A War Crime or an Act of War?
al953
that
he will, in connivance with
some of USA's "free media" especially the Atlanta based newschannel,
stop at nothing to hammer
home a propaganda that Saddam Hussein had killed his own people using
poisonous gases. Can't blame anybody if Paul Joseph Gobbles rings a
bell.
However, as the old adage goes, you cannot fool all the people for all
the
time. So, here're the facts.
Arguably, from the proverbial horse's mouth.
Whether or not there's any justification for war, no matter if the UN
does
not mandate use of force, Babybush is hell-bent on invading Iraq?
Wonder why is he acting insane against almost the entire global
opinion?
Please read on for authoritative answers, some of which are now
declassified.
Circulate it if you care to. And comments are welcome.
This article from NYTimes.com
has been sent to you by
http://us.f208.mail.yahoo.com/ym/Compose?To=pal...@vsnl.in&YY=94508&order=do
wn&sort=date&pos=0.
A War Crime or an Act of War?
January 31, 2003
By STEPHEN C. PELLETIERE
MECHANICSBURG, Pa. - It was no surprise that President
Bush, lacking smoking-gun evidence of Iraq's weapons
programs, used his State of the Union address to
re-emphasize the moral case for an invasion: "The dictator
who is assembling the world's most dangerous weapons has
already used them on whole villages, leaving thousands of
his own citizens dead, blind or disfigured."
The accusation that Iraq has used chemical weapons against
its citizens is a familiar part of the debate. The piece of
hard evidence most frequently brought up concerns the
gassing of Iraqi Kurds at the town of Halabja in March
1988, near the end of the eight-year Iran-Iraq war.
President Bush himself has cited Iraq's "gassing its own
people," specifically at Halabja, as a reason to topple
Saddam Hussein.
But the truth is, all we know for certain is that Kurds
were bombarded with poison gas that day at Halabja. We
cannot say with any certainty that Iraqi chemical weapons
killed the Kurds. This is not the only distortion in the
Halabja story.
I am in a position to know because, as the Central
Intelligence Agency's senior political analyst on Iraq
during the Iran-Iraq war, and as a professor at the Army
War College from 1988 to 2000, I was privy to much of the
classified material that flowed through Washington having
to do with the Persian Gulf. In addition, I headed a 1991
Army investigation into how the Iraqis would fight a war
against the United States; the classified version of the
report went into great detail on the Halabja affair.
This much about the gassing at Halabja we undoubtedly know:
it came about in the course of a battle between Iraqis and
Iranians. Iraq used chemical weapons to try to kill
Iranians who had seized the town, which is in northern Iraq
not far from the Iranian border. The Kurdish civilians who
died had the misfortune to be caught up in that exchange.
But they were not Iraq's main target.
And the story gets murkier: immediately after the battle
the United States Defense Intelligence Agency investigated
and produced a classified report, which it circulated
within the intelligence community on a need-to-know basis.
That study asserted that it was Iranian gas that killed the
Kurds, not Iraqi gas.
The agency did find that each side used gas against the
other in the battle around Halabja. The condition of the
dead Kurds' bodies, however, indicated they had been killed
with a blood agent - that is, a cyanide-based gas - which
Iran was known to use. The Iraqis, who are thought to have
used mustard gas in the battle, are not known to have
possessed blood agents at the time.
These facts have long been in the public domain but,
extraordinarily, as often as the Halabja affair is cited,
they are rarely mentioned. A much-discussed article in The
New Yorker last March did not make reference to the Defense
Intelligence Agency report or consider that Iranian gas
might have killed the Kurds. On the rare occasions the
report is brought up, there is usually speculation, with no
proof, that it was skewed out of American political
favoritism toward Iraq in its war against Iran.
I am not trying to rehabilitate the character of Saddam
Hussein. He has much to answer for in the area of human
rights abuses. But accusing him of gassing his own people
at Halabja as an act of genocide is not correct, because as
far as the information we have goes, all of the cases where
gas was used involved battles. These were tragedies of war.
