CIA - Squaring the Cycle

[Ralph McGehee]

[Edward Combs Jr.]

I never saw a Case-officer do ANY analysis. Generally a source falls into their lap. They get requirements from a clerk that copies from a big book... I U.S. A Airfields 1. mid west 1c. Jets 1c(5). Two engines on and on. Then they give this to the source. The source reports back and the Case-officer gives it to the clerk to se if it filled any of the requirements. The clerk types it all out for the Case-officer to sign. In Military Intelligence most time is spent trying to get equipment from(an un-named Agency) that was made before 1930 and producing multi-tabbed project folders to send off to this same un-named Agency to see if it meets with their approval. Of course CIA Case-officers have more say in what they give to the Requirements clerk. IMHO....the Case-Officer in the CIA is just as far down on the totem-pole as in MI. I think even the Desk-Officers have very little say in what get shot upstairs. it's just I think Congress should work from the Top down not from the Bottom ....................... Ralph McGehee <rmcg...@igc.org> wrote in message news:36D02EF5...@igc.org... ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---- > SQUARING THE CYCLE > Intelligence publications for eons have talked about "The >Intelligence Cycle," starting with: 1. Planning and Direction; >2. Collection; 3 Processing; 4. All Source Analysis and Production; >and, 5. Dissemination. > This theoretical cycle has very little application in reality. To >briefly document my argument -- the House of Representatives Pike >Committee retroactively evaluated CIA intelligence on six major world >developments and found that in all six cases CIA's information was >either wrong or non-existent. In more recent times we note the complete >failure of intelligence during the 25 years of the Vietnam War; plus, >the CIA was virtually the last organization to accept the collapse of >the USSR. We now ask that this agency -- that failed to predict India's >explosion of nuclear devices -- to serve as the bulwark against >international terrorism. > Correcting "the intelligence cycle" is simple in practice; but, >politically (virtually) impossible. The problem begins with the >Director of Operations -- it recruits case officers who are deficient >in analytical ability. This is not an accident -- it is done deliberately. >My arguments re this are oft-repeated, but for the skeptical I recommend >the book by former CIA top official, Duane Clarridge, "A Spy for All >Seasons." In it he documents this phenomenon. > CIA's enemies, Cuba's DGI, the USSR's KGB and East Germany's Stasi >(and probably also Vietnam's Cuc Ngien Cuu) all ran double operations >at the CIA with the greatest of ease. > Assets of all of these organizations fed false data to CIA case >officers who then forwarded that information to CIA Headquarters -- >forever polluting the system. This information was analyzed, evaluated >and formed the basis for comparing all other reporting. > The problem starts with the agent/case officer. Once this data >is recorded as the official position -- nothing can change it -- >not even an unwinnable, 25-year-long war -- and analysis, open source >information, and other data are a lost cause. > The October 1998 Signal's Magazine article "Intelligence Agency >Adjusts as Mission Possible Unfolds," outlines the advances in >the Intelligence side of the Agency in using analytical tools to >better cope with all of today's data. > The ideas and information presented in that article seem >generally plausible. But -- a big but -- analysis must start at >the level of agent contact. If you allow bad data from double or >incompetent, or corrupt agents to enter and pollute the atmosphere, >you never recover. > With analysis measuring an agent's reliability, his/her access, >and all other facts from and about the agent -- you can stop the >pollution before it begins. > One suggestion is to recruit case officers possessing analytical >ability. Clarridge suggests that such ability unduly constrains >an officer's actions. Then the alternative is to place analysts directly >in the operational process. From spotting, assessing, handling to >evaluating. Had such been the case in the USSR, East Germany, Cuba >and Vietnam, none of the enemy double agents would have survived >this analysis. The CIA relies instead on the lie detector -- that >is a joke to foreign services -- the lie detector does not work. >On the spot analysis is the only plausible alternative. > The CIA also relies on the reporting of case officers about his/her >agents and bases its promotions of case officers on the number of agent >recruitment's. This problem has been around forever. It has been noted, >criticized and continued. > Other suggestions include the use of open source information -- >included in the discussion of the Intelligence Cycle but generally >ignored in practice. My experience reading the works of Asian >revolutionaries gave me a view of the Vietnam War totally at >odds with CIA reporting. Others have recorded the deficiency in >using open source information but the CIA regards open sources as >a challenge to its officers, procedures and politicized intelligence. > I suppose the solution can be simple, de-politicize the Intelligence >Cycle, recruit and use good analysts at the operational "front," >and, demand integrity and analysis in agent evaluating, recruiting >and handling. > There seems some recognition of the above by the current leadership >of the CIA, but can it overturn the generations of personnel, procedures >and positions taken by the operating divisions? >Ralph McGehee >http://come.to/CIABASE