soc.history.war.vietnam FAQ: Australian Involvement (1/3)
SHWV Moderating Team
Last-modified: 1996/05/10
Posting-Frequency: monthly (8th)
Frequently Asked Questions: soc.history.war.vietnam
The FAQs on the Australian involvement in Vietnam were written by
Brian Ross.
Australia's Military Involvement in the Vietnam War
This posting is the first of two intended to provide an overview
of Australian military operations in Vietnam, commencing from the
deployment of the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam in 1962 until
1969, when Australian forces began withdrawing, consistent with the
Nixon Doctrine of phased withdrawal from the mainland of Asia and the
policy of Vietnamization.
While the second will deal primarily with the political decisions
to become involved in the Vietnam war, suffice to say for the moment,
that the Australian commitment to Vietnam was largely dictated by
political concerns and was therefore limited by the same concerns. The
predominant theory of defence during the sixties was the containment
of communism and "Forward Defence". Both of these policies relied
heavily on the presence of America in Southeast Asia combating the
perceived Chinese threat. In Vietnam, this translated into the policy
of supporting American military involvement and encouraging the
continuation of this involvement until such time as China was
sufficiently dissuaded from any further adventurism or Australia could
more capably defend itself.
Australian Army Training Team Vietnam
Australia's initial commitment to supporting the American stance
in Vietnam consisted of the deployment of a team of military advisers.
On 26th July, 1962, the Minister for Defence announced Australia's
intention to send 30 instructors to the Republic of Vietnam, 4 going
to the Military Aid Council Vietnam (MACV) Headquarters in Saigon, 22
to regional locations in the Hue area and 4 to Duc My.(1) This team
would be headed by Colonel F.P. Serong, previously the Commanding
Officer at the Jungle Training Centre, Canungra, Queensland and would
fall under the command of the Australian Army Forces, Far Eastern
Landing Forces Headquarters in Singapore.(2) The AATTV arrived in the
Republic of Viet Nam in August, 1962.
AATTV advisers served with ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam)
units, including infantry, artillery and armoured divisions,
independent regiments in the I Corps area (the northern province of
RVN),regional and provincial headquarters, the Viet Nam Police Field
Force, US Special Forces, Montegnard Special Forces and CIA
operations.(3) with the escalation of Australian forces in Vietnam in
1966, Australian advisers also served with 1 Australian Task Force
(1ATF) at Nui Dat.
The primary role of the AATTV was to train ARVN and other forces
in the use of weapons, jungle warfare, tactics and strategy. In
addition, especially after the Australian government allowed them to
serve in battalion and smaller size formations, they took liaison
roles, calling for airstrikes and arranging logistical support and
medevac facilities.(4) They usually operated as individuals or in
small groups of two or three. After 1963, the AATTV came wider the
operational control of MACV HQ in Saigon.
It was intended that the AATTV would represent Australia's
commitment to the American operations in Vietnam, and as such, would
not have a significant military impact, however, the success of
Australian advisers, not the least Captain Peterson's training of the
Montegnard Special Forces in Dar Lac Province, became quickly known
throughout Vietnam. Peterson established Armed Propaganda and
Intelligence Teams (APIT)from amongst Montnegard tribesmen in Ban Me
Thout, designed to disseminate propaganda, collect information and
establish a network of informers, disrupt Viet Cong infiltration and
supply routes, conduct small scale raids, ambushes and similar minor
operations and to conduct long range patrols into Viet Cong 'safe
areas', rescuing captured Monteg nards and liberating equipment and
ammunition.(5) Building on these gains, Peterson established a
'People's Army' just prior to his departure, which at that stage had
effectively regained control over much of southern Dar Lac. Despite
the inadequacies of the ARVN forces in protecting pacified areas, and
the racial problems between Montegnards and ARVN personnel, Peterson
had succeeded in regaining the upper hand in the Ban Me Thout region.
AATTV techniques and method of operations were significantly
different to many of those employed by their American allies.
