Chomsky Bashing - If your talking the talk...then walk the walk
Siggy
backroom pork-barreling involved, that results in our politicians becoming
self-serving, corrupt bastards.............Geez...on the other hand maybe I
do......Hmmmm...
While I am a staunch supporter of democratic society, I do not support the
basic concept of Capitalism: "self-servitude
at the expense of everyone else in my society". As a result, I am generally
supportive of Chomsky's arguments (so far). My signature quote
pretty much summer it up.
My question to all of the Chomsky bashers out there.....Is.....
|You consistantly say that Chomsky only quotes facts and figures (you admit
that much) that support his arguments and that he -does not-
|quote facts or figures that do not support his arguments.........BUT,
you NEVER actually provide any of these facts or figures that he is
|supposedly ignoring ????
|What the hell is going on here ? If your going to say that he is ignoring
"stuff", then have the balls to cough it up and provide the goods.
|Otherwise...shut up and go away....... instead of spewing spam.
Go cludge up another newsgroup, like
alt.idiot.masturbatingwithlotsoftimeononeshands
Don't get me wrong here. If you've got the goods, I want to see (read) it,
so I can balance my opinions with both sides of the coins so to speak. But
if your going to talk the talk, then walk the walk. And when You do it,
please let me know who you work for, so I can temper your
facts/opinions/sources with your self-interest.
--
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Regards........Siggy ~Velox~Versutus~Vigilans~
~The behaviour of the US is perfectly consistent. They have
always thought it ok to support brutal murdering dictators,
so long as they are killing "the right people". bin Laden
made the mistake of starting to kill "the wrong people".
~It's all very
simple, really. -Author Unknown-
TVsHenry
___________________________________________
"What lesson did you hope to teach us by your coward's attack on our World
Trade Center, our Pentagon, us? What was it you hoped we would learn? Whatever
it was, please know that you failed." - Leonard Pitts
Russil Wvong
> My question to all of the Chomsky bashers out there.....Is.....
>
> |You consistantly say that Chomsky only quotes facts and figures (you admit
> that much) that support his arguments and that he -does not-
> |quote facts or figures that do not support his arguments.........BUT,
> you NEVER actually provide any of these facts or figures that he is
> |supposedly ignoring ????
> Don't get me wrong here. If you've got the goods, I want to see (read) it,
> so I can balance my opinions with both sides of the coins so to speak. But
> if your going to talk the talk, then walk the walk. And when You do it,
> please let me know who you work for, so I can temper your
> facts/opinions/sources with your self-interest.
I've written up a critical review of Chomsky's political writings, at
http://www.geocities.com/rwvong/future/chomsky.html
If you want to check who I work for, my resume is on my website:
http://www.geocities.com/rwvong/resume.txt
Here's a question for you, as someone generally supportive of Chomsky's
views: what other books on world history have you read?
Russil Wvong
Vancouver, Canada
www.geocities.com/rwvong
Siggy
Siggy
"TVsHenry" <tvsh...@aol.comtele> wrote in message
news:20020112011414...@mb-mu.aol.com...
TVsHenry
>From: "Siggy" nospamr...@home.com
>Date: 1/12/02 1:14 PM Eastern Standard Time
>Message-id: <u2%%7.3251$bR2.1...@news3.calgary.shaw.ca>
Well, that's not true... it seems you are choosing to ignore the plethora of
links (some placed by me) that answer your questin.
Siggy
I'll check it out this weekend.
I have focused on Canadian history as an adult. A by-product of the very
poor coverage of Canadian history in our school system.
and just recently have begung to really, really explore world events.
I read John Raulston Saul's Voltaire's Bastards and that hooked me. So
far....I do not buy the globalization thing, I have little faith in
politicians, particularly at a federal level and I lean to socialist values.
While I truly believe in the democratic system, capitalism screws it all
up. I like the Scandinavian area's concept.....high taxes, but god dam
it......you actually get something for your money in society...throughout
your life.
I truley believe that if Democratic (capitalist) politicians stopped
raping the tax barrel and conducted themselves with integrity and avoided
patrionage and sleeping with big business, etc....we in Canada and the US
would be able to pay lower tax rates or pay into a system that would truly
benefit us in our retirement years.
That's where I stand and I'm looking to improve my knowledge. Right know
for me, Chomsky is not just a raving loonatic and I do not accept countries
that roam the world stomping on the little guy in the sole name of economic
interests.
It was not right for England, France or Portugal to do it two hundred
years ago....what makes it right for America now ? In each case, their
individual and collective "interferance" in other countries affairs has come
back to bite them in the ass.
Anyways, I'm starting to rant. I'll check out your paper; Thanx
again.
Regards.... Siggy (I work for the government. As such I try not to leave
a -really- obvious identity trail)
--------
"Russil Wvong" <russi...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:afe9ed76.02011...@posting.google.com...
Siggy
of
> links (some placed by me) that answer your questin.
> ___________________________________________
I will endevor to check some of them out.
Siggy
Nark
> > My question to all of the Chomsky bashers out there.....Is.....
> >
> > |You consistantly say that Chomsky only quotes facts and figures (you
admit
> > that much) that support his arguments and that he -does not-
> > |quote facts or figures that do not support his arguments.........BUT,
> > you NEVER actually provide any of these facts or figures that he is
> > |supposedly ignoring ????
> > ...
> > Don't get me wrong here. If you've got the goods, I want to see (read)
it,
> > so I can balance my opinions with both sides of the coins so to speak.
But
> > if your going to talk the talk, then walk the walk. And when You do it,
> > please let me know who you work for, so I can temper your
> > facts/opinions/sources with your self-interest.
>
> I've written up a critical review of Chomsky's political writings, at
>
> http://www.geocities.com/rwvong/future/chomsky.html
You say, "The US is extremely prone to self-flattery and self-deception in
thinking of itself as the virtuous champion of democracy and human rights
everywhere, and in believing that its moral principles are universal
principles which can be applied everywhere. "
If the US is not the "champion of democracy and human rights", who is?
Why can't "its moral principles" including; right to pursue happiness, the
bill of rights, all men are created equal, etc ",...be applied everywhere"?
Real name
> If the US is not the "champion of democracy and human rights", who is?
Actually, the US fails on several tests of human and democratic rights,
domestically-speaking.
The death penalty is invoked in no other G8 country that I can think of
except China. Only Russia has (and for a time, South Africa had) a
higher incarceration rate. Racist, hate and violent crimes in the US are
at levels approx. those of the worst, most depressed UK urban/industrial
zones but extended over the whole country (and crime rates in NY or LA,
for example, far exceed those of, say, Mexico City). Needless to say,
repression of crime and police brutality is notorious in those cities.
Internationally, very few countries act as often as the US in ostensible
defense of democratic rights, but I'm hard-pressed to think of a case
where the US acted (post WW II) to defend a democratic institution
abroad that was threatened with being deposed (unlike, say, those cases
where the US assassinated or deposed democrats). More often US foreign
policy was expedient. Maybe Grenada qualifies as a democratic
intervention. Vietnam? Nah. Korea, sort of.
In WW II, of course, the Americans were late. Waited until they were
attacked themselves and had no choice but to engage. I believe the
romantic notion of a "champion" requires rushing to the fore of the
battle, Nark.
I'd say (off-hand) that post-war Germany, France, Canada, the
Netherlands and Sweden are better defenders of democracy and human
rights abroad than the US, and, per capita, contribute more to
democratic order and human rights. All of those countries provide more
(except Germany, by law) peace-keepers per capita than the US.
The US could begin, perhaps, by paying its UN dues. Then perhaps stop
executing its criminals (kind of a basic human right, that right to
life, don't you know).
Still, the US does a lot of the world's dirty work, and for that we are
grateful. But don't be too quick with this "champion of democracy"
business. That's for domestic consumption, only. It doesn't sell
overseas.
Nark
"Real name" <real...@nowhere.com> wrote in message
news:realname-EEDE9B...@clgrps11.telusplanet.net...
> "Nark" <bar...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > If the US is not the "champion of democracy and human rights", who is?
>
> Actually, the US fails on several tests of human and democratic rights,
> domestically-speaking.
>
> The death penalty is invoked in no other G8 country that I can think of
> except China.
This is a subjective matter. While I am personally against the death
penalty, I do understand the position of the other side quite well. The
question is; is life in prison any better than death for some people?
Again, it's subjective. What you think is cruel others may see as an easy
way out. I personally am against the death penalty because I want to see
hardcore criminals serve their time.
> Only Russia has (and for a time, South Africa had) a
> higher incarceration rate.
Are we talking human rights or criminal rights? Are you suggesting that
putting criminals in prison is wrong? You may be too extreme in your
ideology to be able to talk about mainstream policy.
> Racist, hate and violent crimes in the US are
> at levels approx. those of the worst, most depressed UK urban/industrial
> zones but extended over the whole country (and crime rates in NY or LA,
> for example, far exceed those of, say, Mexico City).
Your information is bogus. Have you been to Mexico City? I feel safe in NY
but far from it in MC. Understand that compilation of statistics is much
better here than in most of the rest of the world, where 10 bucks gets you
off of all but the most severe crimes, on the spot. Besides, I'm not sure
that I can accept your thesis that crime is a human rights violation by the
government.
> Needless to say,
> repression of crime and police brutality is notorious in those cities.
Only by the highest standard. Police brutality is commonplace worldwide.
>
> Internationally, very few countries act as often as the US in ostensible
> defense of democratic rights, but I'm hard-pressed to think of a case
> where the US acted (post WW II) to defend a democratic institution
> abroad that was threatened with being deposed (unlike, say, those cases
> where the US assassinated or deposed democrats). More often US foreign
> policy was expedient. Maybe Grenada qualifies as a democratic
> intervention. Vietnam? Nah. Korea, sort of.
Okay. Maybe so. But I don't think that is what we're talking about. Let's
go back to my statement.
> > If the US is not the "champion of democracy and human rights", who is?
So, who is?
>
> In WW II, of course, the Americans were late. Waited until they were
> attacked themselves and had no choice but to engage. I believe the
> romantic notion of a "champion" requires rushing to the fore of the
> battle, Nark.
Again. If the US isn't, who is? Maybe the US doesn't intervene in EVERY
action. But who intervenes more often than the US? Who is the leader?
>
> I'd say (off-hand) that post-war Germany, France, Canada, the
> Netherlands and Sweden are better defenders of democracy and human
> rights abroad than the US,
Can you substantiate this unfounded claim?
> and, per capita, contribute more to
> democratic order and human rights.
Again. Where do you get your information? Not that it matters, because the
bottom line is that, in terms of contributions, NONE of these countries
comes close to the US in gross terms.
If you have a sovereign nation with a population of 100 people and your per
capita contributions to these causes is $100, does that make you the
Champion of human rights for the world if the US with 300 million people was
at $99? Think about it.
I think we've proven our generosity in terms of foreign aid time and time
again.
>All of those countries provide more
> (except Germany, by law) peace-keepers per capita than the US.
Assuming your statistics are accurate (but I would like a source), it again
goes to the previous statement by me. It is much easier to provide services
to a smaller sample. Yet people around the world look to the US as a place
they dream of living.
>
> The US could begin, perhaps, by paying its UN dues.
Again, nothing to do with democracy or human rights. There is an opposing
position that is valid and wholeheartedly against feeding the UN.
>
> Still, the US does a lot of the world's dirty work,
Exactly.
> and for that we are
> grateful. But don't be too quick with this "champion of democracy"
> business.
SO, who is if not the US.
Matthew Healey
Nark wrote:
>
> "Real name" <real...@nowhere.com> wrote in message
SNIP
>
> Exactly.
>
> > and for that we are
> > grateful. But don't be too quick with this "champion of democracy"
> > business.
>
> SO, who is if not the US.
"US as Champion of Democracy". In a democracy isn't it the case that
'who the ppl vote for is the leader' etcetc. From what I saw the last
attempt at democratic elections in the US, if they had taken place
elsewhere, would have had people calling for independant observers.
Also in the US dont business/corporations give donations/cash to
political parties under the, perhaps not explicit, assumptions that they
will serve their interests ectetc (am I wrong?). I didn't realise that
corporations interests were the same as those of the people.
Anyways how do you actually exercise a democratic choice in the US when
you have really only have two parties who appear to me be differing very
little in terms of political ideology.
I suppose at least the US media sells the illusion of freedom and
democracy.
matt
:p
Russil Wvong
> You say, "The US is extremely prone to self-flattery and self-deception in
> thinking of itself as the virtuous champion of democracy and human rights
> everywhere, and in believing that its moral principles are universal
> principles which can be applied everywhere. "
>
> If the US is not the "champion of democracy and human rights", who is?
The US certainly advocates democracy and human rights (more strongly
than any other country I can think of), but it hasn't done so
*everywhere*. The strongest evidence for US championship of democracy
is in West Germany and Japan, where the US was able to help ensure that
Germany and Japan would become stable, functioning democracies. In the
Middle East, on the other hand, the two pillars of US foreign policy
were Iran (under the Shah) and Saudi Arabia. In Asia, Taiwan and
South Korea were dictatorships for many years; Singapore is still a
one-party state. In Latin America, US foreign policy was more concerned
with stability than with democracy or human rights.
I wouldn't say that democracy and human rights aren't important to the
US. Obviously they are. But I would say that they're a secondary
concern; *stability* is more important to US foreign policy. (IMHO,
rightly so. In the nuclear age, instability in international politics
would be disastrous.)
> Why can't "its moral principles" including; right to pursue happiness, the
> bill of rights, all men are created equal, etc ",...be applied everywhere"?
In a society where people lack food and security, the appeal of these
moral principles is going to be limited.
To quote Hans Morgenthau, discussing the failure of US ideals to appeal
to the people of China and Vietnam ("Politics Among Nations"):
Assured as we are, by and large, of the protection of our lives from
the vicissitudes of death through violence or lack of food and
shelter, we are taking the satisfaction of these biological needs
for granted. Having taken care in good measure of the protection of
life, we concentrate our thoughts and efforts upon the preservation
of liberty and the pursuit of happiness. This being naturally so with
us, we erect this limited experience, subject to the conditions of
time and space, into a universal principle that claims to be valid
everywhere and at all times. Thus we tend to assume, at least by
implication, that what we are allowed to take for granted all men can
take for granted, and that what we are striving for is the object of
the aspirations of all mankind.
Personally, I think it's more important for the US to maintain the
stability of the international status quo, and to provide an *example*
of a successful, stable, prosperous democracy, than to try to impose
its political philosophy everywhere. And there's certainly problems
(like campaign finance reform and political apathy) to be dealt with.
Russil Wvong
You're welcome. I'd like to know what you think.
> I have focused on Canadian history as an adult. A by-product of the very
> poor coverage of Canadian history in our school system.
> and just recently have begung to really, really explore world events.
> I read John Raulston Saul's Voltaire's Bastards and that hooked me. So
> far....I do not buy the globalization thing, I have little faith in
> politicians, particularly at a federal level and I lean to socialist values.
My suggestion would be to start by reading "The Rise and Fall of the
Great Powers", by Paul Kennedy. It's long, but well worth it. It
gives you the big picture, which you definitely need to put Chomsky
into perspective.
With respect to Canadian history, the best history of Canada that
I've seen is "A Brief History of Canada", by Roger Riendeau.
> I truley believe that if Democratic (capitalist) politicians stopped
> raping the tax barrel and conducted themselves with integrity and avoided
> patrionage and sleeping with big business, etc....we in Canada and the US
> would be able to pay lower tax rates or pay into a system that would truly
> benefit us in our retirement years.
It's a little ironic that I have more faith in politicians than you
do, considering that you work for the government. For a thoughtful
discussion of the Canadian welfare state, see "Retooling the Welfare
State", by John Richards.
> That's where I stand and I'm looking to improve my knowledge. Right know
> for me, Chomsky is not just a raving loonatic and I do not accept countries
> that roam the world stomping on the little guy in the sole name of economic
> interests.
That's not what the US does. The US tries to maintain the international
status quo. This belief that international politics is driven by economic
interests is a myth. (For more detailed discussion, see Hans Morgenthau,
"Politics Among Nations".)
If you're seriously interested in learning about world events, I hope
you're prepared to do a lot of reading (and not just Chomsky's books).
So far I haven't seen much evidence of this among Chomsky's followers.
Russil Wvong
> Internationally, very few countries act as often as the US in ostensible
> defense of democratic rights, but I'm hard-pressed to think of a case
> where the US acted (post WW II) to defend a democratic institution
> abroad that was threatened with being deposed (unlike, say, those cases
> where the US assassinated or deposed democrats). More often US foreign
> policy was expedient. Maybe Grenada qualifies as a democratic
> intervention. Vietnam? Nah. Korea, sort of.
When you say "act", are you thinking only of going to war? Because
NATO and the US-Japan alliance -- the cornerstones of US foreign
policy during the Cold War -- were clearly intended to defend
Western Europe and Japan against the Soviet Union. A more recent
example that comes to mind is the US response to China's threats
against Taiwan.
> In WW II, of course, the Americans were late. Waited until they were
> attacked themselves and had no choice but to engage. I believe the
> romantic notion of a "champion" requires rushing to the fore of the
> battle, Nark.
I think that's a fair comment, although the US was already providing
a great deal of support to the Allies through the Lend-Lease program.
In retrospect, it seems crazy for Japan to have attacked the US. So
why did they? Hans Morgenthau, "Politics Among Nations", discussing
the importance of prestige:
At the outbreak of the Second World War, the United States was
already potentially the most powerful nation on earth, and it had
openly declared its opposition to the imperialism of Germany and
Japan. Nevertheless, Germany and Japan proceeded very much as
though the United States as a first-rate power did not exist at
all. The significance of the attack on Pearl Harbor in view of
this discussion lies in the implied expression of contempt for
the military strength of the United States. The reputation for
power of the United States--that is, its prestige--was so low
that Japan could base its war plans upon the assumption that
American military strength would not recover from the blow of
Pearl Harbor in time to influence the outcome of the war. American
prestige was so low that Germany and Italy, instead of trying to
keep the United States out of the European war, seemed almost eager
to bring it in by declaring war against it on December 10, 1941.
Hitler is quoted as having declared in 1934: "The American is no
soldier. The inferiority and decadence of this allegedly New World
is evident in its military inefficiency."
So enormous a deprecation was primarily due to what can almost be
called the absence of an American policy of prestige in so far as
reputation for military power is concerned. Far from demonstrating
to the other nations what the human and material potentialities of
the United States could mean in terms of military power, the United
States seemed almost anxious to prove to the world its unwillingness,
if not inability, to transform these enormous potentialities into
actual instruments of war. Thus the United States invited neglect
and attack from its enemies, failure for its policies, mortal danger
to its vital interests.
> I'd say (off-hand) that post-war Germany, France, Canada, the
> Netherlands and Sweden are better defenders of democracy and human
> rights abroad than the US, and, per capita, contribute more to
> democratic order and human rights. All of those countries provide more
> (except Germany, by law) peace-keepers per capita than the US.
Also a fair comment, although I would point out that it's impossible
for these countries to carry out significant peacekeeping operations
(e.g. during the Balkan wars) without US logistics.
> Still, the US does a lot of the world's dirty work, and for that we are
> grateful. But don't be too quick with this "champion of democracy"
> business. That's for domestic consumption, only. It doesn't sell
> overseas.
More importantly, the stability of the entire international order
depends on the US. With the Soviet Union out of the picture, it's
easy to forget that, but I'd hate to see the results of a conflict
between China and Japan, for example, without the US to maintain
the balance of power.
UnclePete
>interests is a myth.
A strange myth, that happens to be true.
So what else is driving international politics? Peace, love and happiness??
Skipping your history lesson, weren't you?
UnclePete
>If the US is not the "champion of democracy and human rights", who is?
Who says, anybody has to be? But anyway, you are talking about a country
where only 4 decades ago there was segregation???
>Why can't "its moral principles" including; right to pursue happiness, the
>bill of rights, all men are created equal,
Yeah it took almost 200 years to get that dream ( and they left out women)
become true.
>etc ",...be applied everywhere"?
Who says it should be?
TVsHenry
>Date: 1/13/02 10:09 PM Eastern Standard Time
>Message-id: <20020113220941...@mb-ci.aol.com>
>
>>Nark:
>>If the US is not the "champion of democracy and human rights", who is?
>
> Who says, anybody has to be? But anyway, you are talking about a country
>where only 4 decades ago there was segregation???
>
Kinda changing the subject aren't we?
>>Why can't "its moral principles" including; right to pursue happiness, the
>>bill of rights, all men are created equal,
>
> Yeah it took almost 200 years to get that dream ( and they left out women)
>become true.
>
>>etc ",...be applied everywhere"?
>
> Who says it should be?
>
Russil Wvong
> "US as Champion of Democracy". In a democracy isn't it the case that
> 'who the ppl vote for is the leader' etcetc. From what I saw the last
> attempt at democratic elections in the US, if they had taken place
> elsewhere, would have had people calling for independant observers.
Fair enough, although I think this was an unusual case.
Where the naive US view has some basis in fact is that the US *has*
fought for democracy against totalitarianism, and made the difference
between winning and losing, in two out of three of the great and
terrible conflicts of the 20th century: World War II and the Cold War.
(World War I wasn't about democracy, as far as I can tell.)
But the US view of itself as the *virtuous* champion of democracy and
human rights *everywhere* is overstating its case. No country with a
long history can claim to have shown virtue at all times (think of
the war with Mexico, for example, or the war with Spain).
> Also in the US dont business/corporations give donations/cash to
> political parties under the, perhaps not explicit, assumptions that they
> will serve their interests ectetc (am I wrong?). I didn't realise that
> corporations interests were the same as those of the people.
Yes, campaign finance reform is a big issue (and it's hard to get
people to pay attention). That was one of John McCain's major
platform issues.
> Anyways how do you actually exercise a democratic choice in the US when
> you have really only have two parties who appear to me be differing very
> little in terms of political ideology.
Oh, they're pretty different. Check out Paul Krugman's columns in
the New York Times (archived at www.pkarchive.org) for some very
harsh criticism of George Bush's domestic fiscal policy.
I think a more serious problem is that television, by its very nature,
emphasizes *personality* over *issues*, and gives a very simplified
view of the issues (which are usually extremely complex). I'm hopeful
that the Internet may help to balance this a bit. Cyrus Vance (former
secretary of state) just died, and I learned that one of the things he
did was set up a voter-education organization called Public Agenda.
It's got a website, of course, www.publicagenda.org, which is worth
checking out. Here's what it has to say about foreign policy:
http://www.publicagenda.org/issues/overview.cfm?issue_type=americas_global_role
Russil Wvong
> Russil Wvong wrote:
> >This belief that international politics is driven by economic
> >interests is a myth.
>
> A strange myth, that happens to be true.
> So what else is driving international politics? Peace, love and happiness??
Threats to security. Specifically, we live in an anarchic world, in
which the major restraint on states is the balance of power. Typically,
when a major power attempts to overthrow the status quo (e.g. France
under Napoleon, Nazi Germany under Hitler), the other powers form
a coalition against it.
Or, to put it into a soundbite:
International politics is driven by fear, not greed.
> Skipping your history lesson, weren't you?
You seem very sure of your beliefs, so I'm not sure it'll do much good
for me to try to explain why this is a myth. But I suppose I should try.
Also, if you don't mind my asking, what books on world history have
you read, besides Chomsky's? What are you basing your views on?
Hans Morgenthau refutes economic explanations of international politics
In Chapter 5 of "Politics Among Nations" (1948, 6th edition 1985).
Regarding why people believe in the myth, he has this to say:
What Professor Schumpeter has said of the Marxist theory of
imperialism holds generally true: "A series of vital facts of our
time seems to be perfectly accounted for. The whole maze of
international politics seems to be cleared up by a single powerful
stroke of analysis." The mystery of so threatening, inhuman, and
often murderous a historic force as imperialism, the theoretical
problem of defining it as a distinctive type of international
politics, the practical difficulty, above all, of recognizing it
in a concrete situation and of counteracting it with adequate
means--all this is reduced to either the inherent tendencies or
the abuses of the capitalist system. Whenever the phenomenon of
imperialism presents itself for either theoretical understanding
or practical action, the simple scheme will provide an almost
automatic answer that puts the mind at ease.
So what's wrong with the theory?
All economic explanations of imperialism, the refined as well as
the primitive, fail the test of historic experience. The economic
interpretation of imperialism erects a limited historic
experience, based on a few isolated cases, into a universal law of
history. It is indeed true that in the late nineteenth and
twentieth centuries a small number of wars were waged primarily,
if not exclusively, for economic objectives. The classic examples
are the Boer War of 1899-1902 and the Chaco War between Bolivia
and Paraguay from 1932-35. The main responsibility of British
mining interests for the Boer War can hardly be doubted. The Chaco
War is considered by some to have been primarily a war between two
oil companies for the control of oil fields.
But during the entire period of mature capitalism, no war, with
the exception of the Boer War, was waged by major powers
exclusively or even predominately for economic objectives. The
Austro-Prussian War of 1866 and the Franco-German War of 1870, for
instance, had no economic objectives of any importance. They were
political wars, indeed imperialistic wars, fought for the purpose
of establishing a new distribution of power, first in favor of
Prussia within Germany and then in favor of Germany within the
European state system. The Crimean War of 1854-56, the
Spanish-American War of 1898, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05,
the Turko-Italian War of 1911-12, and the several Balkan Wars show
economic objectives only in a subordinate role, if they show them
at all. The two world wars were certainly political wars, whose
stake was the domination of Europe, if not of the
world. Naturally, victory in these wars brought economic
advantages and, more particularly, defeat brought in its wake
economic losses. But these effects were not the real issue; they
were only by-products of the political consequences of victory and
defeat. Still less were these economic effects the motives that
determined in the minds of the responsible statesmen the issue of
war and peace.
The economic theories of imperialism are thus not supported by the
experience of that historic period which they suppose to be
intimately connected, if not identical, with imperialism; that is,
the period of capitalism. Furthermore, the main period of colonial
expansion which the economic theories tend to identify with
imperialism precedes the age of mature capitalism and cannot be
attributed to the inner contradictions of the decaying capitalist
system. In comparison with those of the sixteenth, seventeenth,
and eighteenth centuries, the colonial acquisitions of the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries are small. ...
[discussion of precapitalist empires] All these imperialisms of
precapitalist times share with those of the capitalist period the
tendency to overthrow the established power relations and put in
their stead the dominance of the imperialistic power. Yet those
two periods of imperalism also share the subordination of economic
objectives to political considerations. ... We have seen that
imperialism is not determined by economics, capitalist or
otherwise. We shall see now that capitalists per se are not
imperialists. According to the economic theories and, more
particularly, the "devil" theory, capitalists use governments as
their tools in instigating imperialistic policies. Yet the
investigation of historic instances cited in support of the
economic interpretation shows that in most cases the reverse
relationship actually existed between statesmen and
capitalists. Imperialistic policies were generally conceived by
the governments who summoned the capitalists to support these
policies. Thus historic evidence points to the primacy of politics
over economics, and "the rule of the financier ... over
international politics" is indeed, in the words of Professor
Schumpeter, "A newspaper fairytale, almost ludicrously at variance
with fact." Yet, far from being the instigators, capitalists as a
group--aside from certain individual capitalists--were not even
enthusiastic supporters of imperialistic policies. The literature
and policies of the groups and political parties representing the
capitalist element in modern societies are a testimony to the
traditional opposition of the merchant and manufacturing classes
to any foreign policy that, like imperialism, might lead to
war. As Professor Viner has stated:
It was for the most part the middle classes who were the
supporters of pacificism, of internationalism, of
international conciliation and compromise of disputes, of
disarmament--in so far as these had supporters. It was for the
most part aristocrats, agrarians, often the urban working
classes, who were the expansionists, the imperialists, the
jingoes. In the British Parliament it was spokesmen for the
"moneyed interests," for the emerging middle classes in the
northern manufacturing districts and for the "City" in London,
who were the appeasers during the Napoleonic Wars, during the
Crimean War, during the Boer War, and during the period from
the rise of Hitler to the German invasion of Poland. In our
own country it was largely from business circles that the
important opposition came to the American Revolution, to the
War of 1812, to the imperialism of 1898, and to the anti-Nazi
policy of the Roosevelt administration prior to Pearl Harbor.
From Sir Andrew Freeport in the Spectator at the beginning of the
eighteenth century to Norman Angell's The Great Illusion in our
time, it has been the conviction of the capitalists as a class and
of most capitalists as individuals that "war does not pay," that
war is incompatible with an industrial society, that the interests
of capitalism require peace and not war. For only peace permits
those rational calculations upon which capitalist actions are
based. War carries with it an element of irrationality and chaos
which is alien to the very spirit of capitalism. Imperialism,
however, as the attempt to overthrow the existing power relations,
carries with it the inevitable risk of war. As a group then,
capitalists were opposed to war; they did not initiate, and only
supported with misgivings and under pressure, imperialistic
policies that might lead, and many times actually did lead, to
war.
For anyone interested in learning more about international politics
and world history, I'd highly recommend "Politics Among Nations",
by Hans Morgenthau, and "The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers",
by Paul Kennedy.
Russil Wvong
Vancouver, Canada
www.geocities.com/rwvong
UnclePete
>Threats to security.
You just made my point. One side's economic interest is the other side's
threat to its security.
But let's have an example. There are 2 neighbour contries with a huge
oilfield exactly on their borders. Obviously both country would like to have it
for themselves. So country A's interest in the oilfiled becomes a threat to
country B's security.
> Specifically, we live in an anarchic world,
It is not more anarchic than in the time when Crusaders killed Arabs in
Jerusalem.
