Holistic Logic 101
Ian Goddard
Dear fellow Skeptics,
Let me know if you find an error:
http://www.erols.com/igoddard/holistic.htm
and if so, please define it.
Thanks. igod...@erols.com
***********************************************************************
IAN GODDARD (igod...@erols.com) Q U E S T I O N A U T H O R I T Y
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VISIT Ian Williams Goddard ------> http://www.erols.com/igoddard
_______________________________________________________________________
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Phil Harrison
In article <33af09a7...@news.erols.com>, Ian Goddard
<igod...@erols.com> writes
>Dear fellow Skeptics,
>
>Let me know if you find an error:
>
> http://www.erols.com/igoddard/holistic.htm
>
>and if so, please define it.
>
>Thanks. igod...@erols.com
These are the points that I would criticise:
>ANSWER 1: WHAT is A? A is the relation of A and not-A:
>A = relation
Here you are using A in the definition of A. Therefore you do not seem
to be providing a real definition.
>ANSWER 2: WHERE is A? A is a relation and this relation is not
>exclusively in the black, this relation is not exclusively in the
>white, the relation that is A is and can only be in both the black >and
the white. Therefore A is both A and not-A, or ~A:
>A = relation = (A + ~A)
>A = (A + ~A)
Again you are not really defining what A is. Is it the outline of the
shape, or the area contained within the shape? By your definition, A
would equal everything. You only manage to pull this off by not properly
defining A.
>not-A is necessary for the existence of A,
>therefore, not-A is a part of A.
Not necessarily true. An oven is necessary for the existance of a cake,
but the oven is not part of the cake.
Also, the black area is not necessary for the existance of A. A white A
could exist in a blue area for example.
>QUESTION: Where is the size of A?
The size of A is a property of A. It can still be measured in both
pictures and found to be the same. It is just the concept of "large" and
"small" that is compared to the objects around them. Compared to the
pixels on my monitor, they are the same size.
>When you exit area Y, you enter area not-Y.
>A (to exit) = ~A (to enter)
Agreed
>When you add X to area Y, you subtract X from area not-Y.
>A (to add) = ~A (to subtract)
What are you adding A to, and what are you subtracting not-A from? More
to the point, where did the "A" that you are adding come from? It must
have come from not-A and you are adding it to not-A therefore you are
not changing anything.
>As Einstein proved, when you fall to the earth it is also true that the
>earth rises up to you.
>A (to fall) = ~A (to rise)
Yes, position is relative.
>Point X moves to the right only relative to point not-X which moves to
>the left.
>A (motion) = ~A (counter-motion)
Except that if X is a point, then not-X (being everything else) is not a
point. Therefore this would only be true if everything that was not X is
composed of things that are not moving relative to each other.
>When object A exerts force upon object ~A, object ~A exerts an opposite
>force upon A.
>A (force) = ~A (counter-force)
This would only be true if everything that was not A is composed of a
single object rather than a vast number of objects exerting forces on
each other. For example, when I exert a force on the space bar of my
keyboard, the "q" key (which is not the space key) does not exert that
force.
>The "cube" is neither A (above) nor ~A (below), it is both A and ~A.
>However, the mind wants it to be one or the other. Notice how difficult
>it is to allow it to be neutral, it keeps "shifting" from either A or
>~A. That is a ideal example of the Aristotelian "X is either A
>or ~A, not both A and ~A" illusion happening "right before your eyes."
But it is not a cube, it is a collection of lines on a flat surface.
Also you define A as a cube seen from above. Surely then not-A is
everything that is not a cube seen from above. This would include (among
other things) a cone seen from the side. Since the object does not look
like a cone, then this argument falls down.
Your logic seems to be based on the fact that sometimes you define "not-
A" to be a single object that isn't "A", and other times you define
"not-A" to be everything that isn't A. I think this inconsistency causes
your argument to be flawed.
--
Phil Harrison
Ian Goddard
Thanks Phil for your constructive feedback, some counters...
RE: http://www.erols.com/igoddard/holistic.htm
On Tue, 24 Jun 1997 20:05:33 +0100,
Phil Harrison <phar...@ramtop.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>These are the points that I would criticise:
>
>>ANSWER 1: WHAT is A? A is the relation of A and not-A:
>
>>A = relation
>
> Here you are using A in the definition of A. Therefore you do
> not seem to be providing a real definition.