Experience in the jungles of Malaya and Borneo and limitations on the
number of and facilities available to personnel had combined to
produce very different tactics. Whilst American instructors expounded
the virtues of the rapid deployment of large numbers of troops,
massive fire power and decisive battles, Australians concentrated on
individual marksmanship, the independence of platoons from battalion
HQs, small scale patrols and ambushes. These differences frequently
bought Australian advisers into conflict with their American
superiors. The Australian policy of 'economy of effort' was directly
opposed to the American idea of 'concentration of force'.(6)
The AATTV served with distinction in Vietnam. During AATTV's tour
of duty, members were awarded two Victoria Crosses, several Military
Crosses and several Military Medals.(7) It was the first Australian
force to arrive and the last to leave. After the initial deployment of
30 instructors, it was increased in size by 30 in May 64, by 23 in
June 64 and then by 17 in January 65, bringing it to a total strength
of 100. It was restricted from further increases by the introduction
of a National Service Act ( 1965) in Australia which required large
numbers of instructors. The last instructors were withdrawn from Phuoc
Tuy Province in December 1972.
The First Deployment of Australian Ground Forces
In April 1965, consistent with President Johnson's deployment of
US Marines to protect airforce bases in Vietnam, Prime Minister Robert
Menzies announced his intention to send 1 Battalion, Royal Australian
Regiment (1 RAR) to assist in the defence of American bases. 1 RAR was
restructured into a tropic warfare organisation, similar to that
employed by the American army and was to serve under the US 173rd
Airborne Brigade (Separate) (US 173 Abn Bde)defending Bien Hoa
airforce base.(8) Initially it was intended that 1 RAR would only be
used in defence of the base but by December offensive operations had
begun in conjunction with 173 Abn Bde.(9) During 1 RAR's tour of duty,
22 major operations were conducted, usually within 10-20 miles from
Bien Hoa.
Like the AATTV, significant problems were encountered in
operating with US forces. These were compounded by poor equipment,
including WWll Owen machine guns and boots, and no decent preparation
before embarkation.(10) The operational problems they encountered will
be discussed below, suffice to say here that they were not
sufficiently resolved until 1 ATF was established with its relative
independence. Despite these limitations, however, the Australian
regiment was successfully integrated into the 173rd Abn Bde until it's
tour of duty was completed in June 1966.
1 Australian Task Force, Phuoc Tuy Province
In March 1966, the Australian government announced its intention
to create a single and relatively independent Australian Task Force.
This came largely as a result of political pressure on the Australian
government by Washington but was also consistent with the dominant
foreign and defence policy trends within Canberra at the time.
However, there was good reason to create the Task Force from a
military point of view also. Not only would Australians regain some
control over their troops, they would also b e permitted to conduct
operations in a manner consistent with their experiences and
techniques. Consideration was also given to the limited resources
available to the Australian command in Vietnam and the need to pool
these in order to have a more visible effect.
Phuoc Tuy Province was situated in III Corps Tactical Zone and
had a population of 160,000. At the time the Australian Task Force
arrived, it was a relatively wealthy province, agriculturally rich and
had a comparatively prosperous costal economy.(11) It had been a base
for anti-French activities after WWII and was familiar with the Viet
Minh presence that accompanied these activities. Despite having two
large Catholic migrant towns, it was also a popular base for Viet Cong
activities throughout the peri od of Diem's authority.(12) Operational
in Phuoc Tuy were the 274th and 275th NLF Regiments and D445
Provincial Mobile Battalion, a local force with strong links to the
population, an intimate knowledge of the area and assured
supplies.(13) Phuoc Tuy was chosen because there was a reasonable
amount of enemy activity, no risk of border violations in the pursuit
of the enemy and it had excellent air and sea access ensuring adequate
supplies and an assured evacuation route. The terrain was not
dissimilar from that often encountered by Australians in Malaya and
Borneo.(14) In addition to this, the pacification of Phuoc Tuy was
essential to the Republic of Viet Nam because of it's wealth and to
the MACV because of the significance of Vung Tau port and the supply
line (Route 15) to Saigon and Bien Hoa.
