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The Cosmological Argument

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Karl Kluge

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Sep 8, 1986, 4:36:55 PM9/8/86
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In article <1...@BMS-AT.UUCP>, stu...@BMS-AT.UUCP (Stuart D. Gathman) writes:
> This is exactly right! The only consistent cosmologies I have ever
> encountered are built on either
>
> a) Total meaninglessness (existentialism).
> b) A first cause (God).
>
> Note that quantum mechanics does not provide evidence for either view.

Not quite true. For instance, Berkley's argument for the existance of God
runs something like there has to be a Meta-observer who is responsible for
the world staying consistent when we aren't around to observe it. The
paradox of Schroedinger's Cat and experiments which seem to establish
the existance of systems in juxtapositions of states, where the waveform
only collapses into a particular state when the state of the system is
observed, would seem to refute this argument, as the existence of the
Meta-observer would cause the system to fall into some state.

> Just because we are incapable of observing a cause does not mean that
> it doesn't exist (unless you subscribe to (a) in which case it doesn't
> matter).

On the contrary, it matters a great deal in trying to work out whether
or not there is free will.

> matter). The Heisenberg uncertainty principle can mean either
>
> 1) There is a certain amount of randomness in nature which makes
> measurements beyond a certain precision meaningless.
>
> 2) There is a certain level of detail in nature which we are incapable
> of observing due to our finite nature. (After all, there are more
> atoms in the universe than in all our brains and computers put together.)
>

The Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle says exactly what the math states,
which is that the product of the uncertainty of the meausurement of the
position of a particle and the uncertainty of the measurement of the
velocity is at least a certain constant. It has nothing to do with our
finite nature and everything to do with the fact the measuring the value
of one of the variables to some precision inevitably effects the value
of the other variable in a way that can't be untangled (to know the effect
that the impact of the radiation you're using to measure the position of
a particle is going to have on the velocity of the particle, you would
need to know exectly the position on velocity of the particles in the
beam of radiation, which can't both be measured to arbitrary precision
because of the HUP). So as you can see, it also has nothing to do with
"randomness". There are simply fundamental limitations on the knowledge
one can have of the state of a quantum mechanical system.

Chip Kluge (k...@g.cs.cmu.edu)

All standard disclaimers apply except this one.

Stuart D. Gathman

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Sep 9, 1986, 9:53:49 PM9/9/86
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In article <10...@g.cs.cmu.edu>, k...@g.cs.cmu.edu (Karl Kluge) writes:

> "randomness". There are simply fundamental limitations on the knowledge
> one can have of the state of a quantum mechanical system.

^^^

The knowledge *we* can have is certainly limited. Unless you assume
that only beings with our physical limitations are observing, this
does not mean there are no observers.
--
Stuart D. Gathman <..!seismo!{vrdxhq|dgis}!BMS-AT!stuart>

Wayne Throop

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Sep 15, 1986, 11:44:36 AM9/15/86
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> stu...@BMS-AT.UUCP (Stuart D. Gathman)
>> k...@g.cs.cmu.edu (Karl Kluge)

>> "randomness". There are simply fundamental limitations on the knowledge
>> one can have of the state of a quantum mechanical system.
>

> The knowledge *we* can have is certainly limited. Unless you assume
> that only beings with our physical limitations are observing, this
> does not mean there are no observers.

You mistake what recent expirements have shown. They have shown that,
not only can *we* never know, but *noone* can ever know, because the
information *ISN'T* *THERE* *TO* *BE* *KNOWN*.

--
The best book on programming for the layman is "Alice in Wonderland";
but that's because it's the best book on anything for the layman.
--- Alan J. Perlis
--
Wayne Throop <the-known-world>!mcnc!rti-sel!dg_rtp!throopw

Michael Sellers

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Sep 19, 1986, 4:04:24 PM9/19/86
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[...]

>> The knowledge *we* can have is certainly limited. Unless you assume
>> that only beings with our physical limitations are observing, this
>> does not mean there are no observers.
>
>You mistake what recent expirements have shown. They have shown that,
>not only can *we* never know, but *noone* can ever know, because the
>information *ISN'T* *THERE* *TO* *BE* *KNOWN*.
>
> Wayne Throop <the-known-world>!mcnc!rti-sel!dg_rtp!throopw

I'd really like to see a cogent defense of this last statement (I don't think
it can be done). How can we say that certain information about quantum
mechanical systems, for a given observer with perceptual abilities far
different (better) than our own, is simply unknowable. It is very different
to say that we do not or cannot observe something than to say that it
cannot be observed, period. Remember not to restrict the perceptual system
of the observer to a certain level of resolution or even by what we consider
to be fundamental "laws" (e.g., that the observer must follow a linear time-
stream and cannot observe two events at precisely the same instant). If you
do not restrict the observer in ways similar to how we are restricted, then
even quantum physical fundamentals such as the probabilistic motions of
particles that gives rise to the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle go away,
as it would, in fact, be possible for an observer to apprehend both the
position and the velocity of the particle at the same instant in time.

