Science & atheism are cultures.
Charles Fiterman
about it but most of it is the result of an internal history. Consider
the following questions.
What are the ethics of experiment on human subjects? Chimpanzee
subjects? Rat subjects? Insect subjects? Bacterial subjects? An acre
of rain forest? An acre of the surface of the moon? Can you publish
experiments done unethically?
When can you discuss your results with the general press? When can you
send a paper to two journals for peer review? What are the rules for
picking a journal?
If you isolate an important virus when and how must you share it with
competing scientists? What about a design breakthrough for plasma
containment?
The formal descriptions of atheism all seem to lack something. "I
don't believe in gods" is a normal description of atheism with both
"gods" and "believe in" left vague. But suppose a ghost was captured
in the lab or a soul observed? This would deeply impact the claims of
atheism and the description doesn't say so. A theory that acted like
that would be rejected as poorly formed. Good theories not only stick
their necks out they stick them out as far as they can go, this one
just has the tip of its nose outside the shell if that. Should this
sort of definition be treated as a theory?
Suppose I substitute "I don't believe in the supernatural." What is
the supernatural? Again suppose a ghost was captured in the lab.
Suppose it was written up in a peer reviewed journal and the
observation became part of established mainstream science. Don't
ghosts etc. now become as natural as pumpkins. If so what does the
claim not to believe in the supernatural mean?
The closest I have come to a description of atheism is the following.
Atheists don't willingly serve or worship gods or spirits and use the
ordinary methods of science exclusively to learn about the universe.
I think the real answer is that atheism like science is a culture, you
belong or you don't and definitions all miss something.
Automort
> suppose a ghost was captured
>in the lab or a soul observed? This would deeply impact the claims of
>atheism
It would prove that ghosts and souls exist. Since they are "captured in the
lab" they must meet the materialist criteria on which science is based and thus
are natural phenomena. It would not impact my atheism.
I would doubt it, but if convinced I would be glad to demonstrate that these
things are not supernatural.
> If so what does the
>claim not to believe in the supernatural mean?
That ghosts exist and are therefore not supernatural.
>atheism like science is a culture, you
>belong or you don't and definitions all miss something.
>
Human behavior must take place in a cultural context. That it does does not
disprove atheism or science. That is one of the limitations of human
intelligence and science is a way of trying to reach beyond it. In the long run
it can.
But I understand the objection since half wits and nihilists are discouraged by
the realization they are not the center of the universe. Thus they become
negative and defeatist -- which isn't scientific because it doesn't attempt
objectivity.
John Hicken
> Some parts of the methodology of science can be deduced by thinking
> about it but most of it is the result of an internal history. Consider
> the following questions.
>
> What are the ethics of experiment on human subjects? Chimpanzee
> subjects? Rat subjects? Insect subjects? Bacterial subjects? An acre
> of rain forest? An acre of the surface of the moon? Can you publish
> experiments done unethically?
>
> When can you discuss your results with the general press? When can you
> send a paper to two journals for peer review? What are the rules for
> picking a journal?
>
> If you isolate an important virus when and how must you share it with
> competing scientists? What about a design breakthrough for plasma
> containment?
These are ethical questions, that are not the domain of science, but
are in the domain of ethics, morality and philosophy. Whilst
scientist must consider these issues, they can't answer them using
science.
> The formal descriptions of atheism all seem to lack something. "I
> don't believe in gods" is a normal description of atheism with both
> "gods" and "believe in" left vague.
The reason that god is left vague is that god is that it must cover
quite a number of different definitions of god. However, one defition
could be some sentient being who created the universe, or a sentient
being that is somehow has power over the universe. Mostly, though, it
is fairly obvious what a god is, so a vague definition is not a
problem. However, "believe in", is more well defined. Basically to
believe in something requires you to think that something is true.
> But suppose a ghost was captured
> in the lab or a soul observed? This would deeply impact the claims of
> atheism and the description doesn't say so.
It is not clear that this would be the case. It is perfectly possible
that a soul exists without there being a god. Also ghosts could make
sense without a god. Also atheism does not make any claims, as it is
a LACK of belief. Unless these somehow imply or provide some evidence
for a god, the existence of a soul, or a ghost do not affect atheism
at all.
>A theory that acted like
> that would be rejected as poorly formed. Good theories not only stick
> their necks out they stick them out as far as they can go, this one
> just has the tip of its nose outside the shell if that. Should this
> sort of definition be treated as a theory?
The problem here is that atheism is not a theory, which would mean a
(testable) way of explaining known facts, whereas atheism is not an
explanation, but the disbelief in one particular class of explanation
for things, that involving some sort of god.
> Suppose I substitute "I don't believe in the supernatural." What is
> the supernatural? Again suppose a ghost was captured in the lab.
> Suppose it was written up in a peer reviewed journal and the
> observation became part of established mainstream science. Don't
> ghosts etc. now become as natural as pumpkins. If so what does the
> claim not to believe in the supernatural mean?
There would be no reason to substitute this, as the current definition
of atheism is fine as it is.
> The closest I have come to a description of atheism is the following.
> Atheists don't willingly serve or worship gods or spirits and use the
> ordinary methods of science exclusively to learn about the universe.
This is even worse than the definition you give. It would mean that
those who believe in a god that doesn't require serving or worship
would be classed as atheists. Also it introduces 'spirits', which is
usually even more vague than god. The mention of science is also a
red herring. An atheists may reject all science for some reason.
They may get all there knowledge from their family, or what they watch
on TV.
All that is neccesary for someone to be an atheist is that they don't
believe that any god exists.
> I think the real answer is that atheism like science is a culture, you
> belong or you don't and definitions all miss something.
What do the definition miss? Atheism is not a culture by any
definition that I'm familiar with, as a culture should imply some set
of values, or cultural norms and possibly traditions, which atheism
does not.
Science is closer to being a culture, as there is in some sense a
culture surrounding science, although science as such does not imply
any set of values in general, it is probably true that scientists
share some values to do with their scientific conduct, and possibly
about how science should be used. However, they probably disagree a
lot on other political issues (the death penalty, tax, for example),
as much as the rest of the population.
There are probably disagreements about issues that relate to science.
For example, the use of cloning (animal and human).
Charles Fiterman
> c...@geodesic.com (Charles Fiterman) wrote in message news:<735ad38a.02022...@posting.google.com>...
> > Some parts of the methodology of science can be deduced by thinking
> > about it but most of it is the result of an internal history. Consider
> > the following questions.
