Operation Northwoods: 9/11-Style US Government PsyOps Plan
Tetrahedron Omega
April 30, 2001
Pentagon Proposed Pretext for Cuba Invasion in 1962
In his new exposé of the National Security Agency entitled Body of
Secrets, author James Bamford highlights a set of proposals on Cuba by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff codenamed OPERATION NORTHWOODS. This
document, titled "Justification for U.S. Military Intervention in
Cuba" was provided by the JCS to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara
on March 13, 1962, as the key component of Northwoods. Written in
response to a request from the Chief of the Cuba Project, Col. Edward
Lansdale, the Top Secret memorandum describes U.S. plans to covertly
engineer various pretexts that would justify a U.S. invasion of Cuba.
These proposals--part of a secret anti-Castro program known as
Operation Mongoose--included staging the assassinations of Cubans
living in the United States, developing a fake "Communist Cuban terror
campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in
Washington," including "sink[ing] a boatload of Cuban refugees (real
or simulated)," faking a Cuban airforce attack on a civilian jetliner,
and concocting a "Remember the Maine" incident by blowing up a U.S.
ship in Cuban waters and then blaming the incident on Cuban sabotage.
Bamford himself writes that Operation Northwoods "may be the most
corrupt plan ever created by the U.S. government."
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Justification for US Military
Intervention in Cuba [includes cover memoranda], March 13, 1962, TOP
SECRET, 15 pp. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20010430/northwoods.pdf
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The National Security Archive
The George Washington University Gelman Library
2130 H St., NW Suite 701
Washington, D.C. 20037
website: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv
email: nsar...@gwu.edu , sbec...@gwu.edu
fax: (202) 994-7005
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Below is the complete text from the Freedom of Information
Act-released U.S. government document detailing the Pentagon plan to
murder innocent civilians and murder U.S. Navy members as part of a
"terror campaign" to be blamed on the Cuban government as a pretext to
invade Cuba, code-named Operation Northwoods. This plan had the
written approval of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Lyman
Louis Lemnitzer, and every other member of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff--of which plan President John F. Kennedy refused to implement.
This FOIA-released document is archived at The National Security
Archive at George Washington University (Washington, D.C.).
Here is a highlight from the text of this document where the U.S.
Joint Chiefs of Staff propose to murder U.S. Navy members to be blamed
on the Cuban government:
On page 11 (listed as page 8 within the document), paragraph 3.
sub-paragraph a.:
"3. A 'Remember the Maine' incident could be arranged in several
forms:
"a. We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba."
That is, REAL, NOT SIMULATED; WITH DEATHS OF U.S. NAVY MEMBERS. In
sub-paragraph b. the document details a possible alternative to a.
where deaths would be simulated by blowing up an empty U.S. Navy ship.
I find it interesting that the plan resulting in the real deaths of
actual U.S. Navy members is listed before the non-lethal alternative.
The above-listed lethal plan a. apparently relates to the prior
paragraph 2. sub-paragraph a. number 10 on the same page of the
document, i.e., "(10) Sabotage ship in harbor; large fires --
napthalene." And the alternative simulation-plan b. (of paragraph 3.)
apparently relates to paragraph 2. sub-paragraph a. number 11 on the
same page of the document, i.e., "(11) Sink ship near harbor entrance.
Conduct funerals for mock-victims (may be lieu of (10))."
On page 11 and 12 (listed as page 8 and 9, respectively, within the
document) the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff detail a plan to murder
innocent civilians by sinking a boatload of Cubans en route to Florida
and to injure civilian Cuban expatriates living in the U.S. as part of
a "terror campaign" to be blamed on the Cuban government:
"4. We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami
area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington. The terror
campaign could be pointed at refugees seeking haven in the United
States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans enroute to Florida (real or
simulated). We could foster attempts on lives of Cuban refugees in the
United States even to the extent of wounding in instances to be widely
publicized. Exploding a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spots,
the arrest of Cuban agents and the release of prepared documents
substantiating Cuban involvement, also would be helpful in projecting
the idea of an irresponsible government."