There may be justifications for invading Iraq, but Halabja
is not one of them.
In fact, those who really feel that the disaster at Halabja
has bearing on today might want to consider a different
question: Why was Iran so keen on taking the town? A closer
look may shed light on America's impetus to invade Iraq.
We are constantly reminded that Iraq has perhaps the
world's largest reserves of oil. But in a regional and
perhaps even geopolitical sense, it may be more important
that Iraq has the most extensive river system in the Middle
East. In addition to the Tigris and Euphrates, there are
the Greater Zab and Lesser Zab rivers in the north of the
country. Iraq was covered with irrigation works by the
sixth century A.D., and was a granary for the region.
Before the Persian Gulf war, Iraq had built an impressive
system of dams and river control projects, the largest
being the Darbandikhan dam in the Kurdish area. And it was
this dam the Iranians were aiming to take control of when
they seized Halabja. In the 1990's there was much
discussion over the construction of a so-called Peace
Pipeline that would bring the waters of the Tigris and
Euphrates southØø
to the parched Gulf states and, by
extension, Israel. No progress has been made on this,
largely because of Iraqi intransigence. With Iraq in
American hands, of course, all that could change.
Thus America could alter the destiny of the Middle East in
a way that probably could not be challenged for decades -
not solely by controlling Iraq's oil, but by controlling
its water. Even if America didn't occupy the country, once
Mr. Hussein's Baath Party is driven from power, many
lucrative opportunities would open upØø
for American
companies.
All that is needed to get us into war is one clear reason
for acting, one that would be generally persuasive. But
efforts to link the Iraqis directly to Osama bin Laden have
proved inconclusive. Assertions that Iraq threatens its
neighbors have also failed to create much resolve; in its
present debilitated condition - thanks to United Nations
sanctions - Iraq's conventional forces threaten no one.
Perhaps the strongest argument <Øø
B>left for taking us to war
quickly is that Saddam Hussein has committed human rights
atrocities against his people. And the most dramatic case
are the accusations about Halabja.
Before we go to war over Halabja, the administration owes
the American people the full facts. And if it has other
examples of Saddam Hussein gassing Kurds, it must show that
they were not pro-Iranian Kurdish guerrillas who died
fighting alongside Iranian Revolutionary Guards. Until
Washington gives us proof of Saddam Hussein's supposed
atrocities, why are we picking on Iraq on human rights
grounds, particularly when there are so many other
repressive regimes Washington supports?
Stephen C. Pelletiere is author of "Iraq and the
International Oil System: Why America Went to War in the
Persian Gulf."
.
Copyright 2002 The New York Times Company
Nick Eckert
Watch report on al-Anfal, the genocidal campaign Saddam mounted against the
Kurds in 1987-88. HRW, by the way, is hardly a group in Bush's back pocket.
There is overwhelming evidence that Saddam gassed the Kurds at Halabja.
There is even a tape recording of Ali Hassan al-Majid ("Chemical Ali")
stating that he'll use gas on the Kurds. Here's a quote
According to a 1988 audiotape of a meeting of leading Iraqi officials
published by Human Rights Watch, al-Majid vowed to use chemical weapons
against the Kurds, saying:
"I will kill them all with chemical weapons! Who is going to say anything?
The international community? Fuck them! the international community, and
those who listen to them!
And while you're at it, why don't you read the following document about
"Chemical Ali"?
According to a 1988 audiotape of a meeting of leading Iraqi officials
published by Human Rights Watch, al-Majid vowed to use chemical weapons
against the Kurds, saying:
"I will kill them all with chemical weapons! Who is going to say anything?
The international community? Fuck them! the international community, and
those who listen to them!
"I will not attack them with chemicals just one day, but I will continue to
attack them with chemicals for fifteen days."
"al953" <al...@xyz.com> wrote in message
news:nSU%9.32329$zF6.2...@bgtnsc04-news.ops.worldnet.att.net...
