Notes on the Intellectual Discipline 06
Noel Smith
is an information system, not a belief system. A primary task of the
intellectual discipline is to produce a propositional structure which
is not an ideology.
One could discuss the ways in which the great modern intellectual
isms--Marxism, Nietzscheanism, Freudianism, existentialism, post-
modernism--are ideologies, and as such intellectually unworthy. For
example, dip into almost any of Frederick C. Crews' publications of
the last quarter century to see a masterful dissection of Freud.
Below, two brief selections from the work of Philosophy Professor Jim
Ryan concerning the foundations of the intellectual discipline:
Some of the defenders of Fish seem to assume that there is no
difference between persuasion and good evidence, or, in other words,
that there is no such thing as good evidence. But you cannot believe
that there is no such thing as good evidence, because you would then
be forced to admit that you have no good evidence for this belief.
And you would admit that here you aren't engaging in debate
(deliberation over what the evidence shows) but instead are just
trying to bully, tempt, or otherwise non-rationally compel others to
believe as you do. In university we're trying to avoid unfounded
belief and non-rational persuasion, right? Of course, you could
respond that the concept of good evidence is just a trick perpetrated
by the oppressors, but that argument wouldn't be good evidence but
just more non-rational persuasion.
-- Jim Ryan, philosophy prof. (posted 2/14/00)
www.chronicle.com/colloquy/2000/fish/23.htm
Tuesday, March 11, 2003 Posted by Jim Ryan
Epistemology
Just one more breather from moral philosophy: the celebrated 'problem
of induction'.
What would count as evidence that inductive reasoning was unreliable?
Nothing would count. Any evidence put forth against the reliability of
induction would be either deductive or inductive inferences. Deductive
inferences won’t get you anywhere. In that department, there is only
Hume telling us that induction is not deductively airtight. Hume
famously pointed out that the evidence afforded by our experience of
the past does not give us certainty of the future, where “certainty”
refers to the logical impossibility of error. All one can distill off
from this argument is that induction is not deduction, which is
trivial.
As for inductive evidence that induction is unreliable, i.e., not
conducive to reaching the truth, well, this is an incoherent idea.
So, the question, Are inductive inferences rational? or Is induction
truth-conducive? is a non-question. There is no problem of induction.
Inductive reasoning is by definition rational, reliable,
truth-conducive. "Reasoning" means "using deduction or induction".
philosoblog.blogspot.com/2003_03_01_philosoblog_archive.html#%20%20%2090559169
smw
Noel Smith wrote:
> Just a brief note that the work product of the intellectual discipline
> is an information system, not a belief system. A primary task of the
> intellectual discipline is to produce a propositional structure which
> is not an ideology.
>
What the hell is "the intellectual discipline"?
Could you explain why the products of your own lack of intellectual
discipline always point straight to ideology, or why a defender of "good
evidence" would so consistently evidence his total disregard for minimal
standards of intellectual honesty? It's a source of utter amazement to
me how someone who spends years and years on ranting about books he
hasn't read could present himself as anything other than an ideologue of
the worst sort.
tomca...@yanospamhoo.com
> Could you explain why the products of your own lack of intellectual
> discipline always point straight to ideology, or why a defender of "good
> evidence" would so consistently evidence his total disregard for minimal
> standards of intellectual honesty? It's a source of utter amazement to
> me how someone who spends years and years on ranting about books he
> hasn't read could present himself as anything other than an ideologue of
> the worst sort.
In my guru book I read that when Nietzsche was in thrall to Wagner,
Wagner would have Nietzsche do his Christmas shopping. This holiday
season I hope to hand my wife a shopping bag and say "Dear, would you be
a Nietzsche for me?"
Don Tuite
>
>In my guru book I read that when Nietzsche was in thrall to Wagner,
>Wagner would have Nietzsche do his Christmas shopping. This holiday
>season I hope to hand my wife a shopping bag and say "Dear, would you be
>a Nietzsche for me?"
Watch out she doesn't give you a Nietzsche in the knackers.
Don
Michael S. Morris
Thursday, the 13th of November, 2003
tomcatpolka:
In my guru book I read that when Nietzsche was in thrall to Wagner,
Wagner would have Nietzsche do his Christmas shopping. This holiday
season I hope to hand my wife a shopping bag and say "Dear, would you
be
a Nietzsche for me?"