> >
> > What are the ethics of experiment on human subjects? Chimpanzee
> > subjects? Rat subjects? Insect subjects? Bacterial subjects? An acre
> > of rain forest? An acre of the surface of the moon? Can you publish
> > experiments done unethically?
> >
> > When can you discuss your results with the general press? When can you
> > send a paper to two journals for peer review? What are the rules for
> > picking a journal?
> >
> > If you isolate an important virus when and how must you share it with
> > competing scientists? What about a design breakthrough for plasma
> > containment?
>
> These are ethical questions, that are not the domain of science, but
> are in the domain of ethics, morality and philosophy. Whilst
> scientist must consider these issues, they can't answer them using
> science.
Questions about which journal to submit to are practical not ethical
and have actual impact on the sort of theories that get accepted. Some
of the questions are political. For example questions in stem cell
research.
> > The formal descriptions of atheism all seem to lack something. "I
> > don't believe in gods" is a normal description of atheism with both
> > "gods" and "believe in" left vague.
>
> The reason that god is left vague is that god is that it must cover
> quite a number of different definitions of god. However, one defition
> could be some sentient being who created the universe, or a sentient
> being that is somehow has power over the universe. Mostly, though, it
> is fairly obvious what a god is, so a vague definition is not a
> problem. However, "believe in", is more well defined. Basically to
> believe in something requires you to think that something is true.
I think you have far too narrow a view of what religion is.
A divine emperor has power over part of the universe, and if any deny
it the more fool he, they are more or less sentient. People who
worship power don't much care where it comes from or how it is used. I
don't believe in divine emperors in the sense that I don't believe in
kings not the sense I don't believe in even prime numbers greater than
2.
Someone who willingly worships the emperor is generally not considered
an atheist even if they hold absolutely materialist views. A Christian
who worships the emperor under duress commits at least a mortal sin,
an atheist only demonstrates common sense. This is an important
difference between them and us. Those guys who crashed planes into
tall buildings weren't ours, we don't have a tradition of sacred
martyrdom.
> > But suppose a ghost was captured
> > in the lab or a soul observed? This would deeply impact the claims of
> > atheism and the description doesn't say so.
>
> It is not clear that this would be the case. It is perfectly possible
> that a soul exists without there being a god. Also ghosts could make
> sense without a god. Also atheism does not make any claims, as it is
> a LACK of belief. Unless these somehow imply or provide some evidence
> for a god, the existence of a soul, or a ghost do not affect atheism
> at all.
While it is not clear it would be the case from the definition it
would be the case. Just start a thread asking if atheists believe in
ghosts or a soul and look at the answers you get. Our general world
view rejects these things. Follow the threads here and then do so on a
Christian news group you'll see we have a general world view not a
short definition.
Not having a soul has important consequences, first we're dead when we
die. Second we don't have a magic source of knowledge, self evident
propositions have to be checked experimentally just like anything
else. Their being self evident means we had an emotional reaction to
them not that they were true. People who believe in a soul think self
evident propositions are true for magical reasons, they start from
them and try to prove things. Last we don't care about certainty, its
just an emotional state. People who believe in a soul put a high value
on certainty.
Someone who believed in a soul but no gods would be so far outside our
culture they would seem to us like Jews for Jesus seem to actual Jews.
> >A theory that acted like
> > that would be rejected as poorly formed. Good theories not only stick
> > their necks out they stick them out as far as they can go, this one
> > just has the tip of its nose outside the shell if that. Should this
> > sort of definition be treated as a theory?
>
> The problem here is that atheism is not a theory, which would mean a
> (testable) way of explaining known facts, whereas atheism is not an
> explanation, but the disbelief in one particular class of explanation
> for things, that involving some sort of god.
I agree its not a theory but think its a culture with a general world
view. I'm trying to show how silly it is to treat it as a theory. The
absence of a theory is a theory stated differently.
> > The closest I have come to a description of atheism is the following.
> > Atheists don't willingly serve or worship gods or spirits and use the
> > ordinary methods of science exclusively to learn about the universe.
>
> This is even worse than the definition you give. It would mean that
> those who believe in a god that doesn't require serving or worship
> would be classed as atheists.
Epicureans are generally classed as atheists, so yes.
> Also it introduces 'spirits', which is
> usually even more vague than god. The mention of science is also a
> red herring. An atheists may reject all science for some reason.
> They may get all there knowledge from their family, or what they watch
> on TV.
>
> All that is neccesary for someone to be an atheist is that they don't
> believe that any god exists.
Most gods are small statues, they exist. I've seen them. I don't
believe in them in the sense that I don't believe in fortune tellers
not the sense that I don't beleive in unicorns.
Charles Fiterman
> Human behavior must take place in a cultural context. That it does does not
> disprove atheism or science.
I agree absolutely. What I am saying is that cultural contexts are so
complex they resist simple definitions.
Someone asked Hillel to define Judaism. He replied "I don't define
Judaism, Judaism defines me." This is really true of all human
cultures.
Automort
>What I am saying is that cultural contexts are so
>complex they resist simple definitions.
Yes. I don't know all the facets and such of American culture even though I
know how to use it and navigate through it and understand a lot about its
origins and development.
Even a comparatively stable, primitive culture is probably too complex for one
individual to know it all. Possibly a human could understand an entire
chimpanzee culture, maybe even a neandertal culture, but that's about the
limit. Besides, a culture, even a stable one, changes and alters over
time....you'd have to have the whole span of time in mind, and where would you
see that a culture had become another entity?
John Hicken
> J.hi...@btinternet.com (John Hicken) wrote in message news:<33011670.02022...@posting.google.com>...
> > c...@geodesic.com (Charles Fiterman) wrote in message news:<735ad38a.02022...@posting.google.com>...
> > > Some parts of the methodology of science can be deduced by thinking
> > > about it but most of it is the result of an internal history. Consider
> > > the following questions.
> > >
> > > What are the ethics of experiment on human subjects? Chimpanzee
> > > subjects? Rat subjects? Insect subjects? Bacterial subjects? An acre
> > > of rain forest? An acre of the surface of the moon? Can you publish
> > > experiments done unethically?
> > >
> > > When can you discuss your results with the general press? When can you
> > > send a paper to two journals for peer review? What are the rules for
> > > picking a journal?
> > >
> > > If you isolate an important virus when and how must you share it with
> > > competing scientists? What about a design breakthrough for plasma
> > > containment?
> >
> > These are ethical questions, that are not the domain of science, but
> > are in the domain of ethics, morality and philosophy. Whilst
> > scientist must consider these issues, they can't answer them using
> > science.
>
> Questions about which journal to submit to are practical not ethical
> and have actual impact on the sort of theories that get accepted. Some
> of the questions are political. For example questions in stem cell
> research.