Nick Eckert
Selman Akbulut
"Nick Eckert" <gibb...@nowhere.com> wrote:
> http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/01/iraq0117.htm
Here are two reading assignment for you, which might expand your view of
war crimes:
http://pilger.carlton.com/iraq/impact
http://www.commondreams.org/views03/0126-04.htm
----
Abu-Alwafa
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/31/opinion/31PELL.html?
pagewanted=1MECHANICSBURG, Pa. - It was no surprise that President Bush, lacking
of the Tigris and Euphrates south to the parched Gulf states and, by
extension, Israel. No progress has been made on this, largely because of
Iraqi intransigence. With Iraq in American hands, of course, all that could
change.
Thus America could alter the destiny of the Middle East in a way that
probably could not be challenged for decades - not solely by controlling
Iraq's oil, but by controlling its water. Even if America didn't occupy the
country, once Mr. Hussein's Baath Party is driven from power, many lucrative
opportunities would open up for American companies.
All that is needed to get us into war is one clear reason for acting, one
that would be generally persuasive. But efforts to link the Iraqis directly
to Osama bin Laden have proved inconclusive. Assertions that Iraq threatens
its neighbors have also failed to create much resolve; in its present
debilitated condition - thanks to United Nations sanctions - Iraq's
conventional forces threaten no one.
Perhaps the strongest argument left for taking us to war quickly is that
Golden Sword
with no substance.
The use of the comments such as hatchet man, and the murder and
disappearance of Kurds is obviously an attempt to generate a certain
outlook on the article, obviously negative to the person(s) in question.
And the reference to comment made on unavailable audio tapes of supposed
statements that were made, well, that is propaganda after all. And
unfortunately, even if the tapes were available, I do not speak the
language.
The only reference to support the article is to a book written by the very
same 'Human Rights Watch', so it seems to be a self supporting article.
The only important questions concerning the article that comes to mind, is
who or what is the organization calling itself the 'Human Rights Watch',
what is their agenda, who sponsors the organization, and what is their
payoff?
Nick Eckert wrote:
>
> sorry, here's the link
>
> http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/01/iraq0117.htm
--
Anonymous posting!
Francinevan
So how about Irak coming clean?
Selman Akbulut
mander...@hotmail.com (Francinevan) wrote:
How about Bush coming clean? (who gave Irak those weapons and encauraged
to attack Iran in the first place?)
---
Selman Akbulut
Selman Akbulut <akb...@math.msu.edu> wrote:
Also remember that drug suppliers and dope pushers get more jail-time
then drug users in the court of law.
-----
Nusrat Rizvi
<akb...@math.msu.edu> wrote:
>> Selman Akbulut <akb...@math.msu.edu> wrote in message
>> news:<akbulut-4F1E7A...@msunews.cl.msu.edu>...
>> > In article <laCcnUJtvZO...@comcast.com>,
>> > "Nick Eckert" <gibb...@nowhere.com> wrote:
>> > Here are two reading assignment for you, which might expand your view of
>> > war crimes:
>> > http://www.commondreams.org/views03/0126-04.htm
>> >
>> > ----
>> they only show that war is indeed horrible.
>> So how about Irak coming clean?
>
>How about Bush coming clean? (who gave Irak those weapons and encauraged
>to attack Iran in the first place?)
I have heard Paki Muslims make the same idiotic argument. Tell me,
with your brain and intelligence, how did you get an American visa.
Selman Akbulut
Nusrat Rizvi <rizv...@optonline.net> wrote:
Supporting Bush policy should have something to do you with getting US
visa?, obviously I am not as intelligent as you are :-)
----
Selman Akbulut
Supporting Bush policy should have something to do with getting US
Blue2000
"Nusrat Rizvi" <rizv...@optonline.net> wrote in message
news:kp324vsv3cha5hu4c...@4ax.com...