>in
>which the major restraint on states is the balance of power.
In plain English there is balance when I am the king.(meaning the USA on the
top of the world) Unfortunatelly, there are people who are peasants (meaning
countries with less economic well being) thus from their point of view it is
not a balanced world. Only from the king's point of view.
>nt on states is the balance of power. Typically,
>when a major power attempts to overthrow the status quo
Like in the USA in Nicaragua, like the USA in Vietnam,etc??
> International politics is driven by fear, not greed.
Baloney. If everybody is affraid of everybody, who is the bad guy?
>You seem very sure of your beliefs
and they happen to be the facts. :)
>Also, if you don't mind my asking, what books on world history have
>you read,
There is only one history, although with many interpretations. :)
>What are you basing your views on?
It is called objectivity.
>Hans Morgenthau refutes economic explanations of international politics
1. Who the hell is he? And why should I care?
2. Petibacsi refutes Hans, so is it still a valid argument?
3. If I quote 5 guys who believe the same as I do, am I right?
How about using your own judgement?
You are basicly saying, that one nation attacks the other out of sheer fear?
Then how come that in history (the real one) there were wars where the attacked
nation was absolutelly not a danger for the attacker. Nevertheless they
attacked anyway....
Also when we are talking about wars generally, it would be a logical fallacy
to come up with only one reason why people go to war. Economic reasons are the
most common, but it doesn't mean there can not be other ones.
UnclePete
Segregation kind of has something to do with human rights and democracy. Me
think at least....
Russil Wvong
> Russil Wvong wrote:
>
> You just made my point. One side's economic interest is the other side's
> threat to its security.
I have to repeat my question:
> >... if you don't mind my asking, what books on world history have
> >you read?
I gave Hans Morgenthau's explanation, but I'm not sure if you read
it or not. Is Chomsky your only source of detailed information about
international politics?
> But let's have an example. There are 2 neighbour contries with a huge
> oilfield exactly on their borders. Obviously both country would like to
> have it for themselves. So country A's interest in the oilfiled becomes
> a threat to country B's security.
Sure -- although why doesn't country A just seize the oilfield, rather
than invading and occupying country B, and threatening country S,
suggesting the intention to overturn the entire status quo in the
region?
The Boer War was fought for economic reasons. But not World War II
or World War I or the Franco-Prussian War. And since the deployment
of nuclear weapons, economic explanations of international politics
make even less sense than before. Fear is much more powerful than
greed when you're talking about the possibility of total annihilation.
> > Specifically, we live in an anarchic world,
>
> It is not more anarchic than in the time when Crusaders killed Arabs in
> Jerusalem.
Correct. We've *always* lived in an anarchic world.
> >in
> >which the major restraint on states is the balance of power.
>
> In plain English there is balance when I am the king.(meaning the
> USA on the top of the world)
No, that's not what the balance of power refers to. I'll try to
explain.
1. The basic problem is the following: we have a number of individuals,
each with their own interests and values; there's wide variations in
power and wealth; many of them are heavily armed and belligerent.
How is it possible to prevent this situation from degenerating into
continuous warfare?
You can think of this as a society composed of individuals, or of
the entire world, composed of independent states.
2. There's three possible answers:
a. One answer is *conquest*. This is Thomas Hobbes's answer: you
need a sovereign ruler with a monopoly on force. The ruler
defines the laws of the society, and imprisons or kills anyone
who breaks them.
This works within a particular state, but it hasn't worked at the
international level since the fall of the Roman Empire. There's
no state that's powerful enough to conquer the rest of the world
(not even the US).
b. A second answer is *morality*. You just need to convince the
individuals to get along with each other.
This actually works reasonably well within countries such as
the US and Canada; there's enough of a shared value system to
allow people to trust each other and get along with each other,
based on laws, customs, and shared knowledge of what's considered
appropriate behavior.
But again, it isn't going to work at the international level.
We don't have a common value system; the value placed on human
life varies greatly from one society to another, for example.
And the international laws that do exist (such as laws against
indiscriminate killing of civilians) don't have effective
enforcement mechanisms. If a state decides that it's powerful
enough to flout the agreements that it's signed (e.g. Germany
under Hitler), nobody can do anything about it unless they're
willing to fight a war.
Maybe this'll change in the future, but I'm not holding my breath.
c. At the international level, the traditional answer to this problem
is the *balance of power*.
If one state becomes powerful enough to be a threat, other states
form an alliance against it. If there's a rough balance between
the forces on each side, enough to make it unclear which side would
win a war, then each side will be more cautious about starting
a war. When wars do occur, they're more likely to be limited,
since it's unlikely that a belligerent believes it possible to
completely overthrow the existing balance of power.
European history from 1500 onward is the history of successive
powers attempting to conquer all of Europe: first Spain, then
France, then Germany. In each case, Britain's foreign policy
was explicitly based on maintaining the balance of power (by
supporting whichever side was weaker), since British leaders
were aware that if any one state were to dominate all of Europe,
Britain wouldn't be able to resist alone.
> >Typically, when a major power attempts to overthrow the status quo
>
> Like in the USA in Nicaragua, like the USA in Vietnam,etc??
No. The US was seeking to maintain the status quo in Latin America
(namely US hegemony). Regarding Vietnam, and the Cold War in Asia,
if you're willing to do some reading, try the following article:
"Communist Bloc Expansion in the Early Cold War: Challenging Realism,
Refuting Revisionism," International Security (Winter 1995), by
Douglas Macdonald.
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/macdon.htm
If you're not willing to do any reading, I can't help you. :-)
> > International politics is driven by fear, not greed.
>
> Baloney. If everybody is affraid of everybody, who is the bad guy?
There is no bad guy. Everybody *is* afraid of everybody.
> >You seem very sure of your beliefs
>
> and they happen to be the facts. :)
No comment. :-)
> >Hans Morgenthau refutes economic explanations of international politics
>
> 1. Who the hell is he? And why should I care?
Just read his argument and use your own judgement. If you come up
with a refutation, fair enough. That's why I took the time to
quote his argument; I'm not using argument by authority.
> You are basicly saying, that one nation attacks the other out of
> sheer fear?
No. Sorry, I was describing conflicts between major powers. What
usually happens is that one or more powers seek to overthrow
the status quo. Others form a coalition against it, out of fear.
Who actually starts the war depends on the situation; either side
may attack first.
> Then how come that in history (the real one) there were
> wars where the attacked nation was absolutely not a danger for the
> attacker. Nevertheless they attacked anyway....
A major power surrounded by weak neighbors -- a power vacuum --
may very well attack its neighbors. That's been a common pattern
throughout history (e.g. the Roman Empire, the Arab expansion,
the Mongols, the British Empire, the settlement of the US).
> Also when we are talking about wars generally, it would be a logical
> fallacy to come up with only one reason why people go to war. Economic
> reasons are the most common, but it doesn't mean there can not be other
> ones.
The point of Morgenthau's argument is that economic reasons are *not*
the most common ones. (For anyone who missed the argument, I included
it in http://www.geocities.com/rwvong/future/chomsky.html.)
Why doesn't *anyone*, left or right, seem to know about the balance of
power? Do our schools do such a terrible job of teaching history?
Nark
"UnclePete" <petib...@aol.comic> wrote in message
news:20020113220941...@mb-ci.aol.com...
> >Nark:
> >If the US is not the "champion of democracy and human rights", who is?
>
> Who says, anybody has to be? But anyway, you are talking about a country
> where only 4 decades ago there was segregation???
That's why I used the word "IS" and not "WAS".
Present tense.
>
> >Why can't "its moral principles" including; right to pursue happiness,
the
> >bill of rights, all men are created equal,
>
> Yeah it took almost 200 years to get that dream ( and they left out
women)
> become true.
Okay. Again, we are talking about today.
>
> >etc ",...be applied everywhere"?
>
> Who says it should be?
>
Just people who want to be free. Those who seek enslavement probably have
it.
Nark
> > "US as Champion of Democracy". In a democracy isn't it the case that
> > 'who the ppl vote for is the leader' etcetc. From what I saw the last
> > attempt at democratic elections in the US, if they had taken place
> > elsewhere, would have had people calling for independant observers.
>
> Fair enough, although I think this was an unusual case.
>
> Where the naive US view has some basis in fact is that the US *has*
> fought for democracy against totalitarianism, and made the difference
> between winning and losing, in two out of three of the great and
> terrible conflicts of the 20th century: World War II and the Cold War.
> (World War I wasn't about democracy, as far as I can tell.)
>
> But the US view of itself as the *virtuous* champion of democracy and
> human rights *everywhere* is overstating its case.
First, what is your source that THE US VIEW of itself is what you say.
Yours may be the perspective of an overly defensive Canadian.
> No country with a
> long history can claim to have shown virtue at all times (think of
> the war with Mexico, for example, or the war with Spain).
Obviously. But to say that perfection in your eyes is even possible is
equally ridiculous.
>
> > Also in the US dont business/corporations give donations/cash to
> > political parties under the, perhaps not explicit, assumptions that they
> > will serve their interests ectetc (am I wrong?). I didn't realise that
> > corporations interests were the same as those of the people.
>
> Yes, campaign finance reform is a big issue (and it's hard to get
> people to pay attention). That was one of John McCain's major
> platform issues.
Point? Campaign finance reform is an attempt to stifle the political power
of the people, collectively speaking.
Nark
"Matthew Healey" <md...@nospam.student.canterbury.ac.nz> wrote in message
news:3C41ECD0...@nospam.student.canterbury.ac.nz...
>
>
> Nark wrote:
> >
> > "Real name" <real...@nowhere.com> wrote in message
>
> SNIP
>
> >
> > Exactly.
> >
> > > and for that we are
> > > grateful. But don't be too quick with this "champion of democracy"
> > > business.
> >
> > SO, who is if not the US.
>
> "US as Champion of Democracy". In a democracy isn't it the case that
> 'who the ppl vote for is the leader' etcetc. From what I saw the last
> attempt at democratic elections in the US, if they had taken place
> elsewhere, would have had people calling for independant observers.
Maybe so. But it didn't happen elsewhere.
>
> Also in the US dont business/corporations give donations/cash to
> political parties under the, perhaps not explicit, assumptions that they
> will serve their interests ectetc (am I wrong?).
Maybe so. But apparently even HUGE donations to powerful people can't gain
any help in preventing the collapse of a huge corporation, Enron. The
assumption of influence is not a safe one.
> I didn't realise that
> corporations interests were the same as those of the people.
Newsflash!: Corporations are owned and run by -- drumroll -- people.
>
> Anyways how do you actually exercise a democratic choice in the US when
> you have really only have two parties who appear to me be differing very
> little in terms of political ideology.
The differences are like night and day on many issues my friend. And there
are more parties to choose from.
>
> I suppose at least the US media sells the illusion of freedom and
> democracy.
>
In comparison to the rest of the world, we are the free'st. Nuff said.
Matthew Healey
Nark wrote:
>
> "Matthew Healey" <md...@nospam.student.canterbury.ac.nz> wrote in message
> news:3C41ECD0...@nospam.student.canterbury.ac.nz...
SNIP
> > I didn't realise that
> > corporations interests were the same as those of the people.
>
> Newsflash!: Corporations are owned and run by -- drumroll -- people.
This isn't an anticapitalist statement but (imho) a simple fact (I feel
you're just winding me up but I'll answer anyways): The interests of
corporations etc are not the interests of the average person. The
interests of shareholders is to make a return on their investment. When
corps. give cash to political organisations they want their interests
furthered ie to be in a position to further please their shareholders
interests. Govt is there to serve the interest all people. Not the
interests of corporations and their shareholders (which are often at
odds with the interests of the people).
> > Anyways how do you actually exercise a democratic choice in the US when
> > you have really only have two parties who appear to me be differing very
> > little in terms of political ideology.
>
> The differences are like night and day on many issues my friend.
I think it was the very funny, very dead Mr Bill Hicks who summed it up
nicely when he suggested that voting in American is a choice between the
puppet on then right or the puppet on the far right ;-)
> And there
> are more parties to choose from.
Once you guys get 'proportional representation' then I'll conceed that
actually means anything.
> >
> > I suppose at least the US media sells the illusion of freedom and
> > democracy.
> >
>
> In comparison to the rest of the world, we are the free'st.
wishful thinking Nark ;)
> Nuff said.
'k
matt
:p
UnclePete
>That's why I used the word "IS" and not "WAS".
>Present tense.
OK, so where do you draw the line, when the US suddenly became the champion
of all morals and rigthousness?
So yesterday it was bad, today suddenly it is angel....
UnclePete
>Where the naive US view has some basis in fact is that the US *has*
>fought for democracy against totalitarianism,
But it has no basis. The US couldn't care about the nazis if they hadn't
screwed their interests.
Later on, the US had no problem helping totalian government, supposed they
acknovledged and served their masters.
Remember a guy called Saddam???
>World War I wasn't about democracy, as far as I can tell.
Neither was WWII.
UnclePete
>international politics?
No. Nemeskurty too. Happy? :)
(I guess you never heard of him)
Anyway, my point is here, that an objective observer can judge the source,
specially if he has gather information from different sources.
>Sure -- although why doesn't country A just seize the oilfield, rather
>than invading and occupying country B,
Well, since oilfields tend to occupy large areas, they have to go into the
other country's land. Not neccessarily the whole country though.
>and threatening country S,
>suggesting the intention to overturn the entire status quo in the
>region?
Well, it probably has to do with the local alliances.
>But not World War II
It is kind of funny, but the History of oil on TV covered WWII very much in
depth, I guees just by pure accident.
WWII was all about to divide the Earth or shall we say, redivide?
You might want to check out stories (we might call it history) about how the
US cut off of Japan oilsupply, thus making the way to Pearl Harbor.
>And since the deployment
>of nuclear weapons, economic explanations of international politics
>make even less sense than before.
The 2 has no correlation.
>Fear is much more powerful than
>greed when you're talking about the possibility of total annihilation.
Sure, that's why all warlike activities ceased after WWII. What kind of
newspapers do you subscribe to??
> How is it possible to prevent this situation from degenerating into
> continuous warfare?
Quite seriously, it is impossible, unless the top dog conquers them all. And
as we can see, policing the world is a very huge task and can not be kept up
for very long time.
The balance of power is always just temporary.
>2. There's three possible answers:
>
> a. One answer is *conquest*.
Correct. From the US standpoint it is impossible.
> b. A second answer is *morality*.
Well, economic interests are stronger than morals. Example: you will steal
food when you are starving.
> c. At the international level, the traditional answer to this problem
> is the *balance of power*
We can actually say, that right now there is no balance of power. In the cold
war there was between Russia and the US, but now, the US has found itself alone
on the top of the world.
> If one state becomes powerful enough to be a threat, other states
> form an alliance against it.
Correct, so maybe it is just question of time, when there will be a war with
Europe.
>if you're willing to do some reading, try the following article:
>"Communist Bloc Expansion in the Early Cold War: Challenging Realism,
Maybe you haven't realized, but I am not American. I was born in a Communist
country, so I don't have to do any reading on the subject.
> Everybody *is* afraid of everybody.
Today the US is not affraid of anybody. All those talks about rogue states
and terrorists are for getting a bigger budget.
Who in their *right* mind would attack the US and try to conquer it? I am not
talking here about retaliations, but taking over.
> Others form a coalition against it, out of fear.
>Who actually starts the war depends on the situation; either side
>may attack first.
I am not saying fear can not be a factor (and it certainly was in the cold
war) but through history the basic motives have been economic interests for
going to war.
>A major power surrounded by weak neighbors -- a power vacuum --
So that is happening today with America??
>The point of Morgenthau's argument is that economic reasons are *not*
>the most common ones.
Well, if you read my post on the oil connection in Afghanistan, you can see
that even when there are other factors,
economics are still the major ones.
>Do our schools do such a terrible job of teaching history?
If you are talking about American schools, yes.
Russil Wvong
> "Russil Wvong" <russi...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > Where the naive US view has some basis in fact is that the US *has*
> > fought for democracy against totalitarianism, and made the difference
> > between winning and losing, in two out of three of the great and
> > terrible conflicts of the 20th century: World War II and the Cold War.
> > (World War I wasn't about democracy, as far as I can tell.)
> >
> > But the US view of itself as the *virtuous* champion of democracy and
> > human rights *everywhere* is overstating its case.
>
> First, what is your source that THE US VIEW of itself is what you say.
> Yours may be the perspective of an overly defensive Canadian.
George Kennan, "American Diplomacy 1900-1950." I can give you some
quotes if you like. Of course the US view of itself isn't monolithic,
there's plenty of anti-government sentiment among Americans (particularly
since Vietnam and Watergate; Chomsky would be a good example). But I
think it's fair to say that in the mainstream, there's a fairly strong
tendency for Americans to think of themselves as the good guys. Not
that this is totally without basis, but Kennan's point is that
trying to identify the good guys and the bad guys isn't a very realistic
or useful way of thinking about international politics. Politics is
more often about choosing the lesser of two evils.
> > No country with a
> > long history can claim to have shown virtue at all times (think of
> > the war with Mexico, for example, or the war with Spain).
>
> Obviously. But to say that perfection in your eyes is even possible is
> equally ridiculous.
Not sure what you're saying. Kennan points out that the US has a tendency
to lecture other countries on human rights and democracy, forgetting that
the US hasn't always done a great job itself; and suggests that it'd be
better for the US to stick to trying to provide a good example. (Which,
IMHO, it does do, despite its flaws.)
> > Yes, campaign finance reform is a big issue (and it's hard to get
> > people to pay attention). That was one of John McCain's major
> > platform issues.
>
> Point? Campaign finance reform is an attempt to stifle the political
> power of the people, collectively speaking.
I guess we'll have to disagree. For anyone interested in this issue,
"Running Scared", by Anthony King, discusses the need for US political
reforms in some detail.
America's permanent election campaign, together with other aspects
of American electoral politics, has one crucial consequence,
little noticed but vitally important for the functioning of
American democracy. Quite simply, the American electoral system
places politicians in a highly vulnerable position. Individually
and collectively they are more vulnerable, more of the time, to
the vicissitudes of electoral politics than are the politicians of
any other democratic country. Because they are more vulnerable,
they devote more of their time to electioneering, and their
conduct in office is more continuously governed by electoral
considerations. I will argue that American politicians' constant
and unremitting electoral preoccupations have deleterious
consequences for the functioning of the American system. They
consume time and scarce resources. Worse, they make it harder than
it would otherwise be for the system as a whole to deal with some
of America's most pressing problems. Americans often complain that
their system is not sufficiently democratic. I will argue that, on
the contrary, there is a sense in which the system is too
democratic and ought to be made less so.
[http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/97jan/scared/scared.htm]
Russil Wvong
> >Is Chomsky your only source of detailed information about
> >international politics?
>
> No. Nemeskurty too. Happy? :)
>
> (I guess you never heard of him)
Thanks for the info. I assume that's Istvan Nemeskurty? (I just did
a quick net search.) I found references to books he's written on
Hungarian history, but does he discuss international politics as well?
Anyone else?
> Anyway, my point is here, that an objective observer can judge the
> source, specially if he has gather information from different sources.
Sure, I'd just like to know what your other sources are.
I suppose I should give mine. I'm interested in international politics,
and I like to read, so I've read quite a bit. I can't claim to be
particularly knowledgeable, though.
- George Orwell: everything
- Paul Kennedy: The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers,
Grand Strategies in War and Peace
- Hans Morgenthau: Politics Among Nations
- E. H. Carr: The 20 Years' Crisis 1919-1939
- George Kennan: Memoirs 1925-1950, Memoirs 1950-1967,
American Diplomacy 1900-1950, Around the Cragged Hill,
The Nuclear Delusion
- Robert McNamara: Blundering Into Disaster
- Roy Gutman and David Rieff, eds.: Crimes of War
- Michael Ignatieff: The Warrior's Honour
- William Shirer: The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich
- John Dower: War Without Mercy
- Maurice Meisner: Mao's China and After
- William Polk: The Arab World Today
- Thomas Skidmore and Peter Smith: Modern Latin America
- The Economist
- The New York Review of Books
Finally, I've read "The Chomsky Reader" and "Deterring Democracy".
> >Sure -- although why doesn't country A just seize the oilfield, rather
> >than invading and occupying country B,
>
> Well, since oilfields tend to occupy large areas, they have to go into the
> other country's land. Not neccessarily the whole country though.
>
> >and threatening country S,
> >suggesting the intention to overturn the entire status quo in the
> >region?
>
> Well, it probably has to do with the local alliances.
Perhaps it wasn't just the one oilfield that country A was after.
> It is kind of funny, but the History of oil on TV covered WWII very
> much in depth, I guees just by pure accident.
No, oil's definitely a major military factor. You need oil to
fight a modern war.
> WWII was all about to divide the Earth or shall we say, redivide?
Where are you getting this from? Istvan Nemeskurty?
> You might want to check out stories (we might call it history) about
> how the US cut off of Japan oilsupply, thus making the way to Pearl Harbor.
Sure. George Kennan discusses this in "American Diplomacy 1900-1950".
> >And since the deployment
> >of nuclear weapons, economic explanations of international politics
> >make even less sense than before.
>
> The 2 has no correlation.
Let me put it this way. Suppose country A and country B (the ones
with the shared oilfield) both have nuclear weapons. Is country A
really going to try to invade country B?
> >Fear is much more powerful than
> >greed when you're talking about the possibility of total annihilation.
>
> Sure, that's why all warlike activities ceased after WWII. What kind of
> newspapers do you subscribe to??
I think you misunderstand what I'm saying. Wars can certainly be caused
by fear. If country A is afraid of being attacked by country B, it may
very well decide to attack country B first. That's how Israel decided
to attack Egypt and Syria in 1967.
> > How is it possible to prevent this situation from degenerating into
> > continuous warfare?
>
> Quite seriously, it is impossible, unless the top dog conquers them
> all. And as we can see, policing the world is a very huge task and can
> not be kept up for very long time.
>
> The balance of power is always just temporary.
I know. But it's all we've got.
> > c. At the international level, the traditional answer to this problem
> > is the *balance of power*
>
> We can actually say, that right now there is no balance of power.
> In the cold war there was between Russia and the US, but now, the US
> has found itself alone on the top of the world.
You're absolutely right. See Stephen Walt, "Keeping the World
'Off-Balance': Self-Restraint and U. S. Foreign Policy."
The United States now enjoys a position of preponderance unseen
since the Roman Empire. Not surprisingly, the past decade has
produced a lively debate on U.S. grand strategy, with different
authors offering sharply contrasting advice on how the United
States should respond to its position as the sole remaining
superpower.
This paper considers one element of this debate: will
U.S. preponderance trigger a defensive backlash by other states?
Part I examines why states tend to balance against other states,
and argues that structural balance of power theory cannot explain
why efforts to balance U.S. power have been remarkably weak since
the end of the Cold War. Part II considers alternative
explanations for the absence of any serious attempt to balance
U.S. power, and argues that a combination of balance-of-threat
theory and the theory of collective goods offers the best
explanation for the dearth of balancing behavior. Part III lays
out a set of prescriptions based on these theoretical insights,
emphasizing in particular the need for a policy of
self-restraint.
[http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/Research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP00-013?OpenDocument]
> >if you're willing to do some reading, try the following article:
> >"Communist Bloc Expansion in the Early Cold War: Challenging Realism,
>
> Maybe you haven't realized, but I am not American. I was born in a
> Communist country, so I don't have to do any reading on the subject.
I'm not American either. :-) You might still find it interesting.
It's about Communist expansion in Asia, not Europe.
> > Everybody *is* afraid of everybody.
>
> Today the US is not affraid of anybody.
Even before September 11, the US and Russia still had enough nuclear
weapons to destroy each other several times over. And Russia still
doesn't look very stable.
> Who in their *right* mind would attack the US and try to conquer it?
> I am not talking here about retaliations, but taking over.
Not everyone is always in their right mind. :-) With nuclear
weapons in the picture, people don't want to go to war, but once
you start using threats, sometimes miscalculations happen. Assuming
Russia remains stable, I assume the most likely conflict would be
between the US and China over Taiwan. It's important for the US to
maintain the balance of power in Asia, between China, Japan, and
Russia.
> > Others form a coalition against it, out of fear.
> >Who actually starts the war depends on the situation; either side
> >may attack first.
>
> I am not saying fear can not be a factor (and it certainly was in
> the cold war) but through history the basic motives have been
> economic interests for going to war.
That was why Hitler tried to conquer Europe?
> >A major power surrounded by weak neighbors -- a power vacuum --
>
> So that is happening today with America??
Not that I can tell. From what I can tell, the main US interest
is in maintaining the status quo. It doesn't particularly need
to expand its power.
> >The point of Morgenthau's argument is that economic reasons are *not*
> >the most common ones.
>
> Well, if you read my post on the oil connection in Afghanistan, you
> can see that even when there are other factors,
> economics are still the major ones.
Sorry, I'm not following. Brisard and Dasquie's book says that the US
avoided putting pressure on the Taliban to hand over bin Laden, before
September 11, because they were trying to maintain stability in the
region, in particular to allow for construction of an oil pipeline.
Do you think that the major reason for the US attack on Afghanistan
was the *oil pipeline*, not the September 11 attack?
> >Do our schools do such a terrible job of teaching history?
>
> If you are talking about American schools, yes.
:-)
Russil Wvong
> > I've written up a critical review of Chomsky's political writings, at
> >
> > http://www.geocities.com/rwvong/future/chomsky.html
>
>
> I'll check it out this weekend.
So what did you think, Siggy? (If you don't have time to read it,
you might try skimming it.)
UnclePete
>
>Where are you getting this from?
Well, what did the Germans want? Lifespace, in plain English territory.
England wanted to keep its empire and Russia wanted not to beattacked and maybe
a little Polish field.
America wanted to stay out of the whole mess, but since the US cut off of
the oilsupply of the Japanese, they didn't have much choice but attack.
So was the gentle giant drawn among the hungry wolves and ended up being the
strongest wolf of all.
>Let me put it this way. Suppose country A and country B (the ones
>with the shared oilfield) both have nuclear weapons. Is country A
>really going to try to invade country B?
Oh they can try to screw each other in every other way. With blokads,
embargos, economic tricks, hiring other countries to do the attacking. They can
also start a hidden war with biochemical attacks were the source is hard to
find,etc.
So far that situation hasn't occured until the India-Pakistan nuclear match.
Well maybe Russia and China would count as a previous similar set up, but they
were kind of in the same side, and there was not exactly the oilfield between
them.
But to answer your question, sure, people are stupid enough and I think it is
just question of time when we will see the first mushroom cloud.
> Wars can certainly be caused
>by fear.
Agreed. But fear wasn't the motivation for the Mongol Khans to come to the
West and conquer. Neither was it for the Spaniard, Dutch and English sailors
who went around the world out of sheer economic interest and conquered what
they could.
The Germans didn't try to conquer Europe out of sheer ideology, it was
business as usual. If you go back to the Napoleonic wars, you will find the
vested economic interests too.
I am not saying that religion and hate can't play roles in wars, but most of
the time it is economics.
Do you think ifthe Palestinians had the same rigths and choices in Israel as
the Jews have and they had the saem standard of living, would they care to tie
bombs around themselves? They would be happy to live ever after, instead of
figthing.
>You're absolutely right. See Stephen Walt,
Why do you have to always quote somebody? :)
I think intelligent people can see things objectively for themselves.
> The United States now enjoys a position of preponderance unseen
> since the Roman Empire.
Actually I have a theory that the US is not a country but an Empire itself.
Maybe we should discuss it in this newsgroup since that is a linguistic
question.
Personally I believe the US has already started its selfdestruction, under
Clinton.
Not just by the politicans, but by the people too.
> will
> U.S. preponderance trigger a defensive backlash by other states?
Most likely. And at the root of it there will be economic envy. The whole
world got a little taste od recession in the last decade, when the US was still
flying high.
>It's about Communist expansion in Asia, not Europe.
You see the cold war was about economics in the bottomline too. Who controlls
the masses and the resources?
Ideology was just the tool to reach the goal, the controll of the people's
mind.
>And Russia still
>doesn't look very stable.
Yeah, but this is a different kind of fear. before it was "oh I hope they
don't try to come over" now it is" I hope they are not going to spoil the fun".
>I assume the most likely conflict would be
>between the US and China over Taiwan.
I tend to agree about those damn Chinese! :)
Maybe a hundred years from now they are going to be the rulers of the world.
Godd question is, how former powerful countries can take the sudden change
of the guards??? What will France, England do, both nuclear powers?
>That was why Hitler tried to conquer Europe?
Sure. The German lifespace (sorry, I don't know a better translation) for all
the Arian people.
>From what I can tell, the main US interest
>is in maintaining the status quo.
Well, of course. When you are on power, you are statisfied with the
situation.
>It doesn't particularly need
>to expand its power.
It is getting harder to expand it, it is so huge.
>US
>avoided putting pressure on the Taliban to hand over bin Laden, before
>September 11, because they were trying to maintain stability in the
>region, in particular to allow for construction of an oil pipeline.
Correct. They didn't care about the bad guy as long as they can get
(economically speaking) what they want.
>Do you think that the major reason for the US attack on Afghanistan
>was the *oil pipeline*, not the September 11 attack?
It is a complex question and there were other reasons too, but there is
evidence, that the US sought military intervention in Afghanistan before Sept.
They actually told the Taliban they either
get a golden treatment or carpetbombing.