Politics can have an effect on what scientific research is done, but
the 'real' science, to do with the data, should be less easy to
distort in this way. I am convinced that science is probably the best
tool for finding out about the physical world, despite the fact that
the people involved have biases, as scientists they offer conclusion
for other scientists to critique. It's not perfect, but it seemed to
have served us well so far.
> > > The formal descriptions of atheism all seem to lack something. "I
> > > don't believe in gods" is a normal description of atheism with both
> > > "gods" and "believe in" left vague.
> >
> > The reason that god is left vague is that god is that it must cover
> > quite a number of different definitions of god. However, one defition
> > could be some sentient being who created the universe, or a sentient
> > being that is somehow has power over the universe. Mostly, though, it
> > is fairly obvious what a god is, so a vague definition is not a
> > problem. However, "believe in", is more well defined. Basically to
> > believe in something requires you to think that something is true.
>
> I think you have far too narrow a view of what religion is.
I was talking about the definition of god, not religion. Religion is
probably rather hard to define, and by some definitions atheists can
be have religions. Some have described Marxism as a religion, which
makes some sense, although it is all depends how you define religion.
> > A divine emperor has power over part of the universe, and if any deny
> it the more fool he, they are more or less sentient. People who
> worship power don't much care where it comes from or how it is used. I
> don't believe in divine emperors in the sense that I don't believe in
> kings not the sense I don't believe in even prime numbers greater than
> 2.
Whether a divine emperor is a god depends on whether he has actual
power to manipulate time and space, or whether his power is just an
illusion. If we could command lightning bolts, or slow down time at
his will, then he would probably be a god. An atheism could believe
that such emperor exists, so long as they do not attribute divine
powers.
> Someone who willingly worships the emperor is generally not considered
> an atheist even if they hold absolutely materialist views.
This would depend what worship would involve. If it requires people
to believe in his divine powers, then one couldn't be an atheist, but
if it 'merely' requires people to summit to his will, thinking he
knows best somehow (not becauce he gets messages from god), then
worshop would be compatible with atheism.
> A Christian
> who worships the emperor under duress commits at least a mortal sin,
> an atheist only demonstrates common sense.
This is true, but doesn't seem relevant.
> This is an important
> difference between them and us. Those guys who crashed planes into
> tall buildings weren't ours, we don't have a tradition of sacred
> martyrdom.
It isn't clear who them and us are here. Them could mean muslims, but
us could mean atheists, christians, the western world generally, or
another group entirely. Please tell me what them and us mean here.
> > > But suppose a ghost was captured
> > > in the lab or a soul observed? This would deeply impact the claims of
> > > atheism and the description doesn't say so.
> >
> > It is not clear that this would be the case. It is perfectly possible
> > that a soul exists without there being a god. Also ghosts could make
> > sense without a god. Also atheism does not make any claims, as it is
> > a LACK of belief. Unless these somehow imply or provide some evidence
> > for a god, the existence of a soul, or a ghost do not affect atheism
> > at all.
>
> While it is not clear it would be the case from the definition it
> would be the case. Just start a thread asking if atheists believe in
> ghosts or a soul and look at the answers you get. Our general world
> view rejects these things. Follow the threads here and then do so on a
> Christian news group you'll see we have a general world view not a
> short definition.
It might be the case that atheists tend not to believe in the soul,
and ghosts, but that doesn't mean that belief in these things should
be included in the definition of atheism, as that would mean we needed
a new word for those who do not believe in a god. Atheism itself does
not entail a worldview, although as many atheists become atheists
through skepticism, that they apply that skepticism to other fields.
However, they may also have seen what they thing is evidence for the
existence of ghosts, for example, so their belief would be completely
compatible with skepticism as a worldview. Similarly belief in god
would be compatible with skepticism if someone saw evidence of god's
existence.
Skepticism generally describes some of my worldview, as I would be
prepared to belief in god, ghosts, or anything else given sufficient
evidence for their existence. I suspect many atheists are fairly
similar in this respect.
> Not having a soul has important consequences, first we're dead when we
> die. Second we don't have a magic source of knowledge, self evident
> propositions have to be checked experimentally just like anything
> else. Their being self evident means we had an emotional reaction to
> them not that they were true.
Self evident propositions are things that it doesn't make sense to
deny. Usually they are basic truths that cannot be tested. For
example it is self-evidence that a true statement cannot be false, or
that parallel lines cannot cross only once.
> People who believe in a soul think self
> evident propositions are true for magical reasons, they start from
> them and try to prove things. Last we don't care about certainty, its
> just an emotional state. People who believe in a soul put a high value
> on certainty.
I'm not sure what you are trying to say. Who is 'we', here? Also, I
have seen no reason to suppose that those who believe in soul put a
high value on certainty, as most seem to be religious, and religions
tend to emphasise taking the existence of souls 'on faith'. I have
never heard of anyone trying to prove the existence of souls.
> Someone who believed in a soul but no gods would be so far outside our
> culture they would seem to us like Jews for Jesus seem to actual Jews.
This is true, but probably because it is mainly just religions that
give a reason to believe in souls. Scientific evidence for the
existence of sourls would probably mean that many atheists would
believe in them, probably many would still not believe in god.
> > >A theory that acted like
> > > that would be rejected as poorly formed. Good theories not only stick
> > > their necks out they stick them out as far as they can go, this one
> > > just has the tip of its nose outside the shell if that. Should this
> > > sort of definition be treated as a theory?
> >
> > The problem here is that atheism is not a theory, which would mean a
> > (testable) way of explaining known facts, whereas atheism is not an
> > explanation, but the disbelief in one particular class of explanation
> > for things, that involving some sort of god.
>
> I agree its not a theory but think its a culture with a general world
> view. I'm trying to show how silly it is to treat it as a theory. The
> absence of a theory is a theory stated differently.
No, atheism does not have a world view, although it might be part of a
worldview. It does not claim to be a theory, as it is a LACK of
belief in one particular theory, so it is obviously silly to treat it
like one. Lack of a theory is not a theory, and atheism isn't even
lack of a theory, it is lack of belief in one theory. Atheist
themselves may have theories for things, but these theories do not
constitute atheism.
> > > The closest I have come to a description of atheism is the following.
> > > Atheists don't willingly serve or worship gods or spirits and use the
> > > ordinary methods of science exclusively to learn about the universe.
> >
> > This is even worse than the definition you give. It would mean that
> > those who believe in a god that doesn't require serving or worship
> > would be classed as atheists.
>
> Epicureans are generally classed as atheists, so yes.