In homeschool music appreciation, we just finished off our year and
a bit with Verdi. We used William Berger's _Verdi with a Vengeance_,
which has a short bio, then synopsis (plus) about each of the 26 operas
and the Requiem, plus recording recommendations, and film recs. What we
did is get everything we could get on DVD, read each of Berger's
synopses, then a translation of the libretto, then watched the operas
as a family. With La Traviata we watched two DVD productions
plus timed that with seeing the Indianapolis Opera's production live
last fall. We got through 16 of the operas plus the Requiem.
Generally we found that the most popular ones---La Traviata,
Il Trovatore, Rigoletto, Aida, Otello, and the Requiem---were our
favourites. Though Ernani, Luisa Miller, Un Ballo in Maschera,
Don Carlo, and Falstaff were each gems in their own way. The conventions
make for so much compression of plot that there is a lot of plot
silliness and my children had a low tolerance for that. Still,
we got good at recognizing a grand scena when we encountered one,
and we also did the same sort of program for La Boheme last year,
since there was a live production of it, and we were all struck
by the transformation of the form of opera into something so
much closer to drama by the time of Puccini. I mean, the amazing thing
is to realize that Verdi was considered a big step down that road
in the first place away from Donizetti, Rossini, and Bellini.
Anyway, why I'm on about this is William Berger's _Wagner without Fear_
is our new guidebook to our new composer, and we'll probably do
Wagner for the next year and then some. We have acquired productions
on DVD of Lohengrin, Tannhaueser, Der Meistersinger, Tristan, the
Ring, and Parsifal (yes, the Syberberg film). I haven't found The
Flying Dutchman (or Rienzi, for that matter). Anyway, my sense is
that this is musically very important (for much in music that came
after), and we will certainly want to spend some time with the score
of Tristan (learn how to play the "Tristan chord" on the piano and
suchlike), and especially with the Ring (we have several guides---
especially Father Owen Lee's and Deryck Cooke's guide on 2 CD's to
the leimotifs---my kids are big fans of John Williams, and so I think
we can connect to the compositional style of Star Wars quite effectively
,
plus there's Volsunga Saga to read (probably not Nibelungenlied),
Dore illustrations to look at, a comic-book version of the Ring, and
so on). There's a lot of cool stuff to do. Anyway, the first step
with Wagner was to read the 50 or 60 pages of short bio in Berger's
book. My God, Wagner was a shit! I guess I had only the vaguest
impression of him being arrogant and all from various liner notes.
But, he seems to be the first *composer* we have encountered with the
"I am above it all, the rules do not apply to me" syndrome that we
have seen over and over again in studying modern visual artists. I
mean, Beethoven had a certain terribilita and force of character, but
Wagner seems just a total amoral slimewad at nearly every step of
the way. We encountered a great quote from Mark Twain about his
music: "I'm told it's better than it sounds." I love Wagner's music,
and the overwhelming message to me of the Ring is of the
love-destroying nature of power, but this infatuation of
Nietzsche with Wagner (expressed fawningly in _The Birth of Tragedy_),
and then his later opposition (over the Christian orthodoxy of
Parsifal?---
I don't know, haven't read _Nietzsche contra Wagner_) have become
intriguing, as much to me about Nietzsche as about Wagner.
Mike Morris
(msmo...@netdirect.net)
smw
Michael S. Morris wrote:
> My God, Wagner was a shit!
His wife was even worse. I read a letter she wrote to her daughter, and
it literally made me shiver with pity for the girl.
Michael S. Morris
Thursday, the 13th of November, 2003
I said:
My God, Wagner was a shit!
Silke:
His wife was even worse. I read a letter she wrote to her
daughter, and it literally made me shiver with pity for the girl.
I assume you mean Cosima (since I don't remember that Minna had
any children---but Minna, Wagner's first wife, sounds pretty pitiful,
too).Weird, weird family. No wonder psychoanalysts
have had a field day. Berger makes a claim at one point that
the number of books on Wagner in the Library of Congress is
larger than on any other historical figure than Jesus Christ.
Mike Morris
(msmo...@netdirect.net)
tomca...@yanospamhoo.com
> But, he seems to be the first *composer* we have encountered with the
> "I am above it all, the rules do not apply to me" syndrome that we
> have seen over and over again in studying modern visual artists.
Makes one want to be in the Superman class ...
"Quod licet Jovi, non licet bovi"
tomca...@yanospamhoo.com
> I assume you mean Cosima (since I don't remember that Minna had
> any children---but Minna, Wagner's first wife, sounds pretty pitiful,
> too).Weird, weird family. No wonder psychoanalysts
> have had a field day. Berger makes a claim at one point that
> the number of books on Wagner in the Library of Congress is
> larger than on any other historical figure than Jesus Christ.