Nark
> > "Russil Wvong" <russi...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > > Where the naive US view has some basis in fact is that the US *has*
> > > fought for democracy against totalitarianism, and made the difference
> > > between winning and losing, in two out of three of the great and
> > > terrible conflicts of the 20th century: World War II and the Cold
War.
> > > (World War I wasn't about democracy, as far as I can tell.)
> > >
> > > But the US view of itself as the *virtuous* champion of democracy and
> > > human rights *everywhere* is overstating its case.
> >
> > First, what is your source that THE US VIEW of itself is what you say.
> > Yours may be the perspective of an overly defensive Canadian.
>
> George Kennan, "American Diplomacy 1900-1950." I can give you some
> quotes if you like. Of course the US view of itself isn't monolithic,
Exactly my point. So your statement about a monolithic view taken by the US
is invalid, according to you.
> there's plenty of anti-government sentiment among Americans (particularly
> since Vietnam and Watergate; Chomsky would be a good example).
Even those within the government criticize each other openly. That's the
beauty of the system.
> But I
> think it's fair to say that in the mainstream, there's a fairly strong
> tendency for Americans to think of themselves as the good guys.
And you apparently disagree?
> Not
> that this is totally without basis, but Kennan's point is that
> trying to identify the good guys and the bad guys isn't a very realistic
> or useful way of thinking about international politics.
Why?
> Politics is
> more often about choosing the lesser of two evils.
>
> > > No country with a
> > > long history can claim to have shown virtue at all times (think of
> > > the war with Mexico, for example, or the war with Spain).
> >
> > Obviously. But to say that perfection in your eyes is even possible is
> > equally ridiculous.
>
> Not sure what you're saying. Kennan points out that the US has a tendency
> to lecture other countries on human rights and democracy, forgetting that
> the US hasn't always done a great job itself; and suggests that it'd be
> better for the US to stick to trying to provide a good example. (Which,
> IMHO, it does do, despite its flaws.)
Right. It seems that you are fighting your own recognition of the truth;
that the US IS the beacon of freedom for the world.
No surprise (on the last sentence).
As usual, the author offers nothing substantial in terms of solutions. The
founding fathers of the US devised an ingenious system that seems to provide
the greatest mix of freedom, democracy, and individual rights. The
historical result is the highest standard of living in the world. And the
jury's is in. People from all over the world are trying earnestly to get to
the US so as to enjoy this freedom.
It's not perfect, but let's experiment on Canada before we mess up the US.
Nark
>
>
> Nark wrote:
> >
> > "Matthew Healey" <md...@nospam.student.canterbury.ac.nz> wrote in
message
> > news:3C41ECD0...@nospam.student.canterbury.ac.nz...
>
> SNIP
>
> > > I didn't realise that
> > > corporations interests were the same as those of the people.
> >
> > Newsflash!: Corporations are owned and run by -- drumroll -- people.
>
> This isn't an anticapitalist statement but (imho) a simple fact (I feel
> you're just winding me up but I'll answer anyways): The interests of
> corporations etc are not the interests of the average person.
No surprise here. But we do disagree completely.
> The
> interests of shareholders is to make a return on their investment. When
> corps. give cash to political organisations they want their interests
> furthered ie to be in a position to further please their shareholders
> interests. Govt is there to serve the interest all people. Not the
> interests of corporations and their shareholders (which are often at
> odds with the interests of the people).
You forget who works for the corporation. And who owns the corporation.
Yes, it's true that the shares of a typical corp aren't spread equally
across the country. But considering that many corps provide
services/products (whether directly or indirectly), jobs, and dividends.
There are many people who who are served by corps. I think you assume that
when someone is helped, another is hurt. This is not the case, necessarily.
>
> > > Anyways how do you actually exercise a democratic choice in the US
when
> > > you have really only have two parties who appear to me be differing
very
> > > little in terms of political ideology.
> >
> > The differences are like night and day on many issues my friend.
>
> I think it was the very funny, very dead Mr Bill Hicks who summed it up
> nicely when he suggested that voting in American is a choice between the
> puppet on then right or the puppet on the far right ;-)
>
> > And there
> > are more parties to choose from.
>
> Once you guys get 'proportional representation' then I'll conceed that
> actually means anything.
The two mainstream parties represent a wide array of ideologies. And we
aren't voting for parties, but people. I guess the question is; what do you
suggest to solve these problems?
>
> > >
> > > I suppose at least the US media sells the illusion of freedom and
> > > democracy.
> > >
> >
> > In comparison to the rest of the world, we are the free'st.
>
> wishful thinking Nark ;)
Correct me, Please/
Nark
"UnclePete" <petib...@aol.comic> wrote in message
Since you brought up history, why don't you answer first. Where do you draw
the line? Can you name a people who aren't descended from an invading
force?
Real name
> When you say "act", are you thinking only of going to war? Because
> NATO and the US-Japan alliance -- the cornerstones of US foreign
> policy during the Cold War -- were clearly intended to defend
> Western Europe and Japan against the Soviet Union. A more recent
> example that comes to mind is the US response to China's threats
> against Taiwan.
Primarily, I'm thinking of overt action. Treaty alliances are only
really a covent "to act" in mutual defense. To be credible,
unfortunately, such mutual-defense pacts require a "hot" war from time
to time.
> > In WW II, of course, the Americans were late. Waited until they were
> > attacked themselves and had no choice but to engage. I believe the
> > romantic notion of a "champion" requires rushing to the fore of the
> > battle, Nark.
>
> I think that's a fair comment, although the US was already providing
> a great deal of support to the Allies through the Lend-Lease program.
Of course, though the American reluctance to risk troops was already
established.
> In retrospect, it seems crazy for Japan to have attacked the US. So
> why did they? Hans Morgenthau, "Politics Among Nations", discussing
> the importance of prestige:
You *are* fond of Morgenthau, aren't you? Morgenthau is accurate, as far
as he goes, but he's really arguing for a real-politik, don't you know?
As such, I think there are more positive alternatives for American
foreign policy.
> > I'd say (off-hand) that post-war Germany, France, Canada, the
> > Netherlands and Sweden are better defenders of democracy and human
> > rights abroad than the US, and, per capita, contribute more to
> > democratic order and human rights. All of those countries provide more
> > (except Germany, by law) peace-keepers per capita than the US.
>
> Also a fair comment, although I would point out that it's impossible
> for these countries to carry out significant peacekeeping operations
> (e.g. during the Balkan wars) without US logistics.
Clearly. Although I would also point out that the obvious, potential
military powerhouse in that group is Germany, which is prohibited (by WW
II treaties) from developing significant military resources (as is Japan
in Asia).
> More importantly, the stability of the entire international order
> depends on the US. With the Soviet Union out of the picture, it's
> easy to forget that, but I'd hate to see the results of a conflict
> between China and Japan, for example, without the US to maintain
> the balance of power.
I agree, except that I don't see a balance of power as a normative good.
Again, I'd suggest that Morgenthau has had too much influence on your
geopolitical thinking. He's the academic interpretation of Kissinger in
many ways.
Thanks for your comments, and I think you have a good grasp of the
overall picture (better than mine). If you haven't before, you might be
interested to read messier, detailed opinions. I recommend stuff from
John Ralston Saul, Gary Sick, Richard Falk, Franz Fanon, Willy Brandt,
hmm, others?
Real name
"Nark" <bar...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> "Real name" <real...@nowhere.com> wrote in message
> news:realname-EEDE9B...@clgrps11.telusplanet.net...
> > The death penalty is invoked in no other G8 country that I can think of
> > except China.
>
> This is a subjective matter. While I am personally against the death
> penalty, I do understand the position of the other side quite well. The
> question is; is life in prison any better than death for some people?
> Again, it's subjective. What you think is cruel others may see as an easy
> way out. I personally am against the death penalty because I want to see
> hardcore criminals serve their time.
How is a death penalty subjective (well, I suppose it's subjective for
the one killed)? The US is aligned with Muslim autocracies, and a few
communist Asian countries, by my last reckoning.
For most G8 citizens, right-to-life is a fundamental human right.
State-imposed death sentences are considered barbaric in most of the
rest of the first-world (and most of the second- and third-world).
> > Only Russia has (and for a time, South Africa had) a
> > higher incarceration rate.
>
> Are we talking human rights or criminal rights? Are you suggesting that
> putting criminals in prison is wrong? You may be too extreme in your
> ideology to be able to talk about mainstream policy.
It's may be unwieldy to compare incarceration rates between countries -
perhaps the US really *does* have more violent, more vile, criminals.
Maybe it's only that the US has more money to afford prisons, etc.
As a general test, however, the percentage of the population that sits
in jail is generally considered a reasonble measure of state repression
(by Amnesty International, and the UN). But 1 in 100 people in the US
sit in jail. 1 in 3 blacks between 20 and 29 are under some form of
criminal justice control (parole, prison, etc.).
It seems to me extreme. Canada has a similar economy, similar urban
concentration, and yet has 1/6 the incarceration rate. Britain has 1/8.
Why are so many people in jail in the States?
> > Racist, hate and violent crimes in the US are
> > at levels approx. those of the worst, most depressed UK urban/industrial
> > zones but extended over the whole country (and crime rates in NY or LA,
> > for example, far exceed those of, say, Mexico City).
>
> Your information is bogus. Have you been to Mexico City? I feel safe in NY
> but far from it in MC. Understand that compilation of statistics is much
> better here than in most of the rest of the world, where 10 bucks gets you
> off of all but the most severe crimes, on the spot. Besides, I'm not sure
> that I can accept your thesis that crime is a human rights violation by the
> government.
My info is not well-documented in my previous post, but it's not,
because of that, bogus.
I was speaking personally. I've lived in NY, LA and MC, and found LA to
be the scariest of the three. The police in LA were also the most
military-minded and corrupt from my experience.
> > Needless to say,
> > repression of crime and police brutality is notorious in those cities.
>
> Only by the highest standard. Police brutality is commonplace worldwide.
My standards are not that high. Perhaps yours are too low?
> > > If the US is not the "champion of democracy and human rights", who is?
> So, who is?
> > In WW II, of course, the Americans were late. Waited until they were
> > attacked themselves and had no choice but to engage. I believe the
> > romantic notion of a "champion" requires rushing to the fore of the
> > battle, Nark.
>
> Again. If the US isn't, who is? Maybe the US doesn't intervene in EVERY
> action. But who intervenes more often than the US? Who is the leader?
I can't think of a country that "intervenes" more than the US. That
seems to be the problem. This intervening is viewed by many as
self-serving, economically-driven, oil-based.
The USSR intervened quite a bit, as does China, as did Hitler in his
heyday.
Still, I suppose the US is more amenable to "pure" motives than those
other countries, so you have a point.
> > I'd say (off-hand) that post-war Germany, France, Canada, the
> > Netherlands and Sweden are better defenders of democracy and human
> > rights abroad than the US,
>
> Can you substantiate this unfounded claim?
Well, yeah. If you take away stealth-bombers, smart-bombs, and the
various carrier groups, there *are* presumably means by which countries
can support democracy abroad. How about a quick list of all those
countries that have *not* assassinated South/Latin America leaders
lately?
> > and, per capita, contribute more to
> > democratic order and human rights.
>
> Again. Where do you get your information? Not that it matters, because the
> bottom line is that, in terms of contributions, NONE of these countries
> comes close to the US in gross terms.
>
> If you have a sovereign nation with a population of 100 people and your per
> capita contributions to these causes is $100, does that make you the
> Champion of human rights for the world if the US with 300 million people was
> at $99? Think about it.
>
> I think we've proven our generosity in terms of foreign aid time and time
> again.
If only that were the case. With the typical presumption and arrogance
of the Yanks, you have assumed that the American juggernaut is the
biggest, and bestest, and brightest.
Bend over for your enlightmentent...
The US contributes about 9 billion each year in foreign aid (much of
which is contigent), but that's about 0.1% of US GDP.
In toto, the US contributes about as much as the Northern European
countries together (Norway, Denmark, Sweden).
Japan exceeds the US in raw dollar amounts (at 15 billion).
The US ranks 22nd among G8 and industrial nations in terms of foreign
aid as a percentage of GDP. Granted, they are second or third in raw
dollars terms, but they should be first by a factor of 10 (given the
size and robustness of the US economy). If you take the EU together
(equivalent population), it's a total rout.
The US, is NOT therefore (as you seemed to have assumed) the largest aid
contributor in gross terms. As a percentage of GDP, it lags sadly behind
most western countries.
You seem to argue that the US is bigger and therefore better in
everything, including generosity, fairness, and human rights.
Canada's Trudeau used to say that when the US catches a cold, Canadians
sneeze. I've heard the same sentiment expressed more rudely by South
Americans (except applied to the nether regions of the body). God knows
what Africans and Asians might say.
Americans are, sadly, arrogant, solipistic, and often rude. We *do* have
affection for you, but it is difficult to sustain.
Americans are glad to suck up 30% of the world's resources, fuels and
GDP, and to give back only a few bucks in foreign aid. It's *shameful*
that the US, as the bar-none, richest country on the planet, cannot
exceed a miserable 0.1% GDP contribution, or contribute more to foreign
aid than a few tiny EU countries.
I think it's *very* relevant to this discussion that the US refuses to
pay its UN dues.
You might want to look at:
http://www.globalissues.org/TradeRelated/Debt/USAid.asp
The UN has set an aid target of 0.7% of GDP for G8 countries. The US
contributes only 0.1% of it's GDP, and most of that under restriction
(most-favoured nation status, etc.).
While I agree that Americans are often personally quite generous, I
think they are pretty unaware (or indifferent) as to how poorly the US
government contributes to world aid.
> >All of those countries provide more
> > (except Germany, by law) peace-keepers per capita than the US.
>
> Assuming your statistics are accurate (but I would like a source), it again
> goes to the previous statement by me. It is much easier to provide services
> to a smaller sample. Yet people around the world look to the US as a place
> they dream of living.
Please, do your own fact-checking. It's good for you, and you wouldn't
belive me anyway.
As to the statement that people around the world dream of living in the
US, yeah, possibly some of those who don't know better. TV works its
magic.
I personally wouldn't live in the US again if you multiplied my salary
by 5 (which has offered, by the way).
Imagine that, if you can. The States is a scary, violent, unkind,
money-driven place. I'd rather live in an igloo in Novosibirsk, the
outer Hebrides, or Newfoundland than face that street-level agression in
LA again. The US is an unkind place. I don't *want* to live there.
Too many Americans are simply too scary, angry or strange. Mostly just
angry, poor, and drugged-out, I guess, but your assumption that the
world is full of immigrants is part of the same arrogance mentioned
above.
So 0.01% of the world wants to go to the US. Stop flattering yourselves.
Most of us would rather avoid it.
Real name
> The US certainly advocates democracy and human rights (more strongly
> than any other country I can think of), but it hasn't done so
I would argue that one must reevaluate what it means to advocate
democracy. WW II examples (from which Morgenthau draws), are now +50
years old.
Inasmuch as democracy in Germany changed when the Wall came down (I read
some scribbled grafitti on the Wall saying, "Alles wirt besser, aber
nicht wirt gut" -- "Everything's getting better, but nothing's getting
good").
I can only think that the problems of people have changed from those of
50 years ago.
It seems to me that the US is almost irrelevant in the EU these days,
and (also) in much of Africa, Asia and the Muslim world. The American
influence in the world is largely economic, but even that is changing.
Ironically, one expect the world's sole remaining superpower to
dominate, but, in the absence of a competing state, the US has lost
influence among client states. The G8 countries have been a bit scared
since about the US ecomonic power, too, and are beginning to challenge
US hegemony.
I believe the world has it's best chance now for democratic progress and
peace in 50 years, primarily because the USSR is defunct, and the US has
lost its influence among client states, most of which was based upon
anti-insurgency. Without two superpowers competing, there is a real
chance that sanity might prevail.
Morgenthau does not anticipate or discuss the possibility of a collapse
of real-politik (s'far as I know), which seems short-sighted. Even as
poli-sci students in the '80s it seemed obvious to most of us that the
US would out-spend the USSR, and "win". Although I think, no-one could
have foreseen the abrupt collapse of the Soviet Union, it's diminished
influence should have been clear from about 1982. I remember making a
bet with my Dad in '85 as to whether the USSR'd break up, go to war with
a West European client, or go bankrupt (and I'm an amateur, so...). It
took 'til '89 to collect, but, hell, am I smarter than the State Dep
geeks? Doubt it.
The other obvious scenario (which didn't happen) was that the US would
prop up the USSR client-states, in exchange for political favours. I
guess they did that to an extent, but not enough to forestall the
internal changes.
Of course, Morgenthau is "classic". But that's the reason classic texts
get tossed aside. Out-of-date. Irrevelevant.
> *everywhere*. The strongest evidence for US championship of democracy
> is in West Germany and Japan, where the US was able to help ensure that
> Germany and Japan would become stable, functioning democracies. In the
> Middle East, on the other hand, the two pillars of US foreign policy
> were Iran (under the Shah) and Saudi Arabia. In Asia, Taiwan and
> South Korea were dictatorships for many years; Singapore is still a
> one-party state. In Latin America, US foreign policy was more concerned
> with stability than with democracy or human rights.
>
> I wouldn't say that democracy and human rights aren't important to the
> US. Obviously they are. But I would say that they're a secondary
> concern; *stability* is more important to US foreign policy. (IMHO,
> rightly so. In the nuclear age, instability in international politics
> would be disastrous.)
>
> > Why can't "its moral principles" including; right to pursue happiness, the
> > bill of rights, all men are created equal, etc ",...be applied everywhere"?
>
> In a society where people lack food and security, the appeal of these
> moral principles is going to be limited.
>
> To quote Hans Morgenthau, discussing the failure of US ideals to appeal
> to the people of China and Vietnam ("Politics Among Nations"):
>
> Assured as we are, by and large, of the protection of our lives from
> the vicissitudes of death through violence or lack of food and
> shelter, we are taking the satisfaction of these biological needs
> for granted. Having taken care in good measure of the protection of
> life, we concentrate our thoughts and efforts upon the preservation
> of liberty and the pursuit of happiness. This being naturally so with
> us, we erect this limited experience, subject to the conditions of
> time and space, into a universal principle that claims to be valid
> everywhere and at all times. Thus we tend to assume, at least by
> implication, that what we are allowed to take for granted all men can
> take for granted, and that what we are striving for is the object of
> the aspirations of all mankind.
>
> Personally, I think it's more important for the US to maintain the
> stability of the international status quo, and to provide an *example*
> of a successful, stable, prosperous democracy, than to try to impose
> its political philosophy everywhere. And there's certainly problems
> (like campaign finance reform and political apathy) to be dealt with.
UnclePete
Today's politics is tomorrow's history.
>why don't you answer first.
Oh, so I got the ball back without an answer.
>Where do you draw the line?
Nowhere. I didn't say the US was morally good today.
> Can you name a people who aren't descended from an invading
>force?
So are you arguing, that because other people steal you can steal too?
Russil Wvong
> russi...@yahoo.com (Russil Wvong) wrote:
> > When you say "act", are you thinking only of going to war? Because
> > NATO and the US-Japan alliance -- the cornerstones of US foreign
> > policy during the Cold War -- were clearly intended to defend
> > Western Europe and Japan against the Soviet Union. A more recent
> > example that comes to mind is the US response to China's threats
> > against Taiwan.
>
> Primarily, I'm thinking of overt action. Treaty alliances are only
> really a covent "to act" in mutual defense. To be credible,
> unfortunately, such mutual-defense pacts require a "hot" war from time
> to time.
Fair enough, although the US commitment to defend Western Europe
did involve willingness to risk nuclear war.
> > In retrospect, it seems crazy for Japan to have attacked the US. So
> > why did they? Hans Morgenthau, "Politics Among Nations", discussing
> > the importance of prestige:
>
> You *are* fond of Morgenthau, aren't you?
Yes. :-) I remember reading George Kennan before having read Morgenthau,
and being very puzzled by some of Kennan's criticisms of US foreign policy.
Morgenthau provides a useful framework for thinking about international
politics, at least, and it's not strictly realpolitik; he does discuss
restraints on state behavior besides the balance of power, such as
international morality, international law, world public opinion, the UN,
and even cultural organizations such as UNESCO.
> Morgenthau is accurate, as far
> as he goes, but he's really arguing for a real-politik, don't you know?
> As such, I think there are more positive alternatives for American
> foreign policy.
I'd be interested in hearing more. Personally, I don't see what's
wrong with Paul Kennedy's argument in "The Rise and Fall of the Great
Powers" that over the long run, US power will decline in relative terms.
Combined with the fact that the Soviet Union no longer provides an
automatic check on the US, this strongly suggests that the US ought
to exercise self-restraint in its foreign policy. (I think the
Bush Administration's unilateralist foreign policy, particularly
its pursuit of NMD, is very dangerous.)
> > More importantly, the stability of the entire international order
> > depends on the US. With the Soviet Union out of the picture, it's
> > easy to forget that, but I'd hate to see the results of a conflict
> > between China and Japan, for example, without the US to maintain
> > the balance of power.
>
> I agree, except that I don't see a balance of power as a normative good.
I see the lack of war between China and Japan as a good thing. :-)
> Again, I'd suggest that Morgenthau has had too much influence on your
> geopolitical thinking.
I think that's a fair criticism. My readings in international politics
has been heavily weighted towards the realists (particularly George
Kennan, but also E. H. Carr), plus histories of particular regions and
countries. On the international-law/human rights side, my main sources
are Michael Ignatieff and David Rieff.
> Thanks for your comments, and I think you have a good grasp of the
> overall picture (better than mine). If you haven't before, you might be
> interested to read messier, detailed opinions. I recommend stuff from
> John Ralston Saul, Gary Sick, Richard Falk, Franz Fanon, Willy Brandt,
> hmm, others?
Thanks for the recommendations! Richard Falk is already on my to-read
list. I've read Marcus Pivato's summary of "Voltaire's Bastards", but
not the book itself. (You might be interested in James Scott's
"Seeing Like a State", which covers similar ground.)
Russil Wvong
> I can only think that the problems of people have changed from those of
> 50 years ago.
>
> It seems to me that the US is almost irrelevant in the EU these days,
> and (also) in much of Africa, Asia and the Muslim world. The American
> influence in the world is largely economic, but even that is changing.
I'm not sure what you mean by relevant or irrelevant. The US
obstruction of the Kyoto Accord wasn't a significant issue in
the EU?
> Ironically, one expect the world's sole remaining superpower to
> dominate, but, in the absence of a competing state, the US has lost
> influence among client states. The G8 countries have been a bit scared
> since about the US ecomonic power, too, and are beginning to challenge
> US hegemony.
Agreed.
> I believe the world has it's best chance now for democratic progress and
> peace in 50 years, primarily because the USSR is defunct, and the US has
> lost its influence among client states, most of which was based upon
> anti-insurgency. Without two superpowers competing, there is a real
> chance that sanity might prevail.
>
> Morgenthau does not anticipate or discuss the possibility of a collapse
> of real-politik (s'far as I know), which seems short-sighted.
Sorry, I'm not sure what you mean by the collapse of real-politik.
Do you mean the end of the Cold War, which resulted in US hegemony
instead of a bipolar balance of power?
> Of course, Morgenthau is "classic". But that's the reason classic texts
> get tossed aside. Out-of-date. Irrevelevant.
Er, surely you don't think the current status quo is permanent? Or
are you thinking that the rule of international law can be established
on a permanent basis somehow? (David Rieff has some interesting
things to say about this:
http://www.unnu.com/newhome/Gallery/etexts/globaljustice.htm.)
By the way, do you mind if I ask where you're posting from? I noticed
that you mentioned you'd seen Chomsky lecture in 2000, and he seemed
unsure which city he was in.
Russil Wvong
> >> WWII was all about to divide the Earth or shall we say, redivide?
> >
> >Where are you getting this from?
>
> Well, what did the Germans want? Lifespace, in plain English territory.
> England wanted to keep its empire and Russia wanted not to be attacked
> and maybe a little Polish field.
>
> America wanted to stay out of the whole mess, but since the US cut off
> of the oilsupply of the Japanese, they didn't have much choice but attack.
>
> So was the gentle giant drawn among the hungry wolves and ended up
> being the strongest wolf of all.
I'd put it differently: World War II was about stopping Hitler from
conquering Europe, and Japan from conquering Asia. And the liberal
democracies were too weak to do this without the Soviet Union.
> >Let me put it this way. Suppose country A and country B (the ones
> >with the shared oilfield) both have nuclear weapons. Is country A
> >really going to try to invade country B?
>
> ... But to answer your question, sure, people are stupid enough and
> I think it is just question of time when we will see the first
> mushroom cloud.
Sure. But first someone will have to be stupid enough to overcome
their fear. That's why I'm saying that once nuclear weapons are
in the equation, fear is definitely the most important factor
in international conflict.
> > Wars can certainly be caused
> >by fear.
>
> Agreed. But fear wasn't the motivation for the Mongol Khans to come to the
> West and conquer. Neither was it for the Spaniard, Dutch and English sailors
> who went around the world out of sheer economic interest and conquered what
> they could.
>
> The Germans didn't try to conquer Europe out of sheer ideology, it was
> business as usual. If you go back to the Napoleonic wars, you will find the
> vested economic interests too.
>
> I am not saying that religion and hate can't play roles in wars, but most
> of the time it is economics.
What exactly do you mean by "economics"? It looks like your conception
is general enough to include territory and power. I thought you were
talking about wealth.
> Do you think ifthe Palestinians had the same rigths and choices in
> Israel as the Jews have and they had the saem standard of living,
> would they care to tie bombs around themselves? They would be happy
> to live ever after, instead of figthing.
Sorry, I don't think the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a matter of
economics. It's a matter of territory.
> >You're absolutely right. See Stephen Walt,
>
> Why do you have to always quote somebody? :)
I think international politics is a complicated subject, so I like to
find out what the experts have to say. :-) History is complicated;
international politics is history as it's happening.
> Actually I have a theory that the US is not a country but an Empire
> itself. Maybe we should discuss it in this newsgroup since that is
> a linguistic question.
?? Sure, let's hear it.
> Personally I believe the US has already started its selfdestruction,
> under Clinton.
> Not just by the politicans, but by the people too.
The US definitely has its weaknesses, but don't underestimate the
resilience of the bourgeoisie, no matter how decadent they are.
> >It's about Communist expansion in Asia, not Europe.
>
> You see the cold war was about economics in the bottomline too.
> Who controlls the masses and the resources?
I would say that's not economics, that's power.
> >I assume the most likely conflict would be
> >between the US and China over Taiwan.
>
> I tend to agree about those damn Chinese! :)
>
> Maybe a hundred years from now they are going to be the rulers of the
> world.
Personally I doubt it. They're in a weak geographic position, surrounded
by hostile regional powers (South Korea, Taiwan, Russia, India, Vietnam,
Japan). And their large population is a burden, not a strength. They'll
get stronger, no doubt, and they may be able to achieve regional
hegemony in East Asia, but I don't think they'll be able to challenge
the US and Europe for world power.
> >That was why Hitler tried to conquer Europe?
>
> Sure. The German lifespace (sorry, I don't know a better translation)
> for all the Arian people.
Usually people use the German word, Lebensraum. But I think this
is a pretty clear example where "economic reasons" aren't a good
explanation. Hitler was attempting to overthrow the status quo and
make Germany the ruler of Europe, not to make Germany richer.
> >From what I can tell, the main US interest
> >is in maintaining the status quo.
>
> Well, of course. When you are on power, you are statisfied with the
> situation.
Correct.
> >It doesn't particularly need
> >to expand its power.
>
> It is getting harder to expand it, it is so huge.
Correct again.
> >US
> >avoided putting pressure on the Taliban to hand over bin Laden, before
> >September 11, because they were trying to maintain stability in the
> >region, in particular to allow for construction of an oil pipeline.
>
> Correct. They didn't care about the bad guy as long as they can get
> (economically speaking) what they want.
Until now. Now they care a *lot* about the bad guy.
> >Do you think that the major reason for the US attack on Afghanistan
> >was the *oil pipeline*, not the September 11 attack?
>
> It is a complex question and there were other reasons too, but there is
> evidence, that the US sought military intervention in Afghanistan before
> Sept.
>
> They actually told the Taliban they either
> get a golden treatment or carpetbombing.
That's not much evidence. :-)
TVsHenry
>> get a golden treatment or carpetbombing.
>
>That's not much evidence. :-)
>
"Yes folks, just because two French authors say that does NOT
make it so!!"
___________________________________________
"What lesson did you hope to teach us by your coward's attack on our World
Trade Center, our Pentagon, us? What was it you hoped we would learn? Whatever
it was, please know that you failed." - Leonard Pitts
Russil Wvong
> "Russil Wvong" <russi...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > Not that this is totally without basis, but Kennan's point is that
> > trying to identify the good guys and the bad guys isn't a very realistic
> > or useful way of thinking about international politics.
>
> Why?
Because a lot of the time there's no good guys and bad guys. In the
conflict over Kashmir, who are the good guys, India or Pakistan?
In a war between India and China, who are the good guys? What about
the war in Chechnya?
> > Not sure what you're saying. Kennan points out that the US has a tendency
> > to lecture other countries on human rights and democracy, forgetting that
> > the US hasn't always done a great job itself; and suggests that it'd be
> > better for the US to stick to trying to provide a good example. (Which,
> > IMHO, it does do, despite its flaws.)
>
> Right. It seems that you are fighting your own recognition of the truth;
> that the US IS the beacon of freedom for the world.
A lot of people don't see it that way, and so it might be better if
the US refrained from the lecturing.
