JH: The Design Argument
Rick Gillespie
>There are many categories of evidence. It is difficult to hold discussions
>on all of these at once, so lets focus - to begin at least- on design.
>I consider that it is possible to provide
>a version of the argument from design which makes a good inference
>too best explanation. You could start by saying why you think
>that design doesn't work as an argument for theism ( assuming
>that is what you believe).
I have chosen to spin this off as a separate thread, since Mr. Humphries
correctly stated that is good to focus on a single topic at a time. My
hope is that by creating a new thread for discussing the Design
Argument, we can focus strictly on that topic.
Mr. Humphries states that "I consider that it is possible to provide a
version of the argument from design which makes a good inference too
best explanation." I'm not at all certain from this (since it is loaded
with what Peter Nyikos in talk.origins would call "plausible
deniability") whether Mr. Humphries truly has an argument from design
that *he* considers compelling (regardless of whether anyone else
would). If he does, I ask that he present it here in this thread.
He then goes on to demand " You could start by saying why you think that
design doesn't work as an argument for theism ( assuming hat is what
you believe)." Normally, I would consider this a peculiar way to start a
presentation of an argument, but I've come to expect it from Mr.
Humphries. I fully expect that he will simply deny any of the arguments
that are presented saying something to the effect of "Of course Behe is
a wanker. That's not *my* argument!"
That said, I will attempt to address the issue. Every Argument From
Design I have seen fail on at least two items:
1. No definition of design, or how to recognize it, is given.
2. The argument reduces to personal incredulity.
If Mr. Humphries does indeed have an Argument From Design that he
favours, I suggest that he start by presenting it and showing how it
does not fail on this two points.
Rick Gillespie
Automort
>by creating a new thread for discussing the Design
>Argument, we can focus strictly on that topic.
A semantic problem here is that at least in English "design" can imply an
intentional conscious project, although it can also simply mean a pattern or a
structure. Nevertheless, the use of the word "design" nearly automatically
leads to a creator conclusion.
Could we say "order" or some such instead?
Brian Holtz
> Mr. Humphries said:
>
> >I consider that it is possible to provide
> >a version of the argument from design which makes a good inference
> >too best explanation.
Perhaps then, Jim, you'd be willing to answer two meta-questions about the
argument from design:
In the past, your god was used to explain the "gaps" caused by the absence of a
naturalistic understanding of physics, astronomy, meteorology, agriculture, and
physiology. Most of these gaps began closing after 1500, but by 1850, there
were still no naturalistic explanations for the origin and diversity of life,
the mechanism of mind, and the origin of the universe itself. In 2000,
compelling naturalistic explanations already existed for the diversity of life
and the mechanism of mind, while outlines of naturalistic explanations were
being formed for the origins of life and the universe itself. If by 2150 there
exist naturalistic explanations in these four areas that are as widely accepted
as (say) heliocentrism, what significant gaps in the universe's design will be
left for your god to explain? Would you abandon theism if the Argument From
Design lost these last four major pillars?
> Every Argument From
> Design I have seen fail on at least two items:
> 1. No definition of design, or how to recognize it, is given.
> 2. The argument reduces to personal incredulity.
Rick, would you really lump the Teleological Argument (i.e. the Argument From
Design) in with such losers as the Ontological, Cosmological, and
Anthropological Arguments? After all, there are still 18 to 22 fundamental
dimensionless physical constants that theists like to claim are fine-tuned for
the universe to support life. I would agree that inferring theism from biology
is pretty foolish, but it's not (yet) completely foolish to infer deism from
physics.
(For a list of fundamental dimensionless physical constants, see section 3.1 of
my book Human Knowledge 2000 at http://humanknowledge.net.)
John Secker
<auto...@aol.com> writes
Design is the point of the argument. The question then is there evidence
of Design in this sense.
--
John Secker
Netcom jimhumph
Brian Holtz wrote:
> Perhaps then, Jim, you'd be willing to answer two meta-questions about
the
> argument from design:
>
Sure.
> In the past, your god was used to explain the "gaps" caused by the absence
of a
> naturalistic understanding of physics, astronomy, meteorology,
agriculture, and
> physiology.
>
Not so fast. I accept that in the past a creator god was used to plug gaps
in our
scientific understanding [ such attempts were mistaken IMO, and
were based on an erroneous theology- that is a quite separate topic
however]. But note that physics, astronomy etc are quite consistent
with materialism *or* theism. In other words, if certain religious
explanations have been offered in the past for naturalistic phenomena,
and those explantions have been shown to false in the light of modern
science - something I fully accept incidentally- it by no means follows
that theism is false and that naturalism obtains.
> Most of these gaps began closing after 1500, but by 1850, there
> were still no naturalistic explanations for the origin and diversity of
life,
> the mechanism of mind, and the origin of the universe itself.
>
Again note that current science does not endorse naturalism
when it presents explanations for such things as the origin of the
Universe. Big Bang is quite compatible with theism- indeed a
Catholic priest- Lemaitre- played a key role in its bringing
about its acceptance by the scientific community. Likewise
the theory of evolution is quite compatible with theism or
materialism.
This is sometimes to a difficult point to
get across to atheists who are ex-fundamentalists themselves,
and who refuse to accept that anything other than a literal
reading of Genesis is "genuine religion". These ' fundamentalist
atheists', it seems , are committing the no-true-Scotsman fallacy.
[..]
> ....If by 2150 there
> exist naturalistic explanations in these four areas that are as widely
accepted
> as (say) heliocentrism, what significant gaps in the universe's design
will be
> left for your god to explain?
>
My argument is that theism is not ( and should never have been)
in the business of plugging gaps in the first place. It is a metaphysical
explanation, not an an empirical one.
What questions can theism answer which science cannot?
One example would be that it can explain the highest
level scientific laws. Logically these cannot be explained
by science, since they are the means by which science
explains other phenomena. Here the atheist flounders-
he can only offer the non-explanantion that such laws
"just are".
[..]
> Rick, would you really lump the Teleological Argument (i.e. the Argument
From
> Design) in with such losers as the Ontological, Cosmological, and
> Anthropological Arguments?
>
I don't think that the first of these ( maybe the first two )
are by any means losers as presented in some
modern versions. That doesn't
mean that I think they provide a compelling argument for
theism, but they are at least plausible.
jh
Automort
>in this context the implication of Designer from the existence of
>Design is the point of the argument. The question then is there evidence
>of Design in this sense.
It still seems to me there's something wrong here.
There does appear to be order in the universe, but there appears to me to be no
need for someone to have created that order.
But the argument from design assumes the existence of a creator to begin with.
Stating that order exists is another matter that does not weigh things one way
or the other.
Order exists, so there's an organizer.
Order exists. Period.
Brian Holtz
"Netcom jimhumph" <jimh...@netcomuk.co.uk> :
>
> if certain religious
> explanations have been offered in the past for naturalistic phenomena,
> and those explantions have been shown to false in the light of modern
> science - something I fully accept incidentally- it by no means follows
> that theism is false and that naturalism obtains.
I didn't say it did. I said roughly that the argument from
design is a sinking ship, and asked a) are you on it? and b) do
you have a lifeboat?
> Again note that current science does not endorse naturalism
> when it presents explanations for such things as the origin of the
> Universe.
But science does whittle away at the argument from design, and I was
asking you roughly "does your theism depend on the argument from design?".
> My argument is that theism is not ( and should never have been)
> in the business of plugging gaps in the first place.
I take it, then, that your theism does not depend on the argument from
design, and that even if there were no unexplained design in the universe
you would still be a theist?
> It is a metaphysical explanation, not an an empirical one.
Is there then no possible pattern of empiricial evidence that could
dissuade you from theism? Is your theism empirically unfalsifiable?
If we thawed you out in the year 9000, and you found that science
had explained all apparent design, and that theism was only a faint
memory, and that even aliens contacted by radio were all atheists,
would you still say we all just have our metaphysics wrong?
(For what it's worth, I'd be happy to repost the empirical evidence
it would take to make me a theist.)
> What questions can theism answer which science cannot?
> One example would be that it can explain the highest
> level scientific laws. [..] Here the atheist flounders-
> he can only offer the non-explanantion that such laws
> "just are".
Whereas the theist saying "God just is" is _not_ "floundering"? :-)
Science is of course not a replacement for metaphysics, and it's silly
to pretend that atheists fall off the end of their epistemological
world when you ask what explains the deepest scientific laws.
As you surely know, science can be given a nice foundation of
metaphysical naturalism and materialism.
This is not to say that materialist naturalism _can_ answer the Big
Why (why does god/universe/anything exist?). However, that theism
pretends to have the answer is a bug, not a feature. :-)
> > such losers as the Ontological, Cosmological [..] Arguments?
> >
> I don't think that the first of these ( maybe the first two )
> are by any means losers as presented in some
> modern versions. That doesn't
> mean that I think they provide a compelling argument for
> theism, but they are at least plausible.
Hmm, you seem not depend on the Teleological Argument, and you decline
to endorse the Ontological and Cosmological Arguments. Are you sure
you're a theist, and if so, can you remind us why? :-)
Earle Jones
<jo...@secker.demon.co.uk> wrote:
> No, in this context the implication of Designer from the existence of
> Design is the point of the argument. The question then is there evidence
> of Design in this sense.
*
There is evidence of design in a salt crystal, a snowflake, and an
artichoke.
However, no supernatural force is necessary to explain the structure of
any of these.
earle
*
John Secker
<auto...@aol.com> writes
false, but the Argument from Design is not quite that simple. It
observes the universe, notes that there appears to be Design present,
and deduces the existence of a Designer. Design, in this sense, is the
creation of something for a purpose, and implies that there is someone
who conceived that purpose - the Designer. The flaw (one of them) is
that what looks like Purpose may well be no more than the successful
occupying of a niche. It has been observed that a puddle is perfectly
designed to fit the hole in the road which it occupies, and I have seen
no evidence that the alleged Design in the universe is anything more
than this.
--
John Secker
John Secker
<jimh...@netcomuk.co.uk> writes
>My argument is that theism is not ( and should never have been)
>in the business of plugging gaps in the first place. It is a metaphysical
>explanation, not an an empirical one.
view to that of most people here. To us, the question is "Why does
theism exist, and why do so many people cling to beliefs for which they
have no evidence?". The answer being suggested here is that theism used
to provide an explanation for things for which there was no other
explanation. By the time other, better explanations began to be found,
theism had its own momentum, and a lot of people had (and still have) a
vested interest in keeping it going.
Of course there are other reasons too, like the need most people feel
for reassurance that death is not The End, and a human desire to be told
The Truth, definitively and unequivocally, by some authority in which
they can place complete trust.
--
John Secker
Rick Gillespie
<ho...@eng.sun.com> wrote:
>Rick Gillespie wrote:
>
[snip]
>> Every Argument From
>> Design I have seen fail on at least two items:
>> 1. No definition of design, or how to recognize it, is given.
>> 2. The argument reduces to personal incredulity.
>
>Rick, would you really lump the Teleological Argument (i.e. the Argument From
>Design) in with such losers as the Ontological, Cosmological, and
>Anthropological Arguments?
I see no reason not to.
> After all, there are still 18 to 22 fundamental
>dimensionless physical constants that theists like to claim are fine-tuned for
>the universe to support life.
This is an example of an argument that reduces to Person Incredulity.
Dr. Hugh Ross, for instance, argues that slight variations in those
so-called "fine-tuned" constants yield a universe inhospitable to life
*as we know it* (although he doesn't acknowledge the part that I have
emphasized). Since he can't imagine how this could be, he concludes that
god-did-it.
> I would agree that inferring theism from biology
>is pretty foolish, but it's not (yet) completely foolish to infer deism from
>physics.
It is just another god-of-the-gaps argument. It suffers because
god-did-it is never a better explanation that "I don't know", IMHO.
[snip]
Rick Gillespie
Rick Gillespie
<jimh...@netcomuk.co.uk> wrote:
>
>Brian Holtz wrote:
>
[snip]
> But note that physics, astronomy etc are quite consistent
>with materialism *or* theism. In other words, if certain religious
>explanations have been offered in the past for naturalistic phenomena,
> and those explantions have been shown to false in the light of modern
>science - something I fully accept incidentally- it by no means follows
> that theism is false and that naturalism obtains.
It does show, however, that those particular theisms were wrong.
>
>> Most of these gaps began closing after 1500, but by 1850, there
>> were still no naturalistic explanations for the origin and diversity of
>life,
>> the mechanism of mind, and the origin of the universe itself.
>>
>Again note that current science does not endorse naturalism
>when it presents explanations for such things as the origin of the
>Universe. Big Bang is quite compatible with theism- indeed a
>Catholic priest- Lemaitre- played a key role in its bringing
>about its acceptance by the scientific community. Likewise
>the theory of evolution is quite compatible with theism or
>materialism.
You've brought this up a few times in the past. Saying that something is
compatible with theism is meaningless if there is nothing that is
incompatible with theism. I've asked you at least twice before to tell
us what is incompatible with theism, but you've never answered (although
sc...@home.com tried in talk.origins.)
>This is sometimes to a difficult point to
>get across to atheists who are ex-fundamentalists themselves,
>and who refuse to accept that anything other than a literal
>reading of Genesis is "genuine religion". These ' fundamentalist
>atheists', it seems , are committing the no-true-Scotsman fallacy.
>[..]
>
>
>> ....If by 2150 there
>> exist naturalistic explanations in these four areas that are as widely
>accepted
>> as (say) heliocentrism, what significant gaps in the universe's design
>will be
>> left for your god to explain?
>>
>My argument is that theism is not ( and should never have been)
>in the business of plugging gaps in the first place. It is a metaphysical
>explanation, not an an empirical one.
>What questions can theism answer which science cannot?
>One example would be that it can explain the highest
>level scientific laws. Logically these cannot be explained
>by science, since they are the means by which science
>explains other phenomena. Here the atheist flounders-
>he can only offer the non-explanantion that such laws
>"just are".
Explain for us what these "highest level scientific laws" are. Explain
why they cannot be explained by science. And, finally, offer the answer
that theism provides and explain its superiority to "just are" or "we
don't know."
[snip]
Rick Gillespie
Dick
"Netcom jimhumph" <jimh...@netcomuk.co.uk> wrote in message
news:9gffj8$n6j$8...@taliesin2.netcom.net.uk...
{much snipped}
> My argument is that theism is not ( and should never have been)
> in the business of plugging gaps in the first place. It is a metaphysical
> explanation, not an an empirical one.
> What questions can theism answer which science cannot?
> One example would be that it can explain the highest
> level scientific laws. Logically these cannot be explained
> by science, since they are the means by which science
> explains other phenomena. Here the atheist flounders-
> he can only offer the non-explanantion that such laws
> "just are".
What are the explainations theism provides for those laws?
- Dick
Netcom jimhumph
Brian Holtz wrote:
> > if certain religious
> > explanations have been offered in the past for naturalistic phenomena,
> > and those explantions have been shown to false in the light of modern
> > science - something I fully accept incidentally- it by no means follows
> > that theism is false and that naturalism obtains.
>
> I didn't say it did. I said roughly that the argument from
> design is a sinking ship, and asked a) are you on it? and b) do
> you have a lifeboat?
>
There are various arguments from design- not just one.
I consider that it is possible to construct such an argument
as inference to best explanation which is quite powerful.
Simply asserting that they are a "sinking ship" is scarcely
convincing.
> > Again note that current science does not endorse naturalism
> > when it presents explanations for such things as the origin of the
> > Universe.
>
> But science does whittle away at the argument from design,
>
You are thinking- I imagine- of Paley's argument. But there
are stronger ways of stating the argument.
>and I was
> asking you roughly "does your theism depend on the argument from design?".
>
No.
> > It is a metaphysical explanation, not an an empirical one.
>
> Is there then no possible pattern of empiricial evidence that could
> dissuade you from theism? Is your theism empirically unfalsifiable?
>
Well let me ask you the question- how can one empirically test
theism ( or naturalism)?
> > What questions can theism answer which science cannot?
> > One example would be that it can explain the highest
> > level scientific laws. [..] Here the atheist flounders-
> > he can only offer the non-explanantion that such laws
> > "just are".
>
> Whereas the theist saying "God just is" is _not_ "floundering"? :-)
>
Decidedly not- since one can, I consider , show that necessarily
if God exists he exists necessarily. The atheist is compelled
to posit a contingent "brute fact" set oif laws which "just are".
This is to enter the realm of non-explanation.
> Science is of course not a replacement for metaphysics, and it's silly
> to pretend that atheists fall off the end of their epistemological
> world when you ask what explains the deepest scientific laws.
> As you surely know, science can be given a nice foundation of
> metaphysical naturalism and materialism.
>
Sure, but I am suggesting that sinply positing a set of laws
which exist as a brute fact is profoundly unsatisifactory from
the point of view of science- it is really a non-explanation.
> This is not to say that materialist naturalism _can_ answer the Big
> Why (why does god/universe/anything exist?). However, that theism
> pretends to have the answer is a bug, not a feature. :-)
>
Thesim *can* provide an explanation however- it attributes
the laws to a Creator deity.
jh
Netcom jimhumph
John Secker <jo...@secker.demon.co.uk> wrote in message
news:CMeIAVAE...@secker.demon.co.uk...
> In article <9gffj8$n6j$8...@taliesin2.netcom.net.uk>, Netcom jimhumph
> <jimh...@netcomuk.co.uk> writes
> >My argument is that theism is not ( and should never have been)
> >in the business of plugging gaps in the first place. It is a
metaphysical
> >explanation, not an an empirical one.
> >
> Ah, but Jim, you are looking at the question from a different point of
> view to that of most people here. To us, the question is "Why does
> theism exist, and why do so many people cling to beliefs for which they
> have no evidence?".
>
I have already adressed the "no evidence" claim- it is bogus.
The atheist making it simply launches it as an assertion, and
"evidence" is never defined. Its scarcely a convincing ploy.
[..]
> Of course there are other reasons too, like the need most people feel
> for reassurance that death is not The End, and a human desire to be told
> The Truth,
>
Substitute fear of judgement, need to rebel against authority, middle
aged crisis, to construct a similar psychology of atheistic unbelief.
jh
Netcom jimhumph
Rick Gillespie
> You've brought this up a few times in the past. Saying that something is
> compatible with theism is meaningless if there is nothing that is
> incompatible with theism.
> I've asked you at least twice before to tell
> us what is incompatible with theism, but you've never answered (although
> sc...@home.com tried in talk.origins.)
>
Er...atheism.
[..]
> Explain for us what these "highest level scientific laws" are.
>
I suggest a good physics text.
> Explain
> why they cannot be explained by science.
>
Science cannot explain the highest level laws, since these are
the means by which science explains other phenomena-
think about it long enough and you might get it.
jh
Brian Holtz
"Rick Gillespie" <rwgill...@home.com> wrote :
> god-did-it is never a better explanation that "I don't know", IMHO.
Are you saying that atheism is unfalsifiable? If some god started
inscribing or authenticating its revelation through supernatural
patterns (in cosmological or quantum phenomena) or ongoing miracles
(such as prophecy or communication with a spirit world), you would
nevertheless choose agnosticism over theism?
Brian Holtz
"Rick Gillespie" <rwgill...@home.com> wrote to JH:
>
> Explain for us what these "highest level scientific laws" are.
Examples might be the principle of least action, or the fact that
the speed of light is constant to all observers.
> Explain why they cannot be explained by science.
Because then they wouldn't be "highest level", and their explanation
would be. ;-)
> And, finally, offer the answer
> that theism provides and explain its superiority
> to "just are" or "we don't know."
The standard answer is something like "god set it up this way
to maximize goodness". But behind this lies "god just is",
and so this line of explanation scores poorly on the parsimony meter.
Automort
>It has been observed that a puddle is perfectly
>designed to fit the hole in the road which it occupies, and I have seen
>no evidence that the alleged Design in the universe is anything more
>than this.
Sounds good to me.
If things weren't as they are, they'd likely be otherwise.
Paul Filseth
> After all, there are still 18 to 22 fundamental dimensionless physical
> constants that theists like to claim are fine-tuned for the universe to
> support life. I would agree that inferring theism from biology is pretty
> foolish, but it's not (yet) completely foolish to infer deism from physics.
but the reasoning people offer for getting from them to an intelligent
designer isn't. The apparent fine-tuning implies that at least one
of three possibilities is probably the case: (a) that the fine-tuning
is only apparent, because physical principles we don't yet know about
make the values we observe more probable than they look, or (b) that
other sorts of intelligent beings than our sort -- beings that aren't
"life as we know it" -- are possible, or (c) that there exists stuff
in addition to the big bang debris we see, stuff that isn't governed by
the laws we know about. Any of these possibilities could in principle
account for the apparent fine-tuning all by itself. If the universe
was created by a god then all three are true; and all three could be
true even if there was no god involved. So to infer a god from the
fine-tuned constants is like a cop guessing the deceased might have
died of poison, suffocation or a heart-attack -- and then concluding
that she must have suffered a heart-attack while a bald Dutchman who'd
poisoned her was holding a pillow over her face.
--
Paul Filseth Beware of bugs in the above code; I have only
To email, delete the x. proved it correct, not tried it. - Donald Knuth
John Secker
<earle.jones-6569...@news.palto1.sfba.home.com>, Earle
Jones <earle...@home.com> writes
>In article <Qz+8PtAC...@secker.demon.co.uk>, John Secker
><jo...@secker.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>
>> No, in this context the implication of Designer from the existence of
>> Design is the point of the argument. The question then is there evidence
>> of Design in this sense.
>
>*
>There is evidence of design in a salt crystal, a snowflake, and an
>artichoke.
>
artichoke I pass on.
>However, no supernatural force is necessary to explain the structure of
>any of these.
>
to explain in the absence of a Designer than the artichoke (or the
peacock). That is why Darwin was a genius - he showed that in this
respect the artichoke is just as much a natural, undesigned object as
the crystal - it is simply that the rules which created it are rather
more complicated.
--
John Secker
Rick Gillespie
<jimh...@netcomuk.co.uk> wrote:
>
>Brian Holtz wrote:
>
>> > if certain religious
>> > explanations have been offered in the past for naturalistic phenomena,
>> > and those explantions have been shown to false in the light of modern
>> > science - something I fully accept incidentally- it by no means follows
>> > that theism is false and that naturalism obtains.
>>
>> I didn't say it did. I said roughly that the argument from
>> design is a sinking ship, and asked a) are you on it? and b) do
>> you have a lifeboat?
>>
>There are various arguments from design- not just one.
>I consider that it is possible to construct such an argument
>as inference to best explanation which is quite powerful.