On a lighter note, from rec.humor.funny ...
"The actions taken by the New Hampshire Episcopalians (INDUCTING A GAY
BISHOP) are an affront to Christians everywhere. I am just thankful that
the church's founder, Henry VIII, and his wife Catherine of Aragon, and his
wife Anne Boleyn, and his wife Jane Seymour, and his wife Anne of Cleves,
and his wife Katherine Howard, and his wife Catherine Parr are no longer
here to suffer through this assault on traditional Christian marriages."
Louis Katorz
>Generally we found that the most popular
>ones---La Traviata, Il Trovatore, Rigoletto,
>Aida, Otello, and the Requiem---were our
>favourites. Though Ernani, Luisa Miller,
>Un Ballo in Maschera, Don Carlo, and
>Falstaff were each gems in their own way.
Agree. Would also add "Nabucco" for its "Va pensiero" chorus.
Iirc some time ago, there was a controversy over whether Verdi borrowed
from Wagner in composing "Otello", particulary the love-duet ("Il
bacio") between Otello and Desdemona which was compared to that (the
"Liebestod") of Tristan and Isolde.
Michael S. Morris
Friday, the 14th of November, 2003
I said:
Generally we found that the most popular
ones---La Traviata, Il Trovatore, Rigoletto,
Aida, Otello, and the Requiem---were our
favourites. Though Ernani, Luisa Miller,
Un Ballo in Maschera, Don Carlo, and
Falstaff were each gems in their own way.
Louis Katorz:
Agree. Would also add "Nabucco" for its "Va pensiero" chorus.
I think we missed it as an object of study simply because
I couldn't find a DVD. I've listened to it on CD, but probably
only once, and confessedly not at a level of listening where
it made much of an impression on me. Though maybe I should
give it another try. "Va, pensiero" seems to be something
people know. (I think William Berger suggested he occasionally
hears it playing in his head during sex.)
I would add Simon Boccanegra as another that was
a positive discovery. Which would leave Stiffelio,
Attila, I Vespri Siciliani, La Forza del Destino,
and Macbeth as leaving us all a little cold, of the ones
we we studied and were able to watch/listen on DVD.
Louis:
Iirc some time ago, there was a controversy over
whether Verdi borrowed from Wagner in composing
"Otello", particulary the love-duet ("Il
bacio") between Otello and Desdemona which was
compared to that (the "Liebestod") of Tristan and
Isolde.
I don't know anything about that, but I was struck
about halfway through the Domingo Otello that its
structure might be a parody of a mass, or a black mass.
I guess Iago's aria is well known as a kind of black credo, but
I wondered if anyone has ever noticed the mass thing
before (I tried googling on what keywords I could
and didn't turn up anything online). It struck me
in the credo, which is in Act II, but the opening
in the storm seems to me like a Kyrie, and then
hail, the conqiering hero is like a Gloria.
Act III is all concerned with mercy, and Otello's
steeling of himself to have none. Instead of the
Osanna, you get this praise for the Lion of St.
Mark, which Iago later identifies with the epileptic
Otello on the floor. And, instead of "benedictus qui venit
in nomine domini" there's Otello's "Maledizione!". Human
sacrifice in the 4th act of murder/suicide, Agnus Dei.
Mike Morris
(msmo...@netdirect.net)
Louis Katorz
>"Va, pensiero" seems to be something
>people know. (I think William Berger
>suggested he occasionally hears it playing
>in his head during sex.)
Interesting since it is sung by a group of Hebrew slaves. It is a
memorable melody and the only one generally known from "Nabucco".
Mike continues:
>I was struck about halfway through the
>Domingo Otello that its structure might be
>a parody of a mass, or a black mass. I
>guess Iago's aria is well known as a kind
>of black credo, but I wondered if anyone
>has ever noticed the mass thing before (I
>tried googling on what keywords I could
>and didn't turn up anything online). It
>struck me in the credo, which is in Act II,
>but the opening in the storm seems to me
>like a Kyrie, and then hail, the conqiering
>hero is like a Gloria. Act III is all
>concerned with mercy, and Otello's
>steeling of himself to have none. Instead
>of the Osanna, you get this praise for the
>Lion of St. Mark, which Iago later
>identifies with the epileptic Otello on the
>floor. And, instead of "benedictus qui venit
>in nomine domini" there's Otello's
>"Maledizione!". Human sacrifice in the 4th
>act of murder/suicide, Agnus Dei.
