1999CRH1179A PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO RESOLUTION, Part 1/11
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[Congressional Record: March 11, 1999 (House)]
[Page H1179-H1250]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:cr11mr99-107]
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO RESOLUTION
Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules,
I call up House Resolution 103 and ask for its immediate consideration.
The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:
H. Res. 103
Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this
resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 2(b) of rule
XVIII, declare the
[[Page H1180]]
House resolved into the Committee of the Whole House on the
state of the Union for consideration of the concurrent
resolution (H. Con. Res. 42) regarding the use of United
States Armed Forces as part of a NATO peacekeeping operation
implementing a Kosovo peace agreement. The first reading of
the concurrent resolution shall be dispensed with. General
debate shall be confined to the concurrent resolution and
shall not exceed two hours equally divided and controlled by
the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on
International Relations. After general debate the concurrent
resolution shall be considered for amendment under the five-
minute rule. The concurrent resolution shall be considered as
read. No amendment to the concurrent resolution shall be in
order except those printed in the portion of the
Congressional Record designated for that purpose in clause 8
of rule XVIII and except pro forma amendments for the purpose
of debate. Each amendment so printed may be offered only by
the Member who caused it to be printed or his designee and
shall be considered as read. The chairman of the Committee of
the Whole may: (1) postpone until a time during further
consideration in the Committee of the Whole a request for a
recorded vote on any amendment; and (2) reduce to five
minutes the minimum time for electronic voting on any
postponed question that follows another electronic vote
without intervening business, provided that the minimum time
for electronic voting on the first in any series of questions
shall be 15 minutes. At the conclusion of consideration of
the concurrent resolution for amendment the Committee shall
rise and report the concurrent resolution to the House with
such amendments as may have been adopted. The previous
question shall be considered as ordered on the concurrent
resolution to final adoption without intervening motion
except one motion to recommit with or without instructions.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Burr of North Carolina). The gentleman
from Florida (Mr. Diaz-Balart) is recognized for 1 hour.
Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I yield
the customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Hall). During
consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is for the purpose
of debate only.
Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the distinguished
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
Mr. HASTERT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Florida for
yielding me this time. I rise in support of this rule. I would like to
address the House for a few moments on the issue we are preparing to
consider, the possible deployment of U.S. troops to Kosovo.
The President has made it clear that he is committed to sending
approximately 4,000 U.S. troops to Kosovo as part of a NATO force
intended to keep the peace. I am convinced that the President firmly
believes the presence of U.S. troops in Kosovo is essential to
maintaining peace in this troubled area. Like every American, I hope
the Serbs and the Kosovars are able to achieve a peaceful resolution to
their dispute. We all pray for that outcome. Kosovo is a great human
tragedy, fanned by injustice and unexplained hatred.
As a Member of this great body and now as your Speaker, I have never
wavered in my belief and trust in this institution. Some have argued
that we should not have this debate today, that we should just leave it
to the President. Some have even suggested that taking part and talking
about this could damage the peace process. I disagree. No one should
fear the free expression of ideas, the frank exchange of opinions in a
representative democracy. Two weeks ago, the German Bundestag held an
extensive debate and voted on whether or not Germany should deploy over
5,000 German troops in Kosovo. The British Parliament has also
discussed the deployment of British troops in Kosovo. I do not believe
that any harm has been done to the peace process by the workings of
these two great democracies. In fact, one message which should come
from this debate and those held in the parliaments of our allies is
that a free people can disagree without violence and bloodshed.
On this important subject, I have tried to be direct and honest. I
have spoken with the President and with his Secretary of State. I told
them that I believed it was my duty as Speaker to ensure that Members
of the House of Representatives, Republicans and Democrats, have the
opportunity to fairly and openly debate the important issue before
troops are sent into a potentially dangerous situation. I believe
Congress must have a meaningful role in this decision, no matter how
difficult our choice nor how hard our task.
I have been equally honest in telling the President that I personally
have reservations regarding the wisdom of deploying the additional U.S.
troops to the former Yugoslavia, but I have not made up my mind and I
will listen intently and closely to this debate. I hope that each of
you will do the same, because it is our heavy responsibility and high
honor to represent the men and women who are being asked by the
President to go into harm's way. Each of us must be prepared to answer
to their families and loved ones. I am deeply convinced that we owe
them today's debate, for under our Constitution we share this burden
with our President.
Our debate today will enable each of us to carry out our
responsibilities in a fair and thoughtful way. The gentleman from New
York (Mr. Gilman), at my request, has offered without prejudice this
resolution stating the President's position, that troops be deployed. I
urge the adoption of this open rule that allows every Member of this
House to have a say and to amend this resolution. We have set in place
a fair and open process. We are here to discuss sensitive issues of
policy and not personality. And let me repeat, we are here today to
discuss policy and not personality. I know it does not need to be said,
but I urge all Members to treat this issue with the seriousness that it
deserves. We have a solemn duty to perform. And let us do it with the
dignity that brings credit to this great House.
Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 103 is a modified open rule providing
for the consideration, as the Speaker of the House has just explained,
of House Concurrent Resolution 42, the Peacekeeping Operations in
Kosovo Resolution.
The purpose of the resolution is to authorize the President to deploy
United States armed forces to Kosovo and just as importantly it makes
possible congressional discussion of this very complex situation.
The rule provides for 2 hours of general debate equally divided
between the chairman and the ranking minority member of the Committee
on International Relations. It is the intention of the rule that the
managers of general debate yield time fairly to Republican and
Democratic proponents and opponents of the concurrent resolution.
Further, the bill provides that the concurrent resolution shall be
considered as read and makes in order only those amendments preprinted
in the Congressional Record, to be offered only by the Member who
caused the amendment to be printed, or his designee, and each amendment
shall be considered as read.
In addition, the rule allows the Chairman of the Committee of the
Whole to postpone votes during consideration of the bill and to reduce
voting time to 5 minutes on votes following a 15-minute vote. Finally,
the rule provides one motion to recommit, with or without instructions.
Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 103 is a fair framework to provide a
forum to debate the issues surrounding the possible deployment of U.S.
troops for participation in a NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo. Any
Member can offer any germane amendment to this resolution providing the
amendment was preprinted in the Congressional Record prior to its
consideration. The gentleman from California (Mr. Dreier) made this
announcement on Monday, March 8, on the House floor, as well as through
a Dear Colleague letter to Members.
It has been well known, including in fact through constant press
reports, that the House would be debating this difficult issue this
week. In spite of the snowstorm we had on Tuesday, Members have known
for weeks that we would be taking up this issue prior to the March 15
peace talks in France, the deadline. Were it not for this fair rule,
if, for example, we had brought H.Con.Res. 42 to the floor under
suspension of the rules, it would be nonamendable and would be allowed
only 40 minutes of debate. Therefore, I think it is very important that
Members support this rule, regardless of their position on deployment
or nondeployment of troops, because Congress has every
[[Page H1181]]
right to be debating this resolution today and this rule provides a
fair way to do so.
Some Members as well as other foreign policy experts have questioned
the timing of this debate while peace negotiations have not been
concluded. But if Congress is to deliberate these serious issues prior
to the possible deployment of U.S. troops, now is the time. March 15,
the proposed deadline for a peace agreement for Kosovo, is this Monday,
and U.S. troops could be on their way to Kosovo Monday night if
agreement is reached.
As the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) stated at the Committee on
Rules during our markup, there is no perfect time for this. At least
two of the Members of the six-nation contact group on Kosovo, Germany
and Great Britain, as the Speaker of the House just made reference,
have debated in their parliaments this precise issue this past month.
Now is indeed an appropriate time for the United States House of
Representatives as the sovereign representative body of the American
people to take up the issue of possible deployment of our troops to
join a NATO force.
The situation in Kosovo is indeed precarious. It has now been over a
year since fighting broke out between the Albanian rebels and the
Serbian forces in Kosovo and in spite of an October 1998 cease-fire
agreement, hostilities have continued.
{time} 1145
March 15 is the current deadline for negotiations to be completed on
a peace agreement. What is at issue is the expansion of the U.S. role
in Kosovo and whether U.S. troops should be deployed to participate in
a NATO peace mission should a peace agreement be reached.
Historically it is well known that the Balkans have been a tinder box
for regional wars, and we must not forget that World War I began in
that part of the world.
In 1995, as a member of the Committee on Rules, I brought to the
floor the Bosnia-Herzegovina Self-defense Act to end the arms embargo
on Bosnia. That embargo was morally wrong, and I believe that it was
legally questionable as well from the very beginning. While not
contiguous with Bosnia, where U.S. troops are currently deployed, the
dangers of a spill-over effect and renewed violence in the region have
been realized in the Serbian province of Kosovo. I am extremely
concerned by the genocidal attacks on civilians in Kosovo. As a British
statesman said while debating the situation in the Balkans:
No language can describe adequately the condition of that large
portion of the Balkan peninsula, Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina and the
other provinces, political intrigues, constant rivalries, a total
absence of public spirit, hatred of all races, animosities of rival
religions and an absence of any controlling power, nothing short of an
army of 50,000 of the best troops would produce anything like order in
these parts.
That statement was made by Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli in
October 1878. Unfortunately his words still ring true today.
In summary, the Congress, Mr. Speaker, has every right to debate
whether we should put U.S. troops in harm's way before they are sent.
That is the reason for today's debate.
I urge my colleagues to support this fair rule so that the House will
have the opportunity to debate this very critical issue regarding the
possible deployment of our troops to Kosovo. I would urge my colleagues
to support the rule.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Diaz-
Balart) for yielding me the time. This is a modified open rule. It will
allow for consideration of House Concurrent Resolution 42 which, as my
colleagues have heard, is a resolution authorizing the President to
deploy United States troops to Kosovo. As my colleague has described,
this rule provides for 1 hour of general debate to be equally divided
and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the
Committee on International Relations. The rule permits amendments under
the 5-minute rule, which is the normal amending process in the House.
Under this rule, only amendments which have been preprinted in the
Congressional Record will be in order.
The Committee on Rules has crafted a rule which at another time would
be acceptable. However I believe that the Kosovo resolution should not
be brought up at this time. Therefore I will oppose the previous
question so that the rule can be amended.
For most Americans Kosovo and Serbia are only distant points on the
globe, but that is not so for the community of Dayton, Ohio, the
community which I represent, because it was my community of Dayton that
hosted the peace talks in 1995 that led to the fragile peace that we
are trying to preserve. Today there is continued unrest between the
Serbians and the Albanians in Kosovo. The conflict has already left
more than a thousand civilians dead and as many as 400,000 homeless. If
left unchecked, the turmoil could lead to a broader war in Europe.
However there is hope. Sensitive peace talks are taking place in the
region. Through the efforts of Bob Dole the Albanians appear to be
ready to sign a peace agreement. The United States and its allies
continue to press the parties to restore peace to the region.
My concern with this resolution is not whether Congress has the right
to authorize the commitment of U.S. troops; we have that right. My
concern with this resolution is whether it is in our national interest
to take it up today in the middle of the peace talks that appear to be
succeeding.
Yesterday at the hearing of the Committee on Rules the gentleman from
Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson), who is the ranking Democratic member of
the House Committee on International Relations warned against bringing
this resolution to the House floor today. He testified that it
seriously undermines the prospects for reaching peace in the region and
could lead to more warfare.
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright sounded a similar note of
alarm. Yesterday she testified before the Subcommittee on Commerce,
Justice, State, and Judiciary that this vote will be taken as a green
light for the warring parties to continue fighting.
During the Committee on Rules consideration the gentleman from
Massachusetts (Mr. Moakley), the ranking Democratic member, offered an
amendment to the rule postponing consideration of the resolution until
the end of the current peace negotiations, and that amendment was
defeated on a straight party line vote. Mr. Moakley also offered an
amendment to the rule making in order a floor amendment by the
gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson) supporting the peace process
and authorizing the deployment of troops if a fair and just peace
agreement is reached. The amendment was also defeated on a straight
party line vote.
Perhaps when the time comes under the right conditions Congress
should support the deployment of troops to Kosovo, and perhaps when the
time comes Congress should oppose the move. But the time is not today.
We in Dayton, Ohio, know about peace negotiations in Kosovo and
Serbia. We know how sensitive they can be. We also know how important
they can be because for a brief moment the negotiations of the 1995
accord lived in my community. Let us let the administration negotiate a
peace without Congress sending the wrong signal, and we should not
bring up the resolution today.
If the previous question is defeated, I will offer an amendment to
the rule which will permit the Kosovo resolution to come up only after
the two parties have signed the agreement on the status of Kosovo. The
delay is necessary to ensure that the actions of the House do not
interfere with the peace negotiations in Kosovo.
Before concluding I want to express my appreciation to the gentleman
from California (Mr. Dreier) and to the Republicans on the Committee on
Rules for keeping this a relatively unrestricted rule and for
permitting the motion to recommit. I am heartened by the bipartisan
spirit in which gentleman from California (Mr. Dreier) approached this
rule, and I believe this sends a positive signal at the beginning of
this Congress. Our differences are not in the crafting of the rule,
only in the timing.
[[Page H1182]]
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), a member of the Committee on Rules
and chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
(Mr. GOSS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague from Florida for yielding
me this time.
Mr. Speaker, today the House will debate whether to send U.S. troops
to Kosovo, an issue that may seem to have little relevance to the lives
of many Americans in this time of very blue skies in this country which
we are fortunate to enjoy. But appearances aside, the decisions we make
about Kosovo will affect the course of the United States and our allies
in the world over the next several years.
This matters. It is a critically important debate, and I urge Members
to give it their most thoughtful attention.
Some may question whether this is the right time for a congressional
debate, as we have already heard, about sending U.S. troops to Kosovo.
Once an agreement is reached, the Clinton administration has announced
that it will deploy troops forthwith to begin enforcement of the
agreement. So when is the right time to debate the issue? The answer is
before our men and women in uniform are placed in harm's way.
I am concerned that the administration tends to place U.S. troops
into a dangerous situation where they are unwelcomed by both parties
and do not have clear marching orders. Serbian President Milosevic, an
unsavory strong man in my view, refuses to accept the presence of
foreign troops on Serbian soil, and the Kosovar rebels on their part
refuse to give up their ultimate goal of independence from Serbia. Of
even greater concern is the possibility that the NATO mission may have
the unintended consequence of destabilizing the region by encouraging
separatism in neighboring areas, a situation we are already familiar
with.
Mr. Speaker, there is no question that the humanitarian crisis in
Kosovo cries out for international attention and assistance. But the
real question is: How should the United States of America respond? Is
the answer always the commission of U.S. forces no matter what?
Listening to the Clinton administration, we would think that bombing
and deployment of troops is the only solution available to us.
I am also concerned about the implications of the administration's
Kosovo plans on the future of NATO. For several years NATO has been
grappling with its role in the post cold war period. The
administration's headlong rush to support deployment of NATO troops
outside the treaty area risks damage to the delicate consensus that
underlies the alliance.
In April at NATO's 50th anniversary to be celebrated here in
Washington the Alliance will announce its new strategic concept for the
direction and mission of NATO. Will this document explain why NATO must
intervene in Kosovo, an area outside the treaty boundary, but not
intervene in an area, say, in Africa where there is genocide and a
civil war going where human suffering is just as great.
Mr. Speaker, when President Clinton first proposed sending U.S.
troops to Kosovo, he laid out the following criteria: a strong and
effective peace agreement with full participation by both parties, a
permissive security environment, including the disarmament of the
Kosovar power militaries and a well-defined NATO mission with a clear
exit strategy. These criteria are a good starting point for the
congressional consideration.
Later today I or others may offer amendments to this resolution to
ensure that these criteria and other equally important ones are met
before U.S. troops are sent to Kosovo.
Before I vote to support sending our men and women in uniform to
Kosovo, people in my district want to know the exit strategy as well as
the entry strategy. They want to know how this fits into our national
interest, and they want to know the costs. These are basic questions
that we in Congress should raise so that the American people are fully
informed. Getting answers from the administration is part of our job
description, especially when the use of our men and women in uniform is
involved.
This rule provides for full debate. I urge its support.
Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman
from Michigan (Mr. Bonior).
Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Hall)
for yielding me the time, and again I rise to say that the timing of
this resolution could not be worse, not the fact that we are debating
it. I think the fact that they have allowed a debate and under a
generally open rule is a positive sign, as my friend from Ohio has
stated. But having this debate and having this vote in the midst of
negotiations makes little sense and, in fact, undermines those
negotiations.
Mr. Speaker, I think it is important for us to review where we have
been in the Balkans. In Bosnia tens of thousands of people lost their
lives, thousands of women were raped, hundreds of thousands of people
displaced from their home before we had the courage to finally say no,
and within the past year in Kosovo we have had 2000 people killed, we
have had 400,000 people displaced in Slobodan Milosevic's genocidal
campaign of violence and human rights abuses against the 2 million
ethnic Albanians.
Mr. Speaker, this is not the time to have this resolution on the
floor of the House. On the 15th of January, at Racak, Serbian special
police shot at least 15 ethnic Albanians including elderly people and
children. Human Rights Watch has evidence suggesting that the Serbians
had, and I quote, ``direct orders to kill village inhabitants over the
age of 15.'' In Rogovo, just 2 weeks later Serbian police raided a
farming village and executed 25 people.
This has gone on for a year, it has gone on for more than a year, but
within the last year we have seen these numbers rise to 2,000 people.
Why would Milosevic do anything but stall, not agree to a peace
agreement, if the United States Congress says in a vote later today, if
this rule passes, that we, in fact, will not deploy troops? We will be
giving him a green light, and we will be seeing more Racaks, we will be
seeing more slaughters as we saw in Rogovo, and we will be in an
unvirtuous circle of islands in which we undoubtedly will have to
revisit again on this House floor.
Just today, while Richard Holbrooke was talking with Milosevic
yesterday, violence continued, and there is a picture in the New York
Times showing the deaths of people in the village of Ivaja in Kosovo.
{time} 1200
This slaughter must stop, and the way to stop it is to stop this
resolution from coming to the floor of the House, and we can do that by
voting against the rule. Arthur Vandenberg once said that politics
should stop at the water's edge when it comes to foreign policy. Bob
Dole asked us not to do this yesterday. Let us not do this. Let us stop
here. Vote no on this rule. Then we can have a good debate on this
issue when the issue comes before us when an agreement occurs in this
troubled land.
Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Linder).
Mr. LINDER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Florida (Mr.
Diaz-Balart) for yielding.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H. Res. 103, the rule providing for
consideration of the resolution regarding peacekeeping operations in
Kosovo. This rule ensures a free and open debate and provides Members
the opportunity to have their voices heard on this very important
matter involving the lives of our troops.
The modified open rule passed the House Committee on Rules and it did
not provide any preferential waivers. It allows for all germane
amendments and complies with the request of the gentleman from
Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson), who requested that all amendments be
preprinted in the Congressional Record.
The passage of this rule will, I admit, lead to a wide open
discussion on a very public issue, with the prospect of counter
argument and earnest debate. I welcome that debate and I expect it to
be an extraordinary exchange of ideas and opinions.
I will be honest in stating that I have grave reservations about the
deployment of American troops in Kosovo,
[[Page H1183]]
but I also do not see anything wrong with giving Members the
opportunity to listen closely to the arguments on each side of the
debate.
Our allies, Great Britain and Germany, have deliberated and engaged
in this debate already, and that leads us to the question underlying
the rule we are discussing today: Should the United States House of
Representatives have the opportunity to participate in the decision to
deploy our troops in Kosovo and debate it today?
My personal view is that it would be better if we did not. I would
prefer that this resolution inform the President that we are unwilling
to fund his adventurism without clear rules of engagement, exit
strategies, specific goals and a budget. We have a constitutional
responsibility to participate in decisions putting our troops in harm's
way. I do believe that would better be the question before us.
Having said that, I urge Members to support the fair rule that will
initiate a full and open debate regarding the deployment of young
Americans' lives in a dangerous foreign land.
Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman
from Missouri (Mr. Skelton), who is the ranking member of the Committee
on Armed Services.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Hall)
for yielding to me.
Mr. Speaker, I speak against the rule. I will vote against the rule.
I am deeply concerned that taking this matter up now in the midst of
negotiations between the opposing parties, the Kosovars and Milosevic's
people, will cause great harm and great damage to the negotiating
process.
Should what we do today cause there to be no agreement, we would have
lost, Europe would have lost and there will be continued bloodshed and
anguish in Kosovo. I think it is wrong to take this up now. It is
untimely. It is improper to do so.
Secondly, as it was mentioned by my friend, the gentleman from Ohio
(Mr. Hall), I am the ranking member on the Committee on Armed Services.
This deals with the military of the United States of America.
We in our committee should have had the opportunity to have had a
hearing to find out what troops, under what conditions and if there is
a possibility of saving some other deployments because we are short on
troops today. These are questions that we in our committee should have
had the opportunity to ask, a full and fair hearing in the Committee on
Armed Services, which we did not have.
Thirdly, I would like to mention that I also have an amendment,
should this rule carry, which I hope in all sincerity it does not. I
will have an amendment that requires that there be an agreement between
the parties before any American troops are allowed to go into Kosovo.
That is the bottom line. Right now, bringing up this resolution is
improper and uncalled for because it could very well change the
agreement, cause there not to be an agreement and cause confusion in
that part of the Balkans.
I wish that everyone could have been with me to witness the four-
starred German general who is the second in command at NATO a few weeks
ago when I asked him why is it important that America be involved in
Europe and in NATO?
His answer was a full and complete one, which said it is important
that America be there. I think that if America should be there, we
should have the opportunity to do it the right way, the right time and
under the right resolution and the right vote.
Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Coble).
(Mr. COBLE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. COBLE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Diaz-
Balart) for yielding.
Mr. Speaker, I usually vote consistently in favor of rules, and I may
vote for this rule, but I am opposed to our dispatching troops to
Kosovo, not unlike my friend, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton)
who just spoke.
I recall Bosnia. The President told us our troops would be back home,
I believe, by December 1996. Well, when I last checked, December 1996
has come and long gone and our troops are still there. I was uneasy
about it because I could not grasp the importance of our national
security vis-a-vis Bosnia. Now Kosovo is on the screen and, unlike
Bosnia, as best I remember it, I do not think we have even been invited
to come to Kosovo.
Given these two situations, I don't mean to portray myself as an
isolationist but to suggest that Bosnia and Kosovo are European
problems that should be resolved by Europeans hardly constitutes
isolationism. It is isolationism light at its best, if that.
I just believe that we do not need to insert our oars into those
waters, and I don't mean to come across as uncaring or indifferent to
the problems plaguing Europe, but doggone it, it is indeed a European
problem.
Let our European friends handle it unless it becomes a situation that
causes United States national security to be exposed.
Now, absent that, Mr. Speaker, and my colleagues on both sides, I
think we need to go about our business here. Let our friends across the
water, as my late grandma used to say, let them resolve those problems.
Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman
from Texas (Mr. Ortiz)
Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Speaker, I rise today as a member of the House
Committee on Armed Services to oppose the rule allowing the House to
consider House Resolution 42 regarding Kosovo.
I want to say this in the strongest possible terms, considering this
vote today is so ill-timed as to adversely affect the peace
negotiations ongoing in the Balkans. It has taken us so long to build
the coalition that we have been able to build in that part of the
world, and we understand this. This Congress says they have the
obligation to ensure that the diplomats in the region exhaust all
possible means in their negotiations.
Like the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton), I wish that we had
been able to debate this issue in the committee before it came to the
House floor to see what the needs are, how many troops, the equipment.
So I think that it has all been done in good faith but it is ill-timed.
We also have a unique responsibility in this situation, as we do in
most global spots. We are the world's only remaining superpower. We
have more and better military might than any other country in the
world. If we are indeed the only remaining superpower, then that status
brings certain obligations and responsibilities. This is why I say, let
us discuss it further.
I just got back from Bosnia 4 days ago. The morale of our troops is
high and, not only that, they believe in the mission that they are
conducting in that part of the world. They said for the first time we
have seen young children play in the parks, play in the streets, go to
school. So please help us defeat this rule.
Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from California (Mr. Cunningham).
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, this is exactly the time to have this
discussion, exactly the time. It may not be the time for negotiators
and bean counters but it is for our troops.
I remember Somalia, where the President did not come to Congress when
he changed going after Aideed, and we lost 22 rangers because they
failed to give armor which the military wanted; or Haiti, that we are
today spending $25 million a year in building schools and roads out of
the defense budget.
Kosovo is like any of the United States is to Greater Serbia. It is
not a separate entity. It is the birthplace of the Orthodox Catholic
religion. It is their home. It was occupied by 100 percent Serbs, and
the Turks and the Nazis eliminated and desecrated and ethnically
cleansed Jews, Gypsies and Serbs and now the population is Albanian.
Albania does not want just Kosovo. They want part of Greece. They
want Montenegro. This is only a beginning.
Listen to George Tenet's brief. Bin Laden is working with the KLA,
the terrorists, that is going to hit the United States. If we do not
want to stop this, then do not talk about it, but if we go in there, we
are going to lose a great number of people. For what? They have been
fighting for 400 years.
[[Page H1184]]
This debate is well timed. Maybe not for my colleagues on the other
side but for the kids that have to put those backpacks on and carry
rifles. It is the time to stop this.
Take a look at the number of military deployments. It was 300 percent
during the height of Vietnam. We are killing our military as it is, and
we have one-half the force to do it. That is why they are bailing out.
This is exactly the time, Mr. Speaker, and I reject the other side.
Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
North Dakota (Mr. Pomeroy).
Mr. POMEROY. Mr. Speaker, I strongly object to this rule which will
provide for the House to debate the U.S. involvement in the Kosovo
peace agreement. The reason I object to consideration of this issue at
this time is that as of today, there is no peace agreement and the
process leading to the arriving at a peace agreement is at a terribly
tenuous, sensitive and delicate stage.
{time} 1215
We have all read with horror about the atrocities committed in
Kosovo. Innocent civilians, including little children, have been
savagely and brutally murdered. For the sake of humanity and decency,
we all want this butchery to end. It will require a peace agreement to
end this killing. Our taking up the resolution now while the
deliberations are still underway can only make it more difficult to
resolve this.
Yesterday, former Majority Leader Bob Dole gave advice to the
Committee on International Relations. He says, ``We have 2 steps here.
First, we get an agreement, then the President goes to the American
people to explain it.''
Mr. Speaker, I think we must follow Majority Leader Dole's advice.
Defeat this rule and let the deliberations leading to peace be
concluded.
Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from Colorado (Mr. McInnis).
Mr. McINNIS. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman from Florida
yielding me this time.
The preceding speaker talked about the tragedies that are going on.
Mr. Speaker, those kinds of tragedies are going on throughout the
entire world. This country cannot be the world's police officer. We do
have international commitments, but before we exercise these
commitments, we need to look at the precedents, what we have done in
regards to these kinds of situations.
Number one, we have never gone into the sovereign territory of
another country like this without being invited to settle a dispute
within their boundaries. This is a very similar situation. If the State
of Colorado that I am from got in a dispute with the State of Texas,
would we invite the Turks or the Greeks or NATO to come in and resolve
the dispute between Colorado and Texas?
There are atrocities occurring in Kosovo. It is a proper mission for
humanitarian efforts. It is not a proper mission to intervene with
American military troops that will be there on an indefinite basis. Do
not kid ourselves. It is an indefinite basis.
Look at Cyprus, the United Nations. I just came from Cyprus. United
Nations troops have never been able to make the peace there. They have
been able to keep the peace because of the fact they have troops there.
They have been there for 27 years. It is the same thing here. We are
attempting as outsiders to intervene within the boundaries of a
sovereign country to resolve a dispute that is based in large part on
religion, in large part on nationality; a dispute of which we have very
little historical knowledge; we certainly have very little historical
experience, and we think by force and sending in troops we are going to
make peace. We are not.
We are going to be able to keep the peace. As long as we have troops
in Kosovo, we can keep peace. But we cannot, we do not have the
capability to take hundreds of years of battle and hundreds of years of
rock-solid feelings and force them into a peace agreement.
Finally, Mr. Speaker, let me wrap up by saying that some would
suggest that this is not an appropriate time for delay. This is an
appropriate time for delay before the troops go in. Do not debate after
the troops are in; do it before the troops are in.
Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman
from New York, (Mr. Engel).
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend from Ohio for yielding me
this time.
Mr. Speaker, I have spent as much time as anyone over these past 10
or 11 years dealing with the problem in Kosovo. I want to tell my
colleagues as far as I am concerned this is a wrong rule and the wrong
resolution at the wrong time, and it should be defeated. I have hardly
seen anything more irresponsible, quite frankly, in my 10 plus years
here than this resolution and this rule.
As far as I am concerned, this is an attempt to embarrass the
President, this is mischief-making at its worst, and it undermines
American foreign policy, it undermines the negotiations going on. I
returned from Rambouillet 3 weeks ago, and I can tell my colleagues
that if we pass this rule and the resolution offered by the gentleman
from New York (Mr. Gilman) goes down to defeat, as I suspect it will,
this will destroy the negotiations and destroy the peace process, and
we will be responsible for that.
The Speaker of the House, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hastert)
came and said that this was an open process, and I think he was a bit
disingenuous, quite frankly. He says that he wants to meet Democrats
halfway. We have not seen that meeting us halfway on committee ratios,
we have not seen it on funding, and now the Democrats are pleading, the
administration is pleading and saying please postpone this vote until
there is an agreement, and we cannot even get a postponement on the
vote.
Senator Dole was quite eloquent yesterday. He said, quite simply,
first we get an agreement and then we go before Congress to ratify the
agreement. We do not do it the other way around. Senator Dole has also
spent more time than anybody in terms of Kosovo, and he thinks this
will be very damaging. Everybody that has worked in this process thinks
it will be very, very damaging.
There is no reason to do this kind of thing now, except to embarrass
the President politically and undermine U.S. foreign policy. This is
absolutely irresponsible. It will damage the peace process.
Let me remind my colleagues that foreign policy should be bipartisan.
I was one of those Democrats that voted with President Bush and
supported him in the Persian Gulf War when he asked for bipartisanship.
Now that the shoe is on the other foot, we get very little of it from
the other side. All I know is that in Kosovo there is genocide, ethnic
cleansing and killing, and it needs to stop, and if the United States
Congress votes against sending troops to Kosovo, Slobodan Milosevic,
the butcher of Kosovo, will laugh and laugh and laugh, because we will
have given him cover.
The Albanians, who have agreed to the agreement will back off,
because without strong American participation they will not have the
fortitude; they only trust the United States of America. We have seen
time and time again, we saw it in Bosnia, 200,000 people were
ethnically cleansed, and until the United States grabbed the bull by
the horns and showed the leadership in NATO, people were being killed
and genocide was happening again on the face of Europe. And when the
United States grabbed the bull by the horns, only then did it stop, and
it is the same situation here. It is disingenuous of my colleagues to
say they want the killing to stop, but they do not want to support
American troops as part of NATO on the ground.
Without our participation, the killing will continue and the ethnic
cleansing will continue.
Defeat this rule. It is nothing more than mischief making and it does
not do this Congress good service at all.
Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
I feel obliged to reject the allegation that Congress would be
responsible for atrocities based on the fact that we are bringing forth
this resolution as a sovereign representative body of the American
people. I am unaccustomed to citing, to quoting The Washington Post,
Mr. Speaker, but I feel at this time that I must.
The Washington Post editorial today says, ``It is a bad time for
Congress to
[[Page H1185]]
debate whether the United States should send troops to help police any
peace reached in Kosovo. But there is no better time left, and Congress
has good reason to proceed.''
The Washington Post continues by saying, ``The President ought to be
asking forthrightly for congressional approval, not trying to evade a
congressional judgment on his policy in Kosovo.''
So with all respect, I tell my colleagues that it is not fair, based
on a policy disagreement, which is genuine and which is most
appropriate to say that we would be responsible for atrocities or
horrors that are based on unexplainable and historical reasons in that
part of the world.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr.
Gilman), the distinguished chairman of the Committee on International
Relations.
(Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time.
Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise in support of the rule, H. Con.
Res. 42, authorizing deployment of our U.S. armed forces in Kosovo. It
provides for a clear general debate, and then opens this measure up to
amendments from any member, as long as these amendments were preprinted
in the Record.
I understand that some 53 amendments have been filed and some are
duplicates and I expect the debate will focus on authorizing the
deployment, requiring reports, praising the negotiations, praising our
troops, or prohibiting the deployment. This debate will fulfill our
historic constitutional and legal mandate given by our Founding Fathers
to put the war powers in the hands of the Congress, not the President.
We have called for this because as I understand it, the President
does not want us to vote prior to the conclusions of the ongoing Kosovo
negotiations, and will deploy troops within 48 hours of the agreement,
as he has indicated that he will deploy some 4,000 troops to support
the agreement. And if we were to vote subsequent to deployment, we
would risk undercutting our troops in the field.
According to the Secretary of State, the people's elected
representatives should not vote before deployment and to avoid
undercutting the troops, we should not vote after deployment. That must
not be so. The elected representatives of the people must vote on this
risky mission.
From some of the past conflicts up to and including Desert Storm,
Congress has voted on deployment of our troops and when we did so, we
strengthened our Nation's resolve and our diplomacy.
I believe we must have this vote to require the President to clarify
our mission and to bring the American people into the debate that could
put our uniformed personnel in harm's way.
I want to state that I support this resolution. I support the
deployment of troops to Kosovo, provided they enter Kosovo in a
permissive environment and with agreed-on conditions of the contact
group. With such conditions, I would support our President's commitment
to guaranteeing peace in Kosovo.
To quote the editorial that was just cited by our good colleague from
Florida, the editorial in today's Washington Post entitled ``Bring
Congress In,'' and I quote, ``It takes a bold decision for Bill Clinton
to bring Congress in as a partner this Kosovo, and he should not shy
away from it.''
Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman
from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson), who is the ranking minority member on
the Committee on International Relations.
Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, first let us get straight where we are.
There is no constitutional requirement that the United States Congress
take action prior to the President putting troops into a peacekeeping
situation. This is not initiating a war; this is not moving troops in
an area where we anticipate war. These are peacekeeping operations, and
we have troops all over the world in peacekeeping operations without
having gotten prior congressional approval.
Let us also get rid of some of the arguments that we have heard here
on the floor that we are going to let the Europeans take care of that.
That was tried. The previous administration waited for Europe to
respond to the crisis in Yugoslavia. Mr. Speaker, 200,000 people
murdered, raped, killed in their homes, in open fields, maybe not
reaching the numbers of other mass murders in this century, but
certainly enough that the American people felt that we could no longer
wait, and this President led our effort to end that slaughter.
Burden sharing. We have never had an action where the United States
is to play such a small role in the number of people on the ground;
that in every other action, American forces were there in larger number
and in this case the Europeans are, for the first time in my memory,
accepting a larger responsibility. When we look at the statements, not
just of Ambassador Kirkpatrick and Senator Dole who are clearly in
favor of the President's policy, and in particular Senator Dole
deserves great praise for his actions, his efforts, going to the region
and the work he has done. But even Secretary Kissinger, who has written
in opposition to the policy, was very hesitant to suggest that anybody
should interpret from his article that they should vote against this
resolution.
{time} 1230
What is the right thing to do? The right thing to do, as Senator Dole
said, is first have an agreement and then have a vote. Because if we do
not do it that way, as again Senator Dole said, if we have the vote
first and we fail to pass it, we will probably not have an agreement.
It is an awfully hard place to get an agreement in the first place.
Without all the support from Congress, with the unanimity of the
American people, expressed by 435 Members of this House voting in favor
of the President's actions, it will be exceedingly difficult to achieve
a goal of peace in that area.
But with the actions that we take today, even if we pass it, but with
a small number, it will encourage Milosevic and others who object to
the peace process, who want to see battle continue, and who care not
for the lives on the ground.
I do hope this is a sincere effort where we differ. I sure hope that
we do not see a unified rejection of the negotiations that are going on
today because it is a Democratic President. Speaker Foley, when he sat
in this House, held up the vote on the Persian Gulf for months at the
request of the President of the United States, George Bush. He waited
until the troops were there and ready, and then, with agreement from
the administration, held a vote.
We are asked to vote before there is an agreement, before there is a
conclusion. Support the Committee on Rules' proposal to send this back
and bring it back to the floor when there is actually something to vote
on.
Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman
from California (Mr. Lantos), who is also a very distinguished member
of the Committee on International Relations.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I have the highest regard for all of my
colleagues on the other side of the Chamber, and of course, I
recognize, as we all must, that this is not a partisan issue.
When President Bush asked this body to support him with respect to
the Persian Gulf, I was one of those Democrats who proudly and publicly
supported him. I want to pay tribute to Senator Dole for his courageous
public statements and actions supporting the policy that we support.
It is self-evident that this is the wrong time to deal with this
issue. There may be no agreement for us to implement. But if we vote
now, the likelihood of an agreement diminishes.
How many innocent children and women have to be killed in the former
Yugoslavia for us to talk about genocide? Had we acted in 1991, a
quarter million innocent people who are now dead would be here, and
2\1/2\ million refugees would still be living in their homes.
I know the difference between the Persian Gulf and Kosovo. Kosovo has
no oil. That is the principle that is invoked here, under the table.
Clearly we are not protecting our oil resources in Kosovo, as we did in
the Persian Gulf.
This ought not to be a partisan dispute. We are undermining NATO,
that succeeded in destroying the mighty Soviet Union, if we as the
leader of NATO
[[Page H1186]]
bail out on our international responsibilities.
If we listen closely, we hear the voices of isolationism
reverberating in this Chamber. It is mindboggling. As we close this
century, the lesson of it is that appeasement does not pay, that
aggression must be resisted. I ask my colleagues to reject this rule,
and to have this debate after an agreement will have been reached.
Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman
from Michigan (Mr. Levin).
(Mr. LEVIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Speaker, I was in Bosnia 4 years ago as cochair of a
House delegation, and there were three clear lessons from that trip.
Number one, there is a U.S. national interest in preventing an
outbreak of major conflagration in the Balkans. We should not be the
world's policeman, true. We also should not be asleep at the switch.
Whether we like it or not, the Balkans is an important crossroads.
Secondly, Mr. Milosevic is a major roadblock to peace, and
understands only firmness, total firmness.
Third, the U.S. has a special credibility there. We have a special
credibility, and we need to use it to help bring about peace and to
help enforce it.
The question now is not whether we are going to go to war, but
whether we can negotiate a peace. I urge Members on the majority side
to listen to their standardbearer of 1996, Robert Dole, who said just
yesterday, I would rather have the vote come after the agreement. Mr.
Dole, to his credit, knows the importance of bipartisanship in foreign
policy.
I close with this. This is a particularly sensitive time in the
negotiations for peace in Kosovo. This is not the time to take risks in
undermining those efforts. Those who insist on a debate at this
particular moment should think again, or they bear the responsibility
for the possible consequences of their actions.
Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the
gentlewoman from North Carolina (Mrs. Myrick), a distinguished member
of the Committee on Rules.
Mrs. MYRICK. Mr. Speaker, I do rise today in support of this rule,
because it provides a fair and open debate, as should be the case with
such an important matter. But that said, I strongly oppose the
commitment of U.S. troops to Kosovo unless we are going to go in and
solve the problem.
I do not believe the United States can be the parent or the policeman
of the world, and the fighting there and in the rest of the Balkans is
primarily a European matter and should remain a European matter, and
they should be involved in taking the lead in this.
I believe wholeheartedly in maintaining a strong national defense,
and I will always support our men and women in uniform. In fact, it is
because of my commitment to the troops and not despite of it that I
oppose this deployment of the troops to Kosovo.
To put it simply, our forces are stretched too thin around the globe
to commit 4,000 or 5,000 troops in an effort whose end is nowhere in
sight. When we committed troops to Bosnia, we were told they would be
home that fall; then, that Christmas. That was in 1996. Three years
later, our troops are still in Bosnia.
