The war's implications for Israel
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The war's implications for Israel
By Aviad Kleinberg
The war in Iraq was more than the first expression of the United
States' readiness to go to war as an empire. It was also a conceptual
experiment that bears profound implications. What the United States
learned from this test - as had already been hinted in the smaller war
fought in Afghanistan - is that it is the master of the world and can
make use of its force almost without interference and without it
exacting a true price, neither in casualties nor in economic or
strategic assets.
The choice of Iraq was no accident. Iraq was not selected because it
posed a strategic threat. Even if it had stocks of chemical weapons,
it is hard to view these as a global danger. There are countries that
are far more dangerous. The reason Iraq was chosen is that it was
relatively weak, because the possibility of getting mired there was
small. Hence, it was ideal for a demonstration of the new
Clausewitzian concept of war as the continuation of diplomacy.
The Americans went into this war without having concrete support.
England is an ally of largely-symbolic significance. The Americans
could have got by without the British. The Russians, the European
Union and the United Nations were all against the war. It turned out
that they were not needed, that their protests were irrelevant, and
that their tails were already wagging, instinctively, to greet the
victors.
The threats about the awakening strength of the Muslim world also
turned out to be empty. The Americans had already discovered this in
Afghanistan: You can fight with impunity during the holy month of
Ramadan and without a Muslim coalition. There is no "Muslim world."
The war of civilizations was decided long ago by Coca-Cola and
McDonald's - the John the Baptists of capitalism - and by the savior
himself - Microsoft and the Internet.
The American hesitancy was less of a realistic perception than it was
a late manifestation of the trauma of Vietnam. Not only the Arab
regimes refrained from reacting to the conquest of Baghdad and
Karbala, but the supposedly-fanatic Arab masses also stayed home.
The world has a new sheriff who does not hesitate to use his pistol,
with or without partners, with or without sanction, with or without
justification. The rules have changed. What are the new rules? Well,
this question reminds me of the first time I rented a car. I started
to look over the leasing contract. "Let me save you the time," the
clerk said. "We're always right and you're always wrong."
There is only one country in the world that has not yet fully grasped
the implications of the American invasion of Iraq, and that country is
Israel. From certain points of view, the invasion worked in Israel's
favor. The work of the just is always done by others. Iraq, despite
all the bombastic pronouncements by President Bush, is not a strategic
threat to the United States or to the free world, but it is definitely
a threat to Israel. That threat has been removed, more or less.
However, the invasion of Iraq dramatically lowers Israel's stock as a
strategic asset. And not because Israel is not loyal to Uncle Sam; on
the contrary, it is a most obedient and faithful vassal.
It's just that Israel is not really needed. Israel's great strategic
weight stemmed from its ability to act - or to constitute a potential
threat - in a region in which the United States did not want to
intervene directly. Israel was a regional mini-power through which it
was possible to threaten the Soviet bloc and its satellites, or the
Arab world. Israel preserved American interests.
If American involvement becomes direct, there is no further need for
mediators. The United States does the dirty work itself. Moreover, as
I have argued, American intervention in the Middle East was chosen
less for any salient interest (that is, an economic-strategic
interest) and more because it is easy to carry out.
In the new world, Arab oil is not insignificant, but its significance
is far less than it used to be. From other aspects, the Middle East
has mainly nuisance value.
What will be the significance of the structural reduction in Israel's
status? It will mean that American readiness to go on paying so as to
extricate us from the morass in which we are mired will be diminished.
It is unlikely that the United States will exert increasing pressure
on Israel in order to achieve durable political solutions. The United
States will make do with bad solutions, based on the long-standing
American principle of forging poor settlements the consequences of
which will be paid by others in the future.
Donald Rumsfeld has no inclination to give prizes to Arafat and his
successors. He even likes Ariel Sharon. But the whole thing is
starting to cost too much money. American support will be reduced. The
economic crisis will deepen. Israeli democracy will continue to be
eroded. It won't take much for Israel to become just another Third
World country that solicits help from those willing to be generous.
What conclusion should Israel draw from the war? That it should hurry
on its own to achieve a good settlement that will make it possible to
rehabilitate the economy and start rehabilitating the society and the
state of democracy in the country. In the new world, Israel's major
asset is not military might but genuine membership in the club of the
advanced countries.