IAN: But is not the standard Aristotelian definition
of A "A = A" not also using A in the definition of A?
What I stipulated here seems a pretty
comprehensive definition of what is A:
Criterion for inclusion in “A”
x is a part of A, IF x is necessary for
the specific existence / identity of A.
If this criterion is valid, it then follows that as:
not-A is necessary for the existence of A,
therefore, not-A is a part of A.
In the same fashion, A is a part of not-A.
IF not-A is a part of A,
IF A is a part of not-A,
THEN A and not-A have the same parts.
ERGO: A = not-A
>>ANSWER 2: WHERE is A? A is a relation and this relation is not
>>exclusively in the black, this relation is not exclusively in the
>>white, the relation that is A is and can only be in both the black
>>and the white. Therefore A is both A and not-A, or ~A:
>
>>A = relation = (A + ~A)
>
>
>>A = (A + ~A)
>
> Again you are not really defining what A is. Is it the outline of
> the shape, or the area contained within the shape? By your
> definition, A would equal everything. You only manage to
> pull this off by not
> properly defining A.
IAN: See "Criterion for inclusion in 'A'" ... no?
I would note that simply because we might say,
"A is the internal area of the object A," does
not nullify the reality of its relational, or
holistic, identity. We may choose to ignore its
holistic identity, but in fact we do not and
cannot ignore it for to be aware of A is to
be aware of both A and not-A, so the holistic
nature of its identity is always confirmed.
My effort is simply to affirm its inherent
holism, which is habitually overlooked
leading to the error of assuming that
identity is local and isolated.
>>not-A is necessary for the existence of A,
>>therefore, not-A is a part of A.
>
> Not necessarily true. An oven is necessary for the existance
> of a cake, but the oven is not part of the cake.
>
> Also, the black area is not necessary for the existance of A.
> A white A could exist in a blue area for example.
IAN: Agreed, but the point is that the external area,
be it black, white, or blue, is a necessary feature of
the identity of A, and this holds as a constant. For A
to be A there must be some areas of difference. Apart
from this difference, there is no A, so A is the
difference, not a subset of it, where A is defined
as all those things necessary for its identity.
In the case of a myriad of various objects which would
include cakes and ovens, the variety of objects in the
universe defines the specific nature of each object.
For example, suppose all objects in the universe were
ovens, but there was only one cake, then the identity
of that cake is being defined as unique -- its special
shape and size -- only due to the nature of all other
objects that are defined as "not the cake."
First the cake is defined by its immediate external
surrounding it, then it's identity is further defined
by other objects that occupy that external area. The
multiplicity of objects does not alter the holistic
and inherently nonlocal nature of indentity.
>>QUESTION: Where is the size of A?
>
> The size of A is a property of A. It can still be measured
> in both pictures and found to be the same.
IAN: But in one its small, in the second large. It can
be seen as the same size relative to its internal area
only because it's defined by its external area. When we
measure the internal area of A in box 1 to that of box 2,
we also measure the area around it to be the same, ergo,
it's size is a property of both its internal and external
area, rendering the identity of A uniformly distributed
across both areas, where A is defined as all that of
which it is composed.
When I draw a line in the sand around me defining my zone,
I define two areas, not one. So too, then we measure the
internal area of A we measure two areas not one.
> It is just the concept of "large" and
> "small" that is compared to the objects around them. Compared
> to the pixels on my monitor, they are the same size.
IAN: Apart from relation to not-A, A has no size.
Therefore size is relational, or holistic.
If this is not true, then we can show an example of
a thing, A, where A has size as is removed from any
relation to something that might be called not-A.
But we cannot do that. Therefore size is relative,
and that which is relative contains the whole universe
of discourse from which the relation is derived.
>>When you exit area Y, you enter area not-Y.
>>A (to exit) = ~A (to enter)
>
>Agreed
>
>>When you add X to area Y, you subtract X from area not-Y.
>>A (to add) = ~A (to subtract)
>
>What are you adding A to, and what are you subtracting not-A from?
> More to the point, where did the "A" that you are adding come from?