I have tremendous confidence in America's Armed Forces, and have no
doubt that given a properly defined mission with a clear objective and
a sensible exit strategy, our forces would perform brilliantly. That,
however, does not describe our presence in the former Yugoslavia.
I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this rule and opposing
House Concurrent Resolution 42.
Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to our leader, the
gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Gephardt).
(Mr. GEPHARDT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I have always believed that Congress
should be involved in decisions by our government to send our armed
services into harm's way. I really believe it is best to first commit
the people and then commit the troops.
However, I object strongly to the timing of this debate. We should
not be debating this matter while our diplomats at this very moment are
seeking to convince the parties to this conflict to lay down their
weapons and choose the path of peace.
To conduct a divisive debate in Congress and perhaps fail to support
our government's efforts is the height of irresponsibility, and
threatens the hope for an agreement to halt the bloodshed and prevent
the widening of this war.
We all know that we are at a very delicate moment in the Kosovo peace
negotiations. In part due to the efforts of former Senate Majority
Leader Bob Dole, the Kosovar Albanians are reportedly ready to sign an
agreement, and our diplomats are right now continuing convince
Yugoslavia President Milosevic to agree, as well.
If we reject this legislation, the Kosovars may refuse to sign an
agreement out of fear that U.S. leadership is wavering, and clearly,
Milosevic will be emboldened to continue his rejection of a NATO force
as part of any agreement. Either outcome will only lead to more
violence, more bloodshed, which has engulfed this region over the past
years.
This should not be about politics. It should not be about giving the
administration a black eye. This is about ending a humanitarian
catastrophe and preventing the slaughter of thousands of innocent
people caught in a simmering ethnic conflict.
Lives are at stake here. Our actions today may determine whether the
people of Kosovo have a chance for a peaceful future, or simply resume
the killing that could destabilize the region and threaten United
States interests. I thought until recently that the Republican
leadership shared this view, and grieve that partisanship has no place
in this debate.
When asked a few weeks ago about a House vote on Kosovo, the Speaker
stated publicly, I think we need to make sure that the administration
has the room to negotiate and get the job done in Rambouillet first.
The fact that we are here today demonstrates that Republican leaders
have chosen partisan politics over a united American effort to end the
conflict. It seems that politics has infected foreign policy, and I
think, if that has happened, with great harm to our credibility
overseas.
Others will talk about the importance of U.S. leadership in the
Balkans and Kosovo's significance for the future of NATO. I will simply
reiterate to the Members what Bob Dole said yesterday in the Committee
on International Relations. When asked about the timing of the vote,
Senator Dole said, ``I would rather have the vote come after the
agreement between the Kosovar Albanians and Serbia.''
When asked how Members should vote if this resolution is not
postponed, Senator Dole said, we hope there will be strong bipartisan
support. It is in our national interest to do this.
I regret that the leadership in Congress has forgotten our history
and our background, and the importance of standing united as we attempt
to resolve yet another international conflict. I urge all Members,
Republican and Democratic alike, to vote against this rule, and defer
this action that very well may provoke further bloodshed in the
Balkans.
We can have this vote if there is a treaty. We can have this vote
once there has been some kind of pulling together of a policy that we
can look at and evaluate. This vote today is premature. It is wrong to
have it today. The Members have it within their ability to put this
vote off. I urge Members to vote against the previous question, vote
against the rule, and let us bring up this vote when it is timely and
appropriate.
Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
(Mr. HALL of Ohio asked and was given permission to revise and extend
his remarks and include extraneous material.)
Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I urge Members to vote against the
previous question. If the previous question is defeated, I will offer
an amendment to the rule that will delay consideration of the Kosovo
peacekeeping resolution until an agreement on the status of Kosovo has
been signed between the Serbian government and the Kosovo Albanians.
There is potential for serious damage to the peace process if we
insist on
no...@house.gov
[[Page H1187]]
bringing this debate while negotiations are in midstream and are in a
precarious state. We certainly would not want to do anything in this
body which could have the effect of disrupting or even ending the
prospect for peace in the Balkan region.
{time} 1245
Mr. Speaker, I urge a no vote on the previous question.
Mr. Speaker, I include for the Record the document entitled ``The
Vote on the Previous Question: What It Really Means,'' as follows:
The Vote on the Previous Question: What it Really Means
This vote, the vote on whether to order the previous
question on a special rule, is not merely a procedural vote.
A vote against ordering the previous question is a vote
against the Republican majority agenda and a vote to allow
the opposition, at least for the moment, to offer an
alternative plan. It is a vote about what the House should be
debating.
Mr. Clarence Cannon's ``Precedents of the House of
Representatives,'' (VI, 308-311) describes the vote on the
previous question on the rule as ``a motion to direct or
control the consideration of the subject before the House
being made by the Member in charge.'' To defeat the previous
question is to give the opposition a chance to decide the
subject before the House. Cannon cites the Speaker's ruling
of January 13, 1920, to the effect that ``the refusal of the
House to sustain the demand for the previous question passes
the control of the resolution to the opposition'' in order to
offer an amendment. On March 15, 1909, a member of the
majority party offered a rule resolution. The House defeated
the previous question and a member of the opposition rose to
a parliamentary inquiry, asking who was entitled to
recognition. Speaker Joseph G. Cannon (R-Illinois) said:
``The previous question having been refused, the gentleman
from New York, Mr. Fitzgerald, who had asked the gentleman to
yield to him for an amendment, is entitled to the first
recognition.''
Because the vote today may look bad for the Republican
majority they will say ``the vote on the previous question is
simply a vote on whether to proceed to an immediate vote on
adopting the resolution . . . [and] has no substantive
legislative or policy implications whatsoever.'' But that is
not what they have always said. Listen to the Republican
Leadership ``Manual on the Legislative Process in the United
States House of Representatives,'' (6th edition, page 135).
Here's how the Republicans describe the previous question
vote in their own manual:
``Although it is generally not possible to amend the rule
because the majority Member controlling the time will not
yield for the purpose of offering an amendment, the same
result may be achieved by voting down the previous question
on the rule. . . . When the motion for the previous question
is defeated, control of the time passes to the Member who led
the opposition to ordering the previous question. That
Member, because he then controls the time, may offer an
amendment to the rule, or yield for the purpose of
amendment.''
Deschler's ``Procedure in the U.S. House of
Representatives,'' the subchapter titled ``Amending Special
Rules'' states: ``a refusal to order the previous question on
such a rule [a special rule reported from the Committee on
Rules] opens the resolution to amendment and further
debate.'' (Chapter 21, section 21.2) Section 21.3 continues:
``Upon rejection of the motion for the previous question on
a resolution reported from the Committee on Rules, control
shifts to the Member leading the opposition to the previous
question, who may offer a proper amendment or motion and who
controls the time for debate thereon.''
The vote on the previous question on a rule does have
substantive policy implications. It is one of the only
available tools for those who oppose the Republican
majority's agenda to offer an alternative plan.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana (Mr.
Roemer).
Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman from Ohio (Mr.
Hall) for yielding me the time.
Mr. Speaker, I want to encourage Members on both sides of the aisle
to support the motion of the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Hall) to defeat
the previous question and do so for the following two reasons: One,
maybe the most important book written on the history of Kosovo and
Bosnia in the last several years by Robert Kaplan is ``Balkan Ghosts.''
Certainly the ghosts of this distinguished Chamber are rattling around
as we play some politics with the timing of this resolution.
When it comes to foreign policy, it used to be that we did not play
politics and go across the water's edge. Certainly when it comes to
war, my very first vote in this Chamber, we had dignified and civil
debate really that embodied the comity that this institution is capable
of.
The timing of this resolution is very important. We should not do it
before we see the peace agreement that is reached, if one is reached in
this very volatile and delicate region of the world.
Secondly, Mr. Speaker, and I openly will criticize the administration
for this, I do not know how I would vote next week or the week after on
deploying troops. I think we should have answers to questions about how
thinly our troops might be deployed, what the cost would be, what the
exit strategy will be, how we are going to pay for this, what is the
morale of the troops like and what state is that?
I do not think we should give carte blanche to the administration who
simply announces to Congress that they are going to send 4,000 troops
overseas whether Congress wants to or not.
So in terms of these two reasons, the politics of the timing today is
not appropriate. Let us see if we can get a peace agreement; and then
once we have it, let us debate it. Let us play our constitutional role
in the United States Congress and have input, valuable input and debate
on such a critically important matter for our Constitution, our
country, and our Congress.
Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Speaker, the accusations made by our distinguished colleagues on
the other side of the aisle, especially the minority leader, have been
most unfair, unfortunate, and must be rejected.
Partisanship has not played a role in this timing. The deadline for
negotiations is Monday night. Our troops could be on their way to being
deployed Monday night. If Congress is to have a voice on this issue,
Congress must speak now, as even the Washington Post has recognized.
I personally will join the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman), the
chairman of the Committee on International Relations, in voting in
favor of the authorization, in other words, the underlying concurrent
resolution being brought forth by this rule.
So I would urge my colleagues to vote to support the previous
question and to support the rule.
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to speak on House
Concurrent Resolution 42, a measure regarding the use of United States
Armed Forces as part of a NATO peacekeeping operation to implement a
peace agreement in Kosovo.
At the outset, Mr. Speaker, I would voice my objection on procedural
grounds to the rule authorizing debate today of H. Con. Res. 42, a
measure on which the Democrats had no input and the Administration has
not been permitted to comment upon.
As we all know, Mr. Speaker, the fragile peace negotiations on Kosovo
are being conducted by the six member Contact Group and international
community as we speak. Because of the sensitivity of these on-going
negotiations, this is the absolute worst time to hold a contentious
debate on Kosovo in the House of Representatives. Mixed signals from
the U.S. Congress concerning the U.S. role in Kosovo undercut the
Administration's ability to forge a successful peace agreement between
the warring factions in Kosovo.
Already the situation is being manipulated by Serb leader Slobodan
Milosevic, whose belligerence has been encouraged by perceived
ambivalence in Washington. No doubt this has played a role in recent
setbacks to the peace process, as exemplified by Milosevic's emboldened
insistence to U.S. Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke that any political
agreement based upon his country's acceptance of foreign troops is
unacceptable.
Mr. Speaker, I urge our colleagues to vote against the rule on H.
Con. Res. 42. It is clearly irresponsible to hold a divisive Kosovo
debate now in Congress that will, in all likelihood, materially damage
prospects for a lasting peace agreement being reached in that war-torn
province.
Having said that, Mr. Speaker, if a peace accord in Kosovo is
negotiated, I would urge support for the President's authority to
deploy U.S. troops to implement the peace agreement, as embodied in H.
Con. Res. 42.
As the world's lone superpower, I believe the government of the
United States has a moral obligation to do what we can to stop the
senseless bloodshed in Kosovo. Already over 200,000 lives have been
sacrificed in the region's violence and it must be stopped.
On a strategic level, it is important that the war in Kosovo not be
allowed to escalate and spread, threatening the stability of
surrounding Balkan states as well as that of NATO partners, Greece and
Turkey. The United States has a strategic interest in preserving the
peace and stability of all of Europe, including its southern flank.
[[Page H1188]]
Achieving these important objectives require that an international
peacekeeping force be formed by NATO. As NATO's leader, I believe it
appropriate and not an undue burden that the United States contribute
4,000 U.S. troops, only 14% of the total NATO deployment of 28,000
peacekeeping soldiers. History has shown repeatedly that if the United
States does not participate and lead, NATO is ineffective and falls
apart.
Mr. Speaker, whether we like it or not, America cannot afford to walk
away from the genocide and instability festering in Kosovo. I urge our
colleagues to support H. Con. Res. 42 and its urgent mission to bring
peace to the long suffering people of Kosovo.
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the
rule allowing for the consideration of H. Con. Res. 42.
Mr. Speaker, the consideration of this bill comes at a most
inopportune time. Timing is the key issue in this debate. As
Negotiations to end the fighting in Kosovo are scheduled to resume next
week this body has scheduled a debate as to the course of American
policy in the region. In debating this resolution now we send the wrong
message to friend and foe alike. In debating this issue now we send a
message of indecisiveness and reluctance to fulfill our role as a peace
partner in the region.
A decisive debate on this issue could undermine the talks at a
critical juncture in the dialogue. Even former Senator Dole who
supports a NATO ground presence, recognizes the bad timing of this
resolution. On March 10, Senator Dole testified before the House
International Relations Committee that he ``would rather have the vote
come after the agreement between the Albanians and Serbia.''
Mr. Speaker, I will vote against the rule on H. Con. Res. 42 because
this is the wrong time for the consideration of this legislation by the
House at such a critical moment in the peace negotiations.
Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the
resolution.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Burr of North Carolina). The question is
on ordering the previous question.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground
that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum
is not present.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.
The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
Pursuant to clause 9 of rule XX, the Chair will reduce to a minimum
of 5 minutes the period of time within which a vote by electronic
device, if ordered, will be taken on the question of agreeing to the
resolution.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 219,
nays 203, not voting 12, as follows:
[Roll No. 45]
YEAS--219
Aderholt
Archer
Armey
Bachus
Baker
Ballenger
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bass
Bateman
Bereuter
Biggert
Bilirakis
Bliley
Blunt
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bono
Brady (TX)
Bryant
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Campbell
Canady
Cannon
Castle
Chabot
Chambliss
Chenoweth
Coble
Coburn
Collins
Combest
Cook
Cooksey
Cox
Crane
Cubin
Cunningham
Davis (VA)
Deal
DeLay
DeMint
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Doolittle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
English
Everett
Ewing
Fletcher
Foley
Forbes
Fossella
Fowler
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Ganske
Gekas
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Goode
Goodlatte
Goss
Graham
Granger
Green (WI)
Greenwood
Hall (TX)
Hansen
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Herger
Hill (MT)
Hilleary
Hobson
Hoekstra
Horn
Hostettler
Houghton
Hulshof
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Isakson
Istook
Jenkins
Johnson (CT)
Johnson, Sam
Jones (NC)
Kasich
Kelly
King (NY)
Kingston
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kuykendall
LaHood
Largent
Latham
LaTourette
Lazio
Leach
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
LoBiondo
Lucas (OK)
Manzullo
McCollum
McCrery
McHugh
McInnis
McIntosh
McKeon
Metcalf
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller, Gary
Moran (KS)
Myrick
Nethercutt
Ney
Northup
Norwood
Nussle
Ose
Oxley
Packard
Paul
Pease
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Pombo
Porter
Portman
Pryce (OH)
Quinn
Radanovich
Ramstad
Regula
Reynolds
Riley
Rogan
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roukema
Royce
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Salmon
Sanford
Scarborough
Schaffer
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Sherwood
Shimkus
Shuster
Simpson
Skeen
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Souder
Spence
Stearns
Stump
Sununu
Sweeney
Talent
Tancredo
Tauzin
Taylor (NC)
Terry
Thomas
Thornberry
Thune
Tiahrt
Toomey
Upton
Walden
Walsh
Wamp
Watkins
Watts (OK)
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
NAYS--203
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Andrews
Baird
Baldacci
Baldwin
Barcia
Barrett (WI)
Bentsen
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Bishop
Blagojevich
Blumenauer
Bonior
Borski
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd
Brady (PA)
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Capuano
Cardin
Carson
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Condit
Conyers
Costello
Coyne
Cramer
Crowley
Cummings
Danner
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
DeFazio
DeGette
DeLauro
Deutsch
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Doggett
Dooley
Doyle
Edwards
Engel
Eshoo
Etheridge
Evans
Farr
Fattah
Filner
Ford
Frank (MA)
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green (TX)
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Hastings (FL)
Hill (IN)
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hoeffel
Holden
Holt
Hooley
Hoyer
Inslee
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (OH)
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind (WI)
Kleczka
Klink
Kucinich
LaFalce
Lampson
Lantos
Larson
Lee
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
Lofgren
Lowey
Lucas (KY)
Luther
Maloney (CT)
Maloney (NY)
Markey
Martinez
Mascara
Matsui
McCarthy (MO)
McCarthy (NY)
McDermott
McGovern
McIntyre
McKinney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Menendez
Millender-McDonald
Miller, George
Minge
Mink
Moakley
Moore
Moran (VA)
Murtha
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Owens
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Pelosi
Peterson (MN)
Phelps
Pickett
Pomeroy
Price (NC)
Rahall
Rangel
Rivers
Rodriguez
Roemer
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanchez
Sanders
Sandlin
Sawyer
Schakowsky
Scott
Serrano
Sherman
Shows
Sisisky
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Spratt
Stabenow
Stark
Stenholm
Strickland
Stupak
Tanner
Tauscher
Taylor (MS)
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thurman
Tierney
Towns
Traficant
Turner
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Waters
Watt (NC)
Waxman
Weiner
Wexler
Weygand
Wise
Woolsey
Wu
Wynn
NOT VOTING--12
Becerra
Bilbray
Capps
Delahunt
Frost
Goodling
Gutknecht
John
Mollohan
Morella
Reyes
Saxton
{time} 1308
Messrs. BISHOP, HOEFFEL and PAYNE changed their vote from ``yea'' to
``nay.''
So the previous question was ordered.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Burr of North Carolina). The question is
on the resolution.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Recorded Vote
Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. This is a 5-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 218,
noes 201, not voting 15, as follows:
[Roll No. 46]
AYES--218
Aderholt
Armey
Bachus
Baker
Ballenger
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Barton
Bass
Bateman
Bereuter
Biggert
Bilirakis
Bliley
Blunt
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bono
Brady (TX)
Bryant
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Campbell
Canady
Cannon
Castle
Chabot
Chambliss
Chenoweth
Coble
Coburn
Collins
Combest
Cook
Cooksey
Cox
Crane
Cubin
Cunningham
Davis (VA)
Deal
DeLay
DeMint
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Doolittle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
English
Everett
Ewing
[[Page H1189]]
Fletcher
Foley
Forbes
Fossella
Fowler
Frank (MA)
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Ganske
Gekas
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Goode
Goodlatte
Goss
Graham
Granger
Green (WI)
Greenwood
Gutknecht
Hall (TX)
Hansen
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Herger
Hill (MT)
Hilleary
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hostettler
Houghton
Hulshof
Hutchinson
Hyde
Isakson
Istook
Jenkins
Johnson (CT)
Johnson, Sam
Jones (NC)
Kasich
Kelly
King (NY)
Kingston
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kuykendall
LaHood
Largent
Latham
LaTourette
Lazio
Leach
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
LoBiondo
Lucas (OK)
Manzullo
McCollum
McCrery
McHugh
McInnis
McIntosh
McKeon
Metcalf
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller, Gary
Moran (KS)
Myrick
Nethercutt
Ney
Northup
Norwood
Nussle
Ose
Oxley
Packard
Paul
Pease
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Pombo
Porter
Portman
Pryce (OH)
Radanovich
Ramstad
Regula
Reynolds
Riley
Roemer
Rogan
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roukema
Royce
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Salmon
Sanford
Scarborough
Schaffer
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Sherwood
Shimkus
Shuster
Simpson
Skeen
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Souder
Spence
Stearns
Stump
Sununu
Sweeney
Talent
Tancredo
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Terry
Thomas
Thornberry
Thune
Tiahrt
Toomey
Upton
Walden
Walsh
Wamp
Watkins
Watts (OK)
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
NOES--201
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Andrews
Baird
Baldacci
Baldwin
Barcia
Barrett (WI)
Bentsen
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Bishop
Blagojevich
Blumenauer
Bonior
Borski
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd
Brady (PA)
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Capuano
Cardin
Carson
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Condit
Conyers
Costello
Coyne
Cramer
Crowley
Cummings
Danner
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
DeFazio
DeGette
DeLauro
Deutsch
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Doggett
Dooley
Doyle
Edwards
Engel
Eshoo
Etheridge
Evans
Farr
Fattah
Filner
Ford
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green (TX)
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Hastings (FL)
Hill (IN)
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hoeffel
Holden
Holt
Hooley
Hoyer
Inslee
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (OH)
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind (WI)
Kleczka
Klink
Kucinich
LaFalce
Lampson
Lantos
Larson
Lee
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
Lofgren
Lowey
Lucas (KY)
Luther
Maloney (CT)
Maloney (NY)
Markey
Martinez
Mascara
Matsui
McCarthy (MO)
McCarthy (NY)
McDermott
McGovern
McIntyre
McKinney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Menendez
Millender-McDonald
Miller, George
Minge
Mink
Moakley
Moore
Moran (VA)
Murtha
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Owens
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Pelosi
Peterson (MN)
Phelps
Pickett
Pomeroy
Price (NC)
Quinn
Rahall
Rangel
Rivers
Rodriguez
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanchez
Sanders
Sandlin
Sawyer
Schakowsky
Scott
Serrano
Sherman
Shows
Sisisky
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Spratt
Stabenow
Stark
Stenholm
Strickland
Stupak
Tanner
Tauscher
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thurman
Tierney
Towns
Traficant
Turner
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Waters
Watt (NC)
Waxman
Weiner
Wexler
Weygand
Wise
Woolsey
Wu
Wynn
NOT VOTING--15
Archer
Bartlett
Becerra
Bilbray
Capps
Delahunt
Frost
Goodling
Horn
Hunter
John
Mollohan
Morella
Reyes
Saxton
{time} 1319
So the resolution was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
PERSONAL EXPLANATION
Mr. GOODLING. Mr. Speaker, regrettably I was unavoidably detained for
rollcall votes 45 and 46. Had I been present, I would have voted
``yes'' on both rollcall votes.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Burr of North Carolina). Pursuant to
House Resolution 103 and rule XVIII, the Chair declares the House in
the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the
consideration of the concurrent resolution, House Concurrent Resolution
42.
{time} 1322
In the Committee of the Whole
Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the
Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the
concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 42) regarding the use of United
States Armed Forces as part of a NATO peacekeeping operation
implementing a Kosovo peace agreement, with Mr. Thornberry in the
chair.
The Clerk read the title of the concurrent resolution.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the concurrent resolution is
considered as having been read the first time.
Under the rule, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman) and the
gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson) will each control 1 hour.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman).
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to begin this historic debate
on H. Con. Res. 42. The purpose of this resolution, which I introduced
at the Speaker's request, is to afford an opportunity for the House to
participate in a decision whether or not to deploy our armed forces to
Kosovo to implement the peace agreement now being negotiated at
Rambouillet, France. The Congress has not only a right but a
constitutional responsibility with respect to deployments of our armed
forces into potentially hostile situations and, along with the Speaker,
I believe that debating and voting on this resolution is an appropriate
way for the Congress to begin to carry out this responsibility.
Some Members of Congress have serious reservations about deploying
U.S. Armed Forces to Kosovo as peacekeepers. Others strongly support
the President's policy. In an effort to give the benefit of the doubt
to our President, the text of this resolution does not criticize or
oppose the proposed deployment to Kosovo. To the contrary, it states
that ``the President is authorized to deploy United States armed forces
personnel to Kosovo as part of a NATO peacekeeping operation
implementing a Kosovo peace agreement.''
The Speaker has stressed that this resolution is being offered
without prejudice to the underlying question. We expect Members to vote
their conscience on the resolution, in the solemn exercise of their
responsibility as elected representatives of the American people. No
one can deny that the debate now under way in this House is one of the
most weighty questions a Congress can face: sending into harm's way, on
foreign soil, our uniformed personnel who volunteered to be part of our
Nation's military.
The administration has asserted that it believes it has the authority
to send U.S. troops to Kosovo to enforce a peace plan without
congressional approval. There are many in the House who disagree.
Regardless of where our individual Members may stand on the role of the
Congress in the deployment of our armed forces on foreign soil to
undertake risky missions, it is undeniable that the President's hand
will be strengthened when he seeks and obtains the assent of the
Congress.
There are two observations on this prospective deployment, and I
stress that we are debating this issue before it is fully developed in
order to have a meaningful debate. First, this resolution is an
authorization if the conditions are appropriate, that is, if and only
if hostilities have ceased and if there is an agreement that has been
accepted by both sides.
And, second, as Senator Bob Dole told our Committee on International
Relations yesterday, ``If we're not part of this agreement, there will
not be an agreement.'' Senator Dole's point is that the Albanians of
Kosovo believe that our Nation has to be present for them to accept the
peace plan. We must recognize, also, the proportion of the burden that
we will be accepting in sending our troops to Kosovo. Out of
[[Page H1190]]
some 30,000 total troops that are expected to guarantee the peace, our
share will be only 15 percent. The Europeans will be doing the rest,
and I think it is a fair distribution if the United States wants to
continue to be considered the leader in the NATO alliance.
I would also point out that today's debate is not the last we will
have regarding the U.S. role in Kosovo. There will be ample
opportunities as events unfold in Kosovo for Members to introduce, to
debate and to vote on measures regarding what the U.S. is doing and not
doing in Kosovo. We need, however, to start this debate today and to
demonstrate that the Congress is involved, that it should be involved,
and that it can be involved responsibly in foreign policy questions of
this nature.
Mr. Chairman, in our committee's hearings yesterday, we were also
privileged to have Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick provide some of her
acumen on complex foreign policy questions such as Kosovo. Ambassador
Kirkpatrick pointed out that there is a risk in not paying attention to
violence because it may seem to be disorganized, or its proponents
remote or poorly armed. Ambassador Kirkpatrick went on to state that
``violence can spread, not like dominoes but like putty because we
don't think that it is dangerous.'' This was the attitude of European
nations when Hitler moved into the Rhineland. If the conditions are
appropriate and there are no hostilities, I am inclined to support the
deployment of our forces to Kosovo. I will vote for this measure in its
present form in order to preserve human life. I am confident that this
House over the next several hours will conduct a debate that will be
remembered as one of the higher points of this 106th Congress, where
our Members do the work that they have been entrusted to do by the
American people. Accordingly, Mr. Chairman, I ask that each one of our
colleagues follow the debate closely and vote their conscience on this
measure.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume. As I said earlier, I do not think we should be here today. As
a general practice, I think the Congress ought to execute its authority
based on a concluded agreement, not taking action prior to having any
understanding what the parameters of the agreement will be in that
region or anywhere else. It would be akin to voting on treaties before
they were drafted. If the leadership of this body were running the
Senate, I imagine the next time we had a nuclear missile proliferation
treaty or other arms control treaty, the Senate would either approve
them or reject them before the ink was even on the page.
{time} 1330
But we are here now, and we have taken this fateful step. The lives
of men, women and children in the region will depend on the actions we
take, and again I would like to briefly review a little history.
A previous administration said this was a European problem, let the
Europeans solve it. Over 200,000 men, women and children died, entire
villages were exterminated, a level of atrocity not seen since World
War II or Cambodia occurred in the heart of Europe.
When the committee called in witnesses, they brought in the
majority's best: Senator Dole, who deserves great credit for actually
going to the region on behalf of the administration to try to argue for
the peace plan. Senator Dole testified that if we fail to act today, it
will be likely that we will fail to achieve peace. He wanted to put
this vote off, but he said:
``If you have this vote, make sure you pass it, because if you do not
pass it, you will undermine the possibility of peace in the region.''
Ambassador Kirkpatrick said the same thing.
The only witness brought forth that day to argue the opposite
proposition was former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and even he
said that he would be very careful to take his previous editorial
comments as an excuse to vote against this resolution. Even he
understood the importance of not undermining our negotiators as they
try to achieve the goal to stop murder in the region.
This is not a question about whether we trust the President or we
trust the Secretary of State's agreement. We do not have an agreement
before us.
So I would hope we would accept some amendments that give the
Congress time to reflect but that support the policy that we have
initiated, that we continue to support America's power to save lives
and bring peace to this region of the world.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Virginia (Mr. Wolf).
(Mr. WOLF asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. WOLF. Mr. Chairman, I was in Kosovo 2 weeks ago. It was my second
trip there since 1995. I rise in support of the resolution. I will
stipulate the administration has not done a good job on educating and
conferring with the Congress, nor has it done a good job of telling the
American people what the mission is. However, if there is an agreement
in France, I support the deployment of American troops because I
believe without U.S. participation it will not work.
I spoke to one person over there. I said, ``How many American
soldiers do you need?''
He said, ``At least one, and he has to be out in front because
without America's involvement it will not take place.''
Two hundred thousand people died in Bosnia. Were it not for the
Sarajevo market slaughter, we would not have gotten involved then, and
since our participation nobody has died and it is working.
This is the 50th anniversary of NATO. NATO leaders from all the world
will come here to celebrate the working of NATO, and how can they
celebrate the working of NATO if NATO forces go into Kosovo if there is
an agreement and the Americans do not participate in it?
George Will wrote in Newsweek where he said:
If NATO cannot stop massacres in the center of Europe, it
cannot long continue as an instrument of collective security
against Wye. Given how well things have gone in the last 50
years on the continent, wherein the preceding 35 years things
went wrong at such cost in American blood and treasure, do
Americans want the risk, arising tide of anarchy?
It is important, if there is going to be a NATO, and what we are
voting on today is not only troops with regard to Kosovo if there is an
agreement, we are in essence today, whether we like it or not, voting
on the vitality and the future of NATO.
In closing, if there is a lasting peace though in this region, it is
important that we do everything we can to see that President Milosevic
is removed from power. A just and permanent way for him to step down
must be found. The longer he remains, the longer the turmoil and unrest
and killing will continue in Eastern Europe.
It is not an easy vote, but in the Bible in Luke it says to whom much
is given much is expected, and in one verse it says to whom much is
given much is required. We have been blessed in this country with peace
and prosperity. NATO has been a success, NATO has worked, NATO is
important, and with the 50th anniversary coming up to say that NATO
will participate in Kosovo if there is an agreement, and I stipulate,
but the United States will not participate, will basically be the first
nail in the coffin in the death of NATO.
So with great reluctance stipulating the administration has not
treated our troops fairly with regard to benefits and pay and they have
been weakened, and also they have not made the case, I support the
resolution.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H. Con. Res. 42, a resolution
authorizing the deployment of U.S. troops to Kosovo. I support the
resolution, although imperfect, in its current form. I do so
reluctantly. I do not believe President Clinton has made a credible
case to the American people or to the Congress about the need for this
deployment. I urge him to do so and do so quickly. We will, after all,
be sending America's young men and women into harm's way and the people
deserve to know ``why.''
Two weeks ago I visited Kosovo to get a first-hand glimpse into the
current conflict. I met with representatives of the Kosovo Liberation
Army (KLA/UCK), Serb government officials, NGO representatives and U.S.
Ambassador William Walker, the head of the Organization on Security and
Cooperation in Europe
[[Page H1191]]
(OSCE) mission in Pristina. I also had the chance to talk to members of
the KLA army, many of them everyday people, farmers, storekeepers,
workers and such who were driven to the KLA by the constant, brutal
action of the Serbs.
I am submitting a copy of my trip report for the Congressional
Record. It contains my observations and recommendations regarding the
Kosovo conflict.
I have concluded that if there is a signed peace agreement in
Rambouillet, it will be necessary to commit troops to the Kosovo peace
effort. It is only with the greatest reluctance that I support the
deployment of American troops abroad, but I believe that without U.S.
troops, peacekeeping won't work. The U.S. is both the leader of the
world and of NATO. If NATO is involved, we must be part of the effort
or it will not succeed.
This year is the 50th anniversary of NATO. The anniversary will be
celebrated with events in Washington and elsewhere in the United
States. Kosovo will be a big test for this important alliance. The U.S.
has always been the leader of NATO and we should not shy away from our
commitment now. If we refuse to become part of the NATO effort in
Kosovo, it could only further embolden Serb President Slobodan
Milosevic and dim the prospects for reaching a lasting, peaceful
settlement. The fighting will continue and more people, including many
women and children, will lose their lives. I agree with the words of
Bob Kagan in the Weekly Standard of March 1, 1999. He says the
practical effect of opposing U.S. involvement ``would be to reinforce
Milosevic's conviction that NATO, and particularly the United States,
does not have the stomach to take him on.''
George Will wrote in Newsweek on March 1, ``. . . if NATO cannot stop
massacres in the center of Europe, it cannot long continue as an
instrument of collective security against . . . what? Given how well
things have gone in the last 50 years on the continent where in the
preceding 35 years things went so wrong, at such cost in American blood
and treasure, do Americans want to risk a rising tide of anarchy?'' I
agree with this thoughts.
However, I do not believe the Clinton administration has made a
credible case for U.S. involvement in Kosovo to the American people nor
do I believe that this administration has done a good job taking care
of our men and women in uniform who, at personal risk, have been
carrying out our policy in Bosnia, in Iraq, in Haiti, in South Korea,
on our high seas and ``wherever the U.S.'' needs its strength. We have
drawndown troops to a level now insufficient to meet today's needs.
Many troops go from one deployment to another without time to be home
with their families. U.S. troops are stretched too thin and are not
being treated fairly. Pay and allowances are inadequate, the tempo of
operations is too high (we just need a larger military force to face
the tasks they have been given) and we are not giving our first class
military men and women the tools they need to do the job.
I want to emphasize that there are no better soldiers anywhere in the
world and the morale of our troops is high. But they are not being
treated fairly.
If the troops are to be deployed to Kosovo, we must give them strong
political leadership and a clear mission. We also must be sure that
Americans soldiers, airmen, seamen and marines are given the resources
they need to carry out their ever increasing number of missions around
the world. It's not enough to pass a resolution. Congress must ensure
that the resources available for the American military are there for
them to carry out the growing number of missions the military is being
called upon to carry out.
We also must do more than we have done in Bosnia to build a lasting
peace. While our military effort in Bosnia has been successful, thanks
to the commitment and skill of American troops, the civilian side of
the effort has fallen far short. We have failed so far to bring about
reconciliation among the ethnic factions. An interdependent society
enhanced by an effective marketplace and economic trade system has not
gotten off the ground. For example, three years after the Dayton
accord, the railroad in Bosnia does not yet operate.
We must learn lessons from Bosnia and help create a working regional
government in Kosovo that effectively represents and is accountable to
the people and contributes to the creation of a viable economy. We also
must ensure that a new Kosovo government has effective civilian
oversight over the military and that KLA forces are disarmed and
brought under civilian command. Without strong civilian control, the
KLA could get out of hand.
Most importantly, lasting peace may not occur in the Balkans while
Serbian President Slobodan Milesovic is in power. A just and permanent
way for him to step down must be found. The longer he remains, the
longer turmoil, unrest and killing will continue in eastern Europe.
It is never an easy decision for a Member of Congress to decide to
vote in favor of sending American men and women into a possibly
dangerous situation. I believe, however, that once a peace agreement is
reached--if it is reached--deploying NATO troops to the region to keep
the peace, prevent the conflict from spreading and prevent
destabilizing refugee outflows into neighboring countries is the only
way to ensure stability in Europe. Stability in Europe is in the best
interest of the United States.
Statement by U.S. Representative Frank R. Wolf, Report of a Visit to
the Balkans Kosovo: The Latest Balkan Hot Spot, February 13-18, 1999
This report provides details of my trip to Albania, Macedona
and Kosovo during mid-February, 1999. This visit occurred
during the time the Serb-Kosovo Albanian peace conference was
taking place in Rambouillet, France, and ended only a few
days before the contact group's initially imposed deadline to
reach agreement of February 20. There is every indication
that the U.S. will be concerned with Kosovo for some time to
come and it was important to have a clear, first-hand view of
conditions there.
I have, for many years, had a deep interest in the Balkans
and concern for the people who live there. I have traveled
numerous times to the region. There has been hostility,
unrest and turmoil for hundreds of years. It has been said
that there is too much history for these small countries to
bear. If this is so, it has never been more true than today.
During this trip, I spent one day in Tirana, Albania, where
I met with the U.S. Ambassador Marissa Lino and her embassy
staff; Albanian President Meidani; Prime Minister Majko;
cabinet ministers; the Speaker and other members of
parliament; religious leaders, and heads of Non-Government
Organizations (NGOs) active there.
I spent parts of two days in Skopje, Macedonia, where I met
with embassy Deputy Chief of Mission and Charge d'affaires
Paul Jones; Political Officer Charles Stonecipher; members of
the Macedonian parliament; former Prime Minister and
President of the Social Democratic Union (opposition
political party) Branko Crvenkovski; American soliders
assigned to United Nations forces guarding the Macedonia-
Kosovo border, and the commander and men of the NATO Kosovo
verification and extraction forces as well as representatives
of NGOs in Macedonia.
In Kosovo for a day and a half, I met with head of mission
Ambassador William Walker and senior adviser to ethnic
Albanian elected President Ibrahim Rugova, Professor Alush
Gashi. I also met with Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA/UCK)
spokesman Adem Demaci (who previously spent 26 years in Serb
prisons) and senior Serbian representative in Kosovo, Zoran
Andelkovic. Other meetings included NGO representatives, head
of the Kosovo office of the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), and other officials and representatives.
Our understanding and most able escort was State Department
Foreign Service Officer Ronald Capps. We also stopped at a
Serb police barracks and met with the officer in charge. We
met individual members of the KLA and with a number of
individual Kosovars who had returned to their villages after
having been driven out by Serb attacks. Some villages were
largely destroyed and remain mostly deserted.
The fate of Albania, Macedonia and Kosovo, which border one
another, is interrelated. Albania has a population of about
two million people. Macedonia's population of two million
includes about one third ethnic Albanian. About 90 percent of
the nearly two million people in Kosovo are also ethnic
Albanian.
Kosovo is the southernmost province of present-day Serbia
and has a centuries long history of conflict, turbulence and
hatred. By 1987 Serbian dominance in the region had been
established, Slobodan Milosevic was President and ethnic
Albanian participation in government was virtually
nonexistent.
In response, ethnic Albanians in 1991 formed a shadow
government complete with president, parliament, tax system
and schools. Ibrahim Rugova was elected president and has
since worked for Kosovo independence through peaceful means.
By the mid-1990, the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo
had grown to nearly 90 percent as human rights conditions
continued to go down hill with the Serbs in total control of
police and the army. Many, if not most, individual Serbs also
have weapons as opposed to ethnic Albanians for whom
possessing a gun is against strictly enforced law. Beatings,
harassment and brutality toward ethnic Albanians became
commonplace, particularly in villages and smaller towns.
In 1996 the shadowy, separatist Kosovo Liberation Army
(KLA) surfaced for the first time, claiming responsibility
for bombings in southern Yugoslavia. KLA efforts intensified
over the next several years, government officials and alleged
ethnic Albanian collaborators were killed. The Serbian
government cracked down and violence has escalated since.
I met with a number of KLA members. Most of them are
everyday people, farmers, storekeepers, workers and such who
were driven to the KLA by the constant brutal action of the
Serbs. There are, no doubt, some bad people in the KLA
including thugs, gangsters and smugglers, but most are
motivated by a hunger for independence. Still, it must be
recognized that some acts of terrorism have been committed by
the KLA.
[[Page H1192]]
Conditions in Kosovo continued to deteriorate and alarm the
international community. In October 1998, under threat of
NATO air strikes, Serbian President Milosevic made
commitments to implement terms of U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1199 to end violence in Kosovo, partially withdraw
Serbian forces, open access to humanitarian relief
organizations (NGOs), cooperate with war crimes investigators
and progress toward a political settlement.
As part of this commitment, in order to verify compliance,
President Milosevic agreed to an on-scene verification
mission by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) and NATO surveillance of Kosovo by non-
combatant aircraft. These activities are in progress and NATO
has deployed a small extraction force in next door Macedonia.
I visited with each of these groups.
However, conditions in Kosovo have not stabilized and more
have been killed. Finally, a contact group with members from
the U.S., Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy and Germany
issued an ultimatum to the sides to reach a peace accord by
February 20, 1999. NATO air strikes against targets in Serbia
were threatened if Belgrade did not comply.
The Serbs consider Kosovo the cradle of their culture and
their orthodox religion and are not willing to give it up. I
visited the Field of Blackbirds where the Serbs battled for
and lost control of the region in 1389. I also visited a
Monastery dating back to 1535 that is an important part of
Serb history.
