Why Did X-33 Fail?
tj bandrowsky
spaceflight, the next, X-33 is cancelled.
What actually failed in the program? I've read the engines, fuel
tanks, etc... but what was it?
Scott Lowther
Management.
--
Scott Lowther, Engineer
"Any statement by Edward Wright that starts with 'You seem to think
that...' is wrong. Always. It's a law of Usenet, like Godwin's."
- Jorge R. Frank, 11 Nov 2002
Henry Spencer
tj bandrowsky <tban...@unitedsoftworks.com> wrote:
>What actually failed in the program? I've read the engines, fuel
>tanks, etc... but what was it?
Mostly, the fact that Lockheed Martin had very little incentive to make it
actually fly. They'd won the contract, precluding the possibility that a
competitor might use it as the springboard to an operational vehicle that
would threaten LockMart's expendables business... and that was at least
90% of their real, private goals accomplished. So there was no need to
put their good people on it; what was needed was a show of effort, not
actual results. So they staffed it mostly with inexperienced young guys
who spent a lot of time learning things the hard way. This made for slow
progress with a lot of stumbles along the way, resulting in performance
shortfalls, schedule slips, and ominously low probability of success for
the first flight.
A strong contributing factor was the way LM packed their bid with novel
technology -- a successful attempt to appeal to NASA's infatuation with
new gadgets -- and chose a configuration (VTHL) which could not do "taxi
test" or "bunny hop" incremental expansion of the flight envelope.
--
Faster, better, cheaper requires leadership, | Henry Spencer
not just management. | he...@spsystems.net
Michael J Wise
> What actually failed in the program?
> I've read the engines, fuel tanks, etc... but what was it?
The engines worked just fine.
Who told you otherwise?
The thing that killed it was having to tear out and redesign the composite
LH tanks at the "85% Complete" stage of the project after they suffered an
unplanned (but not unforseeable) failure due to "Cryogenic Pumping".
http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/x-33/1999a.htm
(Scroll down to 1999 November 4)
Ultimately, however, as stated earlier, it was the putting of far too many
untested eggs into one basket. One of 'em broke in spectacular fashion and
the whole basket got thrown out.
The whole thing reeks of mismanagement all the way up the chain of command
to those who made the final decision to terminate the (entire) project.
Aloha mai Nai`a.
--
"Please have your Internet License http://kapu.net/~mjwise/
and Usenet Registration handy..."
John Schilling
The program did not fail; it succeeded brilliantly. Had the X-33
actually flown, and especially had it lead to the follow-on VentureStar,
it would have to have been accounted a miserable failure.
The trick is to understand the goal of the program. The goal of the
program was to preserve LockMart's cushy position in the oligopoly of
overpriced, complex expendable launcher manufacturers by making sure
nobody, but nobody, demonstrated anything cheaper, simpler, or more
reliable. LockMart can't do cheap; it's been decades since they
had to compete for a significant contract on price. What Lockmart
does is cost-plus contracting, where their pay is based on how much
they can get away with spending.
Making space launch a competitive, low-cost market, would be absolutely
ruinous to LockMart. So, the company maneuvered itself into a position
where they got to soak up almost every government megabuck ostensibly
available for the development of low-cost space transportation systems
and spend it on a giant monument to the alleged impossibility of building
low-cost space transportation systems. In this they had plenty of help
from that segment of NASA that would also be ruined by low-cost space
transportation, and were quite successful.
To the extent that anyone involved ever actually expected the program
to result in a low-cost space transportation system, the failure was
in handing it over to NASA/Marshall and then LockMart.
--
*John Schilling * "Anything worth doing, *
*Member:AIAA,NRA,ACLU,SAS,LP * is worth doing for money" *
*Chief Scientist & General Partner * -13th Rule of Acquisition *
*White Elephant Research, LLC * "There is no substitute *
*schi...@spock.usc.edu * for success" *
*661-951-9107 or 661-275-6795 * -58th Rule of Acquisition *
Alan Erskine
they asked for.
The main technology issue was the engine and the hydrogen tank. For some
reason, that had a lot of leakage, but Lockheed felt it could have been
rectefied.
"tj bandrowsky" <tban...@unitedsoftworks.com> wrote in message
news:52e031b9.02122...@posting.google.com...
tj bandrowsky
> Management.
Really? What was it that they did that was so dumb?
Brian Gaff
Brian
--
Brian Gaff - Sorry, can't see pictures, graphics are great, but the blind
can't hear them
bri...@blueyonder.co.uk
"Scott Lowther" <lex...@ix.netcom.com> wrote in message
news:3E0B83...@ix.netcom.com...
---
Outgoing mail is certified Virus Free.
Checked by AVG anti-virus system (http://www.grisoft.com).
Version: 6.0.431 / Virus Database: 242 - Release Date: 17/12/02
Rand Simberg
tban...@unitedsoftworks.com (tj bandrowsky) made the phosphor on my
monitor glow in such a way as to indicate that:
>One moment, we were on our way to VentureStar
No, we weren't. We never were. That was always a fantasy.
--
simberg.interglobal.org * 310 372-7963 (CA) 307 739-1296 (Jackson Hole)
interglobal space lines * 307 733-1715 (Fax) http://www.interglobal.org
"Extraordinary launch vehicles require extraordinary markets..."
Replace first . with @ and throw out the "@trash." to email me.
Here's my email address for autospammers: postm...@fbi.gov
Scott Lowther
>
> >
> > Management.
>
> Really? What was it that they did that was so dumb?
As others pointed out... dumb for you (taxpayer), or dumb for them?
Ian Woollard
> tj bandrowsky wrote:
>
> > What actually failed in the program?
>
> > I've read the engines, fuel tanks, etc... but what was it?
>
> The engines worked just fine.
How well the engines worked is not public knowledge. There's a big
difference between not catastrophically failing and working properly.
All we know is that the engines are somewhere in between.
> Who told you otherwise?
Who told you that they worked just fine?
John R. Campbell
> To the extent that anyone involved ever actually expected the program
> to result in a low-cost space transportation system, the failure was
> in handing it over to NASA/Marshall and then LockMart.
Worse yet, LockMart owns all the patents. Anyone building
something that might require IP that LockMart owns means
that LockMart gets paid or they can even kill it by saying
"no".
All that IP just by "sharing costs" (although NASA kept
having to shovel some more money in, NASA- and the US
Gov't- doesn't own the IP).
And people wonder why the GPL is so awful. If public
monies were spent on developing IP then the public (at
least US companies) should have a fair crack at it for
either free or damn close to it.
(IP for the unabused is "Intellectual Property", the latest
scam to turn intangibles into "tangible assets". The DMCA
is now a key part of that scam, BTW.)
--
John R. Campbell Speaker to Machines so...@jtan.com
- As a SysAdmin, yes, I CAN read your e-mail, but I DON'T get that bored!
"It is impossible for ANY man to learn about impotence the hard way." - me
"ZIF is not a desirable trait when selecting a spouse." - me
John R. Campbell
> Cost. The guvmnt wouldn't keep footing the bill for developing
> the systems they asked for.
>
> The main technology issue was the engine and the hydrogen tank.
> For some reason, that had a lot of leakage, but Lockheed felt it
> could have been rectefied.
Sure, rectified with enough gov't money, spent withing the
LockMart bureaucracy, with IP ending up in private hands
DESPITE the greater investment by the gov't.
The biggest difference between DC-X and X-33 is that the
X-33 needed too much "emergent technology". The DC-X program
was built around the concept of finding all of the needed
goodies sitting on a shelf somewhere. The "Build a Little,
Test a Little" concept was lost DESPITE the "faster, better,
cheaper" mantra that Goldin was pushing. How many DC-X
derivatives could we have had 5 years ago, testing the
envelope?
For (IIRC, someone correct me) less than 10% of the cost
of X-33 the DC-X not only got built (and rebuilt, after
a minor mishap) but actually FLEW. X-33 only flew in
pretty powerpoint presentations.
John R. Campbell
> Ultimately, however, as stated earlier, it was the putting of far
> too many untested eggs into one basket. One of 'em broke in
> spectacular fashion and the whole basket got thrown out.
>
> The whole thing reeks of mismanagement all the way up the chain
> of command to those who made the final decision to terminate the
> (entire) project.
Had you paid attention to the fact that the X-33's flight test
envelope was shrinking? Top mach numbers also kept dropping,
too.
Too much emergent technology (that you noted above) and too
little competition. If some idiot had a lick of sense
they'd've funded the DC-X follow-on at the same time, just
to put pressure on LockMart (and vice-versa).
Now that McD-D is part of Boeing (an ELV vendor) that won't
work any more. Both LockMart and Boeing have an incentive
to sell expensive expendables (EELV: Expensive Expendable
Launch Vehicle).
Sure, a competition might've p1ssed some of the money away
but it's a check-and-balance against corruption.
John R. Campbell
>> Management.
>
> Really? What was it that they did that was so dumb?
Have you heard about ISO-9000? The Bureaucrat:Techie ratio?
For every techie you usually need 2-3 non-productive paper
shufflers there to keep an eye on him and waste his time.
And that doesn't count the managers above them in the food
chain.
And then... both NASA *and* LockMart were in the mgmt food
chain, so that increased the bureaucratic overhead.
Joann Evans
>
> Michael J Wise wrote:
> > Ultimately, however, as stated earlier, it was the putting of far
> > too many untested eggs into one basket. One of 'em broke in
> > spectacular fashion and the whole basket got thrown out.
> >
> > The whole thing reeks of mismanagement all the way up the chain
> > of command to those who made the final decision to terminate the
> > (entire) project.
>
> Had you paid attention to the fact that the X-33's flight test
> envelope was shrinking? Top mach numbers also kept dropping,
> too.
>
> Too much emergent technology (that you noted above) and too
> little competition. If some idiot had a lick of sense
> they'd've funded the DC-X follow-on at the same time, just
> to put pressure on LockMart (and vice-versa).
>
> Now that McD-D is part of Boeing (an ELV vendor) that won't
> work any more. Both LockMart and Boeing have an incentive
> to sell expensive expendables (EELV: Expensive Expendable
> Launch Vehicle).
>
> Sure, a competition might've p1ssed some of the money away
> but it's a check-and-balance against corruption.
IIRC, the original intent was to select two of the three proposals
from Lockheed-Martin, Rockwell and McDonnell-Douglas (which was an
improved DC-X derivative). Don't know when that idea disappeared, but I
thought then and now, that not doing it (or even all three) was a major
mistake....
Michael J Wise
> -- and chose a configuration (VTHL) which could not do "taxi test" or
> "bunny hop" incremental expansion of the flight envelope.
Why not?
You said it yourself WRT a super-heavy lifter, that there's no reason why
the thing needs to be *fully* fueled. Put enough in it to keep the engines
running and idle+ for a few minutes, and see if it can lift off as a HTHL?
Or would it need improved (and heavier) landing gear to do that?
Aloha mai Nai`a!
Michael J Wise
> Had you paid attention to the fact that the X-33's flight test
> envelope was shrinking? Top mach numbers also kept dropping,
> too.
Yes.
I believe that Henry already covered that.
" It's all about weight.
When you need to get to the moon, yes.
When you want to demo new tech, not necessarily.
You can optimize the design LATER.
In this case, doesn't look like there will ever BE a 'Later'.
I keep wondering if we've lost our chance to make it off this rock....
> Sure, a competition might've p1ssed some of the money away
> but it's a check-and-balance against corruption.
Granted.
Anvil
> tj bandrowsky:
> >What actually failed in the program? I've read the engines, fuel
> >tanks, etc... but what was it?
>
> Mostly, the fact that Lockheed Martin had very little incentive to make it
> actually fly. They'd won the contract, precluding the possibility that a
> competitor might use it as the springboard to an operational vehicle that
> would threaten LockMart's expendables business... and that was at least
> 90% of their real, private goals accomplished. So there was no need to
> put their good people on it; what was needed was a show of effort, not
> actual results. So they staffed it mostly with inexperienced young guys
> who spent a lot of time learning things the hard way. This made for slow
> progress with a lot of stumbles along the way, resulting in performance
> shortfalls, schedule slips, and ominously low probability of success for
> the first flight.
>
> A strong contributing factor was the way LM packed their bid with novel
> technology -- a successful attempt to appeal to NASA's infatuation with
> new gadgets -- and chose a configuration (VTHL) which could not do "taxi
> test" or "bunny hop" incremental expansion of the flight envelope.
Many peacetime endeavors run afoul of government think. Engineers and
Scientists are seen as a strategic resource, munitions. Programs are often
developed with an eye to both capture the imagination and develop new
technologies. Had everything gone well it would have flown, but truly such
flights are not needed to be considered a success.
Sadly so much remains hidden away, forgotten, and untested. We begin to amass
ideas and technology that might work rather than discovering new problems and
ideas building on top of real data. Programs like the X-15 and XB-70 were long
ago. Materials extending the thermal limit exist, but no flight hardware. Mach
15+ seems as far away as it was in the 60s. Today's engineers and scientists
graduate knowing little beyond those earlier programs, adding just glimpses of
what might have been.
