urged to raise them on this CCADB Public list by replying directly in this discussion thread. Likewise, a representative of the applicant must promptly respond directly in the discussion thread to all questions that are posted.

CCADB Case Number: 00000585

Organization Background Information (listed in CCADB):

Certificates Requested for Inclusion:

  1. SecureSign Root CA12 (included in case 00000585):

  2. SecureSign Root CA14 (included in case 00000585):

  3. SecureSign Root CA15 (included in case 00000585):

Existing Publicly Trusted Root CAs from Cybertrust Japan / JCSI:

  1. SecureSign RootCA11:

  • Certificate download links: (CA Repository, crt.sh)

  • Use cases served/EKUs: 

    • Server Authentication (TLS) 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1

    • Client Authentication 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2

  • Certificate corpus: here (Censys login required)

  • Included in: Chrome, Microsoft, and Mozilla

  1. Cybertrust iTrust Root Certification Authority:

  • Certificate download links: (CA Repository, crt.sh)

  • Use cases served/EKUs: 

    • Secure Email (S/MIME) 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4

    • Code Signing 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3

  • Certificate corpus: here (Censys login required)

  • Included in: Microsoft

Relevant Policy and Practices Documentation: 

The following policy documents apply to all applicant root CA certificates:

Most Recent Self-Assessment:

The following Self-Assessment applies to all applicant root CA certificates:

Audit Statements:

  • Auditor: KPMG (enrolled through WebTrust)

  • Audit Criteria: WebTrust

  • Date of Audit Issuance: 12/6/2023

  • For Period Ending: 10/5/2023

  • Audit Statement(s):

Incident Summary (Bugzilla incidents from previous 24 months):

  • 1827490: Cybertrust Japan: CRL signature algorithm encoding error


Thank you

-Chris, on behalf of the CCADB Steering Committee


Chris Clements

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Jun 14, 2024, 2:57:46 PMJun 14
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All,

This is a reminder that the public discussion period on the inclusion application of Cybertrust Japan / JCSI will close on June 21, 2024.


Thank you
-Chris, on behalf of the CCADB Steering Committee

Chris Clements

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Jun 26, 2024, 10:55:45 AM (3 days ago) Jun 26
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On May 10, 2024, we began a six-week, public discussion[1] on the request from Cybertrust Japan / JCSI for inclusion of its root certificate(s):

The public discussion period has now ended.

We did not receive any objections or other questions or comments in opposition to Cybertrust Japan / JCSI’s request. We thank the community for its review and consideration during this period. Root Store Programs will make final inclusion decisions independently, on their own timelines, and based on each Root Store Member’s inclusion criteria. Further discussion may take place in the independently managed Root Store community forums (i.e., MDSP).

[1] https://groups.google.com/a/ccadb.org/g/public/c/4OuyyOD-7ng/m/nl-bbjr-AQAJ 

Thank you

-Chris, on behalf of the CCADB Steering Committee

P.S. Members of this group may have noticed recent spam calendar invitation(s) related to past root inclusion public discussions. The CCADB Steering Committee only conducts root inclusion public discussions within this group as detailed on ccadb.org. Please ignore any spam as we continue to refine group moderation. The original senders have been blocked from the community.

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