Vietnam & No Understanding
bnpham
Ralph McGehee wrote:
> >Author: Mark W. McBride, President/CEO
> >Email: Publ...@6th.Estate.com
> >Date: 1998/11/06
> >Forums: alt.politics.org.cia
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >Did you hear the news? On Tue, 03 Nov 1998 13:42:31 -0500, in
> ><363F4E97...@igc.org>, our ether buddy Ralph McGehee
> ><rmcg...@igc.org> spaketh thusly:
>
> >:) I recommend an excellent book review by Professor James G. Blight,
> >:)about a the book written by Kai Bird, THE COLOR OF TRUTH: McGeorge Bundy
> >:)and William Bundy Brothers in Arms. The review appears in the Washington
> >:)Post Book World 11/1/98. Brief extracts are:
> >:)
> >:) Why didn't Mac [Bundy] and Bill Bundy try to prevent the [Vietnam] war,
> >:)or terminate it. They knew the truth, knew we could not win and lacked the
> >:)nerve to press their case on the two presidents they served.
>
> >"Knew we could not win" solely given the constraints placed on the
> >fighters and strategists by the politicians. I disagree with the
> >populist notion that Vietnam was not a winnable war; it _was_ winnable,
> >we just weren't _allowed_ to win it. "Get in, get it done." should have
> >been the order.
>
> Re: McBride's comments:
>
> Here are some of my reasons for saying we could not win. In essence
> we were the invading army without the support of the people of Vietnam.
> Our invasion, of course, was hidden by a bodyguard of lies and presented
> to the world audience as the United States coming to the aid of a
> beleaguered nation.
Your opinion is only half true. No country would whole
heartedly support a foreign presense for a long time, no
matter how altruist is that presense. The sometime concerns
of the South Koreans, the Japanese, the West Germans
shows this. However that did not mean the people in South
VN did not want their freedom from the communists and
would not fight for it. The key here is to provide a consistent
help, not a massive one like when the US troops were in
VN, then just a few years later, reduce the help to a fraction
of it.
> At the end of this post I include figures on the amount of ordinance used
> and the casualities of the Vietnam War. It is quite obvious that the United
> States employed the most devastating force against the Vietnamese -- one
> cannot see in those figures the "constraints" claimed by McBride.
The constraints were real. For years and years, the allies forces
are not allow to pursue the enemies into Cambodia and Laos.
And since the people who waged the war were in Hanoi, but
the allies forces are not allow to take the war there on the ground,
only some bombing runs by the US, that is not anyway to win a
war.
> If you wish to see other of these arguments, please search under
> my name in dejanews.com (power search).
>
> The American people have been so deluged over the longest time by
> propaganda about the war that no mere reference can change anyone's
> views.
>
> However, we now have a number of former key officials admitting the
> realities of Vietnam. The Bundy's, and Robert McNamara and others.
>
> It is pleasant to hold on to our denials, I know, as it took me
> a very long time to overcome my resistant to these truths -- but facts
> eventually wore down my resistance. (I served in Vietnam, wrote a study
> about Asian communism and a book about my apostasy.) In these efforts
> if read all three versions of the Pentagon Papers, the CIA's reporting,
> any number of books about Vietnam and of course, books by those on the
> other side. So I do not come by my views/comments easily.
>
> Ralph McGehee
> CIABASE
>
> National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam
>
> Former President Dwight Eisenhower in his book, "Mandate for Change,"
> said "I have never talked or corresponded with a person knowledgeable
> in Indochinese affairs who did not agree that had elections been held
> at the time of the fighting, possibly 80 per cent of the population would
> have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader..."
In the time of fighting, major war leaders always seem to
command the votes. But after the war, that is another
matter. And almost everyone in VN knows about Ho's
communism, and the communists. Mr. Bush lost an election
almost immediately after the Gulf war, and Ho Chi Minh
dared not even hold any election after the first VN war in
his North VN.
> 60-75 Front was creation in early 60 of association of
> Ex-resistance members, formed by those who had survived the diemist
> Exterminations. Later developed into people's revolutionary party. About in
This is again only half truth. Everyone should know by now that
NLF was an instrument of the communists in the North. It was
formed by 1) the communist cadres who were left behind to
make sure South VN would eventually be under Ho's rule, 2)
many of the Southern communists who regrouped to the North,
and infiltrated back South.
> 60 a number of other organizations created - peasants associations,
> Workers, associations, and others representing youth, women, students,
> Writers, etc. Vgw 186. Front's order of battle three types: self-defense
> Guerrillas - local village units usually peasants by day and guerrillas at
> Night; regional troops on a more permanent basis - job to deal with enemy
> Forces in their region; regular army to deal with enemy's mobile reserves
> And to carry out military ops. 184,6,8. One area's land reform program. 192
> At beginning of 64 front claimed control of two thirds of territory and
> Over half population. It is gvt in everything but name with committees of
> Military affairs, external affairs, public health, culture, info and
> Education, etc. 223. Women's Liberation Association one of mass orgs
> Affiliated with NLF...within which virtually everyone from children to old
> people in liberated areas could make a contribution to struggle. Burchett,
> W. (1965). Vietnam: Inside Story of the Guerrilla War 265
>
> 56-62 Viet Cong organization of population proceeded hamlet by hamlet,
> incorporating ever-larger numbers into associations of peasants [farmers],
> women, youth. Such village organizations meant reduced rent, distribution of
> free land, freedom from both corvee labor and conscription into army,
> protection from extortion and brutality of appointed village chiefs,
Such village organizations mean taxes by the communists, sweep
retributions for insubordination, conscription into the NLF ranks to
wage a war.
It was the NLF and the North VNese who had a war to wage.
Thus it was them who would constantly try to mobilize the
population into fighting a war for them. The South VNese
government on the other hand, did not have a war to fight.
Thus if not for the NLF, the communists in the North, South
VN would have been a much peaceful country, without the
need for conscriptions.
> security police or army. Robert Samsom of U.S. Mission found "the Viet Cong
> land reform program possessed the universality and mass appeal that the
> Diem reform lacked." Guerrillas saw themselves "as the legitimate rulers of
Why did the Viet Cong land reform program were more
appealing? If one look a little more into the reason they
could do that, I think one would have a second thought
about its appealingness. The South VNese government
was a government formed with the ideals of fairness, law,
and order. Therefore the government just cannot take
away the lands rightfully owned by its owners, and just
distribute the lands. It could arrange, and encourage for
the farmers to by the land they work on with grants and/
free interest loans like it did.
The communists on the other hand was bent on using any
method to win whether it was fair, consistent with their
beliefs or not. For example, in the North, they confisticated
the lands away from the farmers into communes. But in
the South, they acted like they that was not their methods,
and appear largess. But even their generousity was based
on expediency, and ruthless methods. They took the land
from the owners without any compensation, and use
threats to force the land owners from complaint or use
punishments if they do. Could a fair, and lawful government
do the same thing the Viet Cong did? I don't think so.