--
Anvil*
Henry Spencer
Michael J Wise <mjw...@kapu.net> wrote:
>> -- and chose a configuration (VTHL) which could not do "taxi test" or
>> "bunny hop" incremental expansion of the flight envelope.
>
>running and idle+ for a few minutes, and see if it can lift off as a HTHL?
>Or would it need improved (and heavier) landing gear to do that?
Probably better landing gear; in particular, you'd have to make it
retractable in flight (I believe X-33's, like the shuttle orbiter's,
wasn't). Certainly more elaborate fuel plumbing, since it would have to
load and feed properly in both vertical and horizontal orientations. That
would be an issue for engine start as well, since you wouldn't have
gravity feed to get fuel into the engines for pump start. More work on
the control system (already a trouble spot), with possibly some CG
problems, especially in abort cases. Generally, not a simple change.
Michael J Wise
> Probably better landing gear; in particular, you'd have to make it
> retractable in flight (I believe X-33's, like the shuttle orbiter's,
> wasn't).
Interesting.
> Certainly more elaborate fuel plumbing, since it would have to load
> and feed properly in both vertical and horizontal orientations.
I was thinking about that with my previous comment, yeah. Speaking of
which, how does one design a tank that can "feed properly" in zero G?
Does one use some sort of a 'post-tank' (one each of the fuel and
oxydizer) that the main tank feeds into, that can be pressurized (with
Helium?) or vented so that it is always (near) full and under pressure?
One would think that "Bubbles" in a tank would be a serious problem...
> That would be an issue for engine start as well, since you wouldn't
> have gravity feed to get fuel into the engines for pump start.
Have small elecrtic pumps that can draw from the 'post-tank's, which they
then present to the turbopump gas generators, wich would also take their
stuffs from the 'post-tank's. Once the thing gets moving, no matter the
orientation, 'DOWN' is always towards the engines.
And again, once the thing gets moving, open up the valve from the mains
to the 'post-tank's, and open up the purge valve from the 'top' of the
'post-tank's to the mains so that the helium (?) has somewhere to escape
to once the main volume of stuffs pour in, and Bob's you Uncle.
> More work on the control system (already a trouble spot), ...
The danged thing should have had at least one seat, IMHO. After all, they
kept putting pilots into the Bell X-1 until they got to Yeager.
(;-)
> with possibly some CG problems, especially in abort cases.
> Generally, not a simple change.
Not insurmountable, either, yeah?
Michael Moser
> ... So they staffed it mostly with inexperienced young guys
> who spent a lot of time learning things the hard way. This made for slow
> progress with a lot of stumbles along the way, resulting in performance
> shortfalls, schedule slips, and ominously low probability of success for
> the first flight.
Wow! such a cool project, if i were into this business, fresh, with
little experience, i'd still put in all i have to make this thing
go...
.. well, this is how inexperienced guys get experienced, i guess.
Michael Moser
> The trick is to understand the goal of the program. The goal of the
> program was to preserve LockMart's cushy position in the oligopoly of
> overpriced, complex expendable launcher manufacturers by making sure
> nobody, but nobody, demonstrated anything cheaper, simpler, or more
> reliable. LockMart can't do cheap; it's been decades since they
> had to compete for a significant contract on price. What Lockmart
> does is cost-plus contracting, where their pay is based on how much
> they can get away with spending.
wouldn't they have won more if they did go for it? (patenting out
every bit on the way, gaining access to foreign launch deals, etc,
etc).
I mean they could have secured a monopoly for decades to come (instead
of keeping on to mainly DOD launches).
> To the extent that anyone involved ever actually expected the program
> to result in a low-cost space transportation system, the failure was
> in handing it over to NASA/Marshall and then LockMart.
So who could/should have done it?
John Schilling
>schi...@spock.usc.edu (John Schilling) wrote in message news:<aug1vb$ihs$1...@spock.usc.edu>...
>> The trick is to understand the goal of the program. The goal of the
>> program was to preserve LockMart's cushy position in the oligopoly of
>> overpriced, complex expendable launcher manufacturers by making sure
>> nobody, but nobody, demonstrated anything cheaper, simpler, or more
>> reliable. LockMart can't do cheap; it's been decades since they
>> had to compete for a significant contract on price. What Lockmart
>> does is cost-plus contracting, where their pay is based on how much
>> they can get away with spending.
>wouldn't they have won more if they did go for it? (patenting out
>every bit on the way, gaining access to foreign launch deals, etc,
>etc). I mean they could have secured a monopoly for decades to come
>(instead of keeping on to mainly DOD launches).
Lockheed-Martin already gets about half of all present American launces,
NASA, DOD, and commercial alike. It's illegal for them to monopolize the
market unless the Government decides that it is in the public interest
for there to be an aerospace monopoly, in which case LockMart gets folded
into BoeDonnel and becomes half of the company that gets all the American
launches.
And they don't get any of the European, Russian, Chinese, or Japanese
launches, because local politics demand that those go up on local rockets
no matter the cost.
So LockMart has locked up as much of the existing market as politics
will allow. And LockMart, like most big corporations, mostly doesn't
believe in new markets and to the extent that it does mostly understands
that smaller, more agile firms would snap them up if they materialized.
VentureStar doesn't bring LockMart any new launches, it just makes the
launches they've already got, cheaper. Since the customers will demand
(and the biggest customer by legal decree will *get*) proportionately
cheaper launch fees, that means LockMart gets *less* money.
VentureStar, I repeat, would have ruined LockMart's launch business
had it reached operational status. Best for their bottom line that
X-33 fail up front, just as soon as it has soaked up every available
NASA dollar for the program.
>> To the extent that anyone involved ever actually expected the program
>> to result in a low-cost space transportation system, the failure was
>> in handing it over to NASA/Marshall and then LockMart.
>So who could/should have done it?
Of the three bidders, Boeing was the only one with a chance. They still
had some understanding of cheap and businesslike, and of evolving markets,
from their airliner side. And no existing launcher business to be ruined
by the newcomer. Even so, it was a small chance at best.
And that was Boeing, which is no more. BoeDonnel, forget it.
Cheap launchers, like any disruptive technology, will have to come either
from a new corporation or from a corporation not presently in the space
launch business.
Henry Spencer
>> and feed properly in both vertical and horizontal orientations.
>
>I was thinking about that with my previous comment, yeah. Speaking of
>which, how does one design a tank that can "feed properly" in zero G?
Well, the fast answer is "with some difficulty". :-) It's generally
considered impractically hard to make big tanks feed reliably in free
fall; it has been done, but it's not easy. The preferred approach is
to use small thrusters to impart enough acceleration to settle the fluids
in the main tanks, before lighting the main engine. The thrusters can be
fed off smaller tanks which use tank bladders to separate gas from liquid.
>> More work on the control system (already a trouble spot), ...
>> with possibly some CG problems, especially in abort cases.
>> Generally, not a simple change.
>
>Not insurmountable, either, yeah?
Could probably be done, but it would be a bunch of extra complications
for an already-troubled program.
Jorge R. Frank
> mich...@sapiens.com (Michael Moser) writes:
>
>>schi...@spock.usc.edu (John Schilling) wrote in message
>>news:<aug1vb$ihs$1...@spock.usc.edu>...
>
>>> To the extent that anyone involved ever actually expected the
>>> program to result in a low-cost space transportation system, the
>>> failure was in handing it over to NASA/Marshall and then LockMart.
>
>>So who could/should have done it?
>
> Of the three bidders, Boeing was the only one with a chance.
Umm, Boeing didn't bid on X-33. The other two bidders were Rockwell and
MDAC, both of which were swallowed by Boeing *after* the fact.
--
JRF
Reply-to address spam-proofed - to reply by E-mail,
check "Organization" (I am not assimilated) and
think one step ahead of IBM.
Jorge R. Frank
news:d70280fc.03010...@posting.google.com:
"Good judgment comes from experience. Experience comes from bad judgment."
Can't remember who said it, but it seems appropriate.
Greg D. Moore (Strider)
"Jorge R. Frank" <jrf...@ibm-pc.borg> wrote in message
news:Xns92F7E368...@204.52.135.10...
judgment."
I've seen "Experience is what you learn when you lack judgement. Judgement
is what you learn when you lack experience."
Christopher
wrote:
<snip>
>Cheap launchers, like any disruptive technology, will have to come either
>from a new corporation or from a corporation not presently in the space
>launch business.
But wouldn't the vested intrests in Lockheed and their Federal
government 'partners' work to squash any upstart 'new corporation'
that look likes its going to spoil the cosy Lockheed US DoD and Gov
dealings. Unless you mean a none American new corporation?
Christopher
+++++++++++++++++
D'ou venons-nous?
Qui sommes-nous?
Ou allons-nous?
Gauguin
Jorge R. Frank
news:Pine.OSX.4.31.030101...@kapu.net:
> Speaking of
> which, how does one design a tank that can "feed properly" in zero G?
> Does one use some sort of a 'post-tank' (one each of the fuel and
> oxydizer) that the main tank feeds into, that can be pressurized (with
> Helium?) or vented so that it is always (near) full and under pressure?
Other way around. The pressurant tank (often helium, as you suggest, but
sometimes nitrogen) is upstream of the propellant (fuel or oxidizer) tank.
> One would think that "Bubbles" in a tank would be a serious problem...
Some systems use bladders to get around this problem; others use screens or
traps that use surface tension to keep the propellant together in one blob
and prevent bubbles from getting in.
John Schilling
>schi...@spock.usc.edu (John Schilling) wrote in
>news:av2hu2$8cp$1...@spock.usc.edu:
>> mich...@sapiens.com (Michael Moser) writes:
>>>schi...@spock.usc.edu (John Schilling) wrote in message
>>>news:<aug1vb$ihs$1...@spock.usc.edu>...
>>>> To the extent that anyone involved ever actually expected the
>>>> program to result in a low-cost space transportation system, the
>>>> failure was in handing it over to NASA/Marshall and then LockMart.
>>>So who could/should have done it?
>> Of the three bidders, Boeing was the only one with a chance.
>Umm, Boeing didn't bid on X-33. The other two bidders were Rockwell and
>MDAC, both of which were swallowed by Boeing *after* the fact.
Right; I meant McDonnel-Douglas, I just had a brain fart regarding which
part of BoeDonnel was which in the Good Old Days(tm).
Either way, both Boeing and MD used to be moderately huge companies that
still understood competing for commercial contracts on price grounds, if
for no other reason than that they competed with each other. Post-merger,
BoeDonnel is a dinosaur that increasingly only competes in the political
arena.
William J Hubeny
> On 26 Dec 2002 13:55:45 -0800, in a place far, far away,
> tban...@unitedsoftworks.com (tj bandrowsky) made the phosphor on my
> monitor glow in such a way as to indicate that:
>
> >One moment, we were on our way to VentureStar
>
> No, we weren't. We never were. That was always a fantasy.
Was the killing of X-34 somehow involved in this NASA-Lockmart circle
jerk or where there other reasons for it?
Bill Hubeny
Henry Spencer
William J Hubeny <far...@airmail.net> wrote:
>Was the killing of X-34 somehow involved in this NASA-Lockmart circle
>jerk or where there other reasons for it?
X-34's death was quite incidental, the result of NASA changing its mind
about what it wanted without being willing to pay the costs of the change.
(In the wake of the back-to-back Mars-probe failures, the potential for
embarrassing failures became an important new review criterion for lots of
NASA projects. The result on X-34 -- with hardware construction already
well underway -- was a demand that the contractors add lots of redundancy
to things like the flight controls. This was not really needed, since
X-34 had the same sort of program-level redundancy normally used for
experimental aircraft: multiple flight articles. But NASA, which had
previously signed off on the design, now was adamant that it needed major
changes... but refused to put in any extra money for them. The upshot was
program cancellation. The demise of the program was considered preferable
to the slightest possibility that it might embarrass NASA management.)
Henry Spencer
Christopher <coro...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>>Cheap launchers, like any disruptive technology, will have to come either
>>from a new corporation or from a corporation not presently in the space
>>launch business.
>
>But wouldn't the vested intrests in Lockheed and their Federal
>government 'partners' work to squash any upstart 'new corporation'
>that look likes its going to spoil the cosy Lockheed US DoD and Gov
Depends how it's done. A head-on assault against the military-industrial
establishment is going to meet a lot of resistance, yes, as Beal found
out.
Historically, the way disruptive technologies get established is to start
out in market niches that the big boys consider unimportant, especially
speculative new ones which they just don't care about, and move up
incrementally from there. As Pat Bahn of TGV once said: "We've had the
very pleasant experience of being giggled at by Boeing and LockMart."
For example, the business-jet builders are starting to attack the low end
of the airliner market, and quite successfully too, because Boeing and
Airbus find it only marginally profitable and don't feel any great
compulsion to fend off competitors there. In another decade or two, the
big boys may well have abandoned half the airliner market to the
newcomers, and they *still* won't be worried, because they'll still own
what they see as the most profitable half...
John R. Campbell
> Michael J Wise wrote:
>> which, how does one design a tank that can "feed properly" in zero G?