The Clinton administration, which does not favor
independence for Kosovo, worries this conflict could spread
if NATO does not intervene and could even involve Turkey,
Bulgaria, Albania and Greece. While this is of concern, there
are other reasons for the U.S. to remain active. The U.S. can
never stand by and allow genocide to take place. Part of the
effort, once a peace agreement between the Serbs and ethnic
Albanians has been signed, could include a NATO ground force
in Kosovo containing a contingent of U.S. troops.
It is clear that a main pipeline for arms reaching ethnic
Albanians in Kosovo is across the Albania-Kosovo border and
any stabilization effort will likely include shutting off
this arms route. It has been suggested that an effective arms
blockade could be accomplished by the Italian government from
the Albanian side of the border with Kosovo.
A number of issues must be addressed before the outcome of
this conflict can be predicted. Principal among these is the
likely strength and stability of an ethnic Albanian led
Kosovo government. Another is the economic potential of a
stand-alone Kosovo, free from Serbia. Also important is what
will be the future of the KLA? Will they give up their arms?
Many in the KLA say ``no''. Could an independent Kosovo make
it on its own? Political ability has not been demonstrated.
Economic development help from the private sector in the West
may not be immediately forthcoming. How would they be propped
up? How will long term cross border hatred between Serbs and
ethnic Albanians be kept in check? Who is going to foot the
bill for all this? European nations?
How and by whom will the issue of war crimes be addressed?
A terrible job on this issue has been done in Bosnia. Known
war criminals have not been pursued after more than three
years. Reconciliation is an important ingredient to lasting
peace but terrible acts have been committed and justice must
be served. The principal perpetrator of injustice and
brutality has been Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. What
about him?
The White House and the present administration are
deserving of some sharp criticism for allowing conditions to
get where they are today.
There appear to be few lessons this administration has
learned from the painful experience of Bosnia. Our government
waited too long to get involved and, once engaged, has been
somewhat ineffective. Too many died in Bosnia during this
delay. While committing troops to the region for one year
(now over three years with no end in sight) has indeed halted
killing, at least temporarily, Bosnia is no further along
toward peaceful self sufficiency than when troops arrive.
Rather, it is as though there is merely a pause in time. If
our troops leave, hostility and brutality would likely
resume. Little infrastructure is being created. Railroads are
not running. Little economic development or growth is
emerging. No lasting plan for peace has been developed and no
interdependent community has been created which would make
undesirable, a return to conflict. Little has been done to
bring about reconciliation.
Meanwhile, as we look at our overall U.S. military
capabilities throughout the world, we see that this
administration has drawn down U.S. military strength to the
level where there are now insufficient forces to meet
today's needs. When I met with our soldiers in the Balkan
region I found many who have gone from one deployment to
another without time to be home with their families. The
troopers I met on the Kosovo border are assigned to a
battalion on its third deployment in three years.
There are no better soldiers anywhere in the world than
these and their morale is high. They are ready to do what is
expected of them and more. But they are not being treated
fairly. Pay and benefits have been allowed to deteriorate.
The tempo of operations has grown to the point where they
have too little time at home. There are just not sufficient
forces to do all the things they are expected to do.
According to the February 17, Washington Post, the Secretary
of the Army's answer is to lower standards and recruit high
school drop-outs. Turning his back on history, this official
has unwisely decided upon another social experiment rather
than dealing fairly with the shortfall.
From 1990 to 1998 the armed forces went from 18 active army
divisions to eight. The navy battle force went from 546 ships
to 346. Air force fighter wings decreased from 36 to 30.
Discretionary defense budget outlays will decrease 31 percent
in the ten years beginning 1990. Service chiefs predict FY
1999 ammunition shortages for the army of $1.7B and $193M for
the marines. These statistics are just the tip of the
iceberg. There is compelling evidence that, in the face of a
huge increase in troop deployments (26 group deployments
between 1991 and 1998 by the Army's own count), this
administration has not made the investment to give our
fighting men and women the tools to do the job asked of them.
The fact that the men and women in uniform are bending to
their task is to their credit, but it is past time to give
them what they need and stop driving them into the ground.
The White House must face up to this shortfall and address
the issue of where the money to pay for our involvement is to
come from. They have not yet done so and time is short.
A strong NATO involvement, with solid U.S. participation,
will be an important part of any workable solution to this
mess. There is a story making the rounds of NATO forces where
an American general, about to depart the region asks his NATO
counterpart how many U.S. troops must remain to ensure safety
and success of the mission. The NATO commander responds,
``Only one, but he must be at the very front''. This is only
a story told in good humor but it makes the point that U.S.
presence is key--perhaps vital.
It is not without irony that the one key player omitted
from the contact group meetings in France is a NATO
representative. The irony deepens when the presence on the
contact group of chronic problem-makes Russia and France is
noted.
Frankly, the U.S. Congress has also had too little
involvement in this Balkan process. The administration has
done and continues to do a poor job in dealing with these
issues. Consultation with the Congress does not appear to
have been a major concern to the White House. While foreign
policy is largely the prerogative of the President, American
lives are being placed at risk in a far-off land and untold
dollars are being committed to this effort. Congress has a
role and must participate in this debate. Congressional
hearings to explore all aspects of this situation are in
order.
conclusions and recommendations:
1. If there is a signed peace agreement in Rambouillet, it
could be necessary to commit U.S. troops to the Kosovo peace
effort. I make this recommendation with reluctance but,
without U.S. troops, peacekeeping won't work. The U.S. is
both the leader of the world and of NATO. If NATO is
involved, we must be a part of the effort or it will fail.
NATO's 50th anniversary is later this spring and there will
be a large celebration in the U.S. Kosovo will be a big test
for this important alliance.
2. There are many differences between the situation
existing several years ago in Bosnia and what is happening
today in Kosovo. Still, thousands died in Bosnia including
too many women and children before NATO troops including a
large contingent of U.S. soldiers moved in and put an end to
the killing. Had not NATO peacekeepers acted over three years
ago, the killing might still be going on today. Without the
commitment of U.S. troops, a NATO peacekeeping intervention
might not even have been attempted. We may wish this were not
so, but it is. Perhaps things can change in the future but
this is today's reality.
3. U.S. troops are stretched too thin and are not being
treated fairly. Pay and allowances are inadequate, the tempo
of operations is far too high (we just need a larger military
force to face the tasks they have been given) and we are not
giving our first class military men and women the tools they
need to do the job. The administration needs to take better
care of our soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen. Congress
should force this issue.
4. Special attention must be paid to the Kosovo Liberation
Army (KLA). While many, perhaps most, are common people whose
interest is defending their families, their homes and
themselves, the army is not without a rogue element. There
is no clearly established and proven civilian government
and there is no line of authority/responsibility between
the KLA and a representative government. Without control,
the KLA could get out of hand.
5. When peacekeepers arrive in Kosovo, one of their first
tasks must be to disarm the KLA. Many in the KLA have said
they will not give up their weapons. An armed KLA will be a
time bomb in the way of progress toward peace. Providing
safeguards for Serbs in Kosovo is an important part of the
peace process.
6. Efforts thus far to build a lasting peace in Bosnia have
come up short. Not only must more be done there but the
lessons learned must be applied to Kosovo. The military
presence in Bosnia has done the job of ending killing and
brutality as it likely will in Kosovo, but the peace-building
effort of reconciliation and creating an interdependent
no...@house.gov
[[Page H1193]]
society and effective marketplace and economic trade system
has not gotten off the ground.
7. Lasting peace in the Balkans will not occur while
Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic is in power. A just and
permanent way for him to step down must be found. The longer
he remains, the longer turmoil, unrest and killing will
continue in eastern Europe.
8. American and other workers and officials of all nations
present in Kosovo (diplomats, United Nations, NGOs, contract
workers, humanitarian care-givers and others) are true heros.
They risk their lives daily to make life a little better for
the people in Kosovo and we should all pray for them. I
happened to see a warning sign posted in a U.N. office
talking about mines. In part, it said, ``There is strong
evidence to suggest some police posts have had anti-personnel
mines placed near them. . . . All staff are asked to be
extremely cautious when in the vicinity . . .'' Yet these men
and women go about their daily duties with dedication and
care for others in spite of the harm that is just a step
away.
9. The foreign policy of this administration continues to
come up short and is deserving of sharp criticism. America is
the one remaining superpower and, like it or not, must assume
this responsibility. Unfolding events continue to point to
the absence of a coherent idea of what to do and how to do
it. While we should have already developed a peace-making
strategy and an exit strategy, the participants at
Rambouillet remain unable to even get things started.
10. President Clinton has done a poor job of making the
case to the American people for U.S. involvement in this
conflict which also has a significant moral aspect to it.
While the U.S. cannot be involved all over the world, we are
a member of NATO which deals with peace and stability in
Europe. Kosovo is a part of Europe and its destabilization
could create a huge refugee population there. Fighting could
even break out elsewhere if this issue is not dealt with
early and effectively. America has been blessed with peace
and prosperity. In the Bible, it says that to whom much is
given, much is expected and there is an obligation on our
part to be a participant in the search for solutions in this
troubled spot.
11. I would like to conclude on a personal note to thank
all of those who assisted me on this mission. I am especially
grateful to U.S. Ambassador Marisa Lino and her staff,
foreign service officer Charles Stonecipher who assisted me
in Macedonia, foreign service officer Ron Capps whose
knowledge and concern was of great help in Kosovo and U.S.
Army Lieutenant Colonel Mike Prendergast who traveled with
me. I appreciate their invaluable assistance.
Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Washington (Mr. Baird).
Mr. BAIRD. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from New York for
yielding this time to me. I am speaking to my colleagues today on a
matter of deep personal importance to me. For 3 years my family and I
hosted a young Bosnian student. His name is Namik, and when he was 14
years old he was running through his village when a Serbian mortar
shell landed next to him and blew his left leg off just below the hip.
For 3 years I worked with Namik, kept him in our home as my own son
taught him to climb and to kayak so that he could have a normal life.
But for 3 years I helped him deal with what it is like to be a young
man who has lost a leg in a war that was not his fault.
When we talk about this issue, Mr. Chairman, we are talking about
human lives, we are talking about NATO, and we are talking about
standing up to genocide and standing up to tyranny. Mr. Milosevic is a
sociopath. He is bloodthirsty, he does not respect basic tenets of
human dignity and morality. If a sociopath were holding hostages, and
he had a police scanner and heard that the police were debating about
whether or not to send in officers to put a stop to what he was trying
to do, we know what would happen to those hostages: they would be
killed. Mr. Milosevic has got to be stopped.
I urge my colleagues for the sake of Namik, for the sake of the
future of NATO, for the sake of the future of our country and for the
sake of stability in Europe and peace internationally, please pass this
resolution. Do not undermine the President at this time, do not allow
the killing to continue in the Balkans.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Washington for
his support for this resolution.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from New York
(Mrs. Kelly).
Mrs. KELLY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of H.Con.Res. 42,
a resolution which supports the deployment of U.S. troops in support of
a NATO peacekeeping effort in Kosovo. The reason we need to support
this legislation today and the reason why we should resist weakening
amendments is the simple fact that NATO peacekeepers, supported by U.S.
troops, represent our last and best chance for a workable peace in this
very troubled land.
I would also add that if we are to maintain any credibility within
NATO, we have an obligation to support this vital peacekeeping mission.
Mr. Chairman, I visited the former Yugoslavia on two separate
occasions in recent years, and I have had the opportunity to visit
Rambouillet recently, to observe the peace talks firsthand and to talk
with the participants. Let me be very clear about this. I believe the
only peace that will occur in Kosovo is one that is enforced by NATO.
Serbian strong man Slobodan Milosevic has shown us time and time again
that he does not recognize international law, he does not respond to
international appeals for peace, and the experience has demonstrated
that he does not always respect prior peace agreements. What he does
respect and what he does respond to is the very real threat of force.
NATO peacekeepers are the only safeguard that will put a stop to the
killing in Kosovo and the only thing that will prevent further violence
down the road.
I cannot over emphasize how sensitive the point at which we now find
ourselves in these negotiations is and that the failure of this
resolution would deal a potentially fatal blow to the peace effort.
Indications are that absent a peace agreement both sides are preparing
for a major escalation of fighting in the spring, and as always in this
case, it will be the innocent civilians who are once again suffering
the horrifying consequences.
Mr. Chairman, a considerable amount of time and effort has been put
into this peace effort, and the stakes could not be higher. Success
means an end to the fighting, an end to the killing and an end to the
destruction of entire villages and towns.
Ultimately we have all witnessed on the evening news the price that
failure has brought to the people of Kosovo. Thousands have been
killed, and tens of thousands turned into homeless refugees.
Peace is at hand if we have the wisdom and the courage to see this
through.
I strongly urge my colleagues to send a message to both sides that
the United States is committed to the peace process and, with that
message, the assurance that we will stand by our commitments to NATO.
Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2 minutes.
Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of this resolution, but
I seriously question the Republican leadership's timing in bringing
this measure to the floor for debate while negotiations are still
underway. I believe a fractious congressional debate about whether or
not to support implementation of a peace agreement at such a critical
juncture in the negotiations seriously undermines our ability to
negotiate a settlement and place directly into the hands of Mr.
Milosevic. We must, as a Congress, show that we are committed to peace
in the former Yugoslavia and working with our allies in NATO towards
that common goal.
Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this resolution.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman
from Kansas (Mr. Ryun).
Mr. RYUN of Kansas. Mr. Chairman, the United States Armed Forces are
being stretched too thin. They have been asked to take on peacekeeping
missions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and now possibly Kosovo. President
Clinton told Congress and the Nation that the United States deployment
to Bosnia in 1995 would be over in 1 year. However, the mission in
Bosnia has continued for 4 years with no strategic exit plan in sight
and, at a cost to the United States at $10 billion, not only are their
peacekeeping missions costly, but they are degrading to the overall
readiness of our fighting forces.
Mr. Chairman, 2,200 troops from the 24th Marine expeditionary unit
currently stationed aboard the Navy ships in the Mediterranean will be
part of the initial force moving into Kosovo as soon as an agreement is
reached between ethnic Albanians and the Serbian government. However
that unit is
[[Page H1194]]
headed into its final month of a 6-month deployment and scheduled to be
home in North Carolina by May 1. To be home by that time the unit will
have to leave Kosovo no later than mid April.
Mr. Chairman, that leaves the administration with limited options,
the most prominent one being extending the length of the unit's
deployment. How long will this unit be there? How much longer will they
be away from their families and beyond their expected 6-month
deployment?
Mr. Chairman, for America's Armed Forces to sustain this
administration's peacekeeping pace the forces must be augmented by an
increased amount of part-time Reserve and National Guard personnel. Not
only are Reserve and National Guard personnel being forced to leave
their families more often, but they are also being asked to increase
the amount of time and technical knowledge taken away from their
careers here in the United States. These military personnel are being
forced to explain open end deployments to their employers who are
becoming less willing to continually lose their skilled employees.
Mr. Chairman, to be able to keep these individuals in the Reserve and
National Guard we must continue to send them into peacekeeping
situations around the globe. In the future, when the Reserve and
National Guard personnel have the opportunity to leave military
service, they will choose their family quality of life and their career
over serving their country. A Kosovo peacekeeping mission will place a
heavy burden on America's Armed Forces and compromise their readiness
levels, the quality of life of their families and the national security
of the United States. We cannot and must not continue to ask our
military to do more with less.
Mr. Chairman, before the administration decides to deploy troops to
Kosovo, I ask that they lay out their plan and details to Congress.
Mr. Chairman, before the Administration decides to deploy troops to
Kosovo, I ask that they lay out their plan in detail to Congress. The
administration should not be able to put the men and women of our armed
forces in harm's way without explaining their reasons for doing so.
Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Florida (Mr. Hastings).
(Mr. HASTINGS of Florida asked and was given permission to revise and
extend his remarks.)
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of H.
Con. Res. 42, legislation to authorize U.S. involvement in peacekeeping
actions in Kosovo.
This debate is about how we see our role in the world. Do we want to
be involved? Do we want to be an active part of the NATO alliance? Do
we want to export our values of democracy? Do we want to be in a
position to influence world events? Because, if we do, we have to be
active even when the direct benefit to the United States is difficult
to discern and most certainly when we can discern that genocide may
occur.
{time} 1345
A secure and stable Europe is of great concern to the United States.
We have fought two major wars of this century, both on the continent of
Europe and both because Europe was completely destabilized by
tyrannical despots and weak economies.
If we weaken the contact group alliance that has worked on this
matter, as well as NATO, the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe, efforts on the ground, by defeating this resolution, it will
surely stoke the fires of instability in Europe.
If our allies cannot count on us, they will surely stop looking to us
for leadership and our influence will wane.
I talked to a colleague of mine in the Organization of Security and
Cooperation in Europe, who is the Chair of the first committee on which
I served. His name is Bruce George and he is a member of the British
Parliament and is their defense expert. He said if we fail today to
support this resolution, it will be short of catastrophic.
Yesterday Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick said that if we do not support
this resolution, we will regret it. I suggest to this body that we
cannot stand idly by and watch children maimed, autonomy destroyed and
a people who are seeking no more than freedom, an opportunity to gain
the same.
Support this resolution.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter), the distinguished vice chairman of our
Committee on International Relations.
(Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, my colleagues, I rise in opposition to
the resolution. I want to drop back, though, to some of the debate that
took place on the rule. The minority leader came here and suggested it
was inappropriate for us to be debating this resolution at this time.
That was also voiced by the ranking minority member of the House
International Relations Committee here today, and by others.
As the gentleman from New York (Chairman Gilman) said, unfortunately
debating the issue before the situation fully developed is important
for Congress to have a meaningful role.
I want to remind my colleagues what happened in Somalia where without
any consultation we saw the Administration move from protecting the
people involved in the deliveries of food to a nation-building process.
It was classic mission creep. I want to remind Members what happened in
the formulation of the Dayton Accords when, in fact, we were told by
the Administration ``do not do anything, it might upset these delicate
negotiations ongoing in Dayton.''
Then what happened? Before Congress had any opportunity express its
view or to have a role, before the Dayton Accords were actually signed,
troops were on the way to Bosnia and we were locked in. Then what were
we told? What we had been told before, we have to support our troops,
our men and women in the field, and Congress was cut out of the
process.
Here we are in another similar situation, but what we have here is
very different. What we have here is an invasion by the United States
and NATO of a sovereign country. Kosovo is an autonomous region within
Serbia.
This Member has previously voiced, and still has enormous
difficulties for many reasons, with the proposal for a peace keeping, I
would have to call it a peace enforcement, plan in Kosovo. Chief among
them is the Member's reservation that the President is ready to act
outside the U.S. Constitution to engage uninvited U.S. combat forces in
an internal conflict in a country which is not a threat to the United
States.
The U.S. Constitution clearly limits his authority to place U.S.
Armed Forces in hostile situations, but can do so only in response to a
national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its
territories or its armed forces.
The more extreme measure of launching unprovoked air strikes against
Serbia, a sovereign country for which I have little respect in terms of
their leadership, who have committed extraordinary atrocities in
Kosovo, nevertheless the Administration proposal to deploy troops to
Kosovo is tantamount to a declaration of war against Serbia.
Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution specifically grants war
declaration authority exclusively to the Congress. The President's
commitment to deploy our troops into a hostile and foreign territory of
Kosovo cannot be considered a defensive measure that falls under his
authority.
What is going to happen? If we ever have a peace agreement on Kosovo,
it will be coerced and it will have to be an enforced peace--for who
knows how long. We have an Administration which has threatened, imagine
this, if you do not sign, Mr. Milosevic, we are going to bomb you.
I suppose we are going to bomb the KLA, too. How does one find the
KLA to bomb? How does one enforce peace on that side?
Let me ask some questions about the current peace proposal. We have
one party somewhat bound to the U.S., the other bound by the threat of
U.S. force.
Many questions need to be addressed: By what means are we going to
protect the Kosovars? Who will police the borders? How will we
neutralize the danger of Kosovo expansion when it has no international
status? What is the political objective? (Autonomy is not the
destination sought by the Albanians.) How do we handle the relationship
of the Albanians in Kosovo with those in the surrounding region? What
are the rules of engagement? What is the concept of how it will end?
[[Page H1195]]
Under what authority can NATO ``invade'' a country in this matter?
Morover, the projected Kosovo agreement is unlikely to enjoy the
support of the parties for a long period of time. For Serbia,
acquiescing under the threat of NATO bombardment, it involves nearly
unprecedented international intercession. Yugoslavia, a sovereign
state, is being asked to cede control and in time sovereignty of a
province containing its national shrines to foreign military force.
Though President Slobodan Milosevic has much to answer for,
especially in Bosnia, he is less the cause of the conflict in Kosovo
than an expression of it. On the need to retain Kosovo, Serbian
leaders--including Milosevic's domestic opponents--seem united. For
Serbia, current NATO policy means either dismemberment of the country
or postponement of the conflict to a future date when, according to the
NATO proposal, the future of the province will be decided.
The same attitude governs the Albanian side. The Kosovo Liberation
Army (KLA) is fighting for independence, not autonomy. The KLA is
certain to try to use the cease-fire to expel the last Serbian
influences from the province and drag its feet on giving up its arms.
And if NATO resists, it may come under attack itself--perhaps from both
sides. What is described by the administration as a ``strong peace
agreement'' is likely to be at best the overture to another, far more
complicated set of conflicts.
Ironically, the projected peace agreement increases the likelihood of
the various possible escalations sketched by the President as
justification for a U.S. deployment. An independent Albanian Kosovo
surely would seek to incorporate the neighboring Albanian minorities--
mostly in Macedonia or FYROM--and perhaps Albania itself. And a
Macedonian conflict would land us precisely back in the Balkan wars of
earlier in this century. Will Kosovo then become the premise for a
semi-permanent NATO move into Macedonia just as the deployment in
Bosnia is invoked as justification for the move into Kosovo? Is NATO to
be the home for a whole series of Balkan NATO protectorates?
In Bosnia, the exit strategy can be described. The existing dividing
lines can be made permanent. Failure to do so will require their having
to be manned indefinitely unless we change our objective to self-
determination and permit each ethnic group to decide its own fate. In
Kosovo, that option does not exist. There are no ethnic dividing lines,
and both sides claim the entire territory. America's attitude toward
the Serbs' attempts to insist on their claim has been made plain
enough; it is the threat of bombing. But how do we and NATO react to
the Albanian transgressions and irredentism? Are we prepared to fight
both sides and for how long? In the face of issues such as these, the
unity of the contact group of powers acting on behalf of NATO is likely
to dissolve. Russia surely will increasingly emerge as the supporter of
the Serbian point of view.
The President's statements ``that we can make a difference'' and that
``America symbolizes hope and resolve'' are exhortations, not policy
prescription. This is bumper sticker foreign policy. Is NATO to become
the artillery to end ethnic conflict? If Kosovo, why not intervention
in East Africa or Central Asia? And would a doctrine of universal
humanitarian intervention reduce or increase suffering by intensifying
ethnic and religious conflict? What are the limits of such a policy and
by what criteria is it established? In Henry Kissinger's view, that
line should be drawn at American ground forces for Kosovo. Europeans
never tire of stressing the need for greater European autonomy. Here is
an occasion to demonstrate it. If Kosovo presents a security problem,
it is to Europe, largely because of the refugees the conflict might
generate. Kosovo is no more a threat to America than Haiti was to
Europe--and we never asked for NATO support here. The nearly 300
million Europeans should be able to generate the ground forces to deal
with the problems for 2.3 million Kosovars. To symbolize Allied unity
on larger issues, we should provide logistics, intelligence and air
support. But I see no need for U.S. ground forces; leadership should
not be interpreted to mean that we must do everything ourselves.
Again, paraphrasing Henry Kissinger, he said in opposing ground
troops in Kosovo that: Each incremental deployment into the Balkans is
bound to weaken our ability to deal with Saddam Hussein and North
Korea. The psychological drain may be even more grave. Each time we
make a peripheral deployment, the administration is constrained to
insist that the danger to American forces is minimal--the Kosovo
deployment is officially described as a ``peace implementation force.''
Such comments have two unfortunate consequences: They increase the
impression among Americans that military force can be used casualty-
free, and they send a signal of weakness to potential enemies.
military readiness
Where will the money be coming from to support Kosovo deployment?
Will it be pulled from readiness accounts? As recently as Monday, March
8, in an HASC hearing that included Maj. Gen. Larry R. Ellis, the 1st
Armored Division commander (Germany based division now with troops in
Bosnia and FY ROM), five other flag officers, and a group of mid-grade
and senior noncommissioned officers, readiness was described as ``a
rubber band that is stretched very, very tight.'' While military
strength has drawn down, deployments have picked up steadily and there
aren't enough people to do the job. Across the board, readiness is
wearing dangerously thin.
A former militaryman described the plight of the mid-career
professional soldier this way:
``They are sent to far-off places with inadequate support, pointless
missions and foolish rules of engagement so the cocktail party set back
in D.C. can have their consciences feel good.''
``We keep drawing down long-term readiness to meet near-term
missions,'' said Gen. Charles C. Krulak, the Marine Corps commandant.
``That is severely straining our long-term readiness and modernization
efforts.''
A 4,000 troop commitment translates into 12,000 troops involved in
Kosovo support (4,000 training to go in, 4,000 on the ground, and 4,000
being retrained upon coming out). This is demoralizing, it degrades
retention, and leads to questions about management.
Secretary Cohen said yesterday that NATO forces would enter Kosovo to
maintain an ongoing peace--that may be true, but it is certainly
debatable. Indeed, this Member would argue that we are talking about
peace-enforcement, not peacekeeping. And I would remind my colleagues
that our last experience with peace enforcement (Somalia) was not a
pleasant one.
The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) is an armed separatist group that
would appear bent on independence; major element in the Serb population
are adamantly opposed to the KLA's objective. This is a situation were
any existing ``peace'' is highly suspect.
There is no way to place a time limit on a Kosovo deployment.
Remember the Bosnia experience. Upon the rapid deployment (without
congressional consent) following the Dayton Accord, Secretary
Christopher assured the nation that it would be for one year only--to
give the Bosnians a chance for peace. Four years later, everyone
acknowledges there is no end in sight to the Bosnia deployment. The
cultural difficulties that gave rise to the violence are far too great.
The cultural difficulties in Kosovo are at least as serious as those
in Bosnia. Milosevic has successfully preyed upon the ancient fears and
hatreds of the Serb population. The Albanian diaspora has fed the most
violent tendencies of the Kosovar Albanian population. And the
Albanians in Kosovo are insisting that a NATO presence remain for at
least three years!
In short, we lack an exit strategy. This is the same point that House
Members argued four years ago regarding Bosnia. At that time, the
Administration discounted our warning that, once deployed, U.S. troops
would be in Bosnia for the long haul. Well, we were right and the
Administration was wrong.
I absolutely do not condone anything that the Serbians have done. In
many ways, they are their own worst enemy. Belgrade has been
condescending and abusive of the rights of ethnic Albanians, and their
brutality gave rise to the KLA. My concern is, do the very real abuses
of the Serbian forces warrant the long term deployment of an
undetermined number of U.S. ground troops?
Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Maryland (Mr. Wynn).
Mr. WYNN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from New York (Mr.
Crowley) for yielding me this time.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the resolution. The only
problem with being a world leader is that sometimes we have to lead. In
the first instance, leadership requires patience, and in that context,
although I strongly support the resolution, I believe it is premature.
We have representatives in the region attempting to negotiate a
framework for peace. We should not be debating whether or not we are
going to intervene at this point.
Having said that, I do support our intervention in the context of
this resolution. It seems to me that leadership also requires taking
some risk and also adopting some unpopular positions.
I do not think anyone is cavalier about putting American troops in
harm's way, but the fact remains that if we are going to support peace
around the world, if we are going to try to maintain and promote an
environment for peace, we have to get involved.
Amendments later today will set parameters for our involvement. We
are not talking about an extensive involvement. We are talking about a
limited
[[Page H1196]]
involvement, with the limited use of American troops.
The fact remains we are a world leader. We are a leader in NATO, and
if we want to maintain that position of leadership, we cannot back
away, we cannot cut and run when we are confronted with an unpopular
situation.
Some will say in the course of this debate, we do not know what the
objective is. The objective is abundantly clear. We are trying to
maintain a framework for peace and maintain an environment for peace.
We are trying to prevent genocide.
Thirdly, we are trying to prevent the spread of this violence
throughout the region, which could lead to even greater catastrophe.
This is not a popular situation. This is a situation that calls for
American leadership.
I think we should proceed on that assumption, allow U.S. troops to be
involved to a limited extent in the context of a negotiated treaty. I
hope people will rise above narrow concerns and take a broader view.
We used to have a notion that Americans were about preserving world
peace. I think we should continue to adopt that position.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Virginia (Mr. Bateman), a member of the Committee on Armed Services.
(Mr. BATEMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am more than aware of the prospects of
negative consequences if our country declines to become involved in a
peacekeeping or peacemaking mission in Kosovo, but in its present form
I cannot support the resolution before us.
If I had some confidence that it would indeed be a peacekeeping
mission, I would feel much differently. Even if certain people signed
an agreement that others have written for them, which is the case here,
and have cajoled them into signing it, it will not be a true peace
agreement.
An agreement requires consent. Absent true consent, we will not be
enforcing or keeping the peace. We will be making a peace foisted upon
parties whose goals are widely disparate and who are determined to
resist by violence those who oppose the achievement of their goal.
Our country has repeatedly enunciated a policy that recognizes
Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo. While we have urged a high degree of
autonomy for that province of Yugoslavia, we have not endorsed the
determination of the ethnic Albanian majority for independence. For our
country to intervene in an issue of the operative relationship between
the central government of Yugoslavia and one of its provinces would be
tantamount to Great Britain having intervened in our Civil War on
behalf of the Confederate States of America. History has verified the
wisdom of our English friends in not having done so.
Consistent with international law, we do not have the legal authority
to intervene against the will of the sovereign state involved.
Policy statements of the administration that we would participate in
bombing of Serbian targets if the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did
not sign an agreement written by us or someone is an appalling notion.
An agreement, even if it is signed under a direct threat of aerial
bombardment, is not worthy of being called an agreement. If the
government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia does not accept the
agreement we wrote for them, I must condemn American military action
that our country will be involved in for what it will be, an act of war
without sanction under our Constitution or international law.
As to the ethnic majority in Kosovo, who is duly authorized to bind
them to an agreement? Is it Mr. Rugova, the head of the Democratic
League of Kosovo? Or is it Mr. Demaci, who is described as, quote, the
chief political representative of the Kosovo Liberation Army?
This gentleman has resigned and condemned those in the KLA who are
inclined to vote for the so-called agreement.
By what authority, if any, was Mr. Thaci charged with the formation
of a provisional ethnic Albanian government?
My generation has a special affinity for collective security, and I
have and hope to remain a steadfast supporter of our NATO alliance.
I wish this debate was not taking place today but unfortunately it
must because if it did not, any debate would come only after the
President had committed us to a military action without the consent of
a majority in the Congress and with only minimal consultation.
Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/4\ minutes to the gentleman
from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich).
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, Jesus said, blessed are the peacemakers
for they shall be called the children of God.
What can be said of a Congress which will not let the United States
make peace in Kosovo? What can be said of a Congress which would
intervene at a critical point in peace negotiations and take steps to
undermine a peace agreement? What can be said of a Congress which
refuses to let the United States join hands with other peacekeepers of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization?
What can be said is this: If we are not letting peace be waged, then
we are letting war be waged.
What can be said is that if we are not thoughtful as to the
consequences of our actions today upon the Kosovo peace talks, then we
are as sorcerer's apprentices, mindlessly stirring a cauldron full of
the blood of Balkan innocents. When this cauldron is stirred, there
will be blood on our hands.
What will be said about this Congress is that with our NATO allies at
the ready, Congress abdicated the United States role as a world leader.
Blessed are the peacemakers.
We are able to make peace because we are the strongest nation in the
world. We are able to make peace because we have been committed to
peace.
Listen to the words of John F. Kennedy's inaugural. He said that we
have been unwilling to witness or permit the slow undoing of those
human rights to which this Nation has always been committed and to
which we are committed today at home and around the world.
We are challenged every day to renew our commitments to peace, to
justice, to the American way of democratic principles, to lifting the
burden of our brothers and sisters anywhere in the world, to becoming
the light of the world.
Our Star Spangled Banner asks this question every day: Oh, say, does
that star spangled banner still wave over the land of the free and the
home of the brave?
Let us continue to demonstrate that we will be brave so that we may
remain free and that others may remain free. Let us not turn our backs
on peace. Let us not turn our backs on our allies. Let us not turn our
backs on those principles which have helped form this Nation. Let us
not turn our backs on those who thirst for justice, on those who hunger
for righteousness, on those who look to the United States to be first
in peace.
{time} 1400
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman who has just made a
very eloquent address, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich), for his
supporting remarks.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from California
(Mr. Cunningham), a member of the Committee on Appropriations.
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I will not condemn any one of the
Members in here for the way that they vote on this. They do it so
because they have different knowledge, they have different beliefs. But
I do resent the minority leader impugning the motives of many of us.
I make my statements on some very deep, rich beliefs and experience
from training, of planning innovations in the defense of countries all
over this world on military staff. And I hated politicians that sat in
soft, cushy chairs and put our men and women in harm's way so easily,
they who had never done that themselves.
Kosovo is not an independent state, it is part of Greater Serbia.
When we go into the full committee, I want to put in here some 1,500
shrines and sanctuaries that the Serbs have in Kosovo, the birthplace
of the orthodox Catholic religion. This is their homeland. This is a
map of Albania. The Albanians do
[[Page H1197]]
not want just Kosovo, they want part of Greece, they want Montenegro,
and they want Kosovo. This is a map of the massacred Serbs, Jews,
gypsies that the KLA has murdered in recent times, not World War II.
The KLA is supported by the mujahedin, Hamas, and even bin Laden. Get
George Tenet's brief, classified brief. That is about as far as I can
go.
This is a list of where the Serbs established Kosovo and were
ethnically cleansed and murdered and forced to flee across the Danube,
their homeland, and Albanians filled the void. Yet, they are defending
their own homeland right now and being murdered.
Now, Milosevic is an impediment. He needs to be removed, in my
opinion, much worse than that. So is Tudjman. But then we look at
Itzebegovic, who has 12,000 mujahedin and Hamas surrounding him. The
prime minister under him trained with Kadafi. If we want to talk about
a foreign policy and we say we are saving lives, it is a powder keg
when we move out of there. Let us not send our men and women to Kosovo.
Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Lantos).
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I thank my friend for yielding this time to
me.
There is an air of unreality about this debate. Tomorrow, some of us
will be at the Harry Truman Library in Independence, Missouri, when
Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland will formally become members of
NATO. NATO, this incredible defensive alliance, which kept the peace in
Europe for two generations, which resulted in the collapse of the
mighty Soviet Union, and which is the cornerstone of security, not just
for Europe, but for much of the rest of the world, and we are now
debating as to whether, after the Albanians and the Serbs agree and
invite us, we might participate with the force of 4,000 in a NATO
contingent of 28,000 to keep the peace in Kosovo.
My wife and I went to Kosovo the first time maybe 35 years ago, and
we have been back there many times since. It is the only place in
Europe where one can find a beautiful young woman of 22 or 23 who has
two teeth because they have no dental care. There is a grinding poverty
that boggles the mind, and these people have been suppressed,
persecuted, given third class citizenship for a long time.
This is our opportunity to do a tiny bit, a tiny bit of what the
great generation of the second war did under infinitely more dangerous
circumstances with infinitely greater sacrifices.
Sunday night, the two vice presidential candidates of the last
presidential election, Al Gore and Jack Kemp, join me for the
Washington premier of The Last Days, a movie about the Holocaust. The
pictures of that movie will remain with everybody who will ever see
that movie. Do we want such movies made of Kosovo? Have we not had
enough slaughter and massacre and murder and extermination of innocent
people there? The only thing that differentiates Kosovo from the
Persian Gulf War is that there is no oil there. But there are
principles there. The same principles that compelled President Bush
decide to send not 4,000 NATO U.S. forces, but half a million American
troops to the Persian Gulf; President Bush, who drew a line at Kosovo
at Christmas 1992, when he said, we are drawing the line, we are not
going to allow Bosnia to be repeated.
Now we have another President, a Democratic President who says the
same thing. One of the great heroes of the second war in public
service, Senator Bob Dole, yesterday told us in committee he is
passionately committed to this course of action.
I am sick and tired of my colleagues saying, this is in Europe; let
the Europeans deal with it. Sarajevo was in Europe. That was the
genesis of the First World War. Czechoslovakia was in Europe. That was
the genesis of the Second World War.
These people who never learn, who are uneducable cannot carry the day
today. I plead with my colleagues to give our government an opportunity
to participate in a NATO peacekeeping force to the tune of 4,000
American soldiers to keep the peace. This is the only honorable way,
and this is the only way not to undermine NATO and the hope of mankind.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde), the distinguished chairman of the
Committee on the Judiciary and a member of our Committee on
International Relations.
(Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I recognize this is a very difficult
decision, and I regret disagreeing with some of my colleagues who
oppose the participation of our forces in the NATO peacekeeping effort,
but it boils down really to a simple proposition: Is NATO worthwhile?
What is the purpose of NATO? What is our role with NATO? We are the
leaders of NATO. NATO is an extremely useful institution to have. It is
beginning to integrate Germany in this exercise. Germany is to provide
3,000 troops, the British, 8,000, the French, 6,000, the United States
4,000, and to what end? To stop genocide. To stop the slaughter. To be
peacekeepers.
There really is a moral obligation on those people who have the
resources to intercede when people are being wantonly, atrociously
killed, and that is what our purpose is. We have a national purpose: to
prevent the spread of this conflict. If we appease Milosevic, if we
leave the field and let the killing go on, we are inviting a wider
spread of the war that could involve two of our NATO allies on the
opposite side, Greece and Turkey.
So there is a humanitarian purpose; there is a peacekeeping purpose,
and in my judgment, the very purpose of NATO would be frustrated; it
would be eviscerated if we turned our back and walked away.
Mr. Chairman, leadership imposes heavy burdens and a cost must be
paid, but we either are going to lead in the struggle, and it is a
struggle for world peace, or we are going to be on the sidelines. I
think for the vitality of NATO, for our role in NATO as a leader, for
integrating the peacekeeping forces with these other countries, clearly
we have to participate, and I will support the resolution.
Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Missouri (Mr. Skelton), the ranking Democrat on the Committee on Armed
Services.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time.
Our colleague from Illinois posed the question, is NATO worth it?
Absolutely. NATO is worth it.
First, we should understand those pages of history that point out
that World War I started in the Balkans, and if NATO in its role in
keeping peace in Europe can be fulfilled, it will be necessary for NATO
to do a peacekeeping mission in Kosovo.
Second, in answer to the gentleman's question, is NATO worth it,
history also tells us that we have had more years of continuous peace
in Europe since the days of the Roman Empire. NATO not only is worth
it, it works, and the United States of America is the leader of NATO.
Tomorrow in Independence, Missouri, at the Truman Library, with the
Secretary of State present as well as other noted Americans, the 50th
anniversary of NATO will be celebrated.
Today, by this vote, we will declare whether NATO is worth it,
whether NATO is to fulfill its goal and mission in the days and years
ahead. I agree with the resolution.
I might also say that I have an amendment which I do not see how
anyone could vote against. Later in the day, my amendment to this
resolution will be to the effect that there should be no troops
deployed until there is an agreement and a subsequent vote. But the
bottom line is, NATO, Mr. Chairman, is worth it.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Bliley), the distinguished chairman of our
Committee on Commerce.