You can view the photoscans of this document on-line at the below
National Security Archive website at George Washington University
(Washington, D.C.) in the Adobe Acrobat Portable Document Format
(PDF):
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20010430/northwoods.pdf
And so with that introduction, below is the full text of this
FOIA-released U.S. government document. All the text within the pound
signs (#) is original to the document with the exception of the page
numbers listed in the brackets ([]), the surrounding hyphens (-) to
indicate page-breaks, and General L.L. Lemnitzer's signature
represented in brackets ([]):
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TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN
UNCLASSIFIED
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
13 March 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS)
1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the attached Memorandum
for the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, which responds to a request
of that office for brief but precise description of pretexts which
would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba.
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the proposed memorandum be
forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes.
It is assumed that there will be similar submissions from other
agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basis for developing
a time-phased plan. Individual projects can then be considered on a
case-by-case basis.
3. Further, it is assumed that a single agency will be given the
primary responsibility for developing military and para-military
aspects of the basic plan. It is recommended that this responsibility
for both overt and covert military operations be assigned the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
[signed "L.L.Lemnitzer" in cursive]
L. L. LEMNITZER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
1 Enclosure
memo for Chief of Operations, Cuba Project
SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED
BY JCS ON 21 May 84
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED
EXCLUDED FROM GDS
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN
--------------------[page 1; page 2:]--------------------
UNCLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET
JCS 1969/321
12 March 1962
Page 2165
COPY NO. 1
SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION
NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES
to the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
on
NORTHWOODS (S)
A report* on the above Subject is submitted for consideration by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
F. J. BLOUIN
M. J. INGELIDO
Joint Secretariat
____________________
* Not reproduced herewith; on file in Joint Secretariat
EXCLUDED FROM GDS
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY
TOP SECRET
JCS 1969/321
2165
UNCLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET
--------------------[page 2; page 3:]--------------------
TOP SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET
JCS 1969/321
14 March 1962
COPY NO. 1
SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DECISION ON JCS 1969/321
A Note by the Secretaries
on
NORTHWOODS (S)
Note by the Secretaries
1. At their meeting on 13 March 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
approved the recommendations in paragraph 8 of JCS 1969/321.
2. In that the Commandant had expressed direct concern of the Marine
Corps in this matter, the provisions of Title 10, US Code 141 (6),
applied and were followed.
3. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached as the
top sheet of JCS 1969/321.
F. J. BLOUIN
M. J. INGELIDO
Joint Secretariat
SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED
BY JCS ON 21 May 84
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED
EXCLUDED FROM GDS
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY
UNCLASSIFIED
--------------------[page 3; page 4:]--------------------
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN
UNCLASSIFIED
9 March 1962
COPY ____ OF ____ COPIES
SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION
REPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REPRESENTATIVE ON THE
CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP
to the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
on
CUBA PROJECT (TS)
The Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, has requested that he be
furnished the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this matter by 13
March 1962.
EXCLUDED FROM GDS
UNCLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN
--------------------[page 4; page 5:]--------------------
UNCLASSIFIED
JUSTIFICATION FOR US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA (TS)
THE PROBLEM
1. As requested* by Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff are to indicate brief but precise description of
pretexts which they consider would provide justification for US
military intervention in Cuba.
FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
2. It is recognized that any action which becomes pretext for US
military intervention in Cuba will lead to a political decision which
then would lead to military action.
3. Cognizance has been taken of a suggested course of action
proposed** by the US Navy relating to generated instances in the
Guantanamo area.
4. For additional facts see Enclosure B.
DISCUSSION
5. The suggested courses of action appended to Enclosure A are based
on the premise that US military intervention will result from a period
of heightened US-Cuban tensions which place the United States In the
position of suffering justifiable grievances. World opinion, and the
United Nations forum should be favorably affected by developing the
international image of the Cuban government as rash and irresponsible,
and as an alarming and unpredictable threat to the peace of the
Western Hemisphere.
6. While the foregoing premise can be utilized at the present time it
will continue to hold good only as long as there can be reasonable
certainty that US military intervention in Cuba would not directly
involve the Soviet Union. There is
___________
* Memorandum for General Craig from Chief of Operations, Cuba Project,
subject: "Operation MONGOOSE", dated 5 March 1962, on file in General
Craig's office.
** Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, from Chief of
Naval Operations, subject: "Instances to Provoke Military Actions in
Cuba (TS)", dated 8 March 1962, on file in General Craig's office.