> It must have come from not-A and you are adding it to not-A
> therefore you are not changing anything.
IAN: Do you mean "It must have come from not-Y..." ??
>>As Einstein proved, when you fall to the earth it is also true that
>>the earth rises up to you.
>>A (to fall) = ~A (to rise)
>
>Yes, position is relative.
>
>>Point X moves to the right only relative to point not-X which moves
>>to the left.
>>A (motion) = ~A (counter-motion)
>
> Except that if X is a point, then not-X (being everything else)
> is not a point. Therefore this would only be true if everything
> that was not X is composed of things that are not moving
> relative to each other.
IAN: Then everything is still, hence motion
is not a factor. Or am I missing your point?
>>When object A exerts force upon object ~A, object ~A exerts an
opposite
>>force upon A.
>>A (force) = ~A (counter-force)
>
>This would only be true if everything that was not A is composed
> of a single object rather than a vast number of objects exerting
> forces on each other. For example, when I exert a force on the
> space bar of my keyboard, the "q" key (which is not the space
> key) does not exert that force.
IAN: True, but that does not invalidate the
inherent conservation, or symmetry, of force.
>>The "cube" is neither A (above) nor ~A (below), it is both A and
~A.
>>However, the mind wants it to be one or the other. Notice how
difficult
>>it is to allow it to be neutral, it keeps "shifting" from either A
or
>>~A. That is a ideal example of the Aristotelian "X is either A
>>or ~A, not both A and ~A" illusion happening "right before your
eyes."
>
> But it is not a cube, it is a collection of lines on a flat
> surface.
>
> Also you define A as a cube seen from above. Surely then not-A is
> everything that is not a cube seen from above. This would include
> (among other things) a cone seen from the side. Since the object
> does not look like a cone, then this argument falls down.
IAN: I think I don't make my point there clear enough.
Those two examples, or the cube and the Mobius strip
are, as I note, "analogies," not proofs or arguments
for holistic identity, just examples of things that
can be two things at the same time, or one thing that
seems to be two things, and how the mind wants to make
them one or two things.
> Your logic seems to be based on the fact that sometimes you define
> "not-A" to be a single object that isn't "A", and other times you
> define "not-A" to be everything that isn't A. I think this
inconsistency
> causes your argument to be flawed.
IAN: I believe your correct to point that I need to
be more clear on what I refer to as "not-A," but I
don't believe it's a flaw in holistic identity theory.
No matter how many things are in our universe of discourse,
all those things area relative. I simply narrow the analysis
at my webpage down to the most primary relation, that of two
things. It does not get more simple. So I do need to expand
into dealing with a multifaceted universe of many things and
show how relational, or holistic, identity holds up. The
example of the size of A does begin to travel down that
more complex road.
The diversity of things introduces the complex issue of do
some things relate to other things more than other things.
For example, do I relate to my a tree in my backyard more
than a rock on Mars? Such variability of relation would begin
to establish a locality, or nonuniformity, of identity.
My intension is to establish the case for total uniformity
and total nonlocality of identity if it can be done. This
is the experience that occurs during the "religious," or
"enlightenment," experience. I purport that this experience
may not be a "hallucination" but that everything else might
be, and that the experience of normal identity locality is
a mental hallucination and the religious experience is the
cessation of that manufactured mental hallucination. In this
way the religious experience is the experience of reality.
That's my a-priori bias from which I need to look to skeptics
to keep me on the straight and narrow... or what a minute,
aren't I trying to get wide and expansive?? ;^)
***********************************************************************
Phil Harrison
In article <33b02cb9...@news.erols.com>, Ian Goddard
<igod...@erols.com> writes
>RE: http://www.erols.com/igoddard/holistic.htm
>
> On Tue, 24 Jun 1997 20:05:33 +0100,
> Phil Harrison <phar...@ramtop.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>
> >These are the points that I would criticise:
> >
> >>ANSWER 1: WHAT is A? A is the relation of A and not-A:
> >
> >>A = relation
> >
> > Here you are using A in the definition of A. Therefore you do
> > not seem to be providing a real definition.
>
>
>IAN: But is not the standard Aristotelian definition
>of A "A = A" not also using A in the definition of A?