Mr. Humphries, you are responding to an article in a thread that I
specifically created for you to discuss the Design Argument, and yet you
have not yet responded to my original article (or, at least, such a
response has not made it to either home.com or google). If such a
powerful argument can be constructed then by all means either present it
or shut up about it.
[snip]
Rick Gillespie
David Wynne-Griffiths
from "Netcom jimhumph" <jimh...@netcomuk.co.uk> contains these words:
> I have already adressed the "no evidence" claim- it is bogus.
> The atheist making it simply launches it as an assertion, and
> "evidence" is never defined. Its scarcely a convincing ploy.
And nor is Humphries' ploy of saying that there is inconclusive evidence
to support his god fantasy without ever daring to reveal to us the
evidence on which he relies for his belief.
--
~~~~~~~~~~
David W-G
~~~~~~~~~~
Brian Holtz
"Netcom jimhumph" <jimh...@netcomuk.co.uk> wrote:
>
> > I said roughly that the argument from
> > design is a sinking ship, and asked a) are you on it? and b) do
> > you have a lifeboat?
> >
> There are various arguments from design- not just one.
> I consider that it is possible to construct such an argument
> as inference to best explanation which is quite powerful.
> Simply asserting that they are a "sinking ship"
Of cousre, my assertion was not so simple. In my prior post I laid out
a capsule history of the argument from design along with a summary of
its current (much-diminished) scope.
> is scarcely convincing.
You mean as "convincing" as "simply asserting" that "it is possible
to construct an argument"? :-)
> > science does whittle away at the argument from design,
> >
> You are thinking- I imagine- of Paley's argument.
I'm thinking that we are continuously finding less and less design
in the world. (Note: physicists seem to have recently added to
the 18-22 fundamental dimensionless constants 4 brand-new constants
derived from a "Maki-Nakagawa-Sakata matrix" that describes
"neutrino oscillation"! However, the overall trend is clear.)
> > Is there then no possible pattern of empiricial evidence that could
> > dissuade you from theism? Is your theism empirically unfalsifiable?
> >
> Well let me ask you the question- how can one empirically test
> theism ( or naturalism)?
Naturalism could be empirically falsified by tomorrow morning if the
gods would just get busy doing some of the things that human religions
claim they used to do. (For example, we could discover new quasars
that spell out "Jesus is Lord".) Naturalism is increasingly validated
(though not strictly proven) by the continuing absence of miracles.
Theism would be easy to verify if there were any good empirical
evidence for it. Alas, it remains suspiciously unverified, and
indeed suspiciously unfalsifiable. Parsimony thus requires that
it provisionally be considered false.
I answered your question. Would you do me the courtesy of answering
mine? It was:
If we thawed you out in the year 9000, and you found that science
had explained all apparent design, and that theism was only a faint
memory, and that even aliens contacted by radio were all atheists,
would you still say we all just have our metaphysics wrong?
> one can, I consider , show that necessarily
> if God exists he exists necessarily.
If this can be "shown", then why isn't the Ontological Argument
universally accepted (and taught in kindergarten :-)? Where in
the philosophical literature can I find a good version of this
"showing"?
> The atheist is compelled
> to posit a contingent "brute fact" set of laws which "just are".
Not necessarily; he could propose an explanation parallel to yours, as
follows. If logical possibility exists, then this universe is necessarily
logically possible and the "brute fact" of its apparent existence
is replaced with the necessity that its existence would seem
apparent to its (necessarily logically possible but perhaps
non-existent) inhabitants.
(I.e. the world might be just a logically possible dream for which
no dreamer exists. For more details, go to groups.google.com
and search for +holtz +"why anything exists" -- or go directly to
http://groups.google.com/groups?q=%2Bholtz+%2B%22why+anything+exists%22&hl=e
n&safe=off&rnum=1&ic=1&selm=3A5F7AF9.A306AAE%40eng.sun.com
Either the God or Dream explanation might be true, but considering
either to be true is unparsimonious.
> This is to enter the realm of non-explanation.
Who gives the guarantee that there must be a knowable answer to
the question "why does anything exist?"? In his _Philosophical
Investigations_, Nozick does a good job of critically examining
the assumptions that tempt us in dealing with this question.
> > This is not to say that materialist naturalism _can_ answer the Big
> > Why (why does god/universe/anything exist?). However, that theism
> > pretends to have the answer is a bug, not a feature. :-)
> >
> Thesim *can* provide an explanation however- it attributes
> the laws to a Creator deity.
What I meant by "bug" is that this purported explanation fails, shattered
on the rocks of parsimony and/or the invalidity of the Ontological Argument.
(I suppose you knew what I meant, and just wanted to re-assert your
position. Well, so do I. :-)
--
Brian...@sun.com
Knowledge is dangerous. Take a risk:
http://humanknowledge.net
Dan Prescher
>
> I have already adressed the "no evidence" claim- it is bogus.
> The atheist making it simply launches it as an assertion, and
> "evidence" is never defined. Its scarcely a convincing ploy.
>
You have mentioned the "no evidence" claim, but hardly addressed it,
jh. If you stand behind your statement that "It's true that there is
no decisive evidence, but false that there is no evidence," tell us
what you think the evidence is. Then tell us why it is not decisive
evidence. Use any definition of "evidence" you like -- just supply the
definition along with the evidence.
No dodges, jh. If you are unable or unwilling to meet this simple
request, tell us why.
--
Dan Prescher
Roughwriters -- Smooth Communications in All Media
www.roughwriters.com
"What if the Hokey Pokey really is what it's all about?"
Earle D Jones
Holtz" <Brian...@sun.com> wrote:
> "Rick Gillespie" <rwgill...@home.com> wrote :
>
> > god-did-it is never a better explanation that "I don't know", IMHO.
>
> Are you saying that atheism is unfalsifiable?
[...]
*
Atheism is about the most falsifiable concept I can envision.
As soon as one God shows up, atheism goes out the window.
earle
*
John Secker
<jimh...@netcomuk.co.uk> writes
>Thesim *can* provide an explanation however- it attributes
>the laws to a Creator deity.
>
--
John Secker
John Secker
<jimh...@netcomuk.co.uk> writes
>I have already adressed the "no evidence" claim- it is bogus.
>The atheist making it simply launches it as an assertion, and
>"evidence" is never defined. Its scarcely a convincing ploy.
>
only possible satisfactory way - by stating the evidence which convinces
you that God exists.
--
John Secker
Netcom jimhumph
Brian Holtz wrote:
"Rick Gillespie"
> > Explain for us what these "highest level scientific laws" are.
>
> Examples might be the principle of least action, or the fact that
> the speed of light is constant to all observers.
>
> > Explain why they cannot be explained by science.
>
> Because then they wouldn't be "highest level", and their explanation
> would be. ;-)
>
Hopefully now that a fellow atheist has explained this to him,
it will eventually register.
jh
Netcom jimhumph
David Wynne-Griffiths <dav...@zetnet.co.uk> wrote in message
news:200106200...@zetnet.co.uk...
-using my definition- the atheist claim of "no evidence" is false.
This is just an assertion. The atheist never bothers to
define evidence.
jh
Rick Gillespie
<jimh...@netcomuk.co.uk> wrote:
>
>Rick Gillespie
>
>> You've brought this up a few times in the past. Saying that something is
>> compatible with theism is meaningless if there is nothing that is
>> incompatible with theism.
>> I've asked you at least twice before to tell
>> us what is incompatible with theism, but you've never answered (although
>> sc...@home.com tried in talk.origins.)
>>
>Er...atheism.
I assume from this that you think that atheism is incompatible with
theism. You're going to have to explain why you say that. Clearly,
atheism and theism co-exist today, so they aren't obviously
incompatible. Perhaps you mean that one cannot be a theist and an
atheist at the same time? If so, that's not exactly earth shattering.
Now, what *else* do you think is incompatible with theism?
>
>
>[..]
>
>
>> Explain for us what these "highest level scientific laws" are.
>>
>I suggest a good physics text.
This is non-responsive. Explain what *you* mean by "highest level
scientific laws". If you are going to refer to other works then give
complete citations to things with which you agree.
>
>> Explain
>> why they cannot be explained by science.
>>
>Science cannot explain the highest level laws, since these are
>the means by which science explains other phenomena-
>think about it long enough and you might get it.
Nope, I still don't get it. Probably because you failed to explain what
the "highest level scientific laws" are.
By the way, you apparently accidentally deleted this request without
remark:
>And, finally, offer the answer
>that theism provides and explain its superiority to "just are" or "we
>don't know."
Would you care to take another stab at it? Pretend I'm stupid and
explain it in small words so I can understand you.
Rick Gillespie
Rick Gillespie
<Brian...@sun.com> wrote:
>
>"Rick Gillespie" <rwgill...@home.com> wrote :
>
>> god-did-it is never a better explanation that "I don't know", IMHO.
>
>Are you saying that atheism is unfalsifiable?
I don't see how that follows from my statement. Atheism is falsifiable
by simply presenting a deity.
> If some god started
>inscribing or authenticating its revelation through supernatural
>patterns (in cosmological or quantum phenomena) or ongoing miracles
>(such as prophecy or communication with a spirit world), you would
>nevertheless choose agnosticism over theism?
Agnosticism, as I use it, is orthogonal to the theism-atheism axis.
Agnosticism-gnosticism deal with *knowledge* of gods, whereas
theism-atheism deal with *belief* about gods.
Now, whether a god could present sufficient evidence to convince me of
its existence depends a great deal on the particular kind of god you're
talking about. If it is an omnipotent god then, well, I can think of no
test that separates the all-powerful from the merely very-powerful, so I
cannot think of anything that would authenticate its existence.
Rick Gillespie
John Secker
Holtz <Brian...@sun.com> writes
>Naturalism could be empirically falsified by tomorrow morning if the
>gods would just get busy doing some of the things that human religions
>claim they used to do. (For example, we could discover new quasars
>that spell out "Jesus is Lord".)
it says God did any manipulation of quasars. Perhaps it was in the
Apocrypha.
However, there does seem to be a distinct lack of miraculous recoveries
from the dead, water into wine, burning bushes and similar.
>Naturalism is increasingly validated
>(though not strictly proven) by the continuing absence of miracles.
>
rooms are full of bogeymen and ghoulies. As the lights are turned on,
and each room is shown to be free of bad guys, it becomes increasingly
unreasonable to insist that the nasties really exist, and they just
happen to be in the few rooms which have not yet been illuminated.
--
John Secker
Netcom jimhumph
Brian Holtz wrote :
> > You are thinking- I imagine- of Paley's argument.
>
> I'm thinking that we are continuously finding less and less design
> in the world. (Note: physicists seem to have recently added to
> the 18-22 fundamental dimensionless constants 4 brand-new constants
> derived from a "Maki-Nakagawa-Sakata matrix" that describes
> "neutrino oscillation"! However, the overall trend is clear.)
>
I don't accept that the claim that we are finding less and less
design in the world is sustainable. Plainly dances, computer
programs, paintings etc are the products of design. Their
output, one imagines, has not diminished. I'm not
clear at all what you mean when you refer to a 'declining
trend' . Please clarify.
> > > Is there then no possible pattern of empiricial evidence that could
> > > dissuade you from theism? Is your theism empirically unfalsifiable?
> > >
> > Well let me ask you the question- how can one empirically test
> > theism ( or naturalism)?
>
> Naturalism could be empirically falsified by tomorrow morning if the
> gods would just get busy doing some of the things that human religions
> claim they used to do.
>
Bu thats not what falsifiable means. For a theory to be falsifiable
one must be able to *specify some test which one could carry out*
which would falsify the theory. Naturalism is not an empirically
testable theory, but - like theism- a metaphysical explanation.
[..]
> Theism would be easy to verify if there were any good empirical
> evidence for it.
>
Theism is not a theory - as I said above it is a metaphysical
explanation.
> Alas, it remains suspiciously unverified, and
> indeed suspiciously unfalsifiable. Parsimony thus requires that
> it provisionally be considered false.
>
Parsimony dictates no such conclusion. If you disagree with
this, please explain exactly *how* parsimony dictates it
Parsimony is just one of a number of criteria one can employ
to compare competing theories ( or perhaps metaphysical explanations).
One considers it alongside such considerations as clarity, 'fit' with
existing
theory, economy, breadth etc. Parsimony is not of overriding
importance when set against these other criteria.
It isn't a principle of logic, and there
is no reason to suppose that the more parsimonious of two
explanations is the theory which 'true'.
> I answered your question. Would you do me the courtesy of answering
> mine? It was:
> If we thawed you out in the year 9000, and you found that science
> had explained all apparent design, and that theism was only a faint
> memory, and that even aliens contacted by radio were all atheists,
> would you still say we all just have our metaphysics wrong?
>
I don't accept that such a situation could come about.
As I pointed out earlier , science cannot explain the highest
level scientific laws ( since it is the means by which science
explains other phenomena). Hence science could not explain *all*
apparent design - that is it would always be arguable that the
highest level laws were the product of design.
> > one can, I consider , show that necessarily
> > if God exists he exists necessarily.
>
> If this can be "shown", then why isn't the Ontological Argument
> universally accepted (and taught in kindergarten :-)?
>
The above is *not* a statement of the ontological argument.
> > The atheist is compelled
> > to posit a contingent "brute fact" set of laws which "just are".
>
> Not necessarily; he could propose an explanation parallel to yours, as
> follows. If logical possibility exists, then this universe is necessarily
> logically possible and the "brute fact" of its apparent existence
> is replaced with the necessity that its existence would seem
> apparent to its (necessarily logically possible but perhaps
> non-existent) inhabitants.
>
There isn't any 'parallel argument'. An argument for theism
such as the one I refer to above utilizes the notion of
a maximally perfect reality- that concept isn't open to the atheist.
When have more time I will present the argument to make this clearer.
> > This is to enter the realm of non-explanation.
>
> Who gives the guarantee that there must be a knowable answer to
> the question "why does anything exist?"? In his _Philosophical
> Investigations_, Nozick does a good job of critically examining
> the assumptions that tempt us in dealing with this question.
>
I am prefectly prepared to allow that this could be the case-
the point is that if the atheist goes down this route he has
abandoned any sort of pretence that his explanation is
empirically based. He's in the realm of "faith" in other
words.
> What I meant by "bug" is that this purported explanation fails, shattered
> on the rocks of parsimony and/or the invalidity of the Ontological
Argument.
>
The ontological argument can be presented in a form which is
deductively valid- validity is not the issue. Critics of the argument
would say that it is unsound.
jh
Eric Dew
>> Are you saying that atheism is unfalsifiable?
>
>
>*
>Atheism is about the most falsifiable concept I can envision.
>
>As soon as one God shows up, atheism goes out the window.
>
Except no two persons can agree on what a God is, and even if one were
to show up, no one can actually accept that the shown-up entity is really
god, so in a way, it's currently unfalsifiable, until there is a way to
explicitly spell out what "God" is (and isn't).
EDEW
Rick Gillespie
No, because all he has done is re-assert what you have already claimed.
Here's a question to help you on your way, though. What makes you so
certain that these "highest level" laws (which, BTW, you still have
failed to describe) cannot describe themselves?
Rick Gillespie
Brian Holtz
"Paul Filseth" <pg...@lsil.com> wrote :
>
> > it's not (yet) completely foolish to infer deism from physics.
>
> of three possibilities is probably the case: (a) that the fine-tuning
> is only apparent, because physical principles we don't yet know about
> make the values we observe more probable than they look, or (b) that
> other sorts of intelligent beings than our sort -- beings that aren't
> "life as we know it" -- are possible, or (c) that there exists stuff
> in addition to the big bang debris we see, stuff that isn't governed by
> the laws we know about.
How can you a priori exclude the possibility of (d) a fine-tuner?
I agree that (a) is more likely than (d), but (d) is not impossible.
Gregg Holmes
> >
> No 'ploy' at all. I have defined 'evidence', and explained why
> -using my definition- the atheist claim of "no evidence" is false.
> This is just an assertion. The atheist never bothers to
> define evidence.
>
> jh
Using your definition of evidence, what is the evidence?
Bolo
Theism has at least as many of your so-called "highest level" conditions
as non-theistic explanations, they just end with one (not counting
restatements) statement that presumes a lot: because god/the gods want it
that way. For example:
Why does the universe exist? (it eventually comes to "because god/the
gods created it, because he/she/it/they wanted it to")
Why is there life in the universe? (again the theist will eventually be
reduced to saying "because god/the gods made it" or "because god/the gods
wanted it to")
Why did an innocent child in (pick your location) die that horrible
death? (because it's god's/the gods' plan, he/she/it/they want it that way)
My question becomes if those are valid for theism, why is "because
that's the way the universe IS" invalid for non-theism?
Some other questions I would appreciate your addressing:
- do you consider a "pattern" the same thing as "design"? My reason:
we humans are good at making patterns out of randomness, just look into the
night sky at constellations. Just because we made a pattern out of the
star's arrangement doesn't mean they were purposely put that way.
- is there a single property/structure/anything of the universe that
you consider MUST have been "designed" and could not under any circumstance
have been random chance? Example: do you consider the speed of light being
(approx) 300,000 km/sec to be evidence that the universe was designed? (or
could it have been 300,001 km/sec or 299,999 km/sec and we'd still be just
as happy, but it just is (approx) 300k km/sec)
- do you equate a "designed" universe to mean that there was
someone/something that designed it? The reason I ask: that provides us some
statement that you are positively asserting.
- how do you address this problem with design: IF something as
complex as the universe must have been designed (and presumably created
according to that design), THEN doesn't that mean the designer was complex
too, and therefore could not have JUST occurred by chance, so what created
that designer/creator? (IF you go with the "but god just IS and always
WAS", why is that line of 'reasoning' invalid for "the singularity from
which the universe emerged just WAS"?)
- how would you respond to this statement: the need for a theist to
ascribe random, natural events to a personified supernatural being does not
provide evidence that those events are not the result of natural processes.
Thank you for a prompt reply (should you provide one).
Erik R.
aka Bolo
John Secker
<rwgill...@home.com> writes
>Now, whether a god could present sufficient evidence to convince me of
>its existence depends a great deal on the particular kind of god you're
>talking about. If it is an omnipotent god then, well, I can think of no
>test that separates the all-powerful from the merely very-powerful, so I
>cannot think of anything that would authenticate its existence.
>
(since convincing you is clearly logically possible), and furthermore,
whatever it takes, an omnipotent God could do it. So we must assume that
He chooses not to bother (or that He does not exist).
--
John Secker
Netcom jimhumph
Dan Prescher <pres...@concentric.net> wrote in message
news:9gq6u3$2...@dispatch.concentric.net...
> "Netcom jimhumph" <jimh...@netcomuk.co.uk> wrote in message
> news:9gmlo8$n4l$1...@taliesin2.netcom.net.uk...
> >
> > I have already adressed the "no evidence" claim- it is bogus.
> > The atheist making it simply launches it as an assertion, and
> > "evidence" is never defined. Its scarcely a convincing ploy.
> >
> You have mentioned the "no evidence" claim, but hardly addressed it,
> jh. If you stand behind your statement that "It's true that there is
> no decisive evidence, but false that there is no evidence," tell us
> what you think the evidence is. Then tell us why it is not decisive
> evidence. Use any definition of "evidence" you like -- just supply the
> definition along with the evidence.
>
Penquin Dictionary of Philosophy on many many occasions:
evidence is that which grounds a belief or theory.
Thus what is evidence for theism should be obvious:
the body of arguments, historical reports and so
on which ground belief. I really don't know how to
make this any simpler. It is not decisive evidence,
because the arguments are not universally accepted as
being sound, and the historical data is not universally
accepted as being reliable. Surely even you will not
dispute that.
jh
Rick Gillespie
wrote:
I don't disagree with what you say, but if there *is* a god out there
that is as powerful as claimed then I don't think she'll have any
trouble convincing of her identity (although I have no idea what it
would take to do so).
Rick Gillespie
John Secker
Holtz <Brian...@sun.com> writes
>
>"Paul Filseth" <pg...@lsil.com> wrote :
>>
>> > it's not (yet) completely foolish to infer deism from physics.
>>
>> The apparent fine-tuning implies that at least one
>> of three possibilities is probably the case: (a) that the fine-tuning
>> is only apparent, because physical principles we don't yet know about
>> make the values we observe more probable than they look, or (b) that
>> other sorts of intelligent beings than our sort -- beings that aren't
>> "life as we know it" -- are possible, or (c) that there exists stuff
>> in addition to the big bang debris we see, stuff that isn't governed by
>> the laws we know about.
>
>How can you a priori exclude the possibility of (d) a fine-tuner?
>I agree that (a) is more likely than (d), but (d) is not impossible.
>
--
John Secker
John Secker
<jimh...@netcomuk.co.uk> writes
>There isn't any 'parallel argument'. An argument for theism
>such as the one I refer to above utilizes the notion of
>a maximally perfect reality- that concept isn't open to the atheist.
>When have more time I will present the argument to make this clearer.
>
this? We are still waiting for a number of other responses from you,
which have been promised "later" or "when I have time".
--
John Secker
John Secker
<ed...@olagrande.net> writes
>In article <earle.jones-A354...@news.palto1.sfba.home.com> you write:
>>> Are you saying that atheism is unfalsifiable?
>>
>>
>>As soon as one God shows up, atheism goes out the window.
>>
>
>Except no two persons can agree on what a God is, and even if one were
>to show up, no one can actually accept that the shown-up entity is really
>god, so in a way, it's currently unfalsifiable, until there is a way to
>explicitly spell out what "God" is (and isn't).
>
that He was indeed God, and there would be no further argument. In that
sense atheism can certainly be shown false. However, as Jim has pointed
out in another post, there is no experiment which we humans can carry
out which would prove it false. This does not trouble me, however - the
same is true of the theory that Santa does not exist. This is not
falsifiable in that sense either, but I'm still not going to be hanging
a stocking out.
--
John Secker
Paul Filseth
> John Secker <jo...@secker.demon.co.uk> wrote ...
> > Netcom jimhumph <jimh...@netcomuk.co.uk> writes
> > > My argument is that theism is not ( and should never have been)
> > > in the business of plugging gaps in the first place. It is a
> > > metaphysical explanation, not an an empirical one.
> >
> > Ah, but Jim, you are looking at the question from a different point
> > of view to that of most people here. To us, the question is "Why
> > does theism exist, and why do so many people cling to beliefs for
> > which they have no evidence?".
>
> I have already adressed the "no evidence" claim- it is bogus.