2
UNCLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN
--------------------[page 5; page 6:]--------------------
UNCLASSIFIED
as yet no bilateral mutual support agreement binding the USSR to the
defense of Cuba, Cuba has not yet become a member of the Warsaw Pact,
nor have the Soviets established Soviet bases in Cuba in the pattern
of US bases in Western Europe. Therefore, since time appears to be an
important factor in resolution of the Cuba problem, all projects are
suggested within the time frame of the next few months.
CONCLUSION
The suggested courses of action appended to Enclosure A satisfactorily
respond to the statement of the problem. However, these suggestions
should be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning
purposes, and together with similar inputs from other agencies,
provide a basis for development of a single, integrated, time-phased
plan to focus all efforts on the objective of justification for US
military intervention in Cuba.
RECOMMENDATIONS
8. It is recommended that:
a. Enclosure A together with its attachments should be forwarded to
the Secretary of Defense for approval and transmittal to the Chief of
Operations, Cuba Project.
b. This paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified or specified
commands.
c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to NATO
activities.
d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United
Nations Military Staff Committee.
3
UNCLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN
--------------------[page 6; page 7:]--------------------
UNCLASSIFIED
DRAFT
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS)
1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the attached Memorandum
for the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, which responds to a
request* of that office for brief but precise description of pretexts
which would provide justification for US military intervention in
Cuba.
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the proposed memorandum be
forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes.
It is assumed that there will be similar submissions from other
agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basis for developing
a time-phased plan. Individual projects can then be considered on a
case-by-ease basis.
3. Further, it is assumed that a single agency will be given the
primary responsibility for developing military and para-military
aspects of the basic plan. It is recommended that this responsibility
for both overt and covert military operations be assigned the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
___________
* Memorandum for Gen Craig from Chief of Operations, Cuba Project,
subject: "Operation MONGOOSE", dated 5 March 1962, on file in Gen
Craig's office.
4
Enclosure A
UNCLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN
--------------------[page 7; page 8:]--------------------
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN
UNCLASSIFIED
APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A
DRAFT
MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, CUBA PROJECT
Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS)
1. Reference is made to memorandum from Chief of Operations, Cuba
Project, for General Craig, subject: "Operation MONGOOSE", dated 5
March 1962, which requested brief but precise description of pretexts
which the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider would provide justification
for US military intervention in Cuba.
2. The projects listed in the enclosure hereto are forwarded as a
preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes. It is assumed
that there will be similar submissions from other agencies and that
these inputs will be used as a basis for developing a time-phased
plan. The individual projects can then be considered on a case-by-case
basis.
3. This plan, incorporating projects selected from the attached
suggestions, or from other sources, should be developed to focus all
efforts on a specific ultimate objective which would provide adequate
justification for US military intervention. Such a plan would enable a
logical build-up of incidents to be combined with other seemingly
unrelated events to camouflage the ultimate objective and create the
necessary impression of Cuban rashness and irresponsibility on a large
scale, directed at other countries as well as the United States. The
plan would also properly integrate and time phase the courses of
action to be pursued. The desired resultant from the execution of this
plan would be to place the United States in the apparent position of
suffering defensible grievances from a rash and irresponsible
government of Cuba and to develop an international image of a Cuban
threat to peace in the Western Hemisphere.
5
Appendix to
Enclosure A
UNCLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN
--------------------[page 8; page 9:]--------------------
UNCLASSIFIED
4. Time is an important factor in resolution of the Cuban problem.
Therefore, the plan should be so time-phased that projects would be
operable within the next few months.
5. Inasmuch as the ultimate objective is overt military intervention,
it is recommended that primary responsibility for developing military
and para-military aspects of the plan for both overt and covert
military operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
6
Appendix to
Enclosure A
UNCLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN
--------------------[page 9; page 10:]--------------------
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN
UNCLASSIFIED
ANNEX TO APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A
PRETEXTS TO JUSTIFY US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA
(Note: The courses of action which follow are a preliminary submission
suitable only for planning purposes. They are arranged neither
chronologically nor in ascending order. Together with similar inputs
from other agencies, they are intended to provide a point of departure
for the development of a single, integrated, time-phased plan. Such a
plan would permit the evaluation of individual projects within the
context of cumulative, correlated actions designed to lead inexorably
to the objective of adequate justification for US military
intervention in Cuba).