If Epicureans believe in god, then I would argue that they are not
atheists. It seem to be more useful to define atheism in terms of
belief. From a brief look on the internet, it isn't clear whether
people think them atheists or not, although quite a few seem to have
their own definition of athiesm, that have nothing to do with belief
in god, that seem designed to equate atheism with wickedness or
hedonism, or wants to 'dump' the epicureans in the atheist camp. This
is Not suprising considering that their actions seem like the sort of
things that most religions denounce as sin.
> > Also it introduces 'spirits', which is
> > usually even more vague than god. The mention of science is also a
> > red herring. An atheists may reject all science for some reason.
> > They may get all there knowledge from their family, or what they watch
> > on TV.
> >
> > All that is neccesary for someone to be an atheist is that they don't
> > believe that any god exists.
>
> Most gods are small statues, they exist. I've seen them. I don't
> believe in them in the sense that I don't believe in fortune tellers
> not the sense that I don't beleive in unicorns.
Everyone agrees that small statues exist. However, to be an atheist
you cannot believe that they are sentient, and have divine powers.
Charles Fiterman
> the 'real' science, to do with the data, should be less easy to
> distort in this way. I am convinced that science is probably the best
> tool for finding out about the physical world, despite the fact that
> the people involved have biases, as scientists they offer conclusion
> for other scientists to critique. It's not perfect, but it seemed to
> have served us well so far.
I am convinced that science is the only tool for finding out about the
world. But I also believe that the form of scientific theories depends
on the history of science. There is no logical reason why Fourier
series was discovered before wavlets, that's just how it happened. Had
wavelets been discovered first every modern scientific theory would
have a very different form and that would be central to the direction
of science.
> I was talking about the definition of god, not religion. Religion is
> probably rather hard to define, and by some definitions atheists can
> be have religions. Some have described Marxism as a religion, which
> makes some sense, although it is all depends how you define religion.
If you are using language normally words shift meaning with speaker
and context.
If you are describing atheism there are two important intersecting
definitions of god with two important descriptions of atheism to be
without them. Gods are objects of religious worship, plenty of them
about mostly small statues and such. Gods are beings with great
supernatural power, I see none of them about.
The first description of atheism comes from gods as objects of
worship. An atheist is a person who from principal or belief does not
willingly worship gods or spirits. This definition of atheism includes
most Buddhists, Taoists, Epicureans, Agnostics and people who use
atheist as a primary religious description. This is similar to
Christianity where within the Protestant movement there are people who
use Christian as a primary religious description.
The second description comes froms gods as beings with supernatural
power and an atheist doesn't believe any of them exist. This includes
people like us who also fit the first definition it also includes a
modern branch of emperor worship called Stalinism. I hope I have more
in common with the Daili Lama than with Kim Jung Il.
> > > A divine emperor has power over part of the universe, and if any deny
> > it the more fool he, they are more or less sentient. People who
> > worship power don't much care where it comes from or how it is used. I
> > don't believe in divine emperors in the sense that I don't believe in
> > kings not the sense I don't believe in even prime numbers greater than
> > 2.
>
> Whether a divine emperor is a god depends on whether he has actual
> power to manipulate time and space, or whether his power is just an
> illusion. If we could command lightning bolts, or slow down time at
> his will, then he would probably be a god. An atheism could believe
> that such emperor exists, so long as they do not attribute divine
> powers.
Whether a divine emperor is a god depends on whether you are talking
about gods as objects of religious worship or gods as supernatural
beings. That's normal usage.
> > This is an important
> > difference between them and us. Those guys who crashed planes into
> > tall buildings weren't ours, we don't have a tradition of sacred
> > martyrdom.
>
> It isn't clear who them and us are here. Them could mean muslims, but
> us could mean atheists, christians, the western world generally, or
> another group entirely. Please tell me what them and us mean here.
I mean they weren't atheists. Christians have tradition of sacred
martyrdom. Anaxagorus was the first historical person clearly an
atheist and given the chance to die for his lack of belief he ran
away.
> Skepticism generally describes some of my worldview, as I would be
> prepared to belief in god, ghosts, or anything else given sufficient
> evidence for their existence. I suspect many atheists are fairly
> similar in this respect.
Yes. What separates us from Christians and the like is that in the
absence of such evidence we don't believe. We use science as our sole
source of knowledge on the subject.
> > Not having a soul has important consequences, first we're dead when we
> > die. Second we don't have a magic source of knowledge, self evident
> > propositions have to be checked experimentally just like anything
> > else. Their being self evident means we had an emotional reaction to
> > them not that they were true.
>
> Self evident propositions are things that it doesn't make sense to
> deny. Usually they are basic truths that cannot be tested. For
> example it is self-evidence that a true statement cannot be false, or
> that parallel lines cannot cross only once.
Look at some Christian proofs you'd be amazed at the nonsense that
passes as self evident.
>
> > People who believe in a soul think self
> > evident propositions are true for magical reasons, they start from
> > them and try to prove things. Last we don't care about certainty, its
> > just an emotional state. People who believe in a soul put a high value
> > on certainty.
>
> I'm not sure what you are trying to say. Who is 'we', here? Also, I
> have seen no reason to suppose that those who believe in soul put a
> high value on certainty, as most seem to be religious, and religions
> tend to emphasise taking the existence of souls 'on faith'. I have
> never heard of anyone trying to prove the existence of souls.
The we here is atheists (second definition) and observation tells me
people who believe in a soul put a high value on certainty.
> No, atheism does not have a world view, although it might be part of a
> worldview. It does not claim to be a theory, as it is a LACK of
> belief in one particular theory, so it is obviously silly to treat it
> like one. Lack of a theory is not a theory, and atheism isn't even
> lack of a theory, it is lack of belief in one theory. Atheist
> themselves may have theories for things, but these theories do not
> constitute atheism.
Our worldview prevades our culture, that's why you don't notice it.
Evolution, the big bang, atomic theory, the notion that you should
live for your beliefs not die for them. Our culture takes Anaxagorous
as an example not Jesus even though the former is largely unknown and
the latter is worshiped.
> If Epicureans believe in god, then I would argue that they are not
> atheists. It seem to be more useful to define atheism in terms of
> belief. From a brief look on the internet, it isn't clear whether
> people think them atheists or not, although quite a few seem to have
> their own definition of athiesm, that have nothing to do with belief
> in god, that seem designed to equate atheism with wickedness or
> hedonism, or wants to 'dump' the epicureans in the atheist camp. This
> is Not suprising considering that their actions seem like the sort of
> things that most religions denounce as sin.