>> Does one use some sort of a 'post-tank' (one each of the fuel and
>> oxydizer) that the main tank feeds into, that can be pressurized (with
>> Helium?) or vented so that it is always (near) full and under pressure?
>
> Other way around. The pressurant tank (often helium, as you suggest, but
> sometimes nitrogen) is upstream of the propellant (fuel or oxidizer) tank.
>
>> One would think that "Bubbles" in a tank would be a serious problem...
>
> Some systems use bladders to get around this problem; others use screens or
> traps that use surface tension to keep the propellant together in one blob
> and prevent bubbles from getting in.
Additionally, another trick is called "ullage", small rocket motors
that impose just enough acceleration to settle the propellants in
the tankage.
Bladderized have their own issues too.
How did the Gemini capsule and Apollo CSM stack handle these? While the
propellants weren't cryogenic they had to feed. Gemini didn't have the
big SM's engine but that might've depended upon ullage from the RCS.
Michael J Wise
> Michael J Wise <mjw...@kapu.net> wrote:
> > Speaking of
> > which, how does one design a tank that can "feed properly" in zero G?
> > Does one use some sort of a 'post-tank' (one each of the fuel and
> > oxydizer) that the main tank feeds into, that can be pressurized (with
> > Helium?) or vented so that it is always (near) full and under pressure?
>
> Other way around.
That's not what I had in mind.
> The pressurant tank ...
Wasn't talking about that.
Three tanks:
1) Post-tank (see below)
which includes a moving "cylinder" to separate the reactant
and the pressurant.
2) Main reactant tank
3) pressurant tank
During filling, the post tank and main tank are filled with reactant.
The post tank is COMPLETELY filled.
While the engine is not running, the reactant valve from the main tank to
the post-tank, and the pressurant-return valve TO the main tank, are kept
CLOSED, and the post-tank is kept pressurized, as is the main tank.
When the time comes to light up the engine, open the valve from the
post-tank to the engine, and the cylinder, pushed by the pressurant on the
other side of it, drives the reactant to the turbopumps. After main engine
start, when the vehicle is moving, open the valve from the main tank to
the post-tank, and the pressurant return valve (so the high pressure
can escape to the main tank, and the cylinder can move back to the
'Full of Reactant' position) and let it refill while at the same time
delivering full volume of reactants to the engine.
Keep the pressure topped up in the main tank, of course.
" Lather, Rinse, Repeat.
It could be restarted in 0G, and unless the post-tank is completely
emptied before the engines can produce thrust, it should work nicely.
Rand Simberg
coro...@hotmail.com (Christopher) made the phosphor on my monitor
glow in such a way as to indicate that:
>>Cheap launchers, like any disruptive technology, will have to come either
>>from a new corporation or from a corporation not presently in the space
>>launch business.
>
>But wouldn't the vested intrests in Lockheed and their Federal
>government 'partners' work to squash any upstart 'new corporation'
>that look likes its going to spoil the cosy Lockheed US DoD and Gov
>dealings. Unless you mean a none American new corporation?
They would certainly try, but that's more difficult to do.
--
simberg.interglobal.org * 310 372-7963 (CA) 307 739-1296 (Jackson Hole)
interglobal space lines * 307 733-1715 (Fax) http://www.interglobal.org
"Extraordinary launch vehicles require extraordinary markets..."
Replace first . with @ and throw out the "@trash." to email me.
Here's my email address for autospammers: postm...@fbi.gov
Rand Simberg
far...@airmail.net (William J Hubeny) made the phosphor on my monitor
glow in such a way as to indicate that:
>> >One moment, we were on our way to VentureStar
>>
>> No, we weren't. We never were. That was always a fantasy.
>
>Was the killing of X-34 somehow involved in this NASA-Lockmart circle
>jerk or where there other reasons for it?
No, that was mostly incompetence on the part of Marshall. It was a
side effect of the loss of the Mars mission that did the controlled
flight into terrain because they had the units wrong (I forget the
name of it). After that, NASA decided that they didn't have enough
redundancy in the X-34 systems (it was single string), and told OSC to
go back and change it. My recollection is that NASA got sticker shock
when they heard the cost, and cancelled the program instead.
Henry Spencer
John R. Campbell <so...@penrij.uucp.jtan.com> wrote:
>How did the Gemini capsule and Apollo CSM stack handle these? While the
>propellants weren't cryogenic they had to feed. Gemini didn't have the
>big SM's engine but that might've depended upon ullage from the RCS.
The RCS tanks on Apollo and (I think) Gemini were bladder tanks. The
Apollo SPS engine had some baffles and whatnot, but those were mostly
just to try to keep gas out of the pipes during RCS maneuvering; RCS
burns were used for propellant settling before SPS burns.
John R. Campbell
> For example, the business-jet builders are starting to attack the low end
> of the airliner market, and quite successfully too, because Boeing and
> Airbus find it only marginally profitable and don't feel any great
> compulsion to fend off competitors there. In another decade or two, the
> big boys may well have abandoned half the airliner market to the
> newcomers, and they *still* won't be worried, because they'll still own
> what they see as the most profitable half...
Sound like how IBM almost ceased to be, starting about 15 years ago.
It's part of the "victory disease", you stop looking at (or valuing)
contrary data. I think it's called "corporate myopia".
(Like how IT&T told A.G.Bell to shove his telephone up his fundament;
they were in the "telegraph" business...)
--
John R. Campbell Speaker to Machines so...@penrij.uucp.jtan.com
"Grace is sufficient so Joy was released." - Heather L. Campbell
Greg D. Moore (Strider)
"Henry Spencer" <he...@spsystems.net> wrote in message
news:H87Io...@spsystems.net...
>
> For example, the business-jet builders are starting to attack the low end
> of the airliner market, and quite successfully too, because Boeing and
> Airbus find it only marginally profitable and don't feel any great
> compulsion to fend off competitors there. In another decade or two, the
> big boys may well have abandoned half the airliner market to the
> newcomers, and they *still* won't be worried, because they'll still own
> what they see as the most profitable half...
I think one really needs to rewrite that paragraph and put in Mainframes and
PCs in the appropriate places.
No one really did a great job of challanging IBM in the mainframe
department. They didn't change their ways until a little something called
the PC took off.
I don't think we'll find the first successful commercial passenger craft to
LEO will have much of an ICBM heritage. It'll be something off the wall.
In-flight refueled. SSTO. Siamese twin craft or something. But it won't
be man in a can on top of an artillary shell.
L. Parker
news:av2hu2$8cp$1...@spock.usc.edu...
> mich...@sapiens.com (Michael Moser) writes:
>
>
> Cheap launchers, like any disruptive technology, will have to come either
> from a new corporation or from a corporation not presently in the space
> launch business.
Or from another country willing to spend the bucks to break into the market.
At which time, it will of course, become necessary to dust off all of that
IP and make VentureStar work so that the other country doesn't endanger
LockMart's business...
L. Parker
tj bandrowsky
>
> As others pointed out... dumb for you (taxpayer), or dumb for them?
I nominally vote Republican but when it comes to space whoever
promises to spend the most, that's who gets my vote.
I don't mind politics having weird effects on projects. It's
--going-- to happen. You can't have a developmental team of 5 people
without having politics, unless you've got a very special almost once
in a lifetime group.
It does bother me that Lockheed almost wanted to it fail...
MattWriter
>redundancy in the X-34 systems (it was single string), and told OSC to
>go back and change it. My recollection is that NASA got sticker shock
>when they heard the cost, and cancelled the program instead.
I remember hearing that version of events, but I don not recall where. Does
anyone have a citation for it?
Thanks,
Matt Bille
(MattW...@AOL.com)
OPINIONS IN ALL POSTS ARE SOLELY THOSE OF THE AUTHOR
John R. Campbell
> (Like how IT&T told A.G.Bell to shove his telephone up his fundament;
> they were in the "telegraph" business...)
*SMACK*
Ooops, I posted that late at night. It was Western Union.
*SMACK*
L. Parker
schedule and under budget. It was also an exceedingly small budget compared
to X-33.
L. Parker
Rand Simberg
tban...@unitedsoftworks.com (tj bandrowsky) made the phosphor on my
monitor glow in such a way as to indicate that:
>> > Really? What was it that they did that was so dumb?
>>
>> As others pointed out... dumb for you (taxpayer), or dumb for them?
>
>I nominally vote Republican but when it comes to space whoever
>promises to spend the most, that's who gets my vote.
That's not a very smart way to make things happen in space. There's
very little correlation between how much money is spent on space
projects, and how successful they are.
Rand Simberg
Parker" <lpa...@cacaphony.net> made the phosphor on my monitor glow
in such a way as to indicate that:
>> Cheap launchers, like any disruptive technology, will have to come either
>> from a new corporation or from a corporation not presently in the space
>> launch business.
>
>Or from another country willing to spend the bucks to break into the market.
>At which time, it will of course, become necessary to dust off all of that
>IP and make VentureStar work so that the other country doesn't endanger
>LockMart's business...
That assumes that VentureStar was a good idea, and if implemented,
could fend off true competition. There's little evidence for that.
Keith F. Lynch
> As Pat Bahn of TGV once said: "We've had the very pleasant
> experience of being giggled at by Boeing and LockMart."
Yes, but last I heard they were still giggling. When's Pat going to
start bending metal?
--
Keith F. Lynch - k...@keithlynch.net - http://keithlynch.net/
I always welcome replies to my e-mail, postings, and web pages, but
unsolicited bulk e-mail (spam) is not acceptable. Please do not send me
HTML, "rich text," or attachments, as all such email is discarded unread.
Christopher
Simberg) wrote:
>On Sun, 05 Jan 2003 19:06:36 GMT, in a place far, far away, "L.
>Parker" <lpa...@cacaphony.net> made the phosphor on my monitor glow
>in such a way as to indicate that:
>
>>> Cheap launchers, like any disruptive technology, will have to come either
>>> from a new corporation or from a corporation not presently in the space
>>> launch business.
>>
>>Or from another country willing to spend the bucks to break into the market.
>>At which time, it will of course, become necessary to dust off all of that
>>IP and make VentureStar work so that the other country doesn't endanger
>>LockMart's business...
>
>That assumes that VentureStar was a good idea, and if implemented,
>could fend off true competition. There's little evidence for that.
Could Lockheed and its DoD and Federal government partners stop
another country from sidelining them in cheap to very cheap access to
space? As the other company/country competition isn't American, then
any American legislation they brought out that would cripple an
American competitor could just be ignored, unless Lockheed and its DoD
and Federal government partners resort to physical sabotage of the
competition. But would they go that far to protect their vested
intrests in space access?
John Schilling
>Could Lockheed and its DoD and Federal government partners stop
>another country from sidelining them in cheap to very cheap access to
>space? As the other company/country competition isn't American, then
>any American legislation they brought out that would cripple an
>American competitor could just be ignored, unless Lockheed and its DoD
>and Federal government partners resort to physical sabotage of the
>competition. But would they go that far to protect their vested
>intrests in space access?
Nobody had to launch cruise missiles at Baikonur to persaude the
Russians to stop selling cheap Proton launches. The United States
is an economic as well as military superpower, and can exert a
great deal of influence over the foreign (and even internal) affairs
of other nations without having to even threaten to kill people.
Christopher P. Winter
wrote:
>
>Lockheed-Martin already gets about half of all present American launches,
>NASA, DOD, and commercial alike. It's illegal for them to monopolize the
>market unless the Government decides that it is in the public interest
>for there to be an aerospace monopoly, in which case LockMart gets folded
>into BoeDonnel and becomes half of the company that gets all the American
>launches.
>
>And they don't get any of the European, Russian, Chinese, or Japanese
>launches, because local politics demand that those go up on local rockets
>no matter the cost.
>
>So LockMart has locked up as much of the existing market as politics
>will allow. And LockMart, like most big corporations, mostly doesn't
>believe in new markets and to the extent that it does mostly understands
>that smaller, more agile firms would snap them up if they materialized.
>
>VentureStar doesn't bring LockMart any new launches, it just makes the
>launches they've already got, cheaper. Since the customers will demand
>(and the biggest customer by legal decree will *get*) proportionately
>cheaper launch fees, that means LockMart gets *less* money.
>
There's some merit in this argument. However, if VentureStar had been
able to fly more often and more on a preset schedule, LockMart's total
profit from it might well have increased. (I know, that's a big *IF*.)
Another aspect is that the technology might have benefitted
expendables. Frex, composite tanks might reduce total vehicle weight,
allowing heavier payloads with existing engines and structure. This would
be a marginal improvement, but possibly significant.
>
>VentureStar, I repeat, would have ruined LockMart's launch business
>had it reached operational status. Best for their bottom line that
>X-33 fail up front, just as soon as it has soaked up every available
>NASA dollar for the program.
>
True, to the extent that VentureStar could handle the payloads
otherwise slated for expendables.
But as for X-33, it's not clear to me what bottom-line benefit LockMart
got from it. They spent IIRC some $200M of their own money and ended up
with a bunch of useless hardware. Not to mention a somewhat tarnished
reputation.
Chris
Christopher P. Winter
wrote:
>
>VentureStar, I repeat, would have ruined LockMart's launch business
>had it reached operational status. Best for their bottom line that
>X-33 fail up front, just as soon as it has soaked up every available
>NASA dollar for the program.
