paper: innovations in oar technology, part I
Renata Pomponi
Transition to a New Dominant Design
Renata Pomponi
December 13, 1994
15.932: Technology Strategy
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank the many knowledgeable people who provided tours of
their facilities and generously donated their time to be interviewed for
this research: Dick Dreissigacker, Peter Dreissigacker, and Larry
Gluckman at Concept II; Jim Dreher and Mike Dreher at the Durham Boat
Company; Doug Martin of Martin Designs; Oaks Ames of Alden Ocean Shells;
Ted Perry of East & West Custom Boats; Gordon Hamilton, M.I.T. Varsity
Menąs Heavyweight Coach; Dave OąNeill, Boston College Varsity Womenąs
Coach; Steve Gantz, U.S. National Rowing Team; and Terry Friel from the
U.S. Rowing Association.
1.0 Introduction
Rowing equipment has evolved considerably since the rough-hewn wooden
hulls and oars first used for sport in the mid-1800s. Todayąs crew
programs have annual budgets averaging $500,000 at the most competitive
universities, with huge investments being made in shells, electronic
speaker systems, rowing machines, and blades. Advancements in rowing
technology can be divided into two categories: materials and design. The
advent of composite materials to replace the bulky wooden predecessors was
certainly a significant breakthrough for both boats and oars. However,
while hull design has been roughly stable for the past century, with only
incremental improvements to gain minor speed advantages, oar design has
gone through considerable upheaval. In 1991, a radical new oar shape, the
łhatchet˛ blade, was introduced and quickly established itself as the new
dominant design to the virtual exclusion of the previous form. Within a
year, nearly all competitive rowing programs had switched to the new
blades, and most, if not all, of the major oar manufacturers had
introduced designs of their own.
This paper examines the technology trajectory of the oar industry,
focusing on the transition to the hatchet dominant design. The story
behind the initial development of the new blade outlines the approach to
innovation management within the rowing equipment industry. The
conditions that permitted the market embrace of a new design following
over a century of tradition are examined in detail from both a demand and
a supply perspective. The strategy used by the primary manufacturer to
gain market acceptance of the hatchet design is of particular interest,
and interviews were conducted within the rowing community to judge user
response and subsequent adoption patterns. An account of innovation
management within the industry is also presented, including design
approaches and competitive positioning, accompanied by an analysis of the
trajectory of oar technology. The impact of tradition on the acceptance
of innovation is explored in detail.
2.0 Background of the U.S. Oar Industry
Competitive rowing in the United States has a rich history of creativity
in equipment design, dating back to when the sport was first introduced
from Europe well prior to the turn of the century. Before a mass market
existed for manufactured oars, hand-crafted one-of-a-kind designs could be
found in nearly every boathouse [Nolte, 1993]. Beginning in the
mid-1960s, a single design gradually became adopted as the standard shape
for the oar blade. This so-called łMacon˛ design had a spoon-like blade
shape symmetrical about the shaft (see exhibit 1). The shape became
established as the dominant design and was mass-produced around the world,
first in wood and then later in composite materials.
The U.S. oar industry currently consists of four producers, all located in
northern New England, who constitute the bulk of the market: Concept II,
Durham Boat Company, Alden Ocean Shells, and Piantedosi Oar Company.
World-wide, Concept II currently holds over half of the total market and
is number one in the elite competitive market. Concept II likewise
encompasses the vast majority of the U.S. market. At 1,000 oars per year,
Durham produces approximately one-tenth of Concept IIąs share in the
competitive market and sells a significant percentage of their output
overseas. Alden focuses on rough-water equipment, both boats and oars,
for mainly the recreational rower and is the majority leader in this
segment. Each of the three manufactures solely in composites. Piantedosi
is the leading manufacturer of wooden oars, a dramatically smaller
business since the introduction of artificial substitutes in the mid-70s.
Piantedosi recently became Aldenąs supplier for wooden oars when Alden
narrowed their focus to composite-based production only. A number of
other low-volume manufacturers make up a negligible portion of the total
U.S. sales, accompanied by a few European and Australia imports.