One way to describe a religion is to say its the example of a striking
influential person. By this measure Epicureanism had a better start
than any other religion and Islam a worse one. Epicureans believed
happyness was the good but also that moderate pleasures were best.
They condemned slavery in a world where it was the central economic
engine.
It was generally illegal to deny the existence of the gods so Epicurus
didn't do that. He said the gods were so high and perfect they didn't
need our worship or touch our affairs. Actual Epicureans had freedom
of thought and used it vigorously. I'm glad to have them in our camp.
> > Most gods are small statues, they exist. I've seen them. I don't
> > believe in them in the sense that I don't believe in fortune tellers
> > not the sense that I don't beleive in unicorns.
>
> Everyone agrees that small statues exist. However, to be an atheist
> you cannot believe that they are sentient, and have divine powers.
Go back to the two definitions of atheist.
John Hicken
news:<735ad38a.02030...@posting.google.com>...
>
> world. But I also believe that the form of scientific theories depends
> on the history of science. There is no logical reason why Fourier
> series was discovered before wavlets, that's just how it happened. Had
> wavelets been discovered first every modern scientific theory would
> have a very different form and that would be central to the direction
> of science.
I generally agree, the direction that science takes is partly
dependent on its history, and probably culture in general. The good
thing about science, of cause, is that it rules out of bounds certain
directions, due to evidence against, and by testing, we can come out
with a good, and probably in general improving approximation on the
truth, whatever direction we come at it from.
> If you are using language normally words shift meaning with speaker
> and context.
However, you miss the point, that I was not discuss religion at all.
> If you are describing atheism there are two important intersecting
> definitions of god with two important descriptions of atheism to be
> without them. Gods are objects of religious worship, plenty of them
> about mostly small statues and such. Gods are beings with great
> supernatural power, I see none of them about.
I think that the latter definition is what is relevant to atheism. I
think the term idol, would be a better word for the former, although
there are probably better words out there, and idol does not apply to
'divine' rulers.
> The first description of atheism comes from gods as objects of
> worship. An atheist is a person who from principal or belief does not
> willingly worship gods or spirits. This definition of atheism includes
> most Buddhists, Taoists, Epicureans, Agnostics and people who use
> atheist as a primary religious description. This is similar to
> Christianity where within the Protestant movement there are people who
> use Christian as a primary religious description.
I don't think that worship is the issue here, but belief. I think it
is more useful to categorise atheism by lack of belief, rather than
lack of workship, as lack of workship could imply simply believing but
not going to church.=, or performing whatever rituals are involved
with the religion. I think that this definition works to some extent,
thought as those who do not belief in the latter type of god are
likely to have little reason to workship the former.
> The second description comes froms gods as beings with supernatural
> power and an atheist doesn't believe any of them exist. This includes
> people like us who also fit the first definition it also includes a
> modern branch of emperor worship called Stalinism. I hope I have more
> in common with the Daili Lama than with Kim Jung Il.
The supernatural power type of god makes more sense as a definition of
god. Lack of belief in a this sort of god probably implies lack of
workship in a religious workship type of god, although the atheism as
lack of belief in a supernatural power type god is, to be, more
sensible.
> Whether a divine emperor is a god depends on whether you are talking
> about gods as objects of religious worship or gods as supernatural
> beings. That's normal usage.
If we are talking about atheism, then the latter definition seems the
appropriate one.
> I mean they weren't atheists. Christians have tradition of sacred
> martyrdom. Anaxagorus was the first historical person clearly an
> atheist and given the chance to die for his lack of belief he ran
> away.
Dying for lack of belief does really have any point.
> Yes. What separates us from Christians and the like is that in the
> absence of such evidence we don't believe. We use science as our sole
> source of knowledge on the subject.
I'm not sure that all atheists only use science in such matters,
although I suspect the number who do are more. I think that there are
probably a fair few who believe in aliens visitations, for example.
Perhaps I'm wrong, and there is evidence for them, but I doubt it. I
think anyway, that atheists are probably more skeptical than the
average person, but that this is only a tendency.
> Look at some Christian proofs you'd be amazed at the nonsense that
> passes as self evident.
If we start changing the meaning of words to suit christianity,
english would probably be unrecognisable.
> The we here is atheists (second definition) and observation tells me
> people who believe in a soul put a high value on certainty.
Who have you observed who have believed in a soul put a high value on
certainty, and what makes you think that they do?
> Our worldview prevades our culture, that's why you don't notice it.
> Evolution, the big bang, atomic theory, the notion that you should
> live for your beliefs not die for them. Our culture takes Anaxagorous
> as an example not Jesus even though the former is largely unknown and
> the latter is worshiped.
I don't think that evolution, the big bang, etc are part of a world
view, I prefer to think of them as following from a worldview, such as
skepticism, where you believe, and only believe, that for which there
is evidence.
> One way to describe a religion is to say its the example of a striking
> influential person. By this measure Epicureanism had a better start
> than any other religion and Islam a worse one. Epicureans believed
> happyness was the good but also that moderate pleasures were best.
> They condemned slavery in a world where it was the central economic
> engine.
I think that Epicureans could well be a religion. I think that
following the example of an influential person could describe many
religions.
> It was generally illegal to deny the existence of the gods so Epicurus
> didn't do that. He said the gods were so high and perfect they didn't
> need our worship or touch our affairs. Actual Epicureans had freedom
> of thought and used it vigorously. I'm glad to have them in our camp.
That is the problem with talking about ancient philosophers,as their
true beliefs may not be disguised. I know very little about them, but
if the Epicureans didn't believe in god then, they would be atheism,
and be theism if they did. I think even if they are theists, they
could have a lot in common with atheists, as free thinkers, if not as
atheism. Have you got any good sources about what epicureans
believe(d), as I can find some sources on the web, but its hard to
know who to believe.
> Go back to the two definitions of atheist.
As before, I think that the statues would be idols, rather than gods.
Charles Fiterman
> think the term idol, would be a better word for the former, although
> there are probably better words out there, and idol does not apply to
> 'divine' rulers.
You're using Christian terms and context without realizing it. You are
implicitly saying any religion not structured like Christianity is
uninteresting and atheism doesn't have to take it into account. I call
this "Not what I was raised as atheism."
Implicit in not what I was raised as atheism is the notion that
members of these devalued religions must be atheists. If you worship
earth, sun, wind and sky and those don't look like Christian gods you
must be an atheist because you don't believe in the "important gods".
I can see a Christian making that claim but not an atheist.
From the viewpoint of atheism all gods must be roughly equal or we end
up claiming animists and druids as members.
