War In Colombia

[Ralph McGehee]

[Jorge Cano]

So let's protect the so call "Human rights" of the worst kind of drug traffickers, rapist, kidnapers
ETC. ETC.
Who is protecting the human rights of al the people affected by the guerrillas? NO ONE

> By designing,
> funding, and implementing militarized anti-drug programs, the United States
> puts assistance into the hands of human rights violators, strengthens
> militaries at the expense of civilian, democratic institutions, and
> increasingly involves itself in Colombia's brutal and intractable
> counterinsurgency war.

[hch]

Who is paying you?

 

hch

 

Ralph McGehee <rmcg...@igc.org> wrote in message news:37FB93ED...@igc.org...

>

---

>                        Opposing War
>             
>
> URGENT ACTION ALERT - OPPOSE MILITARY AID TO COLOMBIA
> Danger of Escalating U.S. Involvement in Counterinsurgency War
> http://www.wola.org/uadrugs.html
>
> Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) October 1999
>
> The United States is embarking on a dangerous new partnership with the
> Colombian army, equipping, training and providing intelligence to the army
> in the name of counternarcotics operations, with more aid on the way.
> However, this aid will only worsen the civil conflict in Colombia, and drag
> the United States further into an unwinnable counterinsurgency war.  The
> Colombian army has the worst human rights record in the hemisphere, and
> continues to actively collaborate with murderous paramilitary forces in many
> areas of the country.  In the past, the U.S. has refused to provide funding
> for the army because of human rights concerns.  Now, U.S. Drug Czar General
> Barry McCaffrey is calling for a $600 million aid package for Colombia,
> possibly including hundreds of millions for the army.
>
> Increased military assistance for Latin America will probably come up in
> Congress in the form of an emergency supplemental (an aid package that
> bypasses the normal foreign aid process)  before the end of October.  Act
> now to let Congress and the administration know that you oppose an increase
> in military aid to Colombia.
>
> Escalating aid to the Colombian army will have disastrous consequences in
> Colombia and represents a danger for the region as a whole.  By designing,

> funding, and implementing militarized anti-drug programs, the United States
> puts assistance into the hands of human rights violators, strengthens
> militaries at the expense of civilian, democratic institutions, and
> increasingly involves itself in Colombia's brutal and intractable
> counterinsurgency war.
>