>
>What I stipulated here seems a pretty
>comprehensive definition of what is A:
>
>
> Criterion for inclusion in A
>
> x is a part of A, IF x is necessary for
> the specific existence / identity of A.
>
> If this criterion is valid, it then follows that as:
>
> not-A is necessary for the existence of A,
> therefore, not-A is a part of A.
> In the same fashion, A is a part of not-A.
>
> IF not-A is a part of A,
> IF A is a part of not-A,
> THEN A and not-A have the same parts.
> ERGO: A = not-A
PHIL:
I think that you need to make a distinction between what is necessary
for the existance of A, and what is necessary for the perception of A.
Looking at your pictures, it could be argued that there is a black "a"
shape in the black square, but we are not able to percieve it.
What you are really saying is that in order to perceive the object A, an
observer needs also to be able to perceieve the surroundings of A. I
don't think that you can then go on to deduce that the surroundings of A
are a part of A from this.
> >>ANSWER 2: WHERE is A? A is a relation and this relation is not
> >>exclusively in the black, this relation is not exclusively in the
> >>white, the relation that is A is and can only be in both the black
> >>and the white. Therefore A is both A and not-A, or ~A:
> >
> >>A = relation = (A + ~A)
> >
> >
> >>A = (A + ~A)
> >
> > Again you are not really defining what A is. Is it the outline of
> > the shape, or the area contained within the shape? By your
> > definition, A would equal everything. You only manage to
> > pull this off by not
> > properly defining A.
>
>IAN: See "Criterion for inclusion in 'A'" ... no?
>
>I would note that simply because we might say,
>"A is the internal area of the object A," does
>not nullify the reality of its relational, or
>holistic, identity. We may choose to ignore its
>holistic identity, but in fact we do not and
>cannot ignore it for to be aware of A is to
>be aware of both A and not-A, so the holistic
>nature of its identity is always confirmed.
>My effort is simply to affirm its inherent
>holism, which is habitually overlooked
>leading to the error of assuming that
>identity is local and isolated.
PHIL:
What do you mean by "local"? In order to perceive A, I do not need to be
able to perceive the whole of the rest of the universe. I only need to
percieve a small area surrounding A. Also those surroundings are not
specifically necessary as I could also percieve A in different
surroundings.
> >>not-A is necessary for the existence of A,
> >>therefore, not-A is a part of A.
> >
> > Not necessarily true. An oven is necessary for the existance
> > of a cake, but the oven is not part of the cake.
> >
> > Also, the black area is not necessary for the existance of A.
> > A white A could exist in a blue area for example.
>
>IAN: Agreed, but the point is that the external area,
>be it black, white, or blue, is a necessary feature of
>the identity of A, and this holds as a constant. For A
>to be A there must be some areas of difference. Apart
>from this difference, there is no A, so A is the
>difference, not a subset of it, where A is defined
>as all those things necessary for its identity.
PHIL:
Identity and perception again (see above).
>In the case of a myriad of various objects which would
>include cakes and ovens, the variety of objects in the
>universe defines the specific nature of each object.
>For example, suppose all objects in the universe were
>ovens, but there was only one cake, then the identity
>of that cake is being defined as unique -- its special
>shape and size -- only due to the nature of all other
>objects that are defined as "not the cake."
HOMER:
Mmm, cake.
>First the cake is defined by its immediate external
>surrounding it, then it's identity is further defined
>by other objects that occupy that external area. The
>multiplicity of objects does not alter the holistic
>and inherently nonlocal nature of indentity.
PHIL:
I am not sure that the identity is further defined by the other objects.
I would say that the identity (or perception of identity) is defined by
the object, the immediate surroundings, and the observer.
> >>QUESTION: Where is the size of A?
> >
> > The size of A is a property of A. It can still be measured
> > in both pictures and found to be the same.
>
>IAN: But in one its small, in the second large. It can
>be seen as the same size relative to its internal area
>only because it's defined by its external area. When we
>measure the internal area of A in box 1 to that of box 2,
>we also measure the area around it to be the same, ergo,
>it's size is a property of both its internal and external
>area, rendering the identity of A uniformly distributed
>across both areas, where A is defined as all that of
>which it is composed.
