Carrier Battles (?)
W. Lydecker
you had a carrier task force in the South Pacific. You get a seemingly
reliable location of an enemy carrier 150 miles to the north.
You have 12 torpedo bombers; 12 dive bombers, and 18 fighters available.
Would you send all the bombers, and 6 fighters escort? I assume CAP
would be more important than the escort. Or, would you keep all fighters
for CAP? Does the carrier have to stay in one
location, or can it zig-zag away and wait for radio contact from
returning planes? Or, is radio contact from carrier too dangerous in
this situation?
Brad Meyer
wrote:
>Does the carrier have to stay in one
>location, or can it zig-zag away and wait for radio contact from
>returning planes?
The pilots were given a "point option" prior to launch, that was the
location the carrier expected to be when the plane returned. If it
wasn't there, then the pilots stared a search and "phoned home". The
carrier might or might not reply depending on circumstance.
Emmanuel.Gustin
: Say you had a carrier task force in the South Pacific. You get
: a seemingly reliable location of an enemy carrier 150 miles to
: the north. You have 12 torpedo bombers; 12 dive bombers, and 18
: fighters available.
Too few fighters for both CAP and escort: Later the fighter
component was strenghtened. Much, if not everything, depends
on whether you assume that the enemy force has already detected
your presence, or not.
If you have the advantage of surprise you might choose
to send 12-12-12 and keep just 6 fighters for a minimal
protection; the reasoning being that the first strike is
likely to win -- carriers are vulnerable.
But if you knew that your own force has already been detected,
you might want to keep most of your fighters for defence.
And if you have reason to assume that the enemy attack has
already been launched, you may want to use all your fighters
for CAP, and perhaps delay your own attack until the enemy
is recovering his own aircraft, and is at its most vulnerable.
But in practice in 1942 the attack formations often missed
their fighter escort or had to do without. Look at the attacks
from the US carriers at Midway: Some fighter cover was allocated
but part of it went astray, and units going in without any
cover were wiped out by the Japanese defences.
: Does the carrier have to stay in one location, or can it
: zig-zag away and wait for radio contact from returning
: planes?
You would want to maintain radio silence, unless you are
certain that the enemy already knows your position. A
meeting point would be pre-arranged, the carrier would
not sit around like a dead duck while the strike was
underway.
Emmanuel Gustin
Lawrence Dillard
news:3e2d9618...@news.pacific.net.au...
> What would be a proper procedure for a 1942 type naval battle?
Hardly anyone knew, at the time. Battle groups with aircraft carriers as
their main weapon were essentially pioneered during this time and were
emerging with startling results. . Several airmen had theories on how to
employ such forces either as the main punch or in a supporting role. Yet the
overwhelming majority of naval leaders were wed still to the primacy of the
battle-line.
In any event, the first necessity was to have sufficient forces in place
(or swiftly available) to be able to give battle. One had also to gain
accurate and timely information on the enemy, including his strength (number
of ships), disposition (which I would describe as types of ships, locations
thereof and current deployment) and capabilities (which can be estimated
from numbers and types). From all the above, and other sources as well (such
as land-based and sea-based aerial scouting and submarine scouting, and
radio intel), your own planning or operations staffs could generate a
reasonable appreciation of what the enemy was capable of doing and a more
chancey appreciation of what his actual intent might be. If they were smart,
experienced and lucky, that is.
Recall that the RN used all the above assets in successfuly dealing with
BISMARCK and with other major German surface units, for example. Airpower
played an unprecedented role in this extended battle, as ostensibly obsolete
"Stringbag" aircraft launched from a British carrier achieved a pivotal hit
on the German supership, a hit which was the proximate cause of her
eventually being brought to bay and sunk (with other successes against the
Germans, weather was such that only aerial scouting played much of a role).