The communists in the US would also get a lot of support
from the poor too if they confisticated all the industries,
lands, and companies and distribute them to the poor in
America. But would that be the right thing to do?
> an independent Vietnam." On 12/20/60, at a secret base near Saigon, National
> Front for Liberation of South Vietnam was announced. NLF best described as
> a coalition led by party members but held together by a common program.
> Front committees were established in thousands of villages. In 2/61, PLAF
> formally organized. Southern and central branches of Lao Dong Party
> merged into central committee directorate for the south which U.S. Called
> COSVN. 75% of villagers supported front, 20% trying to remain neutral, and
> 5% firmly pro-gvt. By 10/61, front so successful that gvt troops could not
> drive more than a few kilometers outside of any given provincial capital
> without running into sniper fire. M. Young. The Vietnam Wars
> 1945-1990 pages 67-73.
Only 5% supported the government? But even in 1064-1965,
when the SVNese military busy fighting among themselves,
the NLF could not deal a major blow to the SVNese government
and did not inspire any mass uprising. And when they attacked
the cities at Tet, 1968, there were no mass uprising in the cities,
nor their attacks accompanied by the revolution of the villagers
in the country.
And when the SVNese government got itself reasonably together
under Mr. Thieu, they focused their attention at the villages, and
won back the countryside. Still the people in the villages did not
rise up en-mass against the SVNese government. For such obvious
fact, I would say at least 90% of the villagers either neutral or
supporting the government. They either stayed to hang on to their
lands, or they would fled into the cities to be safe from the communists.
> Vietnam, 54-75 The U.S. Viewed the NLF order of battle in terms of
> certain number of soldiers and weapons not a mass revolutionary movement -
> and consistently underestimated number of troops and money needed to defeat
> the enemy. American specialists like Lansdale, Trager and Pike never
> [understood] that hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese peasants would
> fight and die willingly, for a cause beyond themselves. Senator
> Gravel edition, (1971). Pentagon papers Volume V 205-6
Again it was only half truth here. It was not a revolutionary
movement. It was a very effective and screwed organization
methods true and tried from the Lenin eras to the rise of the
Chinese communists, the VNese communists in the North
imported to the NLF. There was a need to focus into the
Viet Cong infrastructures, to cut off the head of the snakes.
That's was why the Strategic Hamlet program, the New Life
Hamlet program together with the Phoenix program was so
successful in eliminating the communist hold on the rural
population.
> Vietnam, 45-75 The U.S.'s leading wartime writer/scholar on the
> Vietcong, Douglas Pike, said that the liberation associations of
> the Vietcong were villagers molded into tight-knit, self-controlled,
> self-contained associations. Mao tse-tung of China and Vo Nguyen Giap
> called Liberation Associations the initial phase and the sine qua non
> of their revolutions. In 63, the Vietcong announced that seven
> million south Vietnamese (generally rural civilians) had joined
> these associations. Pike's article avoids numbers but those
> massive figures were the intel community's most sacrosanct secret
> or most egregious failure. If CIA had known and/or
> reported the 7,000,000 person-strong association structure --
> it would have invalidated all U.S. justifications for the war;
> liberation association members and their dedication, caused our defeat in
> Vietnam. Victory was never a possibility. Ciabase 1/95
>
> Vietnam, 67 The order-of-battle fight of Sam Adams and the CIA's
> sacrificing its integrity on the altar of public relations and political
> expediency. Macv excluded village self-defense forces from Vietcong
> yet SDF were hardened guerrillas who responsible for 40% U.S. Casualities.
> Pike Committee investigation concluded juggling figures "created false
> perceptions of enemy of U.S. Forces...pressure from policymaking officials
> [caused] erroneous assessments..." Valentine, d. (1990). The phoenix
> Program 273-4
>
> Vietnam, 68 Chief cause of intel failure re vn was degraded image of
> enemy. Second, pressure from policy-makers reinforced erroneous assessments
> of alied progress and enemy capabilities. Mission restriction curtailed
> necessary collection activity by intel officers and forced reliance on
> officers with military responsibility. House of Representatives
> Pike Committee report.
>
> Vietnam, 54 U.S. Subversion of Geneva agreements began immediately.
> Colonel Lansdale was already in Vietnam. His original mission,
> to by-pass French and to work with Vietnamese in unconventional war.
> Now he redirected to "paramilitary ops in communist areas." U.S.
> imported one million catholic Vietnamese from north that were a resource
> for Ngo Dinh Diem. Lansdale's rumors re U.S. use of nuclear weapons
> in Vietnam. Young, m. (1991). The Vietnam Wars 1945-1990
> page 45
>
> U.S. Could not acknowledge Vietnam was one country and to
> ensure triumph of its creation, U.S. Sent over U.S. 400,000 combat troops
> to fight in Vietnam. None of this could be acknowledged without irreversible
> Damage to American rationale for intervention.
> M. Young. The Vietnam Wars 1945-1990 page 179
>
> Military proceeded to misunderstand Vietnam. But in a sense
> this was necessary - to have acknowledged popular southern base of NLF, to
> Have abandoned diem in favor of a coalition gvt, would have required a
> complete reversal of U.S. Policy. In may 1960, three U.S. Special forces
> Teams arrived in Vietnam to train Vietnamese special forces for
> counterinsurgency. U.S. counterinsurgency entirely focused on
> establishing control over the population. A U.S. Conference said
> Vietnamese "are willing to support whichever side is in momentary
> local control." Kennedy's ci experts viewed insurgency as result of
> a byproduct of disruptive process of modernization, where a
> small band of ruthless outside agitators were able to exploit poverty and
> confusion of a passive population through propaganda and intimidation to
> seize power on behalf of communism. Young, M.
> The Vietnam Wars 1945-1990 pages 74-7
>
> Vietnam, 65 Liberation (NLF) forces by mid 65 had four-fifths of
> territory and 10 out of vn's 14 million population in liberated zones.
> There were 4,300 front "fortified villages" in SVN. Exact size of
> front's armed forces a secret but Dang Thang Chon, v.p. Of liberation
> youth federation said its youth org had 500,000 young members - this
> did not include those in the local Self-defense units but half who
> remained in villages expected to enlist in them. Burchett, W. (1965).
> Vietnam: Inside story of the Guerrilla War 84
>
> Vietnam, 50-75 see "the legacy of the vn war," in the indochina news
> letter. total cambodians, laotians, vnese and american dead 2,282,000;
> wounded 3,200,000; 15,500,000 tons firepower used by u.s. of that total
> 12,000,000 used in svn alone. u.s. used 6,000,000 tons of munitions in wwii
> to compare. "total firepower expended by us and allies probably exceeds the
> total firepower expended by humanity in all wars." financial cost of war to
> u.s. between 350 to 900 billion. indochina news letter 12/82 p12
>
> Vietnam, 50-75 u.s. forces in vn war included 540,000 in vn, 250,000 in
> thailand, okinawa, guam, the philippines, the seventh fleet at sea, taiwan,
> and hawaii who were directly involved in war-related activities. all these
> comprised 23% of active u.s. military personnel. in 68 the u.s. supported
> 820,000 rvn troops, and 66,000 troops from s.korea, australia, new zealand,
> the philippines and thailand. cautious economic estimates for the war thru
> june 74 over 180 billion (in 74 dollars). human toll was staggering.