Stephen Walt, writing on September 11:
LESSON #2: THE UNITED STATES IS LESS POPULAR THAN IT THINKS
Americans are prone to see their country as a "shining city on a
hill" (as President Ronald Reagan liked to say) and often assume
that other societies admire the United States and appreciate its
global role. Yet both the September 11 attacks and the
international response to them underscore the degree to which
many people outside the United States are actually ambivalent
about the U.S. position in the world.
[http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/BCSIA/ISP.nsf/IS/Forthcoming]
> As usual, the author offers nothing substantial in terms of solutions.
He makes a number of recommendations in the article.
> It's not perfect, but let's experiment on Canada before we mess up the US.
Fair enough.
UnclePete
>I'd put it differently: World War II was about stopping Hitler from
>conquering Europe, and Japan from conquering Asia.
Yes, but why did they started? Because with power they also wanted wealth.
The usually comes together in the right hands. :)
>That's why I'm saying that once nuclear weapons are
>in the equation, fear is definitely the most important factor
>in international conflict.
Well, if you put it this way, yes. But just wait until the Arabs get their
own little suitcase nuclear bomb. There will be no problem of using it...
>What exactly do you mean by "economics"? It looks like your conception
>is general enough to include territory and power.
Yes. After all until industrialization territory equaled wealth and more or
less power.
>I thought you were
>talking about wealth.
Well, by economics we could mean the standard of living. Now when you don;t
have a good one, you want to increase it, when you have a real good one, you
are trying to maintain it.
>Sorry, I don't think the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a matter of
>economics. It's a matter of territory.
It is a lot of things. Territory, standard of living, not being equal,etc.
>History is complicated;
I don't neccessary think so. History is basicly what happened when. Now how
you evaluate that, that is a different question.
>I would say that's not economics, that's power.
Yeah, but most people (except Mr. Bloomberg) want to get on power to get
wealth too. Or even if they don't want it, it comes with the "territory", being
on power.
>but I don't think they'll be able to challenge
>the US and Europe for world power.
Well, not neccessarily militarily, but economically. If they put that brain-
and manpower into effective use.....
>Usually people use the German word, Lebensraum. But I think this
>is a pretty clear example where "economic reasons" aren't a good
>explanation.
But Lebensraum also meant rich oilfileds in the area of Baku, in Russia. In
unused territories you can build powerplans, use it for farming,etc. There is
still a lot of economic potential in having territory.
Russil Wvong
> "Nark" <bar...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > "Russil Wvong" <russi...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > > Not that this is totally without basis, but Kennan's point is that
> > > trying to identify the good guys and the bad guys isn't a very
> > > realistic or useful way of thinking about international politics.
> >
> > Why?
>
> Because a lot of the time there's no good guys and bad guys. In the
> conflict over Kashmir, who are the good guys, India or Pakistan?
> In a war between India and China, who are the good guys? What about
> the war in Chechnya?
I just wanted to expand on this a bit. Consider the Vietnam War. The
US had good *motives*, namely stopping North Vietnam from taking over
South Vietnam (similar to the Korean War). But because it didn't have
the support of the people, it was impossible for the US to achieve its
objectives, and so the war turned into a pointless slaughter. At the
risk of irritating UnclePete, here's a 1969 letter to the New York Review
of Books by Stanley Hoffman, in response to Chomsky:
We do disagree on the subject of American objectives in
Vietnam. Professor Chomsky believes that they were wicked; I do
not. I believe that they were, in a way, far worse; for often the
greatest threat to moderation and peace, and certainly the most
insidious, comes from objectives that are couched in terms of fine
principles in which the policy-maker fervently believes, yet that
turn out to have no relation to political realities and can
therefore be applied only by tortuous or brutal methods which
broaden ad infinitum the gap between motives and effects. What
matters in international affairs, alas, far more than intentions
and objectives, is behavior and results. Because I do not believe
that our professed goals in Vietnam were obviously wicked,
Professor Chomsky "reads this as in essence an argument for the
legitimacy of military intervention." If he had not stopped his
quotation of my analysis where he did, he would have had to show
that my case against the war is exactly the opposite: "worthy
ends" divorced from local political realities lead to political
and moral disaster, just as British resistance to the American
revolution was bound to get bankrupt.
[http://www.nybooks.com/articles/11370]
*Not all problems can be solved*. That's what Robert McNamara failed
to understand. And that's why it's important for policymakers to know
what's possible and what's not, which requires a detailed knowledge
of "local political realities". It's not enough to identify one side
as the good guys, and to back them. That was the lesson that people
like Colin Powell learned from Vietnam.
I know that some people will disagree that it was impossible for the
US to win the Vietnam War. Here's what Hans Morgenthau had to say in
September 1965:
I have spoken of the prestige of the nation and of the prestige of
those who govern it, that is, of the mental image which others
have of us. Yet there is another kind of prestige: the image we
have of ourselves. That image will suffer grievous blemishes as we
get ever more deeply involved in the war in Vietnam. This war is a
guerrilla war, and such a war, supported or at least not opposed
by the indigenous population, can only be won by the
indiscriminate killing of everybody in sight, that is, by
genocide. The Germans proved that during the Second World War in
occupied Europe, and they were prevented from accomplishing their
task only because they were defeated in the field. The logic of
the issue we are facing in Vietnam has already driven us onto the
same path. We have tortured and killed prisoners; we have embarked
upon a scorched-earth policy by destroying villages and forests;
we have killed combatants and non-combatants without
discrimination because discrimination is impossible. And this is
only the beginning. For the logic of guerrilla war leaves us no
choice. We must go on torturing, killing, and burning, and the more
deeply we get involved in this war, the more there will be of it.
This brutalization of the Armed Forces would be a serious matter
for any nation, as the example of France has shown. It is
intolerable for the United States. For this nation, alone among
the nations of the world, was created for a particular purpose: to
achieve equality in freedom at home, and thereby set an example
for the world to emulate. This was the intention of the Founding
Fathers, and to this very day the world has taken them at their
word. It is exactly for this reason that our prestige has suffered
so disastrously among friend and foe alike; for the world did not
expect of us what it had come to expect of others.
[http://www.nybooks.com/articles/12776]
And he was right. Vietnam was what damaged the perception of the US
as the good guys, in the world as well as in the US. The Reagan-era
interventions in Central America only aggravated the problem.
UnclePete wants to know why I keep quoting people. Well, I wasn't
there, so I can't tell you anything from my own personal experience.
zztop8970
"UnclePete" <petib...@aol.comic> wrote in message
<snip>
> Do you think ifthe Palestinians had the same rigths and choices in
Israel as
> the Jews have and they had the saem standard of living, would they care to
tie
> bombs around themselves? They would be happy to live ever after, instead
of
> figthing.
Well, this is one question that requires no speculation at all - it has a
clear historical answer:
Arab terrorism against Jews started long before the occupation, and long
before any Israeli state existed.
The fact of the matter is, Arabs were slaughtering Jews in 1920, 1921, 1929
etc,, - long before anyone could claim their struggle had anything to do
with "same rigths and choices in Israel as the Jews have".
Furthermore, The Israeli-Arab conflict provides a remarkable examle that
shows that the struggle is NOT about standard of living: Prior to the
outreak of the intifada, during the yeras 1967-1987, the Arabs in the
occupied territories enjoyed a standard of living that was higher than that
of Arabs in the surrounding countries (Jordan, Syria, Egypt). It was also a
standard of living much higher than they enjoyed under Jordanian occupation
(in the years 1948-1967) - and still the violence erupted against Isarel,
and never did against the Jordanians.
UnclePete
>Consider the Vietnam War. The
>US had good *motives*, namely stopping North Vietnam from taking over
>South Vietnam
Why would it be GOOD motives to interfere with one country's inside matters?
>UnclePete wants to know why I keep quoting people. Well, I wasn't
>there, so I can't tell you anything from my own personal experience.
Well, it also doesn't hurt if you quote the right people. I guess there is a
huge difference between quoting an American General and a Vietnamese Peasant,
who just lost his family to a napalm attack.
UnclePete
>before any Israeli state existed.
>The fact of the matter is, Arabs were slaughtering Jews in 1920, 1921, 1929
Were rich Arabs slaugthering poor Jewish
farmers and settlers?
By the way, the first violences in Germany against Jews were the ones
against well ran Jewish businesses. So there is the envy factor.
>the struggle is NOT about standard of living: Prior to the
>outreak of the intifada, during the yeras 1967-1987, the Arabs in the
>occupied territories enjoyed a standard of living that was higher than that
>of Arabs in the surrounding countries (Jordan, Syria, Egypt).
Hello?? Wrong comparison. You have to compare the Palestinians with the Jews,
not Arabs with Arabs.
But I am not saying that one is not a complex issue and hate or religion
hasn't played any part in it. Of course it has.
zztop8970
"UnclePete" <petib...@aol.comic> wrote in message
> >Arab terrorism against Jews started long before the occupation, and long
> >before any Israeli state existed.
> >The fact of the matter is, Arabs were slaughtering Jews in 1920, 1921,
1929
>
> Were rich Arabs slaugthering poor Jewish
> farmers and settlers?
It was poor Arabs slaugthering equally poor Jewish farmers and settlers, but
that's beside the point. *YOU* claimed the conflict arose out of the fact
that Arabs aren't granted the same rights as Jews in Israel - and the
historical record shows the conflict started even before Israel existed,
hence your claim is false.
>
> By the way, the first violences in Germany against Jews were the ones
> against well ran Jewish businesses. So there is the envy factor.
>
> >the struggle is NOT about standard of living: Prior to the
> >outreak of the intifada, during the yeras 1967-1987, the Arabs in the
> >occupied territories enjoyed a standard of living that was higher than
that
> >of Arabs in the surrounding countries (Jordan, Syria, Egypt).
>
> Hello?? Wrong comparison. You have to compare the Palestinians with the
Jews,
> not Arabs with Arabs.
You are contradicting yourself. If the struggle is, as you claim, one of
poor vs. rich, one would expect the poor Palestinians to rise up against the
(relatively) rich Jordanians - which didn't happen. One would also expect
the poor Israeli Arabs to rise up against the rich Israeli Jews - again this
didn't happen. If we must limit ourself to a comparison of West Bank
Palestinians vs. Israeli Jews - it clearly shows that the struggle is NOT
about economic power at all.
>
> But I am not saying that one is not a complex issue and hate or religion
> hasn't played any part in it. Of course it has.
The point you are missing is that inter-cultural hate, religon and a
struggle for territory were the *main* causes of the conflict, and the
struggle between rich & poor played a secondary part, if at all.
>
Nark
> > "Russil Wvong" <russi...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > > Not that this is totally without basis, but Kennan's point is that
> > > trying to identify the good guys and the bad guys isn't a very
realistic
> > > or useful way of thinking about international politics.
> >
> > Why?
>
> Because a lot of the time there's no good guys and bad guys.
Are we required in EVERY case to either identify good guys/bad guys or not.
I think in the cases where we can, we can. Where we can't, we can't.
>
> > > Not sure what you're saying. Kennan points out that the US has a
tendency
> > > to lecture other countries on human rights and democracy, forgetting
that
> > > the US hasn't always done a great job itself; and suggests that it'd
be
> > > better for the US to stick to trying to provide a good example.
(Which,
> > > IMHO, it does do, despite its flaws.)
> >
> > Right. It seems that you are fighting your own recognition of the
truth;
> > that the US IS the beacon of freedom for the world.
>
> A lot of people don't see it that way, and so it might be better if
> the US refrained from the lecturing.
>
> Stephen Walt, writing on September 11:
>
> LESSON #2: THE UNITED STATES IS LESS POPULAR THAN IT THINKS
>
Again the mysterious "IT". On the one hand you can distinguish between
ideologies in the US and on the other you can't.
> Americans are prone to see their country as a "shining city on a
> hill" (as President Ronald Reagan liked to say)
true, so far.
> and often assume
> that other societies admire the United States and appreciate its
> global role.
Is there evidence for this statement? I don't personally think this way.
In fact, I recognize, from having travelled extensively, that most of the
world despises the US. But this, I believe, is mostly out of jealousy.
> Yet both the September 11 attacks and the
> international response to them underscore the degree to which
> many people outside the United States are actually ambivalent
> about the U.S. position in the world.
I think many people in the US accept this as reality. I don't know who it
is that you claim believes that we are popular. Maybe you can expand on
this.
Nark
"UnclePete" <petib...@aol.comic> wrote in message
What did I steal?
>
>
UnclePete
>that Arabs aren't granted the same rights as Jews in Israel
And that entirely possible that different conflicts have different reasons.
So Arabs could have slaugthers Jews 80 years ago for a different reason.
>You are contradicting yourself.
I seldom do. :)
> If the struggle is, as you claim, one of
>poor vs. rich,
I think I mentioned that the conflict has a few roots not just one.
>one would expect the poor Palestinians to rise up against the
>(relatively) rich Jordanians
How do you know they wouldn't, if you take out the Jews of the problem? Of
course when there is a scapegoat for your problems, you blame the scapegoat
first.
> it clearly shows that the struggle is NOT
>about economic power at all.
Well, who occupies what territory is part of the economic set up.
>The point you are missing is that inter-cultural hate, religon and a
>struggle for territory were the *main* causes of the conflict,
Right, since we are talking about farmers here, territory also means
economics.
and the
>struggle between rich & poor played a secondary part, if at all.
I think we already been here.
UnclePete
>
>What did I steal?
I can sense a little problem here with understanding parallels. :)
zztop8970-
> > *YOU* claimed the conflict arose out of the fact
> >that Arabs aren't granted the same rights as Jews in Israel
>
> And that entirely possible that different conflicts have different reasons.
> So Arabs could have slaugthers Jews 80 years ago for a different reason.
If that is your current claim, the onus is on YOU to prove that the
conflict today is a different one than the one we had 80 yeras ago.
Feel free to post evidence to support this interesting hypothesis,
which is not claimed by any party to the conflict, AFAIK.
>
> >You are contradicting yourself.
>
> I seldom do. :)
No, you often do. You are seldom made aware of it, though.
>
> > If the struggle is, as you claim, one of
> >poor vs. rich,
>
> I think I mentioned that the conflict has a few roots not just one.
>
> >one would expect the poor Palestinians to rise up against the
> >(relatively) rich Jordanians
>
> How do you know they wouldn't, if you take out the Jews of the problem?
Because history shows they didn't. If you have to take out the Jews,
it shows the Jews are the problem.
> of
> course when there is a scapegoat for your problems, you blame the scapegoat
> first.
>
> > it clearly shows that the struggle is NOT
> >about economic power at all.
>
> Well, who occupies what territory is part of the economic set up.
Yup. and I've shown you that when Jordanians occupied th esame
territory, no one rose up against them. That shows the territory in
question is not really the problem, but the racial or cultural
backgroud of the occupiers IS.
>
> >The point you are missing is that inter-cultural hate, religon and a
> >struggle for territory were the *main* causes of the conflict,
>
> Right, since we are talking about farmers here, territory also means
> economics.
First of all, we're not talking about farmers. The majority of the
population, both in Israel and the West bank, is (and was) primarily
urban, and the economy of the region depends far more on industry and
services than on agriculture.
Second,I have shown you that when the same territory was in Jordanian
hands, no one rose against them, which shows that land distribution is
a secondary root cuase (if that), to cutural animosity.
>
> and the
> >struggle between rich & poor played a secondary part, if at all.
>
> I think we already been here.
Indeed. Open your eyes and see that your arguments are baseless.
Russil Wvong
> "Siggy" <nospamr...@home.com> wrote:
> > > I've written up a critical review of Chomsky's political writings, at
> > >
> > > http://www.geocities.com/rwvong/future/chomsky.html
> >
> > Thankyou Russil,
> >
> > I'll check it out this weekend.
>
> So what did you think, Siggy? (If you don't have time to read it,
> you might try skimming it.)
Siggy?
Russil Wvong
> Russil Wvong wrote:
> >What exactly do you mean by "economics"? It looks like your conception
> >is general enough to include territory and power.
>
> Yes. After all until industrialization territory equaled wealth and
> more or less power.
In that case I don't think our views are so far apart: some countries
fight to maintain the status quo (to keep what they have), some
countries fight to overthrow the status quo (to take what others
have). Note, however, that there's a difference between territory
and wealth: wealth is interchangeable, territory isn't. Palestine,
Kashmir, and Kosovo aren't fought over because they'll produce wealth.
> >History is complicated;
>
> I don't neccessary think so. History is basicly what happened when.
> Now how you evaluate that, that is a different question.
Even to find out what happened isn't as simple as you think. How do
you find out what happened in the Six-Day War in 1967, for example?
You look it up in a book. But what happens if someone else looks up
another book and it says something different? Given the existence of
partisanship, propaganda, and lies, how do you know which one's
correct? (What I try to do is triangulate, checking the reliability
of a source by finding out what other people have to say about it.)
And to "evaluate" means looking at *why* events happened. Of course
there'll be a number of different factors, but which ones were more
important? Which ones were less important? (Which is what we're doing
here, in arguing about economic interests vs. power or fear.) I'd
be wary of any theory that claims to provide a simple answer in all
cases, e.g. Lenin's theory that wars are primarily motivated by
economic interests.
I can't claim to be smarter than anyone else. That's why I look up
what other people have to say about these issues.
Regarding the Vietnam War: the US was trying to keep South Vietnam
from coming under Communist control, as in the Korean War -- as usual,
trying to maintain the status quo. I don't think the problem was
their motives, the problem was that they didn't know anything about
what was possible and what wasn't possible in Vietnam. They didn't
realize that it was impossible to achieve their objectives without
killing millions of people. That's the kind of war that's difficult
or impossible to explain through economic motives. (Chomsky gamely
tries to explain that the US was motivated by wanting to ensure that
Japan could exploit Southeast Asia's natural resources, and that the
US really did achieve its objectives, although not its maximal
objectives. I didn't find his explanation particularly plausible.)
Russil Wvong
> "Russil Wvong" <russi...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > Because a lot of the time there's no good guys and bad guys.
>
> Are we required in EVERY case to either identify good guys/bad guys or not.
> I think in the cases where we can, we can. Where we can't, we can't.
In most cases, we can't. The main problem is to figure out how to
maintain stability, not to determine which side is right or wrong.
> > and often assume
> > that other societies admire the United States and appreciate its
> > global role.
>
> Is there evidence for this statement? I don't personally think this way.
> In fact, I recognize, from having travelled extensively, that most of the
> world despises the US. But this, I believe, is mostly out of jealousy.
You may be right; I think fear and blame are also factors. But this is
why I'm saying that a lot of people don't see the US as the "beacon of
freedom for the world."
John Paton Davies, Jr., comments in "Foreign and Other Affairs" that
Americans believe that it's important for the US to be liked abroad
(of course this is commenting on a fictitious monolithic opinion).
His suggestion is that it's more important for the US to be
*respected*. Jealousy and blaming are human nature and can't be
avoided.
Joseph Michael Bay
>Regarding the Vietnam War: the US was trying to keep South Vietnam
>from coming under Communist control, as in the Korean War -- as usual,
>trying to maintain the status quo. I don't think the problem was
>their motives, the problem was that they didn't know anything about
>what was possible and what wasn't possible in Vietnam. They didn't
>realize that it was impossible to achieve their objectives without
>killing millions of people. That's the kind of war that's difficult
>or impossible to explain through economic motives. (Chomsky gamely
>tries to explain that the US was motivated by wanting to ensure that
>Japan could exploit Southeast Asia's natural resources, and that the
>US really did achieve its objectives, although not its maximal
>objectives. I didn't find his explanation particularly plausible.)
I thought Chomsky's take on the war in Vietnam was that the US
achieved the goal of preventing "independent economic development"
from going on there, which would have served as a model to other
countries in the region. I'm not really sure how "independent"
the development would have been, had it happened.
--
Joseph M. Bay Lamont Sanford Junior University
Putting the "harm" in molecular pharmacology since 1998
When crime is outlawed, only outlaws will commit crimes.
LEGALIZE http://www.stanford.edu/~jmbay CRIME
Russil Wvong
> russi...@yahoo.com (Russil Wvong) writes:
> >(Chomsky gamely tries [to explain the Vietnam War, by saying]
> >that the US was motivated by wanting to ensure that
> >Japan could exploit Southeast Asia's natural resources, and that the
> >US really did achieve its objectives, although not its maximal
> >objectives. I didn't find his explanation particularly plausible.)
>
> I thought Chomsky's take on the war in Vietnam was that the US
> achieved the goal of preventing "independent economic development"
> from going on there, which would have served as a model to other
> countries in the region.
Yes, he says that the US was trying to ensure that Vietnam wouldn't
be able to develop successfully outside the capitalist-dominated
international trading system, which would have encouraged its
neighbors -- e.g. Thailand -- to follow. (Needless to say, that
certainly wasn't what US leaders *thought* they were doing; it's
easy to check this by reading their memoirs. Chomsky's theory
doesn't make any sense to me: why bother, considering that Russia
and China were already providing Communist models of economic
development?)
> I'm not really sure how "independent"
> the development would have been, had it happened.
Russil Wvong
Vancouver, Canada
www.geocities.com/rwvong
UnclePete
>Palestine,
>Kashmir, and Kosovo aren't fought over because they'll produce wealth.
Of course one needs something like Lebensraum too.
>Even to find out what happened isn't as simple as you think.
Sure. But that's why you have comon sense. To think seriously, that Vietnam
attacked the US or Poland attacked Germany....
> How do
>you find out what happened in the Six-Day War in 1967, for example?
>You look it up in a book.
Sure. The trick is to look up 2-3 different point of views. And always ask
the basic question: whose interest was it?
> Given the existence of
>partisanship, propaganda, and lies, how do you know which one's
>correct?
Well, after a while you will know which source to trust. Though it takes
practice. :)
>And to "evaluate" means looking at *why* events happened.
Correct. And that's where the problem arouses with current events, because
the media seldom gives us the correct answer.
> e.g. Lenin's theory that wars are primarily motivated by
>economic interests.
When the Crusaders said: Hey why don't we go to the holy land and free it
from the infidels? That was a religious reason, but ransacking everything on
the way there, that was economics. :)
>Regarding the Vietnam War
I have a theory why empires go to wars, maybe I should write a post about it.
UnclePete
>If that is your current claim, the onus is on YOU to prove that the
>conflict today is a different one than the one we had 80 yeras ago.
Or I could just turn it over to you, and say: if this is your current claim,
the onus is on you to prove that the conflict today is the same as we had 80
years ago. :)
But anyway, I was arguing theoretically on that one.
>Because history shows they didn't. If you have to take out the Jews,
>it shows the Jews are the problem.
Sure, Arabs never fought with each others.
Again, I am not saying that the different
religion and ethnicity is not a problem.
> That shows the territory in
>question is not really the problem, but the racial or cultural
>backgroud of the occupiers IS.
Well, if you read the history of Palestine, you see, that the immigrant
Zionists started to take over land, groving in numbers and influence. So yes,
territory and who controls it is part of the problem.
>First of all, we're not talking about farmers.
Sure we are. At least historically speaking.
1878
First Zionist settlement (Petach Tiqva) established under the guise of
agricultural community.
>which shows that land distribution is
>a secondary root cuase (if that), to cutural animosity.
By the way, what are we arguing about here?
Nark
"UnclePete" <petib...@aol.comic> wrote in message
So are you arguing, that because other people did not steal, that you,
therefore, cannot steal? Equally inane and irrelevant.
Nark
> "Nark" <bar...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > "Russil Wvong" <russi...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > > Because a lot of the time there's no good guys and bad guys.
> >
> > Are we required in EVERY case to either identify good guys/bad guys or
not.
> > I think in the cases where we can, we can. Where we can't, we can't.
>
> In most cases, we can't. The main problem is to figure out how to
> maintain stability, not to determine which side is right or wrong.
Just as in any case of wrongdoing within our borders, the police try to
determine right or wrong. Any objective observer must first try to
determine these things in order to adequately assess the situation. Think
of it this way; when critics of the US criticize previous questionable acts
of the US, this is precisely what they're doing. It is a helpful tool.
>
> > > and often assume
> > > that other societies admire the United States and appreciate its
> > > global role.
> >
> > Is there evidence for this statement? I don't personally think this
way.
> > In fact, I recognize, from having travelled extensively, that most of
the
> > world despises the US. But this, I believe, is mostly out of jealousy.
>
> You may be right; I think fear and blame are also factors. But this is
> why I'm saying that a lot of people don't see the US as the "beacon of
> freedom for the world."
Thanks for clarifying. Previously I thought you were saying that the US
wasn't the champion of freedom, rather than "a lot of people don't see the
US as...."
Russil Wvong
> Russil Wvong wrote:
> >you find out what happened in the Six-Day War in 1967, for example?
> >You look it up in a book.
>
> Sure. The trick is to look up 2-3 different point of views.
Right. That's what I try to do, anyway.
> > Given the existence of
> >partisanship, propaganda, and lies, how do you know which one's
> >correct?
>
> Well, after a while you will know which source to trust. Though it takes
> practice. :)
Sure. In particular, I'll check the trustworthiness of a source that
I'm unfamiliar with by checking references, and finding out what
other people have to say about it. In the case of Chomsky, one of
the main reasons I distrust Chomsky is that when I check his references,
I often find that he's misrepresenting them. (For details, see
www.geocities.com/rwvong/future/chomsky.html.)
> >And to "evaluate" means looking at *why* events happened.
>
> Correct. And that's where the problem arouses with current events,
> because the media seldom gives us the correct answer.
I totally agree. I think television is completely unsuited to discussion
of complex issues, by its very nature: its tendency to focus on
individuals and personalities, its need for striking visual images.
But if the media doesn't give us the correct answer, we still need some
kind of explanatory framework: a theory of international politics, in
other words, whether it's provided by Lenin, Morgenthau, or Chomsky.
And from having read both Morgenthau and Chomsky, I think Morgenthau
is right (more or less), and Chomsky is wrong.
> > e.g. Lenin's theory that wars are primarily motivated by
> >economic interests.
>
> When the Crusaders said: Hey why don't we go to the holy land and free it
> from the infidels? That was a religious reason, but ransacking everything on
> the way there, that was economics. :)
I'm afraid I have to bring up the standard criticism of economics:
people aren't as rationally self-interested as economic theory assumes. :-)
> I have a theory why empires go to wars, maybe I should write a post
> about it.
Sure, let's hear it.
Russil Wvong
Vancouver, Canada
www.geocities.com/rwvong
UnclePete
>therefore, cannot steal? Equally inane and irrelevant.
Quite honestly, the logic doesn't work this way.
Bernard Rooney
russi...@yahoo.com (Russil Wvong) wrote:
>
> I've written up a critical review of Chomsky's political writings, at
>
> http://www.geocities.com/rwvong/future/chomsky.html
This is a more worthwhile critique than some I've seen.
> 3.1. Political philosophy
>
> I think Chomsky's point of view is best understood as revolutionary
> anarchism, based on Marxism, but also anti-Leninist (like Rosa
> Luxemburg).
I'm not sure that Chomsky is that much enamoured of revolution (the
romantic appeal of this concept/practice completely escapes me). Ever
since the French revolution we seem to have had one generation after
another growing up with the concept that there will be a revolution, it
will be incredibly exciting, wonderful things will happen. What a
delusion. And the madness is not entirely over even yet.
Chomsky's methods and practices seem to be more in the nature of
political activism of a non-violent sort.
Also not sure how much he is interested in Marx/marxism either. (dont
get me going on this massively overrated guy). Socialism, yes.
Socialism in the sense of the right of the community to arrange its
affairs for its own benefit, rather than the benefit of the few.
Socialism in the "feel good" sense but without concrete economic
analysis (marxist economic analysis rejected as fallacious). Chomsky
himself has said marx didnt have that much interesting to say. Also he
describes his own philosophy as "libertarian socialism", an awkward
construction it seems to me.
Anti-leninist (anti-marxist for that matter), very much so. Due to his
anarchism. I think the anarchism is the key influence. The distrust of
power, and the suspicion about the professed motives of power (orwell).
I prefer to describe his philsophy as philosophical anarchism, or just
anarchism.
>Popular
> revolution by the proletariat against the state is inevitable (in this
> view),
I'm unconvinced that Chomsky is really interested in these awfully
tired marxists concepts of the "inevitability" of the "popular
revolution" and the like.
> In Chomsky's view, the US and USSR were both ruthless and morally
> bankrupt, with the US being no less evil than the USSR,
I'm not sure that he would say the US is "no less evil" than the USSR.
Evil, yes, especially numerous foreign policy adventures, but Stalin
was pretty evil as far as 'evil' goes. Also Chomsky has repeatedly
stated that the US enjoys many valuable freedoms and privileges,
wealth, opportunity etc.
>
> Nathan Folkert (formerly a Chomsky supporter) points out that Chomsky,
> although supposedly opposed to state terror and violence, has in the
> past made
> excuses for China under Mao, presumably because he saw it as a popular
> revolutionary regime. Nathan was referring to a NYC panel discussion in
> December 1967, which included Hannah Arendt (The Origins of
> Totalitarianism). For the most part, Chomsky argues for non-violence,
> but he also
> presents a number of arguments justifying violence. The contrast
> between Arendt's position and Chomsky's position is striking.
I do get an impression that over the years Chomsky has flirted less
and less with the marxist and revolutionary left movements. His later
writings (from say Fateful Triangle) have got nothing to do with those
fallacies.
> CHOMSKY: Let me make just a couple of quick comments. Dr. Arendt
> takes rather an absolutist view, that I don't share, about certain
> historical phenomena such as the character of the new societies
> that have emerged. I don't feel that they deserve a blanket
> condemnation at
> all. There are many things to object to in any society. But take
> China, modern China; one also finds many things that are really quite
> admirable. Many things, in fact, do meet the sort of
> Luxembourgian conditions [referring to Rosa Luxembourg] that apparently
> Dr. Arendt
> and I agree about. There are even better examples than China.