> ACTION REQUEST:  ENCOURAGE YOUR MEMBERS OF CONGRESS TO:
>
> *       Oppose aid to the Colombian army.  See talking points below.
> *       Fund positive programs that will alleviate, not aggravate,
>         Colombia's crisis, including:
> *       protection programs for threatened human rights monitors and human
>         rights education;
> *       judicial reform to end impunity and drug-related corruption;
> *       consensus building programs that encourage local and national civil
>         society and governmental efforts for peace;
> *       humanitarian aid for the displaced;
> *       alternative development programs that help small coca growers switch
>         to legal crops.
>
> Call the congressional switchboard (202/224-3121) for your Senators' and
> Representatives' phone numbers and ask to speak to their foreign policy
> aides.
> _______________________________________________
> COLOMBIA OVERVIEW
>
> For more than four decades, Colombia has suffered a brutal civil war.
> Parties to Colombia's conflict rarely fight one another, and instead attack
> their enemies' alleged sympathizers - most often unarmed civilians.  The
> impact of this violence is staggering. Colombia has the third largest
> internally displaced population in the world.  Human rights monitors, labor
> unionists, peace leaders, humanitarian workers, Afro-Colombians, and
> indigenous peoples are increasingly threatened, displaced by violence,
> disappeared, and murdered.  Massacres in rural areas are a daily occurrence.
>
> All parties to the conflict - guerrillas, paramilitaries, and security
> forces - are responsible for gross violations of human rights and
> international humanitarian law.   The vast majority - more than 70% - of
> human rights violations, however, are carried out by paramilitary forces
> often operating with the support of the Colombian security forces.
>
> No one is capable of "winning" this decades-old war.  Only negotiations will
> bring an end to Colombia's conflict and tragic humanitarian emergency; only
> peace and stability will make it possible to effectively reduce drug
> production and trafficking.  Last August, President Andrés Pastrana took
> office with the promise of seeking a peaceful resolution to the conflict.
> He has met with representatives of the FARC and created a demilitarized zone
> for peace negotiations in southern Colombia.  Many questions remain about
> the political will of all parties involved to negotiate peace.  The only
> certainty is that this process will be long and complicated and will require
> the U.S. government's full support.
>
> The United States claims to support peace and development in Colombia.  In
> reality, however, U.S. policy is undermining efforts for peace.
>
> In public statements, the Clinton administration promotes human rights and
> peace and recognizes the need to provide alternatives for peasant farmers
> that want to stop growing coca.  Yet only $4 million is slated this year for
> judicial reform, human rights, and humanitarian programs, and only $5
> million is destined for alternative development.  No development aid is
> provided for peasants growing coca in southern Colombia, whose crops are
> destroyed by U.S.-funded pesticide spraying programs.   U.S. aid for
> development and human rights is less than 5% of the total aid for Colombia -
> with more than 95% destined for the security forces (most aid to date has
> been provided to the Colombian National Police).
>
> U.S. counternarcotics policies have been a complete failure.  They have
> worsened the conflict in Colombia without impacting the amount of illegal
> drugs coming into the United States.  Over the past decade, the U.S.
> government has spent a total of one billion dollars to fight drugs in
> Colombia, but drug production and trafficking continue to soar.  Despite the
> strategy's proven failure - last year Colombian coca production increased by
> 26% - some U.S. officials want to spend even more money, without openly
> debating the effectiveness or possible alternatives.  Even more troubling is
> their willingness to partner with the Colombian army and further involve our
> government in Colombia's vicious conflict as a result.
>
> Now, U.S. officials are proposing to increase aid to the Colombian military
> for what they call counternarcotics operations.   In fact, these army units
> are carrying out counterinsurgency operations.  The United States justifies
> this policy by calling Colombian guerrillas "narco-guerrillas."  In fact,
> while the guerrillas do profit by taxing drug production, many other groups
> in Colombia are much more deeply involved in drug trafficking.  According to
> the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, Colombian paramilitary organizations
> linked to the Colombian armed forces are directly involved in drug
> trafficking - a fact ignored by the current policy.  And there is no
> evidence that drug trafficking into the United States would be reduced even
> if the guerrillas could be defeated on the battlefield.
>
> We must call on our government to support human rights and peace
> negotiations in Colombia - in word and deed.  By funding Colombia's army,
> however, the United States is escalating the conflict and contributing to