> The atheist making it simply launches it as an assertion, and
> "evidence" is never defined. Its scarcely a convincing ploy.
and
> The atheist never bothers to define evidence.
and
> The atheist ploy is simply to *assert* that there is no evidence, but
> he never defines evidence. Once we define evidence the claim is
> demonstrated as false.
Hey Jim, how come you keep lying for God? You think if you bear
false witness against your neighbors enough times, people will forget
who said what? You know perfectly well I've defined "evidence" here a
number of times -- typically in the course of calling you on it when
you libel us yet again.
"Evidence" means an observation that makes it rational to increase
one's estimate of the probability of a hypothesis. Data "d" is evidence
for hypothesis "h" if P(d|h) > P(d|~h). Don't bother saying this is
incoherent -- we know you're familiar with Bayesian analysis.
As for whether there's evidence for theism, you've just stipulated
that there isn't. If P(d|h) > P(d|~h) holds for any d, then h qualifies
as a physical explanation for d -- "physical law" is simply the observed
pattern of event probability. So if theism is a purely metaphysical
explanation, which you said it is, then its truth or falsehood does not
affect the probability of any observation. So there can be no evidence
for it.
--
Paul Filseth Beware of bugs in the above code; I have only
To email, delete the x. proved it correct, not tried it. - Donald Knuth
Eric Dew
>
>Brian Holtz wrote :
>
>> Naturalism could be empirically falsified by tomorrow morning if the
>> gods would just get busy doing some of the things that human religions
>> claim they used to do.
>>
>one must be able to *specify some test which one could carry out*
>which would falsify the theory. Naturalism is not an empirically
>testable theory, but - like theism- a metaphysical explanation.
Falsifiability may also include the possibility that new evidence is
discovered which contradicts the theory. So for a theory to be falsifiable,
it means some way (test, discovery of evidence) to show the theory is
wrong. In that case, naturalism may be falsifiable, and Brian's suggestion
that the gods go do some non-natural acts would present evidence to
falsify naturalism.
EDEW
jesse l nowells
On Wed, 20 Jun 2001, Netcom jimhumph wrote:
> I have already adressed the "no evidence" claim- it is bogus.
> The atheist making it simply launches it as an assertion, and
> "evidence" is never defined. Its scarcely a convincing ploy.
How does your evidence signify any phenomenon of supernatural beings? How
is that testable? The above is not an argument for a definition of
evidence but an attack agasint atheists as if atheists are responsible for
your lack of candor. Didn't you argue something along the lines that
because of the sheer number of people holding religious beliefs that this
was evidence of the reality of a supernatural phenomenon? That's a pretty
weak argument & you can't blame anybody for making it.
> > Of course there are other reasons too, like the need most people feel
> > for reassurance that death is not The End, and a human desire to be told
> > The Truth,
> Substitute fear of judgement, need to rebel against authority, middle
> aged crisis, to construct a similar psychology of atheistic unbelief.
So, both arguments across the fence of the above type are ad hominem
arguments, none of which has any bearing on the truth or falsity of the
proposition that there is evidence or not, supernatural beings or not, &
so on.
Brian Holtz
>
> I don't accept that the claim that we are finding less and less
> design in the world is sustainable. Plainly dances, computer
> programs, paintings etc are the products of design.
In the context of the Teleological Argument, what counts is original
design, not derivative design. Are you seriously claiming that every line
of Java code I write increases the evidence for a cosmic designer?
(My code is beautiful, but it's not *that* beautiful. :-)
> clear at all what you mean when you refer to a 'declining
> trend' . Please clarify.
I earlier described the trend as starting from a baseline of
the "gaps" caused by the absence of a naturalistic understanding of
physics, astronomy, meteorology, agriculture, and physiology. Most of
these gaps began closing after 1500, but by 1850, there were still
no naturalistic explanations for the origin and diversity of life,
the mechanism of mind, and the origin of the universe itself. In 2000,
compelling naturalistic explanations already exist for the diversity
of life and the mechanism of mind, while outlines of naturalistic
explanations are being formed for the origins of life and the
universe itself.
> > > > Is there then no possible pattern of empirical evidence that could
> > > > dissuade you from theism? Is your theism empirically unfalsifiable?
> > > >
> > > how can one empirically test theism ( or naturalism)?
> >
> > Naturalism could be empirically falsified by [miracles]
> >
> But thats not what falsifiable means.
Would Naturalism not be shown to be false by such evidence?
> For a theory to be falsifiable
> one must be able to *specify some test which one could carry out*
> which would falsify the theory.
Instead of debating the definition of "falsifiable", why don't
you just answer the question I was rephrasing? I.e.: is there no
possible pattern of empirical evidence that could dissuade you from
theism?
> Naturalism is not an empirically
> testable theory, but - like theism- a metaphysical explanation.
So (again), is your belief in theism independent of all
possible empirical evidence? Is there no observable difference
between a possible world in which theism is true and one in which it
is false?
> > Theism would be easy to verify if there were any good empirical
> > evidence for it.
> >
> Theism is not a theory
Are you seriously claiming that it would not be possible for
an actual god to produce empirical evidence that would make me a
theist by tomorrow? Or do you avoid discussing the verifiability of
theism because of the embarrassing lack of such evidence? :-)
> - as I said above it is a metaphysical explanation.
Then your definition of theism is different than mine. I define it
as the thesis that the universe is affected by supernatural agency,
where supernatural means not bound by the lawlike regularities
that appear to govern the material world. How do *you* define it?
> > Parsimony thus requires that
> > [theism] provisionally be considered false.
> >
> please explain exactly *how* parsimony dictates it
The available empirical evidence can be explained just as well without
gods as with.
> One considers it alongside such considerations as clarity, 'fit' with
> existing theory, economy, breadth etc.
To me, parsimony includes "clarity" and "economy". As I note in my
book, parsimony is how one decides between theories that are
"otherwise equivalent". "Fit" and "breadth" are ways that theories
can be inequivalent.
> It isn't a principle of logic, and there
> is no reason to suppose that the more parsimonious of two
> explanations is the theory which 'true'.
Pure logic can define truth for analytic propositions, but not
for synthetic propositions. Judging the truth of synthetic propositions
requires epistemology and not just logic alone. I define truth
(recursively) as logical and parsimonious consistency with evidence
and with other truth.
> it would always be arguable that the
> highest level laws were the product of design.
Ah, so I was right: there is *no* possible pattern of empirical
evidence that could dissuade you from theism. It seems that your
teleological argument in fact reduces to one or both of the
ontological and cosmological arguments. This perhaps explains
why, in a thread devoted to your argument from design, you've
talked so much about metaphysics, and so little about empirical
evidence of design. :-)
> > > one can, I consider , show that necessarily
> > > if God exists he exists necessarily.
> >
> The above is *not* a statement of the ontological argument.
If it's not, then isn't it just a tautology derived from the
definition of "God"? (Feel free to give us your definition. :-)
A quick check of The Encyclopedia Of Philosophy confirms that
your statement is the heart of the ontological argument as
formulated by Hartshorne and Malcolm. Their argument then adds
that God's existence is either necessary or logically contradictory,
that it is not logically contradictory, and that thus it is
necessary.
As the article notes, the argument "fails" due to
its "illicit shift between the notions of ontological and logical
necessity". "In modern philosophy, logical necessity is a concept
which applies only to propositions; a proposition is logically
necessary if it is true in virtue of the meanings of the terms
composing it. And it is a basic empiricist principle that
existential propositions cannot be logically necessary." And:
"existential propositions are always synthetic, always true or
false as a matter of fact rather than as a matter of definition."
> > an explanation parallel to yours, as follows. If logical
> > possibility exists, then this universe is necessarily
> > logically possible and the "brute fact" of its apparent existence
> > is replaced with the necessity that its existence would seem
> > apparent
> >
> There isn't any 'parallel argument'. An argument for theism
> such as the one I refer to above utilizes the notion of
> a maximally perfect reality- that concept isn't open to the atheist.
The parallel is that both argue that the existence of the universe
is explainable once you grant either "maximally perfect
reality" (whatever that is) or the necessary existence of
logical possibility.
> When have more time I will present the argument to make this clearer.
Please do. Or provide a reference to the literature.
> > the invalidity of the Ontological Argument.
>
> The ontological argument can be presented in a form which is
> deductively valid- validity is not the issue. Critics of the argument
> would say that it is unsound.
I didn't mean formal logical validity, but rather strength
in establishing a reliable conclusion, which I gather you'd
rather call "soundness". Fine, use whatever definitions you like,
just as long as you reveal them to us.
> > Who gives the guarantee that there must be a knowable answer to
> > the question "why does anything exist?"?
> >
> I am prefectly prepared to allow that this could be the case-
> the point is that if the atheist goes down this route he has
> abandoned any sort of pretence that his explanation is
> empirically based.
Atheists indeed base their explanation of reality on empirical
evidence and their rational understanding thereof. Furthermore,
atheists readily admit that their explanation and understanding
is uncertain and incomplete. Now, could you explain precisely what
pretense you think you've identified? Are you saying that any
worldview that does not (at least pretend to) answer the Big Why is
necessarily non-empirical?
> He's in the realm of "faith" in other words.
Only if (as you seem to) we take 'faith' to mean provisional
belief in a hypothesis without complete certainty. Not only have
you repeatedly declined to tell us what you mean by 'faith', you
have also yet to respond to my last comments in our thread about
faith:
You are (probably deliberately) obscuring a distinction
between skeptical empiricists (including most atheists and perhaps
even yourself) and dogmatic believers in revelation (including many if
not most adherents of revelation-based religions).
Do you really think that arguments about 'faith' in a.a.m.
parse correctly if 'faith' is replaced with 'strong but uncertain
belief'? Do you really think that atheists' vehement denials of
having "faith" are just a lexicographical misunderstanding, and that
there is no concept or notion that they might be calling 'faith' that
distinguishes the faithful from the faithless?
I will ask yet again: do you have any beliefs based on revelation
and exempt from doubt? I.e. are you one of them, or one of us? :-)
Brian Holtz
"Rick Gillespie" <rwgill...@home.com> wrote :
>
> What makes you [Netcom jimhumph] so
> certain that these "highest level" laws (which, BTW, you still have
> failed to describe) cannot describe themselves?
1. We said they are not self-explaining; we're not talking about
self-describing.
2. I, at least, don't know of any proof that highest-level scientific
laws *cannot* be self-explaining, but I strongly doubt they could be,
and I'm not sure who (hardcore anthropic theorists?) would believe
otherwise.
3. You seem to be asking Jim to prove a negative, similar to how
theists often ask atheists to prove that God does not exist.
Brian Holtz
"Rick Gillespie" <rwgill...@home.com> wrote :
> >
> >> god-did-it is never a better explanation that "I don't know", IMHO.
> >
> >Are you saying that atheism is unfalsifiable?
>
> I don't see how that follows from my statement. Atheism is falsifiable
> by simply presenting a deity.
But not by presenting evidence of a god's deeds?
> >If some god started
> >inscribing or authenticating its revelation through supernatural
> >patterns (in cosmological or quantum phenomena) or ongoing miracles
> >(such as prophecy or communication with a spirit world), you would
> >nevertheless choose ["I don't know"] over theism?
>
> Now, whether a god could present sufficient evidence to convince me of
> its existence depends a great deal on the particular kind of god you're
> talking about. If it is an omnipotent god then, well, I can think of no
> test that separates the all-powerful from the merely very-powerful
The very notion of omnipotence is itself somewhat paradoxical, agreed.
But by "some god" I merely meant any supernatural personal agency, belief
in which would constitute theism. Would the evidence I described make
you a theist in this sense?
Paul Filseth
>
> You are thinking- I imagine- of Paley's argument. But there
> are stronger ways of stating the argument.
Really. Every other way I've encountered was a cheap knockoff of
Paley's argument. It took the scientific breakthrough of the century
to refute Paley; proposed "stronger ways" can generally be disposed
of with five minutes of logic. If you know of an exception to this
pattern, share. What object can you point to that has properties
implying an intelligent non-human designer?
Paul Filseth
> > > it's not (yet) completely foolish to infer deism from physics.
> >
> > The apparent fine-tuning implies that at least one of three
> > possibilities is probably the case: (a) that the fine-tuning is
> > only apparent, because physical principles we don't yet know about
> > make the values we observe more probable than they look, or
> > (b) that other sorts of intelligent beings than our sort -- beings
> > that aren't "life as we know it" -- are possible, or (c) that
> > there exists stuff in addition to the big bang debris we see,
> > stuff that isn't governed by the laws we know about.
>
> How can you a priori exclude the possibility of (d) a fine-tuner?
> I agree that (a) is more likely than (d), but (d) is not impossible.
I didn't exclude a fine-tuner; but a fine-tuner isn't a (d).
That's my point -- a fine-tuner is an (a), and a (b), and a (c). It's
stuff that isn't governed by our laws, intelligent stuff, that makes
our sort of universe more probable. Since "fine-tuner" is a _subset_
of the ways (a) might be the case, that means it's less likely -- it's
the same reason it's more likely that a European will win an Olympic
medal than that a German will. Likewise (b) and (c). It's foolish
to infer a god, not because a god can be ruled out, but because we
have an abundance of possible reasons for the anthropic coincidences
that are all provably more likely than a fine-tuner.
Eric Pepke
> The apparent fine-tuning implies that at least one
> of three possibilities is probably the case: (a) that the fine-tuning
> is only apparent, because physical principles we don't yet know about
> make the values we observe more probable than they look, or (b) that
> other sorts of intelligent beings than our sort -- beings that aren't
> "life as we know it" -- are possible, or (c) that there exists stuff
> in addition to the big bang debris we see, stuff that isn't governed by
> the laws we know about.
Or (d) someone did fine-tune the constants who wasn't particularly
godlike and was just fooling around in the lab.
About 50% of Gregory Benford's books seem to be about this.
-Eric
Brian Holtz
> > >
> > > The apparent fine-tuning implies that at least one of three
> > > possibilities is probably the case: (a) that the fine-tuning is
> > > only apparent, because physical principles we don't yet know about
> > > make the values we observe more probable than they look, or
> > > (b) that other sorts of intelligent beings than our sort -- beings
> > > that aren't "life as we know it" -- are possible, or (c) that
> > > there exists stuff in addition to the big bang debris we see,
> > > stuff that isn't governed by the laws we know about.
> >
> stuff that isn't governed by our laws, intelligent stuff, that makes
> our sort of universe more probable. Since "fine-tuner" is a _subset_
> of the ways (a) might be the case, that means it's less likely -- it's
> the same reason it's more likely that a European will win an Olympic
> medal than that a German will. Likewise (b) and (c).
I don't follow your reasoning here.
Are you trying to classify the divine will and reasoning of a
Designer (resulting in life being more likely) as simply "physical
principles we don't yet know about"? If so, aren't you begging
(or indeed conceding) the entire question of design to call this
only "apparent" fine-tuning but an actual "physical principle"?
If not, then how is a fine-tuner a subset of (a)?
Are you saying that a (perhaps necessarily-existing) intelligent
Designer is a valid counter-example to the claim that the universe
appears fine-tuned to support precisely human-style intelligence?
Wouldn't that be conceding that the Designer exists?
> we have an abundance of possible reasons for the anthropic coincidences
> that are all provably more likely than a fine-tuner.
What are these possible reasons? How are they provably more likely?
Dick
"Brian Holtz" <Brian...@sun.com> wrote in message
news:NixZ6.123949$%i7.86...@news1.rdc1.sfba.home.com...
>
> 2. I, at least, don't know of any proof that highest-level scientific
> laws *cannot* be self-explaining, but I strongly doubt they could be,
> and I'm not sure who (hardcore anthropic theorists?) would believe
> otherwise.
Godel?
- Dick
Dan Prescher
>
> Dan Prescher <pres...@concentric.net> wrote in message
> news:9gq6u3$2...@dispatch.concentric.net...
> > "Netcom jimhumph" <jimh...@netcomuk.co.uk> wrote in message
> > news:9gmlo8$n4l$1...@taliesin2.netcom.net.uk...
> > >
> > > I have already adressed the "no evidence" claim- it is bogus.
> > > The atheist making it simply launches it as an assertion, and
> > > "evidence" is never defined. Its scarcely a convincing ploy.
> > >
> > You have mentioned the "no evidence" claim, but hardly addressed
it,
> > jh. If you stand behind your statement that "It's true that there
is
> > no decisive evidence, but false that there is no evidence," tell
us
> > what you think the evidence is. Then tell us why it is not
decisive
> > evidence. Use any definition of "evidence" you like -- just supply
the
> > definition along with the evidence.
> >
> I have now posted the definition of evidence from the
> Penquin Dictionary of Philosophy on many many occasions:
> evidence is that which grounds a belief or theory.
Dodge. You've still not answered the question. Is "that which grounds
a belief or theory" the definition of evidence you had in mind when
you asserted that "It's true that there is no decisive evidence, but
false that there is no evidence"? Yes or no?
> Thus what is evidence for theism should be obvious:
> the body of arguments, historical reports and so
> on which ground belief. I really don't know how to
> make this any simpler.
You could start by actually stating the evidence for god that you
maintain exists, as I've asked. Instead, you again dodge by describing
the classes and sources of the alleged evidence. Which arguments,
which historical reports, which "and so ons" are you referring to when
you say "It's true that there is no decisive evidence, but false that
there is no evidence"?
>It is not decisive evidence,
> because the arguments are not universally accepted as
> being sound, and the historical data is not universally
> accepted as being reliable. Surely even you will not
> dispute that.
>
> jh
>
I may or may not dispute it, if and when you actually stipulate the
definition of evidence you had in mind when you stated "It's true that
there is no decisive evidence, but false that there is no evidence"
and then supply that evidence. You haven't done either yet. And don't
call me Shirley.
--
Dan Prescher
Roughwriters -- Smooth Communications in All Media
www.roughwriters.com
"What if the Hokey Pokey really is what it's all about?"
--
Eric Dew
>In article <2001062200...@og1.olagrande.net>, Eric Dew
><ed...@olagrande.net> writes
><earle.jones-A354...@news.palto1.sfba.home.com> you write:
>>>> Are you saying that atheism is unfalsifiable?
>>>
>>>
>>>As soon as one God shows up, atheism goes out the window.
>>>
>>
>>Except no two persons can agree on what a God is, and even if one were
>>to show up, no one can actually accept that the shown-up entity is really
>>god, so in a way, it's currently unfalsifiable, until there is a way to
>>explicitly spell out what "God" is (and isn't).
>>
>that He was indeed God, and there would be no further argument. In that
>sense atheism can certainly be shown false. However, as Jim has pointed
>out in another post, there is no experiment which we humans can carry
>out which would prove it false. This does not trouble me, however - the
>same is true of the theory that Santa does not exist. This is not
>falsifiable in that sense either, but I'm still not going to be hanging
>a stocking out.
Actually, Santa is more (than God) likely to be falsifiable. We all know
how Santa is supposed to look like (according to Coca-Cola): A big
burly guy with a big bushy beard, red pajama-like clothing, black boots,
red cap, white gloves, rides a flying sleigh pulled by eight (or nine)
flying reindeers.
If someone came up to you and claimed to be Santa but didn't have any
of those items to show you, you can immediately nix that person. If
a person came up to you and had all those items, well, that's Santa.
Right? I mean, if a guy has a flying sleigh pulled by eight (or nine)
flying reindeers, what else are you going to do other than throw up your
hands and say, "Ok, that's Santa."
But in the case of god, we don't even have a consistent set of descriptions
for the being. Indeed, some versions of the J-C religion manifesto claims
that god *can't* be described. In other words, people can only believe in
an entity that is solely manufactured in their heads.
EDEW
Eric Dew
> Hey Jim, how come you keep lying for God? You think if you bear
>false witness against your neighbors enough times, people will forget
>who said what? You know perfectly well I've defined "evidence" here a
>number of times -- typically in the course of calling you on it when
>you libel us yet again.
>
> "Evidence" means an observation that makes it rational to increase
>one's estimate of the probability of a hypothesis. Data "d" is evidence
>for hypothesis "h" if P(d|h) > P(d|~h). Don't bother saying this is
>incoherent -- we know you're familiar with Bayesian analysis.
I think you got the notations mixed up. The probability for h (they
hypothesis) being true is P(h|&), where & = the sum of all experiential
evidence of the person assessing the probability. What you want to
say is that "d" is evidence for h if
P(h|d,&) > P(h|&)
That is, the probability of h being true assuming all experiential evidence
plus "d" is grater than the probability of h being true assuming just
all experiential evidence.
In other words, your P(d|h) should at least be written as P(h|d) and
you don't want to also say P(h|~d) (nor P(~h|d), although that might
also be a factor as well).
Otherwise, modulo the change in notation, the rest of your argument
makes sense.
EDEW
Eric Pepke
> Hey Jim, how come you keep lying for God? You think if you bear
> false witness against your neighbors enough times, people will forget
> who said what?
Theists do lie a lot, don't they? Not only about big things but about
small, easily checked things. Even trivia.
It's odd behavior, but it's consistent with the view of religion as related
to a Cluster B personality disorder.
Rick Gillespie
<Brian...@sun.com> wrote:
>
>"Rick Gillespie" <rwgill...@home.com> wrote :
>>
>> What makes you [Netcom jimhumph] so
>> certain that these "highest level" laws (which, BTW, you still have
>> failed to describe) cannot describe themselves?
>
>1. We said they are not self-explaining; we're not talking about
>self-describing.
Assuming "we" refers to yourself and Jim Humphries, I see no post where
either of you said that directly. Perhaps you think it is implied by
something else you did say.
>
>2. I, at least, don't know of any proof that highest-level scientific
>laws *cannot* be self-explaining, but I strongly doubt they could be,
Okay. That's a long way from stating with certainty that the "highest
level laws" cannot be described by science.
>and I'm not sure who (hardcore anthropic theorists?) would believe
>otherwise.
I don't know who would think so either, but the possibility cannot be
casually ignored simply because of that.
>3. You seem to be asking Jim to prove a negative, similar to how
>theists often ask atheists to prove that God does not exist.
I'm asking him to *defend* what he has said (not prove). He tends to
make claims that he cannot defend, and I like to call him on them.
Rick Gillespie
Rick Gillespie
<Brian...@sun.com> wrote:
>
>"Rick Gillespie" <rwgill...@home.com> wrote :
>> >
>> >> god-did-it is never a better explanation that "I don't know", IMHO.
>> >
>> >Are you saying that atheism is unfalsifiable?
>>
>> I don't see how that follows from my statement. Atheism is falsifiable
>> by simply presenting a deity.
>
>But not by presenting evidence of a god's deeds?