Radio and human intel allowed the British to learn somewhat in advance that
BISMARCK was going to sortie in the first place. Aerial scouting and agent
reports complemented one another in allowing the British to keep track of
the progress of BISMARCK as she made her way to sea. From the moment she
reached the ocean, BISMARCK was the hunted. An initial but unsuccessful
interception was made, using what were deemed to be adequate available
forces (a famous battle-cruiser and an uncompleted but potent battleship)
and escorts. BISMARCK temporarily broke contact thereafter.
Later, the British were able to utilize radar and Radio Direction Finding to
regain contact with BISMARCK from time to time, and brought forces from as
far away as Gibraltar in the attempt to neutralize the German challenge.
RN was able to accomplish this task because of its tradition of sea-going,
fighting sailors, who were well-supplied with reliable information and who
proved capable of utilizing radar, rdf and radio intel to their best
advantages. At the same moment it must be realized that a minor error almost
cost the RN its quarry: the commander of the chasing fleet left harbor with
the wrong type of maps aboard. What was needed were maps which could be used
to plot supplied positions based on rdf "fixes". Instead the fixes were
initially plotted on standard navigation maps, yielding a misleading
position for BISMARCK. Only at virtually the last minute was the error
rectified and a final, fatal interception accomplished.
SNIP
Rich Rostrom
>What would be a proper procedure for a 1942 type naval battle?
Your strike force would be all your bombers and about half
your fighters. Some fighters would be held back for CAP.
The carrier does not have to hold position absolutely, but
the strike groups should be told where it's going before
they leave - at least that that's the theory.
In any case, the strike group should be returning in about
two hours. They can probably find the the carrier without
directions, unless the carrier went off in some unknown
direction at flank speed for the entire two hours.
I dunno about radio contact, but the US did use radio
homing devices.
--
Never consume legumes before transacting whatsoever | Rich Rostrom
even in the outermost courtyard of a descendant of |
Timur the Terrible. | rrostrom@dummy
--- Avram Davidson, _Dr. Bhumbo Singh_ | 21stcentury.net
--
Herbert Pocket
> What would be a proper procedure for a 1942 type naval battle? Say
> you had a carrier task force in the South Pacific. You get a seemingly
> reliable location of an enemy carrier 150 miles to the north.
> You have 12 torpedo bombers; 12 dive bombers, and 18 fighters available.
> Would you send all the bombers, and 6 fighters escort? I assume CAP
> would be more important than the escort. Or, would you keep all fighters
> for CAP?
A carrier captain/admiral would never operate without CAP for self
protection. One of the main advantages of a carrier group as opposed to
non-carrier formations, is the ability to provide local air superiority and
thereby self protection against (piloted) air attack. For anyone who was in
any doubt, this became self-evident after the sinking of the Bismark in 1941
and therfore well understood by 1942, though the ability to achieve this was
limited at that time by the aircraft available.
> Does the carrier have to stay in one location, or can it zig-zag away and
> wait for radio contact from returning planes?
Carriers are, now as in 1942, limited by many constraints when operating in
a hostile environment. In particular, they must keep on the move and zig-zag
for two reasons:
1. Self protection. If stationary they would be sittting targets for
submarines.
2. The need to maintain wind in the right direction over the deck for
aircrafy deployment and recovery (takeoffs and landings).
A carrier would therefore never voluntarily "stay in one location". It would
always zig-zag, the direction being determined by the wind and possibly
other operational considerations such as the known disposition of the enemy
and "waterspace management" issues (i.e. the area of ocean or "box" in which
the carrier group leader or higher command has designated it to operate for
say an 8 or 12 hour period, and in which it is guaranteed not to be engaged
by friendly forces, paricularly submarines).
The operational decisions for carriers, as other ocean going Naval vessels,
are highly constrained and complex, at least to anyone who has not been
involved in planning/executing Naval operations.
Herbert
--
Joel Shepherd
> What would be a proper procedure for a 1942 type naval battle?
I'm not sure, in retrospect, that anyone followed a proper procedure,
but anyway... ;-)
> Say you had a carrier task force in the South Pacific. You get a
> seemingly reliable location of an enemy carrier 150 miles to the
> north. You have 12 torpedo bombers; 12 dive bombers, and 18
> fighters available. Would you send all the bombers, and 6 fighters
> escort?