The exact placement of the Task Force was to be Nui Dat, a hill
on Route 2, heading north through the centre of the province, and was
an obvious challenge to the NLF and NVA forces in the area. The
Logistics and Supply Group (1 ALSG) was to be situated in Vung Tau
where it had good access to American supply groups and where it was
hoped that it would be somewhat safer from large scale attack.(15)
The Task Force was to be comprised of 2 infantry battalions (5/6
RAR were the first to serve in 1ATF), artillery (including some New
Zealand elements), engineers, signals and administrative support,
under the command of Brigadier O.D.Jackson. 1 ALSG, situated in Vung
Tau, consisted of 176 Air Dispatch Company, 2 Field Ambulance, 33
Dental Unit, 2 Composite Ordnance Depot and the 101 Field Workshop of
Royal Australian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers.(16) Since August
1964, No.35 Transport Squadron R AAF had been situated at Vung Tau and
one year after the arrival of 1 ALSG, (June 1966) No.9 Helicopter
Squadron was also situated in Phuoc Tuy.(17)
1 ATF's objectives in Phuoc Tuy were never very clear. Because it
came under the operational command of US II Field Forces Vietnam (II
FFV) but under the National command of Headquarters Australian Forces
Vietnam, the Commander 1 ATF had to reconcile sometimes inconsistent
objectives. Westmoreland told Jackson to "take over Phuoc Tuy" (18)
this representing the sum of operational commands to 1 ATF whilst from
COMAFV, directions were only a little more specific. The aims of 1 ATF
were defined as the security and domination of 1 ATF's assigned area,
the security of Route 15, the conduct of other operations as required,
conduct operations anywhere in II Corps Tactical Zone and in Bin Thuan
Province, II Corps Tactical Zone, as required and agreed up on by
COMAFV.(19) The actual practicality of these aims was hard to assess
but it seems that this meant 1 ATF was to act in both a pacification
role as well as a large unit to counter main force activity. COIN
operations would require frequent contact and close coordination with
ARVN forces and the civilian administration, yet the advisory
positions in ARVN and the administration were dominated by Americans.
Alternatively, large scale operations against main force units
required more manpower, mobility and fire support and could not
adequately be completed by two battalions, one of which would be
required for base security at all times.(20)
This obscurity when it came to the nature of operations 1 ATF was
to engage in did provide the Commander with some degree of operational
freedom. It was not long before the Australian forces had applied
their own style of operation. The base at Nui Dat, whilst its presence
was readily felt in the area, was not cleared as were American bases
and few ARVN personnel and no indigenous Vietnamese were allowed in to
the base. This meant that troop strength at any one time was hard to
gauge and security was excellent.(21)
It was D Company of 6 RAR that first encountered the enemy in
strength at Long Tan on the 18th August, 1966. In engaging and
severely damaging D445 Regiment, 1 ATF had established a moral and
later physical victory over the NLF in Phuoc Tuy. The TET offe nsive
of February 1968 also contributed to the relative demise of the VC 5th
Division (274 and 275 Regiments) in the region, due to the heavy
casualties they took. In order to combat the decreasing strengths of
the pre-existing NLF forces in the province D440 was created in 1967,
however, this too proved relatively ineffective, not being a local
force so much as comprising large numbers of NVA personnel.(22)
In November 1967, 1 ATF was increased in size by an extra
battalion (including of NZ artillery) and was reinforced by a squadron
of Centurion tanks. This was largely in response to the deteriorating
military situation in Vietnam and the possibility of a TET offensive.
General Vincent(COMAFV, Jan. 67 to Jan. 68.) was enthusiastic to
increase Australian forces either to enable them to take
responsibility for all of Phuoc Tuy or alternatively to allow 1 ATF to
operate more tangibly outside Phuoc Tuy Provinc e.(23) As a result, in
January 1968, 1 ATF was ordered to occupy an area 12 km north of Bien
Hoa airforce base with a view to preventing any expected TET assault.
1 ATF successfully engaged and defeated the enemy in February (as it
did an offensive in Baria at the same time) and returned to Nui Dat.