PHIL:
By restricting concepts of size to either "large" or "small", then you
have to compare the object to surrounding objects. These are relative
concepts. I think that you make a bit of a leap in logic to suggest that
this makes the identity of A uniformly distributed across the area. I
think that it is better to say that the perception of A depends upon the
perception of the surrounding area.
>When I draw a line in the sand around me defining my zone,
>I define two areas, not one. So too, then we measure the
>internal area of A we measure two areas not one.
PHIL:
I disagree with this. When you have drawn your line in the sand, you
have the area inside the line and the area outside it (I am assuming
that you refer to a closed shape). But since you do not fully percieve
the total area outside the line, you do not really measure it. Your
perception is limited to the horizon. However, there are things beyond
the horizon that you cannot see. These are not necessary for the
perception of the smaller area. They cannot be, because you cannot
percieve them and therefore you do not know if they exist.
> > It is just the concept of "large" and
> > "small" that is compared to the objects around them. Compared
> > to the pixels on my monitor, they are the same size.
>
>IAN: Apart from relation to not-A, A has no size.
>Therefore size is relational, or holistic.
>
>If this is not true, then we can show an example of
>a thing, A, where A has size as is removed from any
>relation to something that might be called not-A.
>But we cannot do that. Therefore size is relative,
>and that which is relative contains the whole universe
>of discourse from which the relation is derived.
PHIL:
But to determine a relation you don't need the whole universe, only the
objects in that relationship. This can be only two objects.
> >>When you exit area Y, you enter area not-Y.
> >>A (to exit) = ~A (to enter)
> >
> >Agreed
> >
> >>When you add X to area Y, you subtract X from area not-Y.
> >>A (to add) = ~A (to subtract)
> >
> >What are you adding A to, and what are you subtracting not-A from?
> > More to the point, where did the "A" that you are adding come from?
> > It must have come from not-A and you are adding it to not-A
> > therefore you are not changing anything.
>
>IAN: Do you mean "It must have come from not-Y..." ??
PHIL:
Sorry, I misunderstood. I thought you were still using A to refer to an
object. You are now using A to refer to an action, are you not? This is
a little confusing though.
> >>As Einstein proved, when you fall to the earth it is also true that
> >>the earth rises up to you.
> >>A (to fall) = ~A (to rise)
> >
> >Yes, position is relative.
> >
> >>Point X moves to the right only relative to point not-X which moves
> >>to the left.
> >>A (motion) = ~A (counter-motion)
> >
> > Except that if X is a point, then not-X (being everything else)
> > is not a point. Therefore this would only be true if everything
> > that was not X is composed of things that are not moving
> > relative to each other.
>
>IAN: Then everything is still, hence motion
>is not a factor. Or am I missing your point?
PHIL:
My point is that not-X is not a point, but everything in the enire
universe that is not X. Since everything in the universe (our universe
anyway) is moving, it is too simplistic to use concepts such as left and
right. You can only define the movement of X in terms of the observer or
observers.
> >>When object A exerts force upon object ~A, object ~A exerts an
>opposite
> >>force upon A.
> >>A (force) = ~A (counter-force)
> >
> >This would only be true if everything that was not A is composed
> > of a single object rather than a vast number of objects exerting
> > forces on each other. For example, when I exert a force on the
> > space bar of my keyboard, the "q" key (which is not the space
> > key) does not exert that force.
>
>IAN: True, but that does not invalidate the
>inherent conservation, or symmetry, of force.
PHIL:
I see, you are using A to define the objects and also to define the
forces. This is confusing, and I think you are also mixing the object A
with the force A in your deductions.
PHIL:
If it is a flaw in your reasoning though, it is something you will have
to address in order to prove this theory.
>No matter how many things are in our universe of discourse,
>all those things area relative. I simply narrow the analysis
>at my webpage down to the most primary relation, that of two
>things. It does not get more simple. So I do need to expand
>into dealing with a multifaceted universe of many things and
>show how relational, or holistic, identity holds up. The
>example of the size of A does begin to travel down that
>more complex road.
>
>The diversity of things introduces the complex issue of do
>some things relate to other things more than other things.
>For example, do I relate to my a tree in my backyard more
>than a rock on Mars? Such variability of relation would begin
>to establish a locality, or nonuniformity, of identity.
PHIL:
This would certainly be an area that I would consider important.
