A bit of rambling on Objectivist ideas on altruism and stuff
John Bicketts
This just occured to me, folks.
Concerning objectivism and libertarianism: I asked some if they
thought that since self-interest is the only worthy pursuit, whether
or not stealing was OK. The answer was no, as I expected.
However, isnt not stealing a form of altruism? You are regarding
someone else's livelihood over your own self-interest; That's
altruism.
Now, why do you allow this form of altruism over others? Not only
that, you beleive it should be enforced- everyone should be made to
follow this kind of altruism. Why? Because, i presume, you prefer the
social effects it creates.
So, on that basis, why aren't other forms of altruistic stuff, like
welfare, alright if the social effects are beneficial. And sure,
everybody's made to pay taxes for it whether they want to or no, but
everyone's forced to not steal, regardless of their specific consent
(rather than democratic vote, which objies dont think counts)?
OK, now that that's settled, we can base the argument of
laissez-faire vs liberalism on what is the most beneficial, rather
than on so-called immutable reason and principles.
PS I think its safe to say that NO_ONE here beleives in a system of
total self-interest, where people steal any chance they can get away
with it, and no government interfering in it, and it's recognised as
perfectly legitimate. Who would want to live in that?
BTW: posted seperatly to a.p.o and t.p.l
--John Bicketts
Mailto:sfei...@mach3ww.com
T. Scheeler
In article <33bac0d8...@News.HTWM.De>, John Bicketts <sfei...@SPAMMERS.DIE.DIE.DIEmach3ww.com> wrote:
..
<barf><sigh> another one for the bozo bin.
Carl A. Papenfuss
The answer lies in the difference between ethical egoism and predatory
egoism, between understanding and acting on long range effects rather
than short range effects and desires. In your attempt to place the
l-f vs "liberalism" on a utilitarian level, you have committed the
fallacy of synthesis - that all egoism, at some level, is the same as
predatory egoism. And most people posting here do not subscribe to
predatory egoism.
--
-------------------------------------
Name: Carl A. Papenfuss
E-mail: Carl A. Papenfuss<ca4p...@micron.net>
Date: @date@
Time: @time@
This message was sent by Chameleon
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Tom Robertson
Carl A. Papenfuss wrote:
What John might have been suggesting is that there might be
similarities between ethical egoism and altruism. Ayn Rand's
emphasis, in "Atlas Shrugged," on the benefits to society as a whole
from individualism, is unmistakable. I see no difference in principle
between altruism and respecting the rights of others. I wouldn't call
either one "selfishness," a term I reserve for what Carl called
"predatory egoism," which values self-interest over justice.
Ron Hickman
In an article, John Bicketts writes:
>However, isn't not stealing a form of altruism? You are regarding
>someone else's livelihood over your own self-interest; That's
>altruism.
There is a very selfish motive for someone not to engage in theft,
namely, the consequences. I'm not referring to the possibility of
being caught by the authorities--I'm referring to the certainty of being
caught by yourself. A man who has identified a principle (such as
property rights) as good and proper and who violates that principle is
going to pay for his transgression in the form of a damaged self-esteem.
(For extreme examplea of such consequences, see the work of Yokelson
and Samenow on criminal behavior, in which they report that the one
thing professional criminals all have in common, is a unremitting
feeling of self-disgust.)
The fact that others benefit from your actions does not make that
action altruistic. If an entrepreneur started a new business that
created a thousand jobs, you couldn't properly call his action
altruistic--unless you attached no meaning to your words. Egoism
designates a morality in which the actor is the intended beneficiary
(*not* the sole beneficiary) of his actions. Altruism is the morality
of acting for the benefit of others without personal gain.
Tom Robertson
T. Scheeler wrote:
The arrogance and intolerance of some Objectivists towards sincere
questioners is so disgusting. What spiritual blindness! It's ironic
how antithetical Objectivism and objectivity seem to be. In
denouncing so many others as evil, they don't realize how full of it
they are themselves.
David Harmon
On 7 Jul 1997 07:56:41 GMT, David Friedman <DD...@best.com> wrote:
>1. People happen to have a psychology such that violating rights makes
>them miserable. You seem to be asserting this--but are you willing to
>assert it not only for illegal theft but for the much larger quantities of
>legal theft and robbery currently occurring?
Rand portrayed the large-scale looters thusly in her fiction. Every
one of them knew he was meat for the ghouls as soon as he slipped up,
and none had the satisfaction of creating anything.
But, feelings ought not be a primary consideration. Many people have
a "psychology" such that being called selfish makes them feel
miserable, too. Education can correct that. If violating rights
makes one feel bad, it should be because he knows from some other
source that violating rights is "bad."
Timothy Shell
David Friedman <DD...@best.com> wrote in article
<DDFr-07079...@ddfr.vip.best.com>...
> Answers to this conundrum seem to come down to:
You might add the unit-economy argument.
I can do a cost-benefit analysis for each and every situation that arises,
and decide on an individual, case-by-case basis whether I will steal or
refrain from stealing. This would require me to spend a great deal of time
and energy making decisions.
Or I can do a cost-benefit analysis just once, analyzing the principle of
respecting other people's rights, and the pragmatic alternative, and
deciding which principle would be most beneficial in the long run.
If respecting other people's rights is the better choice, I could adopt
this as a guiding principle in life, and thus save myself the trouble of
doing endless cost-benefit analyses every time a chance to steal came up.
If the trouble saved is substantial, then this would be the better choice.
This does not imply that there will not be some specific situations in
which the benefits of stealing outweigh the costs. But the overall
benefits of consistently following right principles will outweigh the
occasional benefits gained from their violation.
More generally, a principle or a system is good, not because it produces
the best possible outcome in each and every situation, but because it
produces the best overall effects in the long run.
> --
> David Friedman
> DD...@Best.com
> http://www.best.com/~ddfr/
>
> "No man is secure in his life, liberty or property while the legislature
is in session"
>
=====
Timothy Shell : tsh...@mcs.net
Freedoms Nest: http://www.freedomsnest.com
Tom Robertson
Ron Hickman wrote:
>In an article, David Friedman <DD...@best.com> writes:
>
>>In an article, Ron Hickman wrote:
>
>>>There is a very selfish motive for someone not to engage in theft,
>>>namely, the consequences. I'm not referring to the possibility of
>>>being caught by the authorities--I'm referring to the certainty of being
>>>caught by yourself. A man who has identified a principle (such as
>>>property rights) as good and proper and who violates that principle is
>>>going to pay for his transgression in the form of a damaged self-esteem.
>
>>[...] Or to restate, does "identified a principle as good and proper" mean
>>"concluded that I will be better off if I act on that principle" or
>>"concluded that I will be better off if everybody acts on that principle"
>>or something else?
>
>It means you have identified a rule of behavior that advances your
>interests, your values, your life. It is in your self-interest to act on
>principle, and in the interest of others that you do so, too. Similarly,
>it is in other peoples' interest that they act on prinicple and in your
>interest that they do so, too. It's not one or the other, it's both.
>AR illustrated over and over again that there are no conflict of
>interests among rational men pursuing rational values.
>
>Ron Hickman
These types of justifications for Objectivist principles leave me very
confused abut why Objectivists so strongly disapprove of Kant,
Christianity, and altruism. How does first deciding that stealing is
wrong, and then saying that doing what is wrong is against one's
self-interest, differ from doing unto others what one would have them
do unto one, doing one's duty for its own sake, or regarding the
interests of others to be as important as one's own interests?
David Friedman
In article <Ron.Hickman.556.00C3A900@-unisys.com->, Ron Hickman
<Ron.Hickman@-unisys.com-> wrote:
>In an article, David Friedman <DD...@best.com> writes:
>>[...] Or to restate, does "identified a principle as good and proper" mean
>>"concluded that I will be better off if I act on that principle" or
>>"concluded that I will be better off if everybody acts on that principle"
>>or something else?
>
>It means you have identified a rule of behavior that advances your
>interests, your values, your life. It is in your self-interest to act on
>principle, and in the interest of others that you do so, too. Similarly,
>it is in other peoples' interest that they act on prinicple and in your
>interest that they do so, too. It's not one or the other, it's both.
Suppose there is a rule such that if everyone follows it I am better off
than if nobody follows it, but I am still better off if other people
follow it and I don't. Arguably the rule "always respect other people's
rights" qualifies. If this is the case, am I correct in saying that, in
your terms, that principle is not "good and proper" for me?
If the answer is no, then I don't follow your response above, since in the
case I describe it is in my interest that other people act on principle,
but not in my interest that I do. If the answer is yes, you are left with
the problem of showing why it is never in my interest to violate other
people's rights.
David Friedman
In article <01bc8b16$447263e0$0cf936ce@jimhome>, "Timothy Shell"
<tsh...@mcs.net> wrote:
>You might add the unit-economy argument.
>
>I can do a cost-benefit analysis for each and every situation that arises,
>and decide on an individual, case-by-case basis whether I will steal or
>refrain from stealing. This would require me to spend a great deal of time
>and energy making decisions.
>
>Or I can do a cost-benefit analysis just once, analyzing the principle of
>respecting other people's rights, and the pragmatic alternative, and
>deciding which principle would be most beneficial in the long run.
That might be a good reason to follow a rule of thumb of respecting other
people's rights--but not in every case. If you happen to find yourself
with what is obviously an extraordinarily attractive opportunity to steal,
it is worth rethinking the rule to see if it still applies.
Suppose you encounter someone who acts that way. For most of his life he
behaves as an honest and rights respecting individual. He then gets an
opportunity to steal twenty million dollars and run off to Brazil--and
does. Do you approve of his behavior? Do you disapprove only because you
think the ex ante decision costs of rethinking his rule when the
opportunity arose were greater than the expected benefits?
John Bicketts
On 8 Jul 1997 13:35:39 GMT, "Paul Zrimsek" <pzri...@tiac.net> wrote:
>David Friedman <DD...@best.com> wrote in article
><DDFr-07079...@ddfr.vip.best.com>...
>> In article <01bc8b16$447263e0$0cf936ce@jimhome>, "Timothy Shell"
>> <tsh...@mcs.net> wrote:
>>
>> >You might add the unit-economy argument.
>> >
>> >I can do a cost-benefit analysis for each and every situation that
>arises,
>> >and decide on an individual, case-by-case basis whether I will steal or
>> >refrain from stealing. This would require me to spend a great deal of
>time
>> >and energy making decisions.
>> >
>> >Or I can do a cost-benefit analysis just once, analyzing the principle
>of
>> >respecting other people's rights, and the pragmatic alternative, and
>> >deciding which principle would be most beneficial in the long run.
>>
>> That might be a good reason to follow a rule of thumb of respecting other
>> people's rights--but not in every case. If you happen to find yourself
>> with what is obviously an extraordinarily attractive opportunity to
>steal,
>> it is worth rethinking the rule to see if it still applies.
>
>Depending on how often such exceptions come up, this objection could be
>seen as pointing to a strength in Shell's argument rather than a weakness:
>it makes provision for "lifeboat" situations without having to resort to
>the sort of ad-hoc exception-making that deontological rules against theft
>require. My caveat is important, though; having an easy justification for a
>starving man's stealing bread is cold comfort if the theory does, in fact,
>also justify stealing twenty million dollars and running off to Brazil.
>
Yeah, it not only includes times when you MUST steal to survive, but
also when you can simply steal without getting caught (say, you see an
empty Corvette off alone on a country road, with the keys in the
ignition,,,).
>
>Paul Zrimsek
>pzri...@tiac.net
>
--John Bicketts
Mailto:sfei...@mach3ww.com
David Harmon
On 10 Jul 1997 22:56:16 GMT, Amit Kapoor <am...@netcom.com> wrote:
>Afraid the phrase is *rational self-interest*. It is not a license
>for human beings to indulge in whims. Stealing is not in my self-interest
>because I want to live in a society where I want *my* property safe.
Of course, the guys who are gonna steal your stuff would be rolling on
the floor laughing if they could hear you say that. Sorry, but to
think that the crooks won't steal from you because of how moral you
are is about as irrational as it gets.
Jim Klein
Brad Aisa wrote:
> Objectivists view stealing as impractical in principle, and therefore,
> wrong, for many reasons.
Translation: My view of Objectivism is that it exactly correlates with
David Friedman's view of human action.
"Impractical in principle, and therefore wrong..."---now there's one for
the recordbook. The "therefore" means that it's the IMPRACTICALITY
which makes it wrong, quite in opposition to Objectivism (as usual).
> First, it violates independence -- an independent man produces the values
> needed for his own existence (for direct consumption or trade). This makes
> him the master of his own existence and destiny. A person who loots from
> others is a dependent -- they depend upon the productive efforts of others
> to loot, and give up their independence.
It's funny that you so often accuse others of "psychologizing" or some
such, when that's exactly what you do yourself. A person CAN'T give up
their independence...this is a simple fact of reality, and a cornerstone
of Objectivism.
That's not to say that your statement makes no sense; it does. But it
only make sense in a context of already derived values, NOT in the sense
of existential reality, which is the sense you imply.
> Since men properly take measures to prevent theft, and to punish offenders,
> a thief is thus turning all of mankind, in principle, against him -- every
> man is a potential enemy. Contrast to the producer, to whom every
> rights-respecting man is a potential value, and a real indirect value.
With one word---"properly"---you turn a statement of ethics into
physical reality. How very Peikovian of you. What if men "improperly"
do that? What would that make of your argument?
> A thief is unlikely to confine himself purely to the company of other
> thieves. Every time he enters the company of civilized men, he is a liar.