That depends on the god in question, and the quality of the evidence,
but, yes, it could falsify atheism. Do you have any suggestions of such
evidence?
>
>> >If some god started
>> >inscribing or authenticating its revelation through supernatural
>> >patterns (in cosmological or quantum phenomena) or ongoing miracles
>> >(such as prophecy or communication with a spirit world), you would
>> >nevertheless choose ["I don't know"] over theism?
>>
>> Now, whether a god could present sufficient evidence to convince me of
>> its existence depends a great deal on the particular kind of god you're
>> talking about. If it is an omnipotent god then, well, I can think of no
>> test that separates the all-powerful from the merely very-powerful
>
>The very notion of omnipotence is itself somewhat paradoxical, agreed.
Okay.
>But by "some god" I merely meant any supernatural personal agency, belief
>in which would constitute theism. Would the evidence I described make
>you a theist in this sense?
I don't have enough information to knowledgably answer your question.
You'll have to expand on your explanation of the "inscribing or
authenticating" you mention in your article. What, for instance, do you
mean by "through supernatural patterns"? Or, for that matter, what do
you mean by "supernatural"? You seem to implying that we can determine
events caused by supernatural means as opposed to unknown natural means.
Is that correct?
Rick Gillespie
Brian Holtz
"Rick Gillespie" <rwgill...@home.com> wrote :
> >> What makes you [Netcom jimhumph] so
> >> certain that these "highest level" laws (which, BTW, you still have
> >> failed to describe) cannot describe themselves?
> >
> >1. We said they are not self-explaining; we're not talking about
> >self-describing.
>
> I see no post where either of you said that directly.
Jim wrote "science cannot explain the highest level scientific laws".
Assuming scientific explanations must invoke scientific laws, it
follows that: if Jim is wrong, then some (cycle of) highest level
scientific laws must be (mutually) self-explaining.
>> 2. I, at least, don't know of any proof that highest-level scientific
>> laws *cannot* be self-explaining, but I strongly doubt they could be,
>
> Okay. That's a long way from stating with certainty that the "highest
> level laws" cannot be described by science.
After about 3 or 5 postings in our thread about "explaining" highest
level laws, it was you who suddenly started talking about "describing"
highest level laws.
Paul Filseth
> > > > The apparent fine-tuning implies that at least one of three
> > > > possibilities is probably the case: (a) that the fine-tuning is
> > > > only apparent, because physical principles we don't yet know about
> > > > make the values we observe more probable than they look, or
> > > > (b) that other sorts of intelligent beings than our sort -- beings
> > > > that aren't "life as we know it" -- are possible, or (c) that
> > > > there exists stuff in addition to the big bang debris we see,
> > > > stuff that isn't governed by the laws we know about.
> >
> > a fine-tuner is an (a), and a (b), and a (c). It's stuff that
> > isn't governed by our laws, intelligent stuff, that makes our
> > sort of universe more probable. Since "fine-tuner" is a _subset_
> > Likewise (b) and (c).
>
> I don't follow your reasoning here.
>
> Are you trying to classify the divine will and reasoning of a
> Designer (resulting in life being more likely) as simply "physical
> principles we don't yet know about"?
It's what they are. Physical principles are the rules that
describe how stuff behaves. If where stuff goes depends on where a
designer wants it to go, then that's a physical principle. It's no
different from the physical principle that says "whether a muscle
contracts depends on whether the animal it's in wants it to if it's
a striped muscle but not if it's a smooth muscle."
> If so, aren't you begging (or indeed conceding) the entire question
> of design to call this only "apparent" fine-tuning but an actual
> "physical principle"? If not, then how is a fine-tuner a subset
> of (a)?
Sorry, I overstated my case -- delete the "only apparent".
Possibility (a) should have been just "Physical principles we don't yet
know about make the values we observe more probable than they look."
Deliberate fine-tuning is one among the many possible forms such a
principle could take.
> Are you saying that a (perhaps necessarily-existing)
I find the concept of "necessarily existing" absurd. Necessary
for what reason? And why does that reason exist?
> intelligent Designer is a valid counter-example to the claim that
> the universe appears fine-tuned to support precisely human-style
> intelligence?
No -- see retraction above.
> > we have an abundance of possible reasons for the anthropic
> > coincidences that are all provably more likely than a fine-tuner.
>
> What are these possible reasons?
a: There's an unknown principle that makes our world more probable
than it looks.
b: There are other sorts of possible intelligent beings.
c: There's stuff that isn't governed by the laws we know about.
> How are they provably more likely?
Because a fine-tuner is a proper subset of all of them. Think
of a Venn-diagram with three overlapping circles. A fine-tuner is part
of the little space in the middle where they all overlap. The space
of possibility is the whole thing, including the places in just one
circle, places where two overlap, and the rest of the triple-overlap
area in the middle. Of course that's bigger.
The problem with inferring an intelligent fine-tuner is that it's
overly detailed. It's inferring far more than the evidence points to.
It's like seeing a puddle in the morning and seeing it gone that
evening. You could infer it was a hot day, or you could infer that the
temperature was 96 degrees. Which inference is reasonable and which is
foolish?
Brian Holtz
"Rick Gillespie" <rwgill...@home.com> wrote :
> >> >If some god started
> >> >inscribing or authenticating its revelation through supernatural
> >> >patterns (in cosmological or quantum phenomena) or ongoing miracles
> >> >(such as prophecy or communication with a spirit world), you would
> >> >nevertheless choose ["I don't know"] over theism?
>
> What, for instance, do you
> mean by "through supernatural patterns"?
Example: every object outside the Milky Way disappears, except
for a few distant quasars that spell out "Jesus Is Lord".
> Or, for that matter, what do you mean by "supernatural"?
For our purposes, I mean a) egregiously violative of the regularities
that are usually observed in the material world, while also b) consistent
with the expressed will of some agency.
> You seem to implying that we can determine
> events caused by supernatural means as opposed to
> unknown natural means.
I'm indeed implying that it's unparsimonious to blindly believe that
my hypothetical phenomenon is mysteriously natural and not supernatural.
John Secker
<rwgill...@home.com> writes
>I don't have enough information to knowledgably answer your question.
>You'll have to expand on your explanation of the "inscribing or
>authenticating" you mention in your article. What, for instance, do you
>mean by "through supernatural patterns"? Or, for that matter, what do
>you mean by "supernatural"? You seem to implying that we can determine
>events caused by supernatural means as opposed to unknown natural means.
>Is that correct?
>
easy. "Supernatural" describes things which don't happen.
--
John Secker
Earle D Jones
rwgill...@home.com (Rick Gillespie) wrote:
> On Thu, 28 Jun 2001 04:17:57 +0000 (UTC), "Brian Holtz"
> <Brian...@sun.com> wrote:
>
> >
> >"Rick Gillespie" <rwgill...@home.com> wrote :
> >> >
> >> >> god-did-it is never a better explanation that "I don't know", IMHO.
> >> >
> >> >Are you saying that atheism is unfalsifiable?
> >>
> >> I don't see how that follows from my statement. Atheism is falsifiable
> >> by simply presenting a deity.
> >
> >But not by presenting evidence of a god's deeds?
*
Present anything! Just any evidence whatsoever that your god exists.
Atheism is falsifiable upon proof of the existence of a god.
Presenting evidence is the first step to a proof.
But no one who posts here (least of all that ignorant git who is known
as "jh") ever presents any evidence at all. The request for evidence is
usually followed by a question. Such as, "Well, what would you accept
as evidence?"
Don't ask questions, just present some evidence. You know what evidence
is.
earle
Post-Christian humanist, a realist without illusions.
*
"I can provide you with an explanation -- I cannot provide an
understanding."
"I can only give you what I think you said you thought you wanted."
Earle D Jones
epe...@acm.org (Eric Pepke) wrote:
> pg...@lsil.com (Paul Filseth) wrote in message
> news:<2001062418...@lsil.com>...
> > Hey Jim, how come you keep lying for God? You think if you bear
> > false witness against your neighbors enough times, people will forget
> > who said what?
>
> Theists do lie a lot, don't they? Not only about big things but about
> small, easily checked things. Even trivia.
*
The ignorant git (jh) is not the first to lie for god.
"What harm would it do, if a man told a good strong lie for the sake
of the good and for the Christian church...a lie out of necessity, a
useful lie, a helpful lie, such lies would not be against God, he
would accept them."
--Martin Luther [1483 --- 1546]
earle
Post-Christian humanist, an idealist without illusions
*
From a report in "The National Catholic Reporter":
"A Vatican-approved vibrating machine that attaches to the testicles
has proved successful in gathering sperm for medical use as a "moral
alternative to masturbation." The University of the Sacred Heart in Rome
completed a survey of 17 men and concluded that "components that
constitute the masturbation act would seem to be absent," such as
"direct stimulation of the genital organ" and any "erotic feelings." The
report added, they are still working to perfect the device by making it
painful."
Rick Gillespie
<Brian...@sun.com> wrote:
>
>"Rick Gillespie" <rwgill...@home.com> wrote :
>
>> >> What makes you [Netcom jimhumph] so
>> >> certain that these "highest level" laws (which, BTW, you still have
>> >> failed to describe) cannot describe themselves?
>> >
>> >1. We said they are not self-explaining; we're not talking about
>> >self-describing.
>>
>> I see no post where either of you said that directly.
>
>Jim wrote "science cannot explain the highest level scientific laws".
>Assuming scientific explanations must invoke scientific laws, it
>follows that: if Jim is wrong, then some (cycle of) highest level
>scientific laws must be (mutually) self-explaining.
True, it is a consequence of what he said, which is why I brought it up
in the first place. That doesn't mean Mr. Humphries understood that his
comments implied it, and, frankly, I doubt that he did.
>
>>> 2. I, at least, don't know of any proof that highest-level scientific
>>> laws *cannot* be self-explaining, but I strongly doubt they could be,
>>
>> Okay. That's a long way from stating with certainty that the "highest
>> level laws" cannot be described by science.
>
>After about 3 or 5 postings in our thread about "explaining" highest
>level laws, it was you who suddenly started talking about "describing"
>highest level laws.
The change was quite unintentional. But ... what of it? I've lost track
of what we're disagreeing over :-)
Rick Gillespie
ps - I'll be on vacation for a few days, so you won't see any responses
from me until after the coming weekend.
Rick Gillespie
<Brian...@sun.com> wrote:
>
>"Rick Gillespie" <rwgill...@home.com> wrote :
>
>> >> >If some god started
>> >> >inscribing or authenticating its revelation through supernatural
>> >> >patterns (in cosmological or quantum phenomena) or ongoing miracles
>> >> >(such as prophecy or communication with a spirit world), you would
>> >> >nevertheless choose ["I don't know"] over theism?
>>
>> What, for instance, do you
>> mean by "through supernatural patterns"?
>
>Example: every object outside the Milky Way disappears, except
>for a few distant quasars that spell out "Jesus Is Lord".
What makes this a "supernatural pattern"?
>
>> Or, for that matter, what do you mean by "supernatural"?
>
>For our purposes, I mean a) egregiously violative of the regularities
>that are usually observed in the material world, while also b) consistent
>with the expressed will of some agency.
How does one know what is the expressed will of this agency?
>
>> You seem to implying that we can determine
>> events caused by supernatural means as opposed to
>> unknown natural means.
>
>I'm indeed implying that it's unparsimonious to blindly believe that
>my hypothetical phenomenon is mysteriously natural and not supernatural.
I need more than just your say so. Are you saying this is beyond the
abilities of some natural agency to perform? How do you know? Is it
beyond the abilities of some natural agency to hoax?
You seem to be clinging to a god-of-the-gaps. If something happens that
is unexplained and seemingly unexplainable you will file it under
"supernatural". What advantage does this have over saying "I don't
know"?
Rick Gillespie
Brian Holtz
"Rick Gillespie" <rwgill...@home.com> wrote :
> >Example: every object outside the Milky Way disappears, except
> >for a few distant quasars that spell out "Jesus Is Lord".
>
> What makes this a "supernatural pattern"?
It fits the definition you proceed to quote:
> >For our purposes, I mean a) egregiously violative of the regularities
> >that are usually observed in the material world, while also b) consistent
> >with the expressed will of some agency.
>
> How does one know what is the expressed will of this agency?
By observing the expression.
> >I'm indeed implying that it's unparsimonious to blindly believe that
> >my hypothetical phenomenon is mysteriously natural and not supernatural.
>
> I need more than just your say so.
It's a hypothetical, so naturally all you get is "my say so". :-)
To defeat the hypothetical, you have to show that the hypothesized
case is impossible.
> Are you saying this is beyond the
> abilities of some natural agency to perform? How do you know? Is it
> beyond the abilities of some natural agency to hoax?
Of course not. It is logically possible that you are a brain in a
vat, being manipulated in a perfectly non-supernatural laboratory.
Now, are you going to cling blindly and unparsimoniously to this
possibility if ever a deity were the simplest explanation for the
available evidence?
> If something happens that
> is unexplained and seemingly unexplainable you will file it under
> "supernatural".
First, in case it wasn't obvious, I believe that the supernatural is
non-existent but not impossible, which implies I'm an atheist.
Second, you seem to be a priori ruling out deities as a valid explanation.
If deities are possible, then "a god did it" is a valid explanation for
some possible set of evidence. Are you saying that deities are not
only non-existent but *impossible*?
> What advantage does this have over saying "I don't know"?
Parsimony. If instead of a priori refusing to believe in deities
you for some reason refused to believe in heliocentrism,
would you say that "I don't know" is a better answer than heliocentrism
for the apparent motions of the planets?
Paul Filseth
>
> Example: every object outside the Milky Way disappears, except
> for a few distant quasars that spell out "Jesus Is Lord".
But that's a referent, not a meaning. What do you _mean_ by it? What
criterion do you use to decide if a pattern is supernatural.
> > Or, for that matter, what do you mean by "supernatural"?
>
> For our purposes, I mean a) egregiously violative of the regularities
> that are usually observed in the material world, while also b)
> consistent with the expressed will of some agency.
That's a _hypothesis_ about what you mean. Let's test it. One
of the regularities usually observed in the material world is that
animals with high mass/area ratios cannot fly. This regularity is
egregiously violated in a way consistent with the expressed will
of an agency named "Orville and Wilbur Wright". Do you classify
airplanes as supernatural? If you don't, your hypothesis about
what you mean by "supernatural" is refuted.
> I'm indeed implying that it's unparsimonious to blindly believe
> that my hypothetical phenomenon is mysteriously natural and not
> supernatural.
Let's revisit that after you propose a definition that doesn't
wildly conflict with common usage.
Brian Holtz
> > Are you trying to classify the divine will and reasoning of a
> > Designer (resulting in life being more likely) as simply "physical
> > principles we don't yet know about"?
>
> Possibility (a) should have been just "Physical principles we don't yet
> know about make the values we observe more probable than they look."
> Deliberate fine-tuning is one among the many possible forms such a
> principle could take.
Consider these two propositions:
1) Intelligent fine-tuning makes the physical constants more
likely than they appear.
2) Intelligent fine-tuning or some unknown other explanation makes
the physical constants more likely than they appear.
Your argument appears to be: (2) is more likely than (1), and so
one should not believe (1). This argument is not very convincing. :-)
> It's like seeing a puddle in the morning and seeing it gone that
> evening. You could infer it was a hot day, or you could infer that the
> temperature was 96 degrees.
It's like seeing a clock displaying noon. You could infer (it is now noon)
or you could infer (either it is now noon or the clock is wrong). The latter
conclusion may have a slightly higher probability of being true, but this
unremarkable fact is not usually a good reason to disbelieve the
former conclusion.
> > Are you saying that a (perhaps necessarily-existing)
>
> I find the concept of "necessarily existing" absurd.
I too find it unintuitive, but I wouldn't call it absurd. Do you
have some demonstration of its absurdity that could reduce the
famous Ontological Argument to a historical curiosity such as
Zeno's Paradox of Motion? If so, can I co-publish it with you
and share your place in the history of Philosophy? :-)
Brian Holtz
"Paul Filseth" <pg...@lsil.com> wrote :
> > For our purposes, I mean a) egregiously violative of the regularities
> > that are usually observed in the material world, while also b)
> > consistent with the expressed will of some agency.
>
> animals with high mass/area ratios cannot fly. This regularity is
> egregiously violated in a way consistent with the expressed will
> of an agency named "Orville and Wilbur Wright"
As noted in my posting yesterday "Re: definitions of god, atheism, etc":
It should be somewhat obvious that I'm talking about regularities
or patterns that are basic or irreducible in some sense, as opposed
to the regularity that e.g. "West Wing" appears on Wednesday nights.
Paul Filseth
> > > that my hypothetical phenomenon is mysteriously natural and not
> > > supernatural.
> >
> > I need more than just your say so.
>
> It's a hypothetical, so naturally all you get is "my say so". :-)
> To defeat the hypothetical, you have to show that the hypothesized
> case is impossible.
It looks to me like what Rick says he needs more than your
say so to believe is your *non-hypothetical* assertion that calling
your hypothetical event "supernatural" is *more parsimonious*. He
doesn't have to show anything to decline to accept an unproven
premise.
> Second, you seem to be a priori ruling out deities as a valid
> explanation. If deities are possible, then "a god did it" is a
> valid explanation for some possible set of evidence. Are you
> saying that deities are not only non-existent but *impossible*?
Where are you getting that? All sorts of things might possibly
exist but are not valid explanations for any possible observation even
if they do exist. There's a word for them: "unfalsifiable".
John Secker
Holtz <Brian...@sun.com> writes
>> > For our purposes, I mean a) egregiously violative of the regularities
>> > that are usually observed in the material world, while also b)
>> > consistent with the expressed will of some agency.
>>
>> animals with high mass/area ratios cannot fly. This regularity is
>> egregiously violated in a way consistent with the expressed will
>> of an agency named "Orville and Wilbur Wright"
>
>As noted in my posting yesterday "Re: definitions of god, atheism, etc":
> It should be somewhat obvious that I'm talking about regularities
> or patterns that are basic or irreducible in some sense, as opposed
> to the regularity that e.g. "West Wing" appears on Wednesday nights.
>
Wing" regularity. "Men cannot fly" was an absolute rule with no known
violations for millennia. A flying man would have been regarded as a
supernatural event until well after the middle ages. However once it
happens, it is simply a new, natural event. (And, of course, the agency
named "Montgolfier" managed to impose its will on gravity well over a
century before the Wrights).
--
John Secker
Brian Holtz
> > or patterns that are basic or irreducible in some sense, as opposed
> > to the regularity that e.g. "West Wing" appears on Wednesday nights.
> >
> But the rule that Paul mentions is not of the same type as the "West
> Wing" regularity.
They are both of the type of regularity that is not basic or irreducible.
> "Men cannot fly" was an absolute rule with no known
> violations for millennia.
"Men cannot fly" was not a rule of physics, it was an observation about
biology, reducible to more basic rules of physics.
> A flying man would have been regarded as a
> supernatural event until well after the middle ages
It still would be, if he flew superman-style without any observable thrust
or energy source, thus violating momentum and energy conservation.
But a flying or gliding machine would not necessarily have been
regarded as supernatural. Or was Da Vinci making "supernatural" designs
in his sketchbook?
Brian Holtz
"Paul Filseth" <pg...@lsil.com> wrote :
> "Brian Holtz" <Brian...@sun.com> wrote:
> > "Rick Gillespie" <rwgill...@home.com> wrote :
> > > > I'm indeed implying that it's unparsimonious to blindly believe
> > > > that my hypothetical phenomenon is mysteriously natural and not
> > > > supernatural.
> > >
> > > beyond the abilities of some natural agency to perform?
> > > How do you know? Is it beyond the abilities of some natural
> >
> > It's a hypothetical, so naturally all you get is "my say so". :-)
>
> say so to believe is your *non-hypothetical* assertion that calling
> your hypothetical event "supernatural" is *more parsimonious*.
No, his three follow-on questions (restored in brackets above) make
it clear that he was asking how in my hypothetical case I knew that
the phenomena were not caused by a natural agency. My answer was
that by hypothesis all attempts to show that the phenomenon is due to
some natural agency or process meet with failure. Surely after some
period (10 years? 10,000 years?) of failed natural explanations, it
becomes more parsimonious to call it supernatural than to insist it
is mysterious but natural.
> > Second, you seem to be a priori ruling out deities as a valid
> > explanation. If deities are possible, then "a god did it" is a
> > valid explanation for some possible set of evidence. Are you
> > saying that deities are not only non-existent but *impossible*?
>
> All sorts of things might possibly
> exist but are not valid explanations for any possible observation even
> if they do exist. There's a word for them: "unfalsifiable".
I would say that if a thing has no effects that have any possibly
observable consequences, that thing does not "exist". Or, if a thing1
"exists" and has observable consequences, but some other "non-existent"
thing2 is a simpler explanation and no possible observation can show
otherwise, then I would classify thing2 (and not thing1) as
existing. (For a detailed definition of existence, see section
1.1.1 Ontology of my book:
http://c264141-a.smateo1.sfba.home.com/Thoughts/Thoughts.html#Ontology )
Are you saying that there is no conceivable case in which a deity
exists and has observable consequences and is the best explanation
for those consequences?
Automort
>a flying or gliding machine would not necessarily have been
>regarded as supernatural.
Correct. At least the ancient Greeks knew that it was possible for people to
glide with machines (see myth of Icarus & Dedalus -- or perhaps it is a
legend). The "Deus ex Machina" was a person in a Roman stage play representing
a god who was lowered onstage with a crane to represent flying down from
heaven. Of course the audiences knew it was an actor on a wire or rope.
Dan Prescher
> > say so to believe is your *non-hypothetical* assertion that
calling
> > your hypothetical event "supernatural" is *more parsimonious*.
>
> No, his three follow-on questions (restored in brackets above) make
> it clear that he was asking how in my hypothetical case I knew that
> the phenomena were not caused by a natural agency. My answer was
> that by hypothesis all attempts to show that the phenomenon is due
to
> some natural agency or process meet with failure.
Of course, Brian -- if it were the case that we somehow knew that
*all* possible attempts to demonstrate natural agency had actually
been attempted, that there was absolutely nothing else to test, that
there would never *be* anything else to test, *ever* -- then we'd have
a reason to posit the supernatural. Are you saying this hypothetical
case bears any resemblance to life as we know it?
Surely after some
> period (10 years? 10,000 years?) of failed natural explanations, it
> becomes more parsimonious to call it supernatural than to insist it
> is mysterious but natural.
Why do you say that? Given all the supposedly "supernatural" events
throughout the long march of human history that have been shown,
sooner or
later, to be natural, why would you suddenly decide that it was more
parsimonious to give up on naturalism and put a time limit on
scientific investigation?