> But I do think that China is an important example of a new society in
> which
> very interesting positive things happened at the local level, in
> which a good deal of the collectivization and communization was really
> based
> on mass participation and took place after a level of
> understanding had been reached in the peasantry that led to this next
> step.
Nothing wrong with these statements about China. They may well be true.
Its said that the Chinese communists undertook the largest land reform
in human history, better and more successful than the Russian one,
which was a real debacle under the influence of stalin and marxist
"collectivization". But it doesnt excuse Maoist murder.
> Chomsky argues that international politics is primarily driven by the
> interests (particularly the economic interests) of elites. From
> Deterring Democracy:
>
> ... the political leadership has undermined possibilities for
> political settlement and fostered conflict in regions where such
> conflict could lead
> to a devastating nuclear war, and has sometimes come all too
> close--notably the Middle East. These consistent patterns make no sense
> on
> the assumption that security policy is guided by security
> concerns. Case by case, they fall into place on the assumption that
> policy is driven
> by the twin goals of reinforcing the private interests that
> control the state, and maintaining an international environment in
> which they can
> prosper.
Chomsky provides a heap of evidence about this, its pretty convincing
to me. His summary is "hegemony is more important than survivial".
Makes sense, doesnt it?
> 3.3. Brainwashing
>
> Chomsky argues that in the bourgeois democracy of the US, the American
> elite only maintains its legitimacy through a kind of self-brainwashing
> which differs from Soviet totalitarianism only by being more subtle and more
> effective.
This view is developed in "Manufacturing Consent", perhaps his single
most important book. Its one of his greatest contributions, and the
propaganda model is something that will weigh heavily on our minds in
the 21st C, it seems to me. I confess myself to be convinced the model
exists and operates, no small matter.
> 3.4. Chomsky's unreliability
>
> Perhaps the biggest problem I have with Chomsky is that he's an
> unreliable source of historical information
He seems to provide a wealth of sources and information. But perhaps
there is a tendency always to select information that exposes the
"dark side." This is not necessarily 'unreliable'. Also all his
writings are in the context of the (mis-)information of the propaganda
system. Thus they have a slightly peculiar angle, and might not pass as
straight 'history'.
> Mr. Chomsky writes as follows:
>
> Writing in Foreign Affairs, he [Huntington] explains that
> the Viet Cong is "a powerful force which cannot be dislodged
> from its constituency so long as the constituency
> continues to exist." The conclusion is obvious, and he does not shrink
> from it. We can ensure that the constituency ceases to
> exist by "direct application of mechanical and conventional
> power...on such a massive scale as to produce a massive
> migration from countryside to city...."
Chomsky cuts through the bull and gets to the point. The point,
afterall, which Huntington himself has stated. What's 'unreliable'
about this? And doesnt it describe the conduct of the war against South
Vietnam?
> In 1996, Ada Aharoni asked why Chomsky opposed the Middle East peace
> process:
>
> Chomsky's criticism of the Peace Process as damaging the Arab
> cause implies an attack on the wisdom and integrity of most of the Arab
> governments, as well as on Mr. Yasser Arafat and the
> Palestinians, since they accept and are actively involved in the Peace
> Process. They
> find this process in agreement with Arab aspirations, and are
> not convinced by Chomsky line of cynical and destructive criticism, nor
> his
> role of a self-appointed defender of Arab interests.
Chomsky's views about Palestine and the 'Peace Process' are outlined in
his book, Fateful Triangle. This is another devastating work. The main
thesis is the consistent rejectionism of US/Israel. Its hard not to
agree with what is virtually the obvious once it is pointed out.
> Chomsky knifes the immensely more thoughtful philosopher Michael
> Walzer, who urges confrontation
> with and rejection of "all the arguments and excuses for
> terrorism." Rather than accept Walzer's stance as a considered moral
> position - the
> view that a ban on killing innocents should anchor any coherent
> morality - Chomsky disingenuously writes, vis-a-vis Walzer's position:
> "[I]n effect, this translates as a call to reject efforts to
> explore the reasons that lie behind terrorist acts that are directed
> against states he
> supports."
"Immensely more thoughtful philosopher's considered moral opinion"??
That's a joke. Maybe something you could say to a 4year old. Chomsky's
rejoinder to Walzer's inanity is straight to the point.
D.Teale
>
> I totally agree. I think television is completely unsuited to discussion
> of complex issues, by its very nature: its tendency to focus on
> individuals and personalities, its need for striking visual images.
>
> But if the media doesn't give us the correct answer, we still need some
> kind of explanatory framework: a theory of international politics, in
> other words, whether it's provided by Lenin, Morgenthau, or Chomsky.
> And from having read both Morgenthau and Chomsky, I think Morgenthau
> is right (more or less), and Chomsky is wrong.
>
Hi, [true story to follow]
Not to but in, but I have a nice story to relate to the group. One of the
professors at my university that has been around for years often tells an
interesting story. It goes like this: a few years back he was visiting
Ottawa, during his visit he had dinner with one of his former students. This
student had acquired a job with the official opposition and therefore had a
lot of stories to tell. So as the Prof. and former student enjoyed dinner
and discussed various things, time passed quickly, suddenly it was 9:30 and
the former student reluctantly mentioned that he had to leave. The student
said that because of his job he had to go home in order to watch the
national news; part of his job was to watch the news and brief the
opposition members on what questions to give to the gov't during
parliamentary debate. The old Prof. understood and bade farewell, after
paying up, they went their separate ways. As the Prof. walked down the
street to his hotel, happenstance pounced on him, he ran into another former
student. This student had just graduated a couple years prior and had been
working with the gov't in Ottawa ever since. Of course the two engaged in a
short conversation; now, as they spoke, the student seemed to be somewhat
anxious, until finally he mentioned that he must be going, when the prof
wondered why, the student replied "I really must be going, I have to go home
and catch the news so that I can brief the minister on what the opposition
will ask tomorrow".
Well I'm no story teller, but the moral comes through.
Russil Wvong
> Thanks for clarifying. Previously I thought you were saying that the US
> wasn't the champion of freedom, rather than "a lot of people don't see the
> US as...."
It depends where you look. In Western Europe and Japan -- which were,
after all, the cornerstones of US foreign policy after World War II --
I think the US can fairly be described as the champion of freedom,
both helping to rebuild Western Europe (through the Marshall Plan) and
Japan, and defending them from the Soviet Union via NATO and the
US-Japan alliance. I think the most remarkable achievement of US
foreign policy after World War II is that both Germany and Japan are
now stable, democratic, prosperous countries.
Canada, of course, relied on both US military protection and US
markets. I don't know enough about Australia and New Zealand
to comment.
In Asia, the picture is more mixed. Generally speaking, the US
supported anti-Communist regimes, regardless of whether they
were democracies or dictatorships, and regardless of their
respect for human rights or democracy: South Korea, South Vietnam,
Taiwan, Thailand, and the Philippines, for example. South Korea,
Taiwan, and Thailand are doing pretty well. The Philippines looks
shaky. In Vietnam, of course, the US sank into a quagmire: failing
to recognize the limits of military power, US leaders were unable
to either win the war or admit defeat, and ended up killing millions
of people and alienating their own citizens.
In Latin America, US foreign policy after World War II swung back
and forth between the pessimistic policy of supporting dictators,
based on the idea that dictatorships were the only way to provide
stability during the disruptive process of economic development
(see "Foreign and Other Affairs", by John P. Davies, Jr.), and the
optimistic policy of supporting social democrats (see "A Thousand
Days", by Arthur Schlesinger). Kennedy's Alliance for Progress,
which was supposed to do for Latin America what the Marshall Plan
did for Europe, was a failure. The US also organized the overthrow
of Arbenz in Guatemala; destabilized Allende's government in Chile,
which was eventually overthrown by Pinochet, after Allende
expropriated US-owned copper mines; and organized the Contras,
which attempted to overthrow the Sandinista government in Nicaragua.
Worst of all, the US secretly trained Latin American military
personnel in "counter-insurgency" techniques, notably torture and
summary execution (influenced by the French experience fighting
guerrillas in Indochina and Algeria).
In the Middle East, for the most part, the US left matters to
Britain. The US and Britain jointly overthrew Mossadeq in Iran
in 1953; otherwise, the US didn't really get involved until the
Suez Crisis in 1956, when it intervened on behalf of Egypt and
forced Britain, France, and Israel to withdraw. The two pillars
of US foreign policy in the Middle East were Iran (under the
Shah) and Saudi Arabia, both repressive regimes; Turkey, a NATO
member, has also violated the human rights of its citizens,
notably its Kurdish minority. (US intervention did help to
prevent the wars in 1967 and 1973 from escalating, Carter
helped to negotiate peace between Israel and Egypt, and Clinton
made a valiant attempt to bring about peace between Israel and
the Palestinians.)
I don't know enough about Africa to make any intelligent comments.
The US helped to set up the UN, but has become disillusioned with
its effectiveness. (Morgenthau describes how this happened: first
the Security Council was paralyzed by the Soviet veto, then the
General Assembly was paralyzed by the non-aligned movement, and
finally the Secretary-General was paralyzed by France and the
Soviet Union's refusal to pay for peacekeeping.)
To summarize, I think the two most important accomplishments of
US foreign policy during the Cold War were (a) rebuilding Western
Europe and Japan, and (b) avoiding war with the Soviet Union,
particularly nuclear war. But in Latin America, the Middle East,
South Asia, and Africa, people suffer a great deal under the
existing status quo, and at least in Latin America and the Middle
East, the US has had a significant role in maintaining this status
quo.
I hope you'll accept this as a fair picture of US foreign policy after
World War II. I don't think US foreign policy is as evil as Chomsky
portrays it, but neither do I think that it's as virtuous as CNN
portrays it, either.
> > In most cases, we can't. The main problem is to figure out how to
> > maintain stability, not to determine which side is right or wrong.
>
> Just as in any case of wrongdoing within our borders, the police try to
> determine right or wrong. Any objective observer must first try to
> determine these things in order to adequately assess the situation. Think
> of it this way; when critics of the US criticize previous questionable acts
> of the US, this is precisely what they're doing. It is a helpful tool.
I'm afraid domestic and international law are entirely different.
The vast majority of people in the US accept the legitimacy of
domestic law; that's not the case at all when it comes to
international conflict. (For example, under international law,
borders cannot be changed by force; I don't think either Israeli
leaders or their antagonists accept this.) In the absence of
agreed-upon rules, concepts of right and wrong don't have much
force. That's why the balance of power is so important. See
http://www.unnu.com/newhome/Gallery/etexts/globaljustice.htm.
D.Teale
> > Thanks for clarifying. Previously I thought you were saying that the US
> > wasn't the champion of freedom, rather than "a lot of people don't see
the
> > US as...."
>
> It depends where you look. In Western Europe and Japan -- which were,
> after all, the cornerstones of US foreign policy after World War II --
> I think the US can fairly be described as the champion of freedom,
> both helping to rebuild Western Europe (through the Marshall Plan) and
> Japan, and defending them from the Soviet Union via NATO and the
> US-Japan alliance. I think the most remarkable achievement of US
> foreign policy after World War II is that both Germany and Japan are
> now stable, democratic, prosperous countries.
>
Well the circumstances surrounding Japan and Germany's post-war success is
drastically different than any modern foreign policy pursured by the US.
Germany had millions in debt forgiven and massive financial investment from
the international community (drastically different from the modern status
quo that sees the IMF demanding interesting payments at the expense of
social programs). Japan's success was based mostly on their domestic policy
which transferred all of the focus from military to technology and education
(not quite as drastic as the current scenario that sees millions in arms
sales to troubled nations and the influx of sweat shop labor, but very much
different).
> Canada, of course, relied on both US military protection and US
> markets. I don't know enough about Australia and New Zealand
> to comment.
>
Following the WWII, Canada had the third largest fleet in the world and was
prepared to become a major player in int'l shipping. For a well documented
and illustrative account of the unionization of longshoremen and ship-hands
by US mob-related unions that eventually crippled the Canadian shipping
industry see _The Fight For Canada_ by David Orchard. Similarily one may
turn to the better known example of the Avro Arrow, a symbol of
Diefenbaker's entirely submissive gov't.
You forgot to mention the attempt to overthrow Castro in Cuba, the support
of Haitian dictatorship, and left out the the name of 'The School of the
Americas' (now the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation
(WHISC)) where various bad guys have trained, the most notable being the
friend turned enemy du jour, Noriega.
I'm sure there is more.
<snip>
> To summarize, I think the two most important accomplishments of
> US foreign policy during the Cold War were (a) rebuilding Western
> Europe and Japan,
An accomplishment that cannot easily be credited to US foreign policy
outside of its conduciveness.
and (b) avoiding war with the Soviet Union,
> particularly nuclear war.
Close call.
But in Latin America, the Middle East,
> South Asia, and Africa, people suffer a great deal under the
> existing status quo, and at least in Latin America and the Middle
> East, the US has had a significant role in maintaining this status
> quo.
>
Perpetuating the hierarchy is a nice rendition of this trend.
> I hope you'll accept this as a fair picture of US foreign policy after
> World War II. I don't think US foreign policy is as evil as Chomsky
> portrays it, but neither do I think that it's as virtuous as CNN
> portrays it, either.
>
Leaning more towards the Chomsky in effects, slightly less so in motive.
> > > In most cases, we can't. The main problem is to figure out how to
> > > maintain stability, not to determine which side is right or wrong.
> >
> > Just as in any case of wrongdoing within our borders, the police try to
> > determine right or wrong. Any objective observer must first try to
> > determine these things in order to adequately assess the situation.
Think
> > of it this way; when critics of the US criticize previous questionable
acts
> > of the US, this is precisely what they're doing. It is a helpful tool.
>
> I'm afraid domestic and international law are entirely different.
> The vast majority of people in the US accept the legitimacy of
> domestic law; that's not the case at all when it comes to
> international conflict. (For example, under international law,
> borders cannot be changed by force; I don't think either Israeli
> leaders or their antagonists accept this.) In the absence of
> agreed-upon rules, concepts of right and wrong don't have much
> force. That's why the balance of power is so important. See
> http://www.unnu.com/newhome/Gallery/etexts/globaljustice.htm.
>
Agreed, on an international level nearly everything is relative, leaving
power to run its course.
Justin Felux
meaning to have a discussion about for a while.
Russil Wvong:
> It depends where you look. In Western Europe and Japan -- which were,
> after all, the cornerstones of US foreign policy after World War II --
> I think the US can fairly be described as the champion of freedom,
> both helping to rebuild Western Europe (through the Marshall Plan) and
> Japan, and defending them from the Soviet Union via NATO and the
> US-Japan alliance. I think the most remarkable achievement of US
> foreign policy after World War II is that both Germany and Japan are
> now stable, democratic, prosperous countries.
While it is true that the Marshall Plan and activities in Japan following
the war had humanitarian _consequences_, I think it is questionable whether
or not the programs implemented had humanitarian aims. This is often the
case when it comes to U.S. humanitarian aid (real humanitarian aid--not the
kind that involves weapons sales). I haven't done much reading on this
subject, mind you. But what I have read gives me the impression that
following World War II, the fascist resistance in Europe had a very strong
political following (these are people on the far left... socialists,
syndicalists, etc.) These groups were denied aid. The only logical reason
I can think of for this would be that the Marshall Plan's ultimate goal was
to save western capitalism, not help people. Although it obviously did so.
As for Japan, well, I'm not very informed on that subject either. But I do
remember reading some scathing criticisms of the U.S. occupying army. You
know what? I'll just find the places I got this stuff from and paste it
here. . .
Chomsky:
The favored illustration of "generosity and goodwill" is the Marshall Plan.
That merits examination, on the "strongest case" principle. The inquiry
again quickly yields facts "that `it wouldn't do' to mention." For example,
the fact that "as the Marshall Plan went into full gear the amount of
American dollars being pumped into France and the Netherlands was
approximately equaled by the funds being siphoned from their treasuries to
finance their expeditionary forces in Southeast Asia," to carry out terrible
crimes. And that the tied aid provisions help explain why the U.S. share in
world trade in grains increased from less than 10% before the war to more
than half by 1950, while Argentine exports reduced by two-thirds. And that
under U.S. influence Europe was reconstructed in a particular mode, not
quite that sought by the anti-fascist resistance, though fascist and Nazi
collaborators were generally satisfied. And that the generosity was
overwhelmingly bestowed by American taxpayers upon the corporate sector,
which was duly appreciative, recognizing years later that the Marshall Plan
"set the stage for large amounts of private U.S. direct investment in
Europe," establishing the basis for the modern Transnational Corporations,
which "prospered and expanded on overseas orders,...fueled initially by the
dollars of the Marshall Plan" and protected from "negative developments" by
"the umbrella of American power."
And on Japan...
The Destruction, Resurrection, and Eclipse of Japan
By PAUL SIEGEL
John W. Dower's "Embracing Defeat" won the Pulitzer Prize and the National
Book Award for 1999 non-fiction. These prizes were richly deserved.
"Embracing Defeat" explains much about what has made present-day Japan what
it is-and indeed, although Dower does not explicitly draw such conclusions,
about what has made the contemporary world what it is. Marxists and other
radical critics of capitalism can learn many valuable lessons from it.
Dower, generally conceded by scholars in the field to be the foremost
historian of post-war Japan, has engaged in extraordinary research, using
Japanese archives, academic studies, and forms of popular
culture-newspapers, films, song lyrics, best-selling books, private
correspondence-to exhibit swift-changing currents and cross-currents of
Japanese thought and feeling under the American occupation.
Acclaimed by fellow historians, his book, vividly written, makes fascinating
reading for the non-specialist as well as the specialist.
The American occupation authorities were utterly taken aback by the enormity
of the destruction that had been wreaked on Japan and marvelled that the
Japanese government had held out as long as it did. They were equally
surprised by the response of the Japanese people, not at all in keeping with
the notion put forward by their "experts" of a people that had been
thoroughly robotized by the governing militarists and incapable of acting on
its own.
Their lives shattered, exhausted, despairing, disgusted by the plunder of
military stockpiles and the diverting of public resources by members of the
military and civilian elite in the wake of defeat, the Japanese masses
rejected the ultranationalistic concepts with which they had been
indoctrinated. A Japanese police report expressed fear of the mass mood as
one of "grave distrust, frustration, and antipathy toward military and
civilian leaders."
The Japanese, therefore, welcomed as liberators the Americans-who,
determined to smash the Japanese military machine, promised peace and
democracy. The occupation authorities, however, while maintaining absolute
power, ruled through the existing governmental and social elite, purged of
the militarists.
Although the occupying authority, intent on "rooting out" militarism through
"democratization," instituted many democratic reforms, the huge occupation
force by its own existence negated these reforms.
"While the victors preached democracy," Dower points out, "they ruled by
fiat; while they espoused equality, they themselves constituted an in-
violate privileged cast. ... [A]lmost every interaction between victor and
vanquished was infused with intimations of white supremacism."
At the same time that the Supreme Commander, as General MacArthur was
called, spoke about freedom of the press, his headquarters maintained a
tight censorship of the Japanese media. They were not permitted to criticize
occupation policies, to say anything negative about the victors, or even to
mention that the censorship existed.
When a newspaper editorial stated that "the way to express the gratitude of
the Japanese people toward General MacArthur for his efforts to democratize
the nation is not to worship him as a god," the newspaper was, although it
had gotten through the censorship, confiscated by the American military
police.
The Supreme Commander ruled in a kind of double sovereignty with Emperor
Hirohito. During the war MacArthur had been governed in his propaganda
directed to the Japanese people by an internal memorandum that counseled
"the driving of a wedge between the Emperor and the people on the one hand,
and the Tokyo gangster militarists on the other."
In this way, it continued, "calm-minded conservatives may see the light and
save themselves before it is too late." The "calm-minded conservatives,"
Dower explains, is a reference to "elderly conservative elites, including
titled scions of the high nobility, who had controlled the country before
the military gained ascendancy."
Now MacArthur was governed by a memorandum that counseled that "in the
interest of peaceful occupation and rehabilitation of Japan, prevention of
revolution and communism, all facts ... be marshalled ... to establish an
affirmative defense" and "prevent indictment and prosecution of the Emperor
as a war criminal."
To defend the Emperor for the occupation authority's purposes, the ancient
means by which monarchs through the centuries had shrugged off
responsibility for their actions-they had been deceived by "bad advisers"-
was to be used.
Actually, there was by no means the single-minded popular devotion to the
Emperor that MacArthur's advisers, alleged experts on "the Oriental mind,"
claimed. Field-level intelligence agents stated in the early months of the
occupation: "People are more concerned with food and housing problems than
with the fate of the Emperor." Other intelligence reports said things to the
same effect and observed that the Emperor "has even become the `point' of
many jokes."
Toward the occupation itself popular feeling was mixed: there was gratitude
for the Allies having ended the nightmare of war and having ejected the
militarists from the government, mixed with resentment for the arrogance of
the lordly conquerors.
This resentment emerged after the occupation in articles in mass-circulation
magazines that recounted instances of such arrogance. In one notorious
incident American MPs boarded a commuter train and subjected the women on it
to a humiliating examination for evidence of venereal disease, as if to
proclaim that they regarded all Japanese women as whores.
In response to the democratic reforms of the occupation authority, the
Japanese almost immediately, to the dismay of the authority, went far beyond
them. Unions grew extremely rapidly, from 380,000 members at the end of 1945
to one million a month later to 5.6 million at the end of 1946 and to 6.7
million in the middle of 1948. Two-thirds of the unions were dominated by
the Communist Party and the rest by Socialists.
Even more alarming was the "production control" movement in which,
independently of the trade-union officialdom, workers seized control of
factories and continued production without turning the products over to the
owners until the owners acceded to their wage demands.
However, "production control"-which Marxists have traditionally called
"workers' control"-was more than a means to get higher wages; it reflected a
suspicion that factory owners were purposely holding back production to
contribute to the economic crisis and thereby sabotage democratization.
The economic crisis and food scarcity brought forth a huge demonstration of
250,000 people on "Food May Day," 1946, on the plaza in front of the
imperial palace. May Day demonstrations, stimulated by the Russian
Revolution, had been held from 1920 until 1936, after which they were
suppressed.
The Communist Party of Japan and the Marxist intellectuals had almost
entirely succumbed to patriotic hysteria during the war. Only a small number
of Communists-in prison or in the Soviet Union or the Communist-held areas
of China-had maintained their opposition to the war.
Now there was a resurgence of Marxist influence, but the Japanese Communist
Party, while denouncing "militarists and war criminals," proclaimed that it
was taking as "its immediate and fundamental goal the achievement through
peaceful and democratic methods of our country's bourgeois democratic
revolution, which is already in progress."
In accordance with this orientation, the organizing committee of "Food May
Day" expressed its "sincerest appreciation for the measures taken by the
Allied Powers to liberate the people" and petitioned the Emperor, as "the
holder of sovereign power" and "the highest authority," to repudiate those
who had driven Japan to destruction.
Hirohito refused to accept the petition, and MacArthur issued a statement
condemning the "excesses of disorderly minorities," in a phrase that
recalled the war-time laws that his headquarters had annulled six months
before. Mark Gayn, an American journalist on the scene, reported: "There was
consternation in union headquarters and in the offices of the left-wing
parties. In conservative quarters, there was undisguised jubilation."
Even after the statement by MacArthur, however, the unions, responding to a
galloping inflation and government threats to dismiss large numbers of
public employees, made plans for a general strike. MacArthur now announced
that he would not allow "the use of so deadly a social weapon" and forced
the unions to call off the strike.
A "Red purge," in which the occupation authorities, the Japanese government,
and corporation managers worked together, was embarked on. Eleven thousand
activist public employees were dismissed, and after the Korean war began
10-11,000 workers in private industry were also dismissed. "Side by side
with the 'Red purge' came the 'depurge'-the return to public activity of
individuals previously purged 'for all time' for having actively abetted
militarism and ultranationalism."
A particularly egregious case was that of Colonel Tsuji, who had played a
leading role in "the Bataan death march" of American prisoners of war in the
Philippines. Tsuji lived in hiding with the knowledge of General Willoughby,
MacArthur's chief of counter-intelligence and the former commander of
American troops in the Philippines, who was gathering together a corps of
anti-communist officers. He was pardoned in a "Christmas amnesty."
The "Red purge" and the "depurge" weakened labor and the left parties.
Moreover, the economic crisis was resolved by the boom resulting from the
U.S. "special procurements" policy during the Korean war and the post-war
reconstruction of South Korea.
The United States had earlier intended to restrict the Japanese economy to
the production of non-competitive cheap knickknacks, but now it promoted the
growth of heavy industry, production that doubled in two and a half years.
The "Japanese model" of capitalism-governmental "administrative guidance" of
business-had its origin in the Japanese war-production of World War II, but
it was given impetus during this later period by the occupation authority,
which permitted the bureaucracy to remain an unaccountable power and key
banks to control the financing of industry.
"In later decades," comments Dower, "when alarm concerning 'the Japanese
threat' arose in the United States and elsewhere, the binational genesis of
this state-led, keiretsu [powerful business and banking concentrations]
dominated economy was all but forgotten." So is it now forgotten when the
industrial policy of Japan, once feared, is being assigned the blame for
Japan's long recession.
Reading Power's book brings out sharply a number of things. We all know the
immense destructiveness of modern war, the potential of which is now far
greater than it was in World War II, but "Embracing Defeat" exhibits it in
human terms, not merely in statistical terms.
At the same time it shows the great resilience of the human spirit and the
rapid changes in mass consciousness that are possible. Even after radicalism
has been pronounced dead, it revives in response to major events.
"Embracing Defeat" shows, furthermore, how modern technology and
technological know-how can revive the economy of a nation that has been
plunged into the utmost devastation. But it also shows how this "miracle"
does not eliminate the contradictions of capitalism that drive it to a new
impasse.
And, finally, the book shows, through the negative examples of the Japanese
Communist Party and other left parties, the need for a revolutionary party,
steeled in struggle and possessing the confidence of the workers, to
evaluate the situation correctly and lead the masses to victory.
Russil Wvong
> I apologize for the length of this post, but this is something I've been
> meaning to have a discussion about for a while.
No problem. Thanks for posting your comments.
> While it is true that the Marshall Plan and activities in Japan following
> the war had humanitarian _consequences_, I think it is questionable whether
> or not the programs implemented had humanitarian aims.
To me, that's not important. In foreign policy, what's important are
*consequences*, not *aims*. The Alliance for Progress may have had
noble aims, but it failed. The Vietnam War may have had noble aims,
but it resulted in the US killing millions. The US-aided reconstruction
of Western Europe and Japan is a startling contrast with the treatment
of Germany after World War I.
Regarding Dower, I've read his "War Without Mercy". I'll put "Embracing
Defeat" on my to-read list.
Russil Wvong
> left out the the name of 'The School of the
> Americas' (now the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation
> (WHISC)) where various bad guys have trained
Thanks for the update.
> > To summarize, I think the two most important accomplishments of
> > US foreign policy during the Cold War were (a) rebuilding Western
> > Europe and Japan,
>
> An accomplishment that cannot easily be credited to US foreign policy
> outside of its conduciveness.
Not sure what you mean by conduciveness. Obviously the people of
Western Europe and Japan themselves did the rebuilding, but if you
look at what happened to Germany after World War I, it's hard to
argue that US foreign policy didn't play a major role in the
reconstruction.
> > I hope you'll accept this as a fair picture of US foreign policy after
> > World War II. I don't think US foreign policy is as evil as Chomsky
> > portrays it, but neither do I think that it's as virtuous as CNN
> > portrays it, either.
>
> Leaning more towards the Chomsky in effects, slightly less so in motive.
You or me? I totally disagree with Chomsky's views of US motives, but
I don't think motives are particularly important. Regarding effects,
as far as I know Chomsky only portrays negative effects of US foreign
policy (and often exaggerates them).
Russil Wvong
> [story about how the media sets the agenda]
> Well I'm no story teller, but the moral comes through.
It certainly does. :-) Thanks for passing that on. (I wonder
if it's the CBC newscast that people watch each night in Ottawa.)
Russil Wvong
> russi...@yahoo.com (Russil Wvong) wrote:
> > http://www.geocities.com/rwvong/future/chomsky.html
>
> This is a more worthwhile critique than some I've seen.
Thank you! Thanks for reading through it, too. (I wonder what happened
to Siggy.) I hope I've at least encouraged you to be more wary of
accepting Chomsky's statements at face value.
> > 3.1. Political philosophy
> >
> > I think Chomsky's point of view is best understood as revolutionary
> > anarchism, based on Marxism, but also anti-Leninist (like Rosa
> > Luxemburg).
>
> I'm not sure that Chomsky is that much enamoured of revolution (the
> romantic appeal of this concept/practice completely escapes me). Ever
> since the French revolution we seem to have had one generation after
> another growing up with the concept that there will be a revolution, it
> will be incredibly exciting, wonderful things will happen. What a
> delusion. And the madness is not entirely over even yet.
Romanticism never dies. More seriously, it depends on the situation.
Sometimes things *are* terrible, and I wouldn't say that revolutions
never bring improvement. For more discussion, see "The True Believer",
by Eric Hoffer.
> Chomsky's methods and practices seem to be more in the nature of
> political activism of a non-violent sort.