--

Mike Sellers
UUCP: {...your spinal column here...}!tektronix!tekecs!mikes


INNING: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 TOTAL
IDEALISTS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
REALISTS 1 1 0 4 3 1 2 0 2 0

Gene Ward Smith

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Sep 20, 1986, 6:48:16 PM9/20/86
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In article <76...@tekecs.UUCP> mi...@tekecs.UUCP (Michael Sellers) writes:

>>You mistake what recent expirements have shown. They have shown that,
>>not only can *we* never know, but *noone* can ever know, because the

>>information *ISN'T* *THERE* *TO* *BE* *KNOWN* [Wayne Throop].

>I'd really like to see a cogent defense of this last statement (I don't think
>it can be done). How can we say that certain information about quantum
>mechanical systems, for a given observer with perceptual abilities far
>different (better) than our own, is simply unknowable.

Mike, it seems to me you did not read what Wayne said carefully enough.
What he said was that (according to our current understanding) the infor-
mation cannot be measured because it doesn't exist. Even God cannot "see"
what path an electron takes if it doesn't in fact take a path, nor know
simultaneously its position and momentum if these do not simultaneously
exist. If you are asking "How do we *know* this picture of reality is the
correct one?", then this is a general problem in epistemology and the
philosophy of science with no more particular reference to this problem
than to evolution (which I find you defending in the next article).

ucbvax!brahms!gsmith Gene Ward Smith/UCB Math Dept/Berkeley CA 94720
Fifty flippant frogs / Walked by on flippered feet
And with their slime they made the time / Unnaturally fleet.

Michael Sellers

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Sep 22, 1986, 2:08:50 AM9/22/86
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I don't *think* I read Wayne wrong. He seems pretty clear in the quoted
segment above, where he says that various pieces of information [about
quantum mechanical systems, I believe] are Unknowable (capital "U") since
they cannot be apprehended by us or anyone else. Okay so far? In his
view (Wayne, where are you? I'm insecure when speaking for others),
there are some aspects of these systems about which information is not
merely beyond our sensory and instrument capacity, it simply is not
there at all. Now, I will agree that *IF* it were true that, for example,
a particle's position and momentum were existentially mutally exclusive,
then God nor anyone else could know them simultaneously. This (the IF
part) is what I believe Wayne to be asserting. What I want to see is a
defense of this assertion, since I maintain that such limitations are
either based on our own instrument resolution or that we could not tell
for sure if they were or not; basically, I don't think you can say if
a currently unknowable thing is only unknowable to us or is simply and
totally Unknowable to anyone anywhere with any abilities. No experimental
data that I know of can say for sure if intra-nuclear uncertainty is
part of the actual thing, part of the instrument's shortcomings, or part
of the model that we use to describe it. These are all three separate
conditions that, especially when talking about highly speculative and
conceptualized systems such as quantum physics, are easily and often
blurred.
I wasn't meaning to take on all of epistemology either, Gene. We'll
save that for another day :-).

Gene Ward Smith

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Sep 23, 1986, 1:06:51 AM9/23/86
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This has become a discussion on physics, and perhaps the discussion
should be directed there. (Unfortunately, this is likely to annoy some
physics types).

In article <76...@tekecs.UUCP> mi...@tekecs.UUCP (Michael Sellers) writes:

>Now, I will agree that *IF* it were true that, for example,

>a particle's position and momentum were existentially mutually exclusive,


>then God nor anyone else could know them simultaneously. This (the IF
>part) is what I believe Wayne to be asserting. What I want to see is a
>defense of this assertion, since I maintain that such limitations are
>either based on our own instrument resolution or that we could not tell
>for sure if they were or not; basically, I don't think you can say if
>a currently unknowable thing is only unknowable to us or is simply and
>totally Unknowable to anyone anywhere with any abilities. No experimental
>data that I know of can say for sure if intra-nuclear uncertainty is
>part of the actual thing, part of the instrument's shortcomings, or part
>of the model that we use to describe it.

That a theory cannot be falsified is not a reason for accepting it. I
could maintain that faeries dance in the forrest darkness but only when
mundane persons or instruments are not around. I could, but why should I?
Why do you want to maintain an electron has both a position and a momentum,
despite the weight of scientific evidence against this view? I don't get
it. We have a simple model without "hidden variables", and all the local
hidden variable theories which one would naturally propose have been
excluded. If I understand what you are proposing, an electron might
really have both a position and a momentum exactly defined at all times,
but somehow manages to fool us (maybe the interference of faeries?)
into thinking it doesn't. Why assume something bizarre unless you are
forced to? Assuming unnecessary bizarre things is in practice not a
good scientific principle, in any case.

ucbvax!brahms!gsmith Gene Ward Smith/UCB Math Dept/Berkeley CA 94720

Imagine what the world would be like if football was a worthy ritual performed
in stadiums but mathematics was a misunderstood activity ignored by almost all.