>My intension is to establish the case for total uniformity
>and total nonlocality of identity if it can be done. This
>is the experience that occurs during the "religious," or
>"enlightenment," experience. I purport that this experience
>may not be a "hallucination" but that everything else might
>be, and that the experience of normal identity locality is
>a mental hallucination and the religious experience is the
>cessation of that manufactured mental hallucination. In this
>way the religious experience is the experience of reality.
>
>That's my a-priori bias from which I need to look to skeptics
>to keep me on the straight and narrow... or what a minute,
>aren't I trying to get wide and expansive?? ;^)
PHIL:
Well, it's nice to be appreciated for a change. Normally we only get to
argue with the likes of Wollmann, Kettler and Curley! :-)
--
Phil Harrison
Ian Goddard
Phil Harrison wrote:
>
>Ian Goddard wrote:
>>
>> Criterion for inclusion in A
>>
>> x is a part of A, IF x is necessary for
>> the specific existence / identity of A.
>>
>> If this criterion is valid, it then follows that as:
>>
>> not-A is necessary for the existence of A,
>> therefore, not-A is a part of A.
>> In the same fashion, A is a part of not-A.
>>
>> IF not-A is a part of A,
>> IF A is a part of not-A,
>> THEN A and not-A have the same parts.
>> ERGO: A = not-A
>
> PHIL:
> I think that you need to make a distinction between what is necessary
> for the existance of A, and what is necessary for the perception of A.
> Looking at your pictures, it could be argued that there is a black "a"
> shape in the black square, but we are not able to percieve it.
IAN: It could be argued that God exists beyond our
perception. My point being that I'm talking about
what we can show to exist, I'll leave speculation
about what may exist beyond perception to others.
> What you are really saying is that in order to perceive the object
> A, an observer needs also to be able to perceieve the surroundings
> of A. I don't think that you can then go on to deduce that the
> surroundings of A are a part of A from this.
IAN: If we eliminate the physical contrast between
A and not-A we physically eliminate both A and not-A.
The physical existance of a subatomic particle-wave
predicates the contrasting existance of the particle-
wave and an area external to it that might be said
to be "not the particle-wave."
That A=(A+~A) is a physical fact. Until we can show
that a thing, A, can exist free from contrasting
features, with or without an observer, to say
that A=A-(minus)~A, is false.
I don't see that holistic logic is more about laws
of perception than about laws of physical existance
and the inherent nature of things.
>>I would note that simply because we might say,
>>"A is the internal area of the object A," does
>>not nullify the reality of its relational, or
>>holistic, identity. We may choose to ignore its
>>holistic identity, but in fact we do not and
>>cannot ignore it for to be aware of A is to
>>be aware of both A and not-A, so the holistic
>>nature of its identity is always confirmed.
>>My effort is simply to affirm its inherent
>>holism, which is habitually overlooked
>>leading to the error of assuming that
>>identity is local and isolated.
>
> PHIL:
> What do you mean by "local"?
IAN: That the identity of the red ball is
exclusive to its internal area and exists
as it is free from external features... I
would call that "local identity," and
I believe that it is a fallacy.
> In order to perceive A, I do
> not need to be able to perceive the whole of the rest of the
> universe. I only need to percieve a small area surrounding A.
IAN: But the more of a large universe you
discover, the smaller A becomes. As A becomes
relatively smaller, its relative identity changes,
thereby demonstrating further that identity is relative.
> Also those surroundings are not
> specifically necessary as I could also percieve A in different
> surroundings.
IAN: Yes. The point being: no surrounding => no thing.
>>IAN: But in one its small, in the second large. It can
>>be seen as the same size relative to its internal area
>>only because it's defined by its external area. When we
>>measure the internal area of A in box 1 to that of box 2,
>>we also measure the area around it to be the same, ergo,
>>it's size is a property of both its internal and external
>>area, rendering the identity of A uniformly distributed
>>across both areas, where A is defined as all that of
>>which it is composed.
>
> PHIL:
> By restricting concepts of size to either "large" or "small",
> then you have to compare the object to surrounding objects. These
> are relative concepts. I think that you make a bit of a leap in
> logic to suggest that this makes the identity of A uniformly
> distributed across the area.