> I would say that if a thing has no effects that have any possibly
> observable consequences, that thing does not "exist". Or, if a
thing1
> "exists" and has observable consequences, but some other
"non-existent"
> thing2 is a simpler explanation and no possible observation can show
> otherwise, then I would classify thing2 (and not thing1) as
> existing.
God has always been a "simpler" explanation -- the simplest of all
explanations, in fact. But I think it's the simplest reasonable
explanation we're after. And you're limiting our ability to
investigate again -- when do you say that "no possible observation can
show otherwise"? After your research funding runs out? After you get
tired? On your death bed? Pretty limited outlook.
> Are you saying that there is no conceivable case in which a deity
> exists and has observable consequences and is the best explanation
> for those consequences?
Obviously not, since an airtight hypothetical case can be constructed
for anything, given sufficiently restrictive premises. What I'm
curious
to know is this -- are you saying that we live in a universe where
such is the case?
Paul Filseth
> Consider these two propositions:
>
> 1) Intelligent fine-tuning makes the physical constants more
> likely than they appear.
> 2) Intelligent fine-tuning or some unknown other explanation makes
> the physical constants more likely than they appear.
>
> Your argument appears to be: (2) is more likely than (1), and so
> one should not believe (1). This argument is not very convincing. :-)
Why not? Why do you find the less probable more believable than
the more probable? Because intelligent fine-tuning is a familiar idea?
Do theories deserve a leg up because you've heard of them? Or is it
that you have no face to put on "some unknown other explanation"?
Here's a face: maybe some of the apparently fine-tuned constants
are related to one another and we're seeing two views of the same
underlying object. Physics has progressed in the past by unifying
phenomena that had been thought distinct. If we didn't know magnetism
and electricity are the same thing, the relationship among the speed
of light, the dielectric constant of the vacuum and the magnetic
permeability of space would look like it was fine-tuned. So (2) is
now "Intelligent fine-tuning, or the not-yet-discovered unity of
what we currently think of as different laws, or some unknown other
explanation, makes the constants more likely than they appear." Does
(1) still look like a more sensible inference? If you like I can add
more faces to the list.
> > It's like seeing a puddle in the morning and seeing it gone that
> > evening. You could infer it was a hot day, or you could infer
> > that the temperature was 96 degrees.
>
> It's like seeing a clock displaying noon. You could infer (it is
> now noon) or you could infer (either it is now noon or the clock
> is wrong). The latter conclusion may have a slightly higher
> probability of being true, but this unremarkable fact is not
> usually a good reason to disbelieve the former conclusion.
But that's only because you have extensive _experience_ with
clocks. You know that roughly correct clocks are far more common
than way-off ones. You have a rough estimate of the probabilities
themselves, not just knowledge of which is bigger. You know based
on collection of statistics that while the latter conclusion is a
sure thing, the former is about 95% certain, and 95% is enough to
justify belief. What observations have you made of things that
influence physical constants to compare with your clock experience?
Have you seen anything that points to a god being a lot more likely
than unification of laws?
> > > Are you saying that a (perhaps necessarily-existing)
> >
> > I find the concept of "necessarily existing" absurd.
>
> I too find it unintuitive, but I wouldn't call it absurd. Do you
> have some demonstration of its absurdity
Things that are necessary are necessary for a reason. So if a
being exists because it's necessary, why does the _reason_ exist?
"Why is there something instead of nothing?" cannot be explained
correctly, because any answer you might offer qualifies as "something"
and is therefore part of what you were supposed to explain.
> that could reduce the famous Ontological Argument to a historical
> curiosity such as Zeno's Paradox of Motion?
Aren't you the guy who called the Ontological Argument a loser
a few weeks back? It _is_ a historical curiosity. Nobody in his
right mind takes it seriously. I've never heard of anyone who isn't
already a theist for some other reason finding it convincing.
> If so, can I co-publish it with you and share your place in the
> history of Philosophy? :-)
What place in history, the One-Millionth Customer to Refute
St. Anselm? The most famous refutation, due I believe to Kant, is
to point out that the argument treats existence as a property, and
existence is not a property.
John Secker
Holtz <Brian...@sun.com> writes
>> > It should be somewhat obvious that I'm talking about regularities
>> > or patterns that are basic or irreducible in some sense, as opposed
>> > to the regularity that e.g. "West Wing" appears on Wednesday nights.
>> >
>> But the rule that Paul mentions is not of the same type as the "West
>> Wing" regularity.
>
>They are both of the type of regularity that is not basic or irreducible.
>
>> "Men cannot fly" was an absolute rule with no known
>> violations for millennia.
>
>"Men cannot fly" was not a rule of physics, it was an observation about
>biology, reducible to more basic rules of physics.
>
is the phrase you originally used. It had no known violations, ever,
until Montgolfier. The concept of "reducibility to more basic laws of
physics" is based on a perspective looking back, now that we have
greater knowledge.
>> A flying man would have been regarded as a
>> supernatural event until well after the middle ages
>
>It still would be, if he flew superman-style without any observable thrust
>or energy source, thus violating momentum and energy conservation.
>But a flying or gliding machine would not necessarily have been
>regarded as supernatural. Or was Da Vinci making "supernatural" designs
>in his sketchbook?
>
been, especially if he had succeeded in actually creating his designs. I
think a better word for what he was actually doing would be fantasy.
--
John Secker
India
> > curiosity such as Zeno's Paradox of Motion?
>
> Aren't you the guy who called the Ontological Argument a loser
> a few weeks back? It _is_ a historical curiosity. Nobody in his
> right mind takes it seriously. I've never heard of anyone who isn't
> already a theist for some other reason finding it convincing.
>
> > If so, can I co-publish it with you and share your place in the
> > history of Philosophy? :-)
>
> What place in history, the One-Millionth Customer to Refute
> St. Anselm? The most famous refutation, due I believe to Kant, is
> to point out that the argument treats existence as a property, and
> existence is not a property.
The _Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics_ stops just sort of
saying the ontological argument sucks: "Since the time of Immanuel
Kant, the ontological argument has been widely believed to be
invalid." If even Christians think it's bogus (and it strikes this
Christian as being pretty bogus), it's probably safe to give it
"historical curiosity" status.
--India
Jim F.
>
>
>The _Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics_ stops just sort of
>saying the ontological argument sucks: "Since the time of Immanuel
>Kant, the ontological argument has been widely believed to be
>invalid." If even Christians think it's bogus (and it strikes this
>Christian as being pretty bogus), it's probably safe to give it
>"historical curiosity" status.
The monk Gaunilo, provided a critique of the ontological
argument in Anselm's own time, to which Anselm penned a
reply. Aquinas was also skeptical concerning the ontological
argument. On the other hand, at the beginning of the modern
era, Descartes provided a reformulated version of the
ontological argument.
Hume and Kant provided the most devastating criticisms of
the ontological aegument. Kant pointing out that most
versions of the argument presupposed that existence is
a property or predicate. Nevertheless, this hasn't
stopped people from attempting to provide new (or reviving
old) formulations of the argument which they hope can
prove immune to the traditional criticisms. Thus,
Kurt Godel provided one such reformulation, as have
Charles Hartshorne and Norman Malcolm. Generally,
these people have attempted to provide formulations
of the argument that will only presuppposed that
"necessary existence" as a property rather than
existence in general. However, even if we are
willing to grant them this point, the argument would
still seem to be inconclusive since, to say that
God is a being who possesses the property of necessary
existence, would seem to be best understood as either
the assertion that "God exists, and He necessarily
exists" or that "If there is a God, then He necessarily
exists." But we cannot take the first intepretation
as a premise for the argument, since that would render
the argument circular. If the second interpretation
is taken as a premise for the argument, then all that
would follow is that if there is a God, then He necessarily
exists. But that of course would leave the question
of God's existence, still open, which is hardly a
staisfactory conclusion
Jim F.
>
>--India
>
Paul Filseth
> > It looks to me like what Rick says he needs more than your say
> > so to believe is your *non-hypothetical* assertion that calling
> > your hypothetical event "supernatural" is *more parsimonious*.
>
> No, his three follow-on questions (restored in brackets above) make
> it clear that he was asking how in my hypothetical case I knew that
> the phenomena were not caused by a natural agency. My answer was
> that by hypothesis all attempts to show that the phenomenon is due to
> some natural agency or process meet with failure.
Maybe so, or maybe he has a different parsimony metric from
yours; but I guess he can speak for himself if he wants. Either way,
_I_ need more than your say so to accept that in the hypothetical
situation, "supernatural" would be more parsimonious.
> Surely after some period (10 years? 10,000 years?) of failed natural
> explanations, it becomes more parsimonious to call it supernatural
> than to insist it is mysterious but natural.
Why? Have attempted "supernatural" explanations (by hypothesis)
_succeeded_ during that period? Have they explained the event in a
way that helps us understand it, lets us predict its details, or
unifies the phenomenon with others? Or is "goddidit" just as much an
untestable label for the unknown at the end of the 10,000 years as
it was at the beginning? Because if it's the latter, then how could
parsimony possibly favor it? At most they'd be on an equal footing,
having equal records of null results.
(And all this assumes that at some point someone produces an
operational definition of "supernatural". The record of attempts
isn't encouraging. The first requirement of a legitimate theory
is clarity.)
> > > Second, you seem to be a priori ruling out deities as a valid
> > > explanation. If deities are possible, then "a god did it" is a
> > > valid explanation for some possible set of evidence. Are you
> > > saying that deities are not only non-existent but *impossible*?
> >
> > All sorts of things might possibly exist but are not valid
> > explanations for any possible observation even if they do
> > exist. There's a word for them: "unfalsifiable".
>
> I would say that if a thing has no effects that have any possibly
> observable consequences, that thing does not "exist". <snip>
That's highly non-standard usage. If that were what the word
meant, then if reality contains two causally disconnected segments
(as anyone not doing armchair physics should admit it perfectly well
might) then the inhabitants of each segment would have to call the
other "non-existent", even though they're both part of the whole.
"No non-interacting parallel universes exist" is an unfalsifiable
synthetic statement, and making it analytic by redefining "exist"
doesn't settle it; all that does is make people who want to express
the proposition think up a way to rephrase it without using "exist".
You're perfectly entitled to invent new meanings for words, of
course; but no fair drawing a conclusion about what _Rick_ was saying
based on _your_ idiosyncratic dialect.
> Are you saying that there is no conceivable case in which a deity
> exists and has observable consequences and is the best explanation
> for those consequences?
Heck no -- I wasn't presenting my own views, just commenting on
your reasoning. The above might be Rick's opinion; if so, that's
perfectly consistent with what he wrote and perfectly consistent with
there being one or more gods. So your inference that he was implying
gods are impossible was unwarranted.
Brian Holtz
> > 1) Intelligent fine-tuning makes the physical constants more
> > likely than they appear.
> > 2) Intelligent fine-tuning or some unknown other explanation makes
> > the physical constants more likely than they appear.
> >
> > Your argument appears to be: (2) is more likely than (1), and so
> > one should not believe (1). This argument is not very convincing. :-)
>
> Why not?
Because it's general form is fallacious. Given two possibilities
(A) and (A or B), the facile observation that the second is
more probable than the first is not an interesting argument
for the truth of (not A).
> Why do you find the less probable more believable than
> the more probable?
I don't dispute that (A or B) is more likely than (A). I just
dispute that this has any bearing on how probable (A) is.
(A) could be wildly improbable, or it could be virtually certain.
> maybe some of the apparently fine-tuned constants
> are related to one another and we're seeing two views of the same
> underlying object.
Yes, it is for reasons like this that I predict that even the
small amount of remaining apparent design in the universe
will dwindle to (very close to) nothing. Note that while I
predict this, I don't claim to be able to demonstrate it, and
it certainly isn't demonstrated by your analogy that Europeans
win more gold medals than Germans. :-)
> (2) "Intelligent fine-tuning, or the not-yet-discovered unity of
> what we currently think of as different laws, or some unknown other
> explanation, makes the constants more likely than they appear." Does
> (1) still look like a more sensible inference?
I never said it was more sensible. I said "it's not (yet)
completely foolish" [to infer deism from physics]. You then
proceeded to talk about Venn diagrams with overlapping circles. :-)
> > It's like seeing a clock displaying noon. You could infer (it is
> > now noon) or you could infer (either it is now noon or the clock
> > is wrong). [..]
>
> [..] only because you have extensive _experience_ with clocks.
Actually, no. The fact that P(A) <= P(A or B) is not a good argument
to believe (not A), even if I have no other information.
> Have you seen anything that points to a god being a lot more likely
> than unification of laws?
Definitely not. But neither have I seen a demonstration that no
apparent cosmological design in the universe will ever be attributable
to a conscious agency.
> "Why is there something instead of nothing?" cannot be explained
> correctly, because any answer you might offer qualifies as "something"
> and is therefore part of what you were supposed to explain.
Only if you assume that the explanatory relation can never
be reflexive (A explains A) or symmetric (A explains B and
B explains A). In his _Philosophical Investigations_ Nozick
explores the alternative idea of "explanatory self-subsumption"
and gives a hypothetical example:
---------------------------------------------------------
P says: any lawlike statement have characteristic C is true.
Let us imagine this is our deepest law[...] Next we face the
question of why P holds true, and we notice that P itself has
characteristics C. [..] Our question is not whether such
self-subsumption as an instance of itself can constitute
a proof, but whether it can constitute an explanation. [..]
Either there is an infinite chain of different laws and
theories, each explaining the next, or there is a finite
chain. If a finite chain, either the endmost laws are unexplainable
facts or necessary truths or [..] are self-subsuming.
Does [self-subsumption] reduce the arbitrariness and brute-fact
quality of the endpoint at all? If so, does it remove that
quality completely? If a brute fact is something that cannot
be explained by anything, then a self-subsumable principle isn't
a brute fact; but if a brute fact is something that cannot be explained
by anything *else*, such a principle counts as a brute fact.
We normall have no need to distinguish these two senses of
'brute fact' and perhaps usually presume the second. However,
we should not be too impressed by the literature's unanimity that
explanation is irreflexive. Those writers were not considering
explanatory self-subsumption, via quantification theory, of
the most fundamental laws and principles.
---------------------------------------------------------
> > > I find the concept of "necessarily existing" absurd.
> >
> > I too find it unintuitive, but I wouldn't call it absurd.
>
> Aren't you the guy who called the Ontological Argument a loser
Yes, I think it has effectively no persuasive force. But I'm
not so ready to completely dismiss the whole concept of necessary
existence. In particular, I wonder if logical possibility itself
exists necessarily? If nothing existed instead something, would
it therefore be true that nothing can even possibly exist?
If the answer is no, then there may be an answer to the Big Why
("why is there something rather than nothing?"). The answer might be:
Nothing exists except logical possibility, which necessarily exists,
and our perception of material existence is an epiphenomenon of our
being logical subcomponents of a logically possible universe.
Brian Holtz
> > Surely after some period (10 years? 10,000 years?) of failed natural
> > explanations, it becomes more parsimonious to call it supernatural
> > than to insist it is mysterious but natural.
>
> Why? Have attempted "supernatural" explanations (by hypothesis)
> _succeeded_ during that period?
Yes.
> Have they explained the event in a
> way that helps us understand it, lets us predict its details, or
> unifies the phenomenon with others?
Not necessarily, but these criteria aren't mandatory for an
explanation to be considered successful. For example,
notwithstanding some physicists' hopes for "hidden variables",
quantum decay events are not completely understood in the
sense of being fully predictable. And unification
is of course famously lacking between e.g. relativity and
quantum theory. Now, for these reasons, would you say that
quantum theory has not "succeeded" as an explanation?
> Or is "goddidit" just as much an
> untestable label for the unknown at the end of the 10,000 years
It's quite tested in the sense that it is 100% right in predicting
when these miracles occur (i.e. whenever priests will them), while
no natural theory can predict them at all.
> > Are you saying that there is no conceivable case in which a deity
> > exists and has observable consequences and is the best explanation
> > for those consequences?
>
> Heck no [but] The above [is] perfectly consistent with
> there being one or more gods.
Only if your notion of "being" is one that can apply to a thing
even if there is no conceivable way for its consequences to
support the belief that it exists. To me, that's sort of like saying
that you being popular is perfectly consistent with nobody liking
you. Being liked is what constitutes popularity, and being the
best explanation for observable consequences is what I would say
fundamentally constitutes existing.
Otherwise, you could just as easily say that Santa
Claus exists and causes Christmas presents, even
though he is so good at hypnotizing parents and otherwise covering
his tracks that in no conceivable case would anybody conclude that
he is indeed the best explanation for Christmas presents. Such
a notion of being makes it hopelessly indeterminable.
> > I would say that if a thing has no effects that have any possibly
> > observable consequences, that thing does not "exist".
>
> That's highly non-standard usage.
Can you tell me what *is* standard usage? I've put a little
research into this, and the definitions I find are usually
pretty circular.
Merriam-Webster: exist -> real, be; be -> exist, real; real -> exist.
philsophypages.com: existence -> reality, being; reality -> is.
American Heritage: exist -> real, be; real -> actual -> exist;
be -> actual, real.
dictionary.com: exist -> be, real; be -> exist, real; real -> actual,
verifiable existence; actual -> exist
Cambridge: exist -> to be; have the ability to be known,
recognized or understood
allwords.com: exist -> present in the real world or universe
The extensive articles in _The Encyclopedia of Philosophy_ and
the online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy only casually
try to define exist (as real, or concrete, or physical), and are
more concerned with issues of logic: whether existence is a
(1st or 2nd-level) predicate or not, has the same meaning for
properties as for individuals, can be replaced by "instantiates",
etc.
The only elements of non-circularity we find above are: verifiability,
knowability, recognizability, understandability, presence in the
universe, and concreteness/physicality. To me, this all can be
summed up as having consequences (i.e. causal relations) for
which the proposed existent is the best explanation.
> if reality contains two causally disconnected segments
> (as anyone not doing armchair physics should admit it might
Segments that are merely currently disconnected might connect
later, and this is indeed what we believe is happening with
our cosmological horizon as the post-inflationary universe expands.
But segments (like in the many-worlds interpretation of quantum
theory) that can never have any further causal relation
to ours are highly controversial, and seem to have explanatory
utility only in slippery anthropic theories.
> then the inhabitants of each segment would have to call the
> other "non-existent"
Right. How could they otherwise? Who guarantees that if something
exists, any other existing observer should be compelled to consider
that thing to indeed exist? The only ways I see to get such a
guarantee is to a) cheapen the notion of existence so that anything
can be considered to exist, or b) require a causal relation among
proposed existents.
> "No non-interacting parallel universes exist" is an unfalsifiable
> synthetic statement, and making it analytic by redefining "exist"
> doesn't settle it
A statement like that whose truth or falsity seemingly has no possible
consequences is hard to consider as having any content whatsoever.
Defining "exist" to make it analytic seems like a useful way to
get such useless statements off the table.
> all that does is make people who want to express
> the proposition think up a way to rephrase it without using "exist".
Your proposition is probably impossible to express without a
question-begging appeal to the only-intuitively-defined notion
of "exists". I doubt there's a way to rephrase it that doesn't
give parallel universes the same status as fictional universes.
> no fair drawing a conclusion about what _Rick_ was saying
> based on _your_ idiosyncratic dialect.
Either Rick is claiming gods are impossible,
or he has no defense against people who say (unparsimoniously)
that Santa Claus exists and causes Christmas presents and also
arranges it so that his existence is never the best explanation
for Christmas presents. So my conclusion that Rick is claiming
gods are impossible is based not on my dialect, but on my
presumption that he wouldn't want to embrace a silly ontology.
Tony Griffin
> God has always been a "simpler" explanation -- the simplest of all
> explanations, in fact. But I think it's the simplest reasonable
> explanation we're after.
I would go further and suggest that "God" is not an explanation at all.
Its more of a label, when used in this way, like "x" in algebra that represents
an unknown quantity. It's use simply prompts us to ask other questions, that
typically make the "explanation" much less simple.
Tony
Paul Filseth
> > > Your argument appears to be: (2) is more likely than (1), and so
> > > one should not believe (1). This argument is not very convincing. :-)
> >
> > Why not?
>
> Because it's general form is fallacious. Given two possibilities
> (A) and (A or B), the facile observation that the second is
> more probable than the first is not an interesting argument
> for the truth of (not A).
So what? I'm explaining why it's foolish to infer there's a god;
I never said you should infer there's no god. Are you in the habit of
believing every A for which you don't have an interesting argument for
(not A)?
> > Why do you find the less probable more believable than
> > the more probable?
>
> I don't dispute that (A or B) is more likely than (A). I just
> dispute that this has any bearing on how probable (A) is.
> (A) could be wildly improbable, or it could be virtually certain.
And in the case in question, you have no basis whatever for
supposing it's more likely than not. Yet you say it isn't foolish to
conclude there's a god, even though you have an alternative hypothesis
that does have a case for being more likely than not. Why?
> > (2) "Intelligent fine-tuning, or the not-yet-discovered unity of
> > what we currently think of as different laws, or some unknown other
> > explanation, makes the constants more likely than they appear."
> > Does (1) still look like a more sensible inference?
>
> I never said it was more sensible. I said "it's not (yet)
> completely foolish" [to infer deism from physics].
Are you claiming it's an equally sensible inference? If so, why?
If not, then why isn't it foolish to make the less sensible inference?
> You then proceeded to talk about Venn diagrams with overlapping
> circles. :-)
Yes. You asked me to back up my claim that the alternatives
I proposed were provably more likely, so I did. How would you have
preferred for me to?
> > [..] only because you have extensive _experience_ with clocks.
>
> Actually, no. The fact that P(A) <= P(A or B) is not a good argument
> to believe (not A), even if I have no other information.
Actually, yes, you can only infer (A) in this case because you
have extensive experience with clocks. Your correct observation that
I gave no reason to believe (not A) isn't on point. Not having a
reason to believe (not A) does not qualify as a reason to believe (A).
> > Have you seen anything that points to a god being a lot more likely
> > than unification of laws?
>
> Definitely not. But neither have I seen a demonstration that no
> apparent cosmological design in the universe will ever be
> attributable to a conscious agency.
And the possibility of future evidence is a reason to infer a
conscious agency _now_?
> > "Why is there something instead of nothing?" cannot be explained
> > correctly, because any answer you might offer qualifies as
> > "something" and is therefore part of what you were supposed to
> > explain.
>
> Only if you assume that the explanatory relation can never
> be reflexive (A explains A) or symmetric (A explains B and
> B explains A).