(Mr. BLILEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. Bliley. Mr. Chairman, I want to address my remarks to my
colleagues on this side of the aisle. Yes, the Clinton administration
has failed to address the American people on why we should be in the
Balkans, why we should be in Bosnia, and why we should be in Kosovo.
But let me tell my colleagues, I have spent 15 years as a
[[Page H1198]]
member of the U.S. delegation to the NATO parliamentary group. I now
serve as the Vice President. We must be a participant in Kosovo.
Why? Because the Europeans cannot do it themselves. They have
historic alliances. The French and the Russians have been with the
Serbs. The Germans and the Italians have been with the Albanians. If we
are not there and the NATO alliance is not able to go because we are
not there, we are going to see the fighting begin again.
When the Yugoslavs begin bringing in heavy weapons, the Kosovos are
going to call on their Albanian brothers to come to their aid. We run
the risk of Macedonia being involved or the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, and then the really big danger that we have of the Turks and
the Greeks becoming involved.
{time} 1415
Remember, World War I began at Sarajevo. Remember, we hesitated and
did not go into Bosnia right away. We were treated every night to the
atrocities on CNN. Please, support the resolution, even though the
administration has failed to come forward and adequately address the
Congress and the American people.
Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from
Georgia (Ms. McKinney).
Ms. McKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, unfortunately, today we are debating
sending U.S. forces to keep a peace that does not exist, to carry out
an agreement that has not been agreed to, and to assist people on both
sides who do not seem to want our help.
We are being asked to vote on something we cannot even see, and to
sign a blank check. We have written blank checks before, and we have
discovered afterwards just how high the cost has been. In what we do on
Kosovo, we should first make sure that we have an agreement, know the
plans, and know the cost.
In thinking about the cost, we should realize how much our own
reckless actions have added to the bill. For years we have been selling
our highest technology weapons to countries whose possible involvement
in this conflict is important, both for those who want us in and those
who want us to stay out. By our own actions we have greatly raised the
stakes for such a conflict, and we have raised the risks that our
soldiers again and again unnecessarily will be facing the products of
our own factories.
If the parties in Kosovo really want peace, they will both sign the
agreement, and if they do not, the mission of our forces will be truly
impossible. Arms selling and peacemaking do not mix in Kosovo or
anywhere else.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the
gentleman from California (Mr. Rohrabacher), a member of our Committee
on International Relations.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to sending
America's young defenders to Kosovo. We are being asked to deploy our
troops yet again, eroding our overall strength even as new threats are
becoming evident in Asia. Our military is being stretched so thin we
are putting them at grave risk.
Unlike what is happening in the Balkans, there are other national
security threats to our country. By dissipating our limited resources,
asking our military for yet more sacrifice, we are doing a horrible
disservice to our country and to its defenders.
I have no doubt that the people of Kosovo have a right to their self-
determination, just as the people in Slovenia had a right to their
self-determination, in Croatia, in Macedonia, and in Bosnia. Yes, we
were given an option then, do nothing or send in the troops. We could
have then provided the support necessary for those people to fight for
their own independence, but instead, we held off, and then it was just
send in the American troops.
But the people of Kosovo, just like the people in Croatia, are
willing to fight for their own freedom. We are being told, it is either
send troops or do nothing. That is nonsense. If we are too timid to
even recognize that the people of Kosovo, 90 percent of whom want their
independence, they are Muslims, Albanians, who do not want to be under
the heel of oppression of the Serbs, if we cannot at least recognize
their independence, if we are too timid to do that, how can we ask our
own military to jump in the middle of that cauldron?
There is no peace plan. There is no peace plan at all. Our troops
will end up either being the police force of the Serbians, or we will
end up fighting the battle that the people of Kosovo are willing to
fight for themselves.
We have been promised things before in the Balkans. We have been
promised, the last time we have sent our troops, that it would take 1
year and $2 billion. That was 5 years and $12 billion ago. That
dissipation of our money, that stretching our troop strength so wide
that it is about to break, is causing great damage to our national
security.
The Balkans is not in America's national security interest. We can
talk about NATO in nostalgic terms all we want. The job of NATO was
done when the Soviet Union split apart. It is not our job now, because
at that time it was in our national security interest. Now it is not in
our interest to send our young people all over the world, trying to be
the police force of the world in a way that it weakens us as a Nation,
so when there are threats to us from China or from elsewhere, or in
Korea, that we will be unable to act, and that perhaps thousands of
American lives will be lost in situations like that.
Let us support the people of Kosovo's right to self-determination.
Let us give them the weapons they need to do their own fight, and not
have American lives at stake.
Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Chairman, I would just say, the gentleman's proposition would
lead to arms races globally, and increased murder. The choice we have
here today is to support peacekeeping, as compared to warmaking. It is
the right use for our people.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from North Dakota
(Mr. Pomeroy).
Mr. POMEROY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to
me.
Mr. Chairman, I would ask, what does it say about the United States
and its NATO allies that we cannot take on a two-bit bully down the
block? By allowing Milosevic to get away with his third brutal war in a
decade, the United States and NATO will send an encouraging message to
dictators, aggressors, and terrorists around the globe.
Those are not my words, Mr. Chairman. Those are the words of majority
leader Bob Dole in his testimony yesterday to the Committee on
International Relations. He is now charged with getting the parties to
an agreement, and is in the final stages of accomplishing that
extraordinarily difficult undertaking.
It is therefore deeply regrettable, Mr. Chairman, that we are having
this debate today. How can we reasonably make a decision on a
resolution regarding a peace agreement when the peace agreement itself
has yet to be finalized?
But we are where we are, so I urge Members to vote for the
resolution. The slaughter that has been occurring in Kosovo is so
deeply disturbing. If we look at the statistics, they are shocking. If
we look at the individual accounts, they are even more disturbing. I
have a 5-year-old daughter at home. When I read the New York Times
account of the 5-year-old that was hunted down in her backyard and
brutally murdered, and the photograph of her little shoes in the
garden, it is something of a tragedy of a magnitude we cannot ignore.
The U.S. role being considered is only a minor, supporting role. Our
participation will be 15 percent or less, we are told. It is a
situation where we have to do our part to bring the genocide and
atrocities to an end. Vote yes on the resolution.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from Colorado (Mr. Hefley), a member of the Committee on
Armed Services.
Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to
me.
Mr. Chairman, I am delighted we are doing this debate today. I think
that for us not to do this and to wait until it was too late would be a
terrible mistake. I think, as a member of the Committee on Armed
Services, there are four considerations that we need to
[[Page H1199]]
consider before we send troops into Kosovo.
First, the manner in which this administration has circumvented the
legislative process when it comes to deployment of U.S. military forces
around the world has been unprecedented, so it should come as no
surprise that the President does not want us to debate this today. The
President is the Commander in Chief, but he has a consultative partner
in the Congress. He ought to consult us about these things.
When we were debating Bosnia, Mr. Chairman, when we were going to
debate it that night, the President told me he did not care what we
thought about Bosnia. He did not care. He was sending troops into
Bosnia anyway. That should not be the attitude of the Chief Executive.
So we are doing something right here today. Even if he does not care
what we think, we are doing something that should be done.
Secondly, before we send troops in we should have a measure of
success. How do we know when we have done our job? How do we know when
we are finished, when we have completed it? I do not see that in the
plan at this point. I do not see any clear mission or goals or
accomplishment standards, what will be the measure of success.
Third, for the United States to enter the region, there should be a
signed agreement by both the Albanians and the Serbs. Following that,
there should be a request that we in NATO come in to help them. This is
a civil war in a sovereign nation. We should be there only at their
request.
I recently visited similar nations in the Balkans. We can see the
hatred all over that part of the world. The idea that we would be so
arrogant as to believe that we can go in and fix a problem without the
full participation of all the stakeholders in this is just ridiculous.
Then it is even more arrogant, I believe, to think we can mollify this
problem in a short period of time. We may be there a while, if we go
in.
Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
I would like to say that for all the talk of an end game, if we had
had the discussion when we put NATO forces in Europe to stop Communist
expansion, and said, how long are you going to be there, are you going
to be out of there in 2 years, out in a year, we would have lost Europe
while we were debating how long we would stay.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr.
Clement).
Mr. CLEMENT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to
me, and thank the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman).
This is a serious matter, we all know that. But the fact is, I think
a lot of us are questioning the timing of this. I was in Bosnia last
year with the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Ike Skelton) and others.
Those people were so appreciative of the United States, knowing that
the United States is the one and only superpower in the world. We also
know that we do not want to be the Big Brother in the world, as well.
But we also realize that we have a responsibility. We also know that
that is where World War I started, was in the Balkan area.
We have to ask ourselves the question, how can we help? How can we be
supportive, knowing that whatever we do it is not going to be just a
unilateral effort, it is going to be a number of other countries in
concert with the United States agreeing on a peace plan?
The atrocities over there are horrendous, how peoples' lives have
been destroyed, their homes are being destroyed, the looting. It was an
orchestrated conspiracy, and Milosevic, operating in Belfast, is going
to look at all of the things we are doing or not doing.
Yet, we know what Senator Dole has already said. The Republican
nominee for President has made it very clear why. This was before the
Committee on International Relations just yesterday. He said, ``I would
rather have the vote come after the agreement between the Kosovar
Albanians and Serbia.'' I think he is correct, because are we going to
put ourselves in a position where we are going to be responsible for
ruining any opportunity for peace at the table? Let us support our
leadership, and let us have peace in Kosovo.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Weldon).
Mr. WELDON of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for
yielding time to me.
I rise reluctantly to speak in opposition to sending our the United
States Armed Forces into Kosovo. If we look at the U.S. military, it is
overwhelmingly apparent that the Clinton administration has placed our
military budget and the needs of our men and women in uniform on the
back burner while greatly increasing the number of overseas
deployments.
By reducing our national defense budget and failing to provide the
funding necessary for training, equipment, and compensation, this
administration is eroding morale and troop strength. I cannot, in good
conscience, support sending our troops again overseas to support
another overseas mission. It is not fair to our troops. It is not fair
to our families.
Let us review some of the facts on this issue. The number of active
duty army divisions has been reduced from 18 to 8. Under the Clinton-
Gore administration, the number of fighter wings has gone down from 36
to 20. Our naval forces have been reduced by 30 percent.
Today our troops do not have enough ammunition. The Army is short
$1.7 billion in ammunition, the marines $193 million. Too many of our
men and women in uniform have gone too long without seeing their
families, their wives, their husbands, children, and parents. This is
having a terrible effect on morale and retention of a fine, qualified,
uniformed service.
This Administration's neglect of our troops has led to fewer troops
reenlisting and more troops leaving the Armed Forces. Some of our men
and women in uniform are actually on food stamps. This is an outrage.
It is time for this administration to put its money where its mouth
is. It is time for it to draw a line in the sand, and demand that we
send the right amount of funds to support our troops, particularly if
now we are going to send 3,000 more troops overseas to support another
unending overseas deployment.
{time} 1430
Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Maryland (Mr. Cummings), former speaker of the Maryland House.
Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank my colleague for yielding
time to me.
Mr. Chairman, I stand today in support of House Concurrent Resolution
42. Probably one of the most significant moments of my life was when,
back in December of 1997, I went over to Bosnia with the President.
There I saw our troops. When we arrived in Bosnia at about 5 or 6
o'clock in the morning, thousands of people had stood all night just to
simply say thank you for saving our lives. Thank you for giving us our
lives for Christmas.
The President is right. We have to act. We cannot just stand aside
and allow lives to be lost. The fact is that we have a duty, and we
must fulfill that duty. Lest we forget, let us not turn a blind eye.
Remember the Holocaust, remember South Africa, remember Rwanda.
Our Nation is a very, very powerful nation. The fact is, is that we
have to stand up and bring peace and bring life to life. So I stand in
support of House Concurrent Resolution 42 and urge all of my colleagues
to vote for it.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from New York (Mr. Houghton), a member of our Committee on
International Relations.
(Mr. HOUGHTON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. HOUGHTON. Mr. Chairman, I am tempted to go through the
philosophies and the history and the risks and the costs that are
involved here. But to me, and it may be a reflection on my own
position, to me, it is a very simple issue that we are in a situation
now where decisions have to be made. We can be doubtful and unclear and
opinionated about some of the things, whether it is the reigniting of
anarchy in Albania or destabilizing Macedonia, but that is not the
point.
The point is this is a horrible time I think to have this debate. If
we are going to have peace, we must have successful negotiations. We
are right in the middle of negotiations now.
no...@house.gov
[[Page H1200]]
If we vote down this resolution, the negotiations have no merit
because there is no incentive for the people to continue the
negotiations. If we vote for this resolution, we can continue the
negotiations. It is a nonbinding resolution. If we want to, we can take
up the issue whether we should have troops in Bosnia or not.
So, therefore, it is a very clear issue. Do we want to continue the
negotiations? Do we not want to continue the negotiations? I am for
continuing, and I am for this resolution.
Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Texas (Mr. Lampson).
Mr. LAMPSON. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to urge my colleagues to help
Kosovo achieve peace, not only for the benefits of the thousands of
people living in that troubled area of the world, but also for their
family members who live here in the United States.
Let me tell my colleagues about a family in my southeast Texas
district who has loved ones who are trapped in violence-torn Kosovo.
John and Lisa Halili, who own and operate an oyster and shrimping
business in San Leon, watch 24-hour television and read newspapers with
anxiety and anticipation each and every day. Why? Because John's father
and brother, and many other people, have been forced to flee their
homes and, in one instance, hide in a single house in the village of
Vushtrri.
Unfortunately, Bajram and Idriz Halili have been unable to leave
their hideaway and escape to the safety of the United States. So they,
along with their son and daughter-in-law in Texas, wait and wait and
wait for peace to come to Kosovo and the entire region.
Feeling helpless and sometimes hopeless, John and Lisa have contacted
me, hoping that I, as a United States Representative, could do
something to diminish their worry or reunite their family.
Unlike the Halilis, Congress is not helpless, nor should it be
hopeless about peace talks in Kosovo. I know that there are other areas
of the world that are crying out for help, including places in our own
country. But where we can make a difference, we have an obligation to
do so. We have the duty to do whatever it takes to help this troubled
region of the world create an environment of peace for its people and
their families who live within all of our Congressional District.
We as a Congress have a responsibility to support the President so
that the United States speaks with one voice on foreign policy.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from New York (Mr. Lazio).
Mr. LAZIO. Mr. Chairman, I want to begin by congratulating and
thanking the chairman, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman) for his
leadership in helping to move this to a debate which is such an
important part of this process.
One of the most important accomplishments of which America can be
justly proud is its victory in the Cold War, a 50-year struggle during
which literally 500 million people were liberated from control of the
Soviets.
Our ideals, our American ideals of democracy and market capitalism
are in triumph throughout the world, but not in every corner of the
world. With that triumph comes some responsibility.
In the Balkans where slaughter and bloodshed and systemic rape as a
tool of terror have been used over and over again, where families and
villages have been wiped out, America properly has a role, not the only
role, but a leading role. But this is a sobering debate frankly because
of some of the failures of our foreign policy that got us here.
I am in support of the Gilman amendment, because I believe in
America's role in ensuring the peace, in ensuring a strong, integrated
Europe. But let us remind ourselves of the fact that the Dayton Accord
helped perpetuate this because the people of Kosovo who pursued a
nonviolent strategy were left out. The message that was translated from
the State Department was that we will only be engaged if violence is
pursued as a tool. That is the wrong message.
The message from Milosevic was, if one pursues a strategy of violence
and terror, one can consolidate their gains; and we will not push them
back, and they will win.
When our lead negotiator, the Special Envoy to the Balkans, praised
Milosevic for his cooperation in Bosnia and branded the Kosovo
Liberation Army, ``without question a terrorist organization,'' what is
the message that he sends?
We must be there because of a failed American foreign policy, but we
must also be there to keep the people of Kosovo confident in America's
efforts.
Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Ohio (Mr. Traficant).
Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, a 1986 intelligence report warned us of
today's debate. They said the genocide in Kosovo will end by one of two
means, by Western governments assisting and pressuring Belgrade to
grant independence to Kosovo, or be revolutionized.
This is a tough vote. I, like everybody else, want to stop the
slaughter in Yugoslavia and in Kosovo. But let me say this, today's
vote will also reward an international tyrant Milosevic, because we
will be rewarding a flawed agreement.
This agreement should be modified to say, number one, upon enactment
of the agreement, there should be no Serbian troops in Kosovo; number
two, a provision clearly warning Milosevic he will be bombed if he
violates the terms of the agreement; number three, that all war
criminals will be apprehended and will be subject to prosecution, bar
none; and, number four, that, on conclusion of the terms of
Rambouillet, there shall be a referendum vote for independence.
God, we are here in the halls of Washington and Lincoln. In 1986,
they told us, there would be more genocide, more killing, more
oppression, and we have done nothing, and we are about to make the same
mistake.
This is a tough vote for me. But our committee must look at those
facts, Mr. Chairman. My bill clearly speaks to it. There should be an
amendment on this floor to modify that agreement, at least the sense of
this House to, in fact, infer that that subject mattered.
Be careful here. It just is not about deploying troops. Europe should
be providing those ground troops. We should be providing the air and
strategic support. But it is a tough vote, and I give credit to the
Speaker for at least taking up the issue. Our war making powers should
not come down from the White House.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Sanford), a member of our Committee
on International Relations.
Mr. SANFORD. Mr. Chairman, I stand as one against sending troops to
Kosovo and one very much behind the timing of this vote for a couple of
different reasons, but one in which was well described by Henry
Kissinger yesterday.
Yesterday, he said before our committee that he and President Nixon
believed that we were in trouble in Vietnam because our predecessors
had launched the U.S. into an enterprise in a distant region for worthy
causes but without adequately assessing the national interest and the
likely cost. Now, not after the troops are deployed, not after troops
are in the field, but now is the time to assess that cost.
I do not think it passes the cost test for a couple of different
reasons, the first of which is the domino theory has long been
disproven. Clifford Clark was sent by Lyndon Johnson to see our C2
allies in Southeast Asia over 30 years ago to use the same argument.
The C2 allies said, no, we do not think this will grow into a giant
conflict in Southeast Asia. We choose not to go into South Vietnam or
North Vietnam. We ignored their advice and, as a result, 50,000
American boys died.
The domino theory has been disproven. For us to send boys into Kosovo
means it has got to pass the mommy test. The mommy test for me means it
is not only in our strategic interest, but we also have a chance in
making a difference.
Here, as my colleague just pointed out just a moment ago, we were
signing an agreement with Milosevic, who is a person who does not
exactly have a lot of trust in the world community. Yet we are
validating him by signing an agreement with him. In other words, we are
building an agreement on shifting sand.
Thirdly, I would say that troops are thought to be used as policemen.
Modern armies are designed to move. They
[[Page H1201]]
are not designed to stand still. I sat on a plane the other day with a
young enlisted officer who complained about the fact that he had not
seen his baby in 6 months and was being used as a policeman in Bosnia.
Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Maryland (Mr. Cardin).
(Mr. CARDIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. CARDIN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania for
yielding me this time.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this resolution although I must
tell my colleagues I have certain misgivings. My misgivings are not
surrounded by the U.S. role, because I think it is clear that the
United States has a very vital role in this peace process. The
stability in the Balkans are very important to our national interests,
and we are not going to achieve peace in the Balkans without U.S.
leadership.
It is important for the United States to maintain a very strong
position with NATO. So I support the Clinton administration's efforts
in this area.
My concern is a matter of timing. Why are we considering this
resolution now? I agree with my friend the gentleman from New York (Mr.
Houghton) in his comments, in that we should have an agreement first
before we are asked to vote on what the United States' role should be
in enforcing that peace agreement.
We do not know what the agreement itself will be. However, I plan to
vote in support of this resolution because I want to make it clear that
I support the Clinton administration's efforts to bring peace to the
Balkans, that I acknowledge that the U.S. will play, must play a
leadership role in enforcing that peace agreement that we hope will be
achieved.
By voting for this resolution, I think we move forward the peace
process in the Balkans. If we do otherwise, then we are going to be at
least partially responsible for making it more difficult for us to
achieve peace in that very difficult area of the world.
Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support the resolution if we
must vote on it today. If we must vote on it today, then we should
support it.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Paul).
(Mr. PAUL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. PAUL. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the leadership for allowing
this debate to come to the floor. I have, for quite a few weeks,
advocated that we talk about this and have urge that the troops never
be sent to Kosovo without our consent. I do believe, though, that the
process here is less than perfect. The fact that we are talking about a
House Concurrent Resolution at the same time authorizing troop
deployment raises serious questions.
{time} 1445
Since World War II we have not been diligent here in the Congress to
protect our prerogatives with respect to the declaration of war. Korean
and Vietnam wars were fought without a declaration of war. And these
wars were not won.
Since 1973, since the War Powers Resolution was passed, we have
further undermined the authority of the Congress and delivered more
authority to the President because the resolution essentially has given
the President more power to wage war up to 90 days without the Congress
granting authority. It is to our credit at least that we are bringing
this matter up at this particular time.
We must remember that there are various things involved here. First,
whether or not we should be the world policeman. That answer should be
easy. We should not be. It costs a lot of money to do what we are
doing, and it undermines our military strength. So we should consider
that.
We should consider the law and the process in the War Powers
Resolution and just exactly how we grant authority to the President to
wage war. We should be more concerned about the Constitution and how we
should give this authority. We should be concerned about this
procedure.
The bigger question here, however, is if we vote for this, and I
strongly oppose passing this, because if we vote for this, we authorize
the moving of troops into a dangerous area. We should ask ourselves, if
we are willing to vote for this resolution; are we ourselves willing to
go to Kosovo and expose our lives on the front lines? Are we willing to
send our children or our grandchildren; to not only be exposed to the
danger, with the pretext we are going to save the world, but with the
idea that we may lose our life? That is what we have to consider.
Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
New Jersey (Mr. Menendez).
(Mr. MENENDEZ asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, now is not the time to have this debate.
Too much is at stake to risk sending a message of America's disunity at
this critical point in the negotiations. Innocent men, women and
children, little babies, entire families have been butchered, children
have been orphaned, women have been raped, 400,000 people have been
driven from their homes. That is what is at stake here today: human
lives.
If we are the leaders of the free world, if we are still that brave
Nation that stood against darkness in World War II, now is the time to
stand together to help the people of Kosovo find peace. But as we
speak, negotiations are at a critical stage. We are either on the brink
of a breakthrough or at the point of a breakdown. If the negotiations
succeed, thousands of lives will be saved. Thousands of these children
will live to grow up. And if we fail, many of these people will die.
With all that at stake, at a time when these poor people are looking
to us for stability, to help them find their way back to peace, why are
Republicans holding this debate here today at the very moment we need
to show unity?
If there are parts of any final agreement we want to debate, then for
God's sake, let us wait until we see it, let us wait until the ink is
dry, let us wait until it is signed. Right now there is no accord to
debate, there is only the possibility of sabotaging the process before
it has had the chance to reach a conclusion.
That is why this premature debate is the very height of
irresponsibility, and even more so because this is where World War I
began. My colleagues, past is prologue, and we should not have to learn
this lesson twice. This region does have strategic importance to the
United States and many Americans died when the world ignored these
tensions once before.
Preventing an escalation will save American lives in the long run. We
cannot afford a war in Kosovo that could destabilize the region, that
could spill over into Albania, to Macedonia, Turkey, and Greece, which
are NATO allies. We should be standing together. We should be
supporting these negotiations. We should be supporting the suffering
families in Kosovo, and we should have delayed this debate until the
negotiators have had the time to finish their work.
But if Republicans want to force a decision now, the decision should
be and must be that this is a cause and a region in the national
interests of the United States and, ultimately, in the national
security interests of the United States worth defending. And if troops
are needed to do that, we should support that mission and we should
support them.
Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to once again join with us to try
to delay this vote and, if not, then to vote to send a clear message
that America stands ready to help in Kosovo.
Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
New Jersey (Mr. Rothman).
(Mr. ROTHMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. ROTHMAN. Mr. Chairman, the peace talks in Kosovo are predicated
on one very simple premise: The international community must pose a
credible military threat to enforce any peace agreement that is reached
between the Kosovars and the Serbs.
To discuss today whether or not the United States, the world's only
superpower and the world's greatest military force, will lend its
support to any Kosovo peace settlement is premature and is
inappropriate at this time. To debate this issue today undermines the
efforts of the envoys who are trying to
[[Page H1202]]
negotiate a peace settlement between the Serbs and Kosovars.
However, the credible threat of military force does provide an
incentive for the Serbs and Kosovars to reach a peace agreement. To
debate this issue today threatens that incentive and could embolden
Slobodan Milosevic to reject NATO peacekeeping troops completely, and
could cause the Kosovars to give up on the peace process.
The bottom line, though, is that wavering American leadership in this
situation has the potential to lead to more bloodshed in Kosovo that
could spill over into other parts of Europe and metastasize beyond our
control. Mr. Chairman, we cannot have it both ways. We cannot be the
world's only superpower but then remain aloof when the situation
demands our leadership.
Mr. Chairman, I do not rise today to say that the United States is
obligated to resolve every conflict that erupts around the world. We
have the right to decide these matters on a case-by-case basis. But in
this case it is in our national interests to lend our country's support
to the international effort to prevent the return of wanton bloodshed,
murder, rape and wholesale slaughter in Kosovo.
The Balkans have been the birthplace of war before. Allowing a
conflict to explode in that region could have devastating consequences
to the peace and stability of Europe and, hence, to America's national
interests.
Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from
Maryland (Mr. Hoyer).
Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time, and I rise in support of this resolution; in support of basic
human rights, in support of doing the right thing for our country and
for the people of Kosovo.
I welcome this debate, Mr. Chairman, yet I fear that in undertaking
it, what we have done today could have a very serious negative impact
on the current sensitive negotiations on a peace plan. That is why I
voted against the rule. The resolution, however, I pray, will be
passed; that America, at our shores, will stand united; that the
message we send this day will be that America is united in its
conviction and in its commitment to face tyranny where it finds it.
In addition, Mr. Chairman, I am hopeful that we will ratify and
support the representations of two American Presidents, President Bush
and President Clinton.
President Bush said, in his Christmas warning to Milosevic, and I
quote, ``In the event of a conflict in Kosovo, caused by Serbian
action, the U.S. will be prepared to employ military force against the
Serbians in Kosovo and in Serbia proper.'' That was George Bush, then
President of the United States, Christmas 1992.
Mr. Chairman, shortly thereafter, the President of the United States,
William Jefferson Clinton, recommitted to that proposition set forth by
George Bush; that Milosevic, perceived by this Nation as a war
criminal, perceived as savaging the people of Bosnia, if he tried to do
the same in Kosovo, would be confronted by America and, yes, by its
troops.
Mr. Chairman, today we hear that Robert Dole, the candidate for
President of the United States in 1996, testified before the Committee
on International Relations that we should not have this resolution on
the floor. But if we did have it on the floor, as we do, that it ought
to be passed.
That sentiment was shared by Jeane Kirkpatrick under President
Reagan, our representative to the United Nations, by Richard Perle, an
assistant in the Department of Defense, known as a hard-liner, I might
say. A conservative. Vin Weber, a member of this Congress, a close
friend of the former Speaker, signed a letter saying that this action
that the President proposes should be supported. And, lastly, I cite
Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Defense under Ronald Reagan.
Mr. Chairman, America's strength has, in instances overseas, been our
unit, our unity of purpose, our unity of conviction. It is clear that
the Europeans alone will not be able to summon up the political will
and, indeed, the military strength to confront this Bully of Belgrade,
as referred to by Senator Dole.
I would hope, my colleagues, that we come together today, as has Bob
Dole and Bill Clinton, Jeane Kirkpatrick and others, and Richard
Holbrooke, our perhaps next secretary of the United Nations--come
together and say that we will confront war crimes when our Presidents
commit us to that end; that we will support this President and
facilitate the attaining of an agreement. Because to facilitate that
agreement may not only save lives, but it will save the dispossession
of thousands of people. The dispossession from their homes, from their
lands.
Mr. Chairman, this is a great country, and I would remind my
Republican colleagues that when George Bush made a determination to
confront tyranny and send troops to Saudi Arabia, there was a request
on our side for a vote. President Bush asked Tom Foley, the Speaker of
the House of Representatives--and I sat in the room with him--let us
not vote now; let us support this policy so we can put together this
coalition and bring peace and stop this aggression. Speaker Foley
agreed to do so with the President of the United States.
And, indeed, when there was a vote, I tell my friends on the
Republican side of the aisle, as to whether or not we were going to
then deploy those troops in Saudi Arabia into Kuwait, that almost half
of our caucus supported President Bush. I hope we find that
bipartisanship today. I hope we follow Bob Dole. I hope we commit
ourselves to bipartisanship in foreign policy in confronting tyranny.
There are those who say that the United States has no strategic
interest in Kosovo, that we have no interest in the ``internal
affairs'' of another country, that war has become a ``fact of life'' in
the former Yugoslavia.
Mr. Chairman, I submit to you and my colleagues that helping to
resolve the crisis in Kosovo, as we have in Bosnia--stopping war in the
heart of Europe--is a preeminent strategic and moral interest of the
United States. The crisis in Kosovo, like Bosnia, has the potential to
ignite the entire Balkan region, undoing what we have achieved in
Bosnia and drawing in already unstable Albania, Macedonia and
potentially our NATO allies Greece and Turkey.
To those who say that the international community has no interest in
the ``internal affairs'' of another state, I say that both the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the Helsinki Final Act to
which the United States is a signatory, hold otherwise.
Fifty years ago, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights shattered
the idea that national sovereignty should shield governments from
scrutiny of their human rights records. This concept had long insulated
countries from being held accountable for the gross mistreatment of
their own citizens. In the aftermath of the Holocaust, the declaration
captured the world's revulsion of that traditional view of
international relations and made clear a new norm--how a state treats
its own people is of direct and legitimate concern to all states and is
not simply an internal affair of the state concerned. Thirty years
later, the Helsinki Final Act reaffirmed this principle.
Mr. Chairman, the events which have occurred in Kosovo since the
beginning of last year are but an escalation of the repression and
brutality the Albania Kosovars have suffered at the hands of the
Belgrade authorities since 1989 when Slobodan Milosevic unilaterally
revoked the substantial autonomy Kosovo enjoyed under the old Yugoslav
Federation. Of course, since the beginning of 1998 more than 2,000
ethnic Albanians--including women and children--have been killed, many
brutally massacred. Hundreds of villages have been destroyed, and more
than 400,000 people have been displaced. Make no mistake about it, this
is ethnic cleansing.
To those who say that what is happening in Kosovo is the continuation
of centuries old ethnic hatreds, and that ``War has become a fact of
life in this part of the world,'' I ask, what do you propose? Accept
the status quo? Let the opposing factions ``slug it out''--let the
bloodbath continue? I say this is totally unacceptable. Such a course
legitimizes the violence--the murder, the ethnic cleansing--and accepts
the premise that this is the kind of world in which we will always
live.
Mr. Chairman, Kosovo is not Bosnia. The situation on the ground is
certainly different in many ways, yet both share a common suffering--
the scourge of ethnic cleansing, and a common curse--Slobodan
Milosevic. The killing and devastation in Kosovo, like the ethnic
cleansing in Bosnia, are a direct result of the efforts of Milosevic
and his thugs to maintain and consolidate their power.
Mr. Chairman, the United States, NATO and the international community
have made a commitment to bring peace and long-term stability to the
former Yugoslavia. This is a long and difficult struggle, and any peace
agreement will not be effectively implemented without NATO muscle. The
United States must
[[Page H1203]]
lead and take a strong stand against the enemies of peace.
Mr. Chairman, NATO no longer confronts a monolithic enemy. The
threats with which it must now deal come from terrorism and regional
conflicts--like Kosovo. If we and our NATO allies are not willing to
confront the bullies in Kosovo and lay the groundwork for long-term
peace in that region, we will encourage such bullies and ensure that
they will act again sometime, somewhere, That is the lesson of history
we must not forget.
Vote for H. Con. Res. 42.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
South Carolina (Mr. Graham).
Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time. If we believe this operation is equal to what was going on in
Kuwait, we should vote ``yes''.
{time} 1500
If we see it to be different, then we ought to ask what are the
differences. I think it is dramatically different. Our country is about
to commit 4,000 young men and women into a sovereign nation, in a
region in that nation where 90 percent of the inhabitants of Kosovo are
Albanian, who are trying to become independent. We are about to get
ourselves in the middle of a Civil War. This is not fighting Saddam
Hussein, this is interjecting 4,000 Americans into a faraway place
where heartache is normal, where tyranny has existed before, and will
exist after. How do we come home?
You are asking the Congress to have a one-way ticket to a region of
the world that is not going to lead to a world war. It is going to be a
place where they will eventually figure out they can live together,
with our help, but our help should not include 4,000 young Americans
standing in the middle of people with a lot of hot temper. This makes
no sense. Piling this on top of Bosnia is unbelievably expensive. This
is different than Bosnia, this is different than Kuwait. The American
public does not understand what we are doing or why. And all the big
names in international politics to me have not justified why we are
there and how we are going to get out.
Secretary Kissinger says this is more like Vietnam than it is Kuwait.
I hope he is wrong, but I believe he is right. How many more young men
and women are going to go in faraway places to get in the middle of
civil wars where there is a dubious reason to be there to start with
and no way home? I hope none of them come home hurt or maimed. Vote
``no.'' Stand up for America.
Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman
from the District of Columbia (Ms. Norton).
Ms. NORTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time.
What has become of us, my friends? We may well be on the brink of a
peace agreement between the Serbian government and the Kosovo ethnic
Albanian population. Our hearts have been broken for months now. Yet in
the midst of possibility finally, a resolution on this floor to
polarize our country as to what it is already doing. We have been
polarized on domestic issues, but I think the American people expect
more of us when it comes to our international posture.
As I speak, we are erasing the rhetoric of bipartisanship that the
majority has sounded. Because if we cannot be bipartisan when our
country is in the midst of what looks like it can be a successful
effort to stop genocide, then I do not know when we can be bipartisan.
We are undermining not war but peace. There can be no debate that this
is in our national interest, and I have not heard that it is not. Nor
after the Bosnia precedent should there be any debate as to whether we
should go forward now having gotten this far.
What has happened to the Albanians is unspeakable. Milosevic began
shutting down their language institutions and he has ended with
genocide. We have gone, on the other side, from partisanship to
isolationism.
My friends, we cannot lead the world in war or in peace if every time
the party on the other side of the aisle wants to move, you on that
side says, ``We don't move simply because you want to move,'' and that
is what this comes down to. We are assuming the posture you have
historically assumed and yet now that it is our posture, because it is
our President, you have simply jumped to the other side, against the
national interest.
I ask you to stand beside our country, postpone this vote, but, to be
sure, I hope that you will not be found on the other side of a vote
that would undermine our country as it wages peace, not war.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Mica).
(Mr. MICA asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, I come reluctantly to the floor to oppose the
use of United States troops on the ground in Kosovo. I do that because
of two reasons. First, because of the lack of trust and confidence that
I have in this President, and secondly because of the pattern of
experience.
When I got elected in 1992 and began service in 1993, this President
inherited the question of Somalia which President Bush had started as a
humanitarian rescue effort. President Clinton turned that into a
national tragedy, a loss of our troops as we saw our troops drug
through the streets of Somalia. Where are we in Somalia 4 or 5 years
later? Just a few days ago 60 were killed in Somalia.
Then we had Haiti, our second experience in nation-building. And what
have we done in Haiti? We have traded one corrupt government for
supporting another corrupt government at the cost of billions to our
taxpayers. This President and this administration opposed an
international pan-African force in Rwanda before the genocide of our
time took place. That was the experience then, they said no troops
then, and after the genocide we sent our troops into that area.
Bosnia. Time and time again we have set deadlines for our troops in
Bosnia, and our troops are still in Bosnia and our troops are spread
thin across the globe with these deployments from this President, this
administration. Only after Congress stepped in and made sure that we
micromanaged the military effort in Bosnia did we ensure that our
troops would not be killed, that they would have adequate equipment and
that they would serve under United States command and not U.N.
international command. We have no exit strategy. Our military is
stretched to the limits. When the wives and mothers of our reserve
forces call me, I am going to refer them to 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
and this President.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to our
distinguished majority leader, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Armey).
Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Chairman, let me thank the gentleman from New York
(Mr. Gilman), the distinguished chairman of the Committee on
International Relations, for bringing this to the floor. I must tell
the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman) that this is not an easy vote
for me. Indeed I have spent most of the last week worrying and studying
about this vote and even at times trying to come to the point where I
could vote in agreement with you on this proposition, largely out of
the respect that I have for yourself, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr.
Skelton) and others that I have talked to. But I have to say, it has
been a struggle.
I have always been very proud of the American people, proud that
Americans love freedom so much that they are prepared to risk their
peace to defend the freedoms of others.
Since the end of the last war, we have rightly held a larger vision
of our national interest. We do not see it as merely defending our
coastal waters, protecting our commercial interests, or stopping an
invasion of our homeland. We have understood in a way that no other
people in history have that our freedom depends on the freedom of
others.
This principle has inspired our great national initiatives, the
Marshall Plan, the Truman Policy, the democratization of Japan, our
fights for freedom in Korea and Southeast Asia, the Reagan doctrine,
and most recently the expansion of the NATO Alliance for which many in
this body, including the gentleman from New York, and especially the
gentleman from New York, have been responsible.
The result of this effort is that America has made a world in which
hundreds of millions of human beings are living in peace and under
governments of their own choosing and working together for their common
benefit. Very
[[Page H1204]]
few times in this bloody century would anyone have predicted that it
would have ended as well as it does. But it does, because of the wisdom
of the United States of America.
Mr. Chairman, we do have an enduring interest in a peaceful Europe.
What happens in the Balkans is important to our security. Indeed we
must do all we can reasonably expect to do to prevent further killing
and suffering in these troubled lands. But I cannot in good conscience
support the proposed deployment we are debating today. I believe it has
been poorly considered and is unlikely to achieve our desired ends.
I make this objection on purely practical grounds. Its central flaw
is that it depends on negotiating an agreement with the Serbia
dictator, the very man who is responsible for the Balkan horrors in the
first place. Mr. Chairman, he is a brutal killer and we can have no
confidence that he or his followers will respect any agreement that
might be reached.
On the other side will be the Kosovar Liberation Army, a new
formation with little experience in these matters. Its cause may be
noble, but there is little reason to hope its leadership will be able
to discipline its members. The agreement will, after all, come far
short of their desire for true independence.
Our troops may thus find themselves opposed by free-lance opponents
on both sides of this brutal conflict, opponents undisciplined by any
central authority. The resulting bloodshed may produce events that are
far more destabilizing than those the administration fears today. This
could be, Mr. Chairman, another Somalia. For these and other reasons I
have heard stated today, I believe this deployment is unwise and must
be opposed.
Mr. Chairman, we need to take a fresh look at our policy towards the
world's outlaw governments, not just in Serbia, but in Iraq, North
Korea and elsewhere. These rogue regimes are without question the
greatest security threat we face today. The administration response to
them has been haphazard containment efforts, loose arms control
arrangements or other negotiations. Containment and negotiation,
however, can do little to solve the underlying problem, the very
existence of the regimes. What we need is a new version of the Reagan
Doctrine of the 1980s, a policy that seeks not to contain these regimes
but to replace them with democratic alternatives.
Last year, Congress began to shape exactly such a policy towards Iraq
with our passage of the Iraq Liberation Act. We need to consider
similar legislation for other rogue states, including Serbia. I for one
reject the idea that the Serbian people are themselves inherently bent
on ethnic warfare. As the large civil liberties protests in Belgrade
have shown, they aspire to the same democratic privileges that other
Europeans enjoy.
The problem, Mr. Chairman, is Milosevic. Had we followed a determined
policy to change his regime, we could have vastly improved the
prospects for peace in the Balkans and liberated the Serbian people as
well. It is time to begin such a policy now.