It was again called on to help defend Bien Hoa in May.(24)
If Vincent was enthusiastic about Australia's role in the war,
then McDonald, his successor, was passionate. McDonald was keen not to
see Australian operations limited to "[saving] the odd house from
being burned to the ground" in Phuoc Tuy. In gaining U S support for
operations against the VC in the Long Hai Hills in March 1968,
McDonald believed the US was attempting to hasten Australia's victory
over the enemy in Phuoc Tuy so as to get 1 ATF operational in areas of
more strategic importance.(25)
By 1969 and the beginning of the US withdrawal from South
Vietnam, II FFV had re-prioritized its aims and instructed the then
COMAEV, General Hay, that 1 ATF should do likewise. First priority was
to be given to pacification, second to upgrading ARVN for ces and
thirdly to military operations. Pacification operations began in May
1969 however, hampered by unenthusiastic ARVN forces, they proceeded
slowly. The success of the ATF in forcing the withdrawal of NLF
mainforce units and the provincial battalions (the remnants of D445
and the newer but understrength D440) was countered by the maintenance
of the VC infrastructure in the villages.(26) Thus, as the Task Force
withdrew in December 1971, the remaining AATTV members presided over
the gradual return of NLF in Phuoc Tuy.
The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF)
in Vietnam
As part of the policy of encouraging American involvement in
Vietnam, and as a result of his convincing victory at the polls in
November 1966, Menzies decided to increase Australia's military
commitment to Vietnam to include elements of all three service s. The
commissioning of two Charles F. Adams guided missile destroyers in
1965 and the impending replacement of Canberra bombers by F-111s had
made available to COMAFV additional sources for Australian expansion
in Vietnam.(27)
RAAF:
Since August 1964, elements of No.35 Squadron (Transport)
consisting of fixed wing Caribous, had been stationed at Vung Tau in
order to assist in the movement and supply of 1 RAR. With the
establishment of 1ATF and 1 ALSG in June 1966, No.9 Squadron
(Helicopters) were deployed to provide logistic support, troop
movement and medevac facilities for the Task Force. Both of these
commitments were relatively insignificant except in so far as they
represent a desire to have Australians supporting Australians in Phuoc
Tuy. Both units served as essential support for 1 ATF but added little
to the ongoing American involvement.
Perhaps one of the most significant RAAF contributions to the
Vietnam war was the deployment of No.2 Squadron (Canberra Bombers) to
Phan Rang in April 1967. The Australian 5th Airfield Construction
Squadron had completed the provision of Australian facil ities by the
time the first eight of ten bombers arrived. The bombers were to under
go usual maintenance in Phan Rang but had additional facilities at
Butterworth, in Malaysia for major maintenance.(28) The entire
contingent consisted of approximately 300 men and came under the
command of USAF 35th Tactical Fighter Wing.(29)
At the height of Australia's military involvement in Vietnam,
RAAF personnel numbered around 800 people from three squadrons. The
Canberra Bomber squadron was the first summoned home in March 1971
followed by the remaining RAAF personnel in August.<br>
RAN:
The Royal Australian Navy's contingent to the Vietnam war was
somewhat more substantial. The first RAN personnel to see action were
the six members of Clearance Diving Team 3 . CDT 3 was initially part
of the Inshore Undersea Warfare Group 1, based at Ca m Ranh Bay but
itself was assigned to Vung Tau from February 1967. It was largely
responsible for assisting in harbour defence, Explosive Ordnance
Disposal (EOD), harbour patrols and port command and communications
during Operation Stabledoor (1967-1970). (30) In addition to these
responsibilities, CDT 3 was called on to conduct marine salvage
operations, especially where EOD might be called for, river clearing
in preparation for riverine military operations and recovery of enemy
ammunition.
The largest RAN contribution however was supplied by the
deployment of Australian destroyers to Vietnam. The destroyers came
under the command of COMNAVFORV, primarily operating with the US
Seventh meet and in March 1967, HMAS Hobart, was the first to see
action.(31) HMA Ships Hobart and Perth alternated sixth month
deployments until March 1969 when Australia's newest DDG, HMAS
Brisbane arrived. Brisbane was replaced by Vendetta, a Daring Class
Destroyer which was in turn replaced by Perth and Hobart respectively
before completing RAN participation in the Vietnam conflict.(32)
Hobart, being the first RAN vessel to arrive in Vietnam under
combat conditions, participated in Operation Rolling Thunder's
maritime equivalent, Operation Sea Dragon. This was designed primarily
to intercept Water Borne Logistic Craft (WBLC) and bomb military and
logistic targets north of the DMZ. Sea Dragon was suspended in
November 1968 during Perth's second deployment. After this, RAN
vessels' primary task was to provide Naval Gunfire Support (NGFS) for
ground operations near the coast.