>
D'oh. Please disregard my previous followup. I was not thinking
strategically. It's obvious when you think of a LockMart competitor winning
the X-33 contract and going on to succeed in building a VentureStar
equivalent.
LockMart's performance on X-33 precluded that (or at least delayed it).
In the meantime, they avoid laying a bunch of people off, losing valuable
experience. Indeed, as Henry pointed out in another branch of this thread,
they actually benefit by giving some inexperienced people OJT.
Chris
Gordon D. Pusch
> On Tue, 07 Jan 2003 05:54:56 GMT, simberg.i...@trash.org (Rand
> Simberg) wrote:
>
>> On Sun, 05 Jan 2003 19:06:36 GMT, in a place far, far away, "L.
>> Parker" <lpa...@cacaphony.net> made the phosphor on my monitor glow
>> in such a way as to indicate that:
>>
>>>> Cheap launchers, like any disruptive technology, will have to come either
>>>> from a new corporation or from a corporation not presently in the space
>>>> launch business.
>>>
>>> Or from another country willing to spend the bucks to break into the market.
>>> At which time, it will of course, become necessary to dust off all of that
>>> IP and make VentureStar work so that the other country doesn't endanger
>>> LockMart's business...
>>
>> That assumes that VentureStar was a good idea, and if implemented,
>> could fend off true competition. There's little evidence for that.
>
> Could Lockheed and its DoD and Federal government partners stop
> another country from sidelining them in cheap to very cheap access to
> space?
Depends on the country. For example, the US gov't continues to use
"export restrictions" to forbid US businesses from launching payloads
on boosters built by countries that are on its $#!+ list. I do not doubt
that the US gov't likewise has mechanisms to discourage companies from
launching with countries that are nominally its "allies" as well.
> As the other company/country competition isn't American, then any
> American legislation they brought out that would cripple an American
> competitor could just be ignored, unless Lockheed and its DoD and Federal
> government partners resort to physical sabotage of the competition.
It probably wouldn't be the first time such "black bag" jobs have been pulled...
> But would they go that far to protect their vested intrests in space
> access?
Consider what US gov't pressure did to the German rocket company OTRAG
after pressure from the USSR forced them to move their operations from
Zaire to the only other African country that would have them --- Libya...
-- Gordon D. Pusch
perl -e '$_ = "gdpusch\@NO.xnet.SPAM.com\n"; s/NO\.//; s/SPAM\.//; print;'
tj bandrowsky
> very little correlation between how much money is spent on space
> projects, and how successful they are.
It's not at all, I agree, but NASA is in the research business and
cost overruns and big failures happen as a part of that.
Space shuttles and space stations are way expensive. I can see the
point of people that want to kill manned flight, because it does cost
so very much, but I want both manned flight and deep space probes, and
above all more research on fusion engines, so therefor, I have to
expect that this will cost some bank.
Yeah, orbital stuff by third parties is interesting, but, to get
anywhere interesting, we need to have advanced propulsion, a fusion
drive, and that means big R&D and that means NASA for the moment.
Gordon D. Pusch
>>> Really? What was it that they did that was so dumb?
>>
>> As others pointed out... dumb for you (taxpayer), or dumb for them?
>
> I nominally vote Republican but when it comes to space whoever
> promises to spend the most, that's who gets my vote.
Then too bad for you that:
1.) There is NO correlation between gov't spending and project success,
but a STRONG correlation between gov't spending and gov't bureaucracy.
2.) Candidates seldom (if ever) keep their campaign promises --- especially
w.r.t programs that the voting public perceives as "expensive boondoggles."
Once elected, politicians vote along strict party ideology lines over 80%
of the time <http://voteview.uh.edu/chminds/chminds2.htm>.
John Schilling
>> > Really? What was it that they did that was so dumb?
>> As others pointed out... dumb for you (taxpayer), or dumb for them?
>I nominally vote Republican but when it comes to space whoever
>promises to spend the most, that's who gets my vote.
What desirable effects do you imagine will come from politicians
spending lots of money on space?
Henry Spencer
Christopher P. Winter <cpwi...@rahul.net> wrote:
> But as for X-33, it's not clear to me what bottom-line benefit LockMart
>got from it. They spent IIRC some $200M of their own money and ended up
>with a bunch of useless hardware. Not to mention a somewhat tarnished
>reputation.
The latter actually doesn't matter. LockMart is primarily a government
design bureau -- other customers are much less important -- and when it
comes to awarding big contracts, the government has little or no memory.
Besides, MSFC and its apologists will hasten to assure you that what this
really shows is that SSTO is Really Really Hard and needs lots more work
on the technology (by MSFC and friends) before it will be practical.
Rand Simberg
"Christopher P. Winter" <chri...@chrisw20.best.vwh.net> made the
phosphor on my monitor glow in such a way as to indicate that:
> But as for X-33, it's not clear to me what bottom-line benefit LockMart
>got from it. They spent IIRC some $200M of their own money and ended up
>with a bunch of useless hardware. Not to mention a somewhat tarnished
>reputation.
They got to continue to sell Titan, Atlas, and their half of Shuttle.
A successful X-33/operational-vehicle program by someone else would
have put that line out of business. They achieved their strategic
objective the day they won the contract, regardless of their
performance.
Christopher
wrote:
>coro...@hotmail.com (Christopher) writes:
>
>>Could Lockheed and its DoD and Federal government partners stop
>>another country from sidelining them in cheap to very cheap access to
>>space? As the other company/country competition isn't American, then
>>any American legislation they brought out that would cripple an
>>American competitor could just be ignored, unless Lockheed and its DoD
>>and Federal government partners resort to physical sabotage of the
>>competition. But would they go that far to protect their vested
>>intrests in space access?
>
>
>Nobody had to launch cruise missiles at Baikonur to persaude the
>Russians to stop selling cheap Proton launches. The United States
>is an economic as well as military superpower, and can exert a
>great deal of influence over the foreign (and even internal) affairs
>of other nations without having to even threaten to kill people.
So much for the land of the free then. What if the company/country in
another country told America to sling their hook, and continued to
provide cheap or very cheap acces to space?
Allen Thomson
> They got to continue to sell Titan, Atlas, and their half of Shuttle.
> A successful X-33/operational-vehicle program by someone else would
> have put that line out of business. They achieved their strategic
> objective the day they won the contract, regardless of their
> performance.
Assuming this model of the X-33 debacle is correct (which, IMVHO,
it could well be), was it actually illegal? I.e., if LockMart
got NASA to agree to a contract that LM knew it couldn't possibly
perform on, made a best effort to perform, failed as anticipated --
did that violate any law?
Matt Jessick
> schi...@spock.usc.edu (John Schilling) wrote in
> news:av2hu2$8cp$1...@spock.usc.edu:
>
>
>>mich...@sapiens.com (Michael Moser) writes:
>>
>>
>>>schi...@spock.usc.edu (John Schilling) wrote in message
>>>news:<aug1vb$ihs$1...@spock.usc.edu>...
>>
>>>>To the extent that anyone involved ever actually expected the
>>>>program to result in a low-cost space transportation system, the
>>>>failure was in handing it over to NASA/Marshall and then LockMart.
>>>
>>>So who could/should have done it?
>>
>>Of the three bidders, Boeing was the only one with a chance.
>
>
> Umm, Boeing didn't bid on X-33. The other two bidders were Rockwell and
> MDAC, both of which were swallowed by Boeing *after* the fact.
>
Boeing supported the MDAC proposal for X-33.
The badges they gave us to get into their work areas
were very amusing. Vivid crosshatching backgrounds
screaming "ALIEN! ALIEN!" :)
Henry Vanderbilt
A more interesting permutation of those possibilities: LockMart at least
half-believing their own hype about the vehicle configuration, but once
the contract was won, failing to put in anything resembling a "best
effort", instead directing their best internal resources to other
programs whose success was more critical to them - F-22, EG. The fate
of the LASRE program would seem to support the latter assumption - As I
understand it, by the time the relatively inexperienced engineers on
LASRE had clawed their way partway up the learning curve, the money was
spent, the deadlines past, and the subproject cancelled.
Proving any of this, of course, would be the interesting part.
Henry Vanderbilt
hvand...@mindspring.com
Actual illegality would depend on proving
Rand Simberg
thom...@flash.net (Allen Thomson) made the phosphor on my monitor
glow in such a way as to indicate that:
>> They got to continue to sell Titan, Atlas, and their half of Shuttle.
I'm not sure if there are federal laws pertaining to fraud. If they
submitted their proposal via USPS, I suppose they could be nailed for
mail fraud. ;-)
The problem is that it would be almost impossible to prove, absent
some kind of internal memos to that effect. A good job for a
whistleblower, I suppose, but I doubt that if it was ever formally
discussed as their business strategy, it was ever anything other than
verbal.
And I don't claim that Lockmart never had any intention of performing
on the contract--obviously, the debacle didn't reflect well on them as
a company, and a successful X-33 program might have led to a follow-on
Shuttle II cost-plus contract, which I think was always their goal, or
at least hope.
Where I think they were being duplicitous was in their "business
plan," not X-33 itself. I'm just pointing out that it was a no-lose
situation for them, by keeping anyone else from actually building a
competitor.
Anyway, I don't think that there's a legal solution. The solution is
to get smarter people handing out contracts. Assuming, of course,
that Marshall wasn't in collusion themselves...
John R. Campbell
Not at all. The CAN made that simpler.
Don't forget that LockMart has a lot of practice in negotiating a
contract so they knew how to avoid being an Enron/WorldCom/etc.
So there are still ways to do this w/o running afoul of the letter
of the law.
There's no real way to enforce the *spirit* of the law though;
perhaps they will fall prey to competition.
tj bandrowsky
> What desirable effects do you imagine will come from politicians
> spending lots of money on space?
Progress before the market otherwise could or would. I want to see
people on mars. I want to have bigger telescopes in our solar system.
I want our fusion drive. I want to go to the stars. It's hard to
convince a board of directors that humanity should go to space
"because it's there." Sometimes you just have to do things to profit
the soul.
Anthony Q. Bachler
sabotage in order to maintain control of the oil supply, why wouldnt they do
it to retain control of space?
--
"If a million people say a foolish thing, it is still a foolish thing."
Anatole France [Jacques Anatole Thibault] (1844-1924)
"Christopher" <coro...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:3e1aa6f...@news.dsl.pipex.com...
Larrison
> A more interesting permutation of those possibilities: LockMart at least
> half-believing their own hype about the vehicle configuration, but once
> the contract was won, failing to put in anything resembling a "best
> effort", instead directing their best internal resources to other
> programs whose success was more critical to them - F-22, EG.
To a large extent I think you might be right on this -- but Lockheed
Martin really did push this program from what I saw, and it appeared
to have gottent high management attention on a frequent basis at
Lockheed Martin, particularly towards the end. Perhaps that attention
was too late...
I think the reason the X-33 failed was that it tried to push too
many new technologies at one time. There were 5
or 6 different new developments which had all work, else
the concept fell apart. The Skunkworks folks made a big
deal that their synergistic approach was revolutionary,
since all of the technologies worked together to get
farther along than only one new technology might have.
*If* they all worked, the Venturestar would be been really
great, but if one of them didn't work, the program pretty
much fell apart. To work, the Venturestar design needed
-- Lifting body configuration, with highly rounded
leading edges and good controllability, which gave them low
speed landings.
-- Metallic TPS with low maintainability, light weight
and high durability. This was allowed by the low radius of
curvature and low mass of the vehicle, which gave low
heating rates so metallic TPS could be used
-- Highly efficient cryogenic linear aerospike engine,
which allowed them to use the lifting body, get high
propulsive efficiency, which allowed them to get the low
weight vehicle.
-- Composite structure, including multi-lobe composite
propellant tanks. The structure was simple, since the
tanks and thrust structure were coupled into the lifting
body shape and TPS and aerospike.
-- Low development cost, driven the simple design and
high efficency allowed by the synergy of all the
technologies. A very small vehicle allowed by the highly
efficient engines and light weight structure also meant low
cost.
-- Low operating cost, which gave a high flight rate from
capturing the majority of the existing market and from
expected price/ demand elasticity in future demand. The
high flight rate was allowed by the highly maintainable
engine and TPS and avionics. Etc. Etc.
Now, there's a side question here about how much new stuff an
X-vehicle should demonstrate, but let's stick to the X-33 for a
moment.
So what happened? Well, in just about every area there
were problems, which all synergistically coupled back
together and made the design almost unworkable.
Aerodynamics studies and a more detailed design showed
the vehicle was unstable and almost uncontrollable in
landing. They fixed that by sharpening up the nose and
adding control surfaces (eg, wings & tail) to the lifting body.
The vehicle got heavier, the higher heating rates from
sharper edges with higher mass/ ballistic coeff meant
they needed more than just the metallic TPS, etc. The
effort and time in setting this basic configuration was
substantially more than expected.