The lesson of the Cold War should be clear. True peace, justice and
security come not from negotiating with inhuman regimes but
transcending them. Even the most enduring dictatorships can melt before
the power and the ideals of the United States. The power of freedom is
an ideal shared by all people. It can be and must be in the end larger
than any man, no matter how brutal.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the majority leader for his words
with regard to this issue.
Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Texas (Mr. Turner).
Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, the debate we are entered upon today has
the gravest of consequences for our Nation and for our future. Having
recently returned from Bosnia, I had the opportunity there to learn a
little bit about the attitudes present in that region. One thing that I
did learn is that our allies, our NATO allies, have a strong commitment
to keeping peace in the Balkans and they feel very strongly about our
willingness as a NATO partner to stand tall with them in this crisis. I
also learned from talking to some of our military leaders that there is
a clear relationship between the situation in Bosnia and the developing
events in Kosovo. Our investment in Bosnia, as one military leader told
me, is clearly threatened by the developments in Kosovo.
{time} 1515
I also had the opportunity to talk with soldiers on the ground who
are doing an excellent job keeping the peace in Bosnia, and, as one
first sergeant shared with us in testimony before a committee hearing,
he has made a spiritual investment in Bosnia and believes very strongly
that we have done the right thing in trying to help keep the peace
there. He said because of our soldiers children now go to school in
Bosnia, can safely play in playgrounds without fear of land mines or
snipers. We have clearly accomplished the objective of keeping peace in
Bosnia, and the relationship between the situation in Kosovo and Bosnia
is undisputed by those who serve us in our Armed Forces.
I also learned that there are clear limits to what we can hope to
accomplish in that part of the world, and for that reason there must be
clear guidelines before we commit troops to any mission, any joint NATO
mission, in Kosovo. Those principles were set out by the President in a
February 4 address, and I think we must include those principles in the
resolution that will be adopted here today.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the
gentleman from Utah (Mr. Hansen).
(Mr. HANSEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. HANSEN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the resolution.
Mr. Chairman, I believe this debate is timely and important. Public
debate, by those Representatives closest to the people, before our
troops are put in harms way, is not a sign of weakness and division but
rather a clear reminder that the great power of America comes not from
its government, or its military might, but from its people and their
commitment to freedom, peace and democracy.
In my recent travels to the Balkans and Southwest Asia, I have been
greatly impressed by the professionalism of our soldiers, sailors,
airmen, and marines. They have done tremendous service to our country
with few rewards. They care for their aging equipment with great pride,
though hampered by a worsening shortage of spare parts and lack of
meaningful training. While at home, their loved ones struggle to keep
their families together during the many long separations. The military
mission to Bosnia has been an almost flawless success.
In contrast, the foreign policy and political decisions that so
easily put our troops in harms way is a growing failure.
This administration has engaged our troops too often, for too long,
with too small a budget and with too little support from the American
people, the Congress and the world. Our soldiers can stop the fighting,
but Bosnia is not closer to peaceful, stable government today than they
were 5 years ago. Remember, the President promised this effort would
take only 1 year and cost $1 billion. Five years and $10 billion later
there is no end in sight.
In this new age foreign policy, which replaces ``power projection''
with ``sympathy projection,'' we find the easier it is for the United
States to commit its troops into the war zone, the harder it is to get
them out. The objectives of these new entanglements are ambiguous--if
stated at all. The goals change in the middle of the operation. The
troops are left without any way of gauging their progress or even
visualizing the set of circumstances which would enable them to finally
return home.
Today our troops are engaged in Africa, Asia, Europe, and South and
Central America--virtually all over the globe. And they are doing a
magnificient job with only half of the cold war force, and 35 percent
fewer resources. The rate of overseas deployments is up more than 400
percent in this administration alone. Meanwhile, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff stated requirement for an additional $22 billion in defense
investment falls on deaf ears at the White House.
Now we learn that there is another crisis that ``requires'' American
intervention. This time the call comes not from a threatened ally, a
loyal friend or even a recognized country, but from a province within a
sovereign country. When will it end? Or will this new policy or well
meaning enlargement, simply encourage any group with a gripe to choose
separation over the harder course of honest dialogue and true
democracy. There is no doubt in my mind that Serbian President Milosvic
is a brutal and oppressive thug who is guilty of crimes against
humanity and genocide. However, an invasion of his country to embrace a
``county'' in search of independence can only speed our sinking into a
Balkan quagmire.
[[Page H1205]]
Though we would like to think we can, America cannot erase, merely by
its presence, the animosity between religious and ethnic enemies. We
cannot cause a love of freedom and devotion to democracy to bloom in
this fallow land. We cannot make thugs and tyrants believe that ``it
takes a village''. U.S. troops separating warring factions does nothing
to soothe the root cause of the hatred. It only delays the explosion of
vengeance and mistrust. As I see it, these conflicts will eventually
explode. We can only choose whether the explosion happens with U.S.
troops at ground zero or not.
With regard to the prestige and effectiveness of NATO. The only
action which weakens our most important alliance is this President's
repeated use of empty threats of therapeutic air strikes and endless
promises that twenty thousand troops can solve in 1 year--problems
which have defied solution for thousands.
As the American presence lengthens in these ``peacemaking'' and
``nation building'' missions, the animosity inevitably broadens to also
be directed at our troops. Soon the referee is taking blows from both
of the fighters. Our troops must eventually defend themselves, but in
that self-defense they will only serve to increase the hate of both
sides toward America. In these situations, there is no resolution for
America, but shameful retreat or total war. Has the tragedy of Somalia
been that long ago? I cannot support this flawed political effort
without a clear goal, a believable exit strategy and guarantee that
this mission will not further degrade fragile military readiness.
In this case, the best way to support our troops is to keep them
home.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Michigan (Mr. Smith).
(Mr. SMITH of Michigan asked and was given permission to revise and
extend his remarks.)
Mr. SMITH of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I heard somebody on the other
side of the aisle say this is a partisan decision. Not so. Republicans
have mixed emotions. This is a serious decision. Our chairman is voting
for the resolution. Some of us question it very seriously. It is only
partisan if the Democrats decide that they are going to support
whatever the President might do.
It seems reasonable that the President of the United States should
come to not only Congress, but the American people, and present some of
the reasons why it is in America's interest to send our young men and
women into this land of Serbia, into one of the regions of that
sovereign country called Kosovo, to risk their lives. There needs to be
a compelling reason. Dr. Kissinger yesterday said that we might have to
bomb our way in and then not really know which side is going to shoot
at us. The President is planning to deploy U.S. troops without a clear
objective or exit strategy.
Before we deploy any troops, we need clear answers to basic questions
like how will our presence advance lasting peace, and how long will our
troops remain in the region. Serbs and Albanians have fought in Kosovo,
an Albanian-dominated region of southern Serbia, for centuries.
Conflict in the last year between ethnic Albanian rebels and Serb
police has resulted in over 2,000 deaths.
If the President is not willing to come to Congress, and explain;
here is the plan, here is the strategy, here is how long we expect to
be there, here is what we expect American taxpayers to pay; what is
going to happen when we start taking out some of our young men and
women in body bags? One question I had to Dr. Kissinger is why is NATO
willing to commit 24,000 of their troops? His answer was partly the
U.S. demand and the U.S. initiative.
Mr. Chairman, we can not be the police force for the world. We can
not keep spending the Social Security trust fund money. One day, if we
are not careful we will not even have these options of helping those in
need.
While some remain optimistic about the potential peace agreement, I
have serious reservations. Ethnic Albanian leaders in Kosovo have said
that they will settle for nothing less than independence. Serbia
refuses to sign an agreement which dismembers the country. As Dr.
Kissinger stated, ``the projected Kosovo agreement is unlikely to enjoy
the support of the parties involved for a very long period of time.''
The long history of the ethnic conflict in the Balkans makes a
lasting peace in Kosovo unlikely, with or without a NATO presence. If
our goal is to quell the hostilities that have persevered for
centuries, than we will find ourselves in the same situation that we
face in Bosnia, where our troops deployed for an unlimited amount of
time, with no end in sight. U.S. troops have been in Bosnia-Herzegovina
since 1995 at a cost of more than $9 billion to the U.S. taxpayer.
Roughly 6,900 troops are still in Bosnia, even though President Clinton
promised that U.S. participation would be limited to one year.
Despite the massive cuts made to our military, we have more troops
deployed to hostile regions now than during the Cold War. Dr. Kissinger
made the point that ``each incremental deployment into the Balkans is
bound to weaken our ability to deal with Saddam Hussein and North
Korea.''
If NATO intervenes with troops in Kosovo, the U.S. can assist its
NATO partners with communications and intelligence support and back a
political strategy aimed at boosting Serbian opposition to Serbian
President Milosevic. However, I will not support Congressional
authorization to deploy ground troops into a civil conflict with a
sovereign nation to enforce a peace agreement that neither side
supports.
Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
New York (Mr. Engel).
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding this time
to me.
As I mentioned before, I think this resolution is ill-timed and we
should not be doing this, but since it is on the floor I rise to
support the Gilman resolution.
Carnage has gone on in Kosova for too long, and by the way, I say
Kosova with an ``A'' because 92 percent of the people that live there
are ethnic Albanians and pronounce it Kosova. Ethnic and cleansing and
genocide has gone on for too long. The butcher of Kosova, Slobodan
Milosevic, continues to kill people. We continue to see genocide on the
face of Europe. We cannot sit still and continue to allow this to
happen. Until the United States stepped in in Bosnia, we saw 200,000
people ethnically cleansed by Milosevic and his people, murdered, and
we are going to see it again unless the United States grabs the bull by
the horns.
We were told by some on the other side of the aisle that when U.S.
troops went to Bosnia there would be many, many American casualties.
That has not happened. It will not happen in Kosova, but we will
prevent innocent civilians from dying.
I support independence for the people of Kosova because I believe
that is the only long-range plan that works, they are entitled to the
same things that we hold dear, they are entitled when Yugoslavia broke
up the former Yugoslavia, the Croats, and the Slovenians, and the
Bosnians, and the Macedonians all had the right to independence and
self-determination. The Kosovar Albanians should have that same right.
This agreement does not do that, but at least it stops the killing, it
stops the ethnic cleansing, it gives them half a loaf.
Milosevic does not want it. He does not want U.S. troops or NATO
troops because he wants to keep the killing and he wants to keep the
stranglehold on the people of Kosova that have no political rights, no
economic rights, no human rights.
NATO has to lead, and the United States has to lead in NATO. NATO
cannot do it alone. If we are not the leaders, we will not be
successful, NATO will not be successful, and I say to my colleagues we
cannot be in favor of stopping genocide and helping the Albanians if we
are not willing to have NATO troops on the ground with U.S. leadership
and U.S. participation. This is in the vital interests of the U.S. We
do not want a larger war.
We need to support the Gilman resolution. It is time to step up to
the plate.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
South Carolina (Mr. Spence), the chairman of our Committee on Armed
Services.
(Mr. SPENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I have some prepared remarks I would like
to make on this subject, but, if I might, I would like to submit my
remarks for the Record and try to sum up how I feel about this very
important resolution we have before us today.
Of course, as chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, I know
that each and every Member will support our men and women in uniform
whenever and wherever they are called upon
[[Page H1206]]
to go in harm's way. That is why I am in opposition to sending ground
forces to Kosovo, however my colleagues want to pronounce it. My
abiding concern is for the ability of our fighting forces to respond to
crises that amount to real wars. We are right now stretched thin all
over the world with all kind of commitments. The op tempo is great. We
have torn down our forces to the extent that I have very real grave
concerns about our ability to carry out our national strategy of being
able to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major regional
contingencies, or whatever they call them.
We ask our military leaders are we capable, what is our position, our
readiness from the standpoint of being able to carry out this mission,
and they tell us that they can do it, but the risk will be high to
moderate. Mr. Chairman, high to moderate means hundreds of thousands of
casualties I am not prepared to take.
Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Texas (Mr. Hall).
(Mr. HALL of Texas asked and was given permission to revise and
extend his remarks.)
Mr. HALL of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to express my dire
concern and the concern of many of my constituents in my district and
in my State regarding any further deployment of U.S. troops to Kosovo.
I would like to thank the Speaker for providing us with the opportunity
to state our beliefs at this time on this controversial issue, and I
thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Hoeffel) and the leadership
of my party for giving me this opportunity to differ with my party on
this very important item.
I have always supported our uniformed service members and will
continue to do so, but I just cannot support the deployment of our sons
and daughters to locations around the world where we, as an
administration, we, as a Congress, we, as a country, have not
explicitly spelled out our objectives.
Do I regret suffering around the world? Of course. Everyone here does
on both sides of the aisle. But would I sacrifice one American life for
all of Bosnia, Iraq or Kosovo? I absolutely would not without a true
national interest, or a plan to successfully enter, a plan to
successfully succeed and a plan to successfully leave.
Originally the administration assured Congress that it would not send
troops to Kosovo without first providing this body a chance to consider
such an action, but the administration knows that this Congress will
always support our troops once they are deployed, so off they went. And
I would like to ask the President what is our strategy in Kosovo, what
are our objectives, how long are we going to keep our men and women in
uniform away from their families, what action dictates their return
and, finally, what is the overriding national interest in Kosovo that
has prepared him to risk the life of a single American.
In 1996 there were 15,000 American soldiers in Bosnia. Today there
are still some 7,000. We promised our troops an end to Bosnia, yet they
remain a broken promise. At some time we are going to have to keep our
promises to the young men and women of arms of this country.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
North Carolina (Mr. Burr), a member of our Committee on International
Relations.
(Mr. BURR of North Carolina asked and was given permission to revise
and extend his remarks.)
Mr. BURR of North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for
yielding this time to me.
I had remarks to make, and I cannot make them. As I have sat here, I
found that this is an ever-changing process and some are not relevant.
I would only say to many of my colleagues who suggest that this is ill-
timed, to debate whether we send troops is not ill-timed. It is, in
fact, a debate that I believe our process demands.
That process also demands us to ask questions like my colleague from
Texas just asked: Does a deployment to this region make us too thin for
the mission of protecting our national interests? What is our exit
strategy? Will a peace agreement that may be reached be agreed to by
both sides? These are legitimate questions that we need answers to
before we agree to anything.
I found myself going through this process when I sat down with people
that I have a great deal of confidence in: Senator Dole, Jeane
Kirkpatrick, Henry Kissinger, those mountains of the past in foreign
policy and, more important, in United States policy.
As my colleagues know, Mr. Chairman, there are people around the
world that will watch what we do. They will watch what we do, and they
will watch how we act. They realize, as we do, that as we see more and
more evidence of genocide on the TV, that we reach out not necessarily
because of national interests, but because of injustice, injustice in a
region where we have seen martial law take doctors and teachers and
eliminate their profession.
We have many questions to find answers to. I am hopeful that the
resolution that we have got we can perfect and that we can have
unanimous support, but until that point we have a tremendous amount of
work to do, and this administration has a tremendous number of
questions to answer.
Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
North Carolina (Mr. Price).
(Mr. PRICE of North Carolina asked and was given permission to revise
and extend his remarks.)
Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, at least 2,000 people have
been killed and 400,000 have been displaced over this past year by
Slobodan Milosevic's genocidal campaign of violence and human rights
abuses against the 2 million ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. The peace
process now underway represents our best hope for ending this
bloodshed. We do not know if this peace process will succeed, but we do
know that NATO is the best and most credible peacekeeping force, and we
know that U.S. participation may be critical to the viability of NATO
operations.
{time} 1530
A vote at this point against authorizing the deployment of troops
will embolden Milosevic, disrupt the peace process, and call into
question our commitment to NATO.
It used to be said, Mr. Chairman, that politics stopped at the
water's edge. It used to be that if a President said, as this President
has, that a divisive vote of this sort would undermine delicate
negotiations and would harm national security, that that vote would be
deferred.
This raw display of partisanship, this calculated attempt to
undermine the President, and this reckless disregard for the
consequences of our action are unworthy of this body and should be
rejected.
This resolution should not be on the floor in the first place, and
bringing it up is an irresponsible act. But since it is before us and
since the delicate peace negotiations are at risk, the only responsible
vote is yes.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman
from North Carolina (Mr. Hayes).
(Mr. HAYES asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. HAYES. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to House Concurrent
Resolution 42. This is not a partisan issue. I oppose sending our
troops to Kosovo. However, I strongly support the Speaker's call for
debate on this issue.
Enough is enough. We can no longer expect some of the Nation's finest
men and women to travel halfway around the world to accomplish a
mission without objectives.
Mr. Chairman, my district, the 8th of North Carolina, is steeped in
military tradition. We hail Fort Bragg and Pope Air Force Base as our
own, two installations that have sent their fair share into combat. I
visit these bases frequently and I am sure these young men and women I
speak to there are no different than the million and a half soldiers we
have stationed all over the world.
What amazes me every time I speak with these young soldiers is,
without exception, the can-do spirit they demonstrate. They so quickly
forget the sacrifices we asked of them yesterday to accept the
challenges of tomorrow, never once questioning why their government
continues to ask for more while giving less.
In the forty years leading up to 1990, the United States deployed our
troops 10 times. Since then, in only nine years, this country has
deployed more
[[Page H1207]]
than 25 times; 19 under this administration.
Mr. Chairman, today I am doing what all of our men and women in this
service proudly resist. I am asking why? I am asking why do we continue
to send our troops on missions navigated by an administration with
seemingly rudderless foreign policy?
Nearly 20 years ago, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger laid out
a doctrine of criterion that must be met before our forces are sent
into combat.
Is a vital national interest at stake? Will we commit sufficient
resources to win? Will we sustain the commitment? Are the objectives
clearly defined? Is there a reasonable expectation that the public and
Congress support the mission? Have we exhausted our options? And I
would add we must have a clear exit strategy.
Mr. Chairman, on the eve of yet another deployment I ask my
colleagues to join me in sending the administration a strong message.
Do not approve, do not send our troops to Kosovo.
Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2 minutes.
Mr. Chairman, I rise today to express my support for this resolution
and for the attempts to bring peace and stability to Kosovo. While
valid questions have been asked whether or not this is a reasonable
time to debate this issue, we now must act and send a message to
Milosevic and to the world community that enough is enough.
The U.S. must demonstrate leadership. We can only help bring about
democracy, peace and stability, the cornerstones of our society, if we
engage, if we send troops, as part of a NATO peacekeeping force.
Mr. Chairman, our purpose in sending troops if a peace agreement is
reached is clear, to help implement and enforce that peace. We must not
shrink from this responsibility. We must not allow politics to
undermine our leadership abroad. We must stand tall.
Just yesterday, as I sat as a member of the Committee on
International Relations, I heard Ambassador Kirkpatrick say that it is
important for Congress to vote yes. I urge all of my colleagues to do
so.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New
Jersey (Mr. Smith), the distinguished chairman of our Subcommittee on
International Operations and Human Rights.
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the
resolution before us. Frankly, the administration, the Congress, our
allies and the international community as a whole have no easy choices
regarding Kosovo.
Many of our colleagues agree that the United States has the
responsibility to assert its leadership in the world. In asserting this
leadership role, I believe that it is in the interest of the United
States to include protection of human rights, especially the mitigation
of atrocities and the cessation of slaughter, and this sometimes
requires the prudent use of force.
As we debate the deployment of American troops in Kosovo, however,
those of us who had advocated last summer and in the fall that NATO
should intervene, not as peacekeepers but peacemakers, to stop the
Serbian offensive against innocent civilians in Kosovo feel that we
have lost some very significant ground.
NATO has threatened to intervene time and time again and its
credibility regrettably has been tarnished by inaction. Innocent lives
have been lost as a result of indecision, and now one of the seemingly
only alternatives is the deployment of NATO forces, including our own
troops, in an environment in which one side or another may test NATO's
resolve.
Many of us felt the same frustration regarding the United States,
policy towards Bosnia. The Dayton agreement of late 1995 was no
substitute for action. Even just lifting the arms embargo might have
made a significant difference in stopping that genocide in those early
years.
At yesterday's hearing in the Committee on International Relations
regarding Kosovo, Senator Bob Dole and Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick
made very convincing arguments for participation in a peacekeeping
force. I have sympathy with those who take the side that Former
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger made about not being involved in all
of the conflicts around the world. We must, however, consider
involvement where we can make a difference. Kosovo fits that category.
I want to say very clearly, unambiguously, I respect everyone's
position on this. This is one of the harder, more difficult issues that
we have to decide, and we need to listen to all sides, obviously, as we
work through this policy decision.
I intend, Mr. Chairman, to vote for H. Con. Res. 42 as introduced. I
think many of us do have some misgivings about our own Commander-in-
Chief. It is very often not said but thought, but we need to factor in
that fact.
I do believe this is the right thing to do at this particular time.
Failing to participate could mean a further slaughter, perhaps on a
larger scale, of innocent civilians in the Balkans. Failing to
participate could lead to a renewed Balkan conflict which could spread
to neighboring Macedonia and elsewhere. Failing to do so will send a
signal that the United States will not take the lead, even when matters
of principle are being challenged, when people are being killed in
droves, to the detriment of NATO and the other alliances we have around
the world.
This is a resolution that I think deserves support and I hope Members
will consider doing so.
Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from
Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).
(Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas asked and was given permission to revise
and extend her remarks.)
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I rise this afternoon to save
lives. I rise in particular to acknowledge the gentleman from New York
(Chairman Gilman), and the ranking member, the gentleman from
Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson) for realizing the importance of this
commitment.
I would, however, disagree that we should even be on the floor today
precipitously raising this issue, because I believe that we still have
the opportunity for a peace agreement, and we should have awaited what
the details of that peace agreement would be.
There is not one American, Mr. Chairman, that has not acknowledged
and has not shared in the hurt and the pain of the disaster in Kosovo
and the terrible strife between Albanians and Serbs; there is not one.
There is not one that has not watched the bloodshed, has seen the
reports of massacres, seen the untold graves that have been discovered,
there is not one American that does not realize that we hold a very
privileged position in this world. It is one where others look to us.
Mr. Chairman, I do not come here out of guessing, reading news
articles and looking at news reports. I went to Bosnia. I went there on
behalf of the President at the start of us trying to determine how we
in this Congress and the United States could best respond to the
terrible plight of innocent people, women and children.
It was my belief, my heartfelt and studied belief, that the Dayton
Peace Treaty was right. Why? Was it because I sat in rooms behind
closed door? No. Because I walked the streets of Sarajevo and talked to
the people there who said, please help us.
I, too, do not want to see American lives lost. I do not want to send
young men and women in harm's way, but I say we have got a wonderful
bunch in the military, proud, determined, fine. I think we should get
behind them in a bipartisan way, Mr. Chairman, and support this
resolution but let us not do danger to the peace operations that are
going on.
I rise in support of H. Con. Res. 42. This resolution authorizes the
President's use of approximately 4,000 troops for a peacekeeping
operation with Kosovo.
This Body can send an invaluable message to the peace negotiations,
which begin next week. In sending our troops we signal our willingness
to participate as partners in peace. In sending our troops we signal
our continued resolve to see that all of the people of the Balkans
enjoy the benefits of their human rights. In sending our troops we
signal our willingness to be accountable to our NATO commitments and to
the world as its sole remaining super power.
If this Body fails to adopt this resolution now it would be
interpreted as a vote of no confidence for our foreign policy in the
Balkans. It would send confusing signals about our national resolve to
persevere to friend and foe alike. I wish we were not considering this
bill
no...@house.gov
[[Page H1221]]
do anything but just go to Kosovo, hold the hands of both sides and
hope that they will behave when we leave. But of course they will not.
The killing and mayhem will continue as soon as NATO pulls out.
So how long does the President plan to keep our troops there any way?
No occupation can or should last forever.
There is a litany of reasons why we should not send troops to Kosovo,
but the most compelling are the new power and responsibilities the
mission unthinkingly gives to NATO. There are serious concerns about
this new peace making direction for NATO. Its purpose is always to be a
defensive alliance, not an offensive force.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Texas (Mr. DeLay) has
expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. DeLay was allowed to proceed for 2
additional minutes.)
Mr. DeLAY. Mr. Chairman, NATO's purpose has always been a defensive
alliance, not an offensive force going into nonmember nations
uninvited. Once NATO starts meddling in the internal affairs of
sovereign nations, where does it stop? Think about this question for a
moment. Outside of the questions of time and cost and objective, the
Kosovo policy we are debating here today would have tremendous
ramification on NATO's overall mission. We have to take a stand against
these kinds of deployments now to ensure that we stop them before they
ever get started.
NATO is starting to resemble a power-hungry imperialist army.
Originally designed to defend member nations from attack, it is now
setting itself up to be the attacker. Despite the fact that the two
parties in Kosovo refuse to negotiate even directly amongst themselves
and have rejected a cease-fire, the administration threatens to bomb
the Serbs to make them cooperate at the peace table.
There is one major catch here. There is no peace table, just like
there is no peace. The two sides continue to attack one another with a
vengeance. It does not matter how many soldiers NATO sends over there,
no number of troops can keep peace if there is no peace to begin with.
The proposed Kosovo mission is just another bad idea in a foreign
policy with no focus.
As with all the recent failures in American diplomacy, the
administration is trying to obscure its lack of a comprehensive agenda,
and they are doing it with bombs. Bombing a sovereign nation for ill-
defined reasons with vague objectives undermines the American stature
in the world. The international respect and trust for America has
diminished every time we casually let the bombs fly. We must stop
giving the appearance that our foreign policy is formulated by the
Unabomber.
Mr. Chairman, sending U.S. troops to Kosovo is a lose-lose situation.
No matter how we look at it, it is dangerous, it is costly.
America has no strategic interests in the matter, and no one wants us
to be there in the first place. Support the gentlewoman from Florida's
amendment.
Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the underlying amendment,
the Gejdenson amendment limiting the U.S. share of the operation 15
percent, and in opposition to the second degree amendment.
I was a bit puzzled by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Sam Johnson),
who preceded me in the well, who stated that we were voting on an
agreement that was not yet complete and, therefore, we should vote
against it. I share part of that concern. I wish that the leaders of
the House had held this debate until the agreement was complete. I
talked to the White House today. They assured me that if an agreement
is reached, and I believe if we vote in opposition to this resolution
an agreement will not be reached, that there would be a minimum,
absolute minimum, of 3 days before U.S. troop deployment could begin.
That would give the House more than ample time. We could stay here this
weekend and conduct the Nation's business with the full facts of the
peace agreement before us instead of having to vote in the context of
are we undermining the peace agreement that might happen or are we not,
which is what we are doing right now in this debate.
There is no one in this House whose been a stronger proponent for
more than a decade of the restoration of the rightful powers of the
Congress when it comes to war powers. As my colleagues know, there are
a few who have been more critical of the lack of participation of our
wealthy NATO allies in many things, including their own defense during
the years of threat by the Soviet Union. But that said, the timing of
the resolution before us and the debate are very troubling. As my
colleagues know, we should not be having a debate on authorizing the
use of U.S. troops under not yet totally clear conditions while the
negotiations are ongoing.
Mr. Chairman, I really fear that a no vote here by the House of
Representatives tonight will embolden Mr. Milosevic and his genocidal
henchmen and keep them from signing an agreement. Some say we are
bullying him. Well, someone has got to stand up to the bullies in this
world, and perhaps it is time that the United States did.
On the other hand, a yes vote is problematic in that we do not have
the final agreement before us. The gentleman spoke the truth. What
should happen is we should stay in town. If an agreement is signed on
Saturday, we can meet on Saturday, we can meet on Sunday, we can meet
on Monday, and then we can consider a proper authorization which could
have conditions on length, duration, size of the deployment, scope of
deployment, objectives and all those things in it for an up or down
vote.
That would be the proper way to proceed in this matter.
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. DeFAZIO. I yield to the gentleman from Nebraska.
Mr. BEREUTER. We may come out on different sides of this, but I
thought the gentleman ought to know that one of the reasons why we are
in this debate from my perspective and I think from the perspective of
many people is that we were told the same sort of thing: Wait until the
Dayton accord is concluded. This is a very delicate negotiation; do not
get involved. But by the time the signature ended up on the line at
Dayton, troops were already on the way, Congress was precluded from
action, and we were told, ``You must now support our men and women, the
troops abroad.''
Mr. Chairman, that is the reason why we are at this stage in my
judgment.
Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for that, but we
always reserve the power, and I have come to this floor many times to
question precipitous deployment without lawful consultation with
Congress and without an authorization of Congress. I have gone so far
as to sue past Presidents over this issue, but we were denied standing
in the courts.
So in this case, as my colleagues know, I believe that we would be
given that opportunity. We can certainly grasp that opportunity by
staying in town and going into session the moment we hear the accords
have been signed, and then framing a resolution that properly addresses
the concerns around those accords. That is the way we should proceed.
So we are being given a pretty crummy choice here tonight, which is to
undermine the peace negotiations by voting no or vote yes on something
when we do not fully absolutely 100 percent understand the conditions
and terms.
Mr. Chairman, I wish that the leadership on the other side would
reconsider perhaps, pull the bill, keep us in town and take up this
issue when it is more timely.
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number
of words.
Mr. Chairman, when a member of my own party tried to stop COLAs for
our military, the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Fowler) was the first
one to jump and say, ``Duke, I'll support you. Let's get a coalition
together, and let's stop it.'' She cares deeply about our military and
our troops.
I have an article right here that they started fighting last night
again in Kosovo. They are burning houses, they are burning bridges.
I rise in support of the gentlewoman's resolution. Do my colleagues
know who rejected it? Not the Serbs. Holbrooke, Mr. Holbrooke, had to
cancel the peace talks last night. He canceled them until the 23rd
because the
[[Page H1222]]
Albanians rejected it. They will stop nothing short of having a
separate Kosovo. They do not want just Kosovo. They want Montenegro,
and they want parts of Greece.
I said on the floor before, ``Look at Bin Laden, look at the
terrorist leaders speaking openly and how they then filtrated around
Itzebegovic in Bosnia, 12,000 mujahedin in Hamas. That is a threat to
Europe, it is a threat to Greece, and it is a threat to this country.
Bin Laden, active in Albania with the KLA; they have genocided
Montenegrins, Serbs, gypsies and Jews recently, and they continue to do
that. They have been fighting for 500 years.
As my colleagues know, the gentleman talked about some of us fight
for defense dollars. Absolutely right. Look at the emergency state that
our national security is in right now. The President has not asked for
one dime that our defense are going down, and helping building the
roads and working our DOD and other agencies. In Honduras, millions of
dollars, and I support them doing that. I mean they have made a
marvelous expansion down there in helping people in poverty. But when
we look at Haiti, as my colleagues know, we are still spending $25
million a year there building schools and bridges. That comes out of
the defense dollar. In Somalia, billions of dollars. And look what four
times going to Iraq, the billions of dollars. In the Sudan, a billion
dollars did not do very much. Knocked out a pharmaceutical plant. But
all of these things come out of that defense dollar, and what has that
set us back to?
Our kids, our men and women in the military, we are keeping only 23
percent of them because our deployments exceed by 300 percent the
deployments during the height of Vietnam, and yet we are going to ask
only 4000 of them. Do my colleagues know the families and what they are
going through right now? We are keeping only 30 percent of our pilots.
The number one issue is family separation. We are driving our military
into the ground in a very balanced budget amount that we allow, and
then we take 16, not 8 billion, 16 billion, if we take the cost of
bringing on the reserves and we take the other costs associated with
going, 16 billion just for Bosnia, and that does not include next year.
That all comes out of defense, and then again we are going to have to
go in here.
And they were talking about giving a billion dollars to Russia to
stop some nuclear weapons. Well, let Europe. My colleagues say Europe
had not done it. Leadership would force Europe to pay their fair share
and do what we are trying to do. Russia has offered to put more troops
in there. KLA did not want that. Well, the hell with the KLA. Let the
Europeans, France, run by a Socialist-Communist group when they took
over the conservatives' coalition, and they refused to do their part,
let them go in and do it, and let us not send our men and women in
harm's way.
My colleague talked about not understanding the gentleman from Texas
(Mr. Sam Johnson). I do not expect my colleague would. He was a POW for
6\1/2\ years, and he was a war hero. He was tortured, he was shot down
in Vietnam, and he knows what it is to put our kids in harm's way
instead of sitting here in a soft, cushy chair saying, ``Let's send
them.''
Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Gejdenson amendment. I
support the gentleman from Connecticut's amendment, but I have strong
reservations, strong reservations of the Republican leadership's timing
on this legislation. Bringing this measure to the floor for debate
while negotiations are still underway is totally irresponsible.
Mr. Chairman, if and when a peace agreement is signed by both sides,
I believe an American presence as part of a larger international
peacekeeping force in Kosovo is and will be necessary.
{time} 1715
The Kosovar Albanians have already made clear that they will not
agree to any peace proposal without American participation in an
implementation force.
In addition, we have seen that the threat of force is the only
language that President Milosevic understands. A strong U.S. presence
in Kosova would demonstrate to Mr. Milosevic that we would not tolerate
noncompliance with any of the agreements, provisions or a return to the
brutal campaign of repression and genocide that he has brought upon the
ethnic Albanian community.
Mr. Chairman, while our NATO allies have already pledged to provide
the bulk of a post settlement force in Kosovo, we must recognize that
some U.S. participation is not only desired but is expected by our
allies. Quite simply, such participation may be essential to securing
the confidence of all the parties involved.
Mr. Chairman, I have a strong and vibrant Albanian and American
community in my district in the Bronx and Queens. Many of these
families have relatives in Kosovo who have been raped, maimed and
murdered by Serbian forces.
The United States, and we as a Congress, cannot turn our backs or
jeopardize the peace process in Kosovo.
While I strongly support an American presence in an international
implementation of force, I believe to debate this issue at this time is
both irresponsible and damaging to our ability to conclude a peaceful
agreement.
Mr. Chairman, I include for the Record the following New York Times
article.
[From the New York Times, Nov. 6, 1998]
Far From Kosovo, Anguished Vigils And Mourning; Concern for Family
Members Reshapes Immigrants' Lives
(By Barbara Stewart)
Nearly every week, all summer long, Ismer Mjeku, a Bronx
entrepreneur from Kosovo, attended at least one wake, as one
Albanian compatriot after another learned of relatives back
home killed by Serbian soldiers. By late August, it was
practically routine. He would meet his uncle and cousins at
one of the small, dim clubhouses where Albanian men sit,
smoking cigarettes and drinking tiny cups of sweet Turkish
coffee and where traditionally, they have also held wakes.
For the last few months, these spaces have been rented time
and again by immigrant Albanian men, who would spend a day or
two of mourning there. While the women remained home,
receiving the condolences of their female friends, the men
would spend the day at the club in a ritual called pame, ``to
see,'' or ngushellime, ``condolences.''
By Labor Day, Mr. Mjeku, 38, had attended 10 or 11 pamet
within 9 weeks. Like the others in his group, he shook the
hands or hugged the shoulders of each grieving man, sat and
drank a single cup of coffee and smoked one cigarette, rose
and offered his condolences to each man again, and then left,
making room for the next group.
But a few weeks ago, after the older cousin who had been a
second father to him was shot and killed in his home village,
Mr. Mjeku refused to hold a pame. ``We cannot keep doing
these one by one,'' he said in his small walk-up office on
Arthur Avenue in the Belmont section of the Bronx, where he
produces an Albanian business directory. ``So many people
died in Kosovo the last three months. It's not special, each
death. It's not--wow. It's war.''
For many of the approximately 200,000 Albanians in and
around New York and New Jersey--70 percent of whom come from
Kosovo, a Serbian province of Yugoslavia in which 90 percent
of the population are ethnic Albanians--death is no longer
special. After eight months of Serbian attacks on their
relatives in Kosovo, even the deaths of children have become
numbingly routine.
Yet the deaths back home have reshaped the lives of
immigrants here, making them less festive, less social: gone
are the big weddings, the nights of folk dancing, the gay
music.
``When I hear Albanian music, it hurts me,'' said Al
Haxhaj, an Albanian who is a co-owner of the Mona Lisa, a
restaurant in the Murry Hill section of Manhattan that was
formerly called the Piazza Bella. ``It reminds me.''
Since the first Serbian attacks were reported in February,
Albanians around the world have watched events back home with
anguish: the looted and torched villages, the murdered
civilians, the hundreds of thousands of people forced to take
refuge in the surrounding mountains. The violence peaked in
the summer, with 500,000 Albanians living as refugees,
according to international relief agencies. These agencies
also say that 1,000 to 2,000 ethnic Albanians have been
killed, though many agency representatives say they believe
that figure is low.
Reports last week that Yugoslav soldiers were withdrawing
from ethnic Albanian villages because of NATO bombing threats
offered scant comfort. Local immigrants say they do not
believe that the Serbians, their ancient enemies, will stop
their attacks.
All along Arthur Avenue and Pelham Parkway in the Bronx, in
New Jersey cities like Paterson and Garfield and in
neighborhoods throughout Manhattan, ethnic Albanians are
trying to deal with their personal
[[Page H1223]]
tragedies in the midst of this international drama.
Weddings and other celebrations are being canceled. When
their world is right, Albanians frequently celebrate with
huge parties, hiring Albanian musicians so that hundreds of
guests can do traditional folk dancing until morning. But
nobody has the heart now for celebrating.
Last fall, the Piazza Bella hired an Albanian band to play
traditional music, attracting expatriates from miles around.
In February, after the first massacres were reported, Mr.
Haxhaj and Bilbil Ahmetaj, the co-owners, stopped the music.
``We can't be over here dancing and getting drunk when
little kids are being killed and villages are being
trashed,'' said Fekrim Haxhaj, the owner's 18-year-old son.
In normal times, the vast majority of the big wedding
parties at Il Galletto, a banquet hall in North Bergen, N.J.,
are held by Albanian parents, said Vymer Bruncaj, who is a
part owner. But lately, he said: ``The wedding invitation for
Albanians is zero--no invitations. The last five, six months,
you cannot find one.''
Young couples are postponing their weddings or marrying
quietly, with fewer guests and afternoon parties without
music. Last spring, Alta Haxhaj, Fekrim's cousin, canceled
the elaborate wedding for 1,000 guests that she had been
planning for a year. Instead, she and here fiance married
quietly, in street clothes. ``No big pouf,'' she said. ``No
tail behind me, no white pearls.''
When ethnic Albanians get together these days, it is
probably for a candlelight vigil outside the United Nations
or the White House. Conversation never strays far from their
worries. At home and in offices, the computer stays on; the
Web site www.kosova.com carries updates on news from the
region in Albanian and lists the most recent victims. (Kosova
is the ethnic Albanians' preferred spelling.)
Mr. Mjeku, the Bronx businessman, checks the Internet when
he gets to work. On Sept. 30, he spotted his cousin's name on
the list of casualties. ``I closed the office,'' he said.
``I told my uncle in Riverdale. He started to cry. I felt
very bad.''
Now, a month later, Mr. Mjeku said he was having a hard
time focusing on his work. His mind is occupied by memories
of his cousin.
While the Internet brings daily updates, many Albanian-
Americans have been able to reach family members in Kosovo
through satellite cell phones that allow them to connect even
with refugees in the mountains.
The conversations have often been eerie. A few months ago,
Dervish Ukehaxhaj was summoned from the kitchen of the
Madonia Brothers Bakery in the Bronx, which he manages, to
the office downstairs, where Peter Madonia, the owner, handed
him a phone.
``It was his brother in Kosova, and he was in the middle of
shooting.'' Mr. Madonia said. ``He's sitting here in this
office, talking to his brother who is in the front lines, in
the middle of a war.''
In July, there were other calls. One brother and two
cousins had been fatally shot.