IAN: If the identity of A is distributed across all
that defines A, and if everything defines A, then
the identity of A is distributed across everything.
That seems infallibly logical to me.
> I think that it is better to say that the perception of A
> depends upon the perception of the surrounding area.
IAN: But why not say "the physical existance of A..." ?
>>When I draw a line in the sand around me defining my zone,
>>I define two areas, not one. So too, then we measure the
>>internal area of A we measure two areas not one.
>
>PHIL:
>I disagree with this. When you have drawn your line in the sand, you
>have the area inside the line and the area outside it (I am assuming
>that you refer to a closed shape). But since you do not fully percieve
>the total area outside the line, you do not really measure it. Your
>perception is limited to the horizon. However, there are things beyond
>the horizon that you cannot see. These are not necessary for the
>perception of the smaller area. They cannot be, because you cannot
>percieve them and therefore you do not know if they exist.
IAN: My analysis is exclusive to what we can
show, and what we can know, exists. I believe
that it stands that when I define one area
I define two areas regardless of the idea
that one of those areas may exceed the
extent of my awarness. When I define
one area that I know, I define two
areas that I know.
>>IAN: Apart from relation to not-A, A has no size.
>>Therefore size is relational, or holistic.
>>
>>If this is not true, then we can show an example of
>>a thing, A, where A has size as is removed from any
>>relation to something that might be called not-A.
>>But we cannot do that. Therefore size is relative,
>>and that which is relative contains the whole universe
>>of discourse from which the relation is derived.
>
> PHIL:
> But to determine a relation you don't need the whole universe, only
> the objects in that relationship. This can be only two objects.
IAN: Right. Which is why I like to boil it down
to the simple relation of just two things.
Thanks again Phil for your constructive feedback.
Phil Harrison
In article <33b62483...@news.erols.com>, Ian Goddard
<igod...@erols.com> writes
PHIL: I don't think that you need everything that is not A to exist for
A to exist. You claim to show that in order for A to exist then not-A
must also have to exist and therefore A=(A + not A). This means that A
becomes the whole universe.
But why stop there? Surely by this argument you would need some form of
"not universe" for the universe to exist. Then the universe and the "not
universe" become A. What becomes not A then? In order to support the
existence of all that can be shown to exist you need to introduce an
infinity of things that cannot be shown to exist. Therefore you cannot
restrict your analysis to what can be shown to exist since it needs
something that cannot be shown to exist in order to fit into your
reasoning.
>>>I would note that simply because we might say,
>>>"A is the internal area of the object A," does
>>>not nullify the reality of its relational, or
>>>holistic, identity. We may choose to ignore its
>>>holistic identity, but in fact we do not and
>>>cannot ignore it for to be aware of A is to
>>>be aware of both A and not-A, so the holistic
>>>nature of its identity is always confirmed.
>>>My effort is simply to affirm its inherent
>>>holism, which is habitually overlooked
>>>leading to the error of assuming that
>>>identity is local and isolated.
>>
>> PHIL:
>> What do you mean by "local"?
>
> IAN: That the identity of the red ball is
> exclusive to its internal area and exists
> as it is free from external features... I
> would call that "local identity," and
> I believe that it is a fallacy.
PHIL: I would argue that it is possible to percieve part of the
existence of a "red ball" from its internal area, but not the whole of
its existence. That is to say that from within the red ball it may be
possible to determine some of the properties of the ball (for example
its size) but not all of the properties (for example its colour).
I consider this to be the case with the universe. We can percieve some
of the properties from within and this does not require anything that is
not the universe. However, we cannot percieve all of the properties of
the universe.
>> In order to perceive A, I do
>> not need to be able to perceive the whole of the rest of the
>> universe. I only need to percieve a small area surrounding A.
>
> IAN: But the more of a large universe you
> discover, the smaller A becomes. As A becomes
> relatively smaller, its relative identity changes,
> thereby demonstrating further that identity is relative.
PHIL: As A (I assume that you mean the local identity of A here) becomes
relatively smaller, its relative identity becomes less significant. This
could be seen as an argument that nothing exists.
>> Also those surroundings are not
>> specifically necessary as I could also percieve A in different
>> surroundings.
>
> IAN: Yes. The point being: no surrounding => no thing.