3.0 Introduction of the Hatchet Blade
In 1991, following nearly thirty years of Macon dominance, Concept II
introduced a radical new blade design, dubbed the łBig Blade˛ , consisting
of a hatchet-like shape asymmetrical about the shaft (see exhibit 2). The
history behind this product is one typical of interactions within the
rowing community, dominated by dynamic personalities, seat-of-the-pants
ingenuity, and a small-town atmosphere. Although Concept II was clearly
the first to profit from the innovation, competitors Durham and Alden were
both partially involved in instigating its development. This section
describes the activity in each organization regarding the hatchet design,
accompanied by a sample of reactions from the rowing community.
3.1 The Market Leader: Concept II
Concept II was started by two brothers, Dick and Peter Dreissigacker.
Both came from engineering backgrounds, with Dick having been an Olympic
rower in his youth. The company employs about 40 workers in its
Morrisville, Vermont factory, with the majority of design, prototype, and
testing work done by the Dreissigacker brothers. The company entered the
oar business in 1976 as the first to commercialize carbon fiber composite
oars. In 1981, they expanded their product base to include rowing
machines, called ergometers, which quickly became the preeminent
off-season training device for oarsmen and a significant source of revenue
for Concept II. The company manufactured only Macon blades until 1987,
when they introduced an alternative design, with more blade area around
the curve, known as the łdelta˛ blade. An asymmetric blade with similar
area to the Macon blade was introduced and sold in 1989. Although there
was some market interest, the Macon blade remained the primary design,
and not much call now remains for the delta or the original asymmetric
blades.
In the spring of 1991, the Dreissigackers became aware of new blade design
projects being conducted by the Durham Boat Company and various European
manufactures. At the 1991 World Championships, several teams from the
United Kingdom competed with an asymmetrical blade made by the British
company, Hi-Lock [FISA Coach, Fall 1992]. Following the regatta, the
brothers decided that if anyone was going to come out with a new blade
shape, it should be them. They began to look for areas with the greatest
potential impact at which to concentrate their research efforts. In doing
so, they experimented with an asymmetrical blade shape and came to the
conclusion that simultaneously shortening the shaft length (the łoutboard˛
dimension) by six to ten centimeters and increasing the blade area by 17
percent would increase boat speed most effectively. The resultant Big
Blade was a radical departure from both the Macon and the Hi-Lock Power
Blade, which was indeed asymmetrical but had no change in either shaft
length or blade area.
In the fall of 1991, Concept II received the first prototype of the
SpeedBOSS , an electronic device to measure hull speed invented by Brookes
& Gatehouse Rowing. This instrument allowed the brothers to perform
precise quantitative testing instead of just relying on feel, and the
consistency of timing increased the reliability of their results. Tests
performed in a pair shell rowed by the Dreissigackers showed a two percent
increase in speed over the traditional Macon blades. Concept II donated a
set of Big Blades to Dartmouth College and several single scullers for use
in the 1991 Head of the Charles Regatta, the largest single-day rowing
competition in the world. Rowing in the four with coxswain event,
Dartmouth unfortunately never finished the race, having hit a bridge
abutment just as they were passing an announcer who remarked upon the
distinct blade style to the spectators. Regardless of the hapless
performance of the crew, the Big Blade oars were nonetheless introduced to
the rowing community in spectacular fashion.
Concept II continued their launch campaign by sending sample oars to
several Boston-area collegiate crews, some who ended up liking them and
some who didnąt. Most coaches were reluctant to try the new shape since
it was so noticeably different from the traditional Macon. Those who did
often used the oars in easy long-distance practices where the two percent
speed advantage was not apparent. Similarly, without access to precise
measurement instruments, the coaches were unable to gauge the difference.
The Big Bladeąs formal introduction came at the 1991 United States Rowing
Convention in Seattle that December. All in all, no one in the rowing
community paid much attention.
The spring of 1992 brought a turn-about in support for the Big Blade in
the form of the łDartmouth Effect.˛ Dartmouth College, who typically had
a slow early season due to the delayed defrosting of New Hampshire lakes,
did remarkably well in the initial rounds of the college racing circuit.