The answers are going to vary somewhat depending on what navy you're
talking about. Thinking about the USN only...
Doctrine at the time was that it was essential to hit the enemy's
carriers before they could hit yours: that the side that got in the
first shot had a major advantage. So, with regard to bombers, you
launch everything you can.
Fighter assignment is a harder call to make. First, whether you
realize it or not, you don't have enough: 18 fighters is not enough to
cover both strike escort and CAP. At least, not if you're expecting
resistance.
> I assume CAP would be more important than the escort.
That seems to be how the chips generally fell.
> Or, would you keep all fighters for CAP?
Torpedo bombers, in particular, needed protection. You might send 2-3
divisions of fighters to cover them.
> Does the carrier have to stay in one location, or can it zig-zag
> away and wait for radio contact from returning planes?
Frequently pilots were given a "Point Option": the anticipated
position of the carrier by the time of the flight's return.
Obstensibly a comforting bit of data, it was frequently wrong. In
particular, the rate of a carrier's advance was frequently
overestimated. This was especially a problem when planes were being
launched at the limit of their strike range, and expecting base to
close the distance significantly during their absence. Planes would
arrive at Point Option very low on fuel with not a wake in sight.
> Or, is radio contact from carrier too dangerous in this situation?
Voice radio contact from ship to plane was sometimes judged too risky.
US carriers carried a ZB-YE homing beacon, which planes could receive
and use to locate the carrier. I'm assuming the signal put out by this
beacon was short range and not considered likely to give away a
carrier's presence to a distant enemy, like voice radio would.
--
Joel.
--
Clark Wilkins
> you had a carrier task force in the South Pacific. You get a seemingly
> reliable location of an enemy carrier 150 miles to the north.
> You have 12 torpedo bombers; 12 dive bombers, and 18 fighters available.
> Would you send all the bombers, and 6 fighters escort? I assume CAP
> would be more important than the escort. Or, would you keep all fighters
> for CAP?
For the most part, the choice is yours. However, if you send in your 24
bombers without fighter escort, expect them to be shot to pieces with very
few hits and very few returning.
In theory, one fighter can protect two bombers, so you could sent 6 fighters
with each bomber group and still have 6 fighters left for CAP.
The decision now becomes, is a 6 fighter CAP enough? Can they protect your
carrier? You have to make a choice. If you decide they are not enough then
you have a tough decision since, in theory, for every fighter you remove
from the escort and add to your CAP will probably result in two bombers not
coming home. It's a tough decision but the answer is in economics. It's
easier to replace bombers than aircraft carriers. If you don't think a CAP
of 6 fighters is enough, then the bombers get shorted on escort.
::Clark::
--
George
>location, or can it zig-zag away and wait
>for radio contact from returning planes?
I don't know about 1942, but in 1944 the US carriers had radar beacons
that the torpedo bombers and dive bombers could home-in on, if they were
equipped with search radars. Many were. Night fighters also had that
capability, but day fighters had no radar.
If a pilot indicated by radio that he was lost, he might be directed to
turn on his IFF transponder. The carrier radar operator could then
identify the plane, and determine the plane's position for return-home
instructions. This usualy worked if the distance was within range of
the radar limits.
When did IFF become available to the US carriers? .
--
Yau-ming Chiam
Combat from Pearl Harbor to Midway_, Ann. Maryland, USN Inst Press, 1984.
As for CAP, the USN was more likely to hold back more fighters to defend the
carriers.
In Midway, for example, the 1st USN strike force did not enjoy the benefit
of fighter escort. The infamous USN Devasator torpedo bombers were
practically wiped out as a result. The successful Dauntless carrier
divebombers however managed to sink 3/4 of the IJN carriers in that first
strike due to the fact that all of the IJN CAP were busy shooting down the
TBs.
--
Cub Driver
> What would be a proper procedure for a 1942 type naval battle?