> He must erect an ever widening spiral of lies, to hide his true identity
> from the decent people he meets and wants to engage with. Sooner or later,
> he will not even be able to tell the difference between reality and
> fantasy -- his grip on reality and psychological health will deteriorate
> commensurably.
We've been through this before---it just isn't true. Ne'er-do-wells may
have vast personal problems, but the ability "to tell the difference
between reality and fantasy" is very rarely one of them. You should
know half as much about the world, as they do.
> Pride is the result of achievment of value -- the sense that one is fit to
> live in reality and morally worthy of living. A thief can not experience
> this, since his "achievment" is not one of mastering reality, but of
> completely rebelling against it. As such, he will come to feel
> self-contempt.
It's early...comment withheld.
> There are probably many other selfish reasons one could cite for not being
> a thief (or other violator of rights).
Let's hope so!
jk
John Alway
David Harmon <sou...@netcom.com> wrote:
>On 10 Jul 1997 22:56:16 GMT, Amit Kapoor <am...@netcom.com> wrote:
>>Afraid the phrase is *rational self-interest*. It is not a license
>>for human beings to indulge in whims. Stealing is not in my self-interest
>>because I want to live in a society where I want *my* property safe.
Yes, and it's also not in your self-interest to
survive by the efforts of others. Earning your way
through life gives you self-confidence and joy which
stealing could never give you.
>Of course, the guys who are gonna steal your stuff would be rolling on
>the floor laughing if they could hear you say that. Sorry, but to
>think that the crooks won't steal from you because of how moral you
>are is about as irrational as it gets.
I think you misread him.
He's not referring to thieves, but to good men who would seek
retribution against him for his acts of theft. By stealing
from others you turn them against you; by respecting their
rights you make them your ally.
It gets down to this, living with honor is a great value.
Or, put another way, would you trust a back stabber?
...John
OEXCHAOS
John Bicketts wrote:
> on 9 Jul 1997 23:05:11 GMT, Tym Parsons <tpar...@u.washington.edu>
> wrote:
> >On 2 Jul 1997, John Bicketts wrote:
> >> However, isnt not stealing a form of altruism?
> >
> >Wrong.
> >
> >> You are regarding
> >> someone else's livelihood over your own self-interest
> >
>
> Nope.>
Sorry, but Tym (probably accidentally<G>) has it right.
>It's in your own self-interest to steal something, so long as
> the chances of getting caught are low enough. Right?
Nope. We define "self-interest" with a presumption of rationality. It is
NOT in our rational self interest to steal because such is inconsistent
with LIFE. To steal from others is to give them sanction to steal from
you, in retaliation. Futhermore, if one's moral code is to be consistent,
which it must if one wishes to have a moral code that is rational, one
cannot steal if one expects to not be stolen from.
> So, you are restraining your own self-interest when you dont steal
> something that you could have gotten away with.
Nope. You are consistently holding to a rational moral code based upon
self interest.
> Please, next time inform me of how I'm wrong. State reasons.. you
> know, for a philosophy that claims to be based on reason, objectivism
> seems to have that very quality lacking in many of its adherents.
Some folks aren't very patient with silly pronouncements from ignorance
(sorry but your reasoning was sophomoric, no offence). Tym, however, just
isn't good at making reasoned arguments.
Mark Steward Young
Publisher
The Steward Analytics FaxLetter
http://members.aol.com/oexchaos/premium.htm
Learn how our model account made 79% NET last year.
(no more than 20% at risk on any given trade)
OEXCHAOS
David Harmon writes, unbelievably:
> On 10 Jul 1997 22:56:16 GMT, Amit Kapoor <am...@netcom.com> wrote:
> >Afraid the phrase is *rational self-interest*. It is not a license
> >for human beings to indulge in whims. Stealing is not in my
> self-interest
> >because I want to live in a society where I want *my* property safe.
>
> the floor laughing if they could hear you say that.>
Perhaps, but then they've proven that they do not have a rational moral
code, haven't they?
> Sorry, but to
> think that the crooks won't steal from you because of how moral you
> are is about as irrational as it gets.
So is jumping to that conclusion. Behaving morally doesn't indemnify one
from the immorality of others, it DOES however not give sanction to theft.
The first place to start, from a rational moral standpoint, is to
determine consistently applicable moral principles. Once you do that,
then, of course, you have moral sanction to put locks on your door and buy
a pit bull.
Sheeze.
Tym Parsons
On 11 Jul 1997, Brad Aisa wrote:
> Objectivists view stealing as impractical in principle, and therefore,
> wrong, for many reasons.
>
> First, it violates independence -- an independent man produces the values
> needed for his own existence (for direct consumption or trade). This makes
> him the master of his own existence and destiny. A person who loots from
> others is a dependent -- they depend upon the productive efforts of others
> to loot, and give up their independence.
<snip>
> Pride is the result of achievment of value -- the sense that one is fit to
> live in reality and morally worthy of living. A thief can not experience
> this, since his "achievment" is not one of mastering reality, but of
> completely rebelling against it. As such, he will come to feel
> self-contempt.
Brad, this account begs the question. Why can't a man take pride in
mastering reality by exercising independent thought in figuring out how to
best use other men as "productive cattle"? What is wrong with this claim?
;-)
Tym Parsons
Tym Parsons
On 10 Jul 1997, John Bicketts wrote:
> It's in your own self-interest to steal something, so long as
> the chances of getting caught are low enough. Right?
Wrong. Getting caught has nothing to do with it. Think about why you
live with other men in the first place. The primary values obtained from
living in a (rational) society, as opposed to a desert island, are
knowledge and trade.
But knowledge and trade don't grow on trees: their existence requires that
men be free to engage in _reasoned action_. Any form of initiating force,
including stealing, prevents men from engaging in reasoned action: it
sunders thinking from action, thus rendering thought irrelevant to men's
lives. Whether it's stealing candy, embezzling millions of dollars, or
turning a country into a concentration camp, the effect is the same and
only differs by degree: you're subverting the basis for a rational
society.
Initiating force isn't in your self-interest as a matter of *principle*.
Tym Parsons
Iván Ordóñez
In article <19970711183...@ladder01.news.aol.com>, OEXCHAOS
<oexc...@aol.com> wrote:
[...]
> We define "self-interest" with a presumption of rationality. It is
> NOT in our rational self interest to steal because such is inconsistent
> with LIFE.
How do you guys call this kind of arguments? "Floating abstraction," isn't it?
> To steal from others is to give them sanction to steal from
> you, in retaliation.
Only if they found out you had stolen from them.
> Futhermore, if one's moral code is to be consistent,
> which it must if one wishes to have a moral code that is rational, one
> cannot steal if one expects to not be stolen from.
That is not what consistency is about. One who is prudent enough can expect
to steal, never get caught, and hence never fear retaliation. That is as
consistent as it gets.
> > So, you are restraining your own self-interest when you dont steal
> > something that you could have gotten away with.
>
> Nope. You are consistently holding to a rational moral code based upon
> self interest.
Again, the word "consistency" is being misused. There is only inconsistency
when a principle is being violated; the prudent predator is faithful to the
principle "I will act in such ways that I maximize my chances of survival,
and stealing w9ithout getting caught is a way to achieve that." Your use of
the term "rational moral code" is a de-contextualized floating abstraction
(what fun to use these terms!). There is nothing irrational in being a
prudent predator. And as long as morality is only about furthering one's
own self-interest, there's nothing immoral either.
--
Iván Ordóñez
Ordonez-...@osu.edu
http://www.cis.ohio-state.edu/~iordonez
David
As a college student in Boston in the late 70's early 80's I had the
opportunity to hear her speak in the auditorium of NE university. The place
was packed. All the usual band of characters were there, the place was
electric.
She spoke, she argued, she scared the s- - t out of me and my friend. I
would be pleased to reminiscence with anyone else who may have been there
that night, or heard her personally on other occasions. I'm specifically
interested in whether her views changed as she got older, or was she always
like that?
Regards
David
David Harmon
On 11 Jul 1997 18:43:14 GMT, OEXCHAOS <oexc...@aol.com> wrote:
>David Harmon writes, unbelievably:
(Cheap shot. Content free. Nothing I wrote
there requires any great feats of belief.)
>> Of course, the guys who are gonna steal your stuff would be rolling on
>> the floor laughing if they could hear you say that.
>
>Perhaps, but then they've proven that they do not have a rational moral
>code, haven't they?
Begging the question. If you can show that a rational moral code
necessarily precludes stealing, then I would very much like to see it.
It is an attractive proposition, one that I would like to believe, but
the proofs offered have been full of holes.
In particular, Amit appeared to have made a giant leap from "I won't
steal" to "other people won't steal."
>The first place to start, from a rational moral standpoint, is to
>determine consistently applicable moral principles. Once you do that,
>then, of course, you have moral sanction to put locks on your door and buy
>a pit bull.
Note the shift here. It is considerably easier to formulate a code of
"consistently applicable" moral principles, than it is to prove that
those principles are the only ones possible.
It is also easier to point out the gaping holes in a proof than it is
to fill them.
Fortunately for those of us who only aspire to such lofty
philosophical support, the local hardware will meanwhile sell a
Kwikset for cash without requiring any philosophical test.
And a some dogs (I don't know about pit bulls) somehow understand
private property without having read much Rand.
Which is worth more: to have a rational moral code, or to stop people
from stealing your stuff?
John Alway
David wrote:
Re: Ayn Rand...
> She spoke, she argued, she scared the s- - t out of me and my friend.
How so? I'm intrigued.
...John
OEXCHAOS
Tym Parsons writes:
> On 11 Jul 1997, OEXCHAOS wrote:
> > >It's in your own self-interest to steal something, so long as
> > > the chances of getting caught are low enough. Right?
> >
is
> > NOT in our rational self interest to steal because such is
inconsistent
> > you, in retaliation.
Actually, my statement need not have "in retaliation" at all.
> This isn't of the essence. What if others _aren't_ in a position to
steal
> from you?
Well, I suppose they could always just kill you. What do you mean "if they
aren't in a position to steal from you"? If you are in a position to steal
from them, they are in a position to steal from you. Stealing is POSSIBLE
in virtually any social context. And, if it is practical (over any
realistic duration) for one to steal, then it is possible for others to
seal from one.
Such is consistent with reality.
OEXCHAOS
David Harmon writes:
> OEXCHAOS <oexc...@aol.com> wrote:
>
> >David Harmon writes, unbelievably:
> (Cheap shot. Content free. Nothing I wrote
> there requires any great feats of belief.)
I had believed that you were a) smarter than to write the below, and b)
that you understood Objectivism better. Thus, I was incredulous to read
your comments.
> >> Of course, the guys who are gonna steal your stuff would be rolling
on
> >> the floor laughing if they could hear you say that.
> >
> >Perhaps, but then they've proven that they do not have a rational moral
> >code, haven't they?
>
> Begging the question. If you can show that a rational moral code
> necessarily precludes stealing, then I would very much like to see it.
It's called Objectivism, and it's a philosophy from which a rational moral
code readily follows. I suggest you do some reading on it.<g>
> It is an attractive proposition, one that I would like to believe, but
> the proofs offered have been full of holes.
>
> In particular, Amit appeared to have made a giant leap from "I won't
> steal" to "other people won't steal."
Implicit in his argument was that I don't have moral sanction to keep my
stuff if I my moral code premits me to steal (provided such is rational
and objective).
> >The first place to start, from a rational moral standpoint, is to
> >determine consistently applicable moral principles. Once you do that,
> >then, of course, you have moral sanction to put locks on your door and
> buy
> >a pit bull.
>
> Note the shift here. It is considerably easier to formulate a code of
> "consistently applicable" moral principles, than it is to prove that
> those principles are the only ones possible.
Hell, there are lots of principles. However no RATIONAL moral code permits
stealing in the context we are dealing with here.
> It is also easier to point out the gaping holes in a proof than it is
> to fill them.
Of course. But this is rudimentary.
> Fortunately for those of us who only aspire to such lofty
> philosophical support, the local hardware will meanwhile sell a
> Kwikset for cash without requiring any philosophical test.
Correct. But, WHY do you think such is right and good?
> And a some dogs (I don't know about pit bulls) somehow understand
> private property without having read much Rand.
Really. Can you show me this understanding? Couldn't it simply be
instictive territoriality? <duh>
> Which is worth more: to have a rational moral code, or to stop people
> from stealing your stuff?
Irrelevant. Neither is mutually exclusive. Futhermore, going out and
buying a lock indicates that you have at least a rudimentary undertanding
of property rights.
Mark Steward Young
Steward Analytics, Inc.
Publisher of The Z-Trader (> 5% per month NET since inception)
and other trading newsletters.
http://members.aol.com/oexchaos/
FREE Two-week Subscriptions
Iván Ordóñez
In article <19970712171...@ladder02.news.aol.com>, OEXCHAOS
<oexc...@aol.com> wrote:
[...]
> > Only if they found out you had stolen from them.
>
> Which is ALWAYS a risk. And the sanction exists whether or not they do
so. And YOU know it, all the time.
There is always risk in everything you do. If you are prudent enough, you
can minimize the risk to a point such that it is negligible. And it doesn't
matter that you know, if in your mind it is not immoral.
[...]
>> One who is prudent enough can
> > expect to steal, never get caught, and hence never fear retaliation.>
>
> Can one? Really? Is that a consisten moral code?
Yes, yes, and yes, it is.
> Because that person thinks he will never be caught, does it mean that he
doesn't mind if others steal from him if THEY don't get caught?