The Kosovan Liberation Army, with the help of European
expatriates, obtained dozens of powerful cell phones and
distributed them to the villages, according to Isuf Hajrizi,
managing editor of Illyria, and Albanian newspaper based in
the Bronx. When Mr. Hajrizi's parents, along with about 40
other relatives in the village, climbed high into the
mountains above the village to escape Serbian soldiers, they
carried the cell phone with them. ``They had no food,'' he
said. ``But they had that phone--their only link to life.''
But with only one cell phone for at least 1,000 refugees,
it can take hours, or even days to get through. Mr. Hajrizi
last reached his family after spending 10 straight hours
dialing, and then persuading the person who answered to hike
over to his parents' campsite to deliver the phone.
When he finally hear his 74-year-old mother's voice, she
told him that their home and their village had been looted
and burned. They had no food or shelter. She begged for help.
``Why is it like this?'' she asked, as her son listened
helplessly.
That was two weeks ago. Since then, he has not been able to
get through despite trying every day. They must have returned
to the village and are trying to cobble together shelter
there, he tells himself.
``I check the Internet constantly,'' he said. ``I haven't
seen their names on the lists. As long as they don't show up
on the lists, they probably are O.K.''
Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the amendment by the
gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Fowler). Obviously, she does not come to
this issue as a casual observer. In fact, she represents Mayport Naval
Station, which is often the first to deploy forces in times of
conflict.
I join her in opposition to sending American ground forces to the
wartorn province of Kosovo. I would remind my colleagues that four
years ago the President sent thousands of American troops to Bosnia for
what he assured us would be a 1-year mission.
I underscore the comments of the gentleman from Nebraska who was
quite concerned that while we were negotiating a peace agreement at
that time of the Dayton Accords, American troops were deployed in
Bosnia. There was no way to recall them because we were told by the
Administration to support the troops because they are already over
there.
We are again falling into the same trap. Four years have passed and
our troops are still over there. It has become a mission with no end in
sight.
If we send troops to Kosovo, I fear the same thing will happen again,
an open-ended commitment of thousands of young American soldiers to yet
another bloody conflict in the Balkans.
The President wants to send 4,000 American troops to Kosovo if a
peace plan is agreed to by the two warring factions. Of course, we were
all sickened by atrocities that have been committed by both sides in
this war. However, we cannot put our troops in the middle of a conflict
where the rules of engagement are ambiguous.
If American forces go to Kosovo, they will very likely end up in
combat situations. I think we should remember 1993, the disaster in
Somalia where 18 U.S. Army rangers were killed tracking down a Somalian
warlord. These lives were lost because the Administration placed those
forces under international command and refused to provide the heavy
armor and air support that would have given our forces the upper hand
in combat.
Mr. Chairman, too many questions exist as to how our troops will be
deployed. There are too many questions about the rules of engagement
and too many questions about a successful exit strategy.
Mr. Chairman, our Armed Forces are stretched very thin across the
globe in a multitude of deployments. We should be very, very careful
before we commit to another one.
This past weekend, 44 Haitians drowned at sea in an attempt to come
to Florida, to the United States of America. Once again, we have
problems in Haiti but nobody is addressing it.
Cuba shot down two Brothers to the Rescue aircraft, and now we are
sending a baseball team to promote peace and prosperity in Cuba.
The gentleman from Texas (Mr. Sam Johnson) and the gentleman from
California (Mr. Cunningham) spoke on this floor and these two
gentlemen, Members of Congress, have the right to speak about the
deployment of our troops in conflict because they themselves have
represented this great Nation in combat. They speak with authority and
I respect their views.
The December bombing of Iraq occurred and the Administration told us
it had to be done because Ramadan, the Muslim holy month, was fast
approaching. They said we must attack now because if we don't, it would
create an international incident.
What about Hanukkah, which was being celebrated at the time of our
bombing in Iraq?
So I would suggest to the Congress that we carefully consider the
amendment of the gentlewoman from Jacksonville, Florida (Mrs. Fowler)
and that we support it before we become engaged, before we are drawn
into another conflict with no end in sight.
Mr. OLVER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment by the
gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Fowler). Barely 11 years ago, Slobodan
Milosevic seized power in what was then Yugoslavia, and he remains
today the last old line, unrepentant Communist dictator in Europe.
Just 10 years ago, in March of 1989, using tactics that would have
made Joseph Stalin proud, Milosevic surrounded the elected assembly of
Kosovo with Yugoslav Army tanks and secret police and forced that
elected body at gunpoint to renounce the autonomy that was guaranteed
to Kosovo by the Constitution of Yugoslavia. Milosevic did not even
bother to change the Constitution.
In rapid succession, all ethnic Albanian public employees were
dismissed from their jobs, 100,000 of them. The Albanian language was
proscribed for public purposes. The Albanian schools and the university
were closed and systematic repression of the ethnic Albanians began.
Remember that ethnic Albanians were already a majority of the
citizens of Kosovo when Yugoslavia was freed after World War II, and
now are more than 90 percent of that population.
[[Page H1224]]
Then the Milosevic regime was distracted in 1991 and 1992 by its
attacks upon two other U.N. members, namely Croatia and Bosnia, that
led, as we know, to 200,000 deaths and 2 million refugees that have
been spread all over Europe.
It is in that context that President George Bush, on December 27,
1992, warned Milosevic that the U.S. would act if he attacked Kosovo in
a similar way. I quote from the letter that President Bush delivered to
Milosevic, quote, in the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian
action, the United States will be prepared to employ military force
against the Serbs in Kosovo and in Serbia proper, and it was that
policy that President Clinton has been following and reiterated,
reaffirmed in 1993 and has been following.
In that context, the then minority leader, later majority leader and
Republican candidate for President, Robert Dole, has always supported
the strongest possible action, American action, to contain Milosevic's
regime.
In Kosovo, Milosevic used his army and secret police under a renewed
rein of terror to impose thousands of arbitrary arrests, beatings and
extrajudicial killings on ethnic Albanians. We should remember that
just last October, Milosevic signed agreements in regard to Kosovo and
because there were no enforcement provisions there has violated every
provision of those agreements signed only four months or so ago.
All told, at least 2,000 have been indiscriminately killed, men,
women, aged, children, baby in arms and in the womb and at least
400,000 driven from their homes. For all those reasons, the contact
powers have agreed to a NATO effort to establish an enforceable peace
in Kosovo, and if this NATO effort is subverted, and the amendment by
the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Fowler) clearly subverts the effort
to impose a peace in Kosovo, then later this spring this Congress will
have contributed to the creation of hundreds of thousands of more
refugees and to the deaths of a whole new cadre of victims of the
national socialist regime of Slobodan Milosevic.
Milosevic's right-hand deputy, President Seselj, has already told the
Yugoslav parliament that they will drive all of the ethnic Albanians,
citizens of Yugoslavia, from Kosovo.
I implore this Congress not to make this great United States of
America complicit, complicit in these deaths, and creating these
refugees and in aiding in Milosevic's brutal campaign of ethnic
cleansing.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I rise to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I rise regrettably opposed to the amendment, the well-
crafted amendment from my good friend and colleague, the gentlewoman
from Florida (Mrs. Fowler). It is a good amendment and has led to good
debate, but I have a different view of this situation.
I think that the underlying resolution, H.Con.Res. 42 that we are
talking about cannot be supported in its present form because it is
essentially a blank check that grants the Clinton administration
authorization to send troops to Kosovo without any limitations or
restrictions. I think that is much too broad.
The Fowler amendment, on the other hand, would go to the opposite end
of the spectrum denying the administration the authority to send troops
under nearly all but the most dire circumstances.
While the President is the primary architect of American foreign
policy, and we all understand that, Congress nevertheless has very
important obligations in this area, most notably oversight, overseeing
the deployment of our troops. That is one of the reasons we are here.
We do this on behalf of the people we represent back home.
Finding the right balance is never easy, as we know, but I do believe
that the people in my district feel that we should seek something that
is more akin to a middle ground solution to either the underlying
resolution or the Fowler amendment.
The Clinton administration is intent on deploying U.S. troops to
Kosovo and maintains that it does not require congressional approval to
do so. In response, I believe Congress should be careful not to deal
itself out of the process altogether, and I think this debate has been
useful and is going to be more constructive as we go along.
Many members are concerned about the administration's plan and are
not satisfied with standing on the sidelines, which is the practical
effect of both the resolution that underlies H.Con.Res. 42 and the
Fowler amendment. It is either yes or no.
I believe that it is incumbent on Congress to seize this opportunity
to offer constructive input and to put into place reasonable
requirements before our troops are committed. Rather than providing a
blank check or obstructing the way altogether, Congress should require
an explicit statement of the national interests involved, the rules of
engagement, for example, for our troops; the cost of the mission, for
example, of interest to our taxpayers; as well as the entry strategy,
the exit strategy, the amount of protection provided to make sure our
forces will be as safe as possible; those kinds of questions.
As the debate progresses, I anticipate there will be a series of
amendments to do just those kinds of things. I am going to oppose,
somewhat reluctantly, the Fowler amendment because I think there is a
better way to achieve proper accountability from the President about
using our troops in Kosovo.
I urge my colleagues to understand that there are good choices
between the carte blanche of the underlying H.Con.Res. 42 and the no
deployment proposal by the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Fowler).
Those amendments are printed. I urge that my colleagues look at them
and in the meantime I urge a no vote on the Fowler amendment.
Mr. TAYLOR of Mississippi. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the
requisite number of words.
Mr. Chairman, I want to commend my colleague from Florida (Mr. Goss)
for his well thought out, articulate view on this. I want to tell him
that I am in total agreement.
{time} 1730
I urge my colleagues to vote against both the Gejdenson amendment and
the Fowler amendment for all the reasons that the gentleman
articulated.
I think the Gejdenson amendment would have us rush into something
that has yet to have been written. The Fowler amendment would have us
condemn it. I do not think that is a very adult thing to do.
Mr. Chairman, I would urge my colleagues to give strong consideration
to an amendment by the ranking minority member on the House Committee
on National Security, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton). I
think it gives us the best of all of these worlds. It says to those of
us, including myself, who are reluctant to commit troops, Mr.
President, you cannot send troops right now. It gives those of us who
would like to see the details of the peace agreement the opportunity to
wait until it is written, wait until it is brought before this body,
wait until our Supreme Allied Commander, General Wesley Clark, can come
to Washington and explain our concerns about the safety of the troops,
what our mission is, how much it is going to cost, and yes, how long we
are going to be there. Then and only then it calls on Congress to vote
on it.
I applaud my colleagues who say that yes, it is time that Congress
finally starts fulfilling our duties as given to us by the Founding
Fathers in Article I, Section 8, where it says we must decide where and
when young Americans are put in harm's way. We have let both Democratic
and Republican Presidents walk all over us. We have failed in our
duties.
So I applaud those of my colleagues who say, let us do our job. I
also want to applaud the people, including the troops who went to
Bosnia, who showed me that I was wrong when I opposed our intervention
there. It was not a general, it was not an admiral, it was not a
bureaucrat, and it was not a State Department official that showed me
that I was wrong, it was an 18-year-old kid from Ocean Springs,
Mississippi. When I went over there with a notebook looking for kids to
tell me why we should not be there and how stupid it was, and a young
man by the name of Rhodes who might have been all of a corporal, I
said, should we be here? And I was shocked when he said yes. I said,
why? Fresh out of high school, he says, Because I am keeping women from
getting raped, I am keeping little kids from getting tortured, I
[[Page H1225]]
am keeping old men from being murdered just because of their religion.
That is why I joined the army, to be a good guy.
Folks, I was dumbfounded. That mission has never been articulated
better by anyone anywhere and to Corporal Rhodes, wherever you are, God
bless you for saying it, and to his parents, God bless you for bringing
such a kid into this world.
Folks, this is the only rational way to go about this. Let us do our
job. Mr. President, you have no authority to send troops; therefore,
you cannot. Mr. President, bring us a proposal that we can read, take a
look at, and then yes, Mr. President, we owe you the respect of at
least looking at it and then voting on it.
I urge my colleagues to reject the Fowler amendment, I urge my
colleagues to reject the Gejdenson amendment, but I rise in very strong
support of the very rational position brought to us by the gentleman
from Missouri (Mr. Skelton).
Mrs. CHENOWETH. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number
of words.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to the argument that the
United States should become militarily involved in Kosovo at all, and I
support the Fowler amendment. For an administration that places so much
stock in political polls, I wonder if the President does not find it
ironic that most Americans cannot even find Kosovo on the map. Not only
that, but most Americans could not articulate one reason why we should
send other Americans to risk and very possibly lose their lives.
What is the vital interest over there which is being advanced by our
getting involved in the middle of this dispute? We have not heard a
clear answer to this question. Yet, President Clinton has made very
clear what his intention is. He intends to intervene in Kosovo with an
open-ended occupation force, perhaps preceded by air strikes.
We have absolutely forgotten the rules of engagement that were laid
out in the War Powers Act. We do not have an exit strategy. He has made
it clear that he does not think he needs congressional authorization
for this mission. Well, I think, as my colleague, the gentleman from
Mississippi (Mr. Taylor) just articulated, in the Constitution, Article
I, Section 8, it clearly states that it is the Congress that shall
raise up armies and declare war. In the War Powers Act, presidential
executive powers are defined with the ability for the President to
deploy troops without congressional authority only when there has been
a declaration of war, a specific statutory authorization, or, and this
is very important, Mr. Chairman, a national emergency created by attack
upon the United States, its territories, its possessions, or its armed
forces. The situation in Kosovo certainly does not match statutory
authority.
Mr. Chairman, if we are to prevail under the rule of law, the
President must obey the law, like everyone else, and certainly in this
situation that could get us into a quagmire that we may never get out
of.
The administration policy absolutely goes against the fundamentals of
constitutional government and the rule of law. On February 10, for
instance, in testimony before the Committee on International Relations,
Thomas Pickering, who is the Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs, confirmed that Kosovo is sovereign territory of Serbia, and
that attacking the Serbs because they will not consent to foreign
occupation of a part of their territory would be an act of war. An act
of war, Mr. Chairman.
The Constitution of the United States gives sole power to declare war
to the Congress, not to the President. Nothing in the laws or the
Constitution of the United States suggests that a determination by the
United Nations Security Council or by the North Atlantic Council is a
substitute for our country's laws. The mission in Kosovo intended by
this administration is contrary to the principle of national
sovereignty and is a major step towards global authority. The United
States and NATO are demanding that a sovereign state consent to foreign
occupation of its territory, or be bombed if it refuses. This
distinction should be a key one for all Americans concerned about the
threat of the growing power of international institutions and what they
present to national sovereignty.
What kind of precedent are we going to set with this action? What
country are we claiming the right to attack next if we determine that
its behavior does not rise to some international standard? Should we
attack Turkey to protect the Kurds? China, to protect Tibet or Taiwan?
Sri Lanka to protect the Tamils, India to protect the Muslims in
Kashmir? I think not, Mr. Chairman.
Do all of the Members of the House fully appreciate the complicated
quagmire of Kosovo? The history of Kosovo with its competing claims of
Albanians and Serbs is at least as tangled as that of Bosnia, and both
groups are passionately attached to their irreconcilable differences of
what is right and wrong, in their view.
The administration and its supporters tell us all about the
sufferings of the Albanians under the Milosevic regime, and those
should not be minimized, and I concur and identify with their argument
there. But they also tell us almost nothing about the attacks committed
by the Kosovo Liberation Army against Serbian civilians and against
moderate Albanians as well. They tell us nothing about the ethnic
cleansing of Christian Serbs by radical Albanian Muslims under the
Turks, Nazis and Communists alike.
Mr. Chairman, this is a dangerous step that we must not take.
They tell us nothing about the drug-trafficking and other criminal
activity that funds the KLA. They tell us nothing about the support of
Islamic radicals like the Osama bin Ladin network, which, with other
radical forces, is well-established in the KLA's staging area in
northern Albania and is promising to strike at Americans wherever they
are found.
Do we need to put Americans down in a place where they'll be
convenient targets for terrorism?
Putting American troops into this quagmire, where we have no
legitimate interests, is a dangerous and needless risk to American
personnel. Kosovo is not America's fight.
The Congress should reject any measure that is retrospect will be
seen as a blank check for Bill Clinton--a Gulf of Tonkin Resolution for
the Balkans.
Mr. POMEROY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, at the outset, I want to commend my colleague, the
gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. Taylor) for very well articulated
remarks. I come to a slightly different conclusion. I rise to speak in
favor of the Gejdenson amendment and in opposition to the Fowler
amendment.
First, let me speak to the alternative amendment advanced by the
gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Fowler). I believe that it is extremely
ill-advised of this House to be debating this resolution at all. We are
debating involvement in a peace agreement that has yet to be finalized,
so it is not timely right from the outset.
To even try and interject this House into the negotiations underway
by placing proscriptions on what the negotiators might come up with is,
in my opinion, the direct intervention of this House into the
formulation of foreign policy, something placed in the executive branch
under the Constitution for very good reasons. We are not constituted as
individual representatives representing this country to try and steer
negotiations even as they unfold.
Senator Dole, certainly someone who knows the legislative process as
well as any American, advised the Committee on International Relations
yesterday that the time for congressional involvement in these matters
is after the agreements themselves have been reached. Let us look at
what the President might bring back, evaluated and debated at that
time, but not before.
I favor the Gejdenson amendment, because in the absence of orderly
consideration of this matter, it is appropriate, I think, that we not
extend a blank check, but rather a measured authorization, and that is
the Gejdenson amendment before us. It would encourage a conclusion of
the peace process and authorize a NATO force with U.S. involvement of
up to 15 percent. That is clearly a minor supporting role in this
process, but an essential one, in light of the standing of the United
States of America in the world today.
To try and absolutely foreclose any participation by the United
States in a peacekeeping force that might be agreed to under the
agreement, should an agreement be reached, would I believe give great
comfort to those who
[[Page H1226]]
are the enemies of peace in this region, and who want no peace
agreement.
All of us are involved in our legislative responsibilities in
negotiations, and we know that negotiations are, in large part, about
leverage. Why would we want to give Slobodan Milosevic, a perpetrator
of unspeakable horrors in this region, the leverage at this time in the
peace process that, precluding any U.S. troop involvement, would extend
to this evil leader.
Mr. Milosevic 11 years ago went down to Kosovo and began his own
ascendancy in the region by commencing a reign of terror on the
Kosovars of Albanian ethnicity. During the course of that reign of
terror, their autonomy has been stripped and they have been the victims
of unspeakable horrors. We need to bring this to a conclusion with a
negotiated peace, but that is made infinitely more difficult by the
House debate today, and if we should adopt the Fowler amendment it
would be made, in my opinion and the opinion of many observing this
process, it would be made impossible.
The Scriptures tell us, blessed are the peacemakers, and we in the
House want to do everything we can to make their job more difficult, if
not altogether impossible, at this terribly important time.
So let me conclude by saying, let us oppose the Fowler amendment. I
believe it would forestall a conclusion of the peace process. Let us
support the Gejdenson amendment, which would place very significant and
appropriate strictures on the U.S. involvement in what might be a NATO
force, an involvement not to exceed 15 percent; a limited, minor
supporting role, but an essential one, to stop the killing and the
atrocities that have plagued that region.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, this situation, regardless of which route we take, stay
out or go in, has potential dangers. Many people have argued that going
in is going to cause more of a conflagration than if we stayed out.
There are good intellects on both sides of the debate. It is a very
difficult debate. It is a very close question, I think.
I am going to support the base bill. I think in the end the
organization that we created, NATO, that we have always been the guts,
the leadership of, that was put together to handle then the Soviet
Union, has a role in this post-Cold War environment in keeping
stability in Europe. If we do not participate in this operation, and it
is a very dangerous operation, one in which I think we may take
casualties, I think NATO will dissolve as a real entity.
{time} 1745
It may be a debating society, it may have a location, but I think
that NATO will dissolve, and maybe the stability that NATO could bring
to Europe over the long haul will be gone.
So I am going to support the base resolution. All of the dangers that
we see and all of the problems with this deployment or with the
nondeployment are things that we really cannot do much about. We cannot
change the situation, the political situation, in Kosovo. We cannot
change the military offsets. We can do something by participating in
this force.
There is something we can do something about. That is to provide our
men and women who carry out American foreign policy after debates like
this one the wherewithal to be effective. We, the government of the
United States, have not been doing that. Let me show the Members what
we have been doing.
Since Desert Storm, we have cut our military almost in half. We have
gone from 18 army divisions to only 10; 546 naval ships to only 325
now. We have cut another 20 since this chart was put together. We have
gone from 24 fighter air wings to only 13 fighter air wings, cut our
air power almost in half.
Our mission capability, that is the capability of our aircraft to fly
off of their runways or off their carrier decks, like the gentleman
from California (Mr. Cunningham) used to, to fulfill our mission,
whether bombing or recon or something else and return to that home
base, that mission capability that I want 83 percent in the Air Force
has now dropped to 74 percent.
It used to be 77 percent in the Marine Corps. It is now down to 61
percent. Mission capability used to be 69 percent in the Air Force, it
is now 61 percent. A lot of our planes are hanging around as old hangar
queens. They are like old hay balers that we are taking spare parts off
of so the few we have left on the runway will work.
Military aircraft crashes. I can tell the Members, we are now
crashing more aircraft, some 55 in the last 13 months, 14 months, than
we are building, along with the 55 Americans who died as pilots and
crews in those crashes.
Equipment shortages. We are building, and President Clinton's defense
budget continues that this year, if we follow it, we are building to a
200-ship Navy, down from 600 ships. The marines are $193 million short
in basic ammunition. The Army is short about $1.6 billion in
ammunition.
We have aging equipment. We are living off the old equipment of the
Reagan years. Our CH-46 helicopter is over 40 years old. The Clinton
administration intends to fly B-52 bombers with no replacement until
they are 80 years old.
Personnel shortages, we are 18,000 sailors short in the Navy. We are
going to be over 700 pilots short in the Air Force. We are going to be
short in marine aviation, and we are down about 140 helicopter pilots
in the Army.
Here is something we have not been paying attention to. We have a
13.5 percent pay gap between the people who wear the uniform and the
people in the private sector. I want to ask all of the patriotic folks
who have gotten up and spoken about going into Kosovo, and I am going
to vote to go into Kosovo, to really support our troops. I am going to
give the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson) a substitute
amendment that says, let us support them with a pay raise, with new
equipment, by building military construction to house their families
while they are gone, and maybe we will even give them a little
ammunition go. Let us support the troops.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter)
has expired.
(On request of Mr. Cunningham, and by unanimous consent, Mr. Hunter
was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, the Joint Chiefs have done something this
year that they have not done in a long time. I think it is because the
services are desperate, they are desperate for help. The 10,000
uniformed service men and women on food stamps are desperate for help.
They have told us what they need. The Army has come forth and said,
we need an additional $5 billion a year just to maintain this downsized
military of 10 divisions. The Navy has come forth and said, to maintain
305 ships, we need an additional $6 billion a year. The Air Force has
said, to maintain this downsized Air Force of only 13 active fighter
wings, we need an additional $5 billion a year. The marines have said
that to maintain this downsized Marine Corps, that now has the highest
operating tempo of any time since World War II, we need an additional
$1.75 billion a year. They said that on top of that they need a pay
raise for our troops, to start cutting into that 13\1/2\ percent pay
gap.
If we add those together, and if we add the cost of Bosnia, which we
should not take out of ammunition and operations and maintenance, that
is $21.95 billion or $22 billion a year more that our service people
need to be well-equipped and well-paid to serve our country.
So however Members vote on these resolutions, and let me really
commend the brilliant gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Tillie Fowler). I
wish I could support her amendment. I think her conditions are
excellent. But I am going to support the base bill.
However Members vote on this, we should follow up very quickly with a
series of votes, manifested in our budget and in supplemental
appropriations bills, to provide our military what they need, so they
can provide us what we need.
Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. HUNTER. I yield to the gentleman from Colorado.
Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Chairman, I will not take the 5 minutes to do it, but
I want to thank the gentleman for presenting this picture, because that
is the picture I wanted to present. He did it better than I could.
[[Page H1227]]
Who is going to pay the bill for these kinds of things? If we are
going to do them, and we are going to do them, obviously, around the
world, who is going to pay the bill? We need to pony up and do what we
should for our troops.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I rise to oppose the Fowler amendment and to support
the Gejdenson amendment.
As we have this debate in this House at this time, a time that is
poorly timed in terms of what the national interests of the United
States are and ultimately how that may lead to the national security of
the United States, we simply should not be having this debate at this
time.
Right now, as we debate, I am sure that Slobodan Milosevic is looking
at this debate, and how we decide today sends him a signal as to how he
will move, and move militarily. Even before we give an opportunity for
peace to have a chance, we snuff it out with the actions on the Floor.
The gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson) recognizes that the
representatives of the respective parties are supposed to reconvene
next week in France. We could not hold off until there was the
opportunity for those parties to be brought together by the
international community, led by the United States, to see if there is a
chance to avoid countless numbers of murders, countless numbers of
deaths? We could not give that simple opportunity for peace to take
place? It was so compelling to proceed today?
Mr. Chairman, this is not about enforcing our will. It is about
enforcing, hopefully, an agreed commitment, an agreed commitment to
peace. This is a test of NATO, and ultimately, maybe in some different
context, at some different time, Members are going to want NATO to
work.
If Members do not step up to the plate now, the portion of the
amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Turner) to the
amendment offered by the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson)
which limits us to 15 percent, and says, in a clear message to the
Europeans, this is clearly your problem, but we are part of NATO and we
are going to participate in it, if Members want NATO to be put at risk,
they will not respond.
The Fowler amendment is ultimately, in my mind, with all due respect,
should it pass, a death sentence to thousands of people in Kosovo,
because in essence what we are saying by virtue of that amendment, it
is a vote on the ultimate question, to not permit troops to be
deployed, even before we know that in fact an agreement in which we
would be invited in as part of NATO could take place.
We are already sending a message to Slobodan Milosevic that in fact
he does not have to make an agreement; go ahead, just hold out there,
do what you want, and at the end of the day we will have that on our
minds and in our consciences and in the national security interests of
the United States, because the conflagration that will take place if we
do not act under an agreed-upon peace will be incredibly dangerous to
the United States. This is, after all, the location in which World War
II started.
Let me just finish by saying that I am reminded of that quote that
said, during World War II, ``First they came after the trade unionists,
and since I was not a trade unionist, I did not object; and then they
came after the Catholics, and since I was not a Catholic, I did not
object; and then they came after the Jews, and since I was not a Jew, I
did not object; and then they came after me, and there was no one left
to object.''
I agree with the previous speaker, we need to assist our military. I
think many of us are willing to put our votes there. But we need to
make sure that we stand ready not to cast today a vote that in essence
precipitates the chance for peace, that ends it, that gives it a blow
before there is even a chance; and that in essence this vote that we
will be casting, particularly on this amendment, ends up being a death
sentence to thousands of people. We have an opportunity for peace, and
we need to preserve that opportunity for peace.
I urge my colleagues very seriously to vote against the Fowler
amendment, because if not, they are already voting on the ultimate
question; and to therefore, in voting against her amendment and giving
peace an opportunity, then vote for the Gejdenson amendment.
Mrs. WILSON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, there are a lot of thoughtful and difficult issues that
people have been trying to address here on all sides this afternoon. I
think there is sincerity on all sides.
The underlying proposal that we are asked to endorse today is to
endorse, without conditions, the indefinite assignment of 4,000
Americans as part of a NATO force of 30,000 in the territory of a
sovereign country with which we are not at war, and over the objections
of that country, on the grounds that the administration of the province
of Kosovo is not in accordance with international humanitarian
standards.
I am a supporter of NATO, and I am a supporter of American
involvement in the world. In fact, I used to serve in the United States
mission to NATO. I have worn the uniform of a member of the armed
services. But let us not make any mistake here, this deployment is an
extraordinary departure from what is envisioned in the NATO charter,
and it is a departure from much of American diplomatic history.
There are several questions that I asked myself and that I will share
with the Members as a contribution to this debate that I think we are
faced with answering today: What is threat to U.S. security or to U.S.
vital national interests? Clearly, there is no threat to U.S. security
directly, so we are talking about vital U.S. national interests.
We have to answer this question not in some rhetorical way, but in a
very practical, pragmatic, personal way. Put it this way: If a young
person in the hometown of one of us does not come home from Kosovo,
what do we tell their parents they died for? Every man and woman who
has worn the uniform knows that there are things that are worth dying
for. I do not believe that this is one of them.
The administration has said that this is about maintaining stability
in Europe. They are right, the Balkans have been a cauldron of war in
this century. But the threat that they draw from Serbia is overdrawn.
We are not talking about a power on the rise, as we faced in the 1930s
in Europe, but a vicious leader in decline. It is equally probable that
our intervention in Kosovo will itself spread the conflict beyond the
borders of Kosovo and Serbia.
Let there be no doubt that Milosevic is an evil man who has wreaked
havoc on his own people, but the question must be, what is in the U.S.
national interest, and our foreign policy must be based on that.
{time} 1800
The second question is, what are the political objectives that we
hope to achieve, and will the use of military force help us to achieve
those objectives? In Korea, our forces are there to deter aggression
from North Korea. In Desert Storm, our objective was to expel Iraq from
Kuwait.
This is unlike Bosnia where, after 3 years of war, we had exhausted
parties ready to sue for peace, Bosnian Serbs who were being beaten
back and who were eager to free the lines of ethnic enclaves where they
were.
In Kosovo, we have two groups, two ethnic groups that claim the same
territory. There are no enclaves. Into this, we are thrusting U.S. and
NATO forces with no lines to be defended. There is no clear objective.
We are the beginning of a political process, not a peacekeeping
operation, as has been suggested.
Third, what is the size and the structure of the military force, and
is it adequate? What are their rules of engagement, and are these all
clearly defined? If they are not, not one American should go in not
understanding exactly what the rules of engagement are.
If a 19-year-old kid confronts a KLA member who refuses to give up
his or her weapon, what is that 19-year-old kid to do? Do they walk
away? Do they fight? Until we have the answers to basic questions like
that and are confident that our troops know what to do, they should not
go in.
Kosovo is a much more dangerous situation than we faced going into
Bosnia. We need to recognize those risks there and mitigate against
them. There are too many unanswered questions on a deployment of
questionable national
no...@house.gov
[[Page H1214]]
reached, we should give our full support for the deployment of U.S.
troops. For these reason, I support the Gejdenson Amendment to H. Con.
Res. 42.
The CHAIRMAN. All time for general debate has expired.
Pursuant to the rule, the concurrent resolution is considered read
for amendment under the 5-minute rule.
The text of House Concurrent Resolution 42 is as follows:
H. Con. Res. 42
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate
concurring),
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This resolution may be cited as the ``Peacekeeping
Operations in Kosovo Resolution''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
The Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The conflict in Kosovo has caused great human suffering
and, if permitted to continue, could threaten the peace of
Europe.
(2) The Government of Serbia and representatives of the
people of Kosovo may agree in Rambouillet, France, to end the
conflict in Kosovo.
(3) President Clinton has promised to deploy approximately
4,000 United States Armed Forces personnel to Kosovo as part
of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) peacekeeping
operation implementing a Kosovo peace agreement.
SEC. 3. AUTHORIZATION FOR DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES ARMED
FORCES TO KOSOVO.
The President is authorized to deploy United States Armed
Forces personnel to Kosovo as part of a NATO peacekeeping
operation implementing a Kosovo peace agreement.
The CHAIRMAN. No amendment to the concurrent resolution is in order
except those printed in the portion of the Congressional Record
designated for that purpose and pro forma amendments for the purpose of
debate. Amendments printed in the Record may be offered only by the
Member who caused it to be printed or his designee, and shall be
considered read.
The Chairman of the Committee of the Whole may postpone a request for
a recorded vote on any amendment and may reduce to a minimum of 5
minutes the time for voting on any postponed question that immediately
follows another vote, provided that the time for voting on the first
question shall be a minimum of 15 minutes.
Are there any amendments to the concurrent resolution?
Amendment No. 7 Offered by Mr. Gejdenson
Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 7 offered by Mr. Gejdenson:
Page 2, after line 3, insert the following:
(3) Former Senator Robert Dole recently traveled to the
region to meet with the Kosovar Albanians and deliver a
message from President Clinton encouraging all parties to
reach an agreement to end the conflict in Kosovo.
(4) Representatives of the Government of Serbia and
representatives of the Kosovar Albanians are scheduled to
reconvene in France on March 15, 1999.
Page 2, line 4, strike ``(3)'' and insert ``(5)''.
Page 2, strike line 9 and all that follows and insert the
following:
SEC. 3. DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES TO KOSOVO.
(a) Declaration of Policy Relating to Interim Agreement.--
The Congress urges the President to continue to take measures
described in (b) to support the ongoing peace process
relating to Kosovo with the objective of reaching a fair and
just interim agreement between the Serbian Government and the
Kosovar Albanians on the status of Kosovo.
(b) Authorization for Deployment of Armed Forces.--If a
fair and just interim agreement described in subsection (a)
is reached, the President is authorized to deploy United
States Armed Forces personnel to Kosovo as part of a NATO
peacekeeping operation implementing such interim agreement.
(c) Declaration of Policy Relating to Support for Armed
Forces.--The Congress unequivocally supports the men and
women of the United States Armed Forces who are carrying out
their missions in support of peace in the Balkan region, and
throughout the world, with professional excellence, dedicated
patriotism, and exemplary bravery.
SEC. 4. LIMITATION.
The authorization in section 3 is subject to the limitation
that the number of United States Armed Forces personnel
participating in a deployment described in that section may
not exceed 15 percent of the total NATO force deployed to
Kosovo in the peacekeeping operation described in that
section, except that such percentage may be exceeded if the
President determines that United States forces or United
States citizens are in danger and notifies Congress of that
determination.
Point of Order
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the
amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state his point of order.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, subsection 3 of the proposed amendment
includes language that goes beyond the jurisdiction of the Committee on
International Relations and extends into the jurisdiction of the
Committee on National Security. Additionally, the subject matter of the
amendment is different from the underlying text.
For both of these reasons, I urge the Chair to sustain a point of
order.
Parliamentary Inquiry
Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, parliamentary inquiry.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.
Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, is it my understanding that the
objection relates to the statement that the Congress unequivocally
supports the men and women of the United States Armed Forces who are
carrying out their mission in support of peace in the Balkans and
throughout the world with professional excellence and dedicated
patriotism?
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, regular order.
Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, is that the section the gentleman is
objecting to?
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will suspend.
If the gentleman has a parliamentary inquiry, or if the gentleman
would like to be heard on the point of order, the Chair would recognize
him.
Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, my question is, is that the section that
the gentleman objects to?
Mr. GILMAN. Yes. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is not making a proper parliamentary
inquiry of the Chair. The Chair will rule on the germaneness of the
amendment after hearing argument.
Does the gentleman wish to be heard on the point of order?
Mr. GEJDENSON. I do wish to be heard, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman may proceed.
Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, it is my understanding that the Chairman
has just indicated that he objects to this one section that commends
the armed forces for the excellence that they are involved in in
carrying out their mission and their commitment. I would, at the
appropriate time, ask for unanimous consent that we allow this language
to be retained, because I do think, no matter which side of this issue
people are on, that they want to express their support and admiration
for our troops.
So I would ask unanimous consent at the appropriate time, or ask the
gentleman to withdraw his point of order so that we can go forward with
our amendment. It does not really change the policy or the amendment
itself; it is simply, I think, the kind of support we have always
included in times when we are dealing with foreign policy issues, and
we ought not let jurisdictional battles in the Congress preclude us
from making a positive statement about the troops.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there any other Member who wishes to be heard on the
point of order?
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman).
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I want to express support for our forces,
as all of our colleagues do, and as a veteran, I know the sacrifices
that our men and women are asked to make.
I would support a separate resolution on this matter at an
appropriate time, but I do not think that this is an appropriate part
of this resolution, and I raise the point of order.
The CHAIRMAN. If there are no other Members who wish to be heard on
the point of order, the Chair is ready to rule.
The gentleman from New York makes the point of order that the
amendment offered by the gentleman from Connecticut is not germane.
The concurrent resolution authorizes the President to deploy United
States Armed Forces to implement a Kosovo peace agreement. Its
provisions fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Committee on
International Relations. That committee has jurisdiction over
``intervention abroad'', which includes the deployment of armed forces
by the President. Conditions, limitations or
[[Page H1215]]
other attributes of such deployment are within the ambit of
``intervention abroad.''
The amendment offered by the gentleman from Connecticut includes a
provision declaring the support of Congress for the armed forces who
are carrying out their missions in the Balkan region. As evidenced by
the referral of House Resolution 306 in the 104th Congress which was
considered by the House, such a provision falls within the jurisdiction
of both the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on
International Relations. The sentiment contained in section 3 of the
amendment is not a condition, limitation or attribute of the deployment
of armed forces to Kosovo.
As noted in section 798a and 798c of the House Rules and Manual of
the 105th Congress, to be germane, an amendment must relate to the same
subject matter and the same jurisdiction as are addressed in the
concurrent resolution. The Chair finds that the amendment fails both of
these longstanding tests. Therefore, the Chair holds that the amendment
is not germane. Accordingly, the point of order is sustained.
Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I move to appeal the ruling of the
Chair.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is, Shall the decision of the Chair stand
as the judgment of the Committee?
The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the ayes
appeared to have it.
Recorded Vote
Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 218,
noes 205, not voting 10, as follows:
[Roll No. 47]
AYES--218
Aderholt
Archer
DeLay
DeMint
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Doolittle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
English
Everett
Ewing
Fletcher
Foley
Forbes
Fossella
Fowler
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Ganske
Gekas
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Goodlatte
Goodling
Goss
Graham
Granger
Green (WI)
Greenwood
Gutknecht
Hansen
Morella
Myrick
Nethercutt
Ney
Northup
Norwood
Nussle
Ose
Oxley
Packard
Paul
Pease
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Pombo
Porter
Portman
Pryce (OH)
Radanovich
Ramstad
Regula
Reynolds
Riley
Rogan
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roukema
Royce
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Salmon
Sanford
Saxton
Young (FL)
NOES--205
Delahunt
DeLauro
Deutsch
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Doggett
Dooley
Doyle
Edwards
Engel
Eshoo
Etheridge
Evans
Farr
Fattah
Filner
Ford
Frank (MA)
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Gonzalez
Goode
Gordon
Green (TX)
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Wynn
NOT VOTING--10
Becerra
Bilbray
Capps
Frost
John
Mollohan
Quinn
Reyes
Wu
Young (AK)
{time} 1614
Mr. MORAN of Virginia, Ms. LOFGREN, Ms. BERKLEY, and Ms. KAPTUR
changed their vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
So the decision of the Chair stands as the judgment of the Committee.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Amendment No. 5 Offered By Mr. Gejdenson
Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 5 offered by Mr. Gejdenson:
Page 2, after line 3, insert the following:
(3) Former Senator Robert Dole recently traveled to the
region to meet with the Kosovar Albanians and deliver a
message from President Clinton encouraging all parties to
reach an agreement to end the conflict in Kosovo.
(4) Representatives of the Government of Serbia and
representatives of the Kosovar Albanians are scheduled to
reconvene in France on March 15, 1999.
Page 2, line 4, strike ``(3)'' and insert ``(5)''.
Page 2, strike line 9 and all that follows and insert the
following:
SEC. 3. DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES TO KOSOVO.
(a) Declaration of Policy Relating to Interim Agreement.--
The Congress urges the President to continue to take measures
described in (b) to support the ongoing peace process
relating to Kosovo with the objective of reaching a fair and
just interim agreement between the Serbian Government and the
Kosovar Albanians on the status of Kosovo.
(b) Authorization for Deployment of Armed Forces.--If a
fair and just interim agreement described in subsection (a)
is reached, the President is authorized to deploy United
States Armed Forces personnel to Kosovo as part of a NATO
peacekeeping operation implementing such interim agreement.