I went back and re-read the opening interview in "The Chomsky Reader"
(1987), and I'm pretty sure I'm not misrepresenting Chomsky. It's
pretty clear that the Spanish civil war (specifically the Spanish
anarchist movement) is one of his major influences. In his view,
besides the difficulty of carrying out a successful popular revolution,
a Third World revolutionary government is also faced with the problem
of "capitalist encirclement": that is, it would immediately be crushed
by hostile outside powers, particularly the US. The role of the
activist in the US, then, is to prevent the US government from carrying
out such actions against popular revolutions.
> Also not sure how much he is interested in Marx/marxism either. (dont
> get me going on this massively overrated guy). Socialism, yes.
> Socialism in the sense of the right of the community to arrange its
> affairs for its own benefit, rather than the benefit of the few.
> Socialism in the "feel good" sense but without concrete economic
> analysis (marxist economic analysis rejected as fallacious). Chomsky
> himself has said marx didnt have that much interesting to say.
In the interview he says that Marx didn't have that much interesting
to say *about socialism*, that is, what comes after capitalism; rather,
Marx analyzes *capitalism* and its underlying problems. I think it's
pretty clear that Chomsky accepts the Marxist critique of capitalism.
(I'm not condemning him for that, I just disagree.)
> I think the anarchism is the key influence. The distrust of
> power, and the suspicion about the professed motives of power (orwell).
I've read a lot of Orwell, and I find comparing Orwell and Chomsky to
be useful (as I described in the essay). There's some pretty major
differences between their views.
> > In Chomsky's view, the US and USSR were both ruthless and morally
> > bankrupt, with the US being no less evil than the USSR,
>
> I'm not sure that he would say the US is "no less evil" than the USSR.
No? He compares the US to Nazi Germany in a number of cases. E.g.
in his landmark essay "The Responsibility of Intellectuals" (1967):
If it is the responsibility of the intellectual to insist upon
the truth, it is also his duty to see events in their historical
perspective. Thus one must applaud the insistence of the Secretary
of State on the importance of historical analogies, the Munich
analogy, for example. As Munich showed, a powerful and aggressive
nation with a fanatic belief in its manifest destiny will regard
each victory, each extension of its power and authority, as a
prelude to the next step. The matter was very well put by Adlai
Stevenson, when he spoke of "the old, old route whereby expansive
powers push at more and more doors, believing they will open until,
at the ultimate door, resistance is unavoidable and major war breaks
out." Herein lies the danger of appeasement, as the Chinese tirelessly
point out to the Soviet Union — which, they claim, is playing
Chamberlain to our Hitler in Vietnam.
[http://www.nybooks.com/articles/12172]
I think it's difficult to understand Chomsky's comments on September 11
without understanding that he regards the United States as morally
comparable to Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union. Again, it's useful
to compare this to Orwell's views.
> Also Chomsky has repeatedly
> stated that the US enjoys many valuable freedoms and privileges,
> wealth, opportunity etc.
At home.
> I do get an impression that over the years Chomsky has flirted less
> and less with the marxist and revolutionary left movements.
In the 1987 interview in "The Chomsky Reader", the interviewer asks if
his beliefs and views have changed much over the last 20 years, as a
result of his active political involvement. Chomsky says that they
haven't. My assessment is that his views have been pretty consistent.
And I don't think it's a flirtation; rather, he sees the situation in
the Third World as a repetition of Spain, which was a major influence
on him (he wrote his first political essay on the Spanish civil war,
at the age of 10).
> Nothing wrong with these statements about China. They may well be true.
> Its said that the Chinese communists undertook the largest land reform
> in human history, better and more successful than the Russian one,
> which was a real debacle under the influence of stalin and marxist
> "collectivization". But it doesnt excuse Maoist murder.
To me, Chomsky's discussion of whether revolutionary terror in China
was beneficial or not is a remarkable contrast to Hannah Arendt's
statements, and also a remarkable contrast to his willingness to
condemn Singapore and South Korea as quasi-fascist. The mass
starvation of the Great Leap Forward wasn't known at the time,
but there were a lot of people killed during collectivization.
Ian Burama:
Even though Mao never attempted to exterminate a race of people, he
was proud to have destroyed countless members of certain social
categories. In 1950 it was "counterrevolutionary elements" — that is,
bourgeois, intellectuals, capitalists, former members of the [KMT],
and so on. In six months 710,000 people were killed or driven to
suicide. In 1952 it was landlords and their families: up to one
million dead.
["Divine Killer", New York Review of Books, Feb 24, 2000]
> Chomsky provides a heap of evidence about this, its pretty convincing
> to me. His summary is "hegemony is more important than survivial".
> Makes sense, doesnt it?
No, not at all! If you're a policymaker in DC, knowing that you've
got Russian nuclear missiles pointed at you, and that in the next
crisis you're going to be facing the total destruction of yourself,
your family, and everyone around you, are you really going to
be placing hegemony over your personal survival? I think Chomsky
doesn't understand the paradoxes of nuclear weapons at all. I wrote
up a description of the dynamics of nuclear weapons for the Global
Issues FAQ: http://www.geocities.com/rwvong/future/globalfaq.html.
(That's how I got started reading Kennan and other political realists
in the first place, to get a better understanding of the Cold War.)
This is one of the things that bothers me the most about Chomsky:
he provides these facile explanations, backs them up with bogus
evidence, and people think they understand what's going on. He's
a source of misunderstanding rather than understanding.
Maybe I need to add another section to the Chomsky essay, on
nuclear weapons.
> > Chomsky argues that in the bourgeois democracy of the US, the American
> > elite only maintains its legitimacy through a kind of self-brainwashing
> > which differs from Soviet totalitarianism only by being more subtle and
> > more effective.
>
> This view is developed in "Manufacturing Consent", perhaps his single
> most important book. Its one of his greatest contributions, and the
> propaganda model is something that will weigh heavily on our minds in
> the 21st C, it seems to me. I confess myself to be convinced the model
> exists and operates, no small matter.
A friend says he liked "Manufacturing Consent" as well, so I think
I'll have to read it. But if you want an alternate view, see Todd
Gitlin (another leftist media critic):
Even if there were an ideas cartel, there's no guarantee
that readers and viewers would respond as intended. "If you
think (as Chomsky does) that people are reasoning machines,
(then) you think the only reason they would get something
wrong is if their mind machines were filled with the wrong data,"
Gitlin says. "If you gave them different data, they would be
smarter. I think this is a very naive view."
[http://www.nowtoronto.com/issues/19/29/News/tech.html]
> > 3.4. Chomsky's unreliability
> >
> > Perhaps the biggest problem I have with Chomsky is that he's an
> > unreliable source of historical information
>
> He seems to provide a wealth of sources and information.
My point is, although Chomsky appears to be providing a lot of evidence,
if you actually take the time to look up his references, you often find
that he's misrepresenting his supposed sources.
> Chomsky cuts through the bull and gets to the point. The point,
> afterall, which Huntington himself has stated. What's 'unreliable'
> about this? And doesnt it describe the conduct of the war against South
> Vietnam?
Then Chomsky should have found a quote which actually said this, instead
of misrepresenting what Huntington said.
> Chomsky's views about Palestine and the 'Peace Process' are outlined in
> his book, Fateful Triangle. This is another devastating work. The main
> thesis is the consistent rejectionism of US/Israel. Its hard not to
> agree with what is virtually the obvious once it is pointed out.
Argh! It only appears obvious because of Chomsky's willingness to
take quotes out of context, doctor them so as to change their meaning,
and omit material facts (as Orwell describes). Maybe I should have
included some quotes from Avishai Margalit's review of "Fateful
Triangle" (Margalit comments that Chomsky has a tendency to see
the world through newspaper clippings; he hasn't been to Israel
since six weeks in the early 1950s). Margalit is an Israeli dove
and co-founder of Peace Now. If you want to get more context, see
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/14224.
> "Immensely more thoughtful philosopher's considered moral opinion"??
> That's a joke. Maybe something you could say to a 4year old. Chomsky's
> rejoinder to Walzer's inanity is straight to the point.
After reading through Walzer's article on 9/11, I don't see why
you describe it as inane.
http://americanprospect.com/print/V12/18/walzer-m.html
Thanks again for your comments.
D.Teale
> "D.Teale" <tea...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> > [story about how the media sets the agenda]
> > Well I'm no story teller, but the moral comes through.
>
> It certainly does. :-) Thanks for passing that on. (I wonder
> if it's the CBC newscast that people watch each night in Ottawa.)
>
Well... Mansbridge is a pretty hip cat. But seriously, when it comes to the
parliamentary coverage CTV and CBC are near identical. Nontheless, I'd say
the gov't has a 'vested interest' in watching the CBC =).
David Manning
<afe9ed76.0201...@posting.google.com>...
>
> > Chomsky's views about Palestine and the 'Peace Process' are outlined in
> > his book, Fateful Triangle. This is another devastating work. The main
> > thesis is the consistent rejectionism of US/Israel. Its hard not to
> > agree with what is virtually the obvious once it is pointed out.
>
> Argh! It only appears obvious because of Chomsky's willingness to
> take quotes out of context, doctor them so as to change their meaning,
> and omit material facts (as Orwell describes). Maybe I should have
> included some quotes from Avishai Margalit's review of "Fateful
> Triangle" (Margalit comments that Chomsky has a tendency to see
> the world through newspaper clippings; he hasn't been to Israel
> since six weeks in the early 1950s). Margalit is an Israeli dove
> and co-founder of Peace Now.
http://monkeyfist.com/ChomskyArchive/interviews/israel3_html
D.Teale
> > left out the the name of 'The School of the
> > Americas' (now the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation
> > (WHISC)) where various bad guys have trained
>
> Thanks for the update.
>
No problem, but I really think we all should be kicking up more of a fuss
over this atrocity.
> > > To summarize, I think the two most important accomplishments of
> > > US foreign policy during the Cold War were (a) rebuilding Western
> > > Europe and Japan,
> >
> > An accomplishment that cannot easily be credited to US foreign policy
> > outside of its conduciveness.
>
> Not sure what you mean by conduciveness. Obviously the people of
> Western Europe and Japan themselves did the rebuilding, but if you
> look at what happened to Germany after World War I, it's hard to
> argue that US foreign policy didn't play a major role in the
> reconstruction.
>
Well in my opinion (for what its worth), Japan's sucess was based in very
large part on their own domestic policies which were unfettered and likewise
not greatly benefited by US foreign policy. Of course the US could have
crippled the country further and imposed its will, but it didn't, kudos to
them. As for Germany, the stark contrast between post WWI and WWII treatment
is indicative of changing percpetion and goals. Everyone an there dog could
see that the harsh restrictions placed on Germany after WWI could not
repeat, coupled with the fact that the Cold War was in its infancy and there
is vested interest in Germany's well-being.
> > > I hope you'll accept this as a fair picture of US foreign policy after
> > > World War II. I don't think US foreign policy is as evil as Chomsky
> > > portrays it, but neither do I think that it's as virtuous as CNN
> > > portrays it, either.
> >
> > Leaning more towards the Chomsky in effects, slightly less so in motive.
>
> You or me?
Seems to be both.
I totally disagree with Chomsky's views of US motives,
I'd agree most of the time, which leaves the option that they are completely
inept and undeserving of the power wielded.
but
> I don't think motives are particularly important. Regarding effects,
> as far as I know Chomsky only portrays negative effects of US foreign
> policy (and often exaggerates them).
>
Seems to be constucting a much need polemic that allows for critical
evaluation to bring forth polarities thus allowing critical observers to
draw forth the remaining truth. As Blake said "Opposition is true
friendship".
=)
Russil Wvong
> > > his book, Fateful Triangle. This is another devastating work. The main
> > > thesis is the consistent rejectionism of US/Israel. Its hard not to
> > > agree with what is virtually the obvious once it is pointed out.
> >
> > Argh! It only appears obvious because of Chomsky's willingness to
> > take quotes out of context, doctor them so as to change their meaning,
> > and omit material facts (as Orwell describes). Maybe I should have
> > included some quotes from Avishai Margalit's review of "Fateful
> > Triangle" (Margalit comments that Chomsky has a tendency to see
> > the world through newspaper clippings; he hasn't been to Israel
> > since six weeks in the early 1950s). Margalit is an Israeli dove
> > and co-founder of Peace Now.
>
> http://monkeyfist.com/ChomskyArchive/interviews/israel3_html
Thanks for the correction! (Margalit's review is from 1984;
The Fateful Triangle was published in 1983.)
Russil Wvong
> > the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation].
>
> No problem, but I really think we all should be kicking up more of a fuss
> over this atrocity.
Do you know if WHISC is still training students in torture?
> > I totally disagree with Chomsky's views of US motives,
>
> I'd agree most of the time, which leaves the option that they are
> completely inept and undeserving of the power wielded.
George Kennan (who argues for a more modest and restrained US foreign
policy) certainly thinks so. Hans Morgenthau describes the "fear and
trembling with which great statesmen have approached their task,
knowing that in trying to mould the political world they must act
like gods, without the knowledge, the wisdom, the power, and the
goodness which their task demands." This humility is, I think, not
displayed often enough by US leaders. If I can make an unsupported
generalization, Americans tend to be optimistic and confident in
their own abilities, which is great when it comes to tackling solvable
problems, but not so appropriate when facing the unsolvable problems
of international politics.
> > Regarding effects,
> > as far as I know Chomsky only portrays negative effects of US foreign
> > policy (and often exaggerates them).
>
> Seems to be constucting a much need polemic that allows for critical
> evaluation to bring forth polarities thus allowing critical observers to
> draw forth the remaining truth. As Blake said "Opposition is true
> friendship".
> =)
What disturbs me about Chomsky is that a lot of his fans (e.g. Siggy,
who started this thread) seem to accept his version of events
uncritically, without bothering to check other sources. That's why
I put together the critical review article.
D.Teale
> > "Russil Wvong" <russi...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > > Thanks for the update [on the School of the Americas, now renamed
> > > the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation].
> >
> > No problem, but I really think we all should be kicking up more of a
fuss
> > over this atrocity.
>
> Do you know if WHISC is still training students in torture?
>
I do know, and yes they are. The interesting news is that those crazy new US
congressman, the likes of which are being arrested in Puerto Rico for
protesting the navy, or visiting with Fidel in Cuba, are now introduing a
bill to shut down the school. I've taken a small piece of text from
http://www.soaw.org/ this site dedicates ample time and energy to the end
of the school, check it out! :
Representatives Jim McGovern (D-MA), Joe Scarborough (R-FL), the late Joe
Moakley (D-MA), Connie Morella (R-MD), Christopher Shays (R-CT), and Lane
Evans (D-IL) introduced a bill to close the Western Hemisphere Institute for
Security Cooperation (successor to School of the Americas) on Thursday, May
10, 2001.
The bill, HR 1810, is modeled after last year's
Moakley/Scarborough/McGovern/Campbell amendment to the Defense Authorization
Bill. It calls for the closure of the school and the establishment of a
joint congressional task force to assess U.S. training of Latin American
military.
Current Cosponsors of HR 1810
Count: 94 (as of 1/07/02)
-----------------
Just as an interesting side note: in late Sept or early Oct., two anti-SOAW
activists we're travelling from Washington state to Vancouver in order to
give a informative lecture at UBC (I believe). Anyway, these two were
detained at the border, their personal property was seized and copied, they
were denied access to legal counsel and ultimately forbidden from entering
Canada. It was quite alarming, but we were (are) strong and united.
BTW if anyone has a file that refers to this story please post it, I forgot
to save it, Thanks in advance?
> > > I totally disagree with Chomsky's views of US motives,
> >
> > I'd agree most of the time, which leaves the option that they are
> > completely inept and undeserving of the power wielded.
>
> George Kennan (who argues for a more modest and restrained US foreign
> policy) certainly thinks so. Hans Morgenthau describes the "fear and
> trembling with which great statesmen have approached their task,
> knowing that in trying to mould the political world they must act
> like gods, without the knowledge, the wisdom, the power, and the
> goodness which their task demands." This humility is, I think, not
> displayed often enough by US leaders. If I can make an unsupported
> generalization, Americans tend to be optimistic and confident in
> their own abilities, which is great when it comes to tackling solvable
> problems, but not so appropriate when facing the unsolvable problems
> of international politics.
>
It's a standoff between the plausible and possible, as in what one may
conceive possible, may be complety implausible. I really like that Hans
Morgenthau quote, very Kierkegaard, ... if only politicians were absurd =).
One question for you, I haven't read either of the authors you cite. Do you
know if they like Huntington and others are against US support of the UN, or
do they see the UN as a more viable course for US foreign policy?
> > > Regarding effects,
> > > as far as I know Chomsky only portrays negative effects of US foreign
> > > policy (and often exaggerates them).
> >
> > Seems to be constucting a much need polemic that allows for critical
> > evaluation to bring forth polarities thus allowing critical observers to
> > draw forth the remaining truth. As Blake said "Opposition is true
> > friendship".
> > =)
>
> What disturbs me about Chomsky is that a lot of his fans (e.g. Siggy,
> who started this thread) seem to accept his version of events
> uncritically, without bothering to check other sources. That's why
> I put together the critical review article.
>
It's like ABC always says, "the more you know".
D.Teale
> > "Russil Wvong" <russi...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > > Thanks for the update [on the School of the Americas, now renamed
> > > the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation].
> >
> > No problem, but I really think we all should be kicking up more of a
fuss
> > over this atrocity.
>
> Do you know if WHISC is still training students in torture?
>
I do, and yes they are. Now today's unpredictable US congressmen that are
popping up at anti-Navy base rallies in Puerto Rico and Havana boulevards
are introducing a bill to shut the school down. Below is a piece of text
from http://www.soaw.org/leg.html . The site is excellent, check it out for
any info regarding the school.
Representatives Jim McGovern (D-MA), Joe Scarborough (R-FL), the late Joe
Moakley (D-MA), Connie Morella (R-MD), Christopher Shays (R-CT), and Lane
Evans (D-IL) introduced a bill to close the Western Hemisphere Institute for
Security Cooperation (successor to School of the Americas) on Thursday, May
10, 2001.
The bill, HR 1810, is modeled after last year's
Moakley/Scarborough/McGovern/Campbell amendment to the Defense Authorization
Bill. It calls for the closure of the school and the establishment of a
joint congressional task force to assess U.S. training of Latin American
military.
Current Cosponsors of HR 1810
Count: 94 (as of 1/07/02)
> > > I totally disagree with Chomsky's views of US motives,
> >
> > I'd agree most of the time, which leaves the option that they are
> > completely inept and undeserving of the power wielded.
>
> George Kennan (who argues for a more modest and restrained US foreign
> policy) certainly thinks so. Hans Morgenthau describes the "fear and
> trembling with which great statesmen have approached their task,
> knowing that in trying to mould the political world they must act
> like gods, without the knowledge, the wisdom, the power, and the
> goodness which their task demands." This humility is, I think, not
> displayed often enough by US leaders. If I can make an unsupported
> generalization, Americans tend to be optimistic and confident in
> their own abilities, which is great when it comes to tackling solvable
> problems, but not so appropriate when facing the unsolvable problems
> of international politics.
>
The plausible versus the possible, righto. I really like that Morgenthau
quote, very Kieregaard, if only the politiicans were absurd (?).
Being unfamiliar with Morgenthau and Kennan's work, I'd like to ask you if
they are of the opinion that the US should throw its support to the UN, or
as is the case most of the time, continue to work unilaterally with multiple
supporters?
> > > Regarding effects,
> > > as far as I know Chomsky only portrays negative effects of US foreign
> > > policy (and often exaggerates them).
> >
> > Seems to be constucting a much need polemic that allows for critical
> > evaluation to bring forth polarities thus allowing critical observers to
> > draw forth the remaining truth. As Blake said "Opposition is true
> > friendship".
> > =)
>
> What disturbs me about Chomsky is that a lot of his fans (e.g. Siggy,
> who started this thread) seem to accept his version of events
> uncritically, without bothering to check other sources. That's why
> I put together the critical review article.
>
As NBC always says, "the more you know"
David Manning
>
> Thanks for the correction! (Margalit's review is from 1984;
> The Fateful Triangle was published in 1983.)
>
> Russil Wvong
You don't need corrections from me. You need to send a copy of your
so-called "critique" to Chomsky and ask him to comment on it. He'll
suggest plenty of corrections, I'm sure.
Russil Wvong
> You don't need corrections from me. You need to send a copy of your
> so-called "critique" to Chomsky and ask him to comment on it. He'll
> suggest plenty of corrections, I'm sure.
I'm sure he would. After seeing his responses to previous criticisms
(e.g. Leo Casey, Pierre Vidal-Naquet), I'm not sure my ego could take
the abuse. :-) He appears to think that the best defense is an
aggressive offense. So I would expect to see comments about the
Canadian tendency to show slavish devotion to American power; or
racism and lack of respect for human rights in Chinese culture; or
my reliance on the political realists, known for their lack of
morality; or my pathetic attempt to defend the indefensible PPS 23.
"No more need be said."
If you think I'm exaggerating, he includes the following in his
response to Vidal-Naquet:
In France, there may well be other factors: perhaps a lingering
guilt about disgraceful behavior of substantial sectors under Vichy,
the failure to protest the French wars in Indochina, that lasting
impact of Stalinism and more generally Leninist doctrines, the bizarre
and dadaistic character of certain streams of intellectual life in
postwar France which makes rational discourse appear to be such an
odd and unintelligible pastime, the currents of anti-Semitism that
have exploded into violence.
[http://www.zmag.org/chomsky/articles/8010-free-expression.html]
That was after Vidal-Naquet referred to his signing the Faurisson
petition, commented that the petition was "scandalous", and said
that "the right that the forger demands should not be conceded to
him in the name of truth." That's *all* Vidal-Naquet said.
I expect he'll see the review at some point and post such comments;
I'll certainly attach them to the page when they arrive. But
I'm not planning to hasten that day. :-)
So what did you think of the "so-called 'critique'"? In it I was
attempting to focus on his ideas, and to evaluate them fairly and
respectfully. (Chomsky *is* a very distinguished intellectual,
after all.) If you don't think I succeeded, please let me know.
[http://www.geocities.com/rwvong/future/chomsky.html]
David Manning
>
> So what did you think of the "so-called 'critique'"?
> [http://www.geocities.com/rwvong/future/chomsky.html]
>
Keeping to your supposed disagreements with Chomsky:
You write: "In Chomsky's view, the US and USSR were both ruthless and
morally bankrupt, with the US being no less evil than the USSR,
despite the fact that the USSR was totalitarian and the US was a
bourgeois democracy." You provide no quotes from NC to support this
because there are none. Why don't you follow the link I provide below
where Chomsky outlines his views on morality with regard to the US and
the USSR?
In a failed effort to support this "no less evil" falsehood, you
irrelevantly quote a passage from an interview in which NC claims that
as a young boy he "never really believed the thesis" of those that you
claim are his "intellectual antecedents"! He clearly states that these
"antecedents" hold a view he was interested in at the time but that he
plainly does not share. If you want a serious assessment of NC's
intellectual antecedents, you might try to find Robert Barsky's
material on this subject, easily available on the web.
You write: "I think the strongest argument against the Marxist idea of
the inevitable proletarian revolution isn't the totalitarian
dictatorship of the Soviet Union (which could be ascribed to
Leninism); it's the fact that within Western liberal capitalist
states, prosperity is now largely shared with all of society, through
the mechanism of the welfare state, not restricted to the elite." But
this assumes that the prosperity of the proletariat will be a
significant factor in whether or not a revolution will occur. That's
not obvious. Revolutions may be affected by any number of factors, for
example, concerns for social justice that may have nothing to do with
anyone's prosperity.
You write: "Chomsky, although supposedly opposed to state terror and
violence, has in the past made excuses for China under Mao, presumably
because he saw it as a popular revolutionary regime." You then go on
to quote him citing China Quarterly's assessment that the Chinese
revolution's "greater success in achieving a relatively livable and to
some extent just society was correlated with the fact that these
methods involved much less terror [than the Russians]." No one would
argue that CQ "made excuses" for the Chinese state because it
"identifies with popular revolutionary movements" -- NC and CQ are
discussing a correlation between tactics and effects (with NC
stressing that the violence did not contribute to whatever successes
the revolution may have achieved) so neither is "making excuses" --
just the opposite, in fact. It's clear from the quote that NC prefers
a revolution that "minimizes the use of terror except as necessary in
defense." You then go on to ask: Given his criticisms of US allies'
repression, "why did [NC] make so many excuses for China, rather than
condemning mass murder?" Leaving aside the erroneous assumption that
NC (or CQ or anyone else) was "making excuses" for the Chinese
violence, any lack of outright condemnation ought to be clear from the
context: the panel discussion was considering the relative merits of
violence in pursuing a revolutionary cause -- not the question of
whether or not the Chinese mass murder should be condemned. You might
also want to have a look at these remarks of NC's ...
http://monkeyfist.com/ChomskyArchive/misc/reasons_html
... in which he argues that there's real moral value in condemning our
allies' repression because we may be able to alleviate it but there is
little moral value in condemning our enemies' repression when there's
nothing we can do to affect it.
I suppose I could go on but there is no "critique" here for me to
critique. There is misrepresentation and misunderstanding and a
failure to apply simple logic. By the end of your "critique" you are
not evaluating Chomsky's ideas, as you claim, but are merely citing
others' arguments without evaluation.
Russil Wvong
> I suppose I could go on but there is no "critique" here for me to
> critique. There is misrepresentation and misunderstanding and a
> failure to apply simple logic.
First, thanks for responding.
> You write: "In Chomsky's view, the US and USSR were both ruthless and
> morally bankrupt, with the US being no less evil than the USSR,
> despite the fact that the USSR was totalitarian and the US was a
> bourgeois democracy." You provide no quotes from NC to support this
> because there are none.
Sorry, I'm not sure why you think this is a falsehood. Is it my use of
the words "morally bankrupt" or "evil", or my referring to "the US"
instead of "US foreign policy"? I'm afraid I don't see how this is a
misrepresentation or misunderstanding of Chomsky's views. I think
it's pretty clear from his writings. For example, in the link you
provide, Chomsky says:
The main reasons for my concern with U.S. foreign policy are that
I find it, in general, horrifying ....
... The foreign policy of other states is also in general
horrifying -- roughly speaking, states are violent to the extent
that they have the power to act in the interests of those with
domestic power ....
[http://monkeyfist.com/ChomskyArchive/misc/reasons_html]
I'm not saying that this is an inherently discreditable view, I just
disagree with Chomsky. John Gaddis gives another example:
Or consider another lesser-known but no less interesting Oxford
disputation, held precisely half a century later in 1984 between
the great Marxist historian E. P. Thompson and the American
secretary of defense Caspar Weinberger. These improbable contenders
took on the issue: "Resolved, there is no moral difference between
the foreign policies of the U.S. and the USSR." Thompson described
the United States and the Soviet Union, during the debate, as "two
terrorist states," with "born-again Christians on the one side and
still-born Marxists on the other."
[http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/gaddis.htm]
I'm curious: what do you think? Would you disagree with the following
statement?
US foreign policy during the Cold War was no less evil than that
of the Soviet Union.
In fact, Chomsky compares US foreign policy to that of Nazi Germany,
not just the Soviet Union. For example:
If it is the responsibility of the intellectual to insist upon
the truth, it is also his duty to see events in their historical
perspective. Thus one must applaud the insistence of the Secretary
of State on the importance of historical analogies, the Munich
analogy, for example. As Munich showed, a powerful and aggressive
nation with a fanatic belief in its manifest destiny will regard
each victory, each extension of its power and authority, as a
prelude to the next step. The matter was very well put by Adlai
Stevenson, when he spoke of "the old, old route whereby expansive
powers push at more and more doors, believing they will open until,
at the ultimate door, resistance is unavoidable and major war breaks
out." Herein lies the danger of appeasement, as the Chinese tirelessly
point out to the Soviet Union — which, they claim, is playing
Chamberlain to our Hitler in Vietnam.
["The Responsibility of Intellectals", 1967]
> In a failed effort to support this "no less evil" falsehood, you
> irrelevantly quote a passage from an interview in which NC claims that
> as a young boy he "never really believed the thesis" of those that you
> claim are his "intellectual antecedents"!
Sorry, I didn't mean that the Marlenites (who argued that World War II
was a phony war) and other sectarian leftist literature were the *source*
of his political views, only that they were a significant influence
(which is why I said "antecedents"): as Chomsky says, when he was
15 or 16, he spent time reading them and trying to figure out what they
were saying, and he thought that a lot of it rang true. I found this
interesting because Orwell mentions similar views among the English
intelligentsia just before and during the early stages of World War II --
not that the war was a phony war, but that the English government
(as a bourgeois democracy) was equivalent to the Fascists, so it didn't
matter who won. This also explains comments such as these:
It would be interesting to explore more fully the attitude of
Winston Churchill [to the Spanish civil war]. In April 1937
he stated that a Franco victory would not harm British
interests. Rather, the danger was a "success of the trotskyists
and anarchists" (cited by Broue and Temime, op. cit., p. 172).
Of some interest, in this connection, is the recent discovery of
an unpublished Churchill essay written in March 1939 -- six months
after Munich -- in which he said that England would "welcome and
aid a genuine Hitler of peace and toleration" (see *New York Times*,
December 12, 1965).
[Footnote to "Objectivity and Liberal Scholarship", 1968]
In other words, Churchill wasn't so staunchly opposed to Fascism and
Hitler as we're led to believe.