You ought to read about the Battle of Midway in June 1942. It
illustrated most of the problems and many of their solutions.
all the best -- Dan Ford (email: web AT danford.net)
see the Warbird's Forum at http://www.danford.net/index.htm
Vietnam | Flying Tigers | Pacific War | Brewster Buffalo | Piper Cub
--
Ben Schorr
I think it would depend upon a few factors; like if you thought you had the
element of surprise for instance and what other enemy forces you suspected to be
in the area. Also considerations like time of day and what, if any, mission you
were out there performing. If you expected the enemy to have four carriers but
the report only mentioned one, I might wonder where the other three were.
As for staying in one place, no, but you would want to tell your pilots where to
meet you if possible. i.e. you could launch and then steam to the North-East
and recover your aircraft at that point.
I'm not an expert in the subject, however, so perhaps others here have better
information than I do.
--
Aloha,
-Ben-
http://home.hawaii.rr.com/schorr
Portraits - 9/11/01:
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0805072225/benseverythpages
--
W. Lydecker
that worked in a 15 mile radius of carrier. Anybody have an
explanation on how this worked for homecoming pilots? As
for CAP vs escort, of course the bombers are better off with an escort.
But, if there is no home to land on, and no other carrier - disaster.
USN did better job on anti-air flak defense than IJN.
--
George
>mentioned a coded honing device, that
>worked in a 15 mile radius of carrier.
>Anybody have an explanation on how this
>worked for homecoming pilots?
See link for reference to ZB-YE homing beacon.
http://www.cv6.org/company/accounts/jmccarthy/
In 1944 Yorktown CV-10 had the first AN/CPN-6 (YM), 10 cm radar
beacon/transponder, installed. The YM could be interrogated by torpedo
bombers, dive bombers, and F4U night fighters that had 10 cm radars.
The plane's radar would trigger the YM to transmit a coded signal of up
to six pulses, code-spaced to identify which carrier was sending. The
display on the plane's radar looked like several targets, depending on
the code, ie, - -- or -- -- or -- -- --, etc. The range was a couple
of hundred miles, if I recall correctly.
--
Brad Meyer
>You ought to read about the Battle of Midway in June 1942. It
>illustrated most of the problems and many of their solutions.
>
Also good is Eric Hammel's "Guadacanal: The Carrier Battles" which
covers the Santa Cruz and Eastern Solomons battles. Many of the same
sorts of problems/decisions for both sides, but without the US
advantage in intellegence.
--
George
>mentioned a coded honing device, that
>worked in a 15 mile radius of carrier.
>Anybody have an explanation on how this
>worked for homecoming pilots?
This link provides some explanation of the ZB-YE homing system.
http://ussessex.bravepages.com/flyeast.html
Search ZB-YE on google.
--
Andrew Clark
"George" <GNight...@webtv.net> wrote
> In 1944 Yorktown CV-10 had the first AN/CPN-6 (YM)
> 10 cm radar beacon/transponder, installed.
I believe the AN/CPN-6 was an X-Band radar beacon operating
in the 3cm or 10 GHz region, not an S-band radar operating
in the 10 cm/3 GHz. In US service it was codenamed "Minnie".
It operated with the AN/APS-10 X-Band (3cm) airborne search
radar.
W. Lydecker
carriers?" ##################################< All I know is,
Hammel mentioned it in use in the Solomon battles of '42.
Also, it must have been a bitch to be trying to knock down a torpedo
bomber making a run at your carrier, and have "friendly" ack-ack blast
*your* plane.
--
George
>radar beacon operating in the 3cm or 10
>GHz region, not an S-band radar
>operating in the 10 cm/3 GHz.
You are correct. It was X-Band. I (mentally) confused wavelength vs
frequency. How soon we forget. I never heard it referred to as
"Minnie". On Yorktown in 1944-45 it was called "YM" or "Yoke Mike".
Did Minnie replace Mike in the alphabet?. It prabably became Minnie
when Able, Baker,Charlie, Dog, became Alpha, Bravo, etc.
How long was AN/CPN-6 in service?
--
William Donzelli
news:<b0p9sk$1oci$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu>...