Orders started pouring in, with every Monday morning bringing more
telephone calls to Concept II from coaches who wanted hatchets for the
next weekendąs race. Those who were initially conservative quickly
changed their minds after being beaten by a school rowing with the new
oars. By the Eastern Sprints regatta in May, the major championship race
for the region, all except a few of the major universities were rowing
with Big Blades. The 1992 Olympics in Barcelona, at which over half the
competing boats rowed with Big Blades, provided a similar entrance into
international territory.
Within a year, the Big Blade had firmly taken hold of the market. In the
1993 World Championships, 63 out of 69 total medals (23 of 23 gold) were
awarded to teams using Concept II blades [FISA Coach, Fall 1993]. In the
1994 Worlds, only one or two medals were won without the Big Blade, and
one of those was suspected to be either a foreign competitorąs shaft with
a Concept II blade attached or an exact copy molded from a Big Blade.
Concept II now sells a product mix of approximately 90 percent hatchet
blades.
3.2 Competitive Response: Durham Boat Company
Located in the New Hampshire village of the same name, the Durham Boat
Company (DBC) is a small family business whose six employees are all
elite athletes encouraged to fit their work hours around a full-time
training schedule. Bob Dreher, son of DBCąs owner Jim, started making
oars for his own use in 1989, the year before he won the World
Championships in the single scull event. As his blade-making technique
evolved, he began selling sculling oars to his fellow National team
members, and the business was expanded to a modern composite manufacturing
facility.
DBC began selling hatchets copied from a mold of the Concept II blade in
1992. Their own tests showed no measurable speed advantage from the
hatchet design, but Jim Dreher, remarking that he had to follow the market
leader, decided to offer them because that was what his customers
demanded. Although the general shape of the Dreher blade was copied from
a mold of the Concept II design, it differs from the Big Blade in three
key elements: a flattened tip, which DBC considers a more influential
dimension than the blade area; a carbon handle, which reduces weight by
over twenty percent compared to a wooden handle; and an adjustable length
shaft with an interchangeable blade system. A set of Dreher blades was
used at the 1994 World Championships by the lightweight womenąs four, who
won the gold. DBC now sells hatchets at a mix of between 80 and 90
percent for sculls and to the virtual exclusion of their previous Macon
style for sweep oars.
3.3 Parallel Stream of Innovation: Alden Ocean Shells
Alden Ocean Shells differs from Concept II and DBC in that their primary
product is rowing boats; most, if not all, of the oars they sell accompany
the sale of a shell. As the name implies, the company is also directed at
a different market segment - rough water, typically recreational, rowing
instead of competitive racing. In fact, their boats so pervade the rough
water market that is it often referred to as łAlden class˛ rowing,
regardless of the other 70-plus brands of recreational boats available in
the U.S. The harsh environment found in open water rowing places unique
demands on blade design. Negligible cross-over between the two markets
does exist, usually in the form of an Alden shell owner who purchases
Concept II blades. Usually, however, the Alden boat buyer is new to the
sport and therefore willing to purchase whatever oar the salesman
recommends. While this means that the Alden oar market is somewhat closed
to competition, it also permits greater design freedom than is found in
the closely watched, tradition-dependent atmosphere of competitive
rowing. In fact, some of the most innovative approaches to oar design can
be found tucked away in the Alden workshop, where new shapes are tested on
a regular basis. Since the market does not really intersect with that of
Concept II and DBC, the oar development at Alden can be thought of as a
parallel stream of innovation, and thus should be considered in order to
augment the historical perspective of asymmetrical blade development.
Doug Martin, the son of Aldenąs founder, was in charge of blade design
until the company changed hands and now serves as a consultant. Unlike
the Dreissigackers, he is a firm believer in a physics-based approach to
oar design. In 1976, a personal interest in hang-gliding led him to the
concept of modeling a rowing blade as an aerodynamic wing, with the water
acting in place of air. This insight sparked him to test a wide variety
of unconventional blade shapes, often as many as one a day, over the next
thirteen years, including one constructed of flat plywood slats, one that
was five times wider than it was long, and one that was a perfect circle
(see exhibit 3). In 1987, he first experimented with an asymmetrical
blade shape, noticing that Macon blades produced too much force compared
to the water speed. He then proceeded to cut off two-thirds of the blade
area to achieve a better lift-to-drag ratio. The results of this effort
were manufactured for sale two years later as the graphite łDouglas
Deltor,˛ a hatchet-style blade that is much smaller and more pointed at
the tip than the Big Blade. Described as łforgiving and easy to use,˛ the
Deltor has been enormously successful among Alden rowers and has been used
to win several major open water endurance races.