> You write: "I think the strongest argument against the Marxist idea of
> the inevitable proletarian revolution isn't the totalitarian
> dictatorship of the Soviet Union (which could be ascribed to
> Leninism); it's the fact that within Western liberal capitalist
> states, prosperity is now largely shared with all of society, through
> the mechanism of the welfare state, not restricted to the elite." But
> this assumes that the prosperity of the proletariat will be a
> significant factor in whether or not a revolution will occur. That's
> not obvious. Revolutions may be affected by any number of factors, for
> example, concerns for social justice that may have nothing to do with
> anyone's prosperity.
Sure. Where I'm coming from is that I *am* concerned with inequality
in capitalist societies, and if Marx's argument were correct -- that
capitalism leads to progressively worse exploitation and impoverishment
of the proletariat -- that would be a strong argument for revolution,
to me. I think the existence of successful welfare states is an
important counter-argument: it's possible to use the state to
redistribute income and reduce the inequality generated by a
free-market economy.
> It's clear from the quote that NC prefers
> a revolution that "minimizes the use of terror except as necessary in
> defense."
I know. But Hannah Arendt's point was that terror is wrong, regardless
of whether it's revolutionary or counterrevolutionary. Chomsky, on
the other hand, says that *revolutionary* terror may be justified,
depending on whether the success of the revolution depends on the
terror or not, and noting that there's a number of strong arguments
in favor of revolutionary terror; in the end, he doesn't accept these
arguments, but on an empirical basis, not because he regards
revolutionary terror as unjustifiable. In particular, Chomsky doesn't
seem to have much of a problem with the terror that was used in China:
he cites China approvingly as an example of a successful revolutionary
regime based on relatively little terror. Despite what Chomsky says,
there *was* a great deal of terror in China, e.g. Burama's figure of
700,000 "counterrevolutionary elements" killed or driven to suicide
in 1950.
In contrast, Chomsky doesn't make any such allowances for
*counterrevolutionary* regimes such as Singapore (which, despite
being a one-party state, hasn't committed any mass killings,
as far as I know) or South Korea.
> ... the panel discussion was considering the relative merits of
> violence in pursuing a revolutionary cause -- not the question of
> whether or not the Chinese mass murder should be condemned.
Sure. Arendt's view was that revolutionary violence should be judged
the same way as counterrevolutionary violence. Chomsky's view seemed
to be that revolutionary violence may be justifiable -- that there's
strong arguments in its favor, which cannot be lightly dismissed,
although he does disagree with them in the end -- in favor of
revolutionary violence. This doesn't seem like a double standard
to you?
> You might also want to have a look at these remarks of NC's ...
>
> http://monkeyfist.com/ChomskyArchive/misc/reasons_html
>
> ... in which he argues that there's real moral value in condemning our
> allies' repression because we may be able to alleviate it but there is
> little moral value in condemning our enemies' repression when there's
> nothing we can do to affect it.
I would totally agree with that. I certainly think it makes sense for
Chomsky, and for other US intellectuals, to criticize US foreign policy
rather than the policies of other countries. (As I tried to indicate
in the first section of the essay, and on this thread, I certainly
think there's lots of areas where US foreign policy can be criticized.)
The problem I have with Chomsky is that I think his criticisms are
founded on incorrect premises, and backed up by bogus evidence
(see section 3.4).
> By the end of your "critique" you are
> not evaluating Chomsky's ideas, as you claim, but are merely citing
> others' arguments without evaluation.
The point of the last section was to provide references to other people's
criticism of Chomsky, kind of like an existence proof: yes, there are
people who (a) aren't crazed right-wingers and who (b) disagree with
Chomsky. From what I can tell, all of the people I'm referring to in
section 4 are reasonable people, mostly left-wing, and they have
reasonable arguments against Chomsky's views.
Thanks again for your response.
Russil Wvong
> Just as an interesting side note: in late Sept or early Oct., two anti-SOAW
> activists we're travelling from Washington state to Vancouver in order to
> give a informative lecture at UBC (I believe). Anyway, these two were
> detained at the border, their personal property was seized and copied, they
> were denied access to legal counsel and ultimately forbidden from entering
> Canada. It was quite alarming, but we were (are) strong and united.
> BTW if anyone has a file that refers to this story please post it, I forgot
> to save it, Thanks in advance?
I think this is it:
http://groups.google.com/groups?
selm=f9pA7.5604%24SP.637107%40newsread2.prod.itd.earthlink.net
> One question for you, I haven't read either of the authors you cite.
> [George Kennan and Hans Morgenthau]
> Do you know if they like Huntington and others are against US support
> of the UN, or do they see the UN as a more viable course for US
> foreign policy?
Kennan and Morgenthau are both political realists who were influential
in US foreign policy at the beginning of the Cold War. They have
interesting things to say about the UN.
Morgenthau died before the Cold War ended. His analysis (in
"Politics Among Nations", and also a 1965 article in the New York
Review of Books) is that first the Security Council was paralyzed by
the Soviet veto, causing security issues to shift to the General
Assembly; then the General Assembly was paralyzed by the
non-aligned movement, causing a shift to the Secretariat; and
finally the Secretary-General was paralyzed by France and the
Soviet Union's refusal to pay for peacekeeping. Morgenthau's
1965 article is on-line, but unfortunately it's only available
to subscribers:
[http://www.nybooks.com/articles/12975]
Kennan, amazingly, is still alive (he's now in his nineties). When
the UN was first being created, Kennan argued against the high
expectations prevalent at the time. From PPS 23 (1947):
VIII. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
A broad conflict runs through U.S. policy today between what may
be called the universalistic and the particularized approaches to
the solution of international problems.
The *universalistic* approach looks to the solution of
international problems by providing a universalistic pattern of
rules and procedures which would be applicable to all countries,
or at least all countries prepared to join, in an identical way.
This approach has the tendency to rule out *political* solutions
(that is, solutions related to the peculiarities in the positions
and attitudes of the individual peoples). It favors legalistic
and mechanical solutions, applicable to all countries alike. It
has already been embodied in the United Nations, in the proposed
ITO Charter, in UNESCO, in the PICAO, and in similar efforts an
universal world collaboration in given spheres of foreign policy.
This universalistic approach has a strong appeal to U.S. public
opinion; for it appears to obviate the necessity of dealing with
the national peculiarities and diverging political philosophies of
foreign peoples; which many of our people find confusing and
irritating. In this sense, it contains a strong vein of escapism.
To the extent that it could be made to apply, it would relieve us
of the necessity of dealing with the world as it is. It assumes
that if all countries could be induced to subscribe to certain
standard rules of behavior, the ugly realities--the power
aspirations, the national prejudices, the irrational hatreds and
jealousies--would be forced to recede behind the protecting
curtain of accepted legal restraint, and that the problems of our
foreign policy could thus be reduced to the familiar terms of
parliamentary procedure and majority decision. The outward form
established for international dealings would then cover and
conceal the inner content. And instead of being compelled to make
the sordid and involved political choices inherent in traditional
diplomacy, we could make decision on the lofty but simple plane of
moral principle and under the protecting cover of majority
decision.
The *particularized* approach is one which is skeptical of any
scheme for compressing international affairs into legalistic
concepts. It holds that the content is more important than the
form, and will force its way through any formal structure which is
placed on it. It considers that the thirst for power is still
dominant among so many peoples that it cannot be assuaged or
controlled by anything but counter-force. It does not reject
entirely the idea of alliance as a suitable form of counter-force;
but it considers that if alliance is to be effective it must be
based on real community of interest and outlook, which is to be
found only among limited groups of governments, and not upon the
abstract formalism of universal international law or international
organization.
One of Kennan's recent books on foreign policy is "Around the Cragged
Hill" (1992). With the end of the Cold War, Kennan is now arguing
that the US should attempt to withdraw from center stage and focus on
tackling its domestic problems, restricting itself to maintaining its
support for Western Europe and Japan. Along these lines, he says that
the US should attempt to work through multilateral organizations such
as the UN, as much as possible. He also argues that US military aid
to Third World countries (e.g. Latin America; this would presumably
include SOA/WHISC) should be ended as quickly as possible, and
non-military aid should be channelled through multilateral
organizations. There's a review of "Around the Cragged Hill" by
Arthur Schlesinger in the New York Review, but again it's only
available to subscribers:
The UN, moreover, is a necessary adjunct to a restrained American
role. The end of the cold war has increased the salience of the
UN in dealing with world problems. "This will not mean divesting
ourselves of all responsibility for the treatment of the problems
in question; it will mean only that our efforts, instead of being
unilateral, will be exercised through the UN, in multilateral bodies."
Not the self-trumpeting leader in great moral causes but the
modest, willing worker together with others in the vineyard
of international collaboration: that is the image of itself
that America should wish to project to others, but primarily to
itself, as the twenty-first century, so replete with
uncertainties and dangers, begins to impose itself upon us.
[http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2668]
TVsHenry
>people who (a) aren't crazed right-wingers and who (b) disagree with
>Chomsky.
And on the other hand there are bona fide crazed right wingers who find
themselves agreeing with him quite a bit (see David Duke).
_
"The scandal isn't necessarily what Krugman did; it's that his brethren in the
Press believe that he can take $50k for his personal use and remain objective,
but that a politician who gets a campaign donation has been bought." - Orrin
Judd
David Manning
>
> Sorry, I'm not sure why you think this is a falsehood. Is it my use of
> the words "morally bankrupt" or "evil", or my referring to "the US"
> instead of "US foreign policy"? I'm afraid I don't see how this is a
> misrepresentation or misunderstanding of Chomsky's views. I think
> it's pretty clear from his writings. For example, in the link you
> provide, Chomsky says:
>
> The main reasons for my concern with U.S. foreign policy are that
> I find it, in general, horrifying ....
>
> ... The foreign policy of other states is also in general
> horrifying -- roughly speaking, states are violent to the extent
> that they have the power to act in the interests of those with
> domestic power ....
> [http://monkeyfist.com/ChomskyArchive/misc/reasons_html]
>
> I'm not saying that this is an inherently discreditable view, I just
> disagree with Chomsky.
This quote from NC does not say that US foreign policy is "no less
evil" than the USSR's foreign policy or that there is "no moral
difference between the foreign policies of the U.S. and the USSR" --
one could find the foreign policies of both Sweden and South Africa
horrifying without finding them morally equivalent. That's just simple
logic.
> I'm curious: what do you think? Would you disagree with the following
> statement?
>
> US foreign policy during the Cold War was no less evil than that
> of the Soviet Union.
Yes, I would disagree with that statement. I imagine NC would, too, if
you had the integrity to ask him, which apparently you don't.
>
> In fact, Chomsky compares US foreign policy to that of Nazi Germany,
> not just the Soviet Union. For example:
>
> If it is the responsibility of the intellectual to insist upon
> the truth, it is also his duty to see events in their historical
> perspective. Thus one must applaud the insistence of the Secretary
> of State on the importance of historical analogies, the Munich
> analogy, for example. As Munich showed, a powerful and aggressive
> nation with a fanatic belief in its manifest destiny will regard
> each victory, each extension of its power and authority, as a
> prelude to the next step. The matter was very well put by Adlai
> Stevenson, when he spoke of "the old, old route whereby expansive
> powers push at more and more doors, believing they will open until,
> at the ultimate door, resistance is unavoidable and major war breaks
> out." Herein lies the danger of appeasement, as the Chinese tirelessly
> point out to the Soviet Union — which, they claim, is playing
> Chamberlain to our Hitler in Vietnam.
> ["The Responsibility of Intellectals", 1967]
Again, there is nothing in this quote that suggests "moral
equivalency" -- yes, a comparison is made. But, again, a comparison
between, say, the foreign policy of Sweden and South Africa (or pick
any two states you like) would not imply "moral equivalency" ...
Whether you find the quote from NC interesting or not, my point is
that it does not support the "no less evil" line you are trying to tar
him with. Nor does NC argue that bourgeois democracy is equivalent to
Fascism. Unless you can come up with something serious, you might as
well drop this fraudulent line of attack.
>
> > You write: "I think the strongest argument against the Marxist idea of
> > the inevitable proletarian revolution isn't the totalitarian
> > dictatorship of the Soviet Union (which could be ascribed to
> > Leninism); it's the fact that within Western liberal capitalist
> > states, prosperity is now largely shared with all of society, through
> > the mechanism of the welfare state, not restricted to the elite." But
> > this assumes that the prosperity of the proletariat will be a
> > significant factor in whether or not a revolution will occur. That's
> > not obvious. Revolutions may be affected by any number of factors, for
> > example, concerns for social justice that may have nothing to do with
> > anyone's prosperity.
>
> Sure. Where I'm coming from is that I *am* concerned with inequality
> in capitalist societies, and if Marx's argument were correct -- that
> capitalism leads to progressively worse exploitation and impoverishment
> of the proletariat -- that would be a strong argument for revolution,
> to me. I think the existence of successful welfare states is an
> important counter-argument: it's possible to use the state to
> redistribute income and reduce the inequality generated by a
> free-market economy.
Even if Marx's argument were correct, which it's not, the success of
welfare states in redistributing income and reducing inequality is
hardly an argument against a proletarian revolution. If slave
plantations were successful in reducing inequality among slaves that
wouldn't necessarily be a barrier to slave revolt. Similarly, if
welfare states reduce inequality among wage slaves that's no guarantee
of a barrier against the proles revolting and insisting on control of
their lives and work. So, yes, "progressively worse exploitation and
impoverishment" might be a strong argument for revolution but other
factors might be just as strong or even stronger, as I suggested: a
concern for social justice, desire for democracy and freedom, etc.
>
> > It's clear from the quote that NC prefers
> > a revolution that "minimizes the use of terror except as necessary in
> > defense."
>
> I know. But Hannah Arendt's point was that terror is wrong, regardless
> of whether it's revolutionary or counterrevolutionary. Chomsky, on
> the other hand, says that *revolutionary* terror may be justified,
> depending on whether the success of the revolution depends on the
> terror or not, and noting that there's a number of strong arguments
> in favor of revolutionary terror; in the end, he doesn't accept these
> arguments, but on an empirical basis, not because he regards
> revolutionary terror as unjustifiable. In particular, Chomsky doesn't
> seem to have much of a problem with the terror that was used in China:
> he cites China approvingly as an example of a successful revolutionary
> regime based on relatively little terror. Despite what Chomsky says,
> there *was* a great deal of terror in China, e.g. Burama's figure of
> 700,000 "counterrevolutionary elements" killed or driven to suicide
> in 1950.
This is a serious distortion of NC's remarks. He does not say that
China was "a successful revolutionary regime" ("regime" is your word,
not his) -- he says "very interesting positive things happened at the
local level, in which a good deal of the collectivization and
communization was really based on mass participation" in other words,
it is not the "regime" that was successful but that elements at the
grass roots level were positive -- and not because of the violence but
in spite of it. And he does not say there was "relatively little
terror" but that there was "much less terror" than was used in Russia
(citing China Quarterly). From your distortions, you then draw the
conclusion that NC "doesn't seem to have much of a problem with the
terror that was used in China"! If I say that, in spite of violence
against the Tories, positive things happened at the local level during
the American Revolution and that the Americans used much less terror
than the French, only a moron would conclude from those comments that
I "don't seem to have much of a problem with the terror" that was used
in America. Similarly, there's nothing in NC's comments to support
your delusion.
>
> In contrast, Chomsky doesn't make any such allowances for
> *counterrevolutionary* regimes such as Singapore (which, despite
> being a one-party state, hasn't committed any mass killings,
> as far as I know) or South Korea.
>
> > ... the panel discussion was considering the relative merits of
> > violence in pursuing a revolutionary cause -- not the question of
> > whether or not the Chinese mass murder should be condemned.
>
> Sure. Arendt's view was that revolutionary violence should be judged
> the same way as counterrevolutionary violence. Chomsky's view seemed
> to be that revolutionary violence may be justifiable -- that there's
> strong arguments in its favor, which cannot be lightly dismissed,
> although he does disagree with them in the end -- in favor of
> revolutionary violence. This doesn't seem like a double standard
> to you?
There is no double standard that I can see, only the moral standard
that NC discusses in the link I provided, namely, the moral concern
with consequences for human beings which is, as he says, "constantly
denied by intellectual servants of state power who, for obvious
reasons, pretend not to understand them and typically criticize those
who act in accordance with decent moral principles as having a 'double
standard' or worse."
> The problem I have with Chomsky is that I think his criticisms are
> founded on incorrect premises, and backed up by bogus evidence
> (see section 3.4).
But it's pretty clear that you don't even begin to grasp those
premises, let alone the criticisms. As for backing up assertions with
"bogus evidence," you're pretty obviously the pot calling the kettle
black, based on the above.
>
> > By the end of your "critique" you are
> > not evaluating Chomsky's ideas, as you claim, but are merely citing
> > others' arguments without evaluation.
>
> The point of the last section was to provide references to other people's
> criticism of Chomsky, kind of like an existence proof: yes, there are
> people who (a) aren't crazed right-wingers and who (b) disagree with
> Chomsky. From what I can tell, all of the people I'm referring to in
> section 4 are reasonable people, mostly left-wing, and they have
> reasonable arguments against Chomsky's views.
If people need an "existence proof" that liberals and Chomsky diagree
with one another, then that indicates how little they understand NC's
criticisms which are, as you well know, mostly directed at the liberal
intelligentsia. If the liberals are the "reasonable people" who merely
apologize for the state as opposed to the "crazed right-wingers" who
virtually worship the state, then only the naive would feel the need
to construct a proof that any of these people would disagree with
criticism of the state.
Russil Wvong
> russi...@yahoo.com (Russil Wvong) wrote [quoting Chomsky]:
> > The main reasons for my concern with U.S. foreign policy are that
> > I find it, in general, horrifying ....
> >
> > ... The foreign policy of other states is also in general
> > horrifying -- roughly speaking, states are violent to the extent
> > that they have the power to act in the interests of those with
> > domestic power ....
> > [http://monkeyfist.com/ChomskyArchive/misc/reasons_html]
>
> evil" than the USSR's foreign policy or that there is "no moral
> difference between the foreign policies of the U.S. and the USSR" --
> one could find the foreign policies of both Sweden and South Africa
> horrifying without finding them morally equivalent. That's just simple
> logic.
If I understand correctly, you're objecting to my using the word "evil",
when Chomsky used "horrifying". Is this correct? Would you agree that
the following statement, then, is an accurate paraphrase of what Chomsky's
saying?
US foreign policy during the Cold War was no less horrifying
than that of the Soviet Union.
I'm not attempting to fraudulently "tag" Chomsky with something that
he didn't say, or to attack him; I'm just trying to understand what
he's saying. I'm still not sure why you consider my original
description to be an "attack" on Chomsky.
> > I'm curious: what do you think? Would you disagree with the following
> > statement?
> >
> > US foreign policy during the Cold War was no less evil than that
> > of the Soviet Union.
>
> Yes, I would disagree with that statement.
Why? I'm not attempting to score points, I'm genuinely curious why
you say this. I've already given my evaluation of US foreign policy
during the Cold War; what's yours?
> I imagine NC would, too, if
> you had the integrity to ask him, which apparently you don't.
I think the word you want is "courage". :-) I'm certainly not
egotistical enough to think that I could best Chomsky in a
flaming match.
> > Chomsky doesn't
> > seem to have much of a problem with the terror that was used in China:
> > he cites China approvingly as an example of a successful revolutionary
> > regime based on relatively little terror. Despite what Chomsky says,
> > there *was* a great deal of terror in China, e.g. Burama's figure of
> > 700,000 "counterrevolutionary elements" killed or driven to suicide
> > in 1950.
>
> This is a serious distortion of NC's remarks. He does not say that
> China was "a successful revolutionary regime" ("regime" is your word,
> not his) --
True, at the time I couldn't think of a more neutral word than "regime".
Perhaps I should have just said "successful revolution".
> he says "very interesting positive things happened at the
> local level, in which a good deal of the collectivization and
> communization was really based on mass participation" in other words,
> it is not the "regime" that was successful but that elements at the
> grass roots level were positive -- and not because of the violence but
> in spite of it. And he does not say there was "relatively little
> terror" but that there was "much less terror" than was used in Russia
> (citing China Quarterly).
Er, I think you're splitting hairs here. Chomsky himself is giving
China as a positive example of his contention that "there is a
relationship between absence of terror and the degree of
organization, meaningful programs and spontaneity, on the one hand,
and success in achieving a just society on the other." I don't think
it's just a delusion on my part. There's a long footnote in
"Objectivity and Liberal Scholarship" in which he compares the
Chinese revolution to the Spanish anarchist movement (unfortunately
I don't have my copy of "The Chomsky Reader" with me). I can post
it if you'd like.
> > The problem I have with Chomsky is that I think his criticisms are
> > founded on incorrect premises, and backed up by bogus evidence
> > (see section 3.4).
>
> But it's pretty clear that you don't even begin to grasp those
> premises, let alone the criticisms. As for backing up assertions with
> "bogus evidence," you're pretty obviously the pot calling the kettle
> black, based on the above.
I guess we'll have to let other readers decide. I think I've made
a sincere attempt to understand what Chomsky's saying, even if I
disagree. It isn't so far off from Orwell's point of view (Orwell
was certainly critical of bourgeois capitalism, referring to
"capitalist bumsuckers" in one of his essays), and I'm sympathetic
to Orwell's views, having read all of his books in high school.
I found that reading "Objectivity and Liberal Scholarship", which
discusses the Spanish civil war, was very helpful for me in trying
to understand where Chomsky's coming from.
> If people need an "existence proof" that liberals and Chomsky diagree
> with one another, then that indicates how little they understand NC's
> criticisms which are, as you well know, mostly directed at the liberal
> intelligentsia.
A lot of Chomsky's supporters appear to believe that there are no
*rational* counter-arguments against Chomsky, that people merely bash
Chomsky because they don't like what he says, without having any
counter-evidence. For example, see the initial article in this thread.
(I'm wondering what happened to Siggy.) That's why I put together the
web page.
Regarding the liberal intelligentsia and their apologizing for state
power, I should point out that the political realists whom I cite the
most frequently, George Kennan and Hans Morgenthau, were both prominent
opponents of the Vietnam War. Kennan gave televised testimony before
the Senate in 1967 (for five hours, I believe); Morgenthau published
an article in September 1965 in the New York Review of Books opposing
the war, and as of 1969, he had made probably over one hundred "public
assaults on the Vietnam war in the form of articles, lectures, speeches,
debates, etc." [http://www.nybooks.com/articles/11173] In fact, I
think Morgenthau was at the same panel discussion that Arendt and
Chomsky were at. His comment in a 1970 essay:
Rereading now the essays I have written for this and other papers
in the Sixties, I am struck by the activistic, almost rationalistic,
mood that permeates them. One only needed, or so it seemed, to call
the President's attention to the probable consequences of certain
policies and show him the alternatives and their probable consequences,
and he would choose a policy most likely to serve the national
interest. I remember with wry amusement my strenuous and ultimately
successful efforts in 1965 to bring my views on the Vietnam war
to the attention of President Johnson — efforts undertaken in the
naïve assumption that if power were only made to see the truth,
it would follow that lead. President Johnson's political reaction to
this kind of responsible criticism is a matter of public record. His
personal reaction was a systematic attempt, making full use of the
informal powers of his office, to discredit and silence the voice of
the dissenter.
[http://www.nybooks.com/articles/10845]
djinn
<snip discussion of Chomsky's position>
>> > I'm curious: what do you think? Would you disagree with the
>> > following statement?
>> >
>> > US foreign policy during the Cold War was no less evil than
>> > that of the Soviet Union.
>>
>> Yes, I would disagree with that statement.
>
> Why? I'm not attempting to score points, I'm genuinely curious why
> you say this. I've already given my evaluation of US foreign policy
> during the Cold War; what's yours?
>
>> I imagine NC would, too, if
>> you had the integrity to ask him, which apparently you don't.
>
In all of his writings are there quotes that would show one way or the
other? If not, would asking get a clearer answer?
> I think the word you want is "courage". :-) I'm certainly not
> egotistical enough to think that I could best Chomsky in a
> flaming match.
>
Its somewhat telling that you think asking a straightforward question
would draw flames. Although its easy to see why you say that, considering
the responses you've drawn here...
<snip discussion of Chomsky's position on China>
>>
> I guess we'll have to let other readers decide. I think I've made
> a sincere attempt to understand what Chomsky's saying, even if I
> disagree. <snip>
It certainly looks like you've made a sincere attempt. Your posting
of quotes and sources are a help to those of us who'd like to learn more.
It would be a bit less one-sided if your detractors would do the same.
>> If people need an "existence proof" that liberals and Chomsky diagree
>> with one another, then that indicates how little they understand NC's
>> criticisms which are, as you well know, mostly directed at the
>> liberal intelligentsia.
>
> A lot of Chomsky's supporters appear to believe that there are no
> *rational* counter-arguments against Chomsky, that people merely bash
> Chomsky because they don't like what he says, without having any
> counter-evidence. For example, see the initial article in this
> thread. (I'm wondering what happened to Siggy.) That's why I put
> together the web page.
>
That seems true. It also seems that counter-evidence is dismissed out of
hand, or the critic is subjected to ad hominem attacks. Chomsky's
supporters would look a lot more credible if there were occaisional
admissions that Chomsky can be wrong.
<snip>
> Russil Wvong
> Vancouver, Canada
> www.geocities.com/rwvong
Thanks again for the references, and for the relentlessly reasonable posts.
:)
zztop8970-
> >zztop:
> >If that is your current claim, the onus is on YOU to prove that the
> >conflict today is a different one than the one we had 80 yeras ago.
>
> Or I could just turn it over to you, and say: if this is your current claim,
> the onus is on you to prove that the conflict today is the same as we had 80
> years ago. :)
Yes, but since you started arguing that it is a differnt conflict
(read the thread) - the onus is on you.
Don't get me wrong - I'm perfectly happy to show you that the conflict
is one and the same, and that it was all about who (culturally who,
ethnically who) rules the territory.
>
> But anyway, I was arguing theoretically on that one.
>
> >Because history shows they didn't. If you have to take out the Jews,
> >it shows the Jews are the problem.
>
> Sure, Arabs never fought with each others.
Not over Palestine, at least not in modern times. the region was
fairly peacful until the Zionist movement.
> Again, I am not saying that the different
> religion and ethnicity is not a problem.
No, you're saying they are secondary sources, contrary to the evidence
I present you with.
>
>
> > That shows the territory in
> >question is not really the problem, but the racial or cultural
> >backgroud of the occupiers IS.
>
> Well, if you read the history of Palestine, you see, that the immigrant
> Zionists started to take over land, groving in numbers and influence. So yes,
> territory and who controls it is part of the problem.
the territory was there before ZIonist immigartion, and it was owned
by the people the Zionists bought it from - and all of this was
peaceful until the Zionists came in. this shows the conflict is one of
Arab vs. Zionsit and NOT one of poor vs. rich, tenent workers vs. rich
absent landlords, etc...
>
> >First of all, we're not talking about farmers.
>
> Sure we are. At least historically speaking.
> 1878
> First Zionist settlement (Petach Tiqva) established under the guise of
> agricultural community.
>
> >which shows that land distribution is
> >a secondary root cuase (if that), to cutural animosity.
>
> By the way, what are we arguing about here?
We are arguing over what is the primary cause in the Arab-Israeli
conflict. You imply an economic reason, I say that's secondary (if at
all) to the cultural/ethnical conflict over territory ownership.
David Manning
> > russi...@yahoo.com (Russil Wvong) wrote [quoting Chomsky]:
> > > The main reasons for my concern with U.S. foreign policy are that
> > > I find it, in general, horrifying ....
> > >
> > > ... The foreign policy of other states is also in general
> > > horrifying -- roughly speaking, states are violent to the extent
> > > that they have the power to act in the interests of those with
> > > domestic power ....
> > > [http://monkeyfist.com/ChomskyArchive/misc/reasons_html]
> >
> > This quote from NC does not say that US foreign policy is "no less
> > evil" than the USSR's foreign policy or that there is "no moral
> > difference between the foreign policies of the U.S. and the USSR" --
> > one could find the foreign policies of both Sweden and South Africa
> > horrifying without finding them morally equivalent. That's just simple
> > logic.
>
> If I understand correctly, you're objecting to my using the word "evil",
> when Chomsky used "horrifying". Is this correct?
No, that is NOT correct.
> Would you agree that
> the following statement, then, is an accurate paraphrase of what Chomsky's
> saying?
>
> US foreign policy during the Cold War was no less horrifying
> than that of the Soviet Union.
No, that is NOT an accurate paraphrase of what Chomsky is saying and
you know it. One may be horrified by two different things without
finding them morally equivalent. I may be horrified by the foreign
policies of both Portugal and Nazi Germany without believing that
Portugal is no less horrifying (or evil) than Nazi Germany.
Since you like quoting liberals at length, let's try another quote
from NC, same topic, circa 1986, talking to Nicaraguans:
"One of the truths about the world is that there are two superpowers,
one a huge power [the U.S.] which happens to have its boot on your
neck, another, a smaller power [the USSR] which happens to have its
boot on other people's necks. In fact these two superpowers have a
form of tacit cooperation in controlling much of the world. My own
concern is primarily the terror and violence carried out by my own
state, for two reasons. For one thing, because it happens to be the
larger component of international violence. But also for a much more
important reason than that; namely, I can do something about it. So
even if the U.S. was responsible for 2 percent of the violence in the
world instead of the majority of it, it would be that 2 percent I
would be primarily responsible for. And that is a simple ethical
judgment. That is, the ethical value of one's actions depends on their
anticipated and predictable consequences. It is very easy to denounce
the atrocities of someone else. That has about as much ethical value
as denouncing atrocities that took place in the 18th century. The
point is that the useful and significant political actions are those
that have consequences for human beings. And those are overwhelmingly
the actions which you have some way of influencing and controlling,
which mean for me, American actions." Source: _On Power and Ideology_
So, for Chomsky, the US -- the "huge power" -- is responsible for "the
larger component of international violence..." The USSR, the smaller
power, is responsible for less violence. Where is the moral
equivalence? There is none. There is a comparison made between the two
states but the comparison does not imply moral equivalence any more
than a comparison between Nazi Germany (a huge power) and Portugal (a
smaller power) implies that Portugal is no less evil than Nazi
Germany.