(WARNING! Painfully technical description coming. Proceed only if
*really* interested)
> See link for reference to ZB-YE homing beacon.
> http://www.cv6.org/company/accounts/jmccarthy/
But first, some nomenclature.
YE (the carrier/airfield half) is the beacon transmitter. ZB (aircraft
half) is the receiver adaptor. There were some variations on the
system - YG is a smaller (cheaper) version of the YE, used mostly on
island bases. YL is a YG modified for directing landing craft (!). ZB
was later renamed AN/ARR-1 for the AAF. ZBX is a upgraded "standalone"
(more on this later) ZB, later renamed AN/ARR-2.
The ZB is officially called a "Homing Adaptor" because it is not a
full radio receiver. It must be put ahead of a standard aircraft
radio, and the two must work together. Both the adaptor and the radio
had to be tuned individually, but this was quite easy to do. In the
above reference, either the radioman was not very skilled, or the
tuning knobs were installed someplace a hand could not get to (yes,
this happened quite a bit).
The operation of the YE-ZB system is quite neat, especially for being
a pre-War technology (the first YE production contracts were
mid-1938). The tricks to the system were the use of a very high
frequency (246 MHz), and the use of double modulation. Both were
viewed as "secure" - 246 MHz was an incredibly high frequency for the
time the system was developed (NRL, back in 1936), and it was assumed
that no one was puching radio receivers that high. Even if an enemy
was able to produce good, stable receivers up at 246 MHz, the double
modulation would make the signal more-or-less invisible. In a normal
AM signal, like those still in use today for broadcasting,
voice/music/tone modulates a carrier frequency - in broadcasting, this
frequency is the familiar 550-1600 KHz found on radios all over the
place. Receiving such a signal is trivial. In the YE-ZB system,
however, the carrier is modulated just as above, but then is used to
modulate *another* carrier at 246 MHz. The result is the VHF signal
modulated with a broadcast signal modulated with a code (more on this
later). If an enemy was searching around on a suitable receiver, it is
very likely he would skip right over it, as the circuitry in a normal
receiver is simply not made to deal with such a complicated, broad YE
beacon transmission. If lucky, he may notice a change in the amount of
background noise - but that is it.
The code the YE transmitted was also a bit clever. On each carrier, a
YE antenna was mounted very high, and rotated quite slowly - I think 1
rpm. This antenna shot out a narrow beam of RF, much like a radar
antenna. The YE control unit (a neat clockwork device) divided the 360
degrees of rotation into 12 sectors, always referenced to true North.
Each sector was assigned a code - a simple Morse letter. For example,
0 to 30 might be "M", 30 to 60 might be "S", 60 to 90 might be "Y",
and so on. As the antenna rotated, it worked with the control unit,
and automatically sent the code to the YE transmitter, resulting in
the fully coded transmission. Thus, and for example, while the antenna
swept out 0 to 30 degrees, a highly focused radio signal with a few of
Morse Ms would be transmitted to any aircraft out at sea. When the
antenna hit 31 degrees, the Ms would change to Ss. As a bonus, every
sixth antenna revolution, the control unit would not send out the
"sectored" Morse codes, but would switch to a different set of codes
that were not sector dependent. these were the carrier IDs - two
letter Morse combinations, assigned to each carrier (or airfield).
Thus, once our antenna starts its sixth rotation, it would not start
sptting out Ms, but maybe BQ for all sectors, telling any pilots that
he is tuned to station BQ. At the end of the sixth rotation, the whole
cycle repeats, back to Ms, and Ss, and Ys.
On the aircraft side, things basically worked in reverse. The radioman
would tune into the signal with his ZB (interestingly, for more
security, the frequencies printed on the ZB tuning knob are
"incorrect"). As far as I know, however, 246 MHz was the only signal
used, although the YE and ZB could work on a range from 240 to 252
MHz. Anyway, the ZB tuning was not very critical, so I doubt the knobs
were ever really touched. The radioman would then tune his broadcast
receiver to find the ZBs output signal. From there, he would listen,
just as with any other signal. So as you can see, two "radios" are
needed - the ZB only does half the work, as does the broadcast
receiver (generally an ARA, AN/ARC-5, RU, or similar. Any will do).