> according to u.s. estimates, between 45 and 65, nearly 1 million vnese died
> from war-related causes. from 61 thru 73, 660,000 to 925,000 pavn troops
> and the people's liberation armed forces were killed and about 500,000
> wounded. in thirty years of limited war the number of casualties totaled
> between 5,245,000 and 6,140,000 killed and wounded, plus 300,000 mias. the
> vn war the fourth most severe of all international wars. indochina
> newsletter 2/89 p6-7
>
> Vietnam, 54-75 war left 1,724,562 people dead, 2,720,642 wounded, and
> 13,000,000 refugees. u.s. dropped 7.1 million tons bombs and sprayed 75.5
> million litres defoliant on svn. 303,475 u.s. troops wounded. more than
> 4,900 helicopters and 3,700 warplanes downed -- 1,100 over nvn. total u.s.
> costs war range from $378 to 900 billion dollars. levant, v. (1986). quiet
> complicity: canadian involvement in the Vietnam war 46
>
> Vietnam, 63-98 on the 20th anniversary of the end of the war hanoi
> revealed the civilian casualties of the vn war were 2,000,000 in the north,
I really would like to know where the 2,000,000 civilian
casualties of the VN war in the North came from. It was
certainly not from the US bombings since even when the
anti-war from the US urged the communists to inflated the
North VNese casualties to hundreds of thoudsands, they
refused. Does anyone know?
> and 2,000,000 in the south. military casualties were 1.1 million killed and
> 600,000 wounded in 21 years of war (1963-74). these figures were
> deliberately falsified during the war by the north vn to avoid demoralizing
> the population. on the us side, the figures given are 58,200 us soldiers
> killed, 223,748 south Vietnamese soldiers, and 5,200 south koreans,
> australians, new zealanders, and thais. these figures don't factor in laos
> and cambodia. given a Vietnamese population of around 38 million during the
> war, Vietnamese casualties represent a good 12-13% of the country. agence
> france presse 9/4/95
>
> Vietnam - the viet cong were winning because they were leading a social
> revolution. reasons for staying in vn cited by mcnaughton as 70% to avoid a
> humiliating defeat; 20% to keep svn (and the adjacent) territory from
> chinese hands; and, 10% to permit the people of vn to enjoy a better, freer
> way of life. sheehan, n. (1988). a bright shining lie 518-9, 535
--
Please visit the Thai Binh webpages at for extensive coverage of the
events at Xuan Loc, Thai Binh and else where:
http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Lobby/4417
http://www.members.aol.com/thaibinhvn
http://www.geocities.com/CollegePark/Campus/4973/index.htm
Mike Hunt
>
However that did not mean the people in South
> VN did not want their freedom from the communists and
> would not fight for it. The key here is to provide a consistent
> help, not a massive one like when the US troops were in
> VN,
I still haven't heard your reason why the ARVN could not adequately
defend "South" Vietnam between 1954 and 1965 (11 years before U.S.
combat troops arrived). You got billions of dollars from the U.S.
And now you're saying the U.S. gave TOO MUCH aid.
Sheesh...does ANYONE give this bozo any credibility.
Bill Clarke
>
> I still haven't heard your reason why the ARVN could not adequately
> defend "South" Vietnam between 1954 and 1965 (11 years before U.S.
> combat troops arrived). You got billions of dollars from the U.S.
>
> And now you're saying the U.S. gave TOO MUCH aid.
>
> Sheesh...does ANYONE give this bozo any credibility.
Well dumbo, the communist didn’t come to power until 1975, so I guess
ARVN was adequately defending “South” Viet Nam between 1954 and 1965.
By your own admission, 11 years before US combat troops arrived . Of
course, your Uncle Ho admits that he wasted some time killing his own
people up north and that delayed him coming south for a few years.
Why don’t we discuss the Easter Offense of 1972 Hunt. What’s that,
“Nam” makes no mention of it? Well, that could be one of your many
problems.
Bnpham has so much more credibility and honor than you that your post is
hilarious.
And on this note dickhead, I bid you adios. Don’t think that you have
changed historical fact by my absence, I just don’t have time to waste
on your stupid bullshit anymore. I retain the option of telling you
what an obnoxious, arrogant, self righteous, ignorance ass, stupid,
historical know nothing, phony, whining mother fucker you are when you
make personal attacks on one of us. But basically Hunt, you can kiss my
ass good bye.
Bill Clarke
F Troop, 17th by god Cavalry
Mike Hunt
>
> Mike Hunt wrote:
> >
> > I still haven't heard your reason why the ARVN could not adequately
> > defend "South" Vietnam between 1954 and 1965 (11 years before U.S.
> > combat troops arrived). You got billions of dollars from the U.S.
>
> ARVN was adequately defending “South” Viet Nam between 1954 and 1965.
> By your own admission, 11 years before US combat troops arrived .
Not true, dumb ass. The NLF controlled most of Vietnam. ARVN was a
failure and did not have the support of the people. It was run by
corrupt leaders who were appointed by a corrupt government. The failure
of ARVN is why U.S. soldiers were sent there.
It's a fact that during the entire war it was always a question of
weather the ARVN could fight. There was never confidence in them.
> Why don’t we discuss the Easter Offense of 1972 Hunt.
Ok. Why did the U.S. have to bail out ARVN with air strikes? Oh, I
know...to keep another debacle like Lam Son 719 from occuring.
The ARVN could NOT handle the Easter Offense without the U.S. The ARVN
was "massively supported by B-52s and US fighter-bombers". The ARVN was
nothing without the U.S. military, as was shown time and again, until
finally ARVN disintegrated in retreat in 1975. Even their retreat was a
disgrace, the way they treated their own people. In short, they were
losers from the start.
If ARVN had been worth a damn, there would not be 58,000 names on a
wall.
WarLib'yUK
Bill Clarke wrote in message <3645C7...@livingston.net>...
>And on this note dickhead, I bid you adios. Don’t think that you >have changed historical fact by my absence, I just don’t have
time to >waste on your stupid bullshit anymore. I retain the option of telling >you what an obnoxious, arrogant, self righteous,
ignorance ass, >stupid, historical know nothing, phony, whining mother fucker you >are when you make personal attacks on one of us.
But basically >Hunt, you can kiss my ass good bye.
>
>Bill Clarke
>F Troop, 17th by god Cavalry
That goes for me too, after dealing will sorry MF's all day the last thing I want to do is do the same when I relax at home.