Start with a figure ground notion of atheism. Eliminate the Christians
and the Jews and the Moslems and the ancestor worshipers and the
emperor worshipers and the animists and the Duids etc. and you are
left with the atheists. The religions are the figure and we are the
ground.
Does this even make sense as a group? Can you define it in a shorter
way? Astoundingly you can. Atheists don't serve or worship gods or
spirits while those other people all do.
This is close to a reasonable definition but has a few flaws. It
includes a Catholic in a coma. Can you imagine a priest telling a
family "I'm sorry but Jack went into a deep coma before he passed on
and in that state believed nothing and in that state was an atheist so
we can't take him in the Catholic cemetary." I don't think we want
Jack so lets require some reason for not serving gods or spirits. I
call this "principal or belief". I reject Caligula on principal and
Thor on belief.
The other problem is that if an atheist worships the emperor under
duress he's still an atheist. We don't have a tradition of martyrdom.
Groveling to save your skin is just common sense. So we need the word
willingly in there.
An atheist is a person who from principal or belief does not willingly
serve or worship gods or spirits.
This is obviously a construct and constructs need to be tested. The
logical test for this is "Does it include those who want to be
included while excluding those who want to be excluded." It comes very
close, the notable exception is Stalinists who loudly claim to be
atheists but who practice emperor worship. I'm happy to claim they are
our equivalent of Jews for Jesus. Their claim to be atheists is not
honest or in good faith and we don't want them. They don't act like
us, they believe in things like communism long after the physical
evidence says those things are nonsense.
Eric Pepke
> The formal descriptions of atheism all seem to lack something. "I
> don't believe in gods" is a normal description of atheism with both
> "gods" and "believe in" left vague.
Please, just for the sake of nostalgia, assert once again that gods exist
because most of them are small statues.
Robert Wood
>
> From: c...@geodesic.com (Charles Fiterman)
>
> > suppose a ghost was captured
> >in the lab or a soul observed? This would deeply impact the claims of
> >atheism
>
> It would prove that ghosts and souls exist. Since they are "captured in the
> lab" they must meet the materialist criteria on which science is based and thus
> are natural phenomena. It would not impact my atheism.
> I would doubt it, but if convinced I would be glad to demonstrate that these
> things are not supernatural.
If they exist, they are not supernatural. Anything that
exists is a part of nature. To me, by definition, supernatural
does not exist, as it is beyond nature. Nature is all existance,
the universe. There can be nothing outside of the universe, by
definition - universe means ALL THINGS, throughout space and time.
Mind you, my answer to the meaningless question of why does the
universe exist is: by defintion, the universe is all existance,
(no one can argue against that statement), and non-existance,
by definition again, does not exist, therefore the universe
is a logical necessity.
Compare that answer to the relgious response - because god
wants it too, which falls on the blade of question - why
does god exist.
Ultimately, for me, I see that the religious approach does
not actually answer any questions; but provides good reasons
for humans to be nasty to each other.
[\]Robert Wood
The St. Lawrence River - fresh, warm, visible diving.
http://www.magma.ca/~rgwood
Robert Wood
> These are ethical questions, that are not the domain of science, but
> are in the domain of ethics, morality and philosophy. Whilst
> scientist must consider these issues, they can't answer them using
> science.
>
to arrive at an ethical and moral approach to life,
as living humans, employing scientific methods. The
method works so well in other spheres, why deny it
in this these two. Of course, we then must develop
our philosophy a little more. What is a living entity
and why and what and wher, etc. And of course, religion
is of no assistance in this enquiry.
--
John Hicken
> > I think that the latter definition is what is relevant to atheism. I
> > think the term idol, would be a better word for the former, although
> > there are probably better words out there, and idol does not apply to
> > 'divine' rulers.
>
> You're using Christian terms and context without realizing it. You are
> implicitly saying any religion not structured like Christianity is
> uninteresting and atheism doesn't have to take it into account. I call
> this "Not what I was raised as atheism."
I am perfectly aware that I am using Christian words, but only because
they are useful. I thing the word idol is a better word for objects
that people worship, rather than god, which already covers some sort
of being with power over the world. I am not saying that religions
involving idols are not religions, but idols cannot be described as
gods. Most religions with idols seem to use them as symbols for some
god (under my definition), so those who workship them are not
atheists. Also an atheist can still be religious. Buddhists are
usually described as religious atheists.
> Implicit in not what I was raised as atheism is the notion that
> members of these devalued religions must be atheists. If you worship
> earth, sun, wind and sky and those don't look like Christian gods you
> must be an atheist because you don't believe in the "important gods".
> I can see a Christian making that claim but not an atheist.
I am not making that claim. If the earth is somehow sentient, then it
might be a god, if it somehow has power over the world. Even if it
doesn't, those who workship the earth might be workshiping some god
that the earth represents.
> From the viewpoint of atheism all gods must be roughly equal or we end
> up claiming animists and druids as members.
True to some extent. However, god should be well defined enough to
know what is one, and what is not. I don't know enough about the
druids or animists to judge whether they are atheists or not.
> Start with a figure ground notion of atheism. Eliminate the Christians
> and the Jews and the Moslems and the ancestor worshipers and the
> emperor worshipers and the animists and the Duids etc. and you are
> left with the atheists. The religions are the figure and we are the
> ground.
What is an ancestor workshiper? I have never heard this term before.
However, as which emperor worshippers, they could still be atheists,
if they don't attribute divine properties to them.
> Does this even make sense as a group? Can you define it in a shorter
> way? Astoundingly you can. Atheists don't serve or worship gods or
> spirits while those other people all do.
However, the definition of those who do not believe in a god, where
god is defined in the usual way (some sort of supreme being, or
something like that), covers this in less words, and avoid one problem
with your definition, that it means that those who believe in a god,
but do not workship, are atheists, even if it is because they can't be
bothered to go to church, for example, or if they are prevented from
workship, as some christians (erroneously), think that they are.
> This is close to a reasonable definition but has a few flaws. It
> includes a Catholic in a coma. Can you imagine a priest telling a
> family "I'm sorry but Jack went into a deep coma before he passed on
> and in that state believed nothing and in that state was an atheist so
> we can't take him in the Catholic cemetary." I don't think we want
> Jack so lets require some reason for not serving gods or spirits. I
> call this "principal or belief". I reject Caligula on principal and
> Thor on belief.
>
> The other problem is that if an atheist worships the emperor under
> duress he's still an atheist. We don't have a tradition of martyrdom.
> Groveling to save your skin is just common sense. So we need the word
> willingly in there.
>
> An atheist is a person who from principal or belief does not willingly
> serve or worship gods or spirits.