At the end of the resolution, add the following new
section:
SEC. 4. LIMITATION.
The authorization in section 3 is subject to the limitation
that the number of United States Armed Forces personnel
participating in a deployment described in that section may
not exceed 15 percent of the total NATO force deployed to
Kosovo in the peacekeeping operation described in that
section, except that such percentage may be exceeded if the
President determines that United States forces or United
States citizens are in danger and notifies Congress of that
determination.
Parliamentary Inquiry
Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state his parliamentary inquiry.
Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I have a perfecting amendment to the
[[Page H1216]]
Gejdenson amendment or to the Fowler amendment. It is not a substitute.
It is in fact an additional section that would leave the Gejdenson
amendment in effect.
What would be the process here since the Fowler amendment is in fact
a substitute for Gejdenson? Is it? It is not?
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair informs the gentleman from Ohio (Mr.
Traficant) that the amendment pending is the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson). No other amendment or
substitute has been offered to the amendment offered by the gentleman
from Connecticut. The gentleman from Connecticut is entitled to speak
for 5 minutes on his amendment.
Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, further parliamentary inquiry.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state his parliamentary inquiry.
Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I will have, then, an amendment, a
secondary amendment to the Gejdenson amendment in the form of an
addition, and I would like to be protected for an opportunity to
provide that amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair cannot guarantee recognition of any Member
for the purpose of offering second degree amendments. The Chair's job
is to follow regular order, and that is what the Chair intends to do.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson)
for 5 minutes on his amendment.
Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, let me first say to my friends that the
gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Traficant), while he referenced it as a
perfecting amendment, I would say that is a term of the parliamentary
procedures. I would not see it as an improvement on the underlying
amendment. He has a right to offer it, but I disagree with that. I will
just get that out on the table.
Let me tell my colleagues a story about my father. My father will
turn 87 in the next 5 days. Although he never spoke about World War II
much, he told me this one story of a day that raised his hopes, and
then of course there was a lot more calamity after that day. It was
December 7, 1941.
He was a prisoner in a work camp run by the Germans, the Nazis in
World War II. He was one of thousands of Jews across Eastern Europe who
had been rounded up. In his small village of Profonia, there was about
400 Jews and 400 non-Jews. The Jews were put into a labor camp.
On that day or shortly after December 7, he heard that American ships
had been bombed in Pearl Harbor. While in this country there was
obviously great anxiety, my father saw great hope, because for the
first time in the darkness of World War II, he had the vision and hope
that America would be rapidly in this war and that it would soon be
over. But he was wrong.
Before American forces could liberate concentration camps and work
camps across Europe, virtually every member of his family and every
Jewish member of that village, except for a few, were shot to death in
a small depression in their town.
A friend of mine, Senator Wyden's father, found me a letter from a
Nazi who witnessed the executions. He said the first person he shot was
a woman who had given birth the day before. They had her stand naked.
They shot her and her child and proceeded to shoot every other member
of the village that they had rounded up.
What we do here today is not an academic exercise. It is not simply a
function of parliamentary procedures between the executive and the
legislative. This has a real life and death impact for people on this
planet.
We are going to decide whether or not today these negotiations have a
chance at succeeding. There is no guarantee they will succeed. There is
a hope that they will succeed, but there is a guaranteed failure if the
House shuts off the administration's abilities to move forward.
There is no constitutional demand that we vote on this, but we are
here by the procedures that have been forced upon us. So having them
before us, we had better vote yes.
We are not asking to assert American forces in a live fire zone. We
have had on both sides of the aisle broad bipartisan support to send
Americans in harm's way where many would perish. We are sending the
smallest percentage of Americans in a conflict in my memory, and the
President and the Secretary of State say they only enter if a peace
agreement has been signed.
So whatever my colleagues' inclinations are, whatever my colleagues'
philosophies are about war powers in the Constitution, that small
village in Profonia may be replayed again, and it will be on our head
what happens to those people.
Think carefully before one makes their final vote today. This is not
about relationships with the White House, Democrats versus Republicans,
those who believe in intervention and nonintervention. This is about
whether we give peace a chance and whether we have an opportunity to
let children grow into adults.
Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Turner), the
cosponsor of this resolution.
Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to offer this amendment
which I think embodies the intent of many Members of this body. This
amendment very clearly states that if a just and fair interim agreement
is not reached we will not deploy troops.
The President made that very clear as his position on February 4 in a
speech made here in Washington at the Baldridge Quality Awards
Ceremony. No troops unless there is first an agreement. We believe this
amendment should be adopted to make that clear.
Secondly, we believe that there is a limited involvement that the
United States should have and that that involvement should be limited
to 15 percent of the total troop force assembled by the NATO forces for
this mission
Amendment Offered By Mrs. Fowler to Amendment No. 5 Offered By Mr.
Gejdenson
Mrs. FOWLER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment Offered By Mrs. Fowler to Amendment No. 5 Offered
By Mr. Gejdenson:
Page 1, strike line 1 and all that follows through line 9
and insert the following:
(1) President Clinton is contemplating the introduction of
ground elements of the United States Armed Forces to Kosovo
as part of a larger North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
operation to conduct peacemaking or peacekeeping between
warring parties in Kosovo, and these Armed Forces may be
subject to foreign command.
(2) Such a deployment, if it were to occur, would in all
likelihood require the commitment of United States ground
forces for a minimum of 3 years and cost billions of dollars.
(3) Kosovo, unlike Bosnia, is a province of the Republic of
Serbia, a sovereign foreign state.
(4) The deployment of United States ground forces to
enforce a peace agreement between warring parties in a
sovereign foreign state is not consistent with the prior
employment of deadly military force by the United States
against either or both of the warring parties in that
sovereign foreign state.
(5) The Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, has opposed
the deployment of United States ground forces to Kosovo, as
reflected in his testimony before the Congress on October 6,
1998.
(6) The deployment of United States ground forces to
participate in the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia, which
has resulted in the expenditure of more than $10,000,000,000
by United States taxpayers to date, which has already been
extended past 2 previous withdrawal dates established by the
administration, and which shows no sign of ending in the near
future, clearly argues that the costs and duration of a
deployment to Kosovo for peacekeeping purposes will be much
heavier and much longer than initially foreseen.
(7) The substantial drain on military readiness of a
deployment to Kosovo would be inconsistent with the need,
recently acknowledged by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to
reverse the trends which have already severely compromised
the ability of the United States Armed Forces to carry out
the basic National Military Strategy of the United States.
(8) The Congress has already indicated its considerable
concern about the possible deployment of United States Armed
Forces to Kosovo, as evidenced by section 8115 of the
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1999 (Public Law
105-262; 112 Stat. 2327), which sets forth among other things
a requirement for the President to transmit to the Congress a
report detailing the anticipated costs, funding sources, and
exit strategy for any additional United States Armed Forces
deployed to Yugoslavia, Albania, or Macedonia.
(9) The introduction of United States Armed Forces into
hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in
hostilities may occur, clearly indicates authorization by the
Congress when such action is not required for the defense of
the United States, its Armed Forces, or its nationals.
(10) United States national security interests in Kosovo do
not rise to a level that
[[Page H1217]]
warrants the introduction of United States ground forces in
Kosovo for peacekeeping purposes.
Page 1, strike the second amendatory instructions and
insert the following:
Page 1, strike line 8 and all that follows through line 3
on page 2.
Page 2, strike line 4 and all that follows through line 8.
Page 1, line 10, strike ``DEPLOYMENT'' and insert
``LIMITATION ON DEPLOYMENT''.
Page 1, line 14, strike ``described in (b)'' and insert ``,
subject to the limitation contained in subsection (b),''.
Page 2, strike line 1 through line 6 and insert the
following:
(b) Limitation.--The President is not authorized to deploy
ground elements of the United States Armed Forces to Kosovo
as part of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
operation to implement a peace agreement between the Republic
of Serbia and representatives of ethnic Albanians living in
the province of Kosovo.
(c) Rules of Construction.--Nothing in this concurrent
resolution shall be construed--
(1) to prevent United States Armed Forces from taking such
actions as the Armed Forces consider necessary for self-
defense against an immediate threat emanating from the
Republic of Serbia; or
(2) to restrict the authority of the President under the
Constitution to protect the lives of United States citizens.
Strike the second line 1 and all that follows:
Mrs. FOWLER (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous
consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the
Record.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman
from Florida?
Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, we have
not yet seen the language of this amendment, and we would like our
counsel to just have a moment.
The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman object to the dispensing of the
reading?
Mr. GEJDENSON. No, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the amendment is considered as
having been read.
There was no objection.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Fowler) is
recognized for 5 minutes on her amendment.
Mrs. FOWLER. Mr. Chairman, the amendment that I am putting forward
today with the gentlewoman from Missouri (Ms. Danner) would make it
clear that the House does not support the deployment of United States
ground forces to Kosovo and would spell out the reasons why.
There is no question that the situation in Kosovo is a tragedy. My
heart aches for the people there just as it does for those who are
caught in the midst of the civil war in Sierra Leone, the victims of
religious strife in Kashmir and Indonesia, the hundreds of thousands
suffering from induced famine in North Korea, the masses subjected to
suppression of human rights in China and Cuba, the many who have been
violated by enslavement in Sudan.
But as much as we would like to see all of these tragedies resolved
and as much energy as our diplomats and other officials might
appropriately expend to accomplish that, we have not sent our troops to
those places because it is not within our power to solve all the
world's problems.
{time} 1630
It does not make sense to me to compound the tragedy in Kosovo by
deploying American troops there and subjecting them to hostilities and
potential casualties. That would be an even greater tragedy.
Simply put, while I am willing to provide other forms of support,
including air, intelligence, communications and logistics support to a
European initiative to deploy ground forces to Kosovo, steps which my
amendment would permit, I do not believe that our national security
interests in Kosovo rise to a level that warrants the commitment of
U.S. ground troops.
I am deeply concerned that U.S. ground forces are about to be
deployed on the sovereign territory of a dictator who is essentially
being blackmailed to accept a NATO military presence. The
administration is pressuring Milosevic and the KLA to negotiate by
literally holding a gun to their heads. Even if an agreement on Kosovo
is reached, it is a recipe for resentment, not reconciliation, and it
will be our troops on the ground in the cross hairs.
Furthermore, I am deeply concerned that the administration has not
articulated an exit strategy and that there has been no determination
made regarding the cost of the operations or the source of funds to pay
for it. The administration's initiative would draw the United States
further into commitments in the Balkans that have already cost U.S.
taxpayers some $10 billion. After violating two self-imposed deadlines
for the withdrawal of our military forces from Bosnia, the
administration today offers no end in sight to our commitment there.
I would note that the Congress is already on record in requiring the
administration, in Section 8115 of the fiscal year 1999 Defense
Appropriations bill, to provide a report to the Congress on the
national security justification, exit strategy, cost, source of funds,
and other key considerations before the deployment of any additional
U.S. forces to Yugoslavia, Albania or Macedonia. That is Public Law
that we voted on in this House and the President signed.
The President has indicated that the size of any U.S. ground presence
will be small. The fact is the deployment will last for a minimum of 3
years. It will increase already sky-high military personnel deployment
rates. It will place a significant additional strain on our troops and
will further compromise the Nation's military readiness.
For those who have not been out in the field to see our troops
firsthand, today our military is undermanned, is undertrained, and is
underequipped. Our service people have had it with constant
deployments, chronic shortages and cannibalized equipment.
For me, the bottom line is this: Could I look one of my neighbors in
the eye and tell them, with conviction, that their loved one died in
Kosovo in defense of America's vital interests? The answer is no. I
urge Members to vote ``yes'' on the Fowler-Danner amendment.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the gentlewoman's
amendment.
I have visited our troops in Bosnia on several occasions. One of the
great miracles of the Bosnia venture is that not one single American
soldier has been injured or killed as a result of that participation,
but our presence, along with our NATO allies, has prevented the
continuing bloodbath that has inflicted that territory.
Now, no one is arguing that American troops should go to war in
Kosovo. What we are advocating is a conclusion of an agreement between
the Albanians and the Serbs in Kosovo, after which, upon invitation, a
28,000 person force would go to that country to keep the peace. Of the
28,000 soldiers, 4,000 should be members of our own armed forces.
Kosovo, in a sense, is becoming a secondary issue in this debate.
What we are talking about is the survival and the vitality of NATO. As
I mentioned earlier today, some of us will be in Independence,
Missouri, tomorrow at the Truman Library with the ambassadors and
governmental leaders of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, as we
invite them to join NATO. They will ask the question: Why should they
join NATO if NATO is unwilling, upon invitation, to take part in a
peacekeeping mission?
The gentlewoman is talking about military readiness. What is the
military readiness for if it is not to prevent the continuance of
bloodshed upon reaching an agreement between the Albanians and the
Serbs?
This debate today in this House makes me awfully glad that some of my
colleagues were not here when the decision was made to participate in
the Second World War or the Korean War or the Persian Gulf War.
Isolationism is rampant in this body. I repeat that. Isolationism is
rampant in this body. If the Congress of the United States is not
prepared to participate in a NATO peacekeeping mission, upon the
invitation of the two parties, for goodness sake, what is NATO prepared
to do? What is the purpose of NATO if it is not minimally to preserve
peace in Europe?
I ask my colleagues to reject my colleague's amendment and to accept
the responsibility of the one remaining superpower for making a modest
contribution, and I underscore it is a modest contribution, to a NATO
effort to preserve the peace.
Our friends in the United Kingdom are ready to send 8,000 people to
Kosovo, twice as many as we are, yet the Brits' population is one-fifth
of ours. What do we tell our friends in
[[Page H1218]]
London when they are ready to send 8,000 people into that peacekeeping
force; that they should do it all? Well, they have told us there will
not be a NATO peacekeeping force unless we participate. It is only
rational that this minimal participation on the part of the United
States be approved overwhelmingly by this body.
The voices of isolationism have often carried the day in the Congress
of the United States. I hope to God this will not be one of those days.
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word, and I
rise in support of the Fowler amendment.
I particularly want to claim the right to speak after the
distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos), because the
gentleman knows perfectly well that this Member is not an isolationist,
since the gentleman from California and I were among the two Members
who probably had more impact on the President's decision to have a
preventive force sent into Macedonia, or the former Yugoslavian,
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), if one prefers, under United Nations
auspices. And, of course, this Member voted for deployment of our
troops to the Persian Gulf area for Desert Shield and Desert Storm
because, in fact, one country, a member of the United Nations, invaded
another.
But I do think the gentlewoman's amendment is entirely appropriate,
and it does not go to totally restricting American involvement in
Kosovo. It simply says no ground troops. It does not prevent all kinds
of support, such as logistical, intelligence or even air support.
Now, I would like to address the issue of why the Europeans think
American forces should be involved on the ground in Kosovo. Our
European friends and allies say they cannot act without American
leadership. As a long-term member of the North Atlantic Assembly from
the House, I regularly have heard from our European friends that
nothing can be done without America. Frankly, this is nonsense. NATO
has established and has had in place for the last 2 years a concept or
procedure called Combined Joint Task Forces, CJTF, where, out of area,
some members of NATO can participate in a mission, out of area without
all of them participating. This is an ideal time for the CJTF concept
to be employed.
I also would note that the press reports coming out of the
negotiations have some of our European friends insisting that the
administration's willingness to offer several thousand troops is far
too small--that several times that number are necessary. The Europeans
desperately want to be treated as equals but they seem terrified to act
on their own. While I firmly support the Alliance, we have to break our
friends of their undue reliance on U.S. military superiority.
This Member is also concerned about the deployment of more U.S. armed
forces on yet another peacekeeping mission. Really, however, in Kosovo
it is peace enforcement. There is not going to be any peace to be kept
because both these parties, the Government of Yugoslavia or Serbia and
the KLA and the Kosovars are being coerced. That peace enforcement
mission for U.S. ground forces in Kosovo will exacerbate the
detrimental impact these missions are having on our military readiness
to respond to a major attack against our direct interests.
Mr. Chairman, peacekeeping is wholly different from war fighting.
Military units deployed on peacekeeping assignments must undergo
extensive training to regain, renew and reestablish their fighting
skills. Reliance on the U.S. to spearhead and to put teeth into
peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions is, frankly, eroding the war
fighting capability of the United States armed forces. The ever-
increasing number of peacekeeping operations threatens to erode it.
And, in fact, I would have to say that what has been done by moving
this country's armed forces more and more into peace enforcement
activities. It is damaging the capability of the U.S. military.
This Member would also mention that frequent and recurring recalls of
reservists and National Guardsmen to support these missions will
eventually take its toll on U.S. businesses, American productivity and
personal careers. Perhaps the Members understand that the gentleman
from Washington (Mr. Nethercutt) already has a tax credit bill
introduced to try to assist businesses whose National Guard personnel
and military reservists are abroad all the time. That is an
understandable concern. I guess we have had about 10,000 lawsuits filed
now against enterprises by Guardsmen or reservists who have not been
able, in the eyes of the Guardsmen or the reservists, to be placed back
in the job they left for deployment or in a comparable job when they
return. Now that should tell us something.
The Administration appears intent to act independent of Congress to
commit troops to Kosovo. This is both unconstitutional and it is
shortsighted. It jeopardizes the very interests President Clinton has
vowed to preserve and protect, placing at risk not only the Balkans but
also the U.S. war-fighting capacity.
And I would say that what is happening in Macedonia today, with
Serbian troops on their border with tanks and artillery as a result of
American and coalition threats, certainly does not stabilize Macedonia;
Certainly does not prevent the possibility of Greece and Turkey coming
in on opposite sides; it makes a destabilized Macedonia more likely.
What is happening there today because of this so-called peace
enforcement, peace arrangement between Serbia and the KLA, or the
Kosovars, is really destabilizing.
The Kosovars, particularly the KLA, do not have any interest in
autonomy. Their interest is independence. And, in fact, we have Members
standing up in our committees insisting that the Kosovars should be
acting for independence. What is that going to do to the stability of
Albania, Turkey, Macedonia and Bulgaria? It is not positive.
Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleagues for listening.
Mr. Chairman, this member has yet to be convinced that this mission
is well-thought-out or that it is necessary to risk the lives of U.S.
armed forces men and women in another country's civil war. This Member
is also mindful of assertions that a civil war in Serbia could spread
to Macedonia and then bring two NATO allies into conflict--Greece and
Turkey. While this might make a case if the conflict were occurring in
a country adjacent to a NATO ally, Serbia does not meet this criteria.
The use of this argument, to deploy U.S. armed forces to Serbia, is
nothing more than veiled, highly speculative justification. In this
Member's mind, it is a poor display of leadership for the world's only
superpower. The Clinton Administration is too quick to resort to the
heavy hand of U.S. military intervention. Just because we can, doesn't
mean we should!
While some liken the circumstances leading to our potential
involvement in Kosovo as similar to those that resulted in U.S. troops
deploying to Bosnia, this Member disagrees with this assessment. Unlike
Bosnia, Kosovo is not a sovereign nation--it is a province within the
sovereign nation of Serbia. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) is an
armed separatist group that appears focused on a singularly important
objective--independence for the approximately two (2) million ethnic
Albanians living in Kosovo. Kosovar leaders, in Serbia, want
independence, not peace. Serbs are led by one man, Slobodan Milosevic,
who is adamantly opposed to independence for Kosovo and who is willing
to militarily oppose the presence of foreign troops in Serbia. With
tension on both sides, and a history of failed attempts to establish an
accord between Serbs and Kosovars, it is highly likely that the already
sizeable casualty count will continue to rise. This Member has not been
convinced we should risk adding the names of U.S. personnel to that
growing casualty list.
The high tension between KLA and Serb forces, compounded by recent
action by the Serbs to amass 4,500 heavily armored troops with
artillery on the southern Kosovo border with the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), will turn this into peace-enforcement--a
police action. This brings back haunting memories of Korea, Vietnam,
and Somalia. As history has shown, peace-enforcement does not lend
itself to an exit strategy. Police presence is rarely a temporary
situation. In 1995, the Administration indicated that U.S. troops would
be home from Bosnia within a year. The fact is that about 6,200
American military personnel remain deployed within Bosnia nearly four
years later. The successful resolution of the crisis in Serbia will
guarantee a continuous, long-term U.S. military presence there, as well
as in Bosnia.
This Member has previously voiced, and still has, enormous
difficulties, for many reasons, with the proposal to deploy several
thousand U.S. troops as part of a NATO peacekeeping force for Kosovo.
Those reservations have nothing to do with whether Serbian misbehavior
merits punishment. This Member certainly does not condone anything the
Serbs
[[Page H1219]]
have done recently, or over the past decade, to foment Kosovar unrest.
Belgrade has been condescending toward, and abusive of, the rights of
ethnic Albanians, giving rise to the KLA. Yet, Secretary of Defense
William Cohen correctly has noted that ``the notion that only the Serbs
have engaged in atrocities is incorrect.'' While acknowledging that
both sides are contributing to the conflict, this member would quickly
point out that the KLA forces were not the ones to displace nearly
400,000 people, they did not destroy more than 19,000 homes, nor did
they destroy nearly 500 villages. The Serbs accomplished this
brutality, now under the ultimate direction of one individual, Slobodan
Milosevic.
Despite the precedents set by this Administration's previous actions,
or by previous presidents, President Clinton has avoided the
constitutional framework for determining whether it is of vital
national interest to devote a significant portion of our military
capability keeping the peace at two places in the Balkans. Why is this
important? It is important because it jeopardizes the continuity of
American policy. Policy set by the Administration acting alone in this
case becomes susceptible to change upon election of a new president,
which will occur in less than 2 years. Congressional approval of any
American or NATO invasion of Kosovo, on the other hand, enables
continuity of four foreign policy and use of combat force, even after
the end of the president's term.
Last, and far from least, we are on the verge of what this Member
considers to be a much more serious breech of peace in the Balkans. The
People's Republic of China has used its veto power on the U.N. Security
Council to kill extension of the first-ever United Nations Preventive
Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia (FYROM). Continuation of the international peacekeeping
presence in Macedonia (FYROM) has now come into question. Yesterday,
the distinguished gentleman from the 12th District in California, the
Honorable Tom Lantos, joined this Member in signing a joint letter to
the Secretaries of Defense and State, urging, in the strongest possible
terms, that a continued U.S. ``preventative'' peacekeeping force remain
in Macedonia. It is this Member's hope that the Scandinavian forces of
UNPREDEP will also remain.
Macedonia is surrounded by countries--Albania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia,
Greece, and Turkey--that, themselves, are experiencing internal or
external difficulties, or both. Macedonia is a highly volatile friction
point, and it is no coincidence that the Macedonian region has been the
starting point for past wars. Therefore, it is vitally important that
the presence of a stabilization force be maintained. A continuation of
the U.N. mandate may no longer be an option, but the U.S. may find it
necessary to expand its force structure in this sovereign country,
where we, legitimately, have been invited, where we have unambiguous
national interests because of threats to the integrity of the NATO
alliance, and where we absolutely cannot afford an escalation of
conflict. Were Macedonia to become engulfed in ethnic conflict, it is
quite possible that Greece and Turkey, two key NATO allies, would
become engaged on opposing sides--and Albania and Bulgaria might become
involved, too. The potential is that instability in Macedonia would
cause the southern Balkans to erupt into yet another conflict,
potentially leading to a much broader conflagration, or even war. It is
a possibility that must be avoided.
There are appropriate places in the Balkans to deploy U.S. troops:
Macedonia, for example. This Member is not convinced, yet, that it is
appropriate to further tax the U.S. or its armed forces by allowing
this Administration to risk the lives of U.S. service personnel in
Serbia, including Kosovo.
Ms. DANNER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I rise today to express my strong support of the
Fowler-Danner amendment and in opposition to sending troops to Kosovo.
We must always question the wisdom of putting our military in harm's
way, most particularly in what is essentially a civil war.
I would like to share with my colleagues today a letter I received
from a constituent whose husband and family are much closer to this
situation and its ramifications than those of us here today.
{time} 1645
I like many of my colleagues have also traveled to Bosnia, but let me
tell you the story of someone who has served there.
She writes:
Congresswoman Danner, I would like to commend you for your
stance on the issue of sending troops into Kosovo. You may
remember that Bob was with one of the first units to serve in
Bosnia. Ten days after we were married, he left for 11 months
there. At the time, I supported it, believing that the troops
would be out in a short period of time and that real peace
would be achieved. After the experience of spending time in
Europe, my position has changed. I have watched soldiers
spending multiple tours in Bosnia away from families. The
divorce rate is high, children do not have their fathers and
mothers with them, and families are breaking apart due to the
strain. Please work to encourage your colleagues to think
about the ramifications of sending troops to Kosovo in human
terms.
Mr. Speaker, we were told that our military commitment to Bosnia
would last 1 year. We are now approaching the fourth year. We were told
it would cost $1 billion. It has now cost $10 billion. Thus, we must
have, I think, great concern for any commitment with regard to Kosovo.
There is no reason to believe that a mission in Kosovo would not drag
on indefinitely with a high possibility of American casualties.
I strongly urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the
requisite number of words.
Mr. Chairman, we keep talking about a peace agreement. There is not
one. If there were one and our forces were sent in, that is fine. But
without a peace agreement, we are going to coerce those other nations
into signing one, and I do not think that that is a very American way
to deal with this problem, not by force . And I do not think that we
ought to be bombing over there in an effort to try to coerce them to
comply with our peace agreement that we put forward.
NATO is not at risk. NATO is a defensive organization, not an
offensive organization. We appear to be aggressors. I really worry
after talking with our people over there that we are going to lose an
airplane or two. It may not be from ground fire but ultimately we could
lose one from engine failure, and we may. And if that guy gets down in
that area, those people are not going to be very nice to him. They do
not like us over there.
Yesterday, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright told the Congress to
put off today's debate because it might harm the negotiations. I would
tell the Secretary the reason this debate is necessary is because the
real danger is recklessness with our foreign policy.
The President is about to put our troops in the middle of an ethnic
and religious war that has been going on for thousands of years. It is
a lose-lose situation for America. We lose because our troops will be
deployed to a country without a clear mission. Just as in Bosnia, the
President has no entry or exit plan, he has failed to explain the cost
of the mission, and he has failed to explain what effect it will have
on the already sinking morale of our fighting men and women. The
President's continued use of hollow threats of force only guarantees
that our soldiers will be put in harm's way and that dictators will
continue to control how our foreign policy is run. Despite this, the
President continues to state he will send 4,000 U.S. troops to Kosovo
if a peace agreement is signed.
Mr. Chairman, I fought with our Air Force in both Korea and Vietnam,
and I am opposed to the use of U.S. military force where we are not
threatened in this country. I am disturbed that the President would use
NATO to attack a sovereign nation. NATO was not designed to and should
not be used for those purposes. The President knows this, and he has
continually ignored the Congress when making decisions that impact our
ability to keep peace throughout the world. Our fighting men and women
are being used as pawns in a failed foreign policy by this
administration. Our soldiers are leaving the services in droves.
Recruiting is down, morale is low, and the main reason is failed
policies that ship our soldiers, sailors and airmen around the world
with no purpose or plan.
Mr. Chairman, we should not send troops, we should not send bombs, we
should not get involved. It is a conflict that is destined to follow
the rest to failure. The President ought to think long and hard before
he puts our troops in a bottomless pit. He has a responsibility to our
fighting men and women and to this Nation to admit there is no defined
mission in Kosovo and our troops do not belong there. I know that,
however, if our fighting men and women are called to duty, they will go
and they will serve with honor as they always do. But under our
Constitution,
[[Page H1220]]
I believe we in the Congress have as much responsibility as the
President and we must not ask our soldiers, sailors and airmen to serve
in Kosovo without a defined mission or national interest.
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, the other side talks about all kinds of reasons why the
United States should not send any of its troops into Kosovo. We know
that there has been ethnic cleansing. We know there has been genocide.
I was always taught that two wrongs do not make a right and to me it is
ridiculous to say, well, there is genocide going on in all parts of the
world so therefore we should not intervene in any part of the world.
That does not make sense to me at all.
I rise in opposition to the gentlewoman from Florida's amendment
which in effect guts the gentleman from Connecticut's amendment. The
isolationist attitude that I hear amongst some of my colleagues is
indeed troubling and puzzling. We have heard these arguments time and
time and time again. We heard these arguments during the Second World
War when 6 million people plus were ethnically cleansed and the
Holocaust was there. I am not saying that this is on the same level,
but when innocent people are killed because of their race, or
ethnicity, we have a right and a duty, I think, to respond. We saw in
Bosnia that until the United States grabbed the bull by the horns,
Europe was not capable of stopping the carnage, and we saw 200,000
people ethnically cleansed because of their ethnicity, and we will see
it again in Kosovo unless we are willing to step in.
Now, we talk about burdensharing, and I accept the argument that it
is not fair to ask us to do the lion's share. But here we are only
proposing 4,000 troops out of 28,000. This is the poster child for
burdensharing. Our NATO allies are doing the bulk of the troops. And
for the United States to pull out now or for this Congress to send a
wrong message now does such harm to the negotiations, I think probably
destroys the negotiations, and how many more thousands of people will
have to be killed until we step in a year or two or three years away?
Isolationism did not work during World War II, it did not work during
other wars, and it will not work now. I can never understand my
colleagues who say that somehow people who volunteer for the armed
forces and do not want to go, somehow that is a reason not to send
troops. If you volunteer, you know you are volunteering, and in the
future you know you may have to go. So to me because somebody wants to
be with their family, I would want to be with my family, too, but that
is not a reason for United States troops not to do what we need to do,
which is in our national interest. It is in our interest to stop
genocide. It is in our interest to stop a wider war which will surely
happen if we let it go unchecked. We have allies, Greece and Turkey and
other allies, that can be sucked into a wider Balkan war. But if we
take steps now along with NATO, we can prevent all this.
I also do not understand some of my colleagues who are always one to
have more money for the defense budget, they always fight for more
money for defense but yet they never seem to want to use the defense.
It does not make sense to me at all. If we are the superpower in the
world, and we have a strong defense, and we need to beef up our
defense, then there are times we need to use our defense. This is such
a time. We heard when we were debating Bosnia here in Congress that
there would be hundreds if not thousands of American casualties. That
has not happened. It will not happen in Kosovo, either. The naysayers,
the doom and gloom people, it will not happen because our forces are
the best. There is a mission here, and it is a specific mission here.
We are going to Kosovo to keep the peace. Mr. Milosevic has slaughtered
hundreds and hundreds and thousands of Albanians. People there have no
rights. They have no civil rights. They have no human rights. Men,
women and children are slaughtered. We have seen the carnage. Only the
United States leadership can stop it. This is not the time to be
isolationists.
I appeal to my colleagues, and again I think this is the wrong time
to be debating this, because there is no peace agreement. That is just
the point. The gentleman from Texas said there was no agreement. I
think if we pull the rug out from under the President and say we do not
want troops before there is an agreement, there surely will not be an
agreement. We should have waited until there was an agreement to debate
this in the United States House of Representatives.
I sincerely hope that our colleagues will understand the gravity of
this issue and support the gentleman from Connecticut and support the
gentleman from Texas. No more than 15 percent United States
participation is needed.
Mr. DeLAY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I rise today to voice my complete opposition to sending
American troops to Kosovo. There is simply no vision to this mission.
Even the casual observer can see that the proposed Kosovo initiative
has no timetable, no rules of engagement and no greater strategic plan
for that region. Unfortunately, the undefined Kosovo mission is
symbolic of the lack of direction of our recent American foreign
policy. There is a 6-year trend to send American troops anywhere for
any reason, but there are no consistent goals that tie all of these
missions together.
Ronald Reagan once said that changing America's foreign policy is a
little like towing an iceberg. You can only pick up speed as the frozen
attitudes and mistakes of the past melt away. America needs to quickly
change directions and leave behind the chilling comedy of errors that
has defined our recent foreign policy.
Ronald Reagan is a statesman. During his administration, the United
States was the dominant force on the world's stage because there was no
mystery to American foreign policy. During that time, America boldly
told the world that we would bring peace through strength. Ronald
Reagan stood up to the tyranny of communism and said that the American
way would triumph, but not through conciliation and not through
appeasement. The United States won that Cold War because of the truth
of our principles. In every corner of the world we pushed for freedom
and democracy.
Oh, how American policy has changed since the days of Ronald Reagan.
Today there is simply no cohesion and no consistent principles that
form the basis for everything we do on any spot of this map of the
world. American foreign policy is now one huge big mystery. Simply put,
the administration is trying to lead the world with a feel-good foreign
policy. This feel-good foreign policy tears us away from peace through
strength and it has resulted in creating chaos through weakness. This
administration makes threats and never follows up on them. They set
deadlines that are broken and reset, just to be broken again. American
foreign policy failures over the last 6 years litter the international
landscape. Mission-creep in Somalia cost the lives of American
soldiers. North Korea continues to flaunt international law by speeding
ahead with their nuclear program with no consequences whatsoever. Haiti
is still not the beacon of democracy, despite sending U.S. Marines
there. Afghanistan and the Sudan were bombed in the blink of an eye.
Yet Osama bin Laden still represents a threat to thousands of American
lives.
We continuously bomb Iraq, without any clear goals, and without
getting any closer to our ultimate objective of Saddam Hussein being
removed from power. Russia, with its massive nuclear capability is
coming apart at the seams and selling weapons and technology to scrape
by, and we do nothing. China is walking all over us, pure and simple.
Currently we are stuck in a never-ending peacekeeping mission in Bosnia
that was proposed as a 1-year commitment. That promise was made 4 years
ago. And now we have Kosovo.
{time} 1700
Kosovo is not a hopeful nation aspiring to democracy. It is a big
dangerous quagmire. The ethnic Albanians wanted total independence, and
the Serbs do not want to give up any important parts of their country.
Both parties have consistently rejected any chance of a real cease-
fire.
Mr. Chairman, American soldiers are trained to be warriors, not baby-
sitters. The administration has no plan to
no...@house.gov
[[Page H1208]]
in the middle of the peace talks in Kosovo. But if we are to consider
this resolution let us send a clear signal of America's resolve to be a
partner for peace.
The conflict in Kosovo has caused great human suffering and if left
unchecked this conflict could potentially threaten the peace and
stability of Europe. Despite the seriousness of this conflict there are
those who oppose the use of troops. I wonder if those who are opposed
to the use of troops are paying attention to the daily reports of
atrocities, as some 2,000 people have been killed. Are those in
opposition to the use of our troops listening to the international aide
workers who are trying to aid the thousands of refugees fleeing the
war-ravaged province.
Tension in this ethnic Albanian region has been increasing since the
government of Yugoslavia removed Kosovo's autonomous status. Belgrade's
decision came without the approval of the people of Kosovo, which has a
population consisting of 90% ethnic Albanians. Several human rights
groups have made ominous reports of Serbian forces conducting
abductions and summary executions. These reprisal killings and the
continued human rights violations gives rise to the specter of ethnic
cleansing.
The United States and its allies need to take concrete steps to
ensure that this continued violence in the Kosovo region does not
spread to Albania, Macedonia, Greece, and Turkey. In supporting the
President's use of troops, this body would signal a determination to
take proactive measures in the Balkan region and encourage an immediate
peaceful resolution to the conflict.
Mr. Chairman, this bill expresses the sense of the United States
Congress that it deeply deplores and strongly condemns any loss of life
or the destruction of property. In supporting this bill this body does
not choose sides but indicates a willingness to choose the side of
human rights and human dignity.
Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this bill and continue
the U.S. role as a active participant in the Balkan peace process.
Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of our time to the
gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Moran).
Mr. MORAN of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, it is in our interest to engage
in Kosovo. It is in our interest because the reason we enjoy world
peace and domestic prosperity is that we gain from worldwide peace and
prosperity more than any other nation in the world today. If there were
war and depression in Europe we would pay the higher price. We are the
leader of this free world because we have defined ourselves as a
principled nation; because we believe in democracy and free enterprise
and freedom of expression and respect for human rights. And because we
do more than just believe in it and talk about it. We are willing to
stand up for those principles.
One might say we do not belong in the Balkans, that we have nothing
to do with the Balkans. To say that, though, we would have to
conveniently ignore the fact that two world wars were started in the
Balkans, but we cannot ignore it because the reason Europe is stable
today is that we invested after World War II to make sure that it would
not come apart; that it would not be taken over by fascists. We did
that through the Marshall Plan. We did it through investing in the
European powers, and we did it by establishing the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, NATO.
We established NATO, have invested in it sustained it, and must lead
it. The nations of Europe depend upon the strength of our leadership. A
free democratic Europe might not exist today if it were not for the
United States, and it might not exist as free democratic states in the
future if we do not lead through NATO in defense of democracy and human
rights.
The other countries of the world recognize they have to look to us
for leadership. They also have to look to us because we are the
principal military power in this world. We have the capacity to enforce
peace, and the moral compass to insist that it be a principled peace.
We should not be empowering a war criminal, a bully, somebody who has
gained power by using the situation in Kosovo to divide Yugoslavia and
to appeal to the Serbian peoples' worst instincts.
He took away the autonomy of Kosovo in the late 1980s and Milosevic
knew exactly what he did. He bred upon the hatred of ethnic fears. He
used Kosovo to rise to power and he wants to use Kosovo to stay in
power.
It is not in our interest that war criminals have that kind of power.
As we all know, when one stands up to a bully they back down. This is
our opportunity to stand up to that bully. He should not be given the
kind of credibility he has been given. He cannot compete with us
militarily, and he understands that we are acting out of principle;
that if we act, if we lead, the rest of the European powers will
follow. He is counting, though, on the U.S. Congress doing the
politically expedient thing by tying the President's hands and refusing
to stand up to him.
We need to do the right thing in Kosovo today because if we do not do
the right thing in Kosovo today, tomorrow it will be some place else
because other bullies around the world will be empowered by Milosevic's
success in Kosovo. They will learn from this that the United States is
not as determined, we are not as resolved, we are not as principled
that we are not the same Nation that rebuilt Europe after World War II.
The fact is we are the same Nation. We must be the same Nation. We
must not allow this situation to implode so that we enter the conflict
after thousands more people have died and when our troops will be
subjected to far greater danger. Do the right thing in Kosovo today.
The CHAIRMAN. All time of the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr.
Gejdenson) has expired. The gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman) has 1
minute remaining.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the
gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Barr).
(Mr. BARR of Georgia asked and was given permission to revise and
extend his remarks.)
Mr. BARR of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the
resolution for military involvement in Kosovo.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition not only to this resolution, but
to the principle of governing that has brought it to the floor today.
As we all know, this resolution binds no one; it is fundamentally
meaningless. Its passage or failure may make a sound, but that sound
will not be heard outside this chamber.
Right now, American troops are deployed all over the globe on
missions of dubious value with questionable rules of engagement. We
will do our business here today, close the doors, turn out the lights,
and go home; yet American troops will still be deployed all over the
globe, on missions of dubious value, with questionable rules of
engagement.
We can listen to college professors, government bureaucrats,
diplomats, and pundits talk about international law for days. However,
once they're silent, we'll still be left with the cold, hard fact that
it is our job to determine when to commit American troops to military
action.
Once again, we seek to tiptoe around a tough decision. We're trying
to avoid doing our job so we won't sustain any political damage that
might come as a side effect.
What are we afraid of? The Constitution gives us--the Congress--
exclusive power to commit American military forces to action. Congress
certainly hasn't shown similar reticence to use its appropriation
powers, or its power to tax, or its power to regulate.
Personally, I have carefully considered the merits of using American
troops as policemen in Kosovo. I have come to two simple conclusions.
First, the job of a soldier is not to act as a referee, an arbiter, a
builder of societies or nations, or a policeman. The job of a soldier
is to protect America's interests by destroying America's enemies on
the battlefield. It is even more insulting to ask a soldier to serve as
a policeman under the aegis of some international organization instead
of the American flag. Such actions do nothing to further vital American
strategic interests. The role of such international groups is to
perpetuate themselves by talking, sopping up U.S. tax dollars, and
satisfying the goals of some committee of leaders more concerned about
the shape of the table they are sitting around that with the interests
of the United States.