Goodbye little Mikey. Go home it's time to go in.
Nigel Brooks
bnpham
The ARVN was adviced, and taught to fight a US war. One
relied on a total war, with air power compensate for
static battle positions, and shorter range artilleries.
In the Khe Sanh battle, massive B52s were used. But did
anyone say the US troops at Khe Sanh were bailed out by
B52s? To say that the SVNese in 1972 had to be bailed
out by the B52s, that they did not fight is to ignorantly,
maliciously distorted, and maligned the fighting ability
of the ARVN.
Mike Hunt
>
> But basically Hunt, you can kiss my
> ass good bye.
Well, I certainly will miss you, Bill.
Goodbye and good luck.
Your friend,
Mike
Edward Combs Jr.
leave a lot to be desired. In America we believe that the government is here
for the people...in most any Asian or Eastern country they think that people
are there for the Government(whoever is in charge).
....................
bnpham wrote in message <36460BAB...@foxinternet.net>...
>Mike Hunt wrote:
>>
>> Bill Clarke wrote:
>> >
>> > Mike Hunt wrote:
>> > >
>> > > I still haven't heard your reason why the ARVN could not adequately
<snip>
John Carey
I am getting a little tired of all of this ARVN bashing, but on the other
hand, I am very glad that this discussion is taking place on a newsgroup and
not in a barroom somewhere. I am afraid that if we were physically in the
same place, that in pretty short order, I would be in a holding cell
somewhere being booked for aggravated assault and you would be calling your
orthodontist's emergency number.
That the ARVN was organized and trained on the American model, which was
designed to fight a land war in Europe can hardly be attributed to the
individual ARVN soldier, the ARVN leadership nor to the government of South
Vietnam. That the United States was engaging in nation building along the
lines of the Korean experience informed all of those decisions. Apart from
certain small initiatives like Special Forces and the Air Moble concept, the
whole United States military establishment had an orthodox view of how to
organize and they predicated their advisory effort, on which all military
aid was dependent on that plan. In short, the ARVN was built along the
lines of a conventional force designed to fight a land war in Europe because
the United States believed in that concept and wouldn't brook any deviation
from it.
It was a very poor choice for most of the war, but ironically, in the case
of the Easter Offensive in 1972, which was a very conventional action, the
ARVN performed very well against a force superior in both equipment and
number. I remember this very vividly since I was actually there on the
ground during this offensive as an advisor with the 81st Rangers.
When you say that the ARVN and the govenment of South Vietnam never had the
support of the people, I would have to point out that during the 1968 Tet
Offensive, the North Vietnamese leadership were depending on a general
uprising to occur. They thought that the populace in the countryside would
rally and join the great general offensive. In fact, the opposite occurred.
The people supported the ARVN, the RF/PF's and other allied troops against
the PAVN and the VC and the Northern general offensive was decisively
defeated. The infrastructure of the VC never recovered and the PAVN units
in the South were decimated.
At least in that case the people sided with the "corrupt government" of the
South, just as they had done in 1954 when they voted with their feet,
streaming South across the 17th parallell rather than spend two years in a
communist dominated North Viet Nam. Of course, one could argue that they
never realized that the partition was going to last more than 20 years, but
that is another issue entirely. The point is that the people of Viet Nam,
when given a chance often supported the government of South Viet Nam.
That 58,000 Americans died is a tragedy of truly terrible proportion, but to
lay the blame on the courage of the individual ARVN soldier is at best
disingenuous and at worst dishonest and racist. To say that the ARVN can't
fight is to beg the question, why didn't the Americans win then? Certainly
they can fight can't they? Perhaps the need to explain America's
embarrassment about its lack of success in Viet Nam in terms of an ally's
cowardice plays a part in that dynamic, but I personally believe that there
is more to it. Maybe it is because the ARVN were small in stature and came
from an economically underdeveloped country or that they sounded funny when
they tried to speak English (although arguably, not nearly so funny as
American's sounded when they tried to speak Vietnamese).
The real reason that 58,000 Americans died in Viet Nam is that there was
never a stragegy that defined victory for the allies. Westy identified
attrition as a quantifiable measure of effectiveness, but it was clearly a
flawed metric. In 1965, we couldn't even describe what victory actually
meant in Viet Nam, much less achieve it, and in the 10 years of confusion
that ensued, more than 58,000 Americans and a far greater number of
Vietnamese soldiers and civilians on both sides died.
Your's truly and AIRBORNE, ALL THE WAY,
John Carey
Mike Hunt wrote in message <3645F5...@hotmail.com>...
>Bill Clarke wrote:
>>
>> Mike Hunt wrote:
>> >
>> > I still haven't heard your reason why the ARVN could not adequately
>> > defend "South" Vietnam between 1954 and 1965 (11 years before U.S.
>> > combat troops arrived). You got billions of dollars from the U.S.
>>
>> Well dumbo, the communist didn’t come to power until 1975, so I guess
>> ARVN was adequately defending “South” Viet Nam between 1954 and 1965.
>> By your own admission, 11 years before US combat troops arrived .
>
>Not true, dumb ass. The NLF controlled most of Vietnam. ARVN was a
>failure and did not have the support of the people. It was run by
>corrupt leaders who were appointed by a corrupt government. The failure
>of ARVN is why U.S. soldiers were sent there.
>
>It's a fact that during the entire war it was always a question of
>weather the ARVN could fight. There was never confidence in them.
>
>
>> Why don’t we discuss the Easter Offense of 1972 Hunt.
>
>Ok. Why did the U.S. have to bail out ARVN with air strikes? Oh, I
>know...to keep another debacle like Lam Son 719 from occuring.
>
>The ARVN could NOT handle the Easter Offense without the U.S. The ARVN
>was "massively supported by B-52s and US fighter-bombers". The ARVN was
>nothing without the U.S. military, as was shown time and again, until
>finally ARVN disintegrated in retreat in 1975. Even their retreat was a
>disgrace, the way they treated their own people. In short, they were
>losers from the start.
>
>
Monte Olsen
Monte
Bill Clarke wrote in message <3645C7...@livingston.net>...
>Mike Hunt wrote:
>>
>> I still haven't heard your reason why the ARVN could not adequately
>> defend "South" Vietnam between 1954 and 1965 (11 years before U.S.
>> combat troops arrived). You got billions of dollars from the U.S.
>>
>> And now you're saying the U.S. gave TOO MUCH aid.
>>
>> Sheesh...does ANYONE give this bozo any credibility.
>
>Well dumbo, the communist didn’t come to power until 1975, so I guess
>ARVN was adequately defending “South” Viet Nam between 1954 and 1965.
>By your own admission, 11 years before US combat troops arrived . Of
>course, your Uncle Ho admits that he wasted some time killing his own
>people up north and that delayed him coming south for a few years.