No, it doesn't mean that. The prudent predator is strictly selfish: he will
steal if he can do it, but he will be very upset if others steal from him.
There is no contradiction in that, because the entire position is
consistent with selfishness. Hence the best strategy that the predator can
follow is to be hypocritical: convince others that stealing is wrong, and
yet steal himself without getting caught.
>
> > That is as
> > consistent as it gets.
>
> Not morally so. A rational moral code should be consistent, i.e. it
should apply equally well for you, as for me.
Consistency only means that you do not assert and deny a proposition at the
same time. Please tell me, which strictly selfish proposition is being both
asserted and denied by the moral code of the prudent predator? He will say
that his principles are his, and hence they only apply to him. He only
cares about other people's beliefs inasmuch as such beliefs benefit him.
[...]
> > Again, the word "consistency" is being misused.
>
> Perhaps misunderstood, by you.
On the contrary; I am trying to remove once and for all the myth that the
moral code of the prudent predator is inconsistent.
[...]
> Implicit in said principle is that "it is OK to steal--Ok for me to steal
from you, and ok for you to steal from me." Is that the prudent preditor's
position?
No. The position is "It is ok to steal from you, but it is not ok to steal
from me." Sence "me" and "you" denote different people, there is no
inconsistency.
>
> >Your use
> > of the term "rational moral code" is a de-contextualized floating
abstraction
>
> Nonsense. The context is implicit.
So please make it explicit so I can understand it.
>
> >There is nothing irrational in being a
> > prudent predator.>
>
> Only if he doesn't mind being stolen from, and only if such a position
That assumes that being a prudent predator increases significantly the
probabilities of being stolen from, which is a false premise.
>, if carried out to it's logical end wouldn't end with the destruction of man
>qua man in any social context. And of course, any rational man want's to keep
>his stuff, and intuitively KNOWS it is his and that others don't have a right
>to it. Futhermore, the fact of the matter is that such a moral code would lead
>to the ultimate destruction of man if universally held.
It would only lead to such destruction if all people are predators. That is
why the prudent predator will try to convince other people not to steal.
>
> >And as long as morality is only about furthering one's
> > own self-interest, there's nothing immoral either.
>
> Except that it's irrational. And thus detrimental to one's long term
existence.
As I believe it is perfectly clear by now, it is neither. As long as most
people are not predators, those who are predators and are prudent will have
an easy life. And the predator, being strictly selfish, will not try to
convince other people of his principles, but of principles he believes to
be false but that will benefit him if believed by most other people.
--
Ivan Ordonez
iord...@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (finger for PGP public key)
http://www.cis.ohio-state.edu/~iordonez
John Kennedy
On 12 Jul 1997 17:20:24 GMT, you wrote:
>Not morally so. A rational moral code should be consistent, i.e. it should apply equally well for you, as for me.
Are you asserting a moral categorical imperative?
What is good is what is good for you by the objective standard of your
life.
If in your best judgement you can benefit by stealing, why shouldn't
you? True, in many circumstances you will pay a price which may be to
high to merit the risk, but that simply has to be a part of your
calculation. There is no great difficulty in imagining a situation
where you cannot be caught.
Isn't it irrational to say that it cannot be in your rational self
interest to steal in a particular situation before you have examined
the details of the particular situation?
If sober judgement tells you that the act in question will not have
negative consequences for you, then why isn't in your self interest to
steal in such a situation?
I don't advocate stealing and I don't steal. My purpose here is only
to demonstrate a shortcoming in the arguments against stealing.
I hope the arguments get better.
John Kennedy
http://www.cyberia.com/pages/jkennedy/
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On 12 Jul 1997 20:16:41 GMT, Iván Ordóñez
<iord...@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu> wrote:
>In article <19970712171...@ladder02.news.aol.com>, OEXCHAOS
><oexc...@aol.com> wrote:
>
[snip]
>> Implicit in said principle is that "it is OK to steal--Ok for me to steal
>from you, and ok for you to steal from me." Is that the prudent preditor's
>position?
>
>No. The position is "It is ok to steal from you, but it is not ok to steal
>from me." Sence "me" and "you" denote different people, there is no
>inconsistency.
>>
[snip]
This puts the disagreement in a nutshell, I think.
Why do Objectivists universalise like good Kantians? Presumably the
answer is because a rationally intelligent person knows that his or
her life will be easier if s/he has a trustworthy reputation, etc.
But s/he can dissemble, and dissembling is also quite consistent with
that kind of code.
Ultimately, there is no rationally selfish move forbidding stealing,
granted enough chutzpah and ability to get away with it. It's only if
you care about human beings, or about society, or about other people,
that you won't want to steal.
It's weird: there seems to be this suppressed and unacknowledged
other-concern in Objectivism!
- Guru George
*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*
"A true God needs no adoration,
and will not be affected by your scorn.
A 'Black Brother' will shrivel without one,
and foam when faced with the other."
- Marcelo Ramos Motta
from Class C commentary to Liber AL vel Legis
*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*
David Harmon
On 11 Jul 1997 16:25:45 GMT, John Alway
<jal...@icsi.net.SpamTransmogrifier> wrote:
> I think you misread him.
>
> He's not referring to thieves, but to good men who would seek
> retribution against him for his acts of theft. By stealing
> from others you turn them against you; by respecting their
> rights you make them your ally.
You could be right. That is certainly a stronger argument than the
way I read Amit's.
David Friedman
>Afraid the phrase is *rational self-interest*. It is not a license
>for human beings to indulge in whims. Stealing is not in my self-interest
>because I want to live in a society where I want *my* property safe.
>Stealing might be good for my short term interest, but I will loose
>in the long term. Hence the phrase....
Wouldn't the rational thing to do be to estimate how much effect your
particular act of theft will have on how safe your property is, count that
as a cost, and go ahead and steal if it is outweighed by the benefits?
In a large society, the effect of a single act of theft on the general
security of property is very small, so not likely to affect your decision.
Isn't deciding not to steal on the ground that you want to live in a
society where your property is safe, when your act will have only a tiny
effect on whether you live in such a society, an example in indulging in
whim--in this case, the "whim" of wanting to reach an attractive
conclusion and so ignoring the fact that your argument doesn't produce it?
David Friedman
In article <5q41r6$3...@news.interlog.com>, Brad Aisa
<ba...@ERASETHISinterlog.com> wrote:
>Objectivists view stealing as impractical in principle, and therefore,
>wrong, for many reasons.
(usual list omitted)
>There are probably many other selfish reasons one could cite for not being
>a thief (or other violator of rights).
...
As I have pointed out repeatedly, this confuses a plausibility argument
with a proof. There are lots of reasons why stealing is often contrary to
your self interest. But in order to conclude that you should never
steal--more generally, that you should never violate rights--you need
reasons to believe that it is always contrary to your self interest. None
of the reasons Brad offers suffice, since one can always imagine a
possible scenario in which the costs they lead to are small and the
benefits of stealing large.
Some such scenarios are lifeboat situations--and many Objectivists of
approve of rights violations in those situations (or claim that what
appear to be rights violations aren't when in a lifeboat situation). But
many are not--they are cases where someone has an opportunity to gain a
lot at other people's expense by violating rights. I don't think any of
the Objectivists here has either agreed that in such a situation one ought
to violate rights, or presented anything approaching a convincing argument
that such situations never occur.
This was the subject of the "prudent predator" thread some time back,
which interested persons can presumably find and read via Altavista or
DejaNews.
David Friedman
>Nope. We define "self-interest" with a presumption of rationality. It is
>NOT in our rational self interest to steal because such is inconsistent
>with LIFE. To steal from others is to give them sanction to steal from
>you, in retaliation. Futhermore, if one's moral code is to be consistent,
>which it must if one wishes to have a moral code that is rational, one
>cannot steal if one expects to not be stolen from.
I find this puzzling.
1. Either stealing is right or wrong. If it is right, then your failure to
steal doesn't make it wrong, hence doesn't give other people moral reasons
not to steal from you. If it is wrong, then your stealing may give other
people legitimate grounds for stealing from you--but only if they know you
are the guilty party. So the implication is that you shouldn't steal under
circumstances where you are likely to get caught--which we already knew.
The closest I can come to making sense of this form of argument is that
you are confusing the statement:
"If stealing is wrong, then I shouldn't steal"
With the statement:
"Stealing is wrong if and only if I don't steal."
But your actions don't determine whether or not there are good moral
arguments against stealing.
So far as the "consistent moral code" part is concerned, why is what I
expect determined by what I do? If I steal, I may not be able to honestly
argue that other people shouldn't steal--but so what? Whether they steal
has very little to do with my arguments, and less to do with whether my
arguments are honest or not. Whether I expect not to be stolen from
depends on how I expect other people to act. If they believe stealing is
wrong (and don't know I am a thief), then they probably won't steal from
me. If they believe stealing is right, then it is quite likely they will
steal from me--whether or not I steal.
Tom Robertson
OEXCHAOS wrote:
> Iván Ordóñez < Ordonez-...@osu.edu> writes:
>>There is nothing irrational in being a prudent predator.
>Only if he doesn't mind being stolen from, and only if such a position, if >carried out to it's logical end wouldn't end with the destruction of man qua >man in any social context. And of course, any rational man want's to keep >his stuff, and intuitively KNOWS it is his and that others don't have a right >to it. Futhermore, the fact of the matter is that such a moral code would >lead to the ultimate destruction of man if universally held.
If this isn't altruism, what is? Someone with a selfish moral code
wouldn't care what effect that his moral code had on others, except to
the extent that this effect motivated others to respond to him. I
generally consider this effect on others of my moral code to be
negligible, so I would have to be altruistic to care about it.
Paul Zrimsek
John Bicketts <sfei...@SPAMMERS.DIE.DIE.DIEmach3ww.com> wrote in article
<33c2c58d...@News.HTWM.De>...
>>My caveat is important, though; having an easy justification for a
> >starving man's stealing bread is cold comfort if the theory does, in
fact,
> >also justify stealing twenty million dollars and running off to Brazil.
>
> Yeah, it not only includes times when you MUST steal to survive, but
> also when you can simply steal without getting caught (say, you see an
> empty Corvette off alone on a country road, with the keys in the
> ignition,,,).
Shell's argument might be able to handle this objection, if the probability
of being wrong about when it's safe to steal (suppose that Vette has a
Lojack in it?) is high enough to make guessing at it a losing game on
average.
This assumes that the consequences of getting caught are a legitimate
consideration when determining whether or not theft is moral. I'm not
convinced that they are; it seems to add an element of circularity to the
argument. ("Why is theft immoral?" "Because you might get caught and
punished." "Why would anyone punish me?" "Because theft is immoral.")
Paul Zrimsek
pzri...@tiac.net
Tom Robertson
Paul Zrimsek wrote:
>Shell's argument might be able to handle this objection, if the probability
>of being wrong about when it's safe to steal (suppose that Vette has a
>Lojack in it?) is high enough to make guessing at it a losing game on
>average.
>
>This assumes that the consequences of getting caught are a legitimate
>consideration when determining whether or not theft is moral. I'm not
>convinced that they are; it seems to add an element of circularity to the
>argument. ("Why is theft immoral?" "Because you might get caught and
>punished." "Why would anyone punish me?" "Because theft is immoral.")
Just the time and energy wasted going around in circles like this in
discussions suggests that it is immoral to call selfishness a virtue.
David Friedman
In article <01bc8fe9$3c7231c0$5584...@pzrimsek.tiac.net>, "Paul Zrimsek"
<pzri...@tiac.net> wrote:
>This assumes that the consequences of getting caught are a legitimate
>consideration when determining whether or not theft is moral. I'm not
>convinced that they are; it seems to add an element of circularity to the
>argument. ("Why is theft immoral?" "Because you might get caught and
>punished." "Why would anyone punish me?" "Because theft is immoral.")
Not "because theft is immoral" but because other people don't like being
stolen from, and therefor set up institutions, private or public, by which
they precommit themselves to punish thieves if they catch them. So the
argument isn't circular--the victims are acting in their rational self
interest.
The real problem is that all the arguments being offered are plausibility
arguments, showing that it is often imprudent to steal--which is not what
the Objectivist claim to derive respect for other people's rights from
one's own rational self interest requires.
OEXCHAOS
Tom Robertson <mdm...@worldnet.att.net> writes:
> >OEXCHAOS wrote:
> > Iván Ordóñez < Ordonez-...@osu.edu> writes:
> >>There is nothing irrational in being a prudent predator.
>
> >Only if he doesn't mind being stolen from, and only if such a position,
> if >carried out to it's logical end wouldn't end with the destruction of
> man qua >man in any social context. And of course, any rational man
> want's to keep >his stuff, and intuitively KNOWS it is his and that
> others don't have a right >to it. Futhermore, the fact of the matter is
> that such a moral code would >lead to the ultimate destruction of man if
> universally held.
>
> If this isn't altruism, what is?>
The notion of doing something for others, regardless of one's values. That is not what is implicit in the above.
Because rational self interest leads to an outcome similar to an outcome desired by altruists does not mean such is altruism.
> Someone with a selfish moral code
> wouldn't care what effect that his moral code had on others, except to
> the extent that this effect motivated others to respond to him. >
But the PRINCIPLES are the same. Objectively applied, they give sanction for bad things to happen to the prudent preditor.
> I
> generally consider this effect on others of my moral code to be
> negligible, so I would have to be altruistic to care about it. >
Nonsense. You would have to be subjectivistic and irrational NOT to care about it.