As they investigated the engine, they found they needed
a new engine, with high thrust/ weight (I heard over 150:1
at one point). Those costs went up. Since they never
built or really did a detailed design for the full scale
aerospike engine, any problems aren't well known. The
modified J-2 engine turned into an aerospike turned out to
heavier than expected, but in the end, it did fire for its
full duration -- but only on a test stand.
The metallic TPS looked like it would work as expected,
but was heavier and more complex (and costly) than expected
-- and the venturestar probably would have heating
exceeding the capabilities of the metallic materials.
Certainly you would need something else on the leading
edges and wings of the VentureStar.
The composite structure turned out to be much more
complex and harder to make than expected. The composite
propellant tanks were seriously harder to build than
expected, with at least one highly publicized failure. The
highly efficient lifting body structure turned out to not
be as efficient as expected.
All of this drove the mass up dramatically, which drove
up the size of the vehicle. The expected cost of the
vehicle went up too.
All of this was not helped by some management missteps
at Skunkworks. They expected to have an integrated team of
people working this, but had problems getting the
integrated design environment working and had substantial
coordination problems between different parts of Lockheed
Martin and with other contractors. It also didn't help that
there were substantial cultural clashes between folks with
space design experience and aircraft design experience.
(From what I heard, the aircraft guys wouldn't listen to
the space guys, and when the designs failed in a space
operating environment they had to be redone. The aircraft
guys faulted the space guys in turn for being overly
conservative in their designs and their approach to test
and verify everything before flight. Plus rumors of
massive battles within the team about the details of
the design...
All of this started to unravel the fig leaf of building
an X-33 to make a commercial investment decision. Lockheed
Martin had brought in external consultants to write the
business plan part of the original proposal, and these
folks were laid off/ fired immediately after the proposal
was submitted. Lockheed went through at least 3 different
teams with the business plan and "commercial investment
decision" plan, pretty much throwing out the idea they
would ever think about investing in a Venturestar
themselves. (It was rumored they never were serious about
it in the first place, wanting government financing ...)
As the costs went up and up for the X-33, and for the
Ventuerstar to be developed later from the X-33, everyone
realized that the original highly optimistic X-33 and
Venturestar assumptions were wrong. It was going to cost
more -- a lot more -- and not perform as well. A ground
prototype or operational aerospike engine was quietly
deleted from the program plan and money shifted to
development. Other demonstrations which had been planned
to support making the commercial investment decision for
the full scale operational vehicle were "delayed"
indefinitely and their funds moved to solve problems with
the design of the X-33 test vehicle. Almost all of the
supporting demos needed to make that investment decision,
other than the X-33 flight test, were canceled to help
fix problems with the X-33 itself.
The final nail in the coffin was when the composite LH2
tank exploded apart after a cryogenic cycle test. Small
cracks had allowed air to get into the composite structure,
where it had been liquefied by the LH2 in the tank. When
the tank was warmed back up, the liquid air turned back
into a gas, and the resultant pressure "bubble" blew part
of the tank apart. To fix this, the tank would have to be
redesigned and rebuilt -- the entire program (now seriously
over cost and way behind budget) would have to march in
place for from 6 months to a year, just to get the tank
replaced. NASA, which had insisted essentially on a fixed
cost development contract, would not put more money into
the program. Lockheed Martin (and their subcontractors and
partners) had already overrun their budgets by substantial
amounts.
The program died...
Christopher
>Henry Vanderbilt <hvand...@mindspring.com> wrote in message
>
>> A more interesting permutation of those possibilities: LockMart at least
>> half-believing their own hype about the vehicle configuration, but once
>> the contract was won, failing to put in anything resembling a "best
>> effort", instead directing their best internal resources to other
>> programs whose success was more critical to them - F-22, EG.
>
>To a large extent I think you might be right on this -- but Lockheed
>Martin really did push this program from what I saw, and it appeared
>to have gottent high management attention on a frequent basis at
>Lockheed Martin, particularly towards the end. Perhaps that attention
>was too late...
>
>I think the reason the X-33 failed was that it tried to push too
>many new technologies at one time. There were 5
>or 6 different new developments which had all work, else
>the concept fell apart. The Skunkworks folks...
<big snip>
>The program died...
What a very good explanation. And it probably answered all the
questions regarding this thread. Well done Larrison on your reply.
Allen Thomson
[A very interesting summary of X-33]
Most valuable, as always. One sometimes sees why the Usenet is a
Good Thing.
A question/request: Could you provide a timeline (approximate
dates) to connect to the "So what happened?" narrative you've
just given?
One reason I ask is also recorded a bit in Usenet, and that is
that various folks, Henry prominent among them, were providing
early warning as the program went on. It would be instructive to
see if external observers got it more or less right in real time.
(I think they did, but evidence is always nice.)
Kaido Kert
Report on the Audit of NASA X-33 Funding Issues at MSFC"
http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/oig/hq/ig-99-001.pdf
However you wanna look at it, there was something very fishy going on.
Technology-wise, they crammed so many undeveloped technologies in there, so
it was possible to predict that something is going to backfire.
Most of non-NASA experts are saying, that for example composite fuel tanks
were just a waste of money, conventional aluminium wouldve done just as
well.
See this
http://www.spacefuture.com/archive/how_much_new_technology_is_required_for_f
uture_reusable_launch_systems.shtml
on details how much of this actually is needed to get to orbit cheap.
-kert
"tj bandrowsky" <tban...@unitedsoftworks.com> wrote in message
news:52e031b9.02122...@posting.google.com...
> One moment, we were on our way to VentureStar and a golden new era of
> spaceflight, the next, X-33 is cancelled.
>
> What actually failed in the program? I've read the engines, fuel
> tanks, etc... but what was it?
Matt Jessick
> larr...@my-deja.com (Larrison) wrote
>
> [A very interesting summary of X-33]
>
> A question/request: Could you provide a timeline (approximate
> dates) to connect to the "So what happened?" narrative you've
> just given?
>
> One reason I ask is also recorded a bit in Usenet, and that is
> that various folks, Henry prominent among them, were providing
> early warning as the program went on. It would be instructive to
> see if external observers got it more or less right in real time.
> (I think they did, but evidence is always nice.)
I think it would also be amusing to compare the wild claims
of various usenet proponents of the time side-by-side with actual
capabilities mined from company data. Unfortunately, companies
don't release their embarrassments on 25,50 or 125 year schedules
like governments occasionally do. :)
- Matt
Larrison
> dates) to connect to the "So what happened?" narrative you've
> just given?
There's a good timeline on the X-33 from the NASA history office, but
it only gives events and no interpretation. My comments are in []
below...
1996 July 2
Vice President Al Gore announces that Lockheed Martin had won the
competition for the X-33 Phase II contract over contenders McDonnell
Douglas and Rockwell International.
1996 December 18
Completion of PDR (preliminary design review) for X-33 Ground
Support System and Launch Facility. Individual PDRs already had been
conducted on the aerospike engine, the hydrogen tank, the structure,
and most subsystems. [Typically PDR is the "10% design release point",
where the total system design configuration is completed, and 10% of
the detailed design drawing are complete. The total system PDR
apparently had not yet been complete. My understanding is the X-33
"business plan" was not complete, and would not be complete until mid
1997 at the earliest]
1997 Wind tunnel testing of X-33 configuration. There are press
reports of testing continuing from through mid 1997. [This is
probably a sign of problems, since the wind tunnel testing would be
particularly useful in setting the basic configurational parameters
and establishing stability and control requirements on the vehicle.
This is used to size the control surfaces, establish their location,
etc -- which is required before you can do the detailed design
drawings. While I don't think SkWorks had not done aerodynamic
testing prior to winning the X-33, the lifting body design they
selected obviously still needed a lot more to get a good handle on
their configuration. ]
1997 April 16
Continuing wind tunnel testing at Marshall Space Flight Center to
correct X-33 control deficiency at low supersonic speeds (Mach 1 to
2). Adding canards appeared to be the only viable solution to date.
1997 April 30
NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center announced that in Marshall
Propulsion Laboratory's East Test Area, Marshall had conducted
hot-fire tests of components for the X-33 linear aerospike engine. The
test apparatus consisted of three hydrogen-cooled thrust cells
constructed to represent a section of the X-33 engine, which will have
two banks of 10 side-by-side thrusters. Test results were to be
reviewed with Rocketdyne, which built the test thrust cells, and which
will build the X-33 aerospike engine.
1997 May
Wind tunnel testing of a scale model X-33 in the Langley Research
Center's Unitary Wind Tunnel at supersonic speeds ranging from Mach
1.5 to 4.5 continued from mid-April to early May. Wind tunnel testing
also continued through May at the Marshall Space Flight Center.
1997 May
A "tiger team" was working full-time on reducing 5000 to 6000 pounds
from the dry weight (without fuel) of the X-33. The team sorted
through over 400 recommendations to reduce weight.
[As designs are turned from artists conceptions ("view graph
engineering") to detailed design drawings, manufacturing and parts
orders, and assembly/ test plans, weights _as_calculated_ typically go
up. This is based upon better knowledge of what the design needs to
do, but also the addition of things like clips, brackets, harnesses,
etc which are typically not detailed in the early configuration
drawings. Usually there is an allowance in the cost projections for
adding in the detail parts, and some added margin to handle unknowns
in the detailed design. The 5-6,000 lb weight reduction is around 10%
of the total x-33 dry weight, so evidently the system had broken
through all the weight reserves at this point. My suspicion (with
little evidence, but based upon similar experience) is that the
changes in configuration hinted from the extensive wind tunnel testing
above, was forcing a substantial modification of the overall
configuration which broke the previously-baselined mass budget. The
400 recommendations indicate that some level of detailed design was
going on, since you'd need that level of insight to generate that
number of weight-reduction changes.]
1997 May 21
Presentation by the "tiger team" working on the X-33 weight problem.
Weight reduction recommendations were ranked according to minor,
medium, or major cost and schedule impacts. The team indicated that
about 8 000 to 11 000 pounds of weight could be reduced, but the X-33
project costs and schedule would be affected. [ Cost and schedule
impact means something is being redesigned from the baseline...]
1997 June
Additional wind tunnel testing of X-33 models took place in June 1997
in the Langley Research Center's Hypersonic Facilities Complex. Also,
X-33 wind tunnel testing started in Langley's 14- by 22-Foot Subsonic
Tunnel in mid-June.
1997 June 24
Aerospace Daily reported that "typical development problems" had led
to the postponement of the first X-33 test flight from March to July
of 1999, and the slippage of the Critical Design Review from September
to an unspecified time in the fall. A critical problem behind the
postponement was fabrication of the liquid-hydrogen fuel tank. In
addition, Aerospace Daily reported that the Lockheed Martin Skunk
Works had consolidated X-33 project management at Palmdale,
California, and that Jerry Rising had been named vice president for
X-33 and reusable launch vehicles. Rising replaced T.K. Mattingly, who
transferred to Lockheed Martin's aeronautical division at corporate
headquarters in Bethesda, Maryland. [Now you see the tip of the
management programs start to show -- "consolidation of X-33 project
management" indicates problems with the virtual co-located teams,
which rumors say wasn't working. The delay in the CDR indicates
substantial redesign is going on, or that the design is proving to be
a lot more difficult to do. CDR is when you want to be "90% drawings
release", when you have completed 90% of the detailed design of the
system, resolved all major system-level problems, completed your
manufacturing, assembly, integration & test plans, and be starting to
make initial detailed production parts.]
1997 July
In mid-July, wind tunnel testing of X-33 models in the Langley
Research Center's 14- by 22-Foot Subsonic Tunnel concluded.
1997 July 3
Aerospace Daily reported on X-33 progress, based on an interview with
Jerry Rising, Lockheed Martin Skunk Works vice president and program
director for the X-33. The Skunk Works was considering use of a
colder, denser cryogenic propellant, and had dropped plans to add
canards for vehicle stability in the low transonic range (Mach 1 and
2). The canards were dropped in favor of changes in the tail
structure. Weight growth was under attack by a special "tiger team."
[The note about using densified propellant, as proposed by the
Rockwell team for their X-33 is a bit troubling. Either the system is
still having performance and weight problems, or else X-33 is not
going to meet all its flight test goals. But the program is going on,
continuing to do detailed design. The completion of windtunnel tests
indicates they have validated the configuration, at least to the point
where they think they can fly and land the beast.]
1997 August 26
The Linear Acrospike SR-71 Experiment was mounted on a NASA SR-71
aircraft at the NASA Dryden Flight Research Center, Edwards, Calif.,
in preparation for the experiment's first flight, then scheduled for
sometime in September. [This, the LASRE test, was originally approved
to be completed *prior* to the submission of proposals for the X-33
and definitely before the downselect over a year previously.]
1997 August 26
Aerospace Daily reported that a gas generator adapted for the X-33
aerospike engine from a J-2 Saturn rocket engine had undergone
fourteen hot-fire tests at NASA Marshall Space Flight Center. [ Engine
design is continuing.]
1997 August 28
NASA Langley Research Center conducted load tests of a full-scale
segment of a composite intertank structure for the X-33 program.[
Structural design has completed well enough that an intertank design
detail can be tested.]