> I have heard Paki Muslims make the same idiotic argument. Tell me,
> with your brain and intelligence, how did you get an American visa.
How about the following article? Washington Post enough to get you
listen or are you going to remain in denial forever. Notice how helpful
Donnie (Donald H Rumsfeld) was .... he dances to all tunes ......
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A52241-2002Dec29.html
U.S. Had Key Role in Iraq Buildup
Trade in Chemical Arms Allowed Despite Their Use on Iranians, Kurds
By Michael Dobbs
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, December 30, 2002; Page A01
High on the Bush administration's list of justifications for war against
Iraq are President Saddam Hussein's use of chemical weapons, nuclear and
biological programs, and his contacts with international terrorists. What
U.S. officials rarely acknowledge is that these offenses date back to a
period when Hussein was seen in Washington as a valued ally.
Among the people instrumental in tilting U.S. policy toward Baghdad during
the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war was Donald H. Rumsfeld, now defense secretary,
whose December 1983 meeting with Hussein as a special presidential envoy
paved the way for normalization of U.S.-Iraqi relations. Declassified
documents show that Rumsfeld traveled to Baghdad at a time when Iraq was
using chemical weapons on an "almost daily" basis in defiance of
international conventions.
The story of U.S. involvement with Saddam Hussein in the years before his
1990 attack on Kuwait -- which included large-scale intelligence sharing,
supply of cluster bombs through a Chilean front company, and facilitating
Iraq's acquisition of chemical and biological precursors -- is a topical
example of the underside of U.S. foreign policy. It is a world in which
deals can be struck with dictators, human rights violations sometimes
overlooked, and accommodations made with arms proliferators, all on the
principle that the "enemy of my enemy is my friend."
Throughout the 1980s, Hussein's Iraq was the sworn enemy of Iran, then still
in the throes of an Islamic revolution. U.S. officials saw Baghdad as a
bulwark against militant Shiite extremism and the fall of pro-American
states such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and even Jordan -- a Middle East
version of the "domino theory" in Southeast Asia. That was enough to turn
Hussein into a strategic partner and for U.S. diplomats in Baghdad to
routinely refer to Iraqi forces as "the good guys," in contrast to the
Iranians, who were depicted as "the bad guys."
A review of thousands of declassified government documents and interviews
with former policymakers shows that U.S. intelligence and logistical support
played a crucial role in shoring up Iraqi defenses against the "human wave"
attacks by suicidal Iranian troops. The administrations of Ronald Reagan and
George H.W. Bush authorized the sale to Iraq of numerous items that had both
military and civilian applications, including poisonous chemicals and deadly
biological viruses, such as anthrax and bubonic plague.
Opinions differ among Middle East experts and former government officials
about the pre-Iraqi tilt, and whether Washington could have done more to
stop the flow to Baghdad of technology for building weapons of mass
destruction.
"It was a horrible mistake then, but we have got it right now," says Kenneth
M. Pollack, a former CIA military analyst and author of "The Threatening
Storm," which makes the case for war with Iraq. "My fellow [CIA] analysts
and I were warning at the time that Hussein was a very nasty character. We
were constantly fighting the State Department."
"Fundamentally, the policy was justified," argues David Newton, a former
U.S. ambassador to Baghdad, who runs an anti-Hussein radio station in
Prague. "We were concerned that Iraq should not lose the war with Iran,
because that would have threatened Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. Our long-term
hope was that Hussein's government would become less repressive and more
responsible."
What makes present-day Hussein different from the Hussein of the 1980s, say
Middle East experts, is the mellowing of the Iranian revolution and the
August 1990 invasion of Kuwait that transformed the Iraqi dictator, almost
overnight, from awkward ally into mortal enemy. In addition, the United
States itself has changed. As a result of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks on New York and Washington, U.S. policymakers take a much more
alarmist view of the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.