The second conclusion I have come to is that no amount of American
involvement in Kosovo is going to eliminate ethnic conflicts that have
raged for centuries. We've been trying to resolve this problem for
three years and have gotten nowhere. The 4,000 American troops serving
in a NATO occupation are exactly where they started. In a few short
years, Kosovo will take its place in history books along with Bosnia,
Haiti, and Somalia as examples of a foreign policy that has no
principled framework, and which bounces from one so-called crisis to
another, as a drunk bounces off the walls going down a flight of
stairs.
The only people who will rate this action a success are the foreign
policy bureaucrats in
[[Page H1209]]
the Clinton Administration. Because their foreign policy is not saddled
with the burden of concrete goals and objectives, they therefore can--
and will--define anything as a ``success'' whenever pollsters tell them
the ``public'' needs a dose of ``success.'' This is not a recipe for
measured military action; it is a recipe for failure, as defined by
sound historical standards of politics among nations. Doubtlessly, as
this operation sputters to close--whenever that might be--it will be
praised in panel discussions and campaign speeches as a resounding
success, when the facts indicate it was a tremendous waste of time,
resources, prestige, and possibly lives.
However, no matter how strong my feelings on this issue are, I'm
willing to agree that sensible people can disagree over the merits of
military action in Kosovo. What I am not willing to do is agree that
Congress should have a non-binding vote on this matter, wash our hands
of it, move on to other issues that test better in focus groups, and
then periodically return to this issue when bullied by the
Administration into pouring more money into it.
Right now, our soldiers are risking their lives in a country many
Americans have never heard of. My constituents feel very strongly about
this issue. Sadly, their opinions will not be a part of American
foreign policy. While I urge a no vote on the resolution today, it is
far more important for Congress to reassert its role in determining
when and where American forces are committed. To do otherwise is to
knowingly reject a specific, constitutional, and moral duty.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield as much time as he may consume to
the gentleman from California (Mr. Horn).
(Mr. HORN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. HORN. Mr. Chairman, I commend the chairman of the Committee on
International Relations for bringing this resolution to the floor.
The conflict in Kosovo is taking place within a sovereign nation. If
we are going to go to war with a sovereign nation, we ought to provide
a declaration of war. That is what the Constitution of the United
States would have us do. I think all of us in this Chamber know that
Serbian leader Milosevic is a war criminal that should be tried by an
international tribunal. The issue here today is, by what criteria
should Congress and the President of the United States judge whether
American troops should go there?
{time} 1545
When is the success known by American troops sent to Kosovo? The
President repeatedly broke promises regarding the length of service in
Bosnia before admitting our troops will be there indefinitely. Are they
going to spend 50 years in the Balkans around Kosovo to bring peace as
we have in Korea? Korea was where another Nation invaded South Korea.
This is the time to ask the President to face up to the tough
questions and give us the answers to the questions that have been
submitted to him. I would keep American troops out of Kosovo.
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, we should not be asked to vote on this ill-
timed resolution, asked to sign a blank check for this deployment; and
were it not for the consequences, I would not vote for it, certainly
not in the form it comes to us. But if at this critical point, we vote
down this resolution, the winner will be Slobodan Milosevic. He will
read our action as his warrant to act with impunity, to stonewall the
peace negotiators and move with vicious aggression against Kosovo. The
best we can make of the choices before us is to vote for the Gejdenson-
Turner Amendment, and make this resolution turn on the achievement of a
genuine peace agreement.
I would gladly vote for more conditions, for conditions like those
proposed by Mr. cox and Mr. Nethercutt in the amendments they filed in
the record. At the very least, before we send ground troops, we should
know: are they peace-keepers or peace-makers? The words sound similar,
but the missions differ dramatically. I am opposed to sending ground
troops to be peace-makers. But if a durable agreement is reached, I can
support, reluctantly, the deployment of our troops as peace-keepers. I
say ``reluctantly'' because if there were a reasonable division of
labor between us and our European allies, they would take on this
mission. We have at least made the minor precedent of committing only
4,000 troops out of a force of 28,000.
Like everyone in this House, I would prefer to send none. I would
prefer not to put any of our young men and women in harm's way. But we
have learned that if the United States wants things to happen, we have
to lead; and if we want to be the leader among our allies, we have to
participate.
As Senator Dole told us yesterday, if we want to remain the ``leader
of NATO,'' the ``United States cannot ignore serious threats to
stability in Europe.'' I think the U.S. should remain the leader of
NATO, and I will, therefore, vote for this resolution, as amended by
Gejdenson and others.
Mr. BORSKI. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to express support for the
peace process in Kosovo and our troops in the Balkans. Failure to pass
this resolution would seriously hamper the efforts of the United States
to seek a peace agreement in Kosovo.
Ten years ago, Slobodan Milosevic stripped Kosovo of its autonomy--an
action which precipitated the collapse of Yugoslavia and ethnic
violence throughout the Balkans. Since that time, the Kosovars have
been struggling to attain self detemination--a principle we cherish so
deeply here in the United States. Milosevic has responded with
brutality, using the Yugoslavian army to crush the aspirations of the
Kosovars. His forces have terrorized and murdered innocent civilians
and forced thousands from their homes. Indeed, the region today is on
the verge of massive violence and human suffering.
The U.S. is currently leading international negotiations to achieve a
peace agreement between the Serbian Government and Kosovo's ethnic
Albanian population. America and its allies have given Milosevic every
opportunity to resolve this conflict through peaceful means. We are not
asking him to grant anything new to Kosovo--only to restore the
autonomy that we stripped from Kosovo in 1989. Yet Milosevic remains
resistant to an agreement and the presence of an international
peacekeeping force to implement it. Without forceful diplomatic effort
from the U.S. and our allies, peace will never be achieved in Kosovo.
Mr. Chairman each member of this body has reservations anytime we
commit U.S. troops to peacekeeping forces, or to any deployment in a
potentially hostile area. In fact, I have always believed that our
European allies should commit a higher proportion of the peacekeepers
in the Balkans. Fortunately, the Kosovo plan takes a step in that
direction by calling on our European allies to contribute over 24,000
troops--86 percent of the total force.
While U.S. troops would comprise, a small portion of the overall
force, the absence of U.S. troops in a NATO peacekeeping force would
have great consequences. NATO's members continue to look to the U.S. as
a leader--imagine the consequences of not honoring our obligations as
leader of this security alliance. If we fail to respond to new
challenges in the Balkans, our allies will leave the Balkans. If we
abandon our responsibilities in the alliance, we greatly jeopardize our
national interests in Europe, and weaken our leadership role in the
world.
As a new member of the House delegation to the North Atlantic
Assembly, I have been studying our role in NATO in the post-cold-war
world. We recently celebrated the 50th anniversary of NATO--the most
successful security alliance in our Nation's history. But like all
successful institutions, NATO must adapt to the new challenges it
confronts.
In the post-cold-war Balkan world, ethnic conflicts know no
boundaries. Violence in Kosovo greatly jeopardizes the fragile peace in
neighboring Bosnia and Macedonia. It also threatens to place Greece and
Turkey--our NATO allies--at odds with each other. Without peace in the
Balkans, NATO's credibility as a guarantor of peace and stability in
Europe is at risk.
We are at a crucial juncture today in this delicate and complex peace
process. All parties will reconvene on Monday, March 15, to hopefully
achieve an agreement. Any actions taken by Congress between now and
next week will have a profound impact on the final outcome of the peace
process.
Fortunately, the U.S. and its allies are negotiating from a position
of strength. Thanks in large part to the efforts of Bob Dole, the
Kosovars are reportedly united and ready to sign a peace agreement.
Clearly, the pressure is now on Milosevic to make concessions and sign
on the dotted line.
But if we fail to approve this resolution, the pendulum will shift
the other way, and possibly destroy all hopes of achieving a peace
agreement. Defeat today would clearly strengthen Milosevic's hand,
diminish our ability to keep the Kosovars united and greatly weaken our
position of leadership in NATO.
Peace in Kosovo is not a Democratic or Republican priority--it is in
the interests of all of us who support the values of freedom and the
growth of democracy. I would remind my Republican colleagues that
President George Bush in 1992 took forceful steps to warn Milosevic
against the use of force in Kosovo--an action supported in a bipartisan
manner by Congress. I would certainly hope that this same bipartisan
spirit would prevail on the floor today.
Mr. Chairman, instead of sniping at the foreign policy of our
President, we should be expressing our strongest possible support for
the
[[Page H1210]]
men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces. They will not go to Kosovo if
there is no peacekeeping agreement to enforce. But should they be
called upon to serve in Kosovo, our troops should know that they are
strongly supported by Congress.
Mr. HORN. Mr. Chairman, earlier today I expressed my views on why the
American military should not be sent to Kosovo.
The conflict in Kosovo is taking place within a sovereign nation. If
we are going to go to war with a sovereign nation, we ought to provide
a declaration of war. That is what the Constitution of the United
States would have us do. I think all of us in this Chamber know that
Serbian leader Milosevic is a war criminal that should be tried by an
international tribunal. The issue here today is, by what criteria
should Congress and the President of the United States judge whether
American troops should go there? When is the success known by American
troops sent to Kosovo? The President repeatedly broke promises
regarding the length of service in Bosnia before admitting our troops
will be there indefinitely. Are they going to spend 50 years in the
Balkans around Kosovo to bring peace as we have in Korea? Korea was
where another Nation invaded South Korea.
This is the time to ask the President to face up to the tough
questions and give us the answers to the questions that have been
submitted to him. I would keep American troops out of Kosovo.
The President has failed to explain the urgent national interest
which requires the introduction of U.S. forces into Kosovo. He has
failed to even attempt a full explanation of this policy to Congress.
The Constitution has given Congress a clear role to play which the
President has ignored.
The Administration argues that if the House votes against authorizing
its experiments in peacebuilding today, it will undercut ongoing
negotiations and perhaps even lead to more bloodshed. This is
insulting. It is the Administration's refusal to consult with Congress
and its inability to form a strong policy against Serbian aggression
that has led to the debate today. The Administration has rejected all
attempts by Congress to assert its Constitutional role on every
occasion it has put our forces in harm's way without a clear
explanation of its mission or on what our forces were supposed to
accomplish. The current objections by the White House are more of the
same rhetoric from an Executive Branch derisive of consultation with
Congress.
The conflict in Kosovo is taking place within a sovereign nation.
Intervention in Kosovo, even following an agreement forced upon both
sides, is the intervention in a civil war to mediate between two sides
which we are trying to force into an agreement that will require our
forces to uphold.
By what criteria would the President judge success in this mission
whereby American troops could be recalled from Kosovo? The President
repeatedly broke promises regarding the length of service in Bosnia
before admitting that our troops will be there indefinitely. Once a
peacekeeping force enters Kosovo to uphold a forced agreement, that
force will serve indefinitely unless Congress acts to responsibly to
restrict yet another open-ended commitment to achieve nebulous goals.
While the House debates the commitment of forces to Kosovo, we are
also wrestling with the question of funding our armed forces, forces
stretched thin by multiple commitments around the world. We are
debating how to protect our nation from missile attack, perhaps from
missiles improved with stolen American technology. How, then, will
another open-ended commitment of American forces help American
security. I have heard the argument on why American forces must be
present to make a peacekeeping force work, and while these arguments
have merit, they also point out the failure of Europe to deal with
issues in its own backyard.
Under the agreement being negotiated now, the peacekeeping force
would attack Serbia if its forces or sympathizers violate the
agreement, but what would happen if elements of the Kosovo Liberation
Army violates the agreement? How would the United States with NATO
punish Kosovar violations?
The United States presumably has a responsibility to end the
bloodshed in Kosovo because it is the only nation left with the
resources to do so. So why, then, is the Administration not seeking to
put peacekeepers on the ground in Turkey, where thousands of innocent
Kurds have been killed in Turkey's attempt to destroy the terrorists of
the PKK? Why have American peacekeepers not been dispatched to Sierra
Leone, where the killing continues? Why were international peacekeepers
not part of the Irish or Basque peace agreement? What makes Kosovo
different?
Let us keep American troops out of Kosovo. If lives are to be in
harm's way let the European members of NATO handle regional conflicts
in their own backyard.
Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, for the past decade, ethnic Albanians of
Kosovo, a province of Serbia, the dominant republic of Yugoslavia, have
fought a courageous campaign to regain the rights they had taken away
by Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic who in 1989 stripped away the
autonomy they had enjoyed under the Yugoslav Constitution. Milosevic,
the architect of this crisis who also produced the Bosnian tragedy, and
presided over the dissolution of what was once Yugoslavia, has brought
poverty and misery to his own people and has sown the seeds of strident
nationalism throughout the Balkans.
Milosevic has met all attempts to reach a peaceful settlement with
the ethnic Albanian community with forceful vengeance and repression.
President Milosevic escalated this campaign of terror about one year
ago when he launched a brutal crackdown on the majority Albanian
population. Civilians were terrorized, tortured and murdered by Serbian
police and military forces while hundreds more were driven from their
homes. This systematic campaign of repression manifested itself this
past January, when Serbian security forces brutally massacred 45
Albanian citizens in the village of Racak.
Spurred on by Milosevic's campaign of terror, the United States and
its European allies initiated peace talks between the two sides which
ended with both agreeing to resume negotiations on March 15. As part of
a proposed peace agreement, the United States would contribute 4,000
American troops to an international peacekeeping force of 28,000 that
would be responsible for implementing the provisions of the peace
accord.
This possible deployment of American troops to Kosovo has created a
contentious debate within congress. Critics of an American
participation in Kosovo claim that the United States lacks a vital
national interest in this conflict, that we ``don't have a dog in this
fight''. But I would argue that we do indeed have a vital national
interest in this conflict, as this region has previously been the
source of great pain and suffering. Twice before in the 20th century we
have seen American soldiers drawn to Europe to fight wars that either
began in the Balkan region or ignited fighting there. When this region
was again the source of conflict after World War I, the United States
did not intervene and subsequently hundreds of thousands of brave
Americans and Europeans paid the ultimate price. As George Santayana
once said, ``those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat
it.'' Experience dictates that turning a blind eye to this region can
be fraught with peril.
I believe that the current crisis in Kosovo, if not confronted now,
could have devastating and disastrous effects on this region. We must
remember that violence in southern Europe has no boundaries. There is a
strong possibility that the current fighting in Kosovo could trigger a
chain reaction of conflict that might engulf the entire region. A
spreading conflict could re-ignite fighting in neighboring Albania and
destabilize fragile Macedonia where the UN peacekeeping force mission
has ended. In addition, our NATO allies Greece and Turkey, longtime
adversaries with historical ties to both sides, could also be brought
into the conflict. Increasing hostilities would cause massive
suffering, displace tens of thousands of people, undermine stability
throughout South Central Europe and directly affect our key allies in
the region.
As we have learned in Bosnia and seen in Kosovo, the only language
that President Milosevic understands is that of force. Additionally,
what we have seen in the former Yugoslavia in the last decade is that
it is very difficult to stop internal conflicts if the international
community is not willing to use force. The United States must be
willing to show Mr. Milosevic that we will not stand idly by while his
forces systematically murder and displace innocent civilians.
President Clinton once said that the United States is the world's
indispensable nation. I strongly believe this to be true. Our country
has a moral obligation to stand up and act when innocent civilians are
being murdered and their basic fundamental rights are being violated.
As the leading voice in the world for democracy, respect for the rule
of law and fundamental human rights, we are sometimes confronted with
difficult decisions.
This I believe, is one of those decisions. And while I do not take
lightly the decision to dispatch our armed forces abroad, I strongly
believe that the United States must lead the efforts to halt the
bloodshed and violence in Kosovo.
Mr. BONILLA. Mr. Chairman, our responsibility is to protect America.
Our responsibility is to act prudently before placing any of our fellow
Americans in harm's way. We have no responsibility to referee bloody
disputes wherever they crop up.
The fuse on Kosovo has been lit. The Serbs have no interest in
relinquishing their historic claims on the territory. The Albanians
speak with so many voices that the only certainty we have is that any
Albanian leader we deal with will not be speaking for most of his armed
compatriots. When we make ourselves this region's policeman we make our
young men and
[[Page H1211]]
women targets for armed fanatics. And committing them will continue to
place greater strains and burdens on our over-stretched military.
Neither side there likes us. Neither side respects us. Neither side
wants us there. Who are we protecting?
There is no reason to believe that the Albanian and Serb positions
are reconcilable or that either side wants reconciliation.
The risks of this strategy are that transparent. The benefits in
contrast are little more than wishes and hopes which we have no reason
to believe will materialize. Some have argued that defeating this
resolution today will kill the peace process. Let me just say that if
killing the so-called peace process saves American lives I will always
make that choice.
We should oppose this deployment because it will only erode our
military strength, weaken our nation's credibility and place our
military forces at great risk.
If you vote to approve this resolution, you should know why, because
you may have to explain that to the family of an American soldier.
That's not a pleasant thought. I hope, with all my heart, it will never
come true, but that's your responsibility if you vote for this
resolution.
The administration has failed diplomatically. Please don't send our
troops over to make some diplomats look good.
Please reject this misguided policy which threatens the lives of our
military and the security of our nation.
Mr. EVANS. Mr. Chairman, I support H. Con. Res. 42 and encourage my
colleagues to vote for it. At this delicate moment, our support of the
President is critical to the success of this peace agreement.
I am always wary of committing our uniformed men and women into
conflict. However, I strongly believe that we cannot turn a blind eye
to a genocide that is steadily destroying Kosovo and threatening the
peace throughout the region. Rejecting this resolution is complying
with the continued slaughter of hundreds of thousands of men, women and
children. To date, over 400,000 people have been driven from their
homes, 200,000 have perished and entire villages have been pillaged in
the name of ``ethnic cleansing.''
As the sole remaining superpower, we have a responsibility to the
people of the Balkins, NATO and the greater global community to take
our proper role in helping to end this tragedy. I believe that our
allies have truly stepped up to the plate--the bulk of the peacekeeping
forces will not be American, but European. Our participation will help
achieve a European solution to this crisis--something that we must
encourage.
Now is not the time to step away from our responsibility, but to
seize it. I urge my colleagues to support the resolution.
Mr. HILLEARY. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of our
troops, as always, but I stand absolutely opposed to yet another black
hole-undefined U.S. troop deployment, this time to Kosovo, for
peacemaking and peacekeeping reasons.
The debate today mirrors what we have debated the last 4 years over
Bosnia, and yes Mr. Speaker, it is not a news flash that thousands of
U.S. troops are right next door and will unfortunately remain there
indefinitely.
I remind my colleagues of what the President said before he
dispatched thousands of troops to Bosnia. It was to only be a temporary
operation of 12 months and only cost the American taxpayers $1 billion
dollars. As we all know, we are now in year 4 and the price tag is over
$10 billion. We should not be fooled again.
Asked what the plans are now, the Administration says about one year
and about $2 billion. Two billion dollars to merely detour warring
factions. If and when the United States ever does leave the region,
some estimates are that fighting would be restarted within months, if
not weeks.
Mr. Chairman, Kosovo is a dangerous place. If there are questions
about troop safety and regional stability in the Balkans (Bosnia and
Kosovo), I encourage my colleagues to please take a look at a recently
released classified GAO report entitled ``International Security;
NATO's Operations and Contingency Plans for Stabilizing the Balkans''
(GAO-C-NSIAD-99-4).
However, I have also asked that the GAO provide an unclassified
version of this report for the public record. I hope that my colleagues
will consider reading one of these versions before we vote.
The President's plan to add more than 4,000 U.S. ground troops to
Kosovo on top of the 6,900 troops next door in Bosnia, is wrong.
Much to my dismay, this geographic region is increasingly becoming a
permanent forward deployment area and it is conceivable that within the
next few years, we might be in half a dozen countries because of a
Balkan domino effect.
The Administration failed to answer many key questions before U.S.
troops were sent into Bosnia. I ask my colleagues to consider the
following three questions which were never answered before.
What is the mission?
Is the mission in our national security interest or is it a European
security interest?
What is the exit strategy and when does it kick in?
Mr. Chairman, Congress needs to regain control of this peacemaking/
peacekeeping situation, because I think we have a White House with an
itch to disperse U.S. troops worldwide with insufficient American
security interests at stake.
I hope my colleagues on both sides of the aisle will join me in
opposing this important Kosovo resolution.
Mrs. ROUKEMA. Mr. Chairman, I rise to speak on this most serious
issue that confronts us today.
There is little disagreement on the brutal behavior of the Serbs and
the inhuman atrocities they have inflicted upon the Albanian Kosovars.
There is a great human tragedy unfolding in the region.
But the placement of American troops on the ground as a part of
peacekeeping force in a sovereign state torn by civil war must be a
decision that has been fully debated and consented to by Congress. The
President must include Congress in the formulation of this policy.
The Washington Post stated this morning that, ``We think the stakes
are sufficient to make it highly desirable that the president's policy
be supported by a strong bipartisan vote in Congress. The president
ought to be asking forthrightly for congressional approval, not trying
to evade a congressional judgment on his policy in Kosovo.''
Some argue that those in this House that have reservations about
sending American ground forces to Kosovo are isolationists. I
emphatically disagree with this assertion. I firmly support a strong
U.S. presence throughout the world on every stage, including military,
economic, and political. I worked hard in this body on issues such as
full participation in the IMF, being a leader in world trade, economic
support to many nations, humanitarian relief and the fight against
hunger throughout the world, and the strengthening of NATO to mention a
few.
There is no doubt a brutal bloody ethnic civil war is occurring in
Kosovo and that there is the need for a greater debate on this issue.
These ethnic animosities have existed for centuries of time. But to
place American troops in the middle of this ethnic war without a
defined mission, without a defined goal, and without an exit strategy
is highly questionable. It is a question that must be answered by both
the President and Congress before any action it taken.
I question the use of NATO to coerce a sovereign nation to consent to
our position on their own internal issues. Europe should take the lead
on dealing with the Kosovo situation. Europe should supply the ground
troops. I have no problem with the United States providing logistic,
technical, and intelligence assets to support our European allies.
As Henry Kissinger stated in his widely read article, Kosovo, in
terms of security, is a European interest not an American interest.
``Kosovo is no more a threat to America than Haiti was to Europe and
our NATO allies were not asked to help there.''
Let me add this . . . if the President decides to send troops to
Kosovo, with or without the consent of Congress, once young Americans
hit the ground I will strongly support them with the knowledge that
America's sons and daughters will perform with true fidelity to honor,
duty, country. They will as always do their best and make us proud.
So I caution my colleagues that this debate is about policy not
support of our troops in the field and it is about Congress' role in
foreign affairs not isolationism.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I must state my great reservations about
sending American troops to Kosovo.
I include the Kissinger editorial in the Record of this debate.
[From the Washington Post, Feb. 21, 1999]
No U.S. Ground Forces For Kosovo--Leadership Doesn't Mean That We Must
Do Everything Ourselves.
(Henry Kissinger)
President Clinton's announcement that some 4,000 American
troops will join a NATO force of 28,000 to help police a
Kosovo agreement faces all those concerned with long-range
American national security policy with a quandary.
Having at one time shared responsibility for national
security policy and the extrication from Vietnam, I am
profoundly uneasy about the proliferation of open-ended
American commitments involving the deployment of U.S. forces.
American forces are in harm's way in Kosovo, Bosnia and the
gulf. They lack both a definition of strategic purpose by
which success can be measured and an exit strategy. In the
case of Kosovo, the concern is that America's leadership
would be impaired by the refusal of Congress to approve
American participation in the NATO force that has come into
being largely
[[Page H1212]]
as a result of a diplomacy conceived and spurred by
Washington.
Thus, in the end, Congress may feel it has little choice
but to go along. In any event, its formal approval is not
required. But Congress needs to put the administration on
notice that it is uneasy about being repeatedly confronted
with ad hoc military missions. The development and
articulation of a comprehensive strategy is imperative if we
are to avoid being stretched too thin in the face of other
foreseeable and militarily more dangerous challenges.
Before any future deployments take place, we must be able
to answer these questions: What consequences are we seeking
to prevent? What goals are we seeking to achieve? In what way
do they serve the national interest?
President Clinton has justified American troop deployments
in Kosovo on the ground that ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia
threatens ``Europe's stability and future.'' Other
administration spokesmen have compared the challenge to that
of Hitler's threat to European security. Neither statement
does justice to Balkan realities.
The proposed deployment in Kosovo does not deal with any
threat to American security as traditionally conceived. The
threatening escalations sketched by the president--to
Macedonia or Greece and Turkey--are in the long run more
likely to result from the emergence of a Kosovo state.
Nor is the Kosovo problem new. Ethnic conflict has been
endemic in the Balkans for centuries. Waves of conquests have
congealed divisions between ethnic groups and religions,
between the Eastern Orthodox and Catholic faiths; between
Christianity and Islam; between the heirs of the Austrian and
Ottoman empires.
Through the centuries, these conflicts have been fought
with unparalleled ferocity because none of the populations
has any experience with--and essentially no belief in--
Western concepts of toleration. Majority rule and compromise
that underlie most of the proposals for a ``solution'' never
have found an echo in the Balkans.
Moreover, the projected Kosovo agreement is unlikely to
enjoy the support of the parties for a long period of time.
For Serbia, acquiescing under the threat of NATO bombardment,
it involves nearly unprecedented international intercession.
Yugoslavia, a sovereign state, is being asked to cede control
and in time sovereignty of a province containing its national
shrines to foreign military force.
Though President Slobodan Milosevic has much to answer for,
especially in Bosnia, he is less the cause of the conflict in
Kosovo than an expression of it. On the need to retain
Kosovo, Serbian leaders--including Milosevic's domestic
opponents--seem united. For Serbia, current NATO policy means
either dismemberment of the country or postponement of the
conflict to a future date when, according to the NATO
proposal, the future of the province will be decided.
The same attitude governs the Albanian side. The Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA) is fighting for independence, not
autonomy. But under the projected agreement, Kosovo, now an
integral part of Serbia, is to be made an autonomous and
self-governing entity within Serbia, which, however, will
remain responsible for external security and even exercise
some unspecified internal police functions. A plebiscite at
the end of three years is to determine the region's future.
The KLA is certain to try to use the cease-fire to expel
the last Serbian influences from the province and drag its
feet on giving up its arms. And if NATO resists, it may come
under attack itself--perhaps from both sides. What is
described by the administration as a ``strong peace
agreement'' is like to be at best the overture to another,
far more complicated set of conflicts.
Ironically, the projected peace agreement increases the
likelihood of the various possible escalations sketched by
the president as justification for a U.S. deployment. An
independent Albanian Kosovo surely would seek to incorporate
the neighboring Albanian minorities--mostly in Macedonia--and
perhaps even Albania itself. And a Macedonian conflict would
land us precisely back in the Balkan wars of earlier in this
century. Will Kosovo then become the premise for a NATO move
into Macedonia, just as the deployment in Bosnia is invoked
as justification for the move into Kosovo? Is NATO to be the
home for a whole series of Balkan NATO protectorates?
What confuses the situation even more is that the American
missions in Bosnia and Kosovo are justified by different,
perhaps incompatible, objectives. In Bosnia, American
deployment is being promoted as a means to unite Croats,
Muslims and Serbs into a single state. Serbs and Croats
prefer to practice self-determination but are being asked to
subordinate their preference to the geopolitical argument
that a small Muslim Bosnian state would be too precarious and
irredentist. But in Kosovo, national self-determination is
invoked to produce a tiny state nearly certain to be
irredentist.
Since neither traditional concepts of the national interest
nor U.S. security impel the deployment, the ultimate
justification is the laudable and very American goal of
easing human suffering. This is why, in the end, I went along
with the Dayton agreement in so far as it ended the war by
separating the contending forces. But I cannot bring myself
to endorse American ground forces in Kosovo.
In Bosnia, the exit strategy can be described. The existing
dividing lines can be made permanent. Failure to do so will
require their having to be manned indefinitely unless we
change our objective to self-determination and permit each
ethnic group to decide its own fate.
In Kosovo, that option does not exist. There are no ethnic
dividing lines, and both sides claim the entire territory.
America's attitude toward the Serbs' attempts to insist on
their claim has been made plain enough; it is the threat of
bombing. But how do we and NATO react to Albanian
transgressions and irredentism? Are we prepared to fight both
sides and for how long? In the face of issues such as these,
the unity of the contact group of powers acting on behalf of
NATO is likely to dissolve. Russia surely will increasingly
emerge as the supporter of the Serbian point of view.
We must take care not to treat a humanitarian foreign
policy as a magic recipe for the basic problem of
establishing priorities in foreign policy. The president's
statements ``that we can make a difference'' and that
``America symbolizes hope and resolve'' are exhortations, not
policy prescriptions. Do they mean that America's military
power is available to enable every ethnic or religious group
to achieve self-determination? Is NATO to become the
artillery for ethnic conflict? If Kosovo, why not East Africa
or Central Asia? And would a doctrine of universal
humanitarian intervention reduce or increase suffering by
intensifying ethnic and religious conflict? What are the
limits of such a policy and by what criteria is it
established?
In my view, that line should be drawn at American ground
forces for Kosovo. Europeans never tire of stressing the need
for greater European autonomy. Here is an occasion to
demonstrate it. If Kosovo presents a security problem, it is
to Europe, largely because of the refugees the conflict might
generate, as the president has pointed out. Kosovo is no more
a threat to America than Haiti was to Europe--and we never
asked for NATO support there. The nearly 300 million
Europeans should be able to generate the ground forces to
deal with 2.3 million Kosovars. To symbolize Allied unity on
larger issues, we should provide logistics, intelligence and
air support. But I see no need for U.S ground forces;
leadership should not be interpreted to mean that we must do
everything ourselves.
Sooner of later, we must articulate the American capability
to sustain a global policy. The failure to do so landed us in
the Vietnam morass. Even if one stipulates an American
strategic interest in Kosovo (which I do not), we must take
care not to stretch ourselves too thin in the face of far
less ambiguous threats in the Middle East and Northwest Asia.
Each incremental deployment into the Balkans is bound to
weaken our ability to deal with Saddam Hussein and North
Korea. The psychological drain may be even more grave. Each
time we make a peripheral deployment, the administration is
constrained to insist that the danger to American forces is
minimal--the Kosovo deployment is officially described as a
``peace implementation force.''
Such comments have two unfortunate consequences: They
increase the impression among Americans that military force
can be used casualty-free, and they send a signal of weakness
to potential enemies. For in the end, our forces will be
judged on how adequate they are for peace imposition, not
peace implementation.
I always am inclined to support the incumbent
administration in a forceful assertion of the national
interest. And as a passionate believer in the NATO alliance,
I make the distinctions between European and American
security interests in the Balkans with the utmost reluctance.
But support for a strong foreign policy and a strong NATO
surely will evaporate if we fail to anchor them in a clear
definition of the national interest and impart a sense of
direction to our foreign policy in a period of turbulent
change.
Mr. EWING. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to express my concern with the
possibility that U.S. troops my soon be deployed to Kosovo. The U.S.
has promised to send approximately 4,000 troops to Kosovo to enforce a
cease-fire that has not yet been agreed to. We are told that our
servicemen and women will be in Kosovo for at least three years, but
are given no indication of the expected cost, or the goals of the
mission.
I am troubled by the fact that the administration appears to be
rushing towards a quick deployment without explaining to the Congress
and the country why our troops need to be sent to Kosovo. I have yet to
hear a clear explanation of what our interests are in Kosovo--why does
the most powerful nation in the world need to put its troops in harm's
way to enforce a peace agreement that doesn't even exist?
I am not convinced that it is in our best interest to send U.S.
troops to Kosovo. We have many potential trouble spots brewing around
the world that beg for our attention--North Korea, China's missile
race, and the deteriorating situation in Russia are national security
problems vital to our interests, and they beg for strong U.S.
involvement. Yet Congress is being told that the situation in Kosovo is
a vital national security concern, and this threat justifies placing
our troops in harm's way.
We have had troops in Bosnia since 1995, at a cost of more than $12
billion. This is
[[Page H1213]]
money that is taken directly from DoD accounts, reducing our readiness
in other crucial areas. Even worse, the long and repeated tours of duty
in Bosnia have convinced many soldiers in the active and reserve
branches to retire, depleting our ranks of dedicated and experienced
people. Congress is now told that the Army wants to lower its
recruitment standards and begin hiring high school dropouts to make up
for shortages in manpower.
The same crowd that ridiculed the ``Domino Theory'' of communist
expansion now appear to be advancing their own ``Domino Theory'' for
the region around the former Yugoslavia--first it was Macedonia, then
Bosnia, now Kosovo, and then what?
Mr. Chairman, a convincing case has not been made for the necessity
of U.S. troop involvement in Kosovo. The U.S. does not need the best
trained and most powerful army in the world sitting in Kosovo playing
peacekeeper. If Europe is so concerned about the destabilizing effects
of Kosovo, then let them handle the problem. When it is said that
``NATO'' will be providing the troops, that usually can be translated
as ``the U.S.'' America pays the bills and undertakes most of the
difficult missions--virtually all the bombing and other air missions
are handled by our Air Force.
Our troops have been in Bosnia since 1995, at a huge cost to our
military readiness and to the Defense budget. We must resist the urge
to use military force to resolve every humanitarian problem that crops
us. We need to take our troops out of the equation in Kosovo and begin
focusing on real national security concerns.
Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to consideration of
this resolution authorizing the use of U.S. ground troops in Kosovo.
I do not support putting American ground troops, even as part of a
NATO force, in the middle of a civil war in central Europe. But I
object to this resolution on other grounds, as well. This very debate
may hamstring our negotiators as they seek a peaceful resolution of the
Kosovo conflict with the Serbian government and ethnic Albanians.
It makes no sense to me that the Congress is debating a resolution on
use of force before our negotiators have even concluded their attempts
to resolve the Kosovo situation peacefully. I hope we do not damage
their efforts by even taking this resolution under consideration.
I am not opposed to NATO forces being involved in enforcing an
agreement. Our air forces have effectively been used to enforce the
United Nations resolutions involving Iraq, for example. However, I do
not believe it is in our best interests--or in the interest of the
European Community--for Americans to be part of a ground force in
Kosovo. That is why I will cast my vote against this resolution today.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chairman, while there may be no desire by
President Clinton and his Administration to recognize Congress' role in
determining whether or not to deploy troops to Kosovo, we all know that
their decision will require Congress to find the necessary dollars to
pay for this mission. And there is no question that Congress will
provide the necessary dollars to support our men and women in uniform.
But we need to be prepared for the tough choices that lie ahead.
Let's take the U.S. mission in Bosnia as an example. We have been in
Bosnia for almost four years and there is still no end-date in sight.
Yet, the Administration has not included funding for this mission in
their budget until this year. This open-ended mission, while it has
saved lives, it has also cost $19 billion to date.
The Administration may be embarking on this mission in Kosovo to save
lives and prevent open warfare in the Balkans, but we here in Congress
will be responsible for making the tough decisions about how to pay for
it.
There is no money in the President's budget to pay for this
deployment. The Administration has requested increased spending on all
sorts of new programs from education to health care but there is no
money for our troops that may be deployed in Kosovo.
And from the hearings I have attended so far as a Member of the
Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, we are already facing real
shortfalls in funding and manpower in several other ongoing missions,
including the Persian Gulf. And don't be fooled by claims that this
mission will be far more limited than the one in Bosnia and thus, less
costly. In a recent hearing with Secretary of Defense Cohen, I asked
him about the U.S. commitment to deploy 4,000 troops as part of a
larger NATO force. In reality, he told me that the number is closer to
12,000 because for every one of our men on the ground, 3 more of our
soldiers are required in support.
So, I rise to forewarn my colleagues that we will face some very
tough choices about how to pay for these missions, as well as the
proposed pay raise for our military personnel and to address the many
other shortfalls in our military readiness. The President has failed to
do so in his budget, but we will not. The President has not only failed
to consult Congress, but he has failed in his budget proposal to say
how he will pay for this critical decision.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in opposition to H. Con.
Res. 42, a concurrent resolution regarding the use of U.S. Armed Forces
as part of a NATO peacekeeping operation implementing a Kosovo peace
agreement.
Let me first say that I am a strong supporter of the brave and hard-
working men and women of our armed services. I salute them for all they
have done for our great nation, and I am extremely proud of them.
However, this is an initiative that NATO was never intended to
undertake. As Henry Kissinger said at a House International Relations
Committee hearing, this would be an ``unprecedented extension of NATO's
authority.''
More importantly, I believe that inserting our troops in the middle
of an ethnically charged civil war is very dangerous. Neither the
Albanians nor the Serbs are interested in any sort of compromise. The
Albanians want only independence and the Serbs, who view Kosovo as the
cradle of the Serbian civilization, are unwilling to give up their
ancestral homeland. If neither side is interested in working out a
peaceful agreement, the introduction of American troops into the
conflict will probably inflame anti-American sentiments and Albanian
nationalism with disastrous results. They don't want our help and don't
want to work towards peace. I do not believe that we should risk the
lives of our troops for intangible goals that have no basis in reality.
Now, I certainly do not advocate the actions of Yugoslav President
Slobodan Milosevic. There is a compelling body of evidence to believe
that Milosevic is guilty of crimes against humanity and other war
crimes, and I am deeply concerned about this affront to human rights.
This chamber has voted to support the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia in its efforts to bring Milosevic to justice.
However, without a well thought out plan on how we should utilize our
troops, I cannot support this action.
Mr. Chairman, look at the other conflicts we have gotten involved
with. Somalia was a disaster. Iraq continues in its defiance. American
troops are still inextricably entangled in Bosnia. Haiti dissolved its
democracy and now has an authoritarian regime. The track record for
this Administration is not good.
The Administration has not explained how dragging American troops
into another ethnic conflict will protect American interests, and until
that is done in a satisfactory fashion, I cannot and will not support
the Administration's attempts to put American troops in harm's way.
Mr. Chairman, we are not the emergency 911 number for the world, and
I urge my colleagues to oppose this resolution.
Mr. FORD. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of the Gejdenson
Amendment to H. Con. Res. 42. Three months before he died, in his
fourth inaugural address, President Franklin Roosevelt expressed his
hope for a ``just, honorable, and durable'' settlement to World War II.
But he cautioned against acting impetuously to bring about this
settlement, knowing that ``peace could not be achieved immediately.''
President Roosevelt was aware that peace-making is a delicate
process. We have learned, as a country and as a people, that peace is a
difficult goal to achieve. Peace takes engagement. Most of all, peace
takes time.
As most of you know, I am the youngest member of the House. Many
people have tried to find a name for my generation, because in earlier
times there was the World War I generation, the World War II
generation, and the Vietnam Generation. There are no wars to name us
by. Why is that? Because we have learned that U.S. forces should only
be used when there is a clear goal and U.S. interests are threatened.
And even then, we must use force judiciously and effectively.
I myself have some concerns on the extent of our commitment, our exit
strategy, and our rules of engagement. But how can we dictate the terms
of our involvement when a settlement has not yet been reached?
Unfortunately, the majority has brought this resolution to the floor
at this time, against the blatant wishes of all those involved in the
process, from Senator Dole to the President to the Kosovars to the
Serbs. This is an obstruction of the peace process. I support this
amendment because I support the Administration's efforts to secure a
just peace.
At the same time, we must play our constitutional role responsibly.
Let the Administration continue its efforts toward reaching a
settlement. As Speaker Hastert himself said two weeks ago, let's give
them the ``room to negotiate.'' I would be surprised to learn that
Speaker Hastert considers two weeks enough time to resolve a conflict
that spans centuries.
The President should continue taking steps to bring the parties to a
fair and just agreement. If and when such an agreement is