OEXCHAOS
John Kennedy writes:
> On 12 Jul 1997 17:20:24 GMT, you wrote:
>
> >Not morally so. A rational moral code should be consistent, i.e. it
> should apply equally well for you, as for me.
>
> Are you asserting a moral categorical imperative?
It sounds like it, but I'm not. I'm asserting that an objective ethical
standard should, by definition, be objective. The principles applied
should be universal. Anyone want to show me that this is incorrect?
> What is good is what is good for you by the objective standard of your
> life.
Correct. But the PRINCIPLES should be objective, should they not?
> If in your best judgement you can benefit by stealing, why shouldn't
> you? True, in many circumstances you will pay a price which may be to
> high to merit the risk, but that simply has to be a part of your
> calculation. There is no great difficulty in imagining a situation
> where you cannot be caught.
Sure, you might find a situation where you might not get caught. This is
why ethics should be based upon objective standards, not utilitarian ones.
> Isn't it irrational to say that it cannot be in your rational self
> interest to steal in a particular situation before you have examined
> the details of the particular situation?
That is why we consider context. However, in the context implicit in this
discussion, it is most rational to say that stealing is not in your
rational self interest IN PRINCIPLE, because such is a violation of a
CONSISTENTLY applied and rationalally derived ethical code.
> If sober judgement tells you that the act in question will not have
> negative consequences for you, then why isn't in your self interest to
> steal in such a situation?
Because such is not consistent with a rational moral code. You have no
legitimate claim to be free from stealing if you steal. You might try to
go for it, but you lose all sanction for such. Those who DO steal, may get
a way with it, but then we try to hunt them down and punish them. If they
fuck up, they will get caught. Folks fuck up all the time. Even very smart
folks.
> I don't advocate stealing and I don't steal. My purpose here is only
> to demonstrate a shortcoming in the arguments against stealing.
Well, I haven't fleshed this out as much as I should have, and I am
assuming that others, who have read IOE (I haven't, alas) will come in and
do some of my dirty work for me. Also, I'm assuming acceptance of the
fundamental principles from which the ethical prohibition of
non-retalitory force is derived.
> I hope the arguments get better.
Me too!
Jim, where are you, when I need you!<G>
OEXCHAOS
David Friedman, DD...@Best.com writes
> OEXCHAOS
> <oexc...@aol.com> wrote:
>
> >Nope. We define "self-interest" with a presumption of rationality. It
is
> >NOT in our rational self interest to steal because such is inconsistent
> >with LIFE. To steal from others is to give them sanction to steal from
> >you, in retaliation. Futhermore, if one's moral code is to be
consistent,
> >which it must if one wishes to have a moral code that is rational, one
> >cannot steal if one expects to not be stolen from.
>
> I find this puzzling.
>
> 1. Either stealing is right or wrong.>
Right. It is wrong.
> If it is right, then your failure to
> steal doesn't make it wrong, hence doesn't give other people moral
reasons
> not to steal from you.>
Correct. It is wrong, in PRINCIPLE.
> If it is wrong, then your stealing may give other
> people legitimate grounds for stealing from you--but only if they know
you
> are the guilty party.>
But in principle, it is wrong, and in PRINCIPLE it gives sanction for
retalitory action against you. OR, if there is no principle prohibiting
theft, then there is sanction for any theft, against you or others.
> So the implication is that you shouldn't steal under
> circumstances where you are likely to get caught--which we already knew.
This is the utilitarian argument. It is irrelevant to my position.
> The closest I can come to making sense of this form of argument is that
> you are confusing the statement:
> "If stealing is wrong, then I shouldn't steal"
> With the statement:
> "Stealing is wrong if and only if I don't steal."
No, I"m not. I'm saying stealing is wrong because it is inconsistent, IN
PRINCIPLE with a rational ethical code.
> But your actions don't determine whether or not there are good moral
> arguments against stealing.
If you steal, you are acting contrarily to the only consistent and
rationally derived ethical code based upon the facts of reality.
> So far as the "consistent moral code" part is concerned, why is what I
> expect determined by what I do? If I steal, I may not be able to
honestly
> argue that other people shouldn't steal--but so what?>
Then you are a man without a rational ethical code. You MIGHT get away
with stealing, but if you apply the principles implicit in your theft, and
take them to their logical conclusion, the end result is DEATH.
> Whether they steal
> has very little to do with my arguments, and less to do with whether my
> arguments are honest or not.>
Of course not. A gun and a pit bull are much more imporant as a practical
matter. That is why the police are armed not with Atlas Shrugged, but with
guns!<G>
> Whether I expect not to be stolen from
> depends on how I expect other people to act.>
I hate when you quibble this way. I use "expect" in the philosophical
sense. Not in the pragmatic sense. As in "you can't expect me to respect
your rights if you don't respect mine" vs. "I can't expect it to rain if
there are no clouds in the sky".
Frankly, if you don't mind a little psychologizing, I sense it is an
effort to wear your debating opponent down, with wasting energy and time
on simple term usage (which I have little doubt that you understand)
rather than actual debate of concepts. I may be wrong, but it sure feels
manipulative, from this standpoint.
> If they believe stealing is
> wrong (and don't know I am a thief), then they probably won't steal from
> me. If they believe stealing is right, then it is quite likely they will
> steal from me--whether or not I steal.
Correct. And utterly irrelevant to the MORAL PRINCIPLES involved.
Your comments DO, however, point up the shortcoming of utilitarian
arguments in matters of morality and principle.
R Lawrence
David Friedman wrote:
>
>You seem to believe that I have two choices:
>
>1. Respect other people's rights and have them respect mine.
>
>2. Don't respect other people's rights and have them not respect mine.
>
>Presumably we all agree that 2 is preferable--but why are these the
>choices?
Ummm, I assume you meant to say that we all agree that choice *one* is
preferable. I'm quite sure that we don't all agree to choice two.
OEXCHAOS
Ivan writes:
> But see, this is an invalid generalization. It requires dropping
context.
I don't think you realize the context that YOU drop. See below.
> You are making the following inference:
> 1. It is ok for me to steal, but not ok for others to steal =>
> 2. It is OK to steal, but not ok to steal.
> And the inference is invalid. You *cannot* get (2) from selfishness
alone.
> Consider an analogous invalid inference:
> 1') It is not ok to kill human beings without provocation =>
> 2') It is not ok to kill without provocation.
Note what you have done here with your analogy: You have dropped the
context of nonretalitory force from your analogy. IMPLICIT in the term
"stealing" is the use of nonretalitory force.
Thus I am in fact saying the the theft equivalent of:
1') It is not ok to murder human beings =>
2') It is not ok for you or I to murder human beings
> If the inference were true, we would all have to starve to death because
we
> couldn't kill any plants nor animals.
Well, DUH!
> Do you realize that you are dropping the context and in that making an
> invalid inference?
As I have shown, I have not dropped the context, but rather retained such.
I am retaining the context of a consistently applicable ethical standard.
Remember, ethics isn't about utilitarian approaches to hypothetical
situations, it's about defining a standard of behavior which is consistent
with how things SHOULD be.
OEXCHAOS
Iván Ordóñez Ordonez-...@osu.edu writes:
>I write:
> [...] I am claiming that being a prudent preditor
> > gives SANCTION to theft against oneself.
>
> Another floating abstraction. And a collectivistic one. See, when you talk
> about things such as "applicable in all instances" and "sanction" you are
> being collectivistic, because you are generalizing from what benefits a
> single individual to what benefits society.
A drop in temperature chills an entire society. That is a fact of nature, and reality, not a collectivistic notion. The notion of RIGHTS applies to all men. They ALL (within something like a normal definition) have rights, based upon a rational application. In almost any instance, even the dumbest of children will respond to your taking his stuff with an attempt to stop you from doing so. He knows what is HIS and he knows it is RIGHT to take it back from you. This most basic understanding holds throughout
humanity (many amazing misdirections by religion and governments, notwithstanding), and it is that which is the basis for such "sanction", though we can work from a moral rational and less intuitive basis. Regardless, if you take from others, you WILL raise their ire, and if they can figure out it is you, woebetide you. Now, does one respect rights or not? Is it proper to respect rights in some instances, but not others?
The FUNDAMENTAL priciple is that MEN have rights, because they are rational social creatures, and rights are necessary in a social context for men to live. From there, one derives one's own proper behavior. When one determines some arbitrary selfish morality that allows him to lie and steal but of course does not allow others to lie and steal, he is creating a morality which is inconsistent with the FUNDAMENTAL principles which are the basis for his morality.
Structuring a standard which is in my best interests, and applicable in some fashion IN A SOCIAL CONTEXT is what ethics are all about. If such changes with the whim of individuals, then it isn't a standard, now, is it?
> [...]
> > > It would only lead to such destruction if all people are predators. That
> > > is why the prudent predator will try to convince other people not to
> > steal.
> > Which is a fraud, which is also inconsistent with his real values.
>
> See, the prudent predator has only one real value: selfishness. Fraud is
> not inconsistent with it.
So, in his morality, it is OK for another man to force him to do something (like perhaps steal poison labled as some drug desired by the preditor), through a campaign of misinformation and lies.
> [...]
> > (you are defining
> > away any value for the term [principle] within an ethical context).
> All I'm doing is working out the logical consequences of selfishness, and
> showing that they are not what objectivists think.
But you aren't. You are putting the cart before the horse. Of course, I haven't read IOE, so I'm not well versed in proper terminology nor well practiced in laying out these arguments.
I'm making a earnest effort, here, however, without anyone helping me along.(hint!)
In any case if you wish to show me YOUR position on theft, it will help me to formulate an agument in terms that make sense to you, and I can show you where your position is inconsistent. I think, anyway.
So, IS theft wrong? Is it wrong if you can get away with it?
Why, or why not?
I'll then rebuild my argument from your perspective.
Guru George
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On 12 Jul 1997 13:25:21 GMT, Betsy Speicher <be...@speicher.com>
wrote:
>On 11 Jul 1997, Jim Klein wrote:
>
[snip]
>>A person CAN'T give up
>> their independence...this is a simple fact of reality, and a cornerstone
>> of Objectivism.
>
>What was Peter Keating doing that distinguished his approach to life from
>Howard Roark's?
>
Believing that he *could* give up his independence.
David Friedman
You are correct. My error.
Tym Parsons
On 14 Jul 1997, Iván Ordóñez wrote:
> So, for selfish individual S, stealing from others is ok whenever such acts
> benefit S (i.e. when he can get away with it). And for S, being stolen from
> is *never* ok, because losing property harms him.
Wrong. Getting caught has nothing to do with it. Think about why you
live with other men in the first place. The primary values obtained from
living in a (rational) society, as opposed to a desert island, are
knowledge and trade.
But knowledge and trade don't grow on trees: their existence requires that
men be free to engage in _reasoned action_. Any form of initiating force,
including stealing, prevents men from engaging in reasoned action: it
sunders thinking from action, thus rendering thought irrelevant to men's
lives. Whether it's stealing candy, embezzling millions of dollars, or
turning a country into a concentration camp, the effect is the same and
only differs by degree: you're subverting the basis for a rational
society.
Initiating force isn't in your self-interest as a matter of *principle*.
Tym Parsons
Timothy Shell
David Friedman <DD...@best.com> wrote in article
<DDFr-07079...@ddfr.vip.best.com>...
> >
> >Or I can do a cost-benefit analysis just once, analyzing the principle
of
> >respecting other people's rights, and the pragmatic alternative, and
> >deciding which principle would be most beneficial in the long run.
>
> That might be a good reason to follow a rule of thumb of respecting other
> people's rights--but not in every case. If you happen to find yourself
> with what is obviously an extraordinarily attractive opportunity to
steal,
> it is worth rethinking the rule to see if it still applies.
>
It is probably worth rethinking the rule periodically, regardless. As to
the extraordinarily attractive opportunity to steal, it is unlikely that
such an opportunity would arise without some effort on the part of the
actor to create such a situation. It is against one's own long-term
interest to seek to create such situations, because it will likely cost
more to do so (in time, effort, and risk) than one can expect to gain.
I am thinking of this in the same terms I think of casino gambling. It is
not in your self-interest to waste your money in a casino because the odds
are so strongly against you. Dr. Friedman's example is the equivalent of
saying, "Given that you are showing 11 at the Black Jack table, is it wrong
to double down?" Given that, yes, double down. But don't ignore the costs
and associated risks of putting yourself in that situation.
> Suppose you encounter someone who acts that way. For most of his life he
> behaves as an honest and rights respecting individual. He then gets an
> opportunity to steal twenty million dollars and run off to Brazil--and
> does. Do you approve of his behavior? Do you disapprove only because you
> think the ex ante decision costs of rethinking his rule when the
> opportunity arose were greater than the expected benefits?
Principles are used to guide decision making, when the outcome of events is
uncertain. Judgment after the fact, when the outcome is certain, is
something else. The argument I raised related to decision making. It is
irrelevent after the fact. However, if you point to a guy who successfully
stole, or won at blackjack, and say, "Look, it works! I'm going to do that
too," then the argument I raised is meaningful.
> --
> David Friedman
> DD...@Best.com
> http://www.best.com/~ddfr/
>
Timothy Shell
http://www.freedomsnest.com
Tom Robertson
OEXCHAOS wrote:
>Remember, ethics isn't about utilitarian approaches to hypothetical
>situations, it's about defining a standard of behavior which is consistent
>with how things SHOULD be.
I don't see the difference between the two. People should behave in a
way that maximizes utility.
David Friedman
In article <19970714201...@ladder02.news.aol.com>, OEXCHAOS
<oexc...@aol.com> wrote:
...