Stuart D. Gathman

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Sep 23, 1986, 3:29:03 PM9/23/86
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In article <15...@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU>, gsm...@brahms.BERKELEY.EDU (Gene Ward Smith) writes:
> mation cannot be measured because it doesn't exist. Even God cannot "see"
> what path an electron takes if it doesn't in fact take a path, nor know
> simultaneously its position and momentum if these do not simultaneously
> exist.

I (the originator of this argument) did not state that God could measure
position and velocity simultaneously or describe its path.
In fact, I rather agree with your position in this regard
(but we still could be wrong). The point is that God can predict the
outcome of a quantum experiment whereas we can't.

Wayne Throop

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Sep 24, 1986, 1:08:02 PM9/24/86
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> mi...@tekecs.UUCP (Michael Sellers)
>> throopw@dg_rtp.UUCP (Wayne Throop)

>> [no observer] can ever know, because the
>> information *ISN'T* *THERE* *TO* *BE* *KNOWN*.

> If you
> do not restrict the observer in ways similar to how we are restricted, then
> even quantum physical fundamentals such as the probabilistic motions of
> particles that gives rise to the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle go away,
> as it would, in fact, be possible for an observer to apprehend both the
> position and the velocity of the particle at the same instant in time.

And if my grandmother had wheels, she'd be a wagon. Observations have
shown particles *don't* *have* definite position and momentum
simultaneously. And my observations show that my grandmother doesn't
have wheels. If you wish to postulate that there *can* exist observers
not limited by quantum uncertainty, fine. And I can postulate that my
grandmother has wheels. With equal validity.

I agree that "if our observations are wrong, the theory built from those
observations might be wrong". But... so what? The point is we are not
talking about our inability to observe something. We are talking about
our *ability* to observe the *lack* of something. If particles have
definite position and momentum but we just can't see it, they wouldn't
form interference patterns. If local hidden varibles exist then the
"Aspect" experiments wouldn't come out the way they do. And so on.

--
My math requires, when mesons pair,
A particle that isn't there.
It isn't there again today.
Please, Fermi, make it go away!
--- Karen Anderson

Wayne Throop

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Sep 29, 1986, 6:16:12 PM9/29/86
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> mi...@tekecs.UUCP (Michael Sellers)

> I don't *think* I read Wayne wrong. He seems pretty clear in the quoted
> segment above, where he says that various pieces of information [about
> quantum mechanical systems, I believe] are Unknowable (capital "U") since
> they cannot be apprehended by us or anyone else. Okay so far? In his
> view (Wayne, where are you? I'm insecure when speaking for others),
> there are some aspects of these systems about which information is not
> merely beyond our sensory and instrument capacity, it simply is not
> there at all.

Hmmmmmm. Perhaps I was more unclear that I thought. I posted a rather
flip comparison to my grandmother having wheels (which Michael
apparently hasn't seen yet... hope it didn't offend), which I would like
to expand upon here.

First, I am *not* saying that data "hidden" by uncertainty is
Unknowable because it is unknown. Not at all. I'm saying that it is
a mischaracterization of the notion of uncertainty to claim that it is
an observer-related phenomenon at all. The portions of the theory that
derive the uncertainty relationships *don't* *mention* *observers* *at*
*all*. They state that *really* and *truely*, the data isn't there.

Now, if you wish to say that "the theory might be wrong", OK, fine, I'm
easy. But my "theory" that my grandmother doesn't have wheels might be
wrong also. Nevertheless, if somebody said that "You can't rule out
some observer being able to see the tread pattern on your grandmother's
wheels.", I'd feel justified in replying "But my grandmother doesn't
even *HAVE* wheels!" Similarly with data "hidden" by uncertainty.
There *may* be data there. And my grandmother *might* have intangible
wheels.

I hope my thoughts are clearer. I'm *not* saying that current theories
cannot be wrong. I'm saying that current theories imply that no
observer can "see" the "hidden" data, not because of some lack in
observers, but because the data just isn't there. The original posting
(by Stuart Gathman, if I'm not mistaken) focused on the observer, saying
that all observers may not be limited as QM says we are. My objection
is that QM *DOESN'T* *SAY* that we are limited! This is a common
misconception that I tried to clear up, not too well it seems in
retrospect. Sigh.

--
My math requires, when meson's pair,

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