1. Since it would seem desirable to use legitimate provocation as the
basis for US military intervention in Cuba a cover and deception plan,
to include requisite preliminary actions such as has been developed in
response to Task 33 c, could be executed as an initial effort to
provoke Cuban reactions. Harassment plus deceptive actions to convince
the Cubans of imminent invasion would be emphasized. Our military
posture throughout execution of the plan will allow a rapid change
from exercise to intervention if Cuban response justifies.
2. A series of well coordinated incidents will be planned to take
place in and around Guantanamo to give genuine appearance of being
done by hostile Cuban forces.
a. Incidents to establish a credible attack (not in chronological
order):
(1) start rumors (many). Use clandestine radio.
(2) Land friendly Cubans in uniform "over-the-fence" to stage attack
on base.
(3) Capture Cuban (friendly) saboteurs inside the base.
(4) Start riots near the base main gate (friendly Cubans).
7
Annex to Appendix
to Enclosure A
UNCLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN
--------------------[page 10; page 11:]--------------------
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN
UNCLASSIFIED
(5) Blow up ammunition inside the base; start fires.
(6) Burn aircraft on air base (sabotage).
(7) Lob mortar shells from outside of base into base. Some damage to
installations.
(8) capture assault teams approaching from the sea or vicinity of
Guantanamo City.
(9) Capture militia group which storms the base.
(10) Sabotage ship in harbor; large fires -- napthalene.
(11) Sink ship near harbor entrance. Conduct funerals for mock-victims
(may be lieu of (10)).
b. United States would respond by executing offensive operations to
secure water and power supplies, destroying artillery and mortar
emplacements which threaten the base.
c. Commence large scale United States military operations.
3. A "Remember the Maine" incident could be arranged in several forms:
a. We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba.
b. We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere in the Cuban
waters. We could arrange to cause such incident in the vicinity of
Havana or Santiago as a spectacular result of Cuban attack from the
air or sea, or both. The presence of Cuban planes or ships merely
investigating the intent of the vessel could be fairly compelling
evidence that the ship was taken under attack. The nearness to Havana
or Santiago would add credibility especially to those people that
might have heard the blast or have seen the fire. The US could follow
up with an air/sea rescue operation covered by US fighters to
"evacuate" remaining members of the non-existent crew. Casualty lists
in US newspapers would cause a helpful wave of national indignation.
4. We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami
area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington.
8
Annex to Appendix
to Enclosure A
UNCLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN
--------------------[page 11; page 12:]--------------------
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN
UNCLASSIFIED
The terror campaign could be pointed at refugees seeking haven in the
United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans enroute to Florida
(real or simulated). We could foster attempts on lives of Cuban
refugees in the United States even to the extent of wounding in
instances to be widely publicized. Exploding a few plastic bombs in
carefully chosen spots, the arrest of Cuban agents and the release of
prepared documents substantiating Cuban involvement, also would be
helpful in projecting the idea of an irresponsible government.
5. A "Cuban-based, Castro-supported" filibuster could be simulated
against a neighboring Caribbean nation (in the vein of the 14th of
June invasion of the Dominican Republic). We know that Castro is
backing subversive efforts clandestinely against Haiti, Dominican
Republic, Guatemala, and Nicaragua at present and possible others.
These efforts can be magnified and additional ones contrived for
exposure. For example, advantage can be taken of the sensitivity of
the Dominican Air Force to intrusions within their national air space.
"Cuban" B-26 or C-46 type aircraft could make cane-burning raids at
night. Soviet Bloc incendiaries could be found. This could be coupled
with "Cuban" messages to the Communist underground in the Dominican
Republic and "Cuban" shipments of arm which would be found, or
intercepted, on the beach.
6. Use of MIG type aircraft by US pilots could provide additional
provocation. Harassment of civil air, attacks on surface shipping and
destruction of US military drone aircraft by MIG type planes would be
useful as complementary actions. An F-86 properly painted would
convince air passengers that they saw a Cuban MIG, especially if the
pilot of the transport were to announce such fact. The primary
drawback to this suggestion appears to be the security risk inherent
in obtaining or modifying an aircraft. However, reasonable copies of
the MIG could be produced from US resources in about three months.