Could be but I doubt that Verdi intended that. Interesting concept.
J. Del Col
Edward Cone's essay "The Old Man's Toys" in his --Music: A View From
Delft--is a very good study of Verdi's last operas, specifically
--Otello-- and
--Falstaff.--
J. Del Col
Louis Katorz
>che...@webtv.net (Louis Katorz) wrote
>in message
>news:<6068-3FB6965B-46@storefull-229
>.public.lawson.webtv.net>...
>Edward Cone's essay "The Old Man's
>Toys" in his --Music: A View From
>Delft--is a very good study of Verdi's last
>operas, specifically --Otello-- and
>--Falstaff.--
Thanks for the info. Two of my favourites along with "La Forza del
Destino".
Bruce McGuffin
> Anyway, why I'm on about this is William Berger's _Wagner without Fear_
> is our new guidebook to our new composer, and we'll probably do
> Wagner for the next year and then some. We have acquired productions
> on DVD of Lohengrin, Tannhaueser, Der Meistersinger, Tristan, the
> Ring, and Parsifal (yes, the Syberberg film). I haven't found The
> Flying Dutchman (or Rienzi, for that matter). Anyway, my sense is
> that this is musically very important (for much in music that came
> after), and we will certainly want to spend some time with the score
> of Tristan (learn how to play the "Tristan chord" on the piano and
> suchlike), and especially with the Ring (we have several guides---
> especially Father Owen Lee's and Deryck Cooke's guide on 2 CD's to
> the leimotifs---my kids are big fans of John Williams, and so I think
> we can connect to the compositional style of Star Wars quite effectively
Don't forget to obtain a copy of Anna Russell's "The Anna Russell
Album", to hear her very funny analysis of The Ring of the Nibelungs.
Bruce
Michael S. Morris
Wednesday, the 19th of November, 2003
Bruce:
Don't forget to obtain a copy of Anna
Russell's "The Anna Russell Album", to hear
her very funny analysis of The Ring of the Nibelungs.
Ordered from amazon. Thanks for the rec!
Mike Morris
(msmo...@netdirect.net)
Bruce McGuffin
> Wednesday, the 19th of November, 2003
>
> Bruce:
> Don't forget to obtain a copy of Anna
> Russell's "The Anna Russell Album", to hear
> her very funny analysis of The Ring of the Nibelungs.
>
> Ordered from amazon. Thanks for the rec!
I've so inspired myself that I ordered a copy from the library.
I'll turn it loose on the kids during out annual turkey-day drive.
Bruce
Noel Smith
>noel...@invalid.net (Noel Smith) writes:
>
>> Ryan concerning the foundations of the intellectual discipline:
>>
>> Some of the defenders of Fish seem to assume that there is no
>> difference between persuasion and good evidence, or, in other words,
>> that there is no such thing as good evidence. But you cannot
>> believe that there is no such thing as good evidence, because you
>> would then be forced to admit that you have no good evidence for
>> this belief. And you would admit that here you aren't engaging in
>> debate (deliberation over what the evidence shows) but instead are
>> just trying to bully, tempt, or otherwise non-rationally compel
>> others to believe as you do. In university we're trying to avoid
>> unfounded belief and non-rational persuasion, right? Of course, you
>> could respond that the concept of good evidence is just a trick
>> perpetrated by the oppressors, but that argument wouldn't be good
>> evidence but just more non-rational persuasion.
>> -- Jim Ryan, philosophy prof. (posted 2/14/00)
>> www.chronicle.com/colloquy/2000/fish/23.htm
>
>What's the problem with *any* of this, to someone who doesn't believe
>in "good evidence"? He'd just reply, "OK, I basically agree with what
>you said (provided your "we" doesn't include me). What's your point?"
[...]
My point is that your hypothetical simpleton skeptic has disqualified
himself for intellectual discourse. You silently elided the first
sentence of this post, which was: "Just a brief note that the work
product of the intellectual discipline is an information system, not a
belief system."
Your poor anti-intellectual ignoramus doesn't honor the ground rules
of the intellectual discipline and is utterly unqualified to
participate in intellectual activities. "Impudently absurd" is the
term Abraham Lincoln used when confronted with a lie in argument--and
the man who says "I don't believe in evidence" is precisely a liar.
The proper intellectual response to this sort of crap is to say, Don't
you _dare_ talk to me like that!