Whilst the threat of naval or air assault on Australian vessels
was not very large (33), as was the threat of sea borne mines.
However, during inshore operations against WBLCs and in support of
amphibious assaults, the ships were somewhat exposed to ground fire.
In September 1967 Perth was hit by fire from a shore battery whilst in
the pursuit of WBLC. Australian vessels were also used in conjunction
with 1 ATF in Phuoc Tuy. In May 1970 Hobart relieved USS St Paul and
provided NGFS for Australian troops in the Long Hai Hills.(34)
The Royal Australian Navy also played a considerable role in the
deployment of Australian troops and supply to 1 ATF and RAN vessels in
the Gulf of Tonkin. Primary amongst these was HMAS Sydney, an aircraft
carrier converted into a troop transport. 1 RAR was despatched aboard
HMAS Sydney from Sydney to Vung Tau in May 1965. HMA Ships Jeparit and
Boonaroo acted as supply ships for Australian forces in Vietnam and
were particularly important in supplying HMAS Vendetta with ammunition
during its deployment. (35)
Other aspects of RAN involvement in Vietnam included the dispatch
of 8 pilots and support staff for retraining and posting with US 135th
Aviation Company at Vung Tau in October 1967. The RAN Helicopter
Flight Vietnam (RANHFV) was used for troop insertion and as gunships
for support fire. The RAN also provided pilots as part of a detachment
to No.9 Squadron RAAF at Nui Dat, operating in cooperation with 1
ATF.(36)
The Royal Australian Navy personnel in Vietnam totalled 2800. As
far as possible RAN forces were directed to operate in cooperation
with 1 ATF in Phuoc Tuy Province, consistent with the concept of
having an Australian sphere of influence. Whilst operational command
was reserved for COMNAVFORV, the degree of integration with Australian
forces was maintained until the last RAN vessel, HMAS Sydney departed
from Vung Tau in February 1972.<br> <br>
Assessment of Australian Military, Operations
AATTV: Quite obviously if the general method of operations
practiced by Australian forces was significantly different to those
employed by US forces, then so to would the training techniques. The
AATTV, in instructing Vietnamese officers, often found themselves
contradicting or being contradicted by US advisers. In addition to
this, such was the social status acquired by being an officer in ARVN
that Junior officers were discouraged from humiliating their seniors
by learning more than they. Particularly if one trained junior officer
was expected to serve under an untrained (by AATTV or others) senior
officer.(37) AATTV advisers serving with Montegnard units found that
ethnic rivalry between Montegnards and the Vietnamese often resulted
in 'no shoot' a greements being made with the NLF and VC forces
entering Vietnam via Laos or Cambodia. Peterson's Montegnard Special
Forces at one stage in 1964 even rebelled, marching on ARVN forces in
Ban Me Thout.(38)
AATTV operations under COMMACV were quite successful. There were
few problems in the actual command system, save that their were
disagreements over methodology when it came to instruction. AATTV's
only real problems came from working with the ARVN forces , whom they
frequently found to be unenthusiastic, lazy and often corrupt.
1 RAR and US 173rd Abn Bde: There were again general differences
of opinion between these two units as to the conduct of operations.
The Airborne Brigade was designed for large deployments and heavy
firepower whereas 1 RAR, even though restructured to suit the American
style, with its COIN experience in Malaya operating individually from
larger units was unfamiliar and uncomfortable with these type of
tactics.(39) One such example of this was 1 RAR's training with
helicopters. In Malaya, up to 4 helicopters, primarily for medevac
purposes, was all a company could expect or need. There was no
requirement for the calling of air strikes and little for artillery
strikes. Yet at Bien Hoa, the latter of these two were frequently
practiced, due to the number of enemy being engaged, and up to 40
helicopters were effectively at the disposal of the battalion.(40)
Unlike subsequent Australian forces, there was little association with
ARVN forces and no reliance on them.