>The FUNDAMENTAL priciple is that MEN have rights, because they are
rational social creatures, and rights are necessary in a social context
for men to live. From there, one derives one's own proper behavior.
"Rights are necessary in a social context for men to live" is obviously
false, as stated, unless you mean "some system of rights, correct or
incorrect." As you must have noticed, no society in the world enforces
what Objectivists regard as individual rights, yet there are several
billion people who nonetheless live.
Is what you mean that "people will live longer and better lives if
everyone respects rights?" That is a somewhat vague but basically correct
statement--but how do you get from that to "if I want to live a longer and
better life, I ought to respect other people's rights?"
--
David Friedman
DD...@Best.com
http://www.best.com/~ddfr/
"No man is secure in his life, liberty or property while the legislature is in session"
Tom Robertson
OEXCHAOS wrote:
>I submit that if you steal with any regularity, you stand a good chance of
>being caught. Futher, such is NOT a consistent moral code. Unless of
>course, you don't mind if others steal from you, if they don't think they
>will be caught.
The prudent predator's consistency lies in the fact that he also
believes other people should have the same approach he does, that he
wouldn't want them to and that scoiety as a whole would be better off
if no one stole from anyone notwithstanding.
David Friedman
In article
<Pine.OSF.3.96.970714...@saul1.u.washington.edu>, Tym
Parsons <tpar...@u.washington.edu> wrote:
>On 14 Jul 1997, Iván Ordóñez wrote:
>
>> So, for selfish individual S, stealing from others is ok whenever such acts
>> benefit S (i.e. when he can get away with it). And for S, being stolen from
>> is *never* ok, because losing property harms him.
>
>Wrong. Getting caught has nothing to do with it. Think about why you
>live with other men in the first place. The primary values obtained from
>living in a (rational) society, as opposed to a desert island, are
>knowledge and trade.
>
>But knowledge and trade don't grow on trees: their existence requires that
>men be free to engage in _reasoned action_. Any form of initiating force,
>including stealing, prevents men from engaging in reasoned action: it
>sunders thinking from action, thus rendering thought irrelevant to men's
>lives.
But some stealing occurs, hence by your argument men cannot engage in
human action, hence there is no knowledge and no trade--which doesn't seem
to be true.
>Whether it's stealing candy, embezzling millions of dollars, or
>turning a country into a concentration camp, the effect is the same and
>only differs by degree: you're subverting the basis for a rational
>society.
But if my act of prudent theft "subvert(s) the basis" by an amount of
.0000000000001, being only one person in a large society and having a
correspondingly small effect on the rest of the society, and that amount
of subversion makes me worse of by two cents, while my theft gains me a
million dollars, how does an ethic based on rational self interest imply
that I shouldn't do it?
David Friedman
In article <19970715150...@ladder02.news.aol.com>, OEXCHAOS
<oexc...@aol.com> wrote:
>Sanction IN PRINCIPLE. When you violate the the fundamental "rules of
>engagement" (the universal principles necessary for successful life in a
>social context), in principle you give sanction to any who would do the
>same to you.
What does that mean? Is all you are saying that if I steal, and other
people know I steal, then they will feel free to steal from me? If so, the
obvious response is only to steal when the gain is large and the chance of
being detected is small--which isn't the conclusion you want to reach.
Is what you are saying that if I steal, then there is nothing immoral
about other people stealing from me--whether or not they know it? That
might be true, but why should I care? What matters to me is what other
people do, not whether the actions they might take that would injure me
are or are not immoral. So again, as long as I don't get caught, my
"sanction" of their offenses against me does me no harm.
DEFanyo
Tym Parsons writes:
>Whether it's stealing candy, embezzling millions of dollars, or
>turning a country into a concentration camp, the effect is the same and
>only differs by degree: you're subverting the basis for a rational
>society.
So you mustn't steal because if you do society goes to hell?!?
Hmmm... Haven't you said that a society doesn't exist?...
--Dorothy
--------------------------------------------------------------------
We have become, by the power of a glorious evolutionary accident
called intelligence, the stewards of life's continuity on earth.
We did not ask for this role, but we cannot abjure it. We may
not be suited to it, but here we are. -- Stephen Jay Gould
-----------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------
David Harmon
On 12 Jul 1997 18:17:00 GMT, OEXCHAOS <oexc...@aol.com> wrote:
>I had believed that you were a) smarter than to write the below, and b)
>that you understood Objectivism better. Thus, I was incredulous to read
>your comments.
I think I already admitted that I don't have all the answers; if not,
I do so admit now. So, you can spare me the commentary about how much
I do or do not understand. I've been insulted by Chris Wolf.
>However no RATIONAL moral code permits stealing in the context we are
>dealing with here.
Meanwhile you have been having a tough time filling in the gaps in
your proof of that, elsewhere in this thread.
For instance, you just posted:
>In real
>life, it isn't in your RATIONAL best interest to steal. Man lives best if
>man lives a principled existence. The principle of most import, is that
>man's rights may not be LEGITIMATELY violated. Thus, stealing is wrong, in
>principle and since the above principle is NECESSARY for man's very
>existence AS A MORAL BEING, it is also also not in a man's rational best
>interests to steal.
Now, those are all nice lofty principles, but none of them will stand
on their own! They require proof, not repetition and shouting.
Except, that is, the one about rights not being legitimately violated;
that's not a principle, it's just a definition.
Or, as the little kid said, "Why?"
Note that I'm not disagreeing with your principles. I like them a
lot. I just can't prove that they are the only valid principles.
I don't think you can either.
>Futhermore, going out and buying a lock indicates that you have at
>least a rudimentary undertanding of property rights.
No, it merely indicates my desire to lock something up. Couldn't it
be, in your words, just "instinctive territoriality duh."
Gordon Sollars
In article <DDFr-15079...@ddfr.vip.best.com>,
David Friedman <DD...@best.com> wrote:
>
> In article <19970714201...@ladder02.news.aol.com>, OEXCHAOS
> <oexc...@aol.com> wrote:
>
> ...
>
> >The FUNDAMENTAL priciple is that MEN have rights, because they are
> rational social creatures, and rights are necessary in a social context
> for men to live. From there, one derives one's own proper behavior.
>
> Is what you mean that "people will live longer and better lives if
> everyone respects rights?" That is a somewhat vague but basically correct
> statement--but how do you get from that to "if I want to live a longer and
> better life, I ought to respect other people's rights?"
> --
I think the Objectivist needs to appeal to the moral idea of
generalization. I conjecture that phrases like "man qua man" and "man
qua rational being" are meant to do this work within the theory. On
this interpretation the "I" in the above is a placeholder that can be
filled in with any being that has the same essential characteristics
(rationality) that I do. By this generalization the second statement
is transformed into the first. This sort of generalization is not the
same as altruism, although it is virtually the same as Kant's
categorical imperative. Perhaps Objectivists can reject Kantian
metaphysics without rejecting all positions compatable with his moral
theory. Afterall, why should an Objectivist believe that Kant was
consistent?
Alternatively, one could argue that the second statement leads to the
first because of constraints on knowledge. For example, we know that
some persons *are* caught stealing, though presumably they did not
expect to be. Following a general rule of not stealing may be the
best *you* can reasonably hope to do, even though you can imagine
circumstances in which this rule is not the best. There would be no
reason for persons who were much better at theft than any other
activities to follow such a rule (if they could be reasonably sure of
this, of course), but it could supply a reason for most of us. We
would consider those for whom this is not true as outlaws, outside our
moral community. This is a sort of neo-Hobbesian view that I doubt
would appeal to many Objectivists since it does not provide a reason
for *all* rational beings to not to steal.
David Harmon
On 16 Jul 1997 15:22:33 GMT, OEXCHAOS <oexc...@aol.com> wrote:
>So, if you get caught, you aren't prudent enough, and thus weren't a
>prudent preditor, and should have been following "the rules". Sounds
>like the philosophical equivalent of Will Rogers' comments on the
>stock market "buy stocks that go up, if they don't go up, don't buy
>'em."
Yes, it sounds a bit like that. And, the difficulty of following Will
Rogers' formula does not imply that it is immoral to make the attempt.
Amit Kapoor
David Harmon (sou...@netcom.com) wrote:
<snip>
: Now, here comes the big leap. I interpret "because" in such a way
: that "I do <a> because I want <b>" _implies_ "I believe that if I do
: <a> then as a result <b> will happen". That gets me to the
: interpretation:
: If I do not steal
: then society will not steal from me.
: Which is palpably false. Did I make a missteake?
Oops. You are right, it does come across that way. Let me
try and state it differently (and what I really meant :)):
I do not steal to avoid giving others the moral sanction
to steal my property.
A somewhat similar example is, if I am physically bigger
then most people then it is in my self-interest
to threaten (and beat people) to get my way. However if
I think about it, I might be able to get away with it
a few times before other people club together againist
me (it will be in their interest to do so).
A rational predator will be able to steal, but the property
will be missed and will lead to a atmosphere of dis-trust
in society and thus not in his/her long term interest.
Does that make better sense?
cheers-
Amit
Iván Ordóñez
In article <amitEDF...@netcom.com>, Amit Kapoor <am...@netcom.com> wrote:
[...]
> A rational predator will be able to steal, but the property
> will be missed and will lead to a atmosphere of dis-trust
> in society and thus not in his/her long term interest.
The atmosphere of distrust exists anyway, because predators (rational and
non-rational, those who do get caught) will always exist. Therefore, the
impact of the rational predator on society is minimal, and his gain is
considerable, even in the long term.
--
Iván Ordóñez
Ordonez-...@osu.edu
http://www.cis.ohio-state.edu/~iordonez
David Friedman
>A rational predator will be able to steal, but the property
>will be missed and will lead to a atmosphere of dis-trust
>in society and thus not in his/her long term interest.
>
>Does that make better sense?
But this is a matter of degree. In a large society, my rational predation
will have a very small effect on the atmosphere, hence a very small effect
on me via the atmosphere--but a large effect on my wealth. So your
argument may be a good reason to avoid rights violation if you are in a
tiny society, but is almost irrelevant in a big one.
Iván Ordóñez
In article <19970714134...@ladder02.news.aol.com>, OEXCHAOS
<oexc...@aol.com> wrote:
[...] I'm asserting that an objective ethical
> standard should, by definition, be objective. The principles applied
> should be universal. Anyone want to show me that this is incorrect?
Sure. For principles, objective does not imply universal. Principles,
understood as rules you must follow, are individual and depend on one's
circumstances.
[...]
> Correct. But the PRINCIPLES should be objective, should they not?
And all that means is that they should be based on the facts of reality, no
that they should be universal.
[...]
> Sure, you might find a situation where you might not get caught. This is
> why ethics should be based upon objective standards, not utilitarian ones.
Utilitarian standards *are* objective.
--
Ivan Ordonez
iord...@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (finger for PGP public key)
http://www.cis.ohio-state.edu/~iordonez
TAO
Guru George <gurug...@sugarland.idiscover.co.uk> wrote in article
<33ce9ce8...@news.idiscover.co.uk>...
> On 17 Jul 1997 19:30:01 GMT, John Alway
> <jal...@icsi.net.SpamTransmogrifier> wrote:
>
> >Iván Ordóńez wrote:
> >
> >> In article <33c90038...@news.idiscover.co.uk>,
> >> gurug...@sugarland.idiscover.co.uk wrote:
> >
> >> > It's weird: there seems to be this suppressed and unacknowledged
> >> > other-concern in Objectivism!
> >
> >> My impression too. Many of them are actually honest, decent people who
like
> >> to pretend they are exclusively selfish and don't care about other
people.
> >> A bit schizophrenic, if you ask me.
> >
> >
> > I honestly don't understand the confusion. There
> > is no conflict between egoism and caring about
> > other people. Surely you understand this. Surely
> > this isn't an abstruse point. In fact, the conflict
> > lies squarely with altruism, which says help someone
> > _because_ it's not a value to you.
> >
> Could it be something like this?
>
> There is irrational self interest (e.g. range-of-the-moment), and
> rational self interest (e.g. Objectivism).
>
> There is also irrational other interest (the kind of 'logical'
> altruism Rand criticised), but could there be *rational other
> interest* (i.e. genuine interest in the other for his or her own sake,
> not derived from self interest, but not a form of logical altruism
> either)? Well, could there be? It's one of the logical possibilities
> after all!
>
> Put it this way: is rational altruism giving up your happiness for
> another's or - gaining your happiness *through* another's?
> - Guru George
>
>
Apart from situations of pathological dependency I
can not think of "people helping people" for other
than the satisfaction that it gives the giver. If that
is the case there is little altruism left for Objectivists
to reject. If Albert Schweitzer and Mother Teresa
are not objectionable then the doctrine has little
practical meaning.
TAO
------------------------------------------------------------
My kids call me The Ancient One.
I don't even know who Lao Tzu is.
------------------------------------------------------------
Jim Klein
Yogi wrote:
> Mark, you keep losing me in that second sentence: "You have no
> legitimate claim to be free from stealing if you steal." This does not seem to
> follow from your arguments. The principle at question here is self-interest
> not whether or not to steal. What is inconsistent with the following
> statements:
>
> 1) It is in my self-interest to steal
>
> 2) It is in my self-interest to prevent others from stealing from me
It treats the actor as inherently different, on an ethical matter, from
other people. Specifically, it says that the actor belongs to a class
with one ethical principle (it's okay to steal), while other people
belong to a class with a different ethical principle (it's not okay to
steal).