9
Annex to Appendix
to Enclosure A
UNCLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN
--------------------[page 12; page 13:]--------------------
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN
UNCLASSIFIED
7. Hijacking attempts against civil air and surface craft should
appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the government of
Cuba. Concurrently, genuine defections of Cuban civil and military air
and surface craft should be encouraged.
8. It is possible to create an incident which will demonstrate
convincingly that a Cuban aircraft has attacked and shot down a
chartered civil airliner enroute from the United States to Jamaica,
Guatemala, Panama or Venezuela. The destination would be chosen only
to cause the flight plan route to cross Cuba. The passengers could be
a group of college students off on a holiday or any grouping of
persons with a common interest to support chartering a non-scheduled
flight.
a. An aircraft at Eglin AFB would be painted and numbered as an exact
duplicate for a civil registered aircraft belonging to a CIA
proprietary organization in the Miami area. At a designated time the
duplicate would be substituted for the actual civil aircraft and would
be loaded with the selected passengers, all boarded under carefully
prepared aliases. The actual registered aircraft would be converted to
a drone.
b. Take off times of the drone aircraft and the actual aircraft will
be scheduled,to allow a rendezvous south of Florida. From the
rendezvous point the passenger-carrying aircraft will descend to
minimum altitude and go directly into an auxiliary field at Eglin AFB
where arrangements will have been made to evacuate the passengers and
return the aircraft to its original status. The drone aircraft
meanwhile will continue to fly the filed flight plan. When over Cuba
the drone will being transmitting on the international distress
frequency a "MAY DAY" message stating he is under attack by Cuban MIG
aircraft. The transmission will be interrupted by destruction of the
aircraft which will be triggered by radio signal. This will allow ICAO
radio
10
Annex to Appendix
to Enclosure A
UNCLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN
--------------------[page 13; page 14:]--------------------
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN
UNCLASSIFIED
stations in the Western Hemisphere to tell the US what has happened to
the aircraft instead of the US trying to "sell" the incident.
9. It Is possible to create an incident which will make it appear that
Communist Cuban MIGs have destroyed a USAF aircraft over international
waters in an unprovoked attack.
a. Approximately 4 or 5 F-101 aircraft will be dispatched in trail
from Homestead AFB, Florida, to the vicinity of Cuba. Their mission
will be to reverse course and simulate fakir aircraft for an air
defense exercise in southern Florida. These aircraft would conduct
variations of these flights at frequent Intervals. Crews would be
briefed to remain at least 12 miles off the Cuban coast; however, they
would be required to carry live ammunition in the event that hostile
actions were taken by the Cuban MIGs.
b. On one such flight, a pre-briefed pilot would fly tail-end Charley
at considerable interval between aircraft. While near the Cuban Island
this pilot would broadcast that he had been jumped by MIGs and was
going down. No other calls would be made. The pilot would then fly
directly west at extremely low altitude and land at a secure base, an
Eglin auxiliary. The aircraft would be met by the proper people,
quickly stored and given a new tail number. The pilot who had
performed the mission under an alias, would resume his proper identity
and return to his normal place of business. The pilot and aircraft
would then have disappeared.
c. At precisely the same time that the aircraft was presumably shot
down a submarine or small surface craft would disburse F-101 parts,
parachute, etc., at approximately 15 to 20 miles off the Cuban coast
and depart. The pilots returning to Homestead would have a true story
as far as they knew. Search ships and aircraft could be dispatched and
parts of aircraft found.
11
Annex to Appendix
to Enclosure A
UNCLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN
--------------------[page 14; page 15:]--------------------
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN
UNCLASSIFIED
ENCLOSURE B
FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have previously stated* that US
unilateral military intervention in Cuba can be undertaken in the
event that the Cuban regime commits hostile acts against US forces or
property which would serve as an incident upon which to base overt
intervention.
2. The need for positive action in the event that current covert
efforts to foster an Internal Cuban rebellion are unsuccessful was
indicated** by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 7 March 1962, as follows:
" - - - determination that a credible internal revolt is impossible of
attainment during the next 9-10 months will require a decision by the
United States to develop a Cuban "provocation" as justification for
positive US military action."
3. It is understood that the Department of State also is preparing
suggested courses of action to develop justification for US military
intervention in Cuba.
___________
* JCS 1969/303
** JCS 1969/313
12
Enclosure B
UNCLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN
#################################
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