My point, in the larger sense, is that this pseudo-intellectual who
"doesn't believe in", i.e., will not listen to, good evidence is
unfortunately a prototype of such supposed intellectual giants as
Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud whose positions, as previously noted, "are
ideologies, and as such intellectually unworthy." As Frederick Crews,
the brilliantly polemical deconstructor of Freud, remarked, his themes
(in _Skeptical Engagements_) are
the specific failings of Freudian psychoanalysis; the nature,
appeal, and consequences of closed, self-validating doctrines;
the resultant indespensability of an empirical (evidence-
oriented) point of view; and the dubious effects of literary-
critical methods that spurn that point of view. The several
themes really come down to just one: the fear of facing the
world, including its works of literature, without an
intellectual narcotic ready at hand. [p. xi]
Re Nietzsche, Crews argues, "such gurus [as Barthes, Derrida,
Foucault, Lacan, Jameson] are treasured, I suspect, less for their
specific creeds than for the invigorating Nietzschean scorn they
direct at intellectual prudence." [p. xvii]
What is wrong with the current intellectual climate is that someone,
such as your intellectual buffoon, would dare to say "I don't believe
in 'good evidence.' Deal with it" and expect to be taken seriously.
Whole areas of the putative modern intellectual tradition are devoted
to what Sokal and Bricmont called fashionable nonsense.
In _Not Out of Africa_ Mary Lefkowitz notes, "Arguing that Afrocentric
writers offer a valid interpretation of ancient history is like being
comfortable with the notion that the earth is flat." [p. 8] "These
theories," she adds, "are based on false assumptions and faulty
reasoning. [p. xiii] Lefkowitz finds it necessary to remind us that
"The problem with saying that Aristotle stole his philosophy from
Egypt is not that modern Greeks and classicists will be offended;
what's wrong with the statement is that it is untrue." [p. 174]
It cannot be repeated often enough: The intellectual tradition in
large part does not meet the standards of the intellectual discipline.
Too many of its contributors are like Aaron's smugly ignorant foil,
who do not "believe" in good evidence or, believing a doctrine to be
morally right, infer that it must also be true. The intellectual
tradition is rife with the impudently absurd lie-in-argument, the
blatant denial of the obvious, and the violent solecism. The
perpetrators of such dishonesty count on honest men's being too
stunned to respond to such intellectual rot with the immediate and
punishing sarcasm which it deserves.
JimC
Noel Smith <noel...@invalid.net> writes:
> You silently elided the first sentence of this post,
So did I, but I'm not going to gloat about it.
Noel Smith
>noel...@invalid.net (Noel Smith) writes:
[...]
>> Tuesday, March 11, 2003 Posted by Jim Ryan
>> Epistemology
>> Just one more breather from moral philosophy: the celebrated 'problem
>> of induction'.
After I posted the following discussion by Ryan I began to see
problems with it, as Aaron did, but not the same ones. First, to couch
the problems in terms of reliability/unreliability is so vague as to
make it unclear what is being discussed. We need to know, when we say
that something is "reliable," whether we mean that it is necessarily
true (constitutes metaphysical certitude); or whether we mean that it
is certain for all practical purposes (probabilistic truth).
A deductive proposition is analytic. It is necessarily true. As
Anthony Flew put it in _Thinking Straight_, "Its truth can be known
simply by analyzing the meanings of all its constituent terms." [pp.
48-9] It depends on no externality. But that is its weakness: What is
the connection of a deductive proposition to the real world?
An inductive proposition is synthetic. Its truth can be known only
with reference to whatever evidence led to its formulation in the
first place. Induction belongs to the realm of the empirical. As
Pirsig said in _Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance_, "induction
[is] reasoning from particular experiences to general truths." That
the Earth is round is an inductive truth. (More precisely, it is the
result of what William Whewell called "a consilience of inductions":
Time zones, great circle routes, the complementarity of the seasons in
the north and south hemispheres, etc.). If the non-empirical nature of
deduction is deduction's weakness, its empirical nature is induction's
weakness. As I've remarked recently, the empirical is provisional
(this is essentially what Popper's falsification hypothesis means).
Which brings us to the relationship between induction and deduction,
which Ryan purports to deal with but, as I look more closely, does not
resolve. It occurred to me that an analysis of the syllogism might
help clarify things, since there are both deductive and inductive
aspects to those syllogisms which are useful.
A formally valid syllogism is analytically true (see Flew, above).
This is its deductive aspect. But a syllogism is useful only if its
premises are probable. ("All tigers have wings/All winged creatures
can fly/Therefore tigers can fly" is formally valid but not useful.)