U.S. Shifts in Iran-Iraq War
When the Iran-Iraq war began in September 1980, with an Iraqi attack across
the Shatt al Arab waterway that leads to the Persian Gulf, the United States
was a bystander. The United States did not have diplomatic relations with
either Baghdad or Tehran. U.S. officials had almost as little sympathy for
Hussein's dictatorial brand of Arab nationalism as for the Islamic
fundamentalism espoused by Iran's Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. As long as
the two countries fought their way to a stalemate, nobody in Washington was
disposed to intervene.
By the summer of 1982, however, the strategic picture had changed
dramatically. After its initial gains, Iraq was on the defensive, and
Iranian troops had advanced to within a few miles of Basra, Iraq's second
largest city. U.S. intelligence information suggested the Iranians might
achieve a breakthrough on the Basra front, destabilizing Kuwait, the Gulf
states, and even Saudi Arabia, thereby threatening U.S. oil supplies.
"You have to understand the geostrategic context, which was very different
from where we are now," said Howard Teicher, a former National Security
Council official, who worked on Iraqi policy during the Reagan
administration. "Realpolitik dictated that we act to prevent the situation
from getting worse."
To prevent an Iraqi collapse, the Reagan administration supplied battlefield
intelligence on Iranian troop buildups to the Iraqis, sometimes through
third parties such as Saudi Arabia. The U.S. tilt toward Iraq was enshrined
in National Security Decision Directive 114 of Nov. 26, 1983, one of the few
important Reagan era foreign policy decisions that still remains classified.
According to former U.S. officials, the directive stated that the United
States would do "whatever was necessary and legal" to prevent Iraq from
losing the war with Iran.
The presidential directive was issued amid a flurry of reports that Iraqi
forces were using chemical weapons in their attempts to hold back the
Iranians. In principle, Washington was strongly opposed to chemical warfare,
a practice outlawed by the 1925 Geneva Protocol. In practice, U.S.
condemnation of Iraqi use of chemical weapons ranked relatively low on the
scale of administration priorities, particularly compared with the
all-important goal of preventing an Iranian victory.
Thus, on Nov. 1, 1983, a senior State Department official, Jonathan T. Howe,
told Secretary of State George P. Shultz that intelligence reports showed
that Iraqi troops were resorting to "almost daily use of CW" against the
Iranians. But the Reagan administration had already committed itself to a
large-scale diplomatic and political overture to Baghdad, culminating in
several visits by the president's recently appointed special envoy to the
Middle East, Donald H. Rumsfeld.
Secret talking points prepared for the first Rumsfeld visit to Baghdad
enshrined some of the language from NSDD 114, including the statement that
the United States would regard "any major reversal of Iraq's fortunes as a
strategic defeat for the West." When Rumsfeld finally met with Hussein on
Dec. 20, he told the Iraqi leader that Washington was ready for a resumption
of full diplomatic relations, according to a State Department report of the
conversation. Iraqi leaders later described themselves as "extremely
pleased" with the Rumsfeld visit, which had "elevated U.S.-Iraqi relations
to a new level."
In a September interview with CNN, Rumsfeld said he "cautioned" Hussein
about the use of chemical weapons, a claim at odds with declassified State
Department notes of his 90-minute meeting with the Iraqi leader. A Pentagon
spokesman, Brian Whitman, now says that Rumsfeld raised the issue not with
Hussein, but with Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz. The State Department
notes show that he mentioned it largely in passing as one of several matters
that "inhibited" U.S. efforts to assist Iraq.
Rumsfeld has also said he had "nothing to do" with helping Iraq in its war
against Iran. Although former U.S. officials agree that Rumsfeld was not one
of the architects of the Reagan administration's tilt toward Iraq -- he was
a private citizen when he was appointed Middle East envoy -- the documents
show that his visits to Baghdad led to closer U.S.-Iraqi cooperation on a
wide variety of fronts. Washington was willing to resume diplomatic
relations immediately, but Hussein insisted on delaying such a step until
the following year.