>
>Why don’t we discuss the Easter Offense of 1972 Hunt. What’s that,
>“Nam” makes no mention of it? Well, that could be one of your many
>problems.
>
>Bnpham has so much more credibility and honor than you that your post is
>hilarious.
>
>And on this note dickhead, I bid you adios. Don’t think that you have
>changed historical fact by my absence, I just don’t have time to waste
>on your stupid bullshit anymore. I retain the option of telling you
>what an obnoxious, arrogant, self righteous, ignorance ass, stupid,
>historical know nothing, phony, whining mother fucker you are when you
>make personal attacks on one of us. But basically Hunt, you can kiss my
>ass good bye.
>
WarLib'UK
>
> Hi Bill,
>
> I am getting a little tired of all of this ARVN bashing, but on the other
> hand, I am very glad that this discussion is taking place on a newsgroup and
> not in a barroom somewhere. I am afraid that if we were physically in the
> same place, that in pretty short order, I would be in a holding cell
> somewhere being booked for aggravated assault and you would be calling your
> orthodontist's emergency number.
In my opinion, Mr. Hunt is probably not old enough to be allowed in a
barroom.
I am in total agreement with the rest of your post
Bill Clarke
>
> Hi Bill,
>
> I am getting a little tired of all of this ARVN bashing, but on the > other hand, I am very glad that this discussion is taking place on a > newsgroup and not in a barroom somewhere. I am afraid that if we were > physically in the same place, that in pretty short order, I would be > in a holding cell somewhere being booked for aggravated assault and > you would be calling your orthodontist's emergency number.
>
Er... John...er...I think you have me confused with the dickhead that
has been posting all this bullshit. His “name” is Mike Hunt and I would
prefer you send me to my orthodontist than confuse me with this scum.
Except for that, I have to say yours was an excellent reply and I
certainly agree with you. I especially like your points on the
European, conventional war ideology that caused us and ARVN so much
trouble in Veit Nam. I’ve read that our Europe first strategy in WW II
carried over to military promotions after the war, the boys with Ike in
Europe went on to get the 4 stars 15-20 years later while the Pacific
campaign boys got short changed. My question is, why in hell couldn’t
they see that the terrain and objectives had changed and make the
necessary adjustments.
Bill Clarke
F Troop, 17th Cav
HOLLIS6475
>>ARVN was adequately defending “South” Viet Nam between 1954 and 1965.
DUH< the war just starting it roll.
After '65 the US put greater commitment in the WAR, the NAV picked up the
void, After TET, the war was controled by the NVA, with boko supplies. When
the US pulled out, The SVN where left with little suppies (not enought for the
WAR), pretty much left alone. The NVA was not alone.
SO lets jump on the SVN, who left out front with no resources to fight against
a well supplied army.
da Gunny
Do to unsolicited junk and prono, this account has a block on it.
Friends let me know, and I will add you to the OK list.
or send mail to: Point...@aol.com
*{Michael}*
>I still haven't heard your reason why the ARVN could not adequately
>defend "South" Vietnam between 1954 and 1965 (11 years before U.S.
>combat troops arrived). You got billions of dollars from the U.S.
>And now you're saying the U.S. gave TOO MUCH aid.
>Sheesh...does ANYONE give this bozo any credibility.
Having worked a couple of times with the ARVN, I must state that they
didn't appear to put their hearts into it. When the sh*t hit the fan,
they'd scurry off behind some rather large trees and would be more
concerned as to how they'd keep their uniforms cleaned and pressed
rather than fighting off the NVA. We once ran a weapons check on three
ARVN soldiers after a fire-fight. Not one of them had discharged his
weapon!
Michael
Matt Osborn
nothing, their wives and children were always at the mercy of their
locality and if the ARVN soldier didn't look out for his own, he would
lose them in a heartbeat.
We, whose families were 10,000 miles away, had no such concerns and failed
to understand our ally's situation. Where the ARVN were well supplied and
their family's were cared for, the ARVN were equal to us, their brothers
at arms.
Matt Osborn
Mike Hunt
>
> > It's a fact that during the entire war it was always a question of
> > weather the ARVN could fight. There was never confidence in them.
> >
> > was "massively supported by B-52s and US fighter-bombers". The ARVN was
> > nothing without the U.S. military, as was shown time and again, until
> > finally ARVN disintegrated in retreat in 1975. Even their retreat was a
> > disgrace, the way they treated their own people. In short, they were
> > losers from the start.
>
> out by the B52s, that they did not fight is to ignorantly,
> maliciously distorted, and maligned the fighting ability
> of the ARVN.
Wrong.
Why don't you address the disgracefull way the ARVN treated their own
people while they were retreating in 1975.
bnpham
Mike, it seems like you don't have any fact to offer, but only
rhetorics, strongly biased opinions and always running from
one issue to another in an attempt to malign the SVNese
military whom you expressed "relief" when they were
trampled all over by the communists, thrown into the so called
reeducation camps. No wonder even people who were anti-
war condemned you.... but then again, as I have shown, you
are not anti-war. You are pro-war, pro communist war.
> > > If ARVN had been worth a damn, there would not be 58,000 names on a
> > > wall.
--
Mike Hunt
>
> same place, that in pretty short order, I would be in a holding cell
> somewhere being booked for aggravated assault and you would be calling your
> orthodontist's emergency number.
You're an asshole.
> In short, the ARVN was built along the
> lines of a conventional force designed to fight a land war in Europe because
> the United States believed in that concept and wouldn't brook any deviation
> from it.
So what, you dumb ass. That has nothing to do with the fact that the
ARVN would not fight with at least the same commitment as American
soldiers. BOTH the U.S. and the ARVN used the same style, so how does
that excuse the ARVN not having resolve. Sheesh...what dumb ass logic.
> In 1965, we couldn't even describe what victory actually
> meant in Viet Nam,
Not only 1965...the U.S. NEVER could define victory.
BTW, did I mention that you're an asshole.
Mac McKinzie
> > bnpham did not write:
> > > It's a fact that during the entire war it was always a question of
> > > weather the ARVN could fight. There was never confidence in them.
> > >
> > > The ARVN could NOT handle the Easter Offense without the U.S. The ARVN
> > > was "massively supported by B-52s and US fighter-bombers". The ARVN was
> > > nothing without the U.S. military, as was shown time and again, until
> > > finally ARVN disintegrated in retreat in 1975. Even their retreat was a
> > > disgrace, the way they treated their own people. In short, they were
> > > losers from the start.
> >
he did write:
>
> > To say that the SVNese in 1972 had to be bailed
> > out by the B52s, that they did not fight is to ignorantly,
> > maliciously distorted, and maligned the fighting ability
> > of the ARVN.
>
> Wrong.
>
> Why don't you address the disgracefull way the ARVN treated their own
> people while they were retreating in 1975.