This still has the problem I mentioned above.
> This is obviously a construct and constructs need to be tested. The
> logical test for this is "Does it include those who want to be
> included while excluding those who want to be excluded." It comes very
> close, the notable exception is Stalinists who loudly claim to be
> atheists but who practice emperor worship. I'm happy to claim they are
> our equivalent of Jews for Jesus.
> Their claim to be atheists is not
> honest or in good faith and we don't want them. They don't act like
> us, they believe in things like communism long after the physical
> evidence says those things are nonsense.
Whether they act like us is only relevant if atheism is to be a
monolithic group of people who act the same. Give that even most
religions are not this homogenous, to expect atheists to be seems
rather misguided. Here I think that atheists should be restricted to
believe in a god, where god is defined in the usual way, rather than
your peculiar definition.
By this definition, whether someone believes in an certain political
system, has no bearing on atheism. I fail to see why the definition
that an atheist is someone who does believe in god fails, and your
definition is somehow better.
Martin
> > I think that the latter definition is what is relevant to atheism. I
> > think the term idol, would be a better word for the former, although
> > there are probably better words out there, and idol does not apply to
> > 'divine' rulers.
>
> You're using Christian terms and context without realizing it. You are
> implicitly saying any religion not structured like Christianity is
> uninteresting and atheism doesn't have to take it into account. I call
> this "Not what I was raised as atheism."
You put a very high moral responsibility on the atheist: he needs to
'give a chance' to every form of religion, study every form of
religion and disagree with every one of them before he can honestly
say "I am an atheist". That is probably the ideal situation, but can
we impose it as a 'requirement' for 'atheism'? Do we have to say that
an atheist's atheism rests partly on his ignorance, in the case that
that research hasn't been done? I am not sure how to answer those
questions...
> Implicit in not what I was raised as atheism is the notion that
> members of these devalued religions must be atheists. If you worship
> earth, sun, wind and sky and those don't look like Christian gods you
> must be an atheist because you don't believe in the "important gods".
> I can see a Christian making that claim but not an atheist.
If that attitude is something you have observed, it is sadening,
because it is extremely naive.
> From the viewpoint of atheism all gods must be roughly equal or we end
> up claiming animists and druids as members.
Do you mean to say an atheist that wants to criticize religion must
even his efforts between all religions; that after a critique made
against christianism, he must also produce a critique against every
other religions, and if he doesn't do so, an implicit approval is made
of them? Or that an atheist approves a particuliar religion until he
explicits his opinion on that particuliar religion?
> Start with a figure ground notion of atheism. Eliminate the Christians
> and the Jews and the Moslems and the ancestor worshipers and the
> emperor worshipers and the animists and the Duids etc. and you are
> left with the atheists. The religions are the figure and we are the
> ground.
>
> Does this even make sense as a group? Can you define it in a shorter
> way? Astoundingly you can. Atheists don't serve or worship gods or
> spirits while those other people all do.
>
> This is close to a reasonable definition but has a few flaws. It
> includes a Catholic in a coma. Can you imagine a priest telling a
> family "I'm sorry but Jack went into a deep coma before he passed on
> and in that state believed nothing and in that state was an atheist so
> we can't take him in the Catholic cemetary." I don't think we want
> Jack so lets require some reason for not serving gods or spirits. I
> call this "principal or belief". I reject Caligula on principal and
> Thor on belief.
>
> The other problem is that if an atheist worships the emperor under
> duress he's still an atheist. We don't have a tradition of martyrdom.
> Groveling to save your skin is just common sense. So we need the word
> willingly in there.
I doubt the usefulness of considering those things in a definition of
atheism. But for the sake of precision...
> An atheist is a person who from principal or belief does not willingly
> serve or worship gods or spirits.
>
> This is obviously a construct and constructs need to be tested. The
> logical test for this is "Does it include those who want to be
> included while excluding those who want to be excluded." It comes very
> close, the notable exception is Stalinists who loudly claim to be
> atheists but who practice emperor worship. I'm happy to claim they are
> our equivalent of Jews for Jesus. Their claim to be atheists is not
> honest or in good faith and we don't want them. They don't act like
> us, they believe in things like communism long after the physical
> evidence says those things are nonsense.
You readily speak of 'us' and 'them', of who we want with 'us' and who
we don't want with 'us'. You seem to consider atheism as a doctrine;
that, I hope it is not. An atheist is usually a freethinker (and a
freethinker would refuse to speak of 'us', but would speak of 'me'),
one that does not accept any dogma. I think that if atheism can show
formal affinities with dogma, it is a contingency. The only dogma we
might say atheism has is to use objective thinking in the forming of
opinion. The authority of atheism's denial of god/gods is not
dogmatic, but given by objective thinking.
You raise good points when you question what is the degree of cultural
influence in the forming of that objective thinking. It is a very
difficult question. I think that philosophy is the effort to escape
that cultural influence in thinking.
Charles Fiterman
While you will assert once again that words get a single true meaning
from the meaning fairy who speaks only to you and then only if you
aren't recording the conversation.
Words get meaning from common usage and common usage varies with
context and user. If we are discussing the subject matter of atheism
the most appropriate meanings for lower case god are
1. Object of religious worship.
2. Being with great supernatural power.
If we are discusing who is or is not an atheist only the first
definition makes sense because if we use the second we end in classing
idol worshipers, anamists and emperor worshipers as atheists because
they deny the Christian god. Such people would never call themselves
atheists and there is no justification for our doing so. And why
should we as atheists give special status to the Christian god?
In fact for people who don't believe in the supernatural as a
tautology about the structure of science and who use the methods of
science as the only source of knowledge about the universe to use the
second definiton at all is circular and dishonest. I include it only
because so many atheists use it and definitions are a matter of
reporting not legislation. Proper reporting includes silly usage such
as atheist as an insult.
One of the many colorful beings I don't believe in as an atheist is
the meaning fairy. When I want to know what a word means I use
dictionaries and listen to people speak. When the dictionary disagrees
with me I realize the authors are literate people who consulted many
sources and used computer searches in doing so and it is likely they
not I are right. I realize the line items represent many contexts and
users and picking the right one for a given context is not always
easy.
Send me scientific evidence of the meaning fairy and I'll back right
down.
John Hicken
> > I think that the latter definition is what is relevant to atheism. I
> > think the term idol, would be a better word for the former, although
> > there are probably better words out there, and idol does not apply to
> > 'divine' rulers.
>
> You're using Christian terms and context without realizing it. You are
> implicitly saying any religion not structured like Christianity is
> uninteresting and atheism doesn't have to take it into account. I call
> this "Not what I was raised as atheism."