As part of its opening to Baghdad, the Reagan administration removed Iraq
from the State Department terrorism list in February 1982, despite heated
objections from Congress. Without such a move, Teicher says, it would have
been "impossible to take even the modest steps we were contemplating" to
channel assistance to Baghdad. Iraq -- along with Syria, Libya and South
Yemen -- was one of four original countries on the list, which was first
drawn up in 1979.
Some former U.S. officials say that removing Iraq from the terrorism list
provided an incentive to Hussein to expel the Palestinian guerrilla leader
Abu Nidal from Baghdad in 1983. On the other hand, Iraq continued to play
host to alleged terrorists throughout the '80s. The most notable was Abu
Abbas, leader of the Palestine Liberation Front, who found refuge in Baghdad
after being expelled from Tunis for masterminding the 1985 hijacking of the
cruise ship Achille Lauro, which resulted in the killing of an elderly
American tourist.
Iraq Lobbies for Arms
While Rumsfeld was talking to Hussein and Aziz in Baghdad, Iraqi diplomats
and weapons merchants were fanning out across Western capitals for a
diplomatic charm offensive-cum-arms buying spree. In Washington, the key
figure was the Iraqi chargé d'affaires, Nizar Hamdoon, a fluent English
speaker who impressed Reagan administration officials as one of the most
skillful lobbyists in town.
"He arrived with a blue shirt and a white tie, straight out of the mafia,"
recalled Geoffrey Kemp, a Middle East specialist in the Reagan White House.
"Within six months, he was hosting suave dinner parties at his residence,
which he parlayed into a formidable lobbying effort. He was particularly
effective with the American Jewish community."
One of Hamdoon's favorite props, says Kemp, was a green Islamic scarf
allegedly found on the body of an Iranian soldier. The scarf was decorated
with a map of the Middle East showing a series of arrows pointing toward
Jerusalem. Hamdoon used to "parade the scarf" to conferences and
congressional hearings as proof that an Iranian victory over Iraq would
result in "Israel becoming a victim along with the Arabs."
According to a sworn court affidavit prepared by Teicher in 1995, the United
States "actively supported the Iraqi war effort by supplying the Iraqis with
billions of dollars of credits, by providing military intelligence and
advice to the Iraqis, and by closely monitoring third country arms sales to
Iraq to make sure Iraq had the military weaponry required." Teicher said in
the affidavit that former CIA director William Casey used a Chilean company,
Cardoen, to supply Iraq with cluster bombs that could be used to disrupt the
Iranian human wave attacks. Teicher refuses to discuss the affidavit.
At the same time the Reagan administration was facilitating the supply of
weapons and military components to Baghdad, it was attempting to cut off
supplies to Iran under "Operation Staunch." Those efforts were largely
successful, despite the glaring anomaly of the 1986 Iran-contra scandal when
the White House publicly admitted trading arms for hostages, in violation of
the policy that the United States was trying to impose on the rest of the
world.
Although U.S. arms manufacturers were not as deeply involved as German or
British companies in selling weaponry to Iraq, the Reagan administration
effectively turned a blind eye to the export of "dual use" items such as
chemical precursors and steel tubes that can have military and civilian
applications. According to several former officials, the State and Commerce
departments promoted trade in such items as a way to boost U.S. exports and
acquire political leverage over Hussein.
When United Nations weapons inspectors were allowed into Iraq after the 1991
Gulf War, they compiled long lists of chemicals, missile components, and
computers from American suppliers, including such household names as Union
Carbide and Honeywell, which were being used for military purposes.
A 1994 investigation by the Senate Banking Committee turned up dozens of
biological agents shipped to Iraq during the mid-'80s under license from the
Commerce Department, including various strains of anthrax, subsequently
identified by the Pentagon as a key component of the Iraqi biological
warfare program. The Commerce Department also approved the export of
insecticides to Iraq, despite widespread suspicions that they were being
used for chemical warfare.