> violence and suffering.  Now is the time to prevent the United States from
> becoming involved in this quagmire.
>
> _______________________________________________
>
> PARTIES TO COLOMBIA'S CONFLICT:
>
> GUERRILLAS:  Approximately 20,000 combatants compose the two largest
> guerrilla groups, the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and ELN
> (National Liberation Army).  The FARC maintains territorial control in key
> coca-growing regions in southern Colombia, taxing coca cultivation and
> cocaine production to fund its war effort.  The ELN maintains a strategic
> base in key oil-producing areas in the northeastern part of the country.
> Each is responsible for widespread violations of international humanitarian
> law, including extra-judicial executions, forced recruitment of minors, and
> kidnappings.  FARC guerrillas killed 3 U.S. indigenous rights activists this
> year.
>
> PARAMILITARIES:  Paramilitary groups - armed civilians operating with the
> support of local military commanders in many areas of Colombia - are
> responsible for more than 70% of human rights violations in Colombia.  There
> are considerable regional differences between these groups, but they united
> in 1996 as the AUC, United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia.  Paramilitaries
> are currently targeting human rights workers and government judicial
> officials investigating human rights cases, as well as civil society leaders
> supporting the peace process.  They also carry out massacres of unarmed
> peasants in areas they hope to control, forcing many thousands to flee their
> homes.  Many paramilitary leaders, including their public spokesman Carlos
> Castano, are involved in drug trafficking.
>
> COLOMBIAN SECURITY FORCES:  The Colombian army has one of the worst human
> rights records in the hemisphere, largely due to their ongoing collaboration
> with paramilitary violence.  U.S. funding to the army has declined in recent
> years because of human rights concerns.  The Colombian government dismissed
> three generals for their links with paramilitary groups, but these steps
> have yet to be followed by the necessary institutional reforms.  The United
> States has provided high levels of funding for the Colombian National Police
> as part of counternarcotics programs.  Following a major reform effort in
> 1995, the human rights performance of the police has improved; however,
> there are ongoing concerns about police participation in human rights
> violations.
> _______________________________________________
>
> TALKING POINTS: OPPOSE ANTI-DRUG FUNDING FOR COLOMBIAN MILITARY
>
> THE COLOMBIAN ARMY REMAINS ABUSIVE AND UNACCOUNTABLE.
>
> Three generals have been retired because of evidence of participation in
> human rights abuses, but the army harbors many other officers linked to
> serious human rights violations.  Other military officers who have been
> involved in human rights violations - even some officers who have been found
> guilty in civilian courts - remain on active duty.  For example, two
> officers involved in the assassination of a Colombian Senator in 1994 remain
> on duty.  In many regions, human rights groups report ongoing links between
> local military commanders and paramilitary groups, and that the Colombian
> security forces have done little to protect the civilian population from
> paramilitary violence.
>
> THE COLOMBIAN MILITARY - ESPECIALLY THE ARMY - CONTINUES TO COOPERATE WITH
> ILLEGAL PARAMILITARY GROUPS, WHICH ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR ATTACKS AGAINST THE
> CIVILIAN POPULATION AND ARE ALSO INVOLVED IN DRUG TRAFFICKING.
>
> According to the 1998 State Department human rights report:
>
> *       "Credible allegations of cooperation with paramilitary groups,
> including instances of both silent support and direct collaboration by
> members of the armed forces, in particular the army, continued [in 1998]."
>
> *       "Some local army and police commanders tacitly tolerated - and
> sometimes aided and abetted - the activities of paramilitary groups....  At
> times, individual commanders and troops at local levels armed, coordinated
> actions with, or shared intelligence with paramilitary groups, although such
> behavior was less pervasive than in previous years."
>
> A CLOSER U.S. RELATIONSHIP WITH THE COLOMBIAN MILITARY - WHETHER THROUGH
> TRAINING OR SHARED INTELLIGENCE - MAY LEAD TO INCREASED HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
> AND WILL DIRECTLY INVOLVE THE UNITED STATES IN COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS.
>
> In June the General Accounting Office revealed that the United States is now
> sharing intelligence with the Colombian military despite a lack of
> mechanisms "to ensure that it is not being used for other than
> counternarcotics purposes."  General McCaffrey would like to see even more
> intelligence sharing - $40 million of his $600 million proposed aid package
> for Colombia would go toward "Regional Intelligence Programs."
> In 1990, however, changes in Colombia's military intelligence apparatus -
> based upon recommendations from U.S. military advisors - led to clandestine
> intelligence networks that functioned as paramilitary death squads.  One of
