DNSEXT IETF-55 WG mintues

[Ólafur Gudmundsson/DNSEXT co-chair]

IETF-55 Atlanta DNSEXT WG Minutes
Chair: Olafur Gudmundsson og...@ogud.com
Randy Bush (absent)
Note takers: Jun-ichiro itojun Hagino
Scott Rose
Date: 2002/November/19 13:00-14:00 EST (18:00-19:00 UTC)

Agenda Bash

WG document status
RFC editor: Restrict KEY, Roadmap, Obsolete IQuery
IESG: AD is secure, AXFR clarify, Unknown Types, DS
WG last call complete pending changes: Opcode Discover
WG last call: RFC1886bis, DNSSEC Opt-In, TKEY Renewal

GSSAPI and TSIG conflict:
DNSEXT wg generated TSIG RFC
DNSEXT wg processed gssapi TSIG
just before rfc editor started 48hour period we got a report
that there was a conflict between two the documents.
TSIG specifies that TSIG can only be used if original query
contains TSIG
GSSAPI specifies that last message in TKEY exchange has TSIG
last message is empty, and this proves the key negotiated is
working from security point of view this is a good thing

TSIG needs minor updates before advancing to draft standard:
is this extensions one of them?

The sense of the room was that this was a reasonable extensions and the
chair is instructed to take this question to the mailing list.

RFC1886/AAAAbis Vladimir Ksinant presenting
RFC 1886 Update:
goal: push AAAA to draft standard
tests done in July '02
Results:
minor changes in 1886 needed
Status of draft: 00 in Sept, now -01 in Oct.
Now in WG last call - comment now please.

dnssec protocol changes
opt-in David Blacka
03 to 04: editorial
02 to 03:
interaction with wild-cards clarification
ad-bit clarification
validation process changes made more explicit

increases code complexity
2 independent code exists
decreased cost in big registries (signing/whatever)
way NXDOMAIN works in presence of DS and opt-in
how NXDOMAIN change affect application?

There was a comment that security section needs stronger language,
Clearly list the need for zone transfer protection and risk from zone
hijacking of opt-outed delegations.
Authors agreed examine if the current text is insufficient .

Opt-in issues: Rob Austein
opinions about OPT-IN from a study done by Rob and Roy A. -
1. Corner cases are actually DNSSEC issues, not OPT-in specific.
2. DNSSEC pushes a change to the cache algorithm that is
considered standard in DNS today. You have to keep things
together under query names now in order to build auth chain.
Especially when NXT RRs are involved.
3. OPT IN does make the code more complex - resolvers have to
be more intelligent now.
4. No workshop experience dealing with OPT-IN. That would be
nice, since DS has shown problems.
5. It seems to help large delegation heavy zones, but not resolvers.
6. From a technical (coding) viewpoint: the costs are larger
than the benefits. However, higher, operational interests may
rule the day.

Mark Kosters stated there are 2 independent implementations of opt-in
authorative server code. and 2 "independent" implementations of
resolver, both done by the same person in two different code bases.
There where some discussion on if Opt-in is delaying or enabling the
roll-out of DNSSEC. All the speakers stressed the need for some kind of
DNSSEC Real Soon Now.

DS status Olafur Gudmundsson
Implementations:
1 resolver (or 2)
2 server implementation
3 different management tools in development
3 workshops since Yokohama

3 under specified corner cases found
- need to specify what child server returns for DS query at apex
parent not found
- if child is served by the same server as ancestor other
than parent
- RFC2535 capable caches have problem with DS
are there more undiscovered?

one more document update to deal with ancestor problem
solution: resolver detects this from authority section and
asks for delegation information on parent nameservers and then
asks them the question.

TIME TO DECIDE if DS goes forward, is close.

There's no way to determine if all relays are DS capable, does this
require flag to state if DNS entity is DS aware?
Discussion addressed the problems experienced with DNSSEC failing due
to middle boxes that do not understand DNSSEC types or DS processing.
Is it acceptable during deployment to not be able to do DNSSEC
resolution, or should DNSSEC require "clear path"?
The sense of the room was that broken middle-boxes need to be updated
and as long as DNSSEC answers are not messing up middle boxes it is
acceptable to be only able to do DNSSEC resolution in places where
resolvers can talk directly to authorative servers.

KS flag in KEY: Olaf Kolkman
version 03 of draft.
Using a bit in the flags of the KEY record to denote a Key signing
key. No protocol value assigned, for user/operator use only.
Going to WG last call.

Wild-card optimization: Olaf Kolkman
assumption: one needs proof for non-existence of a wild-cards
the proof is to be supplied in the common case where there is
no wild-card in a zone that proof is complicated and somewhat
expensive in terms of computational resources and packet size
is there a way to signal that there is no wild-card in a zone?

proposal:
use a bit in the NXT RR's type bitmap to signal non-existence
of wild-cards
the meaning:
there is no wild-card expansion possible of any name in the
zone's namespace spanned by a NXT RR simplest algorithm to set
the bit turn it on on all NXT RRs in the zone if there are no
wild-cards in the zone turn it off on all NXT RRs in the zone
if there is any wild-card in the zone

pro:
shortcut to a simple and fast code path for server and resolver
smaller footprint
con:
bypassed in the common case, the complicated verification code
is still needed RR type code without RR backward incompatible

current version of doc
the suggested algorithm for setting the bit contain an error
clarifications are needed

what's next
update the draft
does the working group think this is a sane path
dnssec protocol specs need to describe algorithm for denial of
authentication of wild-cards
if not, resolver implementers will do it wrong
no need for more than 2 NXT RRs?

if it makes things more complicated, object.
There where some questions about savings on the wire (about 150 bytes
in the common case). Requires more code, not a lot in resolvers, some
in servers, a lot in signers.
Take issues to the mailing list.

Domain Name Auto Registration for plugged in IPv6 nodes: Hiroshi Kitamura
This document is in a need of home for working group review is
DNSEXT the right home ?
The DNSEXT chairs have suggested advancing the document either
as informational or experimental RFC. Authors would like a
working group last call for that status.
Erik Nordmark commented that he thinks Experimental is a better status
for this as it might be promoted to standards track if it
becomes widely used.
After author updates document chair is to start working group last
call.

End of meeting.

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