Australian Task Force: 1ATF met with mixed successes during its
five years in Phuoc Tuy. Initially, 5 & 6 RAR encountered large scale
opposition and attempted to combat NLF political structure. Given the
limitations under which 1 ATF worked (poor equipment, ambiguous
objectives and unfamiliar combat environment), it could be asserted
that it was quite successful in doing this.(41) Long Tan and the
subsequent follow up missions severely damaged NLF main force units in
the region, however, it is was apparent that the relative speed with
which the NLF reasserted itself in the years of ATF's withdrawal
indicates the failure to win the hearts and minds of the people, a
tactic essential to the defeat of communist terrorists in Malaya and
Borneo.
The increase in size of 1 ATF in November 1967 introduced new
problems and new challenges to the Australians. From January, 1 ATF
operated in engagements outside of Phuoc Tuy. These were again large
scale operations and required some degree of integratio n with
American forces. Similar problems to those experienced by 1 RAR in
1965 were encountered, somewhat lessened in effect by the larger size
of 1 ATF (two battalions were distributed through three bases;
Balmoral, Coogee and Coral) and its increased independence from ll FFV
HQ. The defence of Bien Hoa during the TET offensive in February 1968
was successful in so far as 1 ATF maintained a relatively high enemy
body count and weren't themselves overrun. However, the nature of the
war was such that victories in large scale battle counted for little.
It was hoped that 1 ATF could secure a credible victory in Phuoc Tuy,
one similar in nature to Australia's military experience in Malaya,
where the enemy was totally wiped out, the people supportive of the
Australian presence and the province safe from subversion. an effect,
a lasting and significant impact on the province, culminating in the
battle of Binh Ba in June 1969. 1 ATF returned to Phuoc Tuy, after
several redeployments to Bien Hoa, and engaged in the third phase of
their operations, the pacification of Phuoc Tuy.(42)
This phase, from about mid-1969 to 1971, met with mixed success
also. Although carrying out operations which Australian troops were
more familiar with, the degree of success encountered was somewhat
less than expected. The reasons for this relative failure include not
only the ineptitude of ARVN forces, cooperation with whom was
essential in maintaining an allied presence in any given area, but
also several rather glaring deficiencies in Australian planning. An
ambitious project by Vincent in 1867 to cr eate a minefield barrier
from Dat Do to Phuoc Hai, described by Westmoreland as "imaginative",
had resulted in a substantial number of casualties (almost thirty) in
operations in the Long Hai hills in May 1969 and again by 8 RAR in
January 1970.(43) Whil st it may have been the responsibility of ARVN
forces to patrol the minefield, it was apparent that Vincent was
remiss in expecting them to do so. In addition to this, Larsen
identifies one major deficiency in the Australian civil aid program,
claiming t hat lack of coordination with local administration often
resulted in poor planning and inadequate maintenance of completed
projects.(44)
Quite clearly the major reason for the failure of 1 ATF to
complete a total victory in Phuoc Tuy was the lack of cooperation
between ARVN and 1 ATF and the failure of the civil aid program to win
the support of the populace away from the NLF. Australia's attempts to
train and equip RVN local units and their reluctance to allow these
units any significant participation in the pacification program,
coupled with the failure of these local units to perform adequately,
destined Phuoc Tuy to be returned to the influence of the NLF on the
ATF's withdrawal.
Conclusion
The Nixon (Guam) Doctrine announced in July 1969 and the British
decision to quit East Of Suez by 1971 led to a radical rethinking of
Australian defence and foreign policy in Southeast Asia. Consistent
with the withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam, Australia also
withdrew, the last Australian troops to leave being the AATTV. The
defeat of the Liberal-Country Party coalition government coincided
with this final withdrawal. Australia had spent ten years actively
involved in the conflict in Vietnam, s ending almost 47 000 men,
almost 500 of whom were killed and about 2 400 wounded. Australia paid
its own way through Vietnam, employed its own tactical methods,
adopted its own province and pursued its own political ends.
Australian's were noted to have h ated everybody, the truth of which
may lay under a mixture of racial prejudice and discontent at the
limitations they were placed under compared to the excesses of their
American allies.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Endnotes
1) p.8, Australia's Military Committment to Vietnam, Paper tabled in
accordance with the Prime Minister's Statement in the House of
Representatives on 13 May 1975.
2) p.1, Horner, D.M., Australian Higher Command in the Vietnam War,
Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No.40, Strategic and Defence
Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1986.