3.4 Market Response
The perspective of the user, in this case rowing coaches and athletes, is
always a crucial factor in the success of an innovation. Gordon Hamilton,
coach of the M.I.T. menąs varsity heavyweight rowing program, remembers
noticing immediately the unusually strong puddles left by the Big Blades
at the 1991 Head of the Charles Regatta and felt that the new shape was
obviously an improvement in terms of power transference. Unable to borrow
the demonstration set sent out by Concept II during the winter training
period, he nonetheless bought a set in March 1992 for his top varsity
boat. The hatchetąs speed advantage became quantifiable to him when he
purchased another set for his junior varsity boat, who promptly decreased
their margin relative to the varsity by four seconds, or slightly more
than one percent, over 2000 meters (the standard sprint racing distance).
Early in the 1992 season, after Dartmouth had won a race or two, some
members of the EARC attempted to ban the Big Blades from use until the
following year on the grounds that some schools could not afford to buy
them until the next budgetary cycle and that their use therefore
constituted an unfair advantage. Those in favor of the ban included Harry
Parker, the Harvard varsity coach whose team had immediately bought a set
the past fall. M.I.T.ąs Coach Hamilton protested, arguing that all the
teams would have the new style oars by the next season anyway and that
there was no sense in postponing distribution. He felt that Concept II
had gone out of their way to meet demand for the blades that spring and
that teams that had Big Blades should be able to race with them in the
same way that teams who could afford better boats did. After much debate,
the ban was opposed (and Parkerąs crew returned to their hatchets). As
noted above, all of the EARC members had Big Blades in time for the
Eastern Sprints championship regatta in May. The Big Blade had certainly
become a competitive necessity in collegiate racing.
As for the rowers themselves, first impressions ranged from łI wonder how
long thatąll last?˛ to łWhat the heck is that?˛. Those who had been in
the sport for a long time knew that past innovations in rowing equipment
had little or no objective research behind them and so should be taken
łwith grain of salt.˛ Others felt that the new design made sense, while
admitting that the hatchet shape certainly looked funny to those
accustomed to Macons. As the new oars became more widely dispersed, the
speed advantage was tempered by concerns about the effect of the hatchet
shape on the rowing stroke. The conventional wisdom in the elite rowing
community was that hatchets provided the most advantage to mid-level
crews, since the greater force on the water made them more forgiving of
poor technique. Athletes at the Boston Rowing Center, a National Team
training site, used Macon blades for technique workouts even after they
got hatchets for racing. In general, although teams were going faster,
they felt crews werenąt rowing as well with hatchets from a technical
perspective, since not enough was understood about how to rig the boat or
change the rowing stroke to accommodate the differing forces (rules of
thumb that evolved to fit the Macon shape no longer applied). This
opinion was verified by the Italians, who after winning six straight gold
medals in the World Championships, dropped to fifth place in 1992 when
they switched to hatchets without varying their rigging or rowing style.
At a lower level, where the intricacies of blade technique were not as
well understood, the Big Blades took on a mystique that provided a
psychological advantage to crews that owned them. For example, when
M.I.T. was racing a crew still using Macon blades, Hamilton overheard the
opposing coach telling his team before the race, łIf they beat you, itąs
because of those oars.˛ Hamilton immediately passed on the story to his
rowers, showing them that they had their opponents mentally beaten even
before they got on the water. This type of emotional advertising was
mitigated in circles outside the EARC and the reach of the łDartmouth
effect,˛ where the Big Blades were initially less common and therefore
seen more as an oddity instead of a threat.
tloughlin
: Innovations in Oar Technology:
: Acknowledgments
: 1.0 Introduction
: 3.4 Market Response
--