>
why don't you address the valiant fight put up by those who didn't retreat?
why don't you tell one of the survivors of that fight what a 'disgrace' he
his. little fucker would no doubt kick yer butt for ya.
the Vietnamese have fought for over a 1000 years. you probably have never
fought for anything in your life except a place in line...
amazing.
-mac
BigDog
Mike Hunt wrote in message <364720...@hotmail.com>...
>You're an asshole.
And you're a turd, about to be flushed.
Bugs Bunny
>John Carey wrote:
>>
>> same place, that in pretty short order, I would be in a holding cell
>> somewhere being booked for aggravated assault and you would be calling your
>> orthodontist's emergency number.
>
>You're an asshole.
Awwww. Did he hurt your feelings?
And that's why the pot called the kettle black.
>
>
>> In short, the ARVN was built along the
>> lines of a conventional force designed to fight a land war in Europe because
>> the United States believed in that concept and wouldn't brook any deviation
>> from it.
>
>So what, you dumb ass. That has nothing to do with the fact that the
>ARVN would not fight with at least the same commitment as American
>soldiers. BOTH the U.S. and the ARVN used the same style, so how does
>that excuse the ARVN not having resolve. Sheesh...what dumb ass logic.
>
>
>> In 1965, we couldn't even describe what victory actually
>> meant in Viet Nam,
>
>Not only 1965...the U.S. NEVER could define victory.
>
>
>BTW, did I mention that you're an asshole.
Looking at yourself in the mirror again, eh?
Go take a hit off Pepes pipe and you'll be just fine.
Bugs
John Carey
>You're an asshole.
Well, with compelling rheortic like that, no wonder you have won the
unabashed respect of all with whom you have come in contact here. That was
pithy, terse and for what it is worth, I think rather neatly showed how
wrong I was about everything. Boy, am I embarassed! Your brilliance is
only surpassed by your eloquence.
>> In short, the ARVN was built along the
>> lines of a conventional force designed to fight a land war in Europe
because
>> the United States believed in that concept and wouldn't brook any
deviation
>> from it.
>
>So what, you dumb ass. That has nothing to do with the fact that the
>ARVN would not fight with at least the same commitment as American
>soldiers. BOTH the U.S. and the ARVN used the same style, so how does
>that excuse the ARVN not having resolve. Sheesh...what dumb ass logic.
Mike, you shouldn't criticize that which you don't understand. I was
responding to your statement that during the 1972 Easter Offensive (by the
way, I didn't see you there at the time did I?), that:
>The ARVN was "massively supported by B-52s and US fighter-bombers".
My point is that the United State's military in Viet Nam was also "massively
supported by B-52's and US fighter-bombers," and that such support doesn't
signify a lack of the ARVN's willingness to fight any more than it does an
American unit. And as far as commitment is concerned, they were fighting
before we got there and the show was still going on when we left, and they
killed more PAVN and were killed in greater numbers than American forces,
and among the ARVN dead were some men that I was proud to call my friends,
so have a care Mike when you are calling them cowards.
>BTW, did I mention that you're an asshole.
Yes Mike, you seem to have exhausted that topic and as strange as it may
seem to you, I support your right to have and express that opinion or any
other for that matter, no matter how benighted or uninformed it may be. I
support that right both because it is the cornerstone of liberty and because
so many brave men fought and died for it, all of whom were your betters
Mike, whether they be Vietnamese or American.
Yours truly,
Prince Albert in a Can...
Whoops, I forgot, I am using my real name, not a garmmer school pun related
to a woman's genetals.
Sincerely,
John Carey
John Carey
Please accept my apologies.
With regard to why the leaders of the American military couldn't see that
Viet Nam wasn't Stalangrad, your guess is as good as mine. Actually, I
think that it was just hubris. The American Military leadership, fresh from
some serious fighting in WWII and Korea simply discounted the effectiveness
of a native army. Somewhat like when the lured the PAVN into the valley of
Dien Bien Phu with the idea of crushing the Viets in a set piece battle.
Whoops...
John
Bill Clarke wrote in message <364671...@livingston.net>...
>John Carey wrote:
>>
>> Hi Bill,
>>
>> I am getting a little tired of all of this ARVN bashing, but on the >
other hand, I am very glad that this discussion is taking place on a >
newsgroup and not in a barroom somewhere. I am afraid that if we were >
physically in the same place, that in pretty short order, I would be > in a
holding cell somewhere being booked for aggravated assault and > you would
be calling your orthodontist's emergency number.
>>
>
Bill Clarke
>
> Sorry Bill, my mistake.
>
> Please accept my apologies.
>
No offense taken, thanks for the apology.
Bill Clarke
Bill Clarke
>
> On Sun, 08 Nov 1998 11:50:05 -0800, Mike Hunt <mhu...@hotmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> >Bill Clarke wrote:
> >>
> >> Mike Hunt wrote:
> >> >
> >> > defend "South" Vietnam between 1954 and 1965 (11 years before U.S.
> >> > combat troops arrived). You got billions of dollars from the U.S.
> >>
> >> ARVN was adequately defending “South” Viet Nam between 1954 and 1965.
> >
> >failure and did not have the support of the people. It was run by
> >corrupt leaders who were appointed by a corrupt government. The failure
> >of ARVN is why U.S. soldiers were sent there.
>
> the NLF controlled most of Vietnam, since the NLF did not exist in the
> DRV, If you are saying Hanoi controlled most of Vietnam, that is a
> different issue.
>
> As far as control over the territory south of the 17th, that widely
> varied over the course of hostilities. The very reason Hanoi altered
> their policy to armed insurrection in the late 1950's is because the
> NLF was almost wiped out - but you knew that, didn't you Mikey.
>
> I mean, you couldn't be THAT ignorant of the facts, right?
>
> It is clear that by 1963, ARVN's position as an effective fighting
> force was VERY much in doubt, Harkins' idiotic glowing reports not
> withstanding.
>
> >It's a fact that during the entire war it was always a question of
> >weather the ARVN could fight. There was never confidence in them.
>
> some exceptionally good units within ARVN by the late sixties-early
> seventies. High command was another question. An Loc is a good
> example.
>
> >
> >> Why don’t we discuss the Easter Offense of 1972 Hunt.
> >
> >know...to keep another debacle like Lam Son 719 from occuring.
>
> and some ARVN units suffered from agent within there command
> structure, particularly along the DMZ. On the other hand, many ARVN
> units stood ground against far superior forces. Sweeping, universal
> statement are, as usual, trash, and the refuge of those too lazy to
> actually research the matter.
Damn good reply. With your permission, I’m saving it for future
sweeping, universal statements that are, as usual, trash, and the
refuge of those too lazy to actually research the matter.
bnpham
I think there is something more to be said here. To say that by
1963, or 1964, or 1965, ARVN position as an effective fighting
force was in doubt was a little unfair.
1) During those years, the ARVN was really busy fighting among
themselves - actually it was the generals were busying fighting
Mr. Diem and each other - therefore it was no surprise that the
NLF was taking the advantage. But the fact that even then,
during those 3 years, they were not able to overthrow the
government of SVN despite it was at its weakest, and essentially
leaderless shows that the NLF at that time was not that strong.