3) p.38, McNeill, I., "Australian Army Advisers: Perceptions of
Enemies and Allies", in Maddox, K., &, Wright, B., (eds), War:
Australia and Vietnam, Harper & Row, Sydney, 1987.
4) p.39, Ibid.
5) pp.35-36, McNeill, I., "Peterson and the Montegnards: An Episode in
the Vietnam War", Journal of the Australian War Memorial, Oct.1982,
No.1.
6) pp.56-58, McNeill, I., "Australian Army Advisers: Perceptions of
Enemies and Allies".
7) p.311, McNamara, E.G., "Australian Military Operations in Vietnam",
Journal of the Royal Institute for Defence Studies, Nov.1968, Vol.113,
No.652,.
8) p.30, Breen, R.J., "Problems of an Expeditionary Force - First
Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment, 1965", Defence Force
Journal, Sept/Oct.1986, No.25.
9) p.44, McNeill, I., "An Outline of Australian Military Involvement
in Vietnam: July 1962-December 1972", Australian Defence Force
Journal, Sept/Oct. 1986, No.1.
10) pp.30-32, Breen, R.J., op.cit.
11) p.312, McNamara, E.G., op.cit.
12) pp.60-61, Frost, F., "Australia's War in Vietnam: 1962-1972", in
King, P., (ed), Australia's Vietnam: Australia in the Second
Indo-China War, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1983.
13) p.62, Ibid.,
14) p.45, McNeill, I.., ., "An Outline of Australian Military
Involvement in Vietnam: July 1962-December 1972".
15) p.313, McNamara, E.G., "Australian Military Operations in
Vietnam".
16) p.61, Brodie, S., Tilting at Dominoes: Australia and the Vietnam
War, Child & Assoc., Brookvale, 1987.
17) p.17, Fairfax, D., Navy in Vietnam: A Record of the Royal
Australian Navy in the Vietnam War 1965-1972, AGPS, Canberra, 1980.
18) p.7, McAuley, L., The Battle of Long Tan, the legend of ANZAC
upheld, Hutchinson, Hawthorn, 1986.
19) p.15, Horner, D.M., Australian Higher Command in the Vietnam War.
20) pp.64-65, Frost, F., "Australia's War in Vietnam: 1962-1972".
21) p.9, McAuley, L., The Battle of Long Tan, the legend of ANZAC
upheld.
22) p.314, McNamara, E.G., op.cit.
23) pp.31-32, Horner, D.M., op.cit.
24) p.314, McNamara, E.G., op.cit.
25) pp.34-35, Horner, D.M., op.cit.
26) p.50, McNeill, I., "An Outline of Australian Military Involvement
in Vietnam: July 1962-December 1972".
27) p.96, Larsen, R.L., &, Collins, J.L., Allied Participation in
Vietnam, Dept. of the Army, Washington D.C., 1975.
28) p.97-98, ibid.
29) pp.17-18, Fairfax, D., Navy in Vietnam: A Record of the Royal
Australian Navy in the Vietnam War 1965-1972.
30) pp103-105, ibid.,
31) pp.97-98, Larson, et.al, op.cit.
32) Fairfax, D., Navy in Vietnam: A Record of the Royal Australian
Navy in the Vietnam War 1965-1972.
33) Perhaps with the exception of air assault from USAF jets, Hobart
was struck by three missiles in June 1968, killing two and wounding
several. The fighters also attacked two patrol craft, sinking one.
34) pp.59-61, 85, Ibid.
35) pp.170-173, Vendetta used British ammunition which had to be
shipped from Sydney.
36) p.99, Larsen, et.al., op.cit.
37) pp.43-47, McNeill, I., "Australian Army Advisers: Perceptions of
Enemies and Allies".
38) pp.37-40, McNeill, I., "Peterson and the Montegnards: An Episode
in the Vietnam War".
39) pp.34-35, Breen, R.J., "Problems of an Expeditionary Force - First
Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment, 1965".
40) p.312, McNamara, E.G., op.cit.
41) pp.65-66, Frost, F., "Australia's War in Vietnam: 1962-1972".
42) pp.66-67, ibid.
43) pp.41-42, Horner, D.M., op.cit.
44) p.113, Larsen, et.al, op.cit.,
----------------------------------------------------------------------
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