I am not saying that at all. I am using the word idol, because it is a
better wrord than god to describe an object of religious workship, as
it has a fairly established meaning, and the word god already conveys
a different meaning.
> Implicit in not what I was raised as atheism is the notion that
> members of these devalued religions must be atheists. If you worship
> earth, sun, wind and sky and those don't look like Christian gods you
> must be an atheist because you don't believe in the "important gods".
> I can see a Christian making that claim but not an atheist.
I am not making that claim. All I am saying is what I describe as an
idol, is not a god. This does not mean that workshipping disqualifies
someone from being religion, and in fact I avoid mention of the word
religion, as religion is a seperate issue to atheism/theism, as
atheists could be religious. Someone who worships an idol almost
certainly does so because that idol is a symbol representing some god,
so those who workship them will be theists, not atheists, as they
believe in a god.
> From the viewpoint of atheism all gods must be roughly equal or we end
> up claiming animists and druids as members.
All god's are equal, but an object of religious workship does not
qualify as a god in my book, although those who workship them would
not be atheists, if the idol represented a god, or the workshippers
believed in some sort of god, where god is defined in the usuall way.
> Start with a figure ground notion of atheism. Eliminate the Christians
> and the Jews and the Moslems and the ancestor worshipers and the
> emperor worshipers and the animists and the Duids etc. and you are
> left with the atheists. The religions are the figure and we are the
> ground.
Here, it isn't clear what ancestor worship, and emperor worship
involve. If it involves following an individuals example, then many
atheists would be partaking of it, in particular, AFAIK buddhists do
this, who are generally considered atheists.
> Does this even make sense as a group? Can you define it in a shorter
> way? Astoundingly you can. Atheists don't serve or worship gods or
> spirits while those other people all do.
The conventional definition, of those who do not believe in god would
be a better definition as it is simpler and would cover those who do
not workship because they can't be bothered, or perhaps because they
don't feel their deity ddeserves workship, or because they feel that
god should not be workshipped or served, but that just living a good
life and helping others is more worthwhile.
> This is close to a reasonable definition but has a few flaws. It
> includes a Catholic in a coma. Can you imagine a priest telling a
> family "I'm sorry but Jack went into a deep coma before he passed on
> and in that state believed nothing and in that state was an atheist so
> we can't take him in the Catholic cemetary." I don't think we want
> Jack so lets require some reason for not serving gods or spirits. I
> call this "principal or belief". I reject Caligula on principal and
> Thor on belief.
>
> The other problem is that if an atheist worships the emperor under
> duress he's still an atheist. We don't have a tradition of martyrdom.
> Groveling to save your skin is just common sense. So we need the word
> willingly in there.
>
> An atheist is a person who from principal or belief does not willingly
> serve or worship gods or spirits.
Again, why does the conventional definition of atheist, someone who
doesn't believe that there are any gods, fail?
> This is obviously a construct and constructs need to be tested. The
> logical test for this is "Does it include those who want to be
> included while excluding those who want to be excluded." It comes very
> close, the notable exception is Stalinists who loudly claim to be
> atheists but who practice emperor worship. I'm happy to claim they are
> our equivalent of Jews for Jesus. Their claim to be atheists is not
> honest or in good faith and we don't want them.
>They don't act like
> us, they believe in things like communism long after the physical
> evidence says those things are nonsense.
The problem here is that most religions do not have people who aggree
with each other, as can be revealed by the number of splits that have
occured in Christian, so to expect atheism to be a group of people who
generally agree with each other seems rather naive, and also the
mention of politics seems unneccesary anyway.
Basically I prefer the standard definition of atheism, defined in
terms of the usual sorts of definitions of god, as it has been
established, and cannot see what is wrong with it. It has the
advantage of being restricted just to the subject of god, rather than
bringing in science, or politics, or other beliefs, that have their
own words. In a dabate, it would be a lot easier if as an atheists,
you just didn't believe in god, and couldn't automatically assume that
there are other certain beliefs that you must have.
Automort
>If they exist, they are not supernatural.
Right.
>supernatural
> does not exist, as it is beyond nature.
Right.
>he meaningless question of why does the
> universe exist
Well said. You might as well assert that the universe is hungry or likes
sculpture.
Automort
>I think it is quite possible
> to arrive at an ethical and moral approach to life,
> as living humans, employing scientific methods.
Of course. For one thing, what increases our control over things is moral. How
to use that control? What increases what's called "the quality of life" is
moral. But how do you determine that? Well, freedom from disease and hunger are
a START, like using genetic engineering to keep an otherwise intelligent mother
from passing on alzheimer's disease or the "green revolution" that confounded
those who gleefully predicted mass starvation by the 1970s.
Charles Fiterman
> > implicitly saying any religion not structured like Christianity is
> > uninteresting and atheism doesn't have to take it into account. I call
> > this "Not what I was raised as atheism."
>
> I am not saying that at all. I am using the word idol, because it is a
> better wrord than god to describe an object of religious workship, as
> it has a fairly established meaning, and the word god already conveys
> a different meaning.
An idol is simply a kind of god just as poodles are a kind of dog. You
misunderstand physically observable gods. Some are images of spirits,
some are worshiped as themselves. Divine emperors fulfill their
central claims. So does the sun as a giver of life.
As a child a Pima Shaman told me "These things (earth, sun, wind and
sky) are gods in the traditional religion of our people. We respect
that tradition." Obviously those gods do what they are expected to do,
keep a traditional culture alive.
I have no right to tell people what they should worship or what to
expect of their gods. I have the right to abstain. I have the right to
laugh like a hyena. I have the right to be revolted. But people can
run their religions as the wish. They can chose their priests as they
wish, decorate their churches as they wish and worship anything they
want.
I can think of nothing more revolting than politicians. The most
revolting sort of politician is the unelected variety. The most
revolting of unelected politicians are those who strut about calling
themselves gods. But people who worship power don't care where it
comes from or how it is used. They are worshiped as gods so gods they
are just as a child molesting priest is still a priest until removed
by who ever does that in their religion.
John Hicken
> epe...@acm.org (Eric Pepke) wrote in message news:<ef37f531.02030...@posting.google.com>...
> > c...@geodesic.com (Charles Fiterman) wrote in message news:<735ad38a.02022...@posting.google.com>...
> >
> > > The formal descriptions of atheism all seem to lack something. "I
> > > don't believe in gods" is a normal description of atheism with both
> > > "gods" and "believe in" left vague.
> >
> > Please, just for the sake of nostalgia, assert once again that