This is the real reason why Navy planes were fitted with broadcast
receivers - they were *not* for DF'ing a broadcast stations (but it
made a fine cover story, and Navy planes generally had an LF receiver
for this anyway).
With a tuned-in YE transmission in his ear (remember, because of the
thin beam of radio signal coming from the rotating antenna, he might
only hear the transmission for a few seconds ever minute, as the beam
passes by his plane), the radioman would look up on a code wheel just
what his received code means. In our example, if he heard a few Ms
from his carrier BQ, he would know that he heeds to fly more or less
at a heading of 195 degrees (180s off from the sector). If he hears
any other Morse, he has probably strayed, and needs to correct his
path.
OK, that's enough for now....quiz on Monday.
William Donzelli
Mike Brough
parts of this thread.
The RAF had IFF in 1940 because a misunderstanding by a British radar
operator resulted in him vectoring fighters onto a friendly plane. These
fighters didn't have their IFF turned on and this resulted in damage to a
number of planes as they mistook friend for foe. This was known as 'The
Battle of Barking Creek'.
The Americans had a shipboard system in 1938-9 - you can read about it at
http://webhome.idirect.com/~jproc/sari/sariff.html.
Rich Rostrom
>Also, it must have been a bitch to be trying to knock down a torpedo
>bomber making a run at your carrier, and have "friendly" ack-ack blast
>*your* plane.
Ensign Milton Tootle of VF-8 took off on his first non-training
flight during the torpedo attack on YORKTOWN. He shot down a
Japanese plane, was hit by American flak and bailed out, and
was picked up by a destroyer - all within 15 minutes.
George
>lost, he might be directed to turn on his
>IFF transponder. The carrier radar
>operator could then identify the plane, and
>determine the plane's position for
>return-home instructions. This usualy
>worked if the distance was within range of
>the radar limits.
My post above is not quite correct. I neglected to explain the
Emergency IFF feature. The above paragraph should read:
If a pilot indicated by radio that he was lost, he might be directed to
switch his IFF transponder from Normal to the Emergency function. The
transponder would then transmit a much longer pulse than normal,
allowing the carrier radar operator to identify the plane, and
determine the plane's position for return-home instructions. This usualy
worked if the distance was within range of the radar limits. The code
name for IFF was Lights. The code name for Emergency IFF was Easy
Lights.
--
Rich
> janu...@webtv.net (W. Lydecker) wrote:
>
> >Also, it must have been a bitch to be trying to knock down a torpedo
> >bomber making a run at your carrier, and have "friendly" ack-ack blast
> >*your* plane.
>
> Ensign Milton Tootle of VF-8 took off on his first non-training
> flight during the torpedo attack on YORKTOWN. He shot down a
> Japanese plane, was hit by American flak and bailed out, and
> was picked up by a destroyer - all within 15 minutes.
Ummm, Milt Tootle was assigned to VF-3 for the Battle of Midway. His
original orders were to VF-8, but he was sent to join Thach's happy
little group.
Amongst others duplicating Tootle's feat (taking off into an enemy
attack, cranking up wheels - F4F's - wheels were hand cranked, firing
on incoming enemy planes and avoiding the task force defensive fires,
all at once) were (in order of take off): Lt Cdr JS Thach (credited 1
B5N plus 1 B5N probable), Lt(jg)WN Leonard (credited 1 B5N plus 1 B5N
probable), Lt(jg) WA Haas (credited 1 B5N),Ens JP Adams (credited 1
B5N plus 1 B5N probable), then Tootle, then Mach DC Barnes (credited 2
B5N plus 2 A6M damaged). Leonard, Haas, and Adams were from VF-42 and
were among the 16 pilots from that squadron who were temporarily
assigned to VF-3 for the Midway deployment. All three had seen action
at Coral Sea (Haas credited with 1 A5M and 1 A6M - the first shot down
by a USN pilot; Leonard with 2 F1M's plus 1 B5N probable; Adams with
.5 credit B5N), VF-42 pilots made up 59% of VF-3 pilots, total, and
67% of those assigned to VF-3 who flew in the battle.