I.F. Stone notes that Aristotle divided syllogisms into "the
dialectical, with those [propositions] believed to be necessarily and
always true; the rhetorical, with propositions believed to be
probably, though not always, true." [_Trial of Socrates_, p. 94] The
rhetorical syllogism, that is, is a deduction from inductive
(empirically warranted) premises. In general, deductions descend from
inductions; more precisely, deductions describe the relationship
between inductions.
In the real world, deductive and inductive reasoning are close allies.
Scientific method, for example, is based in large part on formulating
a tentative induction from the available evidence (the experimental
hypothesis), testing the induction under controlled conditions (the
experiment), and refining or perhaps abandoning the hypothesis
depending on the results. If the experimental results do not falsify
the hypothesis, it is used as the basis for deductive inferences
(scientific predictions). Kepler, for example, formulated the Law of
Ellipses by reasoning from the available data concerning planetary
positions over time ('law,' as hypotheses were termed at the time).
That law, with suitable refinements, is used to deduce (predict) where
a given planet will be at a specific time. Induction and deduction
working hand in hand.
I posit that deductions concerning real things--usable deductions--
are of the same epistemic order as inductions. They are provisional.
To rephrase my earlier argument concerning mathematics: Mathematics is
a deductive structure based on inductions; consequently it does not
have a more absolute nature, or possess greater certitude, than our
best inductions (which are necessarily provisional).
This brings us to Plato's Error. Understanding the provisional nature
of the empirical, and the inductive, he abandoned it for an ideal
system which was completely theoretical at the expense of being
undemonstrable by its very nature. To this day philosophical idealism
is the opiate of the intellectuals. Its anti-realism has had deadly
consequences, and its quality of being not disprovable by evidence has
been a magnet for the dishonest and the charlatan. A few samples from
those few intellectuals who have had the courage to address the
problem:
Kant speaks of idealistic intellectualizing: "Concerning metaphysics
in general, [...] I do not wish to hide the fact that I can only look
with repugnance [...] the wrong way has been chosen [...] this
fictitious science with its accursed fertility." [Kant, _Works_, ed.
Cassirer, vol. IX, 56 f. from _Open Society_, v.2, p. 250] Noretta
Koertge speaks of "postmodernist myths about science" as a "house
built on sand," [book title] where we find on p. 7, "Paul Forman, a
historian of science at the Smithsonian, speaks approvingly of "our
postmodern works" with its social-constructionist epistemology and a
'morality-based rather than truth-based _Weltgefuehl_'". Could not
morality depend, at least in part, on truth?
"The new tendency," Popper wrote, "is to discard proofs, and with
them, any kind of rational argument. [...] A new kind of dogmatism
becomes fashionable, [...] It confronts us with its dictum. And we can
_take it or leave it_. [...] Scholasticism and mysticism and despair
in reason, these are the unavoidable results of the essentialism of
Plato [...] The consequences of this defeat for the intellectual
development of mankind can hardly be overrated." [_Open Society_, v.
2, p. 21]
>> What would count as evidence that inductive reasoning was
>> unreliable? Nothing would count. Any evidence put forth against the
>> reliability of induction would be either deductive or inductive
>> inferences. Deductive inferences won't get you anywhere. In that
>> department, there is only Hume telling us that induction is not
>> deductively airtight. Hume famously pointed out that the evidence
>> afforded by our experience of the past does not give us certainty of
>> the future, where `certainty' refers to the logical impossibility of
>> error. All one can distill off from this argument is that induction
>> is not deduction, which is trivial.
>
>This proves there exists a deductive inference which fails to show
>that induction is unreliable. Missing here is the proof that there
>does not exist *any* deductive inference proving the unreliability of
>induction.
>
>> As for inductive evidence that induction is unreliable, i.e., not
>> conducive to reaching the truth, well, this is an incoherent idea.
>
>Seems pretty coherent to me. "If method X is reliable, then (by
>method X) method X is unreliable. Therefore method X is unreliable."
>
>> So, the question, Are inductive inferences rational? or Is induction
>> truth-conducive? is a non-question. There is no problem of
>> induction. Inductive reasoning is by definition rational, reliable,
>> truth-conducive. "Reasoning" means "using deduction or induction".
>
>Non sequitur. This must be a joke. "Inductive reasoning is by
>definition reasoning, so it must be reasonable." Besides, the
>"problem of induction" isn't that there's evidence of unreliability.
>The problem is that there is no evidence of reliability.