Then 3 years later during the Tet offensive, the NLF came out,
and attacking the ARVN main forces (even here, the ARVN
was only at half strength), and it was the ARVN who was doing
the majority of the fighting, they were crushed.
I think the above proved that the NLF although took advantage
of the infighting within South VN during that period of time, did
cause some problems for the SVNese military. However it was
very far from defeating them. The people were still not supporting
the NLF. There were still no massive uprising anywhere. The
people were still waiting for the SVNese government to get a
hold of itself, come out push the communists out, and protect
them. Thus the problem in SVN then was to have an effective
leadership/government, not because of the military lacked of
strength.
Mr. Diem in 1963 had no more than something like 150,000
troops. He tried to request the US support for more to fight
the communists, but had very hard time to get it. He also
wanted to organize ranger units (the VNese ranger units were
first organized by Mr. Diem's government over the protest of
the US) to fight the guerrilla warfare with the VCs, but
disapproved by the US because they thought it was his attempt
to increase the size of his army approved by the US.
You can see this kind of struggle Mr. Diem had trying to
increase the strength of his army to fight the communists in
the book "The Pentagon papers". It was my gripe that the
US refused to help Mr. Diem militarily, thinking that Mr. Diem
had more than enough, that it was his ineffective use of the
military rather than not having it enough, not realizing that
the communists had the capability to fight a very organized
war. Then when they came into VN in 1965, they found out
that they had to use more and more troops themselves.
We have seen this kind of double standards came up from
time to time. For example, the US troops used B52s plentily
in the Khe Sanh battle, and elsewhere. But no one said the
US troops were bailed out by the B52s or that it was the B52s
that won the battles. On the other hand, the hard fightings
of the ARVN were dismissed, and implied that it was the
B52s that did all the work in An Loc, Kon Tum and else
where.
The ARVN was capable of defeating the NLF and to win
against the NLF. They were not defeated by the NLF even
when they had no leader in the years 1963-1965. And they
defeated the NLF in 1968. They lost not to the NLF, but to
an all out attacks by the NVA with the most heavy and modern
weapons the communist bloc could provide. In 1975, it was
reported that the NVA left only one division back in the North
for defensive purpose. All others divisions were in the South.
Against this, the ARVN would need much more military aids
from the US.
> >It's a fact that during the entire war it was always a question of
> >weather the ARVN could fight. There was never confidence in them.
>
> Well, maybe if the "weather" was snow, but it is clear that there were
> some exceptionally good units within ARVN by the late sixties-early
> seventies. High command was another question. An Loc is a good
> example.
>
> >
> >> Why don’t we discuss the Easter Offense of 1972 Hunt.
> >
> >Ok. Why did the U.S. have to bail out ARVN with air strikes? Oh, I
> >know...to keep another debacle like Lam Son 719 from occuring.
>
> No question - the Easter Offensive was stopped by American air strikes
> and some ARVN units suffered from agent within there command
> structure, particularly along the DMZ. On the other hand, many ARVN
> units stood ground against far superior forces. Sweeping, universal
> statement are, as usual, trash, and the refuge of those too lazy to
> actually research the matter.
--
Alan Stark
bnpham wrote:
>
>
> I think there is something more to be said here. To say that by
> 1963, or 1964, or 1965, ARVN position as an effective fighting
> force was in doubt was a little unfair.
>
> 1) During those years, the ARVN was really busy fighting among
> themselves - actually it was the generals were busying fighting
> Mr. Diem and each other - therefore it was no surprise that the
> NLF was taking the advantage. But the fact that even then,
> during those 3 years, they were not able to overthrow the
> government of SVN despite it was at its weakest, and essentially
> leaderless shows that the NLF at that time was not that strong.
>
> <snip>
>
> The ARVN was capable of defeating the NLF and to win
> against the NLF. They were not defeated by the NLF even
> when they had no leader in the years 1963-1965.
Maybe this passage from "Dereliction of Duty" both refutes and defends your
position. But it does seem that the U.S. was walking rather blindly into a
quagmire..
"In February (1965), (General) Johnson had sent his operations deputy,
Lieutenant General Palmer, to South Vietnam. Palmer found the South Vietnamese
Army inept, poorly led, and incapable of fighting effectively against the Viet
Cong, and told Johnson that the United States had two choices" withdrawl or
direct intervention on the ground...
Johnson's trip to Vietnam confirmed Palmer's findings. In the northern half of
South Vietnam, the Viet Cong had cut almost all the transportation routes,
limiting government control to the major cities. In Kontum Province government
forces had abandoned several districts completely. The only means of supply
into the high plateau was by air. In short, the South Vietnamese government
controlled only a small part of the population, concentrated in the costal
urban centers. In addition to almost routine accounts of ARVN defeats at the
hands of the Viet Cong, Westmoreland reported that North Vietnamese Regular
Army regiments had infiltrated into the Central Highlands and were preparing
for a large scale offensive. On his return to Washington, General Johnson
reported that U.S. ground forces would have to intervene directly in the
counterinsurgency." (p.246)
While you say that the NLF was not able to overthrow the government by 1965, it
would seem, from the above, that they were pretty close. This does not appear
to be unlike the situation in China from 1947-49, and we all know what happend
to KMT and its army.
Alan Stark
bnpham
> bnpham wrote:
>
> >
> >
> > I think there is something more to be said here. To say that by
> > 1963, or 1964, or 1965, ARVN position as an effective fighting
> > force was in doubt was a little unfair.
> >
> > 1) During those years, the ARVN was really busy fighting among
> > themselves - actually it was the generals were busying fighting
> > Mr. Diem and each other - therefore it was no surprise that the
> > NLF was taking the advantage. But the fact that even then,
> > during those 3 years, they were not able to overthrow the
> > government of SVN despite it was at its weakest, and essentially
> > leaderless shows that the NLF at that time was not that strong.
> >
> > <snip>
> >
> > The ARVN was capable of defeating the NLF and to win
> > against the NLF. They were not defeated by the NLF even
> > when they had no leader in the years 1963-1965.
>
> Maybe this passage from "Dereliction of Duty" both refutes and defends your
> position. But it does seem that the U.S. was walking rather blindly into a
> quagmire..
>
> "In February (1965), (General) Johnson had sent his operations deputy,
> Lieutenant General Palmer, to South Vietnam. Palmer found the South Vietnamese
> Army inept, poorly led, and incapable of fighting effectively against the Viet
> Cong, and told Johnson that the United States had two choices" withdrawl or
> direct intervention on the ground...