Treating oneself as belonging to an ethical class different from other
humans strikes me as a misidentification of reality.
> Proceeding from the principle of self-interest these two statments are
> wholly compatible and require no leaps. I believe it was David who made the
> point (or something to this effect) that my not stealing will have no
> influence on whether or not others steal from me. If they are acting based on
> pure self-interest then why would they stop to consider my actions? Well, they
> wouldn't. They would only ask whether the action (or prevention thereof) is in
> their self-interest.
It's not tough to imagine an argument that stealing is in one's self
interest. It's also not tough to imagine that not stealing is in one's
self interest. One of these is wrong; which do YOU think it is? I
still can't prove it, but all of my experience leads me to think that
stealing is not in one's self-interest.
jk
Jim Klein
David Friedman wrote:
> 1. Consider two patterns of behavior, A and B. Suppose every individual
> prefers the outcome of everybody following pattern A to the outcome of
> everyone following pattern B. Then it makes sense to say that, as between
> those two alternatives, it is in our interest for all of us to follow A.
> It doesn't follow that we will all do A--because I control only my action,
> and it may be that I am better off if I do B, whatever everyone else is
> doing.
Hold on...that violates the stipulations. If everybody is doing A, then
you can't be better off doing B---that was your original condition.
Thus, it is not the case that "it may be that I am better off if I do B,
whatever everyone else is doing." Not that it matters, but it's nice to
catch you in even a minor error every year or two!
I still maintain that if all the members were actually rational, and
they REALLY preferred everyone doing A versus _anyone_ doing B, and they
were able to communicate with a common language---then they'd really all
do A. That is, the lighthouse would get built.
All of these examples only serve to prove (at least to me) that either
they DIDN'T TRULY prefer what you stipulate they did, OR they're not
rational, which is another way of saying they preferred something else
(that which led to their irrationality) over what you say they
preferred.
> For a slightly less abstract example, suppose that either A or B affects
> people in ways that are hard to predict in advance. We know that 80 people
> will be in a situation where everyone doing A is better for them, 20 in a
> situation where everyone doing B is better, but we don't know in advance
> exactly which 80 it will be. An example would be a legal rule that
> benefits pedestrians at the expense of drivers--where you don't knowfor
> sure whether, if there is an accident, you will be the pedestrian or the
> driver. If you would prefer A given an 80% chance of being a gainer and a
> 20% chance of being a loser, then we might say that A is "in our
> interest."
To address these sorts of arguments generally, I think it's a form of
projection. Because you have an extemely analytic mind, and enjoy both
statistics and predicting, you assume that such is the motivation of
most people. But the simple fact is, it's not. People have all sorts
of weird reasons for doing things, and rationality and considering
personal self-interest often falls remarkably low on the list.
Therefore, I'm inclined to reject analyses which assume that the actors
are doing just that.
And yes, I did take your recommendation and read some of the _Price
Theory_ stuff, and understand why it's okay for statistical purposes to
assume that everybody IS acting rationally and self-interestedly. But
that's not the subject under discussion. We're not trying to figure out
how people act, or even (in this thread) how they SHOULD act. AFAIK,
the specific topic under discussion is whether acts of stealing and such
can be consistent with rational self-interest. ALL of the evidence of
which I'm aware says no, though there is an absence of clear explanation
as to why this is so.
> "No man is secure in his life, liberty or property while the legislature is in session"
Obviously true, but again not the pertinent issue, to me. The relevant
question is whether we can be secure while the legislature is in
_existence_!
jk
David Friedman
In article <33CE71...@icsi.net.SpamTransmogrifier>, John Alway
<jal...@icsi.net.SpamTransmogrifier> wrote:
> In fact, the conflict
> lies squarely with altruism, which says help someone
> _because_ it's not a value to you.
>
>
> ...John
I think that has as much similarity to the real views of real altruists as
the standard left wing parody of Objectivism has to Objectivism. It is
always easy to win arguments if you get to define the other side's
position for him.
For what it is worth, there is an economic literature on altruism which
takes it for granted that altruism means valuing the welfare of others--in
technical terms, having someone else's utility as one of the arguments in
the altruist's utility function.
--
David Friedman
DD...@Best.com
http://www.best.com/~ddfr/
"No man is secure in his life, liberty or property while the legislature is in session"
Tom Robertson
John Alway wrote:
> I do believe this, many people who believe they are
> governed by altruism because they are helping their
> mother, or a friend, are really being governed by
> egoism. It's often misidentified.
I wouild go further than this and say that all apparent altruism is
really egoism. There is neither virtue nor vice in pursuing one's own
self-interest, since it is impossible not to. Virtue is to do so in a
good way, which necessarily includes some of what passes for altruism.
Jim Klein
Tom Robertson wrote:
> >It treats the actor as inherently different, on an ethical matter, from
> >other people. Specifically, it says that the actor belongs to a class
> >with one ethical principle (it's okay to steal), while other people
> >belong to a class with a different ethical principle (it's not okay to
> >steal).
>
> I don't see how it does this. The prudent predator both disapproves
> of other people not doing the same and hopes they don't. There is no
> reason he cannot have the same morality for everyone, just because he
> hopes others are what he regards as immoral.
Does he hope that he himself is immoral, by such a standard?
jk
John Alway
David Friedman <DD...@best.com> wrote:
>In article <33CE71...@icsi.net.SpamTransmogrifier>, John Alway
><jal...@icsi.net.SpamTransmogrifier> wrote:
>> In fact, the conflict
>> lies squarely with altruism, which says help someone
>> _because_ it's not a value to you.
>I think that has as much similarity to the real views of real altruists as
>the standard left wing parody of Objectivism has to Objectivism. It is
>always easy to win arguments if you get to define the other side's
>position for him.
I don't see this as a game as to who can "win" or lose
an argument. That's pretty unimportant on the scale of
things.
The idea behind Kantian ethics is that an act is moral
if its done without any person benefit. If a desire is not
to do good and you do good, then and only then can you be
sure that your act is moral.
If you don't believe Kant has been influential, and that
self-denial, suffering, is not the central ingredient
to altruism, see the reaction to those who have lots of
money and give much more to charity than most people can.
They provide much more in terms of material "benefits" than
a Mother Theresa does. Yet, they are still viewed as
"selfish", "greedy" rich people by leftists in particular.
See Colin Powel's admonishment of Bill Gates a few months back.
Otoh, observe those who have done nothing for anyone else,
and are very poor and suffering (even if by their own hand).
These people are seen as the salt of the earth.
Here again I'll quote from the Harper Collins Philosophy
dictionary...
Altruism may be motivated by (a) a disinterested sense of
duty to humans and society (this is probably Kantianism), or
(b) the disciplined attempt to overcome one's self-centeredness
and selfish desires in love of others, which involves such
qualities as compassion, sympathy, and selflessness.
The note in parentheses is mine.
>For what it is worth, there is an economic literature on altruism which
>takes it for granted that altruism means valuing the welfare of others--in
>technical terms, having someone else's utility as one of the arguments in
>the altruist's utility function.
That would make altruism compatible with egoism in some
cases. But "selfless concern for the welfare of others" is
probably the generally understood meaning of the term, and
the one I find in my dictionary.
...John
John Alway
Guru George wrote:
> On 17 Jul 1997 19:30:01 GMT, John Alway
> <jal...@icsi.net.SpamTransmogrifier> wrote:
> > I honestly don't understand the confusion. There
> > is no conflict between egoism and caring about
> > other people. Surely you understand this. Surely
> > this isn't an abstruse point. In fact, the conflict
> > lies squarely with altruism, which says help someone
> > _because_ it's not a value to you.
> Could it be something like this?
The initial point is most important, which you
are skipping. Namely, egoism and caring about
other people are in harmony.
> There is irrational self interest (e.g. range-of-the-moment), and
Which, ironically, isn't in your self-interest.
> rational self interest (e.g. Objectivism).
> There is also irrational other interest (the kind of 'logical'
> altruism Rand criticised), but could there be *rational other
> interest* (i.e. genuine interest in the other for his or her own sake,
> not derived from self interest, but not a form of logical altruism
> either)? Well, could there be? It's one of the logical possibilities
> after all!
I really have never seen any argument to support
such a position, and it doesn't square with me at
all. Since the concept value comes from the fact
that one has a life/death alternative, one's ultimate
value can't lie outside the self.
> Put it this way: is rational altruism giving up your happiness for
> another's or - gaining your happiness *through* another's?
If it's _your_ happiness which is the end sought,
then that's _egoism_, not altruism.
I do believe this, many people who believe they are
governed by altruism because they are helping their
mother, or a friend, are really being governed by
egoism. It's often misidentified.
...John
David Friedman
In article <1997071802...@cyberia.com>, John Kennedy
<jkennedy@SPAM_DEFLECTORcyberia.com> wrote:
>But lets imagine that such a shadow person exists for the sake of
>argument. Why not prefer a situation where the greatest good is
>possible, even if that means risking some harm, instead of trying to
>choose to minimize potential difficulties?
I don't understand the question. I'm not seeking to "minimize potential
difficulties." I am seeking to maximize expected value--gains in whatever
my maximand is (life expectancy, or happiness, or quality of life--I am
being deliberately vague about that, but so is everyone else) net of
losses, averaged over a set of alternative possibilities..
tmic...@worldnet.fr
On 17 Jul 1997 19:30:01 GMT, in humanities.philosophy.objectivism John
Alway <jal...@icsi.net.SpamTransmogrifier> wrote:
> I honestly don't understand the confusion. There
> is no conflict between egoism and caring about
> other people. Surely you understand this. Surely
> this isn't an abstruse point. In fact, the conflict
> lies squarely with altruism, which says help someone
> _because_ it's not a value to you.
> ...John
Dear John, Like yourself I can honestly see no reason why I should not
be an egoist and at the same time go out of my way to please let's say
my children or even somebody I don't know. I think that unwittingly
you answer the question when you say that it isn't an abstruse point.
It's so simple in fact that it slips by unnoticed. The schoolmen I
think used to say "In simplicitate veritas" which means more or less
that the truth is usually very simple. Or could it be that it's so
obvious that nobody bothers to mention the fact.?
I notice that Tom Robertson elsewhere goes even further and I would
like to go even further than he does and say that in my opinion men
are born egoists and egoism is innate in all of us.Some natural form
of self-protection perhaps ? I don't know. Certainly St Thomas Aquinas
argues strongly against perfect ie disinterested love (caritas
perfecta). Apart from some notes taken ages ago I have no reference
for this though it's probably from 'De hominum natura'.
Kindest regards, Michael Thackray
Amit Kapoor
David Harmon (sou...@netcom.com) wrote:
<snip>
: That fixes the problem I originally objected to, but still leaves me
: wondering a bit. I confess that I am not entirely clear on this
: "moral sanction" idea. I think it means that it is morally OK for you
I debated on using the term for a little while, but finally used it in
a very loose sense. I realized the definition I was using for stealing
was itself wrong. In my mind I had used:
to take someones property by unjust means
which to start with makes stealing wrong. I will base (hopefully
a better argument) on a slightly different meaning:
appropriation of someone's property without consent
The problem I see is we are not agreeing on the definition of the
term rational. Lets assume that they are only two people in
existence, X and Y. If X makes a statement, "A is A" and Y
agrees to it, it is a rational statement for it applies regardless
of the source (X or Y).
Now if X state's:
1. X's property belongs to X.
2. Y's property belongs to X.
as the premise, Y has to agree to it. If Y does, that is fine
for no conflict arises. However if we state the above statement
as X saying:
a. My property is mine.
b. Your (Y) property is also mine (stealing)
and Y tries to apply the same, a conflict arises, because in
essense Y is saying that its property belongs to both X and Y
and also that X's property belongs to Y.
So in what stealing does is raises conflicts between
X and Y and that normally means a premise not agreed on (which
in this case is (a) and (b)). (Here I am making an assumption
that X and Y do want conflicts)
The number of people involved do not matter for the same logic
is applied. Does that make better sense?
On a side note:
Someone (I think it was Guru George) who stated something to the
effect that, "objectivists have concern for other people". That
is true, but the root of that concern is again as I tried drawing
above is "rational self-interest".
cheers-
Amit
Guru George
On 14 Jul 1997 16:59:46 GMT, Tym Parsons <tpar...@u.washington.edu>
wrote:
>
>On 12 Jul 1997, Guru George wrote:
>
>> Why do Objectivists universalise like good Kantians?
>
>They don't universalise "like good Kantians".
Oh yes they do. As has been pointed out numerous times, if your
morality were *purely* rationally selfish, there would be no reason
not to steal from people in 'crunch' situations, where prudential
considerations have no weight (e.g. when you can get away with it).
All those arguments that say "if everybody ...." are
universalisability arguments.
>
>> Ultimately, there is no rationally selfish move forbidding stealing,
>> granted enough chutzpah and ability to get away with it. It's only if
>> you care about human beings, or about society, or about other people,
>> that you won't want to steal.
>>
>> It's weird: there seems to be this suppressed and unacknowledged
>> other-concern in Objectivism!
>
>Instead of making specious claims like this, why doesn't the poster
>respond to MY account?
>
Eh? I warn't talkin' to you Tymbo, I was commenting on an exchange
between OEXCHAOS and Ivan Ordonez.
- Guru George
*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*
"A true God needs no adoration,
and will not be affected by your scorn.
A 'Black Brother' will shrivel without one,
and foam when faced with the other."
- Marcelo Ramos Motta
from Class C commentary to Liber AL vel Legis
*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*^*
Billy Goode
Jim Klein <easy...@ameritech.net> wrote in article
<33CF4D...@ameritech.net>...