That's not an assumption; it follows from what it means to
explain something.
> In his _Philosophical Investigations_ Nozick explores the alternative
> idea of "explanatory self-subsumption" and gives a hypothetical
> example:
> P says: any lawlike statement have characteristic C is true.
> Let us imagine this is our deepest law[...] Next we face the
> question of why P holds true, and we notice that P itself has
> characteristics C. [..] Our question is not whether such
> self-subsumption as an instance of itself can constitute
> a proof, but whether it can constitute an explanation. [..]
> <snip> If a brute fact is something that cannot be explained by
> anything, then a self-subsumable principle isn't a brute fact; <snip>
To me, that looks an awful lot like Nozick just stuck in his
conclusion as a premise.
> But I'm
> not so ready to completely dismiss the whole concept of necessary
> existence. In particular, I wonder if logical possibility itself
> exists necessarily? If nothing existed instead something, would
> it therefore be true that nothing can even possibly exist?
> If the answer is no, then there may be an answer to the Big Why
> ("why is there something rather than nothing?"). The answer might be:
> Nothing exists except logical possibility, which necessarily exists,
> and our perception of material existence is an epiphenomenon of our
> being logical subcomponents of a logically possible universe.
Well, let's start by not being "deceived by grammar". I don't
know what it means to say logical possibility exists. The formal way
to talk about existence is to phrase it as quantification over some
set of properties. You don't say "God exists."; you say "There exists
an x such that ((x created the universe) and (x is intelligent) and
(For all y, if (y created the universe) then (y = x)))." Existence
statements that can't be rephrased that way are category errors. Can
you put "Logical possibility exists necessarily" into that form? What
are the properties of logical possibility?
Paul Filseth
> > Why? Have attempted "supernatural" explanations (by hypothesis)
> > _succeeded_ during that period?
>
> Yes.
>
> > Have they explained the event in a way that helps us understand
> > it, lets us predict its details, or unifies the phenomenon with
> > others?
>
> Not necessarily, but these criteria aren't mandatory for an
> explanation to be considered successful. For example,
> notwithstanding some physicists' hopes for "hidden variables",
> quantum decay events are not completely understood in the
> sense of being fully predictable. And unification
> is of course famously lacking between e.g. relativity and
> quantum theory. Now, for these reasons, would you say that
> quantum theory has not "succeeded" as an explanation?
That's two equivocation fallacies. Quantum theory does not
purport to explain why a quantum decay event occurs when it does; it
simply says we don't know that. What it proposes to explain is how
likely such an event is in a given time. That, it predicts in detail:
"50% chance in the first N seconds, 25% in the second, 12.5% in the
third...", etc. It explains why N is whatever it is, based on the
calculated height and width of an energy barrier. And it unifies the
phenomenon with a vast number of others; that general relativity isn't
one of them doesn't change that. And special relativity was unified
with quantum mechanics back in the 30s. QM accounts for everything in
the world except gravity. That's pretty good. If unification didn't
count as a criterion for explanation unless we unify every phenomenon
in the world in one shot, science couldn't get anywhere.
> > Or is "goddidit" just as much an
> > untestable label for the unknown at the end of the 10,000 years
>
> It's quite tested in the sense that it is 100% right in predicting
> when these miracles occur (i.e. whenever priests will them), while
> no natural theory can predict them at all.
That's not a prediction. According to your scenario, _first_ we
observed that priests could make this happen, and _then_ people said
it was because goddidit.
> > > Are you saying that there is no conceivable case in which a deity
> > > exists and has observable consequences and is the best explanation
> > > for those consequences?
> >
> > Heck no [but] The above [is] perfectly consistent with
> > there being one or more gods.
>
> Only if your notion of "being" is one that can apply to a thing
> even if there is no conceivable way for its consequences to support
> the belief that it exists. To me, that's sort of like saying
> that you being popular is perfectly consistent with nobody liking
> you. Being liked is what constitutes popularity, and being the
> best explanation for observable consequences is what I would say
> fundamentally constitutes existing.
Yes, you've already explained how "exist" works in your idiolect,
so I didn't use it. Now you're seizing "being" to use as a synonym for
pd-exist? Then I guess the time to switch to E-Prime has come.
> Otherwise, you could just as easily say that Santa Claus exists and
> causes Christmas presents, even though he is so good at hypnotizing
> parents and otherwise covering his tracks that in no conceivable case
> would anybody conclude that he is indeed the best explanation for
> Christmas presents. Such a notion of being makes it hopelessly
> indeterminable.
Yes. Some concepts don't support determination of their entire
extensions, and English has evolved mechanisms for allowing English
speakers who like talking about such concepts to do so. Other languages
have too -- mathematicians talk about the limit as N goes to infinity of
the fraction of N-state Turing machines that halt, even though we know
no procedure can determine that number.
> > > I would say that if a thing has no effects that have any possibly
> > > observable consequences, that thing does not "exist".
> >
> > That's highly non-standard usage.
>
> Can you tell me what *is* standard usage?
Sure. I'll point out the concept it stands for when somebody
uses it.
> I've put a little research into this, and the definitions I find
> are usually pretty circular.
> Merriam-Webster: exist -> <snip>
All dictionary definitions loop back on themselves at some point.
So go to primary sources. Observe the speech community using the
word. Lexicographers do that.
> The only elements of non-circularity we find above are: verifiability,
> knowability, recognizability, understandability, presence in the
> universe, and concreteness/physicality. To me, this all can be
> summed up as having consequences (i.e. causal relations) for
> which the proposed existent is the best explanation.
If so, the lexicographers botched their job. Most of the above
elements belong to epistemology, while "exist" and "being" belong to
ontology. You can't settle the immaterial-soul question by word games,
which defining "exist" as requiring concreteness/physicality tries to
do. "Presence in the universe" merely shoves the problem off onto the
definition of "universe".
> > if reality contains two causally disconnected segments
> > (as anyone not doing armchair physics should admit it might
>
> Segments that are merely currently disconnected might connect
> later,
And they might not. Let's contemplate the latter scenario.
> But segments (like in the many-worlds interpretation of quantum
> theory) that can never have any further causal relation
> to ours are highly controversial,
Right. So you've encountered the controversy and recognize what
the participants are disagreeing about. Standard-usage "exist" stands
for that "notion of being".
> and seem to have explanatory utility only in slippery anthropic
> theories.
If you regard the notion as useless, feel free not to use it. Do
not feel free to assume no one else uses it.
> > then the inhabitants of each segment would have to call the
> > other "non-existent"
>
> Right. How could they otherwise?
Very easily. By either (a) not taking a position on the matter,
or (b) jumping to a correct conclusion not supported by evidence. By
standard usage, if they call the inhabitants of the other segment
"non-existent", they're making a false statement.
> Who guarantees that if something exists, any other existing observer
> should be compelled to consider that thing to indeed exist? The only
> ways I see to get such a guarantee is to a) cheapen the notion of
> existence so that anything can be considered to exist, or b) require
> a causal relation among proposed existents.
"Who guarantees?"?!? Who told you you get a guarantee? You can't
rationally justify doing either (a) or (b), so sorry, no guarantee.
> > "No non-interacting parallel universes exist" is an unfalsifiable
> > synthetic statement, and making it analytic by redefining "exist"
> > doesn't settle it
>
> A statement like that whose truth or falsity seemingly has no possible
> consequences is hard to consider as having any content whatsoever.
> Defining "exist" to make it analytic seems like a useful way to
> get such useless statements off the table.
George Orwell coined a word for the practice of enforcing someone's
preferences about what concepts other people think about by redefining
words and restricting language: "Newspeak".
> > all that does is make people who want to express the proposition
> > think up a way to rephrase it without using "exist".
>
> Your proposition is probably impossible to express without a
> question-begging appeal to the only-intuitively-defined notion
> of "exists".
Possibly so. But when you brought up the many-worlds QM model
you proved you know what I'm talking about. You share the intuitive
notion, so we can communicate.
> I doubt there's a way to rephrase it that doesn't
> give parallel universes the same status as fictional universes.
Our local segment of everything contains writers who cause events
in fictional universes, which in turn cause events in readers' minds.
How could causally disconnected parallel universes have the same status?
> > no fair drawing a conclusion about what _Rick_ was saying
> > based on _your_ idiosyncratic dialect.
>
> Either Rick is claiming gods are impossible,
> or he has no defense against people who say (unparsimoniously)
> that Santa Claus exists and causes Christmas presents and also
> arranges it so that his existence is never the best explanation
> for Christmas presents. So my conclusion that Rick is claiming
> gods are impossible is based not on my dialect, but on my
> presumption that he wouldn't want to embrace a silly ontology.
No defense?!? He can say "That's unfalsifiable." and move on.
Brian Holtz
makes the physical constants more likely than they appear.
B: Some unknown other explanation
makes the physical constants more likely than they appear.
> > Given two possibilities
> > (A) and (A or B), the facile observation that the second is
> > more probable than the first is not an interesting argument
> > for the truth of (not A).
>
> So what? I'm explaining why it's foolish to infer there's a god;
> I never said you should infer there's no god.
Given two possibilities (A) and (A or B), the facile observation
that the second is more probable than the first is not an interesting
argument for the foolishness of saying A is more probable than B.
Maybe I misunderstood you, but you seemed to be making such an
argument when you earlier wrote:
- Since "fine-tuner" is a _subset_
- of the ways (a) might be the case, that means it's less likely -- it's
- the same reason it's more likely that a European will win an Olympic
- medal than that a German will.
> > (A) could be wildly improbable, or it could be virtually certain.
>
> And in the case in question, you have no basis whatever for
> supposing it's more likely than not.
I made no suppositions about the relative likelihood of A vs B. I was
just pointing out that the relative likelihood is what matters,
regardless of the greater absolute likelihood of (A or B).
> Yet you say it isn't foolish to conclude there's a god,
I said "it's not (yet) completely foolish".
> even though you have an alternative hypothesis
> that does have a case for being more likely than not.
Is this alternative (B) or (A or B)? I personally would bet on (B),
but it's not (yet) completely foolish to bet on (A). If it were,
then you can be sure that (B) would not be phrased as "some unknown
other explanation". :-)
> Are you claiming it's an equally sensible inference? If so, why?
> If not, then why isn't it foolish to make the less sensible inference?
It's not completely foolish if the "less sensible inference" is
not completely unjustifiable. My point is that there are
degrees of strength and weakness of inference, and that the
argument from design is the least weak of the arguments of
theists and deists. Do you think that some other
argument of theirs is the least weak, or do you think they are
all precisely equally weak? :-)
> Your correct observation that
> I gave no reason to believe (not A) isn't on point. Not having a
> reason to believe (not A) does not qualify as a reason to believe (A).
Nor does it qualify as a reason to consider belief in (A) completely
foolish. Again, it all comes down to the actual merits of A, regardless
of the ability of logical disjunction to increase probability. :-)
> > neither have I seen a demonstration that no
> > apparent cosmological design in the universe will ever be
> > attributable to a conscious agency.
>
> And the possibility of future evidence is a reason to infer a
> conscious agency _now_?
Nope, it (i.e. the current apparent design and the current absence
of such a demonstration) is merely a reason not to consider such
an inference to be completely foolish.
[I'm taking our discussion of necessary existence of logical possibility
to sci.logic.]
Brian Holtz
"Paul Filseth" <pg...@lsil.com> wrote :
> "Brian Holtz" <Brian...@sun.com> wrote:
> > > Have attempted "supernatural" explanations (by hypothesis)
> > > _succeeded_ during that period? [..]
> > > Have they explained the event in a way that helps us understand
> > > it, lets us predict its details, or unifies the phenomenon with
> > > others?
> >
> > these criteria aren't mandatory for an
> > explanation to be considered successful. For example, [..]
> > quantum decay events are not completely understood in the
> > sense of being fully predictable. And unification
> > is of course famously lacking [with] relativity
>
> Quantum theory does not
> purport to explain why a quantum decay event occurs when it does
I didn't say it did. I merely pointed out that QT does not fully
live up to your criteria of understanding and prediction, while
it is nevertheless "successful".
> If unification didn't
> count as a criterion for explanation unless we unify every phenomenon
> in the world in one shot, science couldn't get anywhere.
Right, which is why you shouldn't hold my hypothetically successful
supernatural explanation to an unreasonably high standard of
"success". So what exactly did you mean by "unifies the
phenomenon with others"?
And to repeat my original question:
by hypothesis all attempts to show that the phenomenon is due to
some natural agency or process meet with failure. Surely after some
period (10 years? 10,000 years?) of failed natural explanations, doesn't
it become sensible to say that the "supernatural" explanation is
"successful"?
> > > is "goddidit" just as much an
> > > untestable label for the unknown at the end of the 10,000 years
> >
> > ["goddidit"] is quite tested in the sense that it is 100% right in
> > predicting when these miracles occur (i.e. whenever priests will
> > them), while no natural theory can predict them at all.
>
> That's not a prediction.
Father Jones announces that tomorrow he will perform miracle X.
The hypothetical supernatural theory then produces the statement
that tomorrow miracle X will happen, while the naturalist-mysterian
theory is silent. The next day, miracle X happens. How is that
not a prediction? Aw geez, are we now going to argue over the
definition of "prediction"...? :-)
> According to your scenario, _first_ we
> observed that priests could make this happen, and _then_ people said
> it was because goddidit.
Newton first saw an apple fall, and then said gravity did it. Does
that mean his theory of gravity makes no predictions?
> > > > Are you saying that there is no conceivable case in which a deity
> > > > exists and has observable consequences and is the best explanation
> > > > for those consequences?
> > >
> > > Heck no
So, to clarify, you agree that there is a conceivable case in which a
deity exists and has observable consequences and is the best explanation
for those consequences? If so, then what is it, and how is it different
from my hypothetical miracle-working priest?
> > > [but] The above [is] perfectly consistent with
> > > there being one or more gods.
> >
> > Only if your notion of "being" is one that can apply to a thing
> > even if there is no conceivable way for its consequences to support
> > the belief that it exists. [B]eing the
> > best explanation for observable consequences is what I would say
> > fundamentally constitutes existing. [..]
> > Otherwise, you could just as easily say that Santa Claus exists [..]
> > Such a notion of being makes it hopelessly indeterminable.
>
> Yes. Some concepts don't support determination of their entire
> extensions
My point is not merely that all existents could not be enumerated,
or that some corner cases would be hard to determine. My point is
that such a notion of "being" makes it impossible to rebut the
proposition that an arbitrary thing (e.g. Santa Claus) exists.
> > Can you tell me what *is* standard usage [for "exists"]?
>
> Sure. I'll point out the concept it stands for when somebody
> uses it.
(I would expect such evasiveness from JH, but not you...)
I'm not asking for instances, since they are everywhere
(like "*is*" above or "are" in this sentence). I'm asking
if you've got a better definition than the ones I've mentioned.
> All dictionary definitions loop back on themselves at some point.
> So go to primary sources. Observe the speech community using the
> word. Lexicographers do that.
>
> > The only elements of non-circularity we find above are: verifiability,
> > knowability, recognizability, understandability, presence in the
> > universe, and concreteness/physicality. [..]
>
> If so, the lexicographers botched their job.
So you disagree not only with my definition but also with those
of all the lexicographers I could find? :-) And yet you're still sure
that you have a different and better (but secret?) way to describe
"standard usage"? :-)
> You can't settle the immaterial-soul question by word games,
> [such as] defining "exist" as requiring concreteness/physicality
Right, which is why I propose to settle it by requiring causal
relatedness.
> > and seem to have explanatory utility only in slippery anthropic
> > theories.
>
> If you regard the notion as useless, feel free not to use it. Do
> not feel free to assume no one else uses it.
I'm not saying they don't use it, I'm just saying (as you say about
"supernatural") that they are confused when they use it. As you
wrote: "I've noticed whenever people attempt to explain what they
_mean_, by giving _criteria_ rather than examples, they fail".
Is it perhaps fear of such failure that prevents you from telling
us your own criteria for "exists"? :-)
> > > then the inhabitants of each segment would have to call the
> > > other "non-existent"
> >
> > Right. How could they otherwise?
>
> Very easily. By either (a) not taking a position on the matter,
Then for all things (e.g. Santa Claus) that in
standard usage are positively considered not to exist, this option
would insted require merely not taking a position on their existence.
> or (b) jumping to a correct conclusion not supported by evidence.
Then for any thing (e.g. Santa Claus) that in
standard usage is positively considered not to exist, this option
would make that thing's existence irrefutable.
> if they call the inhabitants of the other segment
> "non-existent", they're making a false statement.
Only because you stipulate that those inhabitants "exist" -- without
saying what that means. :-)
> > > "No non-interacting parallel universes exist" is an unfalsifiable
> > > synthetic statement, and making it analytic by redefining "exist"
> > > doesn't settle it
> >
> > A statement like that whose truth or falsity seemingly has no possible
> > consequences is hard to consider as having any content whatsoever.
>
> George Orwell [called such a move] "Newspeak".
All I'm doing here is invoking the Verifiability Principle, which
in philosophy is called "positivism". Calling my move Orwellian
is little more than an ad hominem.
> > Your proposition is probably impossible to express without a
> > question-begging appeal to the only-intuitively-defined notion
> > of "exists".
>
> Possibly so. But when you brought up the many-worlds QM model
> you proved you know what I'm talking about. You share the intuitive
> notion
I know what you *think* you're talking about (just as you've said
you know how "supernatural" is used in ordinary language). But I'm also
asserting that this "intuitive notion" is confused to the extent
that it doesn't cash out as causal relatedness.
> > I doubt there's a way to rephrase it that doesn't
> > give parallel universes the same status as fictional universes.
>
> Our local segment of everything contains writers who cause events
> in fictional universes, which in turn cause events in readers' minds.
> How could causally disconnected parallel universes have the same status?
Sherlock Holmes doesn't exist, but the the character of Sherlock
Holmes does exist. The character of Sherlock Holmes has causal
relations with existing things, but Sherlock Holmes does not.
Sherlock Holmes has the same status as a parallel universe.
> > or [Rick] has no defense against people who say (unparsimoniously)
> > that Santa Claus exists and causes Christmas presents and also
> > arranges it so that his existence is never the best explanation
> > for Christmas presents.
>
> He can say "That's unfalsifiable."
Then by what criteria could Rick ever assign anything to the
category of (not existing) instead of to the category of
(existing but can never be the best explanation for the evidence)?
Indeed, how can he ever assign anything to the category of
(existing) instead of to the category (not existing but is the
best explanation for the evidence)? Operationally, he would have
to use the paired categories inseparably. So by saying it is
impossible for gods to be considered the best explanation, he
would in effect be saying it is impossible for gods to exist.
Paul Filseth
> > > Given two possibilities (A) and (A or B), the facile observation
> > > that the second is more probable than the first is not an
> > > interesting argument for the truth of (not A).
> >
> > So what? I'm explaining why it's foolish to infer there's a god;
> > I never said you should infer there's no god.
>
> Given two possibilities (A) and (A or B), the facile observation
> that the second is more probable than the first is not an interesting
> argument for the foolishness of saying A is more probable than B.
> Maybe I misunderstood you, but you seemed to be making such an
> argument when you earlier wrote:
>
> - that means it's less likely -- it's the same reason it's more
> - likely that a European will win an Olympic medal than that a
> - German will.
Huh? "European" maps onto (A or B) here, not B. It could well
be more probable that a German will win than that a person from a
different part of Europe will.
There are two comparisons and two arguments going on here. It's
foolish to prefer "intelligent improbability reducer" to "improbability
reducer" because it's less likely. There's no reason to prefer
"intelligent improbability reducer" to "unintelligent improbability
reducer" because you have no data pointing to intelligence.
> > > (A) could be wildly improbable, or it could be virtually certain.
> >
> > And in the case in question, you have no basis whatever for
> > supposing it's more likely than not.
>
> I made no suppositions about the relative likelihood of A vs B. I
> was just pointing out that the relative likelihood is what matters,
> regardless of the greater absolute likelihood of (A or B).
The relative likelihood _of the things you could infer_ is what
matters. Your options aren't {"infer A", "infer B"}. Your options
are {"infer A", "infer B", "infer (A or B)"}. "Infer B" is every bit
as foolish as "infer A" if you have no basis to choose between A and B;
but the fact that A is no worse than B doesn't stop inferring A from
being foolish.
> > Yet you say it isn't foolish to conclude there's a god,
>
> I said "it's not (yet) completely foolish".
>
> > even though you have an alternative hypothesis
> > that does have a case for being more likely than not.
>
> Is this alternative (B) or (A or B)?
In this case it's (A or B or C or D), where A is an intelligent
improbability reducer, B is an unintelligent improbability reducer,
C is other ways to implement intelligence in other kinds of physics,
and D is parallel universes.
> I personally would bet on (B), but it's not (yet) completely foolish
> to bet on (A).
What you bet on and what you infer are two different things. You
can bet on something simply by taking it as a premise that it's fairly
probable. That's not completely foolish -- all computed probabilities
are ultimately based on such premises -- but it's no excuse to mistake
a premise for a conclusion derived by reasoning.
> If it were, then you can be sure that (B) would not be phrased as
> "some unknown other explanation". :-)
It isn't. The unintelligent improbability reducer has already
been expanded into "the not-yet-discovered unity of what we currently
think of as different laws, or some unknown other explanation".
Apart from that, it's not obvious that a possible explanation
deserves a boost in our estimate of its probability merely because
we're able to think of it. People might be biased toward thinking of
some kinds of explanations. I have no idea why mass curves space, but
if someone proposes it's because of a secret CIA conspiracy to tamper
with the fabric of space-time, I'll have no trouble regarding that as
a completely foolish bet, even though the alternative is phrased as
"some unknown other explanation".
> It's not completely foolish if the "less sensible inference" is
> not completely unjustifiable. My point is that there are
> degrees of strength and weakness of inference, and that the
> argument from design is the least weak of the arguments of
> theists and deists. Do you think that some other
> argument of theirs is the least weak, or do you think they are
> all precisely equally weak? :-)
No, the weakest is the "Transcendental Argument for God". The
argument from design was the best they had, but Darwin shot it down.
The argument from fine-tuning of physics is not the same argument
as the argument from design, and it's weaker than the AfD was. My
point is they are all too weak to qualify as justification for an
inference.
> Nor does it qualify as a reason to consider belief in (A) completely
> foolish. Again, it all comes down to the actual merits of A,
> regardless of the ability of logical disjunction to increase
> probability. :-)
The actual merits of A are estimated based on all sorts of
intuitive considerations, among which is how people phrase it to
themselves. Long familiarity with religious ideology is likely to
get you to phrase it as "a god" vs. "something else". This may tend
to draw your attention away from the fact that "hypothesis A" is as
overspecified for the task of accounting for the data at hand as
"96 degrees" is for accounting for the evaporation of some water.