Let's take another NC quote, this one from 1988:
"I do not have the ludicrous egotism which makes me the arbiter of all
atrocities over the world. I'm not trying to give an A to this country
and a B minus to this country and so on. The principle that I think we
ought to follow is ... the principle we rightly expect Soviet
dissidents to follow. What principle do we expect Sakharov to follow,
let's say? What lets us decide whether Sakharov's a moral person? I
think he is. Sakharov does not treat every atrocity as identical. He
has nothing to say about American atrocities. When he's asked, he says
I don't know anything about them, I don't care about them. What he
talks about are Soviet atrocities, and that's right. Because those are
the ones that he's responsible for. You know, it's a very simple
ethical point - you're responsible for the predictable consequences of
your actions. You're not responsible for the predictable consequences
of someone else's actions. Now, we understand this when we're talking
about dissidents in the Soviet Union but we refuse to understand it
when we're talking about ourselves for very good reasons. Commissars
in the Soviet Union don't understand it about dissidents. Commissars
in the Soviet Union attack Sakharov and other dissidents because they
don't talk about American crimes. We understand exactly why that's
just hypocrisy and cynicism when they do it and we should understand
the same when we do it. ... The most important thing, for me and for
you, is to think about the consequences of your actions. What can you
affect? Those are the ones you primarily ought to be concerned about."
Source: http://www.zmag.org/chomsky/interviews/8812-massey-qa.html
Okay, there you have it: the primary moral concern is not with one
state or the other but with the consequences of your actions.
>
> > > Chomsky doesn't
> > > seem to have much of a problem with the terror that was used in China:
> > > he cites China approvingly as an example of a successful revolutionary
> > > regime based on relatively little terror. Despite what Chomsky says,
> > > there *was* a great deal of terror in China, e.g. Burama's figure of
> > > 700,000 "counterrevolutionary elements" killed or driven to suicide
> > > in 1950.
> >
> > This is a serious distortion of NC's remarks. He does not say that
> > China was "a successful revolutionary regime" ("regime" is your word,
> > not his) --
>
> True, at the time I couldn't think of a more neutral word than "regime".
> Perhaps I should have just said "successful revolution".
Perhaps you should have just stuck to the truth. NC does NOT call it a
"successful revolution" either. He claims "positive things" happened
at the grass roots level but that hardly constitutes a "successful
revolution"! At any rate, nothing of what NC says supports the idea
that NC is "making excuses" for China under Mao or that he "doesn't
seem to have much of a problem with the terror that was used in China"
-- those are your fantasies, unsupported by his comments:
> > he says "very interesting positive things happened at the
> > local level, in which a good deal of the collectivization and
> > communization was really based on mass participation" in other words,
> > it is not the "regime" that was successful but that elements at the
> > grass roots level were positive -- and not because of the violence but
> > in spite of it. And he does not say there was "relatively little
> > terror" but that there was "much less terror" than was used in Russia
> > (citing China Quarterly).
>
> Er, I think you're splitting hairs here.
I'm splitting hairs when you describe NC's finding "some positive
things" at the local level as "making excuses" for a "regime"? I'm
splitting hairs when you claim that NC describes China's using
"relatively little terror" when he, in fact, describes China using
"much less terror [than the Russians]"? Get real. Suppose I say that
some positive things happened at the local level in 1980s Russia and
you claim I'm making excuses for the Soviet regime? Or suppose I say
the Americans used much less terror in their revolution than the
French did in theirs -- and you claim I said that the Americans used
"relatively little terror"? Would anybody take you seriously? And
these are the sort of distortions that characterize your alleged
"critique" ...
> Chomsky himself is giving
> China as a positive example of his contention that "there is a
> relationship between absence of terror and the degree of
> organization, meaningful programs and spontaneity, on the one hand,
> and success in achieving a just society on the other." I don't think
> it's just a delusion on my part.
Your delusion is that someone who says the above is somehow "making
excuses" for China or implies that he "doesn't seem to have much of a
problem" with the Chinese terror. You can't logically draw those
conclusions from the comments. If I say that, in spite of violence,
positive things happened at a local level in 1770s America, it does
not follow automatically from that that I don't have a problem with
violence against the Tories or the slaughter of the Native Americans
or the institution of slavery. Surely, that's clear.
> A lot of Chomsky's supporters appear to believe that there are no
> *rational* counter-arguments against Chomsky, that people merely bash
> Chomsky because they don't like what he says, without having any
> counter-evidence. ... That's why I put together the
> web page.
Okay, well, let us know when you post some rational arguments.
>
> Regarding the liberal intelligentsia and their apologizing for state
> power, I should point out that the political realists whom I cite the
> most frequently, George Kennan and Hans Morgenthau, were both prominent
> opponents of the Vietnam War.
Leaving Kennan's and Morgenthau's views aside, dovish liberal
opponents of the war would be considered state apologists. The doves'
view assumed that the US had the right to attack South Vietnam but
objected to the war on tactical grounds: that too many people were
getting killed or it was unwinnable or it made us look bad or it was
misplaced generosity, etc. The radical opponents were arguing that the
state had no right to commit an act of aggression regardlesss of
tactical concerns.
Kennan gave televised testimony before
> the Senate in 1967 (for five hours, I believe); Morgenthau published
> an article in September 1965 in the New York Review of Books opposing
> the war, and as of 1969, he had made probably over one hundred "public
> assaults on the Vietnam war in the form of articles, lectures, speeches,
> debates, etc." [http://www.nybooks.com/articles/11173] In fact, I
> think Morgenthau was at the same panel discussion that Arendt and
> Chomsky were at.
Ah, no, he wasn't. But NC quotes his classic observation about the
government having a monopoly on violence.
>
> > I imagine NC would, too, if
> > you had the integrity to ask him, which apparently you don't.
>
> I think the word you want is "courage". :-) I'm certainly not
> egotistical enough to think that I could best Chomsky in a
> flaming match.
Fine. You're an intellectual coward, then. We agree on that much.
Nathan Folkert
> russi...@yahoo.com (Russil Wvong) wrote in message news:
> <afe9ed76.02013...@posting.google.com>...
[snip]
> > Sure. Arendt's view was that revolutionary violence should be judged
> > the same way as counterrevolutionary violence. Chomsky's view seemed
> > to be that revolutionary violence may be justifiable -- that there's
> > strong arguments in its favor, which cannot be lightly dismissed,
> > although he does disagree with them in the end -- in favor of
> > revolutionary violence. This doesn't seem like a double standard
> > to you?
>
> There is no double standard that I can see, only the moral standard
> that NC discusses in the link I provided, namely, the moral concern
> with consequences for human beings which is, as he says, "constantly
> denied by intellectual servants of state power who, for obvious
> reasons, pretend not to understand them and typically criticize those
> who act in accordance with decent moral principles as having a 'double
> standard' or worse."
Chomsky has presented a moral principle regarding the use of violence:
"violence is not legitimate unless the consequences of such action are
to eliminate a still greater evil." On the surface, this principle
seems reasonable, and I think most would agree with it, but it raises
another question. How does one judge what is the "greater evil"? If
one's perception and analysis of evil is perverse, then this
principle, likewise, becomes perverse. So let us consider Chomsky's
perception and analysis of evil.
As you point out in Chomsky's rationalization above, Chomsky does not
view the critical analysis of the enemy of one's state, and thus the
accurate judgment of evil, as being morally neutral. Precisely
*because* critical analysis of an enemy of one's state is often used
to justify violence, Chomsky views it as being morally vacuous *at
best* and morally reprehensible at worst, whereas critical analysis of
one's own state is a "decent moral principle". But this is not
precisely his view, either, because he also does not view critical
analysis of one's own state as morally neutral. He rejects critical
analysis that justifies the use of violence, and immediately compares
attempts to defend such decisions with the behavior of German and
Japanese fascists. He goes so far as to say, for example, that even
to debate the American intervention in Vietnam rather than to simply
condemn it as an "obscenity" is to lose one's humanity, though most
newsgroup readers recognize these words only from Chomsky's defense in
the Faurisson controversy.
So we are left with the following: it is morally reprehensible to
condemn the violence of the enemies of our state, and it is morally
reprehensible to attempt to justify the violence of our own state.
(At least, this is the standard he holds us to. He is not so kind to
Vaclav Havel, but I'll get to that in a moment.) What does this mean,
then, when we consider his stance on the use of violence? It means
that he views the attempt to determine the greater evil to be evil
itself. It means that it is immoral to critically analyze the
behavior of the enemies of our state, thus impossible to judge them as
being the greater evil -- all violence used against them is
unjustified and therefore evil. Cute trick.
Thus while Chomsky is perhaps not subjectively pro-Soviet, he is
objectively pro-Soviet (which is more extreme than your debate over
whether he "equates" the two superpowers), because he wants to make it
impossible to judge the Soviet imperialist expansionism as being a
greater evil than American intervention, and therefore all American
violence against the Soviet sphere is necessarily evil and all Soviet
violence is necessarily above judgment. This same argument extends to
other areas of our foreign policy. This entire group is filled with
people who piously claim to oppose the bias inherent in our
institutional structures, but they cannot even see the obvious bias,
*inherent in his own moral principles*, of the man after whom it was
named.
Chomsky goes even further, actually. He routinely compares the Soviet
sphere with the American sphere. If it is true, as Chomsky claims in
his rant against Vaclav Havel's speech to the Joint Session of
Congress, that "It's also unnecessary to point out to the half a dozen
or so sane people who remain that in comparison to the conditions
imposed by US tyranny and violence, East Europe under Russian rule was
practically a paradise"
(http://monkeyfist.com/ChomskyArchive/essays/havel_html), then by the
logic above, the use of violence by the Russians in Eastern Europe is
morally superior to the use of violence by Americans in, for example,
Latin America. Though he refuses to allow Americans such excuses, he
has in many places deflected criticism of the Soviets in Eastern
Europe based on the "strategic and historical reasons, of an obvious
nature" raised by a re-armed West Germany. In "The Legitimacy of
Violence as a Political Act", he goes so far as to say that the
violence of communist revolutionaries might be *justified* if it was
truly necessary to help the peasants overcome their "inferiority
complex" (if you are confused as to why this suggestion is morally
abhorrent, I suggest that you some day look up exactly what was done
in places like North Vietnam, North Korea, and China to "rouse the
peasants", and ponder Chomsky's words over the corpses of millions).
Havel's speech to Congress was two months after his election as
president of newly non-Communist Czechoslovakia, which was two months
after he was last jailed by the Communist regime, and two months
before the Soviet military finally withdrew from their country. I
don't find it to be a terribly good speech, but if you're interested,
it is available on the web
(http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/havel1.htm). Havel was, in
fact, condemning the policies of the power under which he lived (the
Soviets), and praising the official enemy (the United States),
pleading that they do more to end the tyranny under which he lived.
Chomsky, however, condemns Havel, regarding him as being on a moral
and intellectual level *vastly below* that of "Stalinist hacks". It
might make sense in Chomsky's framework to condemn the American
supporters of Havel, who he can argue are just using the whole thing
as more propaganda to perpetrate atrocities upon communists and
justify their nefarious policies. But as it stands, Chomsky is
demonstrating that he holds the opposite standards for dissidents in
the Soviet sphere as he does for dissidents in the American sphere.
This does not follow from his previously proclaimed moral principles
(in fact, it runs directly counter to them), and can only be regarded
as manifest sympathy for the Soviets, regardless of his infantile
rationalizations of his statements being "important truths" that will
be interpretable by the American intellectual community (err... rather
"totalitarian culture") "only at the level of 'Fuck You'".
Incidentally, he is also demonstrating in this letter a most revolting
hypocrisy. He compares Havel with "a Fatherland Front leader in a
remote village in Vietnam" who he recalls making remarks "describing
the USSR as the hope for the oppressed and the US government as the
brutal oppressor of the human race". He seems to be misremembering
*his own* speech, given in North Vietnam, describing the US government
as "a social class [...] that has no place in the 20th century, that
has only the capacity to repress and murder and destroy", while
describing the North Vietnamese Soviet puppet revolution as being at
"the forefront of the struggle to create a world in which the chains
of oppression have been broken and replaced by social bonds among free
men working in true solidarity and cooperation"
(http://www.frontpagemag.com/archives/rogues/la1-15-99.htm). No
wonder he made a point to judge Havel as being "morally and
intellectually" below "Stalinist hacks" -- Chomsky was one of them.
[snip]
- Nate
John Filiss
"David Manning" <quote...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:e57e1dc8.02020...@posting.google.com...
Even taking Chomsky's rationalization at face value, he basically gives the
show away in saying that his focus is in cataloging American crimes while
ignoring Soviet crimes, hence ignoring the context by which we can judge the
nature of the actions of either side.
I actually think Chomsky's modus operandi is more corrupt than he lets on
here (see Nathan Folkert's excellent response to your previous post), but
the above paragraphs already attest to his irrelevance as an historian. If
the reader wants objectivity, Chomsky is not the place to turn.
Thanks for the quotes. I will use them in the future to reference Chomsky's
admission of his own bias, in the event anyone mistakenly felt that his was
an open search for truth in its entirety.
John Filiss
http://primitivism.com
David Manning
<4b923300.02020...@posting.google.com>...
>
> Chomsky has presented a moral principle regarding the use of violence:
> "violence is not legitimate unless the consequences of such action are
> to eliminate a still greater evil." On the surface, this principle
> seems reasonable, and I think most would agree with it, but it raises
> another question. How does one judge what is the "greater evil"? If
> one's perception and analysis of evil is perverse, then this
> principle, likewise, becomes perverse. So let us consider Chomsky's
> perception and analysis of evil.
>
> As you point out in Chomsky's rationalization above, Chomsky does not
> view the critical analysis of the enemy of one's state, and thus the
> accurate judgment of evil, as being morally neutral. Precisely
> *because* critical analysis of an enemy of one's state is often used
> to justify violence, Chomsky views it as being morally vacuous *at
> best* and morally reprehensible at worst, whereas critical analysis of
> one's own state is a "decent moral principle". But this is not
> precisely his view, either, because he also does not view critical
> analysis of one's own state as morally neutral. He rejects critical
> analysis that justifies the use of violence, and immediately compares
> attempts to defend such decisions with the behavior of German and
> Japanese fascists. He goes so far as to say, for example, that even
> to debate the American intervention in Vietnam rather than to simply
> condemn it as an "obscenity" is to lose one's humanity, though most
> newsgroup readers recognize these words only from Chomsky's defense in
> the Faurisson controversy.
But it's not true that NC "rejects critical analysis that justifies
the use of violence" by the US. He supported the US' participation in
Europe in the Second World War, for example. So you're starting with a
false premise and the rest of your post is based on this false
premise.
>
> So we are left with the following: it is morally reprehensible to
> condemn the violence of the enemies of our state, and it is morally
> reprehensible to attempt to justify the violence of our own state.
QUESTION: Can you give an example of a situation where military force
is justified?
CHOMSKY: Force was justified when Japan bombed Pearl Harbor and
Germany declared war against us.
Source: http://monkeyfist.com/ChomskyArchive/interviews/salon_html
> (At least, this is the standard he holds us to. He is not so kind to
> Vaclav Havel, but I'll get to that in a moment.) What does this mean,
> then, when we consider his stance on the use of violence? It means
> that he views the attempt to determine the greater evil to be evil
> itself. It means that it is immoral to critically analyze the
> behavior of the enemies of our state, thus impossible to judge them as
> being the greater evil -- all violence used against them is
> unjustified and therefore evil. Cute trick.
So Chomsky thinks that "all violence used against" Nazi Germany was
"unjustified and therefore evil"? You're living in a dream world.
Cuter trick.
I'm snipping the rest of your fantasies, based as they are on an
obvious falsehood.
Russil Wvong
> russi...@yahoo.com (Russil Wvong) wrote:
> > I think the word you want is "courage". :-) I'm certainly not
> > egotistical enough to think that I could best Chomsky in a
> > flaming match.
>
> Its somewhat telling that you think asking a straightforward question
> would draw flames. Although its easy to see why you say that, considering
> the responses you've drawn here...
I think it's just David Manning's responses. :-) I've had some very
intelligent discussions with Chomsky supporters in the past, such as
John Caruso. A friend from India is about to pass the page on to
some friends of his who are Chomsky fans; I'm interested in finding
out what they think.
I was thinking of sending the full page to Chomsky and asking for his
feedback, but perhaps I should just send him the one question. I'm
still really puzzled by David Manning's objection, though -- it seems
totally clear to me from Chomsky's writings.
> > I guess we'll have to let other readers decide. I think I've made
> > a sincere attempt to understand what Chomsky's saying, even if I
> > disagree. <snip>
>
> It certainly looks like you've made a sincere attempt. Your posting
> of quotes and sources are a help to those of us who'd like to learn more.
Thank you!
> > A lot of Chomsky's supporters appear to believe that there are no
> > *rational* counter-arguments against Chomsky, that people merely bash
> > Chomsky because they don't like what he says, without having any
> > counter-evidence. For example, see the initial article in this
> > thread. (I'm wondering what happened to Siggy.) That's why I put
> > together the web page.
>
> That seems true. It also seems that counter-evidence is dismissed out of
> hand, or the critic is subjected to ad hominem attacks. Chomsky's
> supporters would look a lot more credible if there were occaisional
> admissions that Chomsky can be wrong.
That's one thing I find puzzling about Chomsky: I've seen him say that
he was wrong exactly once. [http://www.nybooks.com/articles/11044]
In general he doesn't seem to take criticism very well.
> Thanks again for the references, and for the relentlessly reasonable posts.
> :)
You're welcome!
John Filiss
Said participation benefitting the Soviet Union, incidentally. So it is
actually consistent within the context that Nathan was using.
>
>
> >
> > So we are left with the following: it is morally reprehensible to
> > condemn the violence of the enemies of our state, and it is morally
> > reprehensible to attempt to justify the violence of our own state.
>
>
> QUESTION: Can you give an example of a situation where military force
> is justified?
>
> CHOMSKY: Force was justified when Japan bombed Pearl Harbor and
> Germany declared war against us.
>
> Source: http://monkeyfist.com/ChomskyArchive/interviews/salon_html
So force is justified when another nation attacks you militarily and
declares war on you? Is there ANYONE anywhere who would say otherwise, and
still be taken seriously?
<snip>
Russil Wvong
> russi...@yahoo.com (Russil Wvong) wrote:
> > I think the word you want is "courage". :-) ...
>
> Fine. You're an intellectual coward, then. We agree on that much.
I think that may be all we agree on. :-)
> > Would you agree that
> > the following statement, then, is an accurate paraphrase of what Chomsky's
> > saying?
> >
> > US foreign policy during the Cold War was no less horrifying
> > than that of the Soviet Union.
>
> No, that is NOT an accurate paraphrase of what Chomsky is saying and
> you know it. One may be horrified by two different things without
> finding them morally equivalent.
Which is why I didn't say "morally equivalent", I said "horrifying",
which is what Chomsky said.
> I may be horrified by the foreign
> policies of both Portugal and Nazi Germany without believing that
> Portugal is no less horrifying (or evil) than Nazi Germany.
So you're saying that although Chomsky judges both US and Soviet
foreign policy to be horrifying, he may still think that Soviet
foreign policy is more horrifying than that of the US? (And what's
your personal opinion -- do you think that Soviet foreign policy
was more horrifying than that of the US?) Or just that it doesn't
make sense to compare them?
I think you're on pretty weak ground. When Chomsky compares
*actions and consequences*, his assessment is that US foreign
policy is worse, because the US was more powerful than the
Soviet Union. As in your quote:
> "One of the truths about the world is that there are two superpowers,
> one a huge power [the U.S.] which happens to have its boot on your
> neck, another, a smaller power [the USSR] which happens to have its
> boot on other people's necks. In fact these two superpowers have a
> form of tacit cooperation in controlling much of the world. My own
> concern is primarily the terror and violence carried out by my own
> state, for two reasons. For one thing, because it happens to be the
> larger component of international violence. ..."
When Chomsky compares the *motivations* of the Soviet Union and
the Western democracies, his assessment is that they're about the
same. For example, in a 1992 interview with John Pilger:
[I] could see that the Spanish Civil war was - in fact, it was
like, as I have later learned, all civil wars are, it was
tripartite. There are two parts that are fighting, and they
enter history; they're fighting to see who picks up the share of
power; then there's the general population, who they both [want to]
destroy. In the Spanish Civil War, there was a popular revolution,
and the Stalin-backed Republic, and the Fascists, first combined,
along with the Western democracies, to destroy the popular
revolution, and after that was done, they fought to pick up the
spoils. Which is not an unusual pattern.
[http://www2.prestel.co.uk/littleton/jp_noamc.htm]
Or in comparing justifications for state violence and atrocities,
whether liberal or Leninist, he finds them to be the same:
Call it what you like, but it's certainly not unique to the United
States; in fact I think it's close to a cultural universal that the
atrocities and violence carried out by powerful institutions,
including the State and corporations are reframed as a reflection
of that same power in such a way that when they meet the public and
often enter history they have a rather benign look about them.
[http://www.greenworldcenter.org/democchomsk2.html]
> So, for Chomsky, the US -- the "huge power" -- is responsible for "the
> larger component of international violence..." The USSR, the smaller
> power, is responsible for less violence.
If violence is immoral, this presumably means that the US is *worse*
than the USSR, no?
> "I do not have the ludicrous egotism which makes me the arbiter of all
> atrocities over the world. I'm not trying to give an A to this country
> and a B minus to this country and so on. The principle that I think we
> ought to follow is ... the principle we rightly expect Soviet
> dissidents to follow. What principle do we expect Sakharov to follow,
> let's say? What lets us decide whether Sakharov's a moral person? I
> think he is. Sakharov does not treat every atrocity as identical. He
> has nothing to say about American atrocities. When he's asked, he says
> I don't know anything about them, I don't care about them. What he
> talks about are Soviet atrocities, and that's right. Because those are
> the ones that he's responsible for. You know, it's a very simple
> ethical point - you're responsible for the predictable consequences of
> your actions. You're not responsible for the predictable consequences
> of someone else's actions. Now, we understand this when we're talking
> about dissidents in the Soviet Union but we refuse to understand it
> when we're talking about ourselves for very good reasons. Commissars
> in the Soviet Union don't understand it about dissidents. Commissars
> in the Soviet Union attack Sakharov and other dissidents because they
> don't talk about American crimes. We understand exactly why that's
> just hypocrisy and cynicism when they do it and we should understand
> the same when we do it. ... The most important thing, for me and for
> you, is to think about the consequences of your actions. What can you
> affect? Those are the ones you primarily ought to be concerned about."
I don't have any problem with this reasoning at all (except to say that
a citizen in a democracy has *more* responsibility than a dissident
in a Soviet Union, since the power of the dissident to affect the
actions of the Soviet Union would be negligible). It certainly
makes sense to pay more attention to your own actions than to
others' actions.
> Okay, there you have it: the primary moral concern is not with one
> state or the other but with the consequences of your actions.
I don't see how one excludes the other. Chomsky says that you
need to look at the consequences of your actions, but he also does
make comparisons between the consequences and motivations of US
and Soviet foreign policy. I still don't see why you object
so strongly to my saying so.
[Regarding China:]
> Perhaps you should have just stuck to the truth. NC does NOT call it a
> "successful revolution" either. He claims "positive things" happened
> at the grass roots level but that hardly constitutes a "successful
> revolution"!
No?
It's clear, I believe, ... that the success was considerably
greater in achieving a just society.
[http://monkeyfist.com/ChomskyArchive/talks/violence_html]
> At any rate, nothing of what NC says supports the idea
> that NC is "making excuses" for China under Mao or that he "doesn't
> seem to have much of a problem with the terror that was used in China"
> -- those are your fantasies, unsupported by his comments:
Perhaps I should provide more examples. Regarding the invasion and
occupation of Tibet, he says:
There are various harsh things that one might say about Chinese
behavior in what the Sino-Indian Treaty of 1954 refers to as
"the Tibet region of China," but it is no more proof of a tendency
towards expansionism than is the behavior of the Indian
government with regard to the Naga and Mizo tribesmen.
["The Responsibility of Intellectuals", 1967]
"The Tibet region of China"? So, er, it wasn't an invasion, then?
Comparing the Spanish anarchists with Vietnam and China:
The circumstances of Spain in the 1930s are not duplicated elsewhere
in the underdeveloped world today, to be sure. Nevertheless, the
limited information that we have about popular movements in Asia,
specifically, suggests certain similar features that deserve much
more serious and sympathetic study than they have so far received.[10]
[10] It is interesting that Douglas Pike's very hostile account of
the National Liberation Front, cited earlier, emphasizes the popular
and voluntary element in its striking organizational successes.
What he describes, whether accurately or not one cannot tell,
is a structure of interlocking self-help organizations, loosely
coordinated and developed through persuasion rather than force --
in certain respects, of a character that would have appealed to
anarchist thinkers. Those who speak so freely of the "authoritarian
Vietcong" may be correct, but they have presented little evidence to
support their judgment. Of course, it must be understood that Pike
regards the element of voluntary mass participation in self-help
associations as the most dangerous and insidious feature of the NLF
organizational structure.
Also relevant is the history of collectivization in China, which,
as compared with the Soviet Union, shows a much higher reliance on
persuasion and mutual aid than on force and terror, and appears to
have been much more successful. See Thomas P. Bernstein,
"Leadership and Mass Mobilization in the Soviet and Chinese
Collectivization Campaigns fo 1929-30 and 1955-56: A Comparison,"
*China Quarterly*, no. 31 (July-September 1967), pp. 1-47, for some
interesting and suggestive comments and analysis.
The scale of the Chinese Revolution is so great and reports in depth
are so fragmentary that it would no doubt be foolhardy to attempt a
general evaluation. Still, all the reports I have been able to study
suggest that insofar as real successes were achieved in the several
stages of land reform, mutual aid, collectivization, and formation
of communes, they were traceable in large part to the complex
interaction of the Communist party cadres and the gradually evolving
peasant associations, a relation which seems to stray far from the
Leninist model of organization. This is particularly evident in
William Hinton's magnificent study *Fanshen* (New York: Monthly
Review Press, 1966), which is unparalleled, to my knowledge, as an
analysis of a moment of profound revolutionary change. What seems
to me particularly striking in his account of the early stages of
revolution in one Chinese village is not only the extent to which
party cadres submitted themselves to popular control, but also, and
more significant, the ways in which exercise of control over steps
of the revolutionary process was a factor in developing the
consciousness and insight of those who took part in the revolution,
not only from a political and social point of view, but also with
respect to the human relationships that were created. It is
interesting, in this connection, to note the strong populist
element in early Chinese Marxism. For some very illuminating
illustrations about this general matter, see Maurice Meisner,
*Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism* (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1967).
I am not suggesting that the anarchist revolution in Spain -- with
its background of more than thirty years of education and struggle --
is being relived in Asia, but rather that the spontaneous and
voluntary elements in popular mass movements have probably been
seriously misunderstood because of the instinctive antipathy
toward such phenomena among intellectuals, and more recently,
because of the insistence on interpreting them in terms of Cold War
mythology.
["Objectivity and Liberal Scholarship", 1968]
I hope it's clear from these quotes that Chomsky is remarkably
sympathetic towards Maoist China. Not that this is somehow immoral --
I think this was quite common. The fact that 15-30 million people had
died from starvation during the Great Leap Forward wasn't widely known
at the time. But there *was* a great deal of terror, which was known,
and I don't think I'm misrepresenting Chomsky in saying that he appears
to have believed that the achievements of the Chinese revolution
outweighed the terror.
> Leaving Kennan's and Morgenthau's views aside, dovish liberal
> opponents of the war would be considered state apologists. The doves'
> view assumed that the US had the right to attack South Vietnam but
> objected to the war on tactical grounds: that too many people were
> getting killed or it was unwinnable or it made us look bad or it was
> misplaced generosity, etc. The radical opponents were arguing that the
> state had no right to commit an act of aggression regardlesss of
> tactical concerns.
Wouldn't a "state apologist" be, well, apologizing for the Vietnam
War rather than opposing it and calling it genocide? Hans Morgenthau,
September 1965:
I have spoken of the prestige of the nation and of the prestige of
those who govern it, that is, of the mental image which others
have of us. Yet there is another kind of prestige: the image we
have of ourselves. That image will suffer grievous blemishes as we
get ever more deeply involved in the war in Vietnam. This war is a
guerrilla war, and such a war, supported or at least not opposed
by the indigenous population, can only be won by the
indiscriminate killing of everybody in sight, that is, by
genocide. The Germans proved that during the Second World War in
occupied Europe, and they were prevented from accomplishing their
task only because they were defeated in the field. The logic of
the issue we are facing in Vietnam has already driven us onto the
same path. We have tortured and killed prisoners; we have embarked
upon a scorched-earth policy by destroying villages and forests;
we have killed combatants and non-combatants without
discrimination because discrimination is impossible. And this is
only the beginning. For the logic of guerrilla war leaves us no
choice. We must go on torturing, killing, and burning, and the more
deeply we get involved in this war, the more there will be of it.
[http://www.nybooks.com/articles/12776]