> > >It treats the actor as inherently different, on an ethical matter,
from
> > >other people. Specifically, it says that the actor belongs to a class
> > >with one ethical principle (it's okay to steal), while other people
> > >belong to a class with a different ethical principle (it's not okay to
> > >steal).
> > Tom Robertson wrote
> > I don't see how it does this. The prudent predator both disapproves
> > of other people not doing the same and hopes they don't. There is no
> > reason he cannot have the same morality for everyone, just because he
> > hopes others are what he regards as immoral.
> Jim Klein wrote:
> Does he hope that he himself is immoral, by such a standard?
By his standards immoral would be:
1) It is not in my self-interest to steal
2) It is not in my self-interest to prevent others from stealing
Hence, he has no reason to "hope" he is immoral by such a standard.
Unstealingly yours,
Billy Goode
Daniel Smith
Ivan Ordonez:
>Except that I had never in my life met anyone with such conception of
>altruism until I met the Objectivists. The whole Objectivist idea of
>selfishness as a virtue as opposed to altruism, the vice, is a strawman. I
>am both selfish and altruistic, and anyone who is not an Objectivist will
>understand that this makes perfect sense.
I'm curious Ivan, why do you engage in altruistic behavior?
Daniel Smith
Guru George
o-state.edu> <Ordonez-Reinoso.1-ya02...@nntp.service.ohio-state.edu> <Pine.OSF.3.96.970714...@saul1.u.washington.edu>
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On 14 Jul 1997 23:59:32 GMT, Tym Parsons <tpar...@u.washington.edu>
wrote:
[snip]
>Wrong. Getting caught has nothing to do with it. Think about why you
>live with other men in the first place. The primary values obtained from
>living in a (rational) society, as opposed to a desert island, are
>knowledge and trade.
>
[etc. snip]
All this is fine as an argument why people in general shouldn't steal,
on principle, but if my effect on society is comparatively tiny, the
loss I receive as 'feedback' from my actions will be negligible, and
if my concern is to be only for myself, that will be a negligible
consideration in my present deliberations whether to steal or not when
I can get away with it.
DEFanyo
Brad Asia wrote:
>An altruistic theory says that actor X must produce the moral value, which
>then is to be bestowed upon receiver Y, X <> Y.
How, pray tell, does one bestow a moral value upon another? I
can't give away honesty, integrity, self-esteem, courage. And
altruism doesn't say that *everything* you have is to be given
away, it only says that you may have a disinterested concern for
another -- you may give without expecting like value in return.
The Greeks didn't even have such a category. Evidentally, egoism
arose as a counterforce against the perceived altruistic teachings
of Christianity.
>Egoistic theories say that X and Y should be one and the same.
Even at the times the egoist doesn't want it that way? Trying to
run family relationships on a trader principle is ridiculous. And
keeping ledgers between friends (I'm NOT talking about
aquaintances!) is a waste of time and effort -- and friendship, a
very precious commodity.
>THEN, we can
>start differentiating between varieties of egoism, such as
>hedonism
>(emotional/subjective egoism), and varieties of (alleged) rational egoism.
What ARE you talking about? How can there be varieties of egoism?
"Everything I do is for me alone and for no one else" brooks of no
varieties.
Iván Ordóñez
In article <33D2FD...@ameritech.net>, easy...@ameritech.net wrote:
[...] But the same is NOT true of the
> multitudes of God-inspired or community-inspired devotees who use the
> principle of altruism as a justification for compelling the action of
> others.
Maybe it's just me, but I'd never dream of using the word *altruistic* do
describe such hypocrites.
Al Mok
In article <01bc95e5$e901a5e0$0cf936ce@jimhome>,
Timothy Shell <tsh...@mcs.net> wrote:
#
#Iván Ordóńez <iord...@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu> wrote in article
#<iordonez-ya0240800...@nntp.service.ohio-state.edu>...
#> Except that I had never in my life met anyone with such conception of
#> altruism until I met the Objectivists. The whole Objectivist idea of
#> selfishness as a virtue as opposed to altruism, the vice, is a strawman.
#
#This strawman argument ignores the fact that Objectivists clearly define
#what they mean by terms such as altruism, selfishness, and hedonism. These
#definitions may be different from more common usages - hedonism, for
#example, is the sacrificing of others to serve yourself. The justification
#for using terms in this fashion can be found in the Objectivist theory of
#concepts, in Rand's "Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology." Basically,
#it is a matter of defining by essentials, coupled with the assumption that
#essentials, and therefore definitions, are not arbitrary..
In order for Rand to make the distinction between altruistic and egoistic
behavior, the essentials of the concept of *self-interest* must be precisely
and completely specified. For an individual to volitionally take an action
involves a conscious decision the basis of which is accessible only to the
individual, and usually only to a certain degree, because of our limited
understanding about how the human mind works to resolve the pull of different
desires. I don't think we have enough knowledge to talk scientifically about
a term such as *self-interest* today, not to say during Rand's lifetime.
#This leaves three ideas that need to be defined. Acting under the
#assumption of a harmony of interests, where one's own good promotes the
#good of others, is called selfishness. Acting under the assumption of a
#conflict of interests, while seeking to sacrifice self to serve others, is
#called altruism.
In other words, if one cannot justify how an action furthers one's
*self-interest*, then taking said action is an altruistic act. What then
constitue *self-interest*, e.g., to can distinguish it from emotional whim?
#Using terms in this manner, it is a flat contradiction to be both selfish
#and altruistc, as one assumes harmony of interests, the other conflict of
#interests.
Many if not most of our actions require considerations of trade-offs,
e.g., I may decide to spend an hour coaching my friend's kid because
I want her to understand basic math, even though I may get more research
done thinking about a problem in that hour. Now if I take the attitude
that my friend's kid's happiness _always_ comes before mine, then you
might say that I am an altruist, but what if it is not my friend's kid but
my own that I am considering to help? I suspect that many parents are
willing to go to extremes to secure the safety and happiness of their own
children, even at great risks to their own lives. I am not sure if Rand
would have called these parents altruists. Where does one draw the line
_and_ how does one justify it from the facts of reality, other than on
emotional grounds?
Cheers,
-- Al Mok
--
Aloysius K. Mok m...@cs.utexas.edu Department of Computer Science
University of Texas at Austin
"Why?" "Why not?" Austin, Texas 78712
(512)471-9542
TAO
Jim Klein <easy...@ameritech.net> wrote in article
> But the same is NOT true of the
> multitudes of God-inspired or community-inspired devotees who use the
> principle of altruism as a justification for compelling the action of
> others.
>
> jk
>
Jim, I am not aware of those multitudes (compellers). Can you be more
specific?
TAO
Guru George
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On 21 Jul 1997 17:46:54 GMT, Tym Parsons <tpar...@u.washington.edu>
wrote:
>> As has been pointed out numerous times, if your
>> morality were *purely* rationally selfish, there would be no reason
>> not to steal from people in 'crunch' situations, where prudential
>> considerations have no weight (e.g. when you can get away with it).
>
>But you can't "get away with it". Not for the long-term.
If I can get away with it till I am dead, that ought to be long
enough. Are you claiming there is some inexorable, mystical law that
always catches criminals out before they die or something? If, given
the context of the pp's knowledge, s/he thinks s/he can get away with
it, that's rational enough. "Not for the long term" holds in many
cases, maybe most, but that's not good enough for philosophy; if you
stick to it, you are guilty of wishful thinking, IMO.
[snip]
Guru George
vice.ohio-state.edu> <33D2FD...@ameritech.net>
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On 21 Jul 1997 06:56:59 GMT, Jim Klein <easy...@ameritech.net> wrote:
>You're just saying that "doing something for
>someone else" can be equally sensible, and moral, as "doing something
>for yourself". Stated that way, it's true, though most Objectivists
>would relate "moral" to "rational" to "doing things for yourself". But
>it's only motivationally, not physically, that the distinction is
>important. Your motivation IS self-interest; it's only the results
>which coincide with altruism. Around here, "altruism" more commonly
>refers to the actual motivation, in that it places the value of others'
>well-being above that of the actor. It is this trick which allows the
>"duty" thing to come about.
You've got the nub of the matter here I think, Jim. *This* is what
Objectivism is really against, not 'helping other people', and not
even, I think, valueing others above self if that's what turns you on
(after all, there seems to be room for this even in Objectivism, if
the other is a value *to you* - and the difference between an
Objectivist mother and Mother Theresa, say, would just be in some kind
of scope perhaps, or a particular set of standards). You're right,
it's the duty thing that's the very devil.
>I'd bet a bundle that the motivation for
>your altruistic behavior isn't duty, but rather desire. I'd guess the
>same is true of Mother Theresa. But the same is NOT true of the
>multitudes of God-inspired or community-inspired devotees who use the
>principle of altruism as a justification for compelling the action of
>others.
The question is: where and when is *compulsion* justified? The
irrational altruist simply wants to entrance you into his or her
'duty' trance. The rational altruist is simply somebody who feels
benevolence, and wants people to be happy, fulfilled, etc., and is
maybe even willing to recommend such a way of being to others, but not
to *compel* them.
The idiocy is, that anything compelled cannot be moral, because it
hasn't been *chosen*: that's where Objectivism is bang on target.
Tom Robertson
John Bicketts wrote:
>Most polluting corporations today seem to find the costs to
>themselves of pollution less than the savings gained by doing so.
If the aggregate costs of a corporation's pollution to everyone are
greater than the aggregate savings to everyone, wouldn't that
corporation's pollution constitute an initiation of force? Or would
any cost to anyone constitute an initiation of force, regardless of
what benefits there were?
Guru George
On 22 Jul 1997 21:47:38 GMT, Stephen Grossman <sgr...@pictac.com>
wrote:
>In article <33d1f0f3...@news.idiscover.co.uk>,
>gurug...@sugarland.idiscover.co.uk wrote:
>if my effect on society is comparatively tiny, the
>> loss I receive as 'feedback' from my actions will be negligible, and
>> if my concern is to be only for myself, that will be a negligible
>> consideration in my present deliberations whether to steal or not when
>> I can get away with it.
>
>As police know, most thieves lead miserable lives and as they get older,
>things get worse. No pension or medical plan or even Social Security.
>Their lives must be hidden from almost everyone, making dishonesty a daily
>companion. Even top gangsters live middleclass lives since the IRS would
>get them. There's probably more. Eg, thieves become increasingly dependent
>upon others, a devastating effect upon self-esteem, probably leading to
>alcoholism and drug addiction.
Yes, that's absolutely true of those who take a *career* as a thief;
but the point at issue is whether it is in my self interest to steal
on those occasions when my best estimate is that I can get away with
it (the principle being "I won't steal - except when I can get away
with it", which is perfectly consistent as a rational principle).
To take a simple example - stealing stationery from work. Another
example - you see somebody has left their wallet behind on a train,
and there's nobody else in the compartment.
In such situations, and in more complex ones where the benefit from
theft would be even greater, there seems to be nothing to stop a
rationally selfish individual from stealing.
The only thing I can see that stops one is *consideration* - if you
forbear from theft on such occasions, you are in a mild, and rational
sense, being altruistic. I don't think there's any way of avoiding
this conclusion.
Stephen Grossman
In article <33d1f0f3...@news.idiscover.co.uk>,
gurug...@sugarland.idiscover.co.uk wrote:
if my effect on society is comparatively tiny, the
> loss I receive as 'feedback' from my actions will be negligible, and
> if my concern is to be only for myself, that will be a negligible
> consideration in my present deliberations whether to steal or not when
> I can get away with it.
As police know, most thieves lead miserable lives and as they get older,
things get worse. No pension or medical plan or even Social Security.
Their lives must be hidden from almost everyone, making dishonesty a daily
companion. Even top gangsters live middleclass lives since the IRS would
get them. There's probably more. Eg, thieves become increasingly dependent
upon others, a devastating effect upon self-esteem, probably leading to
alcoholism and drug addiction.
€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€
Reason is man's basic means of survival. AYN RAND
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tracking Marxist revolution: www.etext.org/Politics/ZigZag
Metaphysics: www.etext.org/Philosophy/Objectivism/Existence-2.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stephen Grossman
Fairhaven, MA, USA
sgr...@pictac.com
€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€
Guru George
ech.net> <iordonez-ya0240800...@nntp.service.ohio-state.edu>
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On 21 Jul 1997 17:34:00 GMT, Iván Ordóñez
<iord...@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu> wrote:
>In article <33CDAE...@ameritech.net>, easy...@ameritech.net wrote:
>
>> Myself, the best I've got so far is, "You always have to live with
>> yourself."
>
>Yes, this is good, except that it doesn't work for all people. Sociopaths,
>for example, don't have a conscience, so "living with themselves" is not a
>problem at all even after committing the most heinous crimes.
>
But then the whole problem of morality is irrelevant to them - you are
hardly going to convince them by *any* sort of rational argument
(except the kind that appeals to their will to self-preservation).
(Although I think there are such people, I think 'sociopath' is far
too loaded a term to describe them. Not having a conscience and not
being sociable are not equivalent.)
John Alway
John Bicketts wrote:
[...]
> Exactly. Most polluting corporations today seem to find the costs to
> themselves of pollution less than the savings gained by doing so.
I don't know if that's true or not, as many corporations
are judged by hyper-sensitive environmentalists who 1> have
irrational expectations, 2> don't know what they're talking
about and/or 3> are anti-industry. However, even if true,
it's not an important point, because most people today are
not Objectivists, and thus don't realize that it's not in
their best long-range interest to harm others. This includes
those who run corporations, many of whom are pro gov't
statists anyway.