> Johnson's trip to Vietnam confirmed Palmer's findings. In the northern half of
> South Vietnam, the Viet Cong had cut almost all the transportation routes,
> limiting government control to the major cities. In Kontum Province government
> forces had abandoned several districts completely. The only means of supply
> into the high plateau was by air. In short, the South Vietnamese government
> controlled only a small part of the population, concentrated in the costal
> urban centers. In addition to almost routine accounts of ARVN defeats at the
> hands of the Viet Cong, Westmoreland reported that North Vietnamese Regular
> Army regiments had infiltrated into the Central Highlands and were preparing
> for a large scale offensive. On his return to Washington, General Johnson
> reported that U.S. ground forces would have to intervene directly in the
> counterinsurgency." (p.246)
>
> While you say that the NLF was not able to overthrow the government by 1965, it
> would seem, from the above, that they were pretty close. This does not appear
> to be unlike the situation in China from 1947-49, and we all know what happend
> to KMT and its army.
Even with the above assessment Alan, it was talking about NVA
regiments infiltrated into the Central Highlands, not just the NLF.
At that time, SVN might be in the danger of being run over by the
NVA, but not the NLF. But then there is no guarantee in that.
In 1975, the NVA had to use all their military strength, some 20
divisions to defeat the ARVN. With one or two divisions in 1965,
the NVA might gain some ground, but I don't think they will be
able to conquer the whole country then. And if gotten helped -
materially, not troops - I think the ARVN would be able to regain
the lost ground.
Don't forget, as early as 1960, the US already wanted to bring
troops into VN. If they did, they would make a case for it.
But SVN survived then. The communists admitted the Strategic
Hamlet program in 1962 caused them tremendous problems.
The coup against Mr. Diem in 1963 did much more damage
to the government of SVN, and the ARVN than anything the
communists was able to do.
> Alan Stark
Alan Stark
I hestitated using that last bit regarding the NVA because I thought you might
respond they way you did. The Palmer and Johnson findings dealt with the Viet Cong
and not the NVA. IMHO, if the ARVN was as strong as you believe it was then we (U.S.)
would have been much better served by providing you with financial and military
(non-personnel) aid, but apparently members of the US armed forces and governement
did not believe there was either a viable government or army in south Vietnam,
therefore troops and air strikes were required. Unfortunately, other than sending
troops and launching limited air strikes, there weren't any real objectives or
goals...the quagmire strategy.
BTW, I wouldn't stress 1975 too much, especially after Thieu's masterful strategy of
giving up the Central Highlands basically without a fight.
Alan Stark
Mike Hunt
>
> I think there is something more to be said here. To say that by
> 1963, or 1964, or 1965, ARVN position as an effective fighting
> force was in doubt was a little unfair.
>
> 1) During those years, the ARVN was really busy fighting among
> themselves - actually it was the generals were busying fighting
> Mr. Diem and each other - therefore it was no surprise that the
> NLF was taking the advantage. But the fact that even then,
> during those 3 years, they were not able to overthrow the
> government of SVN despite it was at its weakest, and essentially
> leaderless shows that the NLF at that time was not that strong.
Then why did the U.S. military go there, if not to bail you out. Why
would the U.S. risk American lives if you were being successful against
the DRV. Sheesh...talk about being deluded...
> He also
> wanted to organize ranger units (the VNese ranger units were
> first organized by Mr. Diem's government over the protest of
> the US) to fight the guerrilla warfare with the VCs, but
> disapproved by the US because they thought it was his attempt
> to increase the size of his army approved by the US.
What! You mean the U.S. would rather risk the lives of it's own
citizens than have the "South" Vietnamese use their own people.
> It was my gripe that the
> US refused to help Mr. Diem militarily,
Wait a minute. I thought you were saying the ARVN did not need the
military help of the U.S....that the ARVN had the DRV under control.
> thinking that Mr. Diem
> had more than enough, that it was his ineffective use of the
> military rather than not having it enough, not realizing that
> the communists had the capability to fight a very organized
> war.
Tell us why the ARVN could not be as organized as the DRV.
> Then when they came into VN in 1965, they found out
> that they had to use more and more troops themselves.
Of course. The people of the DRV were commited (unlike the "South"
Vietnamese) and were going to win regardless of how high the stakes
went.
> On the other hand, the hard fightings
> of the ARVN were dismissed, and implied that it was the
> B52s that did all the work in An Loc, Kon Tum and else
> where.
Not the B52s...the U.S. military. You could not do it alone...you
needed to be propped up.
The DRV did not have B52s either. Your whiner ARVN just could not fight
for their beloved "South" Vietnam.
> They lost not to the NLF, but to
> an all out attacks by the NVA with the most heavy and modern
> weapons the communist bloc could provide.
You're whining. Your side spent seventeen times more than the DRV side
and could not win. Your side had B52s, aircraft carriers, and the best
of everything. But you lacked resolve. End of war...end of story.
> In 1975, it was
> reported that the NVA left only one division back in the North
> for defensive purpose. All others divisions were in the South.
> Against this, the ARVN would need much more military aids
> from the US.
More whining. You seem to forget 1954 to 1974 when the U.S. propped you
up with 800 billion dollars and three million military personnel.
> > >It's a fact that during the entire war it was always a question of
> > >weather the ARVN could fight. There was never confidence in them.
The question has been difinitively answered...they were losers from the
start.
WarLib'UK
>
> Jerry Wrote
> Not only were they quite good at not fighting, Some of them were also
> quite good at selling the supplies that we sent them, to the black
> market, some of those same supplies ended up in the hands of the Viet
> Cong. There just is no way that as many Viet Cong as there were in that
> country, when I was there, could the north ever supply them the amount of
> small arms ammo, that could sustain the battles that the Viet Cong staged
> all over that country.
I don't believe that US/Nato ammunition was compatible with chicom stuff-
So their supply lines were indeed very good. 556 nato and 7.62 nato don't
fit ak's
WarLib'UK
>
> Jerry Wrote
> Not only were they quite good at not fighting, Some of them were also
> quite good at selling the supplies that we sent them, to the black
> market, some of those same supplies ended up in the hands of the Viet
> Cong. There just is no way that as many Viet Cong as there were in that
> country, when I was there, could the north ever supply them the amount of
> small arms ammo, that could sustain the battles that the Viet Cong staged
> all over that country.
I don't believe that US/Nato ammunition was compatible with chic stuff- So
Mac McKinzie
nigel ol dood, ya don't need AKs when ya got the M16s and M60s as well...
you recall how there never was any brass around after a firefight??? their
recycling program was pretty good too. :)
-mac
Flashmax
I got this from an 11th ACR troop who died 3 yrs ago of a heart problemat 45
yo.
TET 68 a company of ARVN troops who had missed or the plane missed its
departure time held the perimiter of Tan Sohn Nhut airfield until relieved by
elements of the 11 ACR.
Might i be enlightened ?? IOW i think the disparagement of the ARVN is more
myth than fact.
Don T.
Zoomie
Pull the chocks,lets get this kite in the air.
All of us cannot be heroes; Most of us just
stand on the curb and clap. Will Rogers