PHIL: But you do not need everything that is not the local identity of A
to exist in order to percieve A. You just need something else. Therefore
no specific thing is necessary for the existance of A.
You could also percieve some of the properties of A from within. You
only need an external viewpoint in order to percieve everything about A.
>>>IAN: But in one its small, in the second large. It can
>>>be seen as the same size relative to its internal area
>>>only because it's defined by its external area. When we
>>>measure the internal area of A in box 1 to that of box 2,
>>>we also measure the area around it to be the same, ergo,
>>>it's size is a property of both its internal and external
>>>area, rendering the identity of A uniformly distributed
>>>across both areas, where A is defined as all that of
>>>which it is composed.
>>
>> PHIL:
>> By restricting concepts of size to either "large" or "small",
>> then you have to compare the object to surrounding objects. These
>> are relative concepts. I think that you make a bit of a leap in
>> logic to suggest that this makes the identity of A uniformly
>> distributed across the area.
>
> IAN: If the identity of A is distributed across all
> that defines A, and if everything defines A, then
> the identity of A is distributed across everything.
>
> That seems infallibly logical to me.
PHIL: But for your conclusions to be sound, you don't just need
infallible logic. Your premise must also be sound. I am disputing the
premise that everything defines A.
>> I think that it is better to say that the perception of A
>> depends upon the perception of the surrounding area.
>
> IAN: But why not say "the physical existance of A..." ?
PHIL: Because I think that the perception of something and the physical
existance of something are too different issues. I would even revise my
statement to say that the perception of ALL aspects of A depends upon
the perception of the surrounding area. This would allow for the fact
that we can percieve some aspects of the universe without percieving
anything that is not the universe.
>>>When I draw a line in the sand around me defining my zone,
>>>I define two areas, not one. So too, then we measure the
>>>internal area of A we measure two areas not one.
>>
>>PHIL:
>>I disagree with this. When you have drawn your line in the sand, you
>>have the area inside the line and the area outside it (I am assuming
>>that you refer to a closed shape). But since you do not fully percieve
>>the total area outside the line, you do not really measure it. Your
>>perception is limited to the horizon. However, there are things beyond
>>the horizon that you cannot see. These are not necessary for the
>>perception of the smaller area. They cannot be, because you cannot
>>percieve them and therefore you do not know if they exist.
>
> IAN: My analysis is exclusive to what we can
> show, and what we can know, exists. I believe
> that it stands that when I define one area
> I define two areas regardless of the idea
> that one of those areas may exceed the
> extent of my awarness. When I define
> one area that I know, I define two
> areas that I know.
PHIL: As I have said above, in order to extend your reasoning to include
the whole universe, you need to have something that is not the universe
in order for your reasoning to hold. Therefore your analysis cannot be
restricted to what we can know to exist.
>>>IAN: Apart from relation to not-A, A has no size.
>>>Therefore size is relational, or holistic.
>>>
>>>If this is not true, then we can show an example of
>>>a thing, A, where A has size as is removed from any
>>>relation to something that might be called not-A.
>>>But we cannot do that. Therefore size is relative,
>>>and that which is relative contains the whole universe
>>>of discourse from which the relation is derived.
>>
>> PHIL:
>> But to determine a relation you don't need the whole universe, only
>> the objects in that relationship. This can be only two objects.
>
> IAN: Right. Which is why I like to boil it down
> to the simple relation of just two things.
PHIL: But in order to extend your conclusions to the whole universe, you
need to consider what happens when you include the whole universe. It
appears to me that you then need to start including "not universes" and
then "Not not universes" and so on.
In my opinion, you do not need the whole universe to define an object,
you just need another object. When you only consider the relationship
between two objects then obviously in order to fully define object A you
would need object B. But if you introduce object C into the picture, do
you still need object B? Couldn't you just define object A from object
C?
>
> Thanks again Phil for your constructive feedback.
>
>
>********************************************************************
> VISIT Ian Williams Goddard ------> http://www.erols.com/igoddard
>____________________________________________________________________
I did, and I was quite impressed. I especially liked the part about your
8th Great Grandfather. I think that you are on dodgy ground with your
theory of gravity though (but that would be another discussion).
--
Phil Harrison