1997 September 11
Aerospace Daily reported on X-33 progress. Five of eight 100-pound
liquid hydrogen tank panels had been fabricated by Alliant TechSystems
in a Utah plant, and tests of the composite seams were proceeding
without any surprises. The liquid oxygen tank had been welded
together. A "big hunk" of vehicle weight was cut by removing the turbo
alternator. Cooling the liquid oxygen and hydrogen propellants to
temperatures lower than normal helped to cut overall vehicle weight
even further, and to allow the X-33 to carry additional fuel.
1997 September 18
End of two-day Design Review of the X-33 Thermal Protection System by
Rohr at its Chula Vista, California, facility.
1997 September 24
End of the two-day Critical Design Review of the X-33 aerospike engine
(known also as the XRS-2200 engine). The CDR took place at
Rocketdyne's DeSoto campus in Chattsworth, California, where the X-33
engines are being designed.
[So the CDRs of the TPS and aerospike engine are completed,
approximately on the original schedule. Of course, the detail design
integration of these elements needs to be incorporated into the
detailed design planned for the system-level CDR, for the flight
vehicle.]
1997 October 31
NASA announced that the X-33 had completed the five-day vehicle
Critical Design Review (CDR) successfully. This was a major event in
the evolution of the X-33. With completion of the CDR, NASA gave the
Skunk Works approval to proceed with the fabrication of all remaining
components and the assembly of the flight vehicle. Over 590 people
selected by the Lockheed Martin Skunk Works attended the CDR. The
package of CDR technical information contained some 2750 charts in 11
volumes.
1997 October 31
First successful flight of the LASRE experiment at NASA's Dryden
Flight Research Center.
1997 November 14
Groundbreaking ceremony took place at future X-33 launch site on
Edwards Air Force Base
1998 February 11
The first major X-33 component, the liquid oxygen tank, was delivered
to the Palmdale, California, hanger where construction of the vehicle
was taking place. Delivery was made by an Airbus A300-600ST. [I would
suspect that the LOX tank had to have designed and released to
manufacturer in mid 1997 to allow this delivery. ]
1998 March 4
A NASA SR-71 completed its first cold flow flight as part of the
Linear Aerospike SR-71 Experiment (LASRE) at NASA's Dryden Flight
Research Center, Edwards, Calif.
1998 March 20
During a project review held at the Rocketdyne facility in Canoga
Park, Rocketdyne made known certain schedule hazards that had
developed with two of their suppliers, Weldmac and CFI. It was
reported that, in the worst case, aerospike engine deliveries might
slip three to five months. Rocketdyne was looking into their
suppliers' difficulties in hopes of mitigating risk to the program
schedule. [The engines are turning out to a bit harder to make than
expected. Not this is just manufacturing serial scheduling problems
it appears -- getting suppliers to deliver to meet a tight schedule,
not any fundamental problems with the engine. Of course, at this time
no aerospike has ever been flight tested in transonic and supersonic
conditions...]
1998 April 8
With the exception of some fastener shortages, the center thrust
structure of the X-33 vehicle was now complete.
1998 April 19
The liquid oxygen tank was moved into the main assembly fixture. The
move took less than an hour, and was completed two days ahead of
schedule.
1998 May 18
NASA's F-15B Aerodynamic Flight Facility aircraft was flight testing
thermal protection materials intended for use on the X-33 on an F-15B
fighter to determine the durability of the materials, specifically
measuring the shear and shock loads to which the materials are
exposed. The F-15B is a NASA test aircraft based at Dryden Flight
Research Center, Edwards, Calif. The materials tested included
metallic Inconel tiles, soft Advanced Flexible Reusable Surface
Isolation tiles, and sealing materials.
1998 June 8
Aerospace Daily reported: "Lockheed Martin is carrying a 'three-month
hazard' on the linear aerospike engine it will need to power the X-33
testbed next summer, but Rocketdyne has developed workarounds and
fixes to get the engine back on track," citing Lockheed Martin program
manager Jerry Rising.
1998 June 8
Aerospace Daily reported that leakage into the structure of the
subscale aerospike mounted on NASA's SR-71 Blackbird had delayed the
first hot-fire test of the engine "a few weeks."
1998 June 8
As reported in Aerospace Daily, X-33 program manager Jerry Rising and
X-34 program manager Bob Lindberg threatened to not allow their X
vehicles to fly, unless Congress passes indemnification legislation
protecting them against third-party liability in case of an accident
during flight testing. [People are not working out the details of the
flight test program and have just figured out that is something goes
wrong somewhere, they can be sued for major damages. Originally, the
X-33 might have had unlimited 3rd party liability -- which meant that
if someone is injured or their property damaged, the manufacturer of
the vehicle could be sued for unlimited amounts. Typically in a
government contract, you don't have this since you are building to the
government's direction, but under the Cooperative Agreement used for
the X-33, the contractor still held liability.]
1998 June 30
NASA announced completion of the F-15B flight testing of thermal
protection materials for the X-33 at NASA's Dryden Flight Research
Center, Edwards, CA. The six flights tested the durability of the
materials at hypersonic velocities. The F-15B reached an altitude of
36,000 feet and a top speed of Mach 1.4. The material samples tested
included metallic Inconel tiles, soft Advanced Flexible Reusable
Surface Insulation tiles, and sealing materials.
1998 July 6
Aerospace Daily, in an article titled "Wagons Ho!" reported that the
Lockheed Martin Skunk Works had abandoned flying the X-33 back to its
launch pad at Edwards AFB in favor of trucking the experimental
aircraft overland, "because the Shuttle program won't give up one of
its two Boeing 747s for ferry flights."
1998 July 22
Difficulties with fabricating the X-33 liquid hydrogen tanks
continued. as a result, delivery dates for the two tanks slipped from
July 31st and September 2nd to mid-October and mid-November,
respectively. The impact of these delays on vehicle assembly was still
be assessed.
1998 July 29
Aerojet recommended to NASA and Lockheed Martin that they use a
thruster configuration that includes a nozzle made of columbium to
correct for the thermal problems that had caused nozzles to burn
through in earlier tests. Using columbium nozzle parts will not
increase the X-33's net weight, however preparing the parts will
require a long lead time. To minimize schedule impact, Aerojet
proposed delivering the thrusters without nozzles to allow
continuation of vehicle assembly and supplying the columbium nozzles
at a later date.
1998 August 26
AlliedSignal delivered the X-33 nose landing gear strut. It will be
modified into the X-33 configuration for a test fit. This same test
fit already has been accomplished for the main trunion pivots and the
drag link attachments without any problems.
1998 September 23
A nine-panel thermal protection system array was test fitted on the
bottom of the X-33 last week by a joint team of BF Goodrich and Skunk
Works technicians. The metallic panels were equipped with the new
secondary seal designs. One panel also was removed from the center of
the array to prove that any panel could be replaced. [The new
secondary seals apparently were required based upon the results of the
F-15 and other ground testing done. I believe this was done to
minimize the hot gas intrusion through the gaps in the TPS (which was
also a big issue with the Shuttle's tiles). If the first test fitting
of the TPS panels if being done in Sep 98, this is a little late in
the schedule, but how much I don't know...]
1998 September 27
Continuing difficulties with fabrication of the two liquid hydrogen
tanks. A cure cycle was lost during the first doubler installation
process on tank #2. The tank was removed early from the cure cycle
after blowing a bag at the end of a ramp up point. The combination of
the out time and this cure cycle resulted in an unacceptable strength
impact to the bond joints. The doublers were removed over the weekend
(26-27 September) and can be replaced with existing materials. Loss of
the cure cycle delayed fabrication of tank #2 by 30 days. Construction
of the vehicle structure and electronics continued.
1998 October 2
The X-33 engine testing program began. At 12:13am Central Time, the
first successful aerospike engine-related test took place at NASA's
John C. Stennis Space Center (Hancock County, Mississippi). The test
was intended to calibrate the liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen fuel
turbopumps, to check facility settings, and to verify valve timing to
prime the gas generator. The test lasted 2.81 seconds, and no flaws or
anomalies were detected. The tested powerpack hardware consisted of
the main power generating and pumping components of the aerospike
engine, including the liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen turbopumps, a
gas generator for the turbopump drive, vehicle connect lines, and
interconnecting flight ducts. These powerpack tests are critical to
the development of the linear aerospike engine, because they allow
various performance levels to be tested in parallel with the design
and construction of the engine. Full-scale engine tests are scheduled
to occur at NASA's Stennis Space Center later this year.
1998 October 7
B.F. Goodrich completed the last major testing of the metallic panels
for the X-33 thermal protection system at NASA's Marshall Space Flight
Center, Alabama. [TPS design is now completed. However, what is the
design needed for the Venturestar? ]
1998 October 14
Boeing presented their current estimate to complete. Their plan
transferred $36 million from the VentureStar reusable launch vehicle
(RLV) to the X-33 by eliminating the fabrication, assembly, and
testing of the RLV power pack. By adding a second engine test stand in
Phase III (the program is presently in Phase II), Boeing has been able
to develop a schedule that would support a first flight of VentureStar
within six months of the current Skunk Works schedule. In addition,
Boeing declined additional investment in the project. The $36 million
transferred from VentureStar to X-33 is the same amount as the
additional X-33 costs caused by Boeing's delay in delivering the
aerospike engine (see 1998 October 27 below). [The critical
demonstration of the engine needed for the Venturestar is cancelled
during the X-33 phase of the program. The aerospike needed for the
Venturestar is not just a scaled up version of what is to be used in
the X-33. It has a different engine cycle, substantially different
combustion chamber and controller, and is new build engine. Not
having the engine test in the X-33 means that the 'commercial
investment decision' that was the original reason for the X-33 is
probably gone at this point.]
1998 October 21
The first two upper thermal protection system panels arrived at the
hanger from B.F. Goodrich's Riverside plant. They were to be test
fitted on the forward most position of the liquid oxygen tank. Repair
patches for liquid hydrogen tank #1 were completed and shipped, while
work continued on the second tank.
1998 October 27
In a joint NASA and Lockheed Martin media teleconference, Jerry
Rising, Lockheed Martin Skunk Works vice president for the X-33 and
VentureStar, announced that the first flight of the X-33 would be
delayed six months until December 1999, because of late delivery of
the aerospike engine in September 1999. This delay in engine delivery
will cost an additional $36 million. Lockheed Martin expects
Rocketdyne to absorb the additional cost. Lockheed Martin has cut out
all overtime on the program and plans to cut project personnel in
order to reduce escalating costs.
1998 October 28
The two leeward #1 composite panels were delivered to the hanger for a
fit check on the vehicle. The two leeward #2 panels were to be shipped
on Monday, 1 November, for a fit check. Once the panel fit checks are
made, all composite panels will be shipped back to B.F. Goodrich's
Riverside plant for completion. Also, a successful cure cycle on
liquid hydrogen tank #2 was accomplished over the weekend, 24-25
October. As a result, all lobe skins were bonded on both tanks.
1998 November 11
The X-33's electronics achieved an important milestone when Sanders
shipped two Vehicle Health Monitoring computers to the Skunk Works.
Also, the Skunk Works had identified a potential winner of the
contract to transport the X-33 over land [back from the landing site].
1998 November 13
A test of the aerospike engine power pack took place at 100% power
over a period of 30 seconds during the week ending 13 November. A 250
second test was planned for the following week.
1998 November 18
Work began on the ballast bulkhead assembly. Faced with a continually
slipping schedule at the Sunnyvale plant, subcontractor Alliant and
the Skunk Works formulated plans to speed up work. Shift schedules
will be changed so as to effectively double manpower. [Now go back and
read the Oct 27 note]
1998 November 20
Announcement that NASA and the Lockheed Martin Skunk Works have
terminated the Linear Aerospike SR-71 Experiment (LASRE). The LASRE
sought to obtain data on the aerospike engine intended for use on the
X-33 and VentureStar by mounting half of a scale-model aerospike
engine on the back of an SR-71 aircraft and studying the effects of
gas flow. The modified SR-71 carried out seven LASRE test flights.
Those flights, however, tested only cold flow gas conditions; all hot
flow experiments are now cancelled. Two flights collected aerodynamic
data on the combination of the aerospike engine with the SR-71
aircraft. In two others, gaseous helium and liquid nitrogen were
cycled through the test rig to test its plumbing, and three more
flights, liquid oxygen flowed through the system. The two hot-fire
test flights planned to validate computer models of aerospike
performance in flight are now cancelled. The LASRE was repeatedly
delayed by hardware and other problems. Cancellation of the LASRE
allows any remaining funds to be used by the Skunk Works to cover X-33
cost overruns.
1998 November 24
In its December 2, 1998, issue, Aerospace Daily reported that on
November 24, 1998, Boeing's Rocketdyne Division completed the first
four tests of its XRS-2200 linear aerospike engine at NASA's Stennis
Space Center in Mississippi . In these tests, the engine's
turbomachinery and gas generator were run at full power, then
throttled back to 57% power.
1998 November (sometime)
The TPS panels are declared "ready for flight" based upon ground and
F-15 flight testing.