The fact that Iraq was using chemical weapons was hardly a secret. In
February 1984, an Iraqi military spokesman effectively acknowledged their
use by issuing a chilling warning to Iran. "The invaders should know that
for every harmful insect, there is an insecticide capable of annihilating it
. . . and Iraq possesses this annihilation insecticide."
Chemicals Kill Kurds
In late 1987, the Iraqi air force began using chemical agents against
Kurdish resistance forces in northern Iraq that had formed a loose alliance
with Iran, according to State Department reports. The attacks, which were
part of a "scorched earth" strategy to eliminate rebel-controlled villages,
provoked outrage on Capitol Hill and renewed demands for sanctions against
Iraq. The State Department and White House were also outraged -- but not to
the point of doing anything that might seriously damage relations with
Baghdad.
"The U.S.-Iraqi relationship is . . . important to our long-term political
and economic objectives," Assistant Secretary of State Richard W. Murphy
wrote in a September 1988 memorandum that addressed the chemical weapons
question. "We believe that economic sanctions will be useless or
counterproductive to influence the Iraqis."
Bush administration spokesmen have cited Hussein's use of chemical weapons
"against his own people" -- and particularly the March 1988 attack on the
Kurdish village of Halabjah -- to bolster their argument that his regime
presents a "grave and gathering danger" to the United States.
The Iraqis continued to use chemical weapons against the Iranians until the
end of the Iran-Iraq war. A U.S. air force intelligence officer, Rick
Francona, reported finding widespread use of Iraqi nerve gas when he toured
the Al Faw peninsula in southern Iraq in the summer of 1988, after its
recapture by the Iraqi army. The battlefield was littered with atropine
injectors used by panicky Iranian troops as an antidote against Iraqi nerve
gas attacks.
Far from declining, the supply of U.S. military intelligence to Iraq
actually expanded in 1988, according to a 1999 book by Francona, "Ally to
Adversary: an Eyewitness Account of Iraq's Fall from Grace." Informed
sources said much of the battlefield intelligence was channeled to the
Iraqis by the CIA office in Baghdad.
Although U.S. export controls to Iraq were tightened up in the late 1980s,
there were still many loopholes. In December 1988, Dow Chemical sold $1.5
million of pesticides to Iraq, despite U.S. government concerns that they
could be used as chemical warfare agents. An Export-Import Bank official
reported in a memorandum that he could find "no reason" to stop the sale,
despite evidence that the pesticides were "highly toxic" to humans and would
cause death "from asphyxiation."
The U.S. policy of cultivating Hussein as a moderate and reasonable Arab
leader continued right up until he invaded Kuwait in August 1990, documents
show. When the then-U.S. ambassador to Baghdad, April Glaspie, met with
Hussein on July 25, 1990, a week before the Iraqi attack on Kuwait, she
assured him that Bush "wanted better and deeper relations," according to an
Iraqi transcript of the conversation. "President Bush is an intelligent
man," the ambassador told Hussein, referring to the father of the current
president. "He is not going to declare an economic war against Iraq."
"Everybody was wrong in their assessment of Saddam," said Joe Wilson,
Glaspie's former deputy at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, and the last U.S.
official to meet with Hussein. "Everybody in the Arab world told us that the
best way to deal with Saddam was to develop a set of economic and commercial
relationships that would have the effect of moderating his behavior. History
will demonstrate that this was a miscalculation."
© 2002 The Washington Post Company
rented dentures
>The psychopathic liar that George W. Bush is, it is only but natural
>that
>he will, in connivance with
>some of USA's "free media" especially the Atlanta based newschannel,
>stop at nothing to hammer
>
>home a propaganda that Saddam Hussein had killed his own people using
>poisonous gases. Can't blame anybody if Paul Joseph Gobbles rings a
>bell.
Shit, what about Janet Reno and Billy Bob hisself and the toasted
whacked out bible thumpers in Texas?
But hey, they HAD to gas and burn them, kids and all. Somebody claimed
them kids were being abused!