...John
Tym Parsons
On 21 Jul 1997, Guru George wrote:
> >But you can't "get away with it". Not for the long-term.
>
> If I can get away with it till I am dead, that ought to be long
> enough. Are you claiming there is some inexorable, mystical law that
> always catches criminals out before they die or something? If, given
> the context of the pp's knowledge, s/he thinks s/he can get away with
> it, that's rational enough. "Not for the long term" holds in many
> cases, maybe most, but that's not good enough for philosophy; if you
> stick to it, you are guilty of wishful thinking, IMO.
Getting caught isn't what's of the essence here. If you'd been following
anything I've posted on this thread, you'd know that.
Tym Parsons
Tym Parsons
On 22 Jul 1997, John Bicketts wrote:
> >> It's in your own self-interest to steal something, so long as
> >> the chances of getting caught are low enough. Right?
> >
> >Wrong. Getting caught has nothing to do with it. Think about why you
> >live with other men in the first place. The primary values obtained from
> >living in a (rational) society, as opposed to a desert island, are
> >knowledge and trade.
> >
> >But knowledge and trade don't grow on trees: their existence requires that
> >men be free to engage in _reasoned action_. Any form of initiating force,
> >including stealing, prevents men from engaging in reasoned action: it
> >sunders thinking from action, thus rendering thought irrelevant to men's
> >lives. Whether it's stealing candy, embezzling millions of dollars, or
> >turning a country into a concentration camp, the effect is the same and
> >only differs by degree: you're subverting the basis for a rational
> >society.
>
>
> Aah, I see, you think theft is wrong because of the overall negative
> effect on society.
No, I'm saying that theft isn't in anyone's self interest.
> So isnt this just a question of which sorts of altruism produce the
> best society, rather than self-interest vs. altruism?
You can't define what the "best" society is until you've determined what
"good" is in the first place: i.e. resolving the whole issue of
self-interest vs. altruism.
Tym Parsons
Guru George
On 23 Jul 1997 17:07:05 GMT, Tym Parsons <tpar...@u.washington.edu>
wrote:
>
I've been following what you said, but it just doesn't make any sense.
Knowledge and trade are values that I can only get in a functioning
society, fine.
If *everybody* stole, etc., then *I* would be worse off, fine.
But it's not necessarily the case that if *I* steal, then *I* will be
worse off, because the dysfunctionalising effect my stealing has on
society is minimal compared to the benefit I'm getting from stealing.
Iván Ordóñez
In article <dls216.114...@psu.edu>, Daniel Smith <dls...@psu.edu> wrote:
> Let me take another approach. How do you define altrusim?
> I ask only because what most people call altrusim I see as benevolence.
I use the word "altruism" to refer to the valuing of people as ends in
themselves, without reference to the self. I am altruistic when I do
something for other people even if I personally have little or nothing to
gain.
For example, at the end of my life, if it turns out that I have lots of
money, I will make sure that lots of that money go to serve the advancement
of humanity. Such act will not benefit me at all, since I will be about to
die; hence it will be altruistic.
Daniel Smith
>In article <dls216.114...@psu.edu>, Daniel Smith <dls...@psu.edu> wrote:
>> Let me take another approach. How do you define altrusim?
>> I ask only because what most people call altrusim I see as benevolence.
Ivan replied:
>I use the word "altruism" to refer to the valuing of people as ends in
>themselves, without reference to the self. I am altruistic when I do
>something for other people even if I personally have little or nothing to
>gain.
How can you value other people without reference to the self? If *you* value
anything, it must originate from the self.
I've gotta log off for a bit. I'll come back to this later.
DS
Daniel Smith
>In article <dls216.114...@psu.edu>, Daniel Smith <dls...@psu.edu> wrote:
>> Let me take another approach. How do you define altrusim?
>> I ask only because what most people call altrusim I see as benevolence.
Ivan replies:
>I use the word "altruism" to refer to the valuing of people as ends in
>themselves, without reference to the self. I am altruistic when I do
>something for other people even if I personally have little or nothing to
>gain.
How can you value other people without reference to the self? If *you* value
anything, it must originate from the self. Also, I would question whether
or not you have anything to gain from what you call altruistic acts.
For instance, just last week leaving a movie theatre I
overheard two young girls who were trying to buy their tickets, but then
realized they had missed the discount show and thus they'd have to pay full
price. However, they did not have enough money. They sighed and walked out of
the theatre. I walked outside and I offered them the extra money
they needed to see the movie. Now most people would call that an act of
altrusim. I, however, call it an act of benevolence. Here's why:
As an individual capable of valuing, and as someone who seeks to achieve
and maintain values, I am familiar with the pain and frustration that
can occasionally accompany the pursuit and maintenance of one's goals
and values. I am also familiar with the joy that one can
experience achieving and maintaining values. Thus when I see
others seeking to achieve or maintain values I can empathize with
them. Moreover, as someone whose sense of self-esteem is enhanced
by actions that promote self-efficacy, I seek to engage in such actions.
I suggest that this capacity for empathy and the role of self-esteem are at
least two of the things that promote behaviors that seem to be of no
*apparent* benefit to the actor. That is, actions that promote the
achievement and maintenance of others' values (because one knows personally
the vicissitudes of that process and also because the act of effecting what
one considers to be positive change [self-efficacy] enhances one's
self-esteem) can actually benefit the actor. Stated differently, promoting
the value and goal achievement/maintenance of others can benefit an actor
emotionally-psychologically. Because I was capable of ending their
frustration (an negative emotional state I am familiar with), it felt good
to give those girls money so they could see that movie--I value feeling good.
Furthermore, as someone who values a civil society in which others assist
others without chance of *existential-material* benefits, it is in my
interest to promote such behavior by engaging in it myself. When I gave
those girls that money I was promoting civil behavior, and thus promoting a
civil society.
Therefore, the action I engaged in last week was not altruistic because
it did not entail (within my value hierarchy) an act of sacrfice or
selflessness. Indeed, it was self-intersted in several ways. And that's what
distinguishes it from an act of altruism.
This, however, raises the issue of personal value hierarchies and personal
motivation in determing whether an action is altruistic or benevolent.
Unfortunately, I don't have time right now to get into that.
>For example, at the end of my life, if it turns out that I have lots of
>money, I will make sure that lots of that money go to serve the advancement
>of humanity. Such act will not benefit me at all, since I will be about to
>die; hence it will be altruistic.
Life is not a collection of discrete moments, its an integrated experience
that shapes the way we think about the past, present and the future. The
fact that you think about the future in the terms that you do affects the way
you think about your life and yourself in the present--this has psychological
value for you now. And thus, I suggest, makes it possible for your gesture
to be non-altruistic.
The above represents my first attempt to articulate what has been, up until
now, a jumble of inchoate thoughts. Feedback is appreciated.
Daniel Smith
TAO
Daniel Smith <dls...@psu.edu> wrote in article
<dls216.115...@psu.edu>...
IMO the above needs much work. First, all kinds of sacrifice induce
those feelings of self validation that you have described. The same goes
for duty well discharged. You are leaving altruism for those who do
benevolence without feeling that it is either their duty or their
privilege.
They must have the feeling that they are damaging and impoverishing
their lives. I don't know anybody that feels or acts that way. IMO the
only way that you can draw a distinction between altruistic and egoistic
trades is by declaring irrational some of the altruistic values, in which
case you may not borrow them.
TAO
Tom Robertson
Daniel Smith wrote:
>Altruism need not include forcing people to sacrifice for the common
>good. The altruism I'm familiar with--and yes this includes sources other
>than Rand--entails believing sacrifice for the benefit of others is
>morally virtuous. It is this premise I reject.
I don't see how sacrificing your money so that others will see a movie
is not altruistic. If what makes it selfish is that you enjoyed it,
and if altruism is sacrificing for others in the absence of this joy,
then I am not aware of any examples of altruism. Maybe what you are
disapproving of should be called "doormat-and/or-sucker-ism," rather
than altruism.
Daniel Smith
"TAO" <gp...@usa.net> regarding my thoughts writes:
>IMO the above needs much work. First, all kinds of sacrifice induce
>those feelings of self validation that you have described. The same goes
>for duty well discharged.
An excellent point. However, I think the overall value hierarchy and
psychological make-up (both of which are influenced by many factors) of the
individual makes a difference whether the sense of validation, as you
call it, supplements self-esteem or what some Objectivists call pseudo-
self-esteem. The former is considered beneficial to one's well-being, while
the latter is considered inimical to it. I tenatively suggest that
sacrificial actions reinforce pseudo-self-esteem.
You are leaving altruism for those who do
>benevolence without feeling that it is either their duty or their
>privilege.
Not at all, see above.
>They must have the feeling that they are damaging and impoverishing
>their lives. I don't know anybody that feels or acts that way.
I think there are many things which constitute an action being altruistic.
Among them, however, feeling that one is damaging or impoverishing one's
life are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions. That is, one can
engage in an action that one can consider to be "damaging" and/or
"impoverishing" but not be engaging in sacrifice. How? One can feel that
an action is damaging or impoversing *now*, but that that action serves
to contribute toward the achievement or maintenance of a value *in the
future*. Of course, depending on circumstances, such an action entails
risk, but that does not make it sacrificial.
IMO the
>only way that you can draw a distinction between altruistic and egoistic
>trades is by declaring irrational some of the altruistic values, in which
>case you may not borrow them.
IMO, the only way you can draw a distinction between altruistic and egoistic
actions is to consider the overall existential context in which the action
takes place, as well as the personal value hiearchy and motivation of the
actor in question.
Thanks for your comments. I look forward to hearing from you again.
Daniel Smith
PS - I should make it clear that I am not an Objectivist, and so my
views do not represent those who dub themselves Objectivists.
TAO
Daniel Smith <dls...@psu.edu> wrote in article
<dls216.115...@psu.edu>...
> PS - I should make it clear that I am not an Objectivist, and so my
> views do not represent those who dub themselves Objectivists.
>
Would it be prudent to ask you in what ways do you agree and disagree with
Objectivism?
TAO
Guru George
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On 24 Jul 1997 19:22:10 GMT, Tym Parsons <tpar...@u.washington.edu>
wrote:
>
>On 23 Jul 1997, Guru George wrote:
>
>> But it's not necessarily the case that if *I* steal, then *I* will be
>> worse off, because the dysfunctionalising effect my stealing has on
>> society is minimal compared to the benefit I'm getting from stealing.
>
>Yeah, that's what they all say. And who are you to say they're wrong?
>
Is that supposed to be a rational response?
John Alway
Bill Adams wrote:
[...]
> I'm a new subscriber who just lurked through about 25 posts in this
> thread. About half-way through them it occurred to me what's wrong with
> GG's statement.
> By stealing, whether or not you get caught, you violate your victim's
> rights. His rights derive from the fact that every man is morally an
> end in himself.
> The theft would gain you his property, but you would know that you were
> living on a morally sub-human level. You would trade your precious
> self-esteem for what could only be a trinket by comparison. Indeed, you
> can't get away with it.
> Theft is not an act of rational self-interest, but a particularly
> dreadful sacrifice. To steal, in this sense, is self-sacrificial.
I hope Bill's post hasn't gone unnoticed. It's
a pithy point.
...John
Iván Ordóñez
In article <33d52e1a...@news.idiscover.co.uk>,
gurug...@sugarland.idiscover.co.uk wrote:
> On 21 Jul 1997 17:34:00 GMT, Iván Ordóñez
> <iord...@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu> wrote:
>
[...] Sociopaths,
> >for example, don't have a conscience, so "living with themselves" is not a
> >problem at all even after committing the most heinous crimes.
> >
> But then the whole problem of morality is irrelevant to them - you are
> hardly going to convince them by *any* sort of rational argument
> (except the kind that appeals to their will to self-preservation).
Exactly, and this is what I have been saying repeatedly. For the truly
selfish individual, morality (the common definition) is irrelevant, since
it is inherently a social construction. He or she does not care about
things such as "rights" or what is right or wrong. He or she only cares
about his or her own well-being. And having that nature does not imply
being irrational, by the way.
Iván Ordóñez
In article <dls216.115...@psu.edu>, Daniel Smith <dls...@psu.edu> wrote:
[...] Now most people would call that an act of
> altrusim. I, however, call it an act of benevolence.
If most people call it altruism, why don't you do so yourself? What is the
use of altering language so other people don't understand it?
> Here's why:
>
[...] Thus when I see
> others seeking to achieve or maintain values I can empathize with
> them. Moreover, as someone whose sense of self-esteem is enhanced
> by actions that promote self-efficacy, I seek to engage in such actions.
In other words, you are a decent guy who is capable of empathy and
compassion. Why do you need to rationalize that?
Even if these actions do benefit you (through "self esteem" enhancement or
whatever) I would suggest that you do not rationally calculate this when
you engage in acts of altruism: you just do it, because it is in your
nature to do so. As an ex-objectivist, you have a handy piece of
rationalization available that, making use of faulty psychology, attempts
to explain your behavior as something ultimately selfish. You don't need
that rationalization to justify being altruistic (or benevolent, whatever).
Just realize that altruism is a kind of behavior that has evolved into our
species and that we therefore carry in our genes: it is, as I said before,
part of our nature.
Iván Ordóñez
> How can you value other people without reference to the self? If *you* value
> anything, it must originate from the self.
What I said was a shorthand for "without reference to the well-being of the
self." I would like to help the prosperity of humanity even long after I am
gone.