1998 December 2
Aerospace Daily reported that NASA's Office of the Inspector General,
in an audit titled "X-33 Funding Issues" (IG-99-001), found that the
NASA Marshall Space Flight Center allowed $56 million in year-end
obligations for the X-33 to go unrecorded in fiscal years 1996 and
1997, thereby giving Congress an inaccurate picture of the program's
status at the ends of those two years. The Inspector General reported
that Marshall Space Flight Center contract officers had established an
arrangement with the Lockheed Martin Skunk Works to delay billing for
completed X-33 work until the following fiscal year. In fiscal 1996,
that amounted to $22 million, and in fiscal 1997, to $34 million. The
Inspector General maintained that obligations "should be recorded not
later than NASA's acceptance of the completed milestone work" and
recommended that NASA adjust its financial records to reveal the X-33
program's financial status "fully and accurately," and that NASA
review the funding and payment practices used on the X-33 program to
ensure that they meet the requirements of the Antideficiency Act and
internal controls.
1998 December 4
Senior NASA staff, Boeing representatives, and X-33 project personnel
from Boeing Rocketdyne and Lockheed Martin attended a meeting at
Lockheed Martin's corporate headquarters in Bethesda, Maryland, to
discuss the development of the X-33 aerospike engine. At the meeting,
Boeing proposed to downsize the ground portion of the propulsion
demonstration program in order to use the resulting savings to fund
X-33 engine cost overruns.
1998 December 16
Construction of the X-33 continued. Both liquid hydrogen tanks
completed cures. Two gaseous oxygen tanks and two methane tanks
belonging to the auxiliary propellant system were installed on the
liquid oxygen tank. The thrust structure is nearly complete. Some
clearance issues have emerged during installation of the nose gear
support structure. Power pack assembly no. 2 was completed and sent to
NASA Stennis for testing, while power pack assembly no. 1 was still
having problems.
Construction of the X-33 launch site begins to close out. The four
vehicle hold down posts were installed onto the rotating launch mount.
The diesel generator for the site's electrical supply was run for the
first time. The Vehicle Positioning System was unpacked and set up for
testing. Sanders completed delivery of the Operations Control Center
hardware. The X-33 launch site is now completed.
1999 January 5
Problems continued to plague the X-33's liquid hydrogen tank #1.
Bubbles and cracks were observed on lobe skin 1 after the last cure
cycle. The tank was undergoing tests to determine if any of the other
lobe skins were affected. The cause of failure was still under
investigation, while the tooling used to manufacture tank #1 has been
shipped back to Alliant. Tank #2 successfully completed another curing
cycle in the autoclave. Only one autoclave cycle remains, and that one
will install the dome doublers.
1999 January 13
Progress continued on the X-33 and its launch site.
Rocketdyne completed a 250-second test on power pack #1 the week of
January 4th, with no anomalies reported. Once power pack #1 completes
its tests, power pack #2 will undergo the same tests at NASA's Stennis
Research Center. Liquid hydrogen tank #2 completed its final cure
successfully the night of January 11th. It will now be moved out of
the autoclave building to the building 104 for installation of thrust
busters and tank sealant. However, the entire lobe skin of liquid
hydrogen tank #1 will be removed, except for the bonded areas, this
week. Failure of the lobe skin on liquid hydrogen tank #1 was so
total, that a new tank skin will have to be built. Twenty four
metallic thermal protection system panels were delivered to the Skunk
Works. All of the X-33's 250 flat panels have completed assembly and
braze operations.
1999 January 14
At Lockheed corporate headquarters in Bethesda, Maryland, Lockheed's
Pete Teets, NASA's Gary Payton, and representatives from Boeing and
Boeing's Rocketdyne Division met to decide how to save the RLV
(VentureStar) engine, while still covering the X-33 aerospike engine
cost overruns.
1999 January 21
Aerospace Daily reported that first launch of the X-33 had been
postponed to July 2000. Following the recent failure of the entire
lobe skin of liquid hydrogen tank #1, the same tank's internal wall
lost its bond, while it was undergoing heat treatment in a Lockheed
Martin autoclave in Sunnyvale, California. Construction of the X-33
liquid hydrogen tanks already caused a four-month delay earlier in the
program, when the original material had to be replaced with the
current composite material. NASA and Skunk Works program officials
scheduled a press conference today to discuss the situation.
1999 January 21
During a telephone press conference, NASA and Skunk Works program
officials discussed the failure of liquid hydrogen tank #1 and its
impact on the program schedule. First flight of the X-33 has been
postponed to July 2000, and the cost of replacing the tank's lob skin
will run nearly $5 million in addition to the significant cost overrun
resulting from the aerospike engine difficulty. One measure the Skunk
Works planned to institute in order to recover the added cost of
replacing the lobe skin on liquid hydrogen tank #1 was to slow down
work on the project and shift some workers to other projects.
1999 January 26
Announcement of the formation of the VentureStar Limited Liability
Company (LLC) to turn the X-33 Program into a "viable commercial
entity." VentureStar will identify potential strategic partners and
obtain all necessary commitments to meet established financial goals
and key program milestones. Jerry Rising, current Skunk Works Vice
President of X-33/RLV, has been appointed President of VentureStar
LLC. Cleon Lacefield replaces him as Vice President and Program
Manager of the X-33/RLV Program. [This was a major press
announcement and I believe tied to achievement of a payment milestone
in the RLV Phase II (X-33 phase) program. However, from retrospect,
note how they have formed the company, before they have figured out if
they will have any data to know if the engine works for the
Venturestar, since the LASRE and the powerhead ground test have been
cancelled.]
1999 February 1
Agreement finally reached that $23 M will be transferred from the
VentureStar engine development to resolve problems with the X-33
aerospike engine, whose cost overrun is estimated to be $36 million.
Boeing, whose Rocketdyne Division is building the aerospike engine,
offered to contribute $10 million in corporate funds to the project.
Of that amount, $6 million would go toward the aerospike cost overrun,
while the remainder would be held as a reserve by the program office.
1999 February 3
NASA announced that the X-33's metallic thermal protection panels had
passed a series of tests in high-speed, high-temperature wind tunnels
and attached to the bottom of a NASA F-15 aircraft flying at nearly
Mach 1.5.
1999 February 15
This week, 9 lobe skin core pull tests were completed on liquid
hydrogen tank #1, and they were found to be within tolerances. The
same lobe skin had tested low earlier with the field equipment. The
field equipment is undergoing evaluation to determine why it did not
read correctly. The low core pulls on the flight lobe skins are now
considered invalid.
1999 February 24
During the fourth test of Power Pack Assembly #2, a redline shutdown
occurred after 130 seconds of a planned 250 second duration test. The
problem was caused by water freezing in the gas generator chamber
pressure sensor line. No hardware damage occurred.
1999 March 5
At Edwards AFB today, the formal dedication of the X-33 launch site,
henceforth to be known as the X-33 Flight Operations Center, took
place. The Sverdrup Corporation of St. Louis, Missouri, designed and
built the $32-million center in just over 12 months and under budget.
1999 April 7
Liquid Hydrogen Tank #2 is nearly complete, while Liquid Hydrogen Tank
#1 is about to have replacement lobes 1 & 4 installed and enter the
autoclave this week. Both body flaps now have one skin installed, and
side fairings are being fitted on both. Instrumentation is installed
on the left hand, and installation of the final skin is expected next
week when the side fairings are complete. The first test of Power Pack
#3 ran successfully on March 31st. The final test was conducted
successfully last week. This concludes Power Pack testing. No tests
are scheduled to be run on Power Pack #4.
1999 May 6
B.F.Goodrich slipped delivery of the first two elevons by about two
weeks. This delay impacts the start of tile installation at
Oceaneering. All tiles for the elevons have been delivered and are
located at Oceaneering's X-33 facility. Skunk Works personnel picked
up containers holding 1100 -1400 tiles from Lockheed's Sunnyvale plant
and delivered them to Oceaneering. The tiles were primarily to support
the elevons, but a third were for the body flaps. The balance of the
tiles should be ready for pickup and delivery from Sunnyvale by
mid-May. [Note, tiles are now being used on the elevons, not the
metallic TPS panels.]
1999 May 25
NASA and the Skunk Works hosted a teleconference on the X-33 and
VentureStar. The Skunk Works reported that the aerospike engine and
the hydrogen tank continue to be the major technological hurdles; no
additional ones are foreseen, as construction of the X-33 continues.
During the teleconference, Skunk Works officials gave several
projected schedule dates. They anticipate that the team will transport
the X-33 vehicle to its launch site in January 2000. Assembly of the
first aerospike engine is scheduled for completion on June 25,
followed by engine testing and integration into the vehicle. Cleon
Lacefield, speaking on behalf of the Skunk Works X-33 Program, stated
that he was "fairly confident" that first flight will take place in
July 2000.
1999 June 4
The X-33 Quarterly Review took place at NASA's Stennis Space Center in
Mississippi. Here are a few of the Quarterly Review highlights:
A lot of hardware is still pouring in for installation in the vehicle.
Number 1 flight engine is now to be shipped to Stennis on June 25
instead of June 14.
First leak test of the liquid hydrogen tank was sheduled for August
14, 1999; however, NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center is not yet
prepared to measure the leak rate. Also, the work on the tank thrust
buster apparently was not on Marshall's schedule.
1999 July 6
The roll-out of the first of four X-33 (XRS-2200) aerospike engines
took place today. This was a major event for Rocketdyne. Of the four
X-33 aerospike engines that Rocketdyne is building, the first two will
serve as test engines, while the second set of four engines will be
fitted to the X-33 vehicle. Delivery of the vehicle engines likely
will not occur until November or December. The first X-33 flight then
will not take place until July 2000, as currently planned.
1999 August 30
In a draft General Accounting Office (GAO) report, according to
Aerospace Daily, delays in the X-33 Program may have an impact on
NASA's decisions regarding upgrades to the Shuttle. It also noted that
the Skunk Works could charge X-33 cost overruns to other federal
programs as independent research and development (IRAD) overhead. As a
result, an estimated $286.6 million industry contribution to the X-33
program may amount to only $125.4 million. The GAO report also stated
that, according to Aerospace Daily, NASA has lowered its performance
objectives. Industry will receive a $60 million payment after five
flights, instead of $75 million for 15 flights. NASA responded that
they altered the performance requirements after Lockheed Martin agreed
to increase its contribution by $75 million. As for the IR&D
deductions, the actual amount, NASA stated, may turn out to be lower
after an audit.
1999 September 7
NASA announced that one of the X-33 composite liquid hydrogen fuel
tanks would soon undergo a series of pressure and stress tests at
NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Ala.
1999 September 22
The X-33 Quarterly Review was held at Marshall Space Flight Center. No
new issues arose. Meanwhile, construction of the vehicle continued.
The port and starboard flex lines have been mated to the liquid oxygen
tank. Bracket connection and leak checks are in progress. Connection
of the flex lines to the downcomer was scheduled for this week. The
GPS antennas passed qualification. Installation on the thrust
structure continued. Plumbing on the forward ballast bulkhead is
complete, though without insulation. The remaining two elevons were
received from B.F. Goodrich, and they will be shipped to Oceaneering.
This will constitute the full set of flight controls workable for tile
and blanket installation. The liquid hydrogen tanks continue to be
troublesome. Tank no. 2 is undergoing repairs for leakage. The sealant
liner on the outside longerons is delaminating. A borescope will be
used next week to inspect the inside liners.
1999 October 1
Progress on the X-33 continues. Tank #2 was tested with liquid
hydrogen. The tank was filled to 100% flight load and pressurized to
20 psi. The test was terminated early by the facility hydrogen leak
detector sensors. Leaks are in process of being fixed.
Twenty-seven boxes of TPS panels have been delivered to date. This
equates to 648 panels (52%) out of a total 0f 1241.
Both vertical stabilizers are structurally complete. The right rudder
is complete and installed on the vertical stabilizer and the left will
be completed and installed this week. FADS plumbing on the forward
ballast bulkhead are complete, less insulation.
The GPS antennas have passed qualification.
1999 November 4
NASA Marshall Space Flight Center issued a Media Advisory reporting
that: "Damage was discovered Wednesday [November 3] evening to one
wall of the X-33's composite liquid hydrogen tank currently undergoing
cryogenic and structural loads testing at NASA Marshall Space Flight
Center in Huntsville, Ala. The damage was discovered at "approximately
6:45 p.m. CST while viewing the tank over video monitors,
approximately two hours after the completion of a test cycle which
appeared to be nominal." This was the fifth test being conducted on
the tank. No one was hurt during the tank failure.
According to one report, the outer skin and honeycomb center
apparently pulled away from the inner lining. Gene Austin, NASA's X-33
Program Manager, and his Lockheed Martin Skunk Works counterpart,
Cleon Lacefield, went to Marshall late today (4 November) to survey
the problem.
Lockheed may move to use an aluminum lithium tank design for the X-33.
The schedule impacts will be addressed in the upcoming weeks. Already,
even before this current damage occurred, program members were
considering delaying the first X-33 flight, which is scheduled for
July 2000. Dealing with the damaged composite tank may push the date
of first flight into 2001.