Regards,
Rich
--
William Donzelli
news:<3e3e1e22...@news.pacific.net.au>...
> I believe the AN/CPN-6 was an X-Band radar beacon operating
> in the 3cm or 10 GHz region, not an S-band radar operating
> in the 10 cm/3 GHz. In US service it was codenamed "Minnie".
> It operated with the AN/APS-10 X-Band (3cm) airborne search
> radar.
It could talk to many X-band sets. I suspect that the AN/CPN-6 was
originally intended for island bases, to give B-29s something to look
at for navigation. The installation on the carrier may have been one
of the many ersatz solutions the Navy came up with.
AN/APS-10 has an interesting history - a dud when introduced (it had a
very short life in the Navy, as the pilots rejected it as it was too
heavy). Very few were made during the war. I the 1950s, however, it
was looked at again by the military and went into full production. I
suppose the definition of "heavy" changed.
William Donzelli
David Thornley
Brad Meyer <brad...@attbi.com> wrote:
>>
>Also good is Eric Hammel's "Guadacanal: The Carrier Battles" which
>covers the Santa Cruz and Eastern Solomons battles. Many of the same
>sorts of problems/decisions for both sides, but without the US
>advantage in intellegence.
>
the USN and IJN were starting to get a good idea of what they wanted
to do and why. Neither side really knew what it was doing at the
Coral Sea, and Midway was a combination of great intelligence on
the US side and inept planning on the Japanese.
--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
da...@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-
Michael Emrys
thor...@visi.com wrote on 1/28/03 2:30 AM:
> Neither side really knew what it was doing at the Coral Sea, and Midway was a
> combination of great intelligence on the US side and inept planning on the
> Japanese.
Also, the Santa Cruz and Eastern Solomon battles were probably the most even
match-ups of the war. Before that, the US was fighting at a small
disadvantage in a number of areas. After that, the Japanese were usually
fighting at a huge disadvantage.
Michael
William Donzelli
> I never heard it referred to as
> "Minnie". On Yorktown in 1944-45 it was called "YM" or "Yoke Mike".
> Did Minnie replace Mike in the alphabet?.
"Minnie", because it talks to "Mickey" - better known as AN/APQ-13 (a
version of H2X).
> How long was AN/CPN-6 in service?
Well into the 1950s. I have one that someday I will threaten to fire
up, so they ain't dead yet...
William Donzelli
Terence O'Brien
> GNightingale asked: "When did IFF become available to the US
> carriers?"
Surely the USA must have had it in use right from the beginning of their
war. I know that our Blenheim squadron (53) was using it operationally
in late 1940, and I wrote in CHASING AFTER DANGER (and in this
newsgroup?) about the modifications we adopted to safeguard against
friendly fire. and to avoid disclosing one's presence to German radio
operators. I think (not necessarily with accuracy, of course) that radar
details were handed over by the British in return for aid, and surely
that meant that IFF was already in use long before Pearl Hzarbour.
Terence O'Brien
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William Donzelli
> I think (not necessarily with accuracy, of course) that radar
> details were handed over by the British in return for aid, and surely
> that meant that IFF was already in use long before Pearl Hzarbour.
U.S. Navy IFF was around in early 1942, but in very small numbers and
only available for ships (models BE and BF, and presumably BA, BB, BC,
and BD, although no one I know has ever seen real references of
these). These were based on the Mk IV system. There was a Mk IV system
for aircraft available in 1942, but it was not used until very late in
the war, and in very small numbers, due to the general adoption of the
Mk III system.
There also was an oddball IFF set, made specifically for the models FC
and FD fire control radars, as well as the SCR-296 shore battery
radar. It was called BR, and did not fit into the "Mk system". It too
was fairly early in the game.
William Donzelli
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