> these, Naval Intelligence Network No. 7, was responsible for the murder of
> more than 50 civilians.
>
> THE DANGER OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN COLOMBIA'S COUNTERINSURGENCY WAR LOOMS
> CLOSER THAN EVER.
>
> *       During their Washington visit, the Colombian Defense Minister and
> Commander in Chief requested counterinsurgency assistance from Washington,
> not just anti-drug aid.
>
> *       With increased frequency, General McCaffrey and congressional drug
> warriors refer to the Colombian insurgents as "narco-guerrillas," asserting
> that the United States must help the Colombian military fight the insurgency
> in order to "win the drug war."  McCaffrey also stated on July 16 that it is
> "silly at this point" to try to differentiate between anti-drug efforts and
> the war against insurgents.
>
> *       A recent report by the General Accounting Office reveals that the
> United States shares intelligence with the Colombian military - even though
> its use may not be limited to counternarcotics operations.
>
> *       Five American soldiers killed in the plane crash in Colombia on July
> 23 were performing joint surveillance with Colombian military in
> guerrilla-controlled territory.  The incident raises questions about the
> extent of the U.S. military's role in Colombia, where it maintains
> approximately 200 troops.
>
> *       This year the U.S. military is training and equipping a 1,000-man
> counternarcotics battalion within the Colombian army.  The aid received by
> this battalion will contribute enormously to the army's counterinsurgency
> efforts.  The intended area of operations is the southern coca-growing
> region - traditionally a FARC stronghold - and the training will include
> general combat skills not specific to anti-drug operations.
>
> *       The United States is providing training and assistance to the
> "Special Forces Battalion," which is involved in counter-insurgency
> operations throughout the country.
>
> ANTI-DRUG AID FOR THE COLOMBIAN MILITARY WOULD BE BETTER SPENT ON
> HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND PROGRAMS TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
> ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.
>
> Even without emergency infusions of anti-drug funding, this year our
> government will spend more than $230 million on counternarcotics aid to
> Colombia, primarily to the military and police.  Yet less than $10 million
> will be spent on alternative development, judicial reform, law enforcement
> efforts, and human rights programs, with only one million dollars for
> Colombia's 1.5 million internal refugees.  This aid imbalance doesn't just
> ignore Colombia's dire human rights situation and immediate humanitarian
> crisis - it exacerbates them.
>
> Anti-drug budgets are ballooning across Latin America, diverting funds from
> programs that promote democracy, economic development, and human rights -
> programs that, in the long run, will do more to curb drug production and
> trafficking than supporting abusive and unaccountable militaries.  Despite
> pressing needs to address severe poverty and inequality in Latin America,
> economic assistance to the region has been cut by two-thirds over the past
> decade.  During that time, anti-drug funding has more than tripled.
> _______________________________________________
>
> RESOURCES
>
> Washington Office on Latin America
> 202/797-2171
> wo...@wola.org
> http://www.wola.org
> "U.S. International Drug Control Policy: A Guide to Citizen Action"
> http://www.wola.org/drugsguide.htm
>
> Latin America Working Group
> 202/546-7010
> la...@lawg.org
> http://www.lawg.org
>
> US/Colombia Coordinating Office
> Phone: 202/232-8090 Fax: 202-232-8092
> agi...@igc.org
>
>  ****** This alert was written by the Washington Office
> on Latin America (WOLA). It is available online at
> http://www.wola.org/uadrugs.html
> Please feel free to distribute and post where appropriate.
> Do not edit its contents nor remove identifying material
> without permission.  For more information, contact WOLA
> at (202) 797-2171 or pcl...@wola.org. ******
>
> ========================================================
> ========================================================
>
>         THE WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA
>
> The Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) promotes human rights,
> democracy and social and economic justice in Latin America and the
> Caribbean.  WOLA facilitates dialogue between governmental and
> non-governmental actors, monitors the impact of policies and programs of
> governments and international organizations, and promotes alternatives
> through reporting, education, training and advocacy.  Founded in 1974 by a
> coalition of religious and civic leaders, WOLA works closely with civil
> society organizations and government officials throughout the hemisphere.
>
>                 Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA)
>                 1630 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 200
>                 Washington, DC 20009
>                 Tel:  202/797-2171
>                 Fax:  202/797-2172
>                 wo...@wola.org
>                 http://www.wola.org
>