1999 November 17
In reporting on the damaged X-33 liquid hydrogen tank, Aerospace Daily
speculated today that: "Now that the cause of the tank failure won't
be fully understood until late this year, and repairs or rework to
follow that before qualification testing can resume, it appears less
likely than ever that the X-33 will be able to fly next year." NASA,
however, states that the exact impact on the X-33 program schedule
remains undetermined. [A joint Lockheed Martin Missiles and Space and
Lockheed Skunk Works team has prepared a preliminary evaluation of the
option to replace the composite hydrogen tanks with aluminum tanks.
The schedule for this effort is 18 months, including testing.]
1999 December 8
Progress on X-33 vehicle construction continues. Testing with the
power on is continuing with software installed in both the vehicle and
the portable operation control center. Current efforts are focused on
bringing up the vehicle health monitoring computers. When these are
operational, the basic foundation of avionics will be in place and
will be ready for all other system checkouts to be run.
In addition, the righthand main landing gear wheel well structure and
the associated aft righthand lower thermal protection system
substructure have been mated in the main assembly tool. This is the
first time that structure subassembled in three different tools came
together with very minor problems. The Skunk Works also has installed
three lower skins permanently on the righthand canted fin. When all
skins (with the exception of the actuator bays) are installed, the
Skunk Works will install the metallic thermal protection system panels
on the lower (or windward) side of the canted fin. Installation of the
righthand skin should be completed this week.
1999 December 15
At the request of the Lockheed Martin Board of Directors, the Skunk
Works formed a combined technical Red Team to review both X-33 and
VentureStar in late January 2000. Dr. Bill Ballhaus has agreed to lead
the team. The team will be comprised of chief engineers from the
government, Lockheed Martin, and venture contractors. The team will
examine the technical viability and various issues involved with the
X-33 Recovery Plan and will provide a SSTO credibility check for the
VentureStar design.
As for the Recovery Plan itself, Skunk Works X-33 officials met with
their NASA counterparts last week. NASA agreed to give the Skunk Works
written authorization to continue on with the design of the metallic
(aluminum-lithium alloy) tanks this week. They also agreed to increase
the program obligated funding level by $32M.
In addition, a three-man Skunk Works team went to Huntsville to assist
NASA in extracting the hydrogen tank from the test fixture, which was
successfully completed on Saturday, December 11. The investigation
team has indicated that they may want some additional support to
remove all or a portion of the failed lobe for analysis.
The Skunk Works removed two actuator controllers from valve assemblies
supplied by Lockheed Martin Missiles and Space division. These in turn
were shipped to Stennis to allow aerospike engine testing to continue.
The controllers have proved unreliable, and Rocketdyne has had
failures of the units allocated to them plus their spares. The
controllers were supplied by Allied Signal, which is working with
their supplier to remedy the situation.
1999 December 18
Engineers at NASA's Stennis Space Center ran the Rocketdyne XRS-2000
X-33 to full power for the first time today, Saturday, hitting 100%
thrust in an 18-second-long hot-fire test at Stennis' A-1 test
facility. Engine performance was deemed "satisfactory" throughout the
test, based on preliminary data. Minor pinhole-sized erosion
discovered on the interior wall of one of the engine's 20 thrust cells
was considered within bounds for development testing and was not
believed to be a block to additional hot-fire tests. The thrust cells
direct the engine's exhaust onto actively cooled "ramps" that allow
the plume to expand to the optimum angle for its altitude during
ascent. X-33 engine testing will resume early next year.
2000 January 7
Aerospace Daily reported today that the X-33 tank failure
investigation team probably would not release its findings until the
middle of February. Meanwhile, engineers at Lockheed Martin's Michoud
facility (New Orleans) have started preliminary design work on
aluminum-lithium replacement tanks, which would be ready in about a
year and a half. However, the article pointed out, the metallic tanks
would not demonstrate one of the critical technologies for a
commercial RLV, namely the composite fuel tanks. Aerospace Daily also
reported that the metallic tanks were just one option under
consideration, but did not disclose what those other options might be.
The tanks are also critical to the assembly of the X-33 vehicle, as
the two liquid hydrogen tanks support the vehicle's metallic thermal
protection system panels over a large part of its structure, so that
vehicle assembly cannot be completed until the tanks are fixed.
2000 January 7
According to Space.com today, Lockheed Martin agreed to invest an
additional $100 million into the X-33 project over the next two years
to repair or replace the failed fuel tank, provided that NASA does not
terminate the program.
2000 January 20
During the past week, the Skunk Works reached a key milestone when
communications were established between the vehicle control computers,
the vehicle health monitoring computers, and the power distribution
systems. Also, Oceaneering Thermal Systems (OTS) continued to install
tiles at a rapid pace. Complete installation includes tile bonding,
bond verification, and gap filler fabrication. The body flaps are at
70% tile bond complete, the right elevons tiles are 90% bonded, and
the left elevons are 75% bonded. Bond verification is also proceeding
well. Gap fillers are being fabricated in parallel with tile bonding.
Currently all assemblies are working to scheduled delivery of February
and March for right and left, respectively.
Lockheed Martin Missiles and Space received official approval to begin
design and fabrication of the replacement hydrogen tanks with
aluminum. Both Lockheed Martin Missiles and Space and the Skunk Works
are gearing up to execute the redesign. FAMSCO is scheduled for the
middle to latter part of February after some preliminary design. Also,
the Skunk Works anticipates an additional 10,000 to 13,000 man-hours
of fabrication effort to replace thermal protection system
substructure elements because of differing coefficients of thermal
expansion between the composite and aluminum tanks.
2000 January 21
NASA's Stennis Space Center today at 11:09 p.m. EST completed a
60-second test of the Rocketdyne X-33 linear aerospike engine. The
test demonstrated the vectored thrust capability of the engine for the
first time. This vectoring capability (analogous to the gimbaling of a
bell rocket engine) will help to steer the vehicle during ascent. The
test also compared different hydrogen and oxygen mixture ratios (5.5,
5.3 and 4.7) at different thrust levels (60%, 80%, and 100% power).
The test lasted three times longer than previous hot firings. During
the test, technicians also varied the thrust across the actively
cooled aerospike "ramp" by 5%.
2000 February 3
The X-33 aerospike engine completed a successful 125-second test this
evening. The test included throttling and calibration at various power
levels to update the engine performance model. Today's test was the
longest test run to date at 100 percent power, exceeding the previous
test by 30 seconds. The successful test also marked the first
demonstration of plus or minus 15 percent thrust vector control.
2000 March 22
Today, a complete and successful 220-second test of the X-33 aerospike
engine took place at NASA's Stennis Space Center. The test validated a
new mixture ratio control algorithm and incorporated several reactive
control logic updates. The next engine test is scheduled for April 3,
2000, and will last a full 250 seconds, longer than the engine is
expected to burn on any given flight of the experimental vehicle. For
the actual flight from Edwards AFB to Michael Army Airfield, engine
runs from 230 to 240 seconds will be required.
2000 March 28-29
The liquid hydrogen metallic tank Preliminary Design Review (PDR) took
place at Lockheed Martin Space's Michoud plant near New Orleans.
2000 June 2
The Skunk Works started fabrication of the first pieces of the new
aluminum lithium liquid hydrogen tanks.
2000 August 10
The X-33 liquid hydrogen tank failure report was released today.
According to the failure report, the cause of the debonding was
microcracks in the composite inner and outer skins. The cracks allowed
pressurized hydrogen to seep into the core from inside the tank and
caused the nitrogen gas maintained outside the tank as a safety
measure to be "cryopumped" in through the outer skin as the liquid
hydrogen chilled it. That produced pressure that was higher than
expected in the composite core, which in turn caused the separation.
Aiding the separation was a piece of scrap polytetrafluoroethylene
tape in the composite structure and a known weakness in the strength
of the adhesive used in laying up the structure caused by the amount
of time it took to apply the adhesive to the large tank pieces.
However, the manufacturing flaws in the tank were secondary to the
flawed design itself in causing the failure.
2000 September 13
A NASA Marshall press release announced today that preparations were
under way at NASA's John C. Stennis Space Center near Bay St. Louis,
Miss., for the final phase of testing to qualify the X-33 linear
aerospike engine. The test stand is undergoing modifications to
accommodate two engines for simultaneous firings in their flight
configuration. The engine tests are scheduled to begin late this year.
Following successful completion of this series of engine tests, the
engines will be shipped to Palmdale, Calif., where they will be
installed on the X-33 vehicle. Approximately nine engine tests are
planned. These tests will verify the seal between the two engines;
dual-engine start, stop, and operational parameters; and the ability
of the engines to control the X-33's direction of flight by varying
the thrust from side to side and engine to engine. The tests also will
verify the ability of one engine's turbo-machinery to power both
engines should a set of turbo-machinery fail during flight.
September 29, 2000
A NASA press release announced today that the space agency and
Lockheed Martin had agreed on a plan to go forward with the X-33
program. The plan included aluminum fuel tanks for the vehicle's
hydrogen fuel, a revised payment schedule, and a target launch date in
2003 on the firm's ability to win additional funding under NASA's
Space Launch Initiative.
The program restructuring provides milestone payments to Lockheed
Martin's industry team to complete testing and delivery of the
hardware and software systems this year. The plan places greater
emphasis on mission safety and more ground demonstration of critical
technology prior to actual flight. The program requires no additional
funding from NASA through March 2001, but will need additional funding
for completion.
Work on the X-33 vehicle has continued at the Palmdale, CA, assembly
facility during the tank investigation and subsequent negotiations
between NASA and Lockheed Martin. According to the press release,
vehicle assembly is currently 75 percent complete, and more than 95
percent of the vehicle's components have been fabricated, tested, and
delivered to Palmdale. All of the X-33's hardware except the new
hydrogen tanks is expected to be completed by the end of 2000. NASA
and Lockheed Martin are proceeding with design of aluminum
liquid-hydrogen tanks for the X-33, replacing the experimental
composite tanks originally planned.
2000 December 13
NASA and its business partners presented a positive and optimistic
report on the X-33 at a press conference broadcast over NASA TV. Cleon
Lacefield, Lockheed Martin Vice President for X-33, emphasized the
importance of the aerospike tests that began earlier this month and
pointed out the program's major achievements to date, namely,
successful testing of how the lifting body will react with the
aerospike engine, successful testing of the liquid oxygen fuel tanks
and the thermal protection system, and successful testing of the
avionics and vehicle software. Gene Austin, NASA X-33 Program Manager,
added that certification of the vehicle's lifting body design through
the entire flight regime in wind tunnels was another key program
achievement.
Don Chenevert, NASA X-33 Program Manager for Aerospike Engine Testing,
Stennis Space Center, reviewed the successes of aerospike engine
testing to date, then explained briefly the kinds of tests that
already began earlier this month. The main test objective now is to
evaluate how the dual engines operate. Mike McKeon, X-33 Aerospike
Engine Program Manager for Boeing's Rocketdyne Propulsion and Power
division, Canoga Park, CA, outlined the planned program of 11 tests
and explained how the firing of the two engines will be used to assist
the X-33 in various flight modes, including banking. The longest
planned test will last 212 seconds. Toward the end of 2001, the
engines would be shipped to Palmdale, CA, for fitting into the X-33
vehicle.
In response to reporters' questions, Gene Austin explained that the
90-day extension to the original cooperative agreement will expire on
March 31. Lockheed, however, has submitted a proposal to continue the
program starting April 1, 2001, and the firm, according to Austin, has
a "good chance of success in extending the program." He also announced
that the aluminum liquid hydrogen tanks had completed their Critical
Design Review (CDR) and that their construction has begun, with some
of the tank panels already completed.
When asked about the status of the VentureStar full-scale operational
vehicle, Cleon Lacefield replied that it remained a "top effort" and
that the firm's Space Launch Initiative proposal has the VentureStar
architecture. However, he added, the VentureStar was not the only
architecture proposed by Lockheed for the Space Launch Initiative.
Lacefield further explained that the aluminum tanks were "exactly what
we want for VentureStar." They would give the vehicle the same weight
per cubic-foot of volume as the composite tanks, because the liquid
oxygen tanks are "really state of the art." Moreover, the aluminum
tanks would give the VentureStar architecture an acceptable design
margin to build the vehicle. Lacefield stated that VentureStar risk
reduction efforts would take place during the period prior to 2005,
and that the first VentureStar flight would take place sometime in
2010 to 2012.
Toward the end of the press conference, Gene Austin characterized the
X-33 project as the "most significant program in a long time" and the
"best assignment of my career." He then announced his retirement from
the program and from NASA effective January 3, 2001, and his return to
Alabama during the summer of 2001.
2001 March 1
NASA announced today in a press release the selection of a number of
companies to enter into competitive negotiations for the Space Launch
Initiative (SLI). In doing so, the agency also announced that the X-33
Program would not receive Space Launch Initiative funds. The X-33
Program consequently will conclude upon completion of the cooperative
agreement between NASA and Lockheed Martin on March 31, 2001. Lockheed
Martin may chose to continue underwriting development of the X-33 with
its own funds.
NASA investment in the X-33 program totaled $912 million, staying
within its 1996 budget projection for the program. Lockheed Martin
originally committed to invest $212 million, and during the life of
the program increased that amount to $357 million.