What logical disjunction does is rephrase the hypothesis in a form
that doesn't hide the overspecification. There's never a reason to
infer an overspecified hypothesis.
> > And the possibility of future evidence is a reason to infer a
> > conscious agency _now_?
>
> Nope, it (i.e. the current apparent design and the current absence
> of such a demonstration) is merely a reason not to consider such
> an inference to be completely foolish.
So you can't exhibit a reason for the inference but you think
inferring it without reason isn't completely foolish? Inferring
something without a reason to do so is my criterion for the inference
being completely foolish. What's your criterion, demonstration of
falsehood?
Paul Filseth
> > Quantum theory does not purport to explain why a quantum decay
> > event occurs when it does
>
> I didn't say it did. I merely pointed out that QT does not fully
> live up to your criteria of understanding and prediction, while
> it is nevertheless "successful".
Sure it does. My criteria aren't "understand everything" and
"predict everything". They're "understand something" and "predict
something". QM is famous for being the theory nobody understands,
of course; but there are phenomena we understand better in the sense
that there's only one thing we don't understand instead of many.
And QM rather spectacularly predicted antimatter.
> > If unification didn't count as a criterion for explanation
> > unless we unify every phenomenon in the world in one shot,
> > science couldn't get anywhere.
>
> Right, which is why you shouldn't hold my hypothetically successful
> supernatural explanation to an unreasonably high standard of
> "success". So what exactly did you mean by "unifies the
> phenomenon with others"?
It means a hypothesis for the cause of some mystery phenomenon
also implies some other unexplained phenomenon will occur. For
instance, we hypothesize that light comes in fixed size lumps. This
implies that electrons won't spiral into atomic nuclei and release an
infinite amount of light, and it also implies that a bright light beam
hitting a photocell won't make the electrons fly out any faster than
a dim beam. Two previously unexplained and apparently unrelated
observations both follow from the same hypothesis.
> > > ["goddidit"] is quite tested in the sense that it is 100% right in
> > > predicting when these miracles occur (i.e. whenever priests will
> > > them), while no natural theory can predict them at all.
> >
> > That's not a prediction.
>
> Father Jones announces that tomorrow he will perform miracle X.
> The hypothetical supernatural theory then produces the statement
> that tomorrow miracle X will happen, while the naturalist-mysterian
> theory is silent. The next day, miracle X happens. How is that
> not a prediction?
I meant the _class_ of events isn't predicted. Of course
individual members of the class are predicted, but "more of the same"
isn't a prediction specific to the goddidit hypothesis -- it also
follows from the "The future will resemble the past" postulate, which
is a default assumption in science. Inference to best explanation is
great when you have one, but failing that, science is always prepared
to fall back on induction. Why do you say the naturalist theory is
silent? Anybody in your scenario who insists after 10,000 years that
there must be an unknown but natural reason why all those crucifixes
appear will predict the next one just as confidently as a theist, on
the grounds that whatever the cause may be, it will probably keep
operating. The point of prediction is to _test_ theories, by finding
a point on which competing theories _disagree_.
> > According to your scenario, _first_ we observed that priests could
> > make this happen, and _then_ people said it was because goddidit.
>
> Newton first saw an apple fall, and then said gravity did it. Does
> that mean his theory of gravity makes no predictions?
What do you think Newton's theory says, "Stuff falls because of
'gravity'."? His theory predicts that if you plug the known distance
to the moon, the known period of its revolution, and the height of an
apple tree branch into a certain formula, you'll get the time it takes
for an apple to fall. That wasn't known before he discovered it.
> > > Are you saying that there is no conceivable case in which a deity
> > > exists and has observable consequences and is the best explanation
> > > for those consequences?
> >
> > Heck no
>
> So, to clarify, you agree that there is a conceivable case in which
> a deity exists and has observable consequences and is the best
> explanation for those consequences?
Certainly not. You keep making inferences that aren't remotely
justified by the evidence. :-) I'm taking no position on whether
such a case could occur, because I don't have a definition of "deity"
to work with that's capable of partitioning the set of possible beings
into deities and nondeities. The first requirement for a legitimate
theory is clarity.
> > > Such a notion of being makes it hopelessly indeterminable.
> >
> > Yes. Some concepts don't support determination of their entire
> > extensions
>
> My point is not merely that all existents could not be enumerated,
> or that some corner cases would be hard to determine. My point is
> that such a notion of "being" makes it impossible to rebut the
> proposition that an arbitrary thing (e.g. Santa Claus) exists.
"Santa Claus exists." isn't well-formed. Existence should be
ascribed to properties, not things. If you give a list of properties
you take as defining what it means for something to be an example of
some sort of thing, (e.g. _a_ Santa Claus) then one can easily rebut
the proposition for many such lists. One simply checks to see if the
properties are mutually incompatible. As Buck Field wrote,
"The Great Circular Triangle is easily disproven because it has
mutually exclusive characteristics, and therefore cannot exist.
The Damning Offenders to Hell for Eternity God of Justice has
them too, and is likewise disproven."
> > > Can you tell me what *is* standard usage [for "exists"]?
> >
> > Sure. I'll point out the concept it stands for when somebody
> > uses it.
>
> (I would expect such evasiveness from JH, but not you...)
> I'm not asking for instances,
I respect you too. I didn't evade anything. Instances are what
determines meaning; they're the usage definitions try to model.
> since they are everywhere (like "*is*" above or "are" in this
> sentence).
So you were using them in the conventional sense, and not in the
sense of your causality-definition? Why then are you trying to stop
everybody else from using them that way?
> I'm asking if you've got a better definition than the ones I've
> mentioned.
You are _now_; you didn't before. You seem to be under the
impression that usage should follow definitions rather than vice
versa. Usage was around for thousands of years before anybody ever
thought of defining a word. It's okay to use concepts we haven't
figured out how to define.
But since you want a definition, I'll give it a shot. (But the
fact that people have a different concept in mind from your proposed
definition has been empirically established. So if my attempt is no
good, that doesn't mean you're right and the concept you object to
doesn't exist; it just means I'm not a brilliant lexicographer. :-)
People make mental models of stuff, but the stuff doesn't have
to match any particular model. The stuff can do anything it wants,
so to speak. Since it can do anything it wants, as long as a model
doesn't make contradictory assertions, the stuff can match it.
("Anything it wants" may match either of two contradictory assertions,
but any relation the stuff may have to _both_ won't satisfy what
people mean by "match".)
Some models take the form of graphs with vertices mapping to
stuff and edges mapping to cause-effect relations among stuff. In
some such graphs the edges collectively form paths connecting every
vertex to every other; in other graphs they don't. The stuff might
match one (or more) of the former or the latter. (Or it might match
no graph model at all.)
"There exists an X with property P" means you have a graph model
in mind, and you have an algorithm in mind that partitions vertices
(or sets of vertices) into "P" and "not-P" classes, and the algorithm
outputs "P" when given at least one input, and the stuff happens to
match the model.
> > > The only elements of non-circularity we find above are: verifiability,
> > > knowability, recognizability, understandability, presence in the
> > > universe, and concreteness/physicality. [..]
> >
> > If so, the lexicographers botched their job.
>
> So you disagree not only with my definition but also with those
> of all the lexicographers I could find? :-)
For an atheist, you appeal to authority quite a lot. :-) This
isn't about me and my "disagreement" with them. I _exhibited_ defects
in the definitions (as characterized by you above). It's not me you
have to deal with, it's the _defects_. Or fail to deal with, as the
case may be.
> And yet you're still sure that you have a different and better (but
> secret?) way to describe "standard usage"? :-)
Where did you get that? I offered an example, not a description.
I observed that standard usage doesn't match their definition, which
tries to model it. I'm _not_ sure I can describe it better. You don't
have to have a better theory to show that an existing theory fails.
> > You can't settle the immaterial-soul question by word games,
> > [such as] defining "exist" as requiring concreteness/physicality
>
> Right, which is why I propose to settle it by requiring causal
> relatedness.
That hardly settles it. The immaterial-soul theory is quite
specific that soul-events cause physical events and physical events
cause soul-events. That's how two souls carry on a conversation.
> > If you regard the notion as useless, feel free not to use it. Do
> > not feel free to assume no one else uses it.
>
> I'm not saying they don't use it, I'm just saying (as you say about
> "supernatural") that they are confused when they use it. As you
> wrote: "I've noticed whenever people attempt to explain what they
> _mean_, by giving _criteria_ rather than examples, they fail".
> Is it perhaps fear of such failure that prevents you from telling
> us your own criteria for "exists"? :-)
No s***, Sherlock. Was the smiley intended to express your
feeling that this is somehow a point in your favor? That they (or
maybe we) are confused and not clear on the concept doesn't mean
everyone should pretend we have a completely different concept in
mind. For either "supernatural" or "exist". That's what we're
doing if we accept an ill-considered definition.
> > or (b) jumping to a correct conclusion not supported by evidence.
>
> Then for any thing (e.g. Santa Claus) that in standard usage is
> positively considered not to exist, this option would make that
> thing's existence irrefutable.
If by "Santa Claus" you mean "a" Santa-like being in a detached
part of the multiverse, it's existence _is_ irrefutable. Go ahead
and try to prove there's no such thing without doing armchair physics.
If you mean "the" actual Santa Claus of Earth-legend, then whether
"exist" requires causal interaction is moot. Causality is required
whether it's part of what's understood by "exist" or not, because
causal interaction is part of what's understood by "the" Santa Claus.
Santa brings kids presents, after all.
> > if they call the inhabitants of the other segment "non-existent",
> > they're making a false statement.
>
> Only because you stipulate that those inhabitants "exist"
Only for the purpose of exploring that scenario. The scenario
exists. The stuff might match it. If you reject it a priori you're
doing armchair physics.
> -- without saying what that means. :-)
At risk of talking to deaf ears, you know what the concept means
well enough to use it yourself. So why the bejesus shouldn't I get to
rely on that?
> > > > "No non-interacting parallel universes exist" is an unfalsifiable
> > > > synthetic statement, and making it analytic by redefining "exist"
> > > > doesn't settle it
> > >
> > > A statement like that whose truth or falsity seemingly has no possible
> > > consequences is hard to consider as having any content whatsoever.
> >
> > George Orwell [called such a move] "Newspeak".
>
> All I'm doing here is invoking the Verifiability Principle, which
> in philosophy is called "positivism". Calling my move Orwellian
> is little more than an ad hominem.
This from the guy who compared _me_ to JH. By snipping what you
snipped you've completely altered the meaning of what I wrote, and of
what you wrote that I was responding to. Here's how the exchange
really went:
> A statement like that whose truth or falsity seemingly has no
> possible consequences is hard to consider as having any content
> whatsoever. Defining "exist" to make it analytic seems like a
> useful way to get such useless statements off the table.
George Orwell coined a word for the practice of enforcing
someone's preferences about what concepts other people think
about by redefining words and restricting language: "Newspeak".
Invoking the Verifiability Principle isn't what I said Orwell called
"Newspeak". Positivism is what you're doing if you choose not to
consider certain statements. It's Newspeak when you try to _push_
that choice on others by _taking their words away from them_. When I
call that Orwellian, it's not an ad hominem, it's criticism. Applying
your own definition of a word to what others say even though that's
not what they mean by it, on the grounds that you think what they _do_
mean is confused or philosophically unsound, is putting words in their
mouths.
> Sherlock Holmes doesn't exist, but the the character of Sherlock
> Holmes does exist. The character of Sherlock Holmes has causal
> relations with existing things, but Sherlock Holmes does not.
> Sherlock Holmes has the same status as a parallel universe.
If Sherlock Holmes were real he'd have a predictable effect on
the earth; we'd keep hearing about crimes getting solved in spite of
the staggering cluelessness of Scotland Yard or something. :-) Since
it's not happening, we can tell he's not real. If a parallel universe
is real it doesn't have any effect on the earth, nor would one expect
it to. That's not the same status.
> > He can say "That's unfalsifiable."
>
> Then by what criteria could Rick ever assign anything to the
> category of (not existing) instead of to the category of
> (existing but can never be the best explanation for the evidence)?
Either contradictory putative attributes or a low Bayesian prior
probability. I.e., implausibility.
> Indeed, how can he ever assign anything to the category of
> (existing) instead of to the category (not existing but is the
> best explanation for the evidence)?
Well, since noncontradictory attributes don't prove existence,
his best bet would be to go with implausibility. If a hypothesis
explains, predicts and unifies enough, it seems improbable that the
universe would coincidentally make something that doesn't exist seem
to do such a good job.
> Operationally, he would have to use the paired categories
> inseparably.
Hardly. There are all sorts of unfalsifiable hypotheses that
flunk the laugh test. But there are some that pass it -- parallel
universes being the prime example. Why shouldn't people make that
distinction if they find it interesting?
Brian Holtz
> It's foolish to prefer "intelligent improbability reducer" to
> "improbability reducer" because it's less likely.
Who can you cite as saying that (A) is more likely than (A or B)?
> There's no reason to prefer
> "intelligent improbability reducer" to "unintelligent improbability
> reducer" because you have no data pointing to intelligence.
This indeed is the heart of the matter, regardless of the facile
observation that "improbability reducer" is more likely than
"intelligent improbability reducer". :-)
I agree the data don't compel the conclusion of intelligent design,
but I don't agree they rule it out. There are still around 20 fundamental
dimensionless constants along with the various laws and edge conditions
of cosmology, and reasonable people can argue that many of these
seem tuned to allow life. One such list of 18 tunings is at
http://www.reasons.org/resources/papers/astroevid.html,
though I bet some of those can already be explained either
by anthropic arguments (e.g 10, 12) or as strict consequences (e.g 17)
of some other tuning.
> > > even though you have an alternative hypothesis
> > > that does have a case for being more likely than not.
> >
> > Is this alternative (B) or (A or B)?
>
> In this case it's (A or B or C or D), where A is an intelligent
> improbability reducer, B is an unintelligent improbability reducer,
> C is other ways to implement intelligence in other kinds of physics,
> and D is parallel universes.
That's an uninteresting "alternative" because it includes A. The
interesting alternative is (B or C or D). Is it completely foolish
to say (A) is more likely than (B or C or D)?
> > I personally would bet on (B), but it's not (yet) completely foolish
> > to bet on (A).
>
> That's not completely foolish -- [..] but it's no excuse to mistake
> a premise for a conclusion derived by reasoning.
I'm of course not saying that the evidence and argument for (A)
are irrefutable. I'm merely disagreeing with your apparent assertion
that the evidence is non-existent and the argument is completely
fallacious.
> > If it were, then you can be sure that (B) would not be phrased as
> > "some unknown other explanation". :-)
>
> It isn't. The unintelligent improbability reducer has already
> been expanded into "the not-yet-discovered unity of what we currently
> think of as different laws, or some unknown other explanation".
"Not yet discovered" is close enough to "some unknown other
explanation" that I wouldn't want to try to defend your move
here against a theist charge of hand-waving. :-)
> it's not obvious that a possible explanation
> deserves a boost in our estimate of its probability merely because
> we're able to think of it.
A theist could just as easily say that an unknown explanation doesn't
deserve a boost merely because we haven't yet been able to think of it.
Thinking of (A) is of course necessary for assigning it any significant
probability, but I don't see anybody arguing that it's sufficient.
> No, the weakest is the "Transcendental Argument for God". The
> argument from design was the best they had, but Darwin shot it down.
> The argument from fine-tuning of physics is not the same argument
> as the argument from design, and it's weaker than the AfD was.
It's still an argument from design, only it's based on a whole lot
less (but far more subtle) design. Darwin gave the argument from
design what I think is a fatal wound, but it's not dead yet (unlike
e.g. the Anthropological argument).
> they are all too weak to qualify as justification for an
> inference.
I agree the argument from design does not (and will likely never)
have compelling force, but I still say it's different from the
others in that we haven't put the last nail in its coffin.
(You'll know we have when there exists rebuttal explanations for
the coincidences like those listed by the theist I cited.)
> "hypothesis A" is as
> overspecified for the task of accounting for the data at hand as
> "96 degrees" is for accounting for the evaporation of some water.
Not at all. In your taxonomy of hypotheses you have only four
phyla, whereas there are any number of temperature species that can
account for evaporation.
> > it (i.e. the current apparent design and the current absence
> > of such a demonstration) is merely a reason not to consider such
> > an inference to be completely foolish.
>
> So you can't exhibit a reason for the inference but you think
> inferring it without reason isn't completely foolish?
The "apparent design" is of course itself the prima facie reason
theists give for inferring a designer. If there were absolutely no
reason for a proposed inference, then of course that inference would
be completely foolish.
Brian Holtz
> My criteria aren't "understand everything" and
> "predict everything". They're "understand something" and "predict
> something".
The miraculous priest theory satisfies those criteria.
> > So what exactly did you mean by "unifies the
> > phenomenon with others"?
>
> It means a hypothesis for the cause of some mystery phenomenon
> also implies some other unexplained phenomenon will occur.
Are you saying that if a theory doesn't predict and explain some
other phenomenon previously thought to be unrelated, then the theory
cannot be considered a successful explanation of the original
phenomenon?
> > > > while no natural theory can predict them at all.
> > >
> > > That's not a prediction.
> >
> > Father Jones announces [..]
> > The next day, miracle X happens. How is that not a prediction?
>
> I meant the _class_ of events isn't predicted
That depends on who's defining the class. What principled method
of defining event classes makes this not a prediction?
> Why do you say the naturalist theory is silent?
Because no theory exists that can predict the phenomena without
making reference to the will of the priest.
> Anybody in your scenario who insists after 10,000 years that
> there must be an unknown but natural reason why all those crucifixes
> appear will predict the next one just as confidently as a theist
Only if he includes the will of the priest as part of his unknown
but "natural" reason. Of course, such a "reason" is by my definition
supernatural, but you dodge this conclusion by claiming that my
definition (and all others you've seen) is unclear. Are you also
claiming positively that a clear definition of supernatural is
impossible (or, equivalently for our purposes, that supernaturality
is by proper definition impossible or oxymoronic)?
> > > According to your scenario, _first_ we observed that priests could
> > > make this happen, and _then_ people said it was because goddidit.
> >
> > Newton first saw an apple fall, and then said gravity did it. Does
> > that mean his theory of gravity makes no predictions?
>
> His theory predicts that if you plug [..] the height of an
> apple tree branch into a certain formula, you'll get the time
> it takes for an apple to fall. That wasn't known before he
> discovered it.
The priest theory predicts that if you plug in the announced
intention of the priest, you'll get the amount by which conservation
laws are about to be violated. Before this theory, it wasn't known
whether or by how much conservation would be violated.
> > So, to clarify, you agree that there is a conceivable case in which
> > a deity exists and has observable consequences and is the best
> > explanation for those consequences?
>
> Certainly not. [..] I'm taking no position on whether
> such a case could occur, because I don't have a definition of "deity"
> to work with that's capable of partitioning the set of possible beings
> into deities and nondeities.
Are you claiming that no such definition is possible? And do you worry
at all that you'll seem to be disingenuously ducking the issue by
stubbornly claiming that millenia of philosophical debate has been
about a concept that you now claim is too ill-defined (and undefinable?)
to justify taking a position?
Let me operationalize this somewhat. Do you agree that there is
a conceivable case in which something exists and has observable
consequences and is the best explanation for those consequences
and would be considered by most people to be a "deity"? And before
you cite cases of advanced UFO super-science or whatever, can you
cut to the chase and tell us what is the closest case you could
imagine to the traditional human monotheistic notion of a deity?
> > such a notion of "being" makes it impossible to rebut the
> > proposition that an arbitrary thing (e.g. Santa Claus) exists.
>
> one can easily rebut
> the proposition for many such [things]. One simply checks to see if
> [its alleged] properties are mutually incompatible.
Are you saying Santa Claus has mutually incompatible properties?
If so, then substitute for him any non-self-contradictory but
non-existent thing, and address my point. Viz.,
such a notion of "being" makes it impossible to rebut
the proposition that an arbitrary non-self-contradictory thing
(e.g. Santa Claus or whatever) exists.
> > > > Can you tell me what *is* standard usage [for "exists"]?
> > >
> > > Sure. I'll point out the concept it stands for when somebody
> > > uses it.
> >
> > I'm not asking for instances,
>
> Instances are what determines meaning
But instances are not all there is to meaning. In my book I define
meaning as "the context-sensitive connotation ultimately established
by the relevant denotation and use". Connotation (i.e. associated
properties and concepts) is ultimately more important (for philosophy,
not lexicography) than denotation.
> they're the usage definitions try to model.
Can definitions never have any prescriptive utility? Can the exercise
of precisely defining something never lead to new insight? I think not.
> > since they are everywhere (like "*is*" above or "are" in this
> > sentence).
>
> So you were using them in the conventional sense, and not in the
> sense of your causality-definition?
Those senses overlap enough that either works for the present purposes.
The non-overlap only matters in corner cases such as parallel or
fictional universes, and not at all when I straightforwardly ask
you "what is standard usage?".
> Why then are you trying to stop
> everybody else from using them that way?
They can use "is" and "exist" all they want in the conventional sense
for conventional cases. But when they talk about unconventional
cases like gods and say (as Rick did)
god-did-it is never a better explanation than "I don't know"
I will point out the implications of their statements.
Which are (again): Either Rick is claiming gods are impossible,
or he has no defense against people who say (unparsimoniously)
that Santa Claus exists and causes Christmas presents and also
arranges it so that his existence is never the best explanation
for Christmas presents. So my conclusion that Rick is claiming
gods are impossible is based not on my dialect, but on my
presumption that he wouldn't want to embrace a silly ontology.
> You seem to be under the impression that usage should follow
> definitions rather than vice versa.
Philosophical usage should follow precise definitions, and
precise definitions should follow from and clarify common usage.
> It's okay to use concepts we haven't figured out how to define.
Why is it, then, that when I use the concepts of "supernatural" and
"deity", you (when it suits you :-) act as though you don't know
what I mean?
> People make mental models of stuff, but the stuff doesn't have
> to match any particular model. The stuff can do anything it wants,
> so to speak. Since it can do anything it wants, as long as a model
> doesn't make contradictory assertions, the stuff can match it.
> ("Anything it wants" may match either of two contradictory assertions,
> but any relation the stuff may have to _both_ won't satisfy what
> people mean by "match".)
>
> Some models take the form of graphs with vertices mapping to
> stuff and edges mapping to cause-effect relations among stuff. In
> some such graphs the edges collectively form paths connecting every
> vertex to every other; in other graphs they don't. The stuff might
> match one (or more) of the former or the latter. (Or it might match
> no graph model at all.)
>
> "There exists an X with property P" means you have a graph model
> in mind, and you have an algorithm in mind that partitions vertices
> (or sets of vertices) into "P" and "not-P" classes, and the algorithm
> outputs "P" when given at least one input,
So far this sounds like logical existence, not ontological existence.
> and the stuff happens to match the model.
It appears you have just defined existence as stuffness,
which hardly solves the problem. :-)
> > > > The only elements of non-circularity we find above are:
verifiability,
> > > > knowability, recognizability, understandability, presence in the
> > > > universe, and concreteness/physicality. [..]
> > >
> > > If so, the lexicographers botched their job.
> >
> > So you disagree not only with my definition but also with those
> > of all the lexicographers I could find? :-)
>
> For an atheist, you appeal to authority quite a lot. :-)
To determine "standard usage", what else can one do but appeal to
the habits of the linguistic community, especially as recorded
by lexicographers?
> This isn't about me and my "disagreement" with them. I _exhibited_
defects
> in the definitions. It's not me you have to deal with, it's the _defects_.
You are the one who called my definition "non-standard". When I show
that the non-circular elements of all the published definitions
I can find resonate quite well with my definition, you call those
definitions "defective". I agree they are defective in a perscriptive
sense (in ways that my definition corrects), but this has nothing
to do with their correctness in a descriptive sense. What
lexicographic or other evidence do you have to show that the "standard
usage" of 'existent' (and related words be/real/actual) bottoms out
as anything else than what I say it does (causal relatedness)? Note
that this doesn't require that English speakers recognize that
'existence' bottoms out as 'causal relatedness'. It merely requires that
every accurate description of what speakers mean by 'existence' bottoms
out (perhaps indirectly) as 'causal relatedness'.
> I observed that standard usage doesn't match their definition
You did? You wrote:
> the lexicographers botched their job. Most of the above
> elements belong to epistemology, while "exist" and "being" belong to
> ontology. You can't settle the immaterial-soul question by word games,
> which defining "exist" as requiring concreteness/physicality tries to
> do. "Presence in the universe" merely shoves the problem off onto the
> definition of "universe".
Where is there an observation here about "standard usage"?
> > > You can't settle the immaterial-soul question by word games,
> > > [such as] defining "exist" as requiring concreteness/physicality
> >
> > Right, which is why I propose to settle it by requiring causal
> > relatedness.
>
> That hardly settles it. The immaterial-soul theory is quite
> specific that soul-events cause physical events and physical events
> cause soul-events.
I'm not sure what you mean by "the immaterial-soul question" here.
The issue I see is how to decide whether souls or other purported
immaterial things "exist". Dictionary definitions of "exist" often
cash out as concreteness/physicality/materiality. I agree that such
a criterion is a worthless way to decide whether souls etc. "exist".
As an alternative, I propose the criterion of whether they are
causally related to our universe. I think my criterion *can* help
settle the issue. Now, if anybody adamantly insists souls etc. "exist"
even though they are causally unrelated to our universe, I'll make
no sudden movements, back slowly away and and say in reassuring
tones that we'll have to agree to disagree. ;-)
> > I'm not saying they don't use it, I'm just saying (as you say about
> > "supernatural") that they are confused when they use it.
>
> That they (or maybe we) are confused and not clear on the concept
> doesn't mean everyone should pretend we have a completely
> different concept in mind.
I make no such pretense, especially since the lexicographic data
I cite suggest that in fact standard usage can be summed
up and clarified as I do. So I am just pointing out that people
must either clarify their concept along the lines identified, or
embrace what appears to be an untenable implication of not doing so.
> > > or (b) jumping to a correct conclusion not supported by evidence.
> >
> > Then for any thing (e.g. Santa Claus) that in standard usage is
> > positively considered not to exist, this option would make that
> > thing's existence irrefutable.
>
> If by "Santa Claus" you mean "a" Santa-like being in a detached
> part of the multiverse, it's existence _is_ irrefutable.
If by "detached" you mean will never have had any possible causal
relationship with us, then its "existence" is indeed in principle
without any possible observable consequences. But if by "detached" you
mean something weaker, then its existence would in fact have
possible observable consequences and would in principle be
refutable.
> If you mean "the" actual Santa Claus of Earth-legend, [..]
> causal interaction is part of what's understood by "the" Santa Claus.
Not for my hypothetical Santa Claus who arranges that his
existence is never the best explanation for Christmas presents
(or any other phenomena). That's the very Santa whose "existence"
I say Rick has no argument against.
> > Only because you stipulate that those inhabitants "exist"
>
> Only for the purpose of exploring that scenario. The scenario
> exists. The stuff might match it. If you reject it a priori you're
> doing armchair physics.
I'm not sure what your point is here. You originally wrote:
> if reality contains two causally disconnected segments [..]
> then the inhabitants of each segment would have to call the
> other "non-existent", even though they're both part of the whole.
My point is that it wouldn't matter if "reality" (whatever that might mean)
contained things that we would mistakenly say it doesn't contain
if those things can never have any possible causal relationship with us.
So if you're looking for an uncomfortable implication of my definition, keep
looking. :-)
> > > > > "No non-interacting parallel universes exist" is an unfalsifiable
> > > > > synthetic statement, and making it analytic by redefining "exist"
> > > > > doesn't settle it
> > > >
> > > > A statement like that whose truth or falsity seemingly has no
possible
> > > > consequences is hard to consider as having any content whatsoever.
>
> Positivism is what you're doing if you choose not to
> consider certain statements.
No, it's stronger: positivism asserts that certain statements
are propositionally meaningless.
> It's Newspeak when you try to _push_
> that choice on others by _taking their words away from them_.
If I knew how to "take words from" people, then I would have already
taken enough from _you_ to wrap this up. :-) I hardly think I'm
"taking words away from" anyone by pointing out that certain of their
statements have untenable implications or are propositionally
meaningless.
> Applying your own definition of a word to what others say even though
that's
> not what they mean by it, on the grounds that you think what they _do_
> mean is confused or philosophically unsound, is putting words in their
> mouths.
If pointing out the implications of what others say is "putting
words in their mouths", then I plead guilty. I'd rather spend
time debating the substance of my allegations than arguing over
whether making those allegations is rhetorically polite. Debates
about the recent course of the debate is what makes most Usenet
discussions so lame...
> > > "No non-interacting parallel universes exist" is synthetic.
> >
> > I doubt there's a way to rephrase it that doesn't
> > give parallel universes the same status as fictional universes. [..]
> > Sherlock Holmes has the same status as a parallel universe.
I should have written: "the universe of Sherlock Holmes has the
same status as a parallel universe".
> If Sherlock Holmes were real he'd have a[n] effect [..]
> If a parallel universe is real it doesn't have any effect [..]
> That's not the same status.
If the fictional universe of Sherlock Holmes were by some amazing
coincidence a "real" non-interacting "parallel universe", it would
not have any effects. A fictional universe would have precisely
the same effect-causing status as a non-interacting parallel
universe, and should therefor be considered to have the same
ontological status.
> > Then by what criteria could Rick ever assign anything to the
> > category of (not existing) instead of to the category of
> > (existing but can never be the best explanation for the evidence)?
>
> a low Bayesian prior probability. I.e., implausibility.
How does Rick determine a priori that it's implausible that a
deity could exist and therefor that
god-did-it is never a better explanation than "I don't know".
> If a hypothesis
> explains, predicts and unifies enough, it seems improbable that the
> universe would coincidentally make something that doesn't exist seem
> to do such a good job.
How do you determine the probability or improbability of
such a coincidence? You have to pick your ontology (i.e. decide how
to decide what counts as real) before you can start drawing
conclusions from the patterns and frequencies you notice amongst
those things you do count as real.
> > Operationally, he would have to use the paired categories
> > inseparably.
>
> Hardly. There are all sorts of unfalsifiable hypotheses that
> flunk the laugh test.
Only if you smuggle in the hidden assumption of a parsimonious notion
of existence, and thus beg the question.
> But there are some that pass it -- parallel
> universes being the prime example.
How could one conclude that a particular parallel universe belongs
to the category of (existing) instead of to the category (not existing
but is the best explanation for the evidence)?
--
br...@holtz.org
http://humanknowledge.net
Dez Akin
> "Paul Filseth" <pg...@lsil.com> wrote:
>
> > It's foolish to prefer "intelligent improbability reducer" to
> > "improbability reducer" because it's less likely.
>
> Who can you cite as saying that (A) is more likely than (A or B)?
>
> > There's no reason to prefer
> > "intelligent improbability reducer" to "unintelligent improbability
> > reducer" because you have no data pointing to intelligence.
>
> This indeed is the heart of the matter, regardless of the facile
> observation that "improbability reducer" is more likely than
> "intelligent improbability reducer". :-)
>
> I agree the data don't compel the conclusion of intelligent design,
> but I don't agree they rule it out. There are still around 20 fundamental
> dimensionless constants along with the various laws and edge conditions
> of cosmology, and reasonable people can argue that many of these
> seem tuned to allow life. One such list of 18 tunings is at
> http://www.reasons.org/resources/papers/astroevid.html,
> though I bet some of those can already be explained either
> by anthropic arguments (e.g 10, 12) or as strict consequences (e.g 17)
> of some other tuning.
There are 26 dimensionless constants thus far in the Standard Model
and General relativity.
These constants are:
Standard Model
3 coupling constants for U(1)xSU(2)xSU(3), often expressed in terms of
alpha, alpha_s and the Weinberg angle.
12 lepton- and quark masses (or better their dimensionless ratio
m_particle/m_Planck)
4 parameters of the CKM mixing matrix.
4 parameters of the CKM mixing matrix for neutrinos.
2 Higgs-parameters: The Higgs-mass and the Higgs vacuum expectation
value
Outside Standard Model
GR: 1 gravity coupling constant G
Some of these constants have very little to do with everyday life...
altering some of the neutrino masses by large margins or some of the
CKM mixing matrix isn't a great disaster. Some are 'fine tuned' but
our theories for gravity and QFT are incomplete as of yet.
For an interesting look at the reasons that the universe is the way it
is:
http://nedwww.ipac.caltech.edu/level5/Hogan/Hogan_contents.html
The dimensionless constants in the current model of reality are by no
means the only mixing that allows life to form nor necissarily the
most advantageous.
A designer isn't required for the universe to produce life, just a set
or subset of reality that follows the rules of the Standard model (or
rather what will come to replace it) where all the initial
conditions/dimensionless constants are realized; Which is a bit
simpler than an 'designer' existing outside of space or time playing
with reality in complex messy ways until something blinks and says
'why am I here.'
Paul Filseth
> > It's foolish to prefer "intelligent improbability reducer" to
> > "improbability reducer" because it's less likely.
>
> Who can you cite as saying that (A) is more likely than (A or B)?
Huh? Nobody says it's more likely. The point is, lots of people
prefer it -- they argue for (A), while they never give (A or B) a
moment's thought. They obviously prefer (A) on some basis other than
probabilistic reasoning.
> > There's no reason to prefer "intelligent improbability reducer"
> > to "unintelligent improbability reducer" because you have no
> > data pointing to intelligence.
>
> This indeed is the heart of the matter, regardless of the facile
> observation that "improbability reducer" is more likely than
> "intelligent improbability reducer". :-)
You keep saying "facile" and using smileys in bizarre places. Are
you trying to be condescending? If so, try first reaching a position
of superiority. The heart of the matter is that what causes people to
think "a god" is a reasonable inference is faulty categorization caused
by religious propaganda. Many people divide the space of possibilities
into "a god" vs. "something else", when the nature of the problem makes
it more reasonable to divide the space into "improbability reducer"
vs. "multiple chances at the outcome". When "a god" is placed in that
framework, making its description read "intelligent improbability
reducer", it's clearly overspecified for the evidence to be explained,
just as if it had read "purple improbability reducer".
> I agree the data don't compel the conclusion of intelligent design,
> but I don't agree they rule it out.
You don't agree with whom that they rule it out? Who ever said
it was ruled out?
> There are still around 20 fundamental dimensionless constants along
> with the various laws and edge conditions of cosmology, and reasonable
> people can argue that many of these seem tuned to allow life.
They had to fit within far tighter tolerances to allow Automort's
great-uncle to be struck by lightning. Why is it that the people who
believe in anthropic reasoning always say "life", and never stuff like
that?
> > > > even though you have an alternative hypothesis
> > > > that does have a case for being more likely than not.
> > >
> > > Is this alternative (B) or (A or B)?
> >
> > In this case it's (A or B or C or D), where A is an intelligent
> > improbability reducer, B is an unintelligent improbability reducer,
> > C is other ways to implement intelligence in other kinds of physics,
> > and D is parallel universes.
>
> That's an uninteresting "alternative" because it includes A.
That you call this alternative "uninteresting" is a value-judgment
on your part that a smiley is your argument for. (A or B or C or D) is
the most it's reasonable to infer from narrow tolerances.
> The interesting alternative is (B or C or D).
Sorry, by your value-judgment criterion, that's uninteresting too.
A is a subset of C and D as well. A god is an intelligence implemented
some way other than our physics, and a parallel universe is stuff that
didn't result from our big bang, such as, say, a god.
> Is it completely foolish to say (A) is more likely than (B or C or D)?
We'll take that as "(A) is more likely than (B or C-A or D-A)".
It's completely foolish to _infer_ it based on no evidence. If someone
wants to say it as a premise, he can suit himself -- priors are based
on intuition.
> > > I personally would bet on (B), but it's not (yet) completely
> > > foolish to bet on (A).
> >
> > That's not completely foolish -- [..] but it's no excuse to mistake
> > a premise for a conclusion derived by reasoning.
>
> I'm of course not saying that the evidence and argument for (A)
> are irrefutable. I'm merely disagreeing with your apparent assertion
> that the evidence is non-existent
Present some. What observation favors "intelligent improbability
reducer" over "unintelligent improbability reducer"? ("It looks really
improbable." doesn't qualify.)
> and the argument is completely fallacious.
The conclusion does not follow from its premises. What makes an
argument fallacious if not this?
> > The unintelligent improbability reducer has already been expanded
> > into "the not-yet-discovered unity of what we currently think of
> > as different laws, or some unknown other explanation".
>
> "Not yet discovered" is close enough to "some unknown other
> explanation" that I wouldn't want to try to defend your move
> here against a theist charge of hand-waving. :-)
It's not close to that at all -- the history of science is full
of unifications. Hypothesizing more of them is just extrapolation from
experience.
> > it's not obvious that a possible explanation deserves a boost in
> > our estimate of its probability merely because we're able to think
> > of it.
>
> A theist could just as easily say that an unknown explanation doesn't
> deserve a boost merely because we haven't yet been able to think of
> it.
But nobody's giving it one. Neither possibility has earned a
boost so neither gets it. I'm not making an inference that depends on
giving one possibility of many a boost; your theist is.
> > The argument from design was the best they had, but Darwin shot it
> > down. The argument from fine-tuning of physics is not the same
> > argument as the argument from design, and it's weaker than the AfD
> > was.
>
> It's still an argument from design, only it's based on a whole lot
> less (but far more subtle) design. Darwin gave the argument from
> design what I think is a fatal wound, but it's not dead yet
Well, we can label things whatever we like, but there's a
difference between the arguments. In Paley's argument, biological
structure implies biological function, and then he claimed function
implies design. This is what Darwin shot down -- he showed there's
a way to get function without design.* The problem in the anthropic
argument is to get from structure to function. We get hints that eyes
are probably for helping us see because they show up where vision is
useful -- things that wouldn't benefit from seeing, like trees and
rocks, tend not to have them. But what is there in physics suggesting
that the constants are "for" life? Most of the matter in the universe
is non-living and it follows exactly the same constants as living
matter.
(* This, incidentally, supplies yet another face for option B -- it's
possible that universes reproduce with mutating physics, and life forms
tend to accidentally do things to cause universe reproduction events.
So the constants evolve towards those most optimal for life.)
> (unlike e.g. the Anthropological argument).
What argument is that?
> > "hypothesis A" is as overspecified for the task of accounting for
> > the data at hand as "96 degrees" is for accounting for the
> > evaporation of some water.
>
> Not at all. In your taxonomy of hypotheses you have only four
> phyla, whereas there are any number of temperature species that can
> account for evaporation.
Hypothesis A isn't a phylum -- it's a species. Let me put the
hypotheses in one-to-one correspondence:
Evaporated water Narrow tolerances
... ...
90 Parallel universe type Y
91 Parallel universe type Z
92 Unification-based improbability reducer
93 Evolutionary improbability reducer
94 Equilibrium-based improbability reducer
95 Purple improbability reducer
96 Intelligent improbability reducer
97 Equine improbability reducer (bbhh)
...
103 Intelligence before stars formed
104 Intelligence after stars burn out
105 Intelligence in alternate physics type A
106 Intelligence in Turing Machines in "Life"
107 Intelligence directly in "Life"
108 Intelligence in alternate physics type C
...
> > So you can't exhibit a reason for the inference but you think
> > inferring it without reason isn't completely foolish?
>
> The "apparent design" is of course itself the prima facie reason
> theists give for inferring a designer. If there were absolutely no
> reason for a proposed inference, then of course that inference would
> be completely foolish.
There is no apparent design in physics. Apparent design is what
you have when you see an architect drawing blueprints for a building.
Short of that, design is inferred or it's assumed; it's not apparent.
What there is, in physics, is narrow tolerances for certain classes
of phenomena, one of which has been selected for discussion on the
basis of unspecified criteria that include its narrow tolerance. The
reason theists call that "apparent design" is that they're biased in
favor of design as an account for narrow tolerances.
Paul Filseth
> > Certainly not. [..] I'm taking no position on whether such a
> > case could occur, because I don't have a definition of "deity" to
> > work with that's capable of partitioning the set of possible beings
> > into deities and nondeities.
>
> Are you claiming that no such definition is possible? And do you
> worry at all that you'll seem to be disingenuously ducking the issue
> by stubbornly claiming that millenia of philosophical debate has
> been about a concept that you now claim is too ill-defined (and
> undefinable?) to justify taking a position?
You just said "disingenuous" one time too many. If I don't
satisfy your standards, go talk to somebody who does.
Brian Holtz
makes the physical constants more likely than they appear.
B: Some unknown other explanation
makes the physical constants more likely than they appear.
"Paul Filseth" <pg...@lsil.com> wrote:
> they argue for (A), while they never give (A or B) a
> moment's thought. They obviously prefer (A) on some basis other than
> probabilistic reasoning.
Yes, the choice between an epistemic commitment to (A) instead of
(A or B) has to do with the relative likelihoods of A and B, and not
the greater absolute likelihood of (A or B).
> Many people divide the space of possibilities
> into "a god" vs. "something else", when the nature of the problem makes
> it more reasonable to divide the space into "improbability reducer"
> vs. "multiple chances at the outcome".
The reason why the possibility space is typically divided into
"a god" vs. "something else" in discussions like this is that
the discussion is about whether god exists. :-)
> it's clearly overspecified for the evidence to be explained,
> just as if it had read "purple improbability reducer".
The analogy doesn't hold, because there are no grounds to debate the
relative likelihood of purple vs. non-purple improbability reducers.
> Why is it that the people who
> believe in anthropic reasoning always say "life", and never stuff like
> [someone being struck by lightning]?
Because anthropic reasoning is about intelligent observers (which are
a natural product of life), and not about lightning strikes.
> > > In this case it's (A or B or C or D), where A is an intelligent
> > > improbability reducer, B is an unintelligent improbability reducer,
> > > C is other ways to implement intelligence in other kinds of physics,
> > > and D is parallel universes.
>
> (A or B or C or D) is
> the most it's reasonable to infer from narrow tolerances.
I agree that there is as yet no dispositive case to be made either for
or against any of these four possibilities. I predict that over time
the case for B and C will strengthen while the case for A collects more
dust. Progress may also be made on a philosophical argument for D, along
the lines of our universe not being a parallel physical one but merely
a logically possible one.
> A is a subset of C and D as well.
Perhaps, since you seemed to chang my definition of A. Your C and D are
simply ways in which our physical constants might turn out not to be
fine-tuned at all.
> > I'm of course not saying that the evidence and argument for (A)
> > are irrefutable. I'm merely disagreeing with your apparent assertion
> > that the evidence is non-existent
>
> Present some.
I did: http://www.reasons.org/resources/papers/astroevid.html
> What observation favors "intelligent improbability
> reducer" over "unintelligent improbability reducer"?
If by "observation" you mean "empirical observation", then note that
while empirical observations are the foundation of such "evidence and
argument", they are not its totality.
> > It's still an argument from design, only it's based on a whole lot
> > less (but far more subtle) design.
>
> [..] But what is there in physics suggesting
> that the constants are "for" life?
The suggestion stems from the observations that a) the only system known
to support life and intelligence is our physical universe, and
b) minor perturbations of some of our fundamental physical constants
would make known life impossible.
> Most of the matter in the universe
> is non-living and it follows exactly the same constants as living
> matter.
In the only system known to support life and intelligence, the non-living
parts are necessary consequences of the settings of the physical constants
that make life and intelligence possible.
> > (unlike e.g. the Anthropological argument).
>
> What argument is that?
That humans have a universal sense of morality and spirituality, and
that the cause of this effect is God.
> > > "hypothesis A" is as overspecified for the task of accounting for
> > > the data at hand as "96 degrees" is for accounting for the
> > > evaporation of some water.
> >
> > Not at all. In your taxonomy of hypotheses you have only four
> > phyla, whereas there are any number of temperature species that can
> > account for evaporation.
>
> Hypothesis A isn't a phylum -- it's a species.
A is a top-level category in our 4-way taxonomy of explanations, and
yet it's also an instance in your list that includes "theory Y",
"theory Z", "theory C", and of course a "purple" theory. :-) I'll leave
it to our readers to decide whether these considerations make A
more analogous to a phylum or a species.
> design is inferred or it's assumed; it's not apparent.
> What there is, in physics, is narrow tolerances for certain classes
> of phenomena, one of which has been selected for discussion on the
> basis of unspecified criteria that include its narrow tolerance.
The criteria are: 1) intelligence, being a) who we are, b) the most
complex phenomenon in the universe, and c) what allows anthropic
reasoning to occur; and 2) life, being necessary (and perhaps sufficient)
for our intelligence to develop.
--
br...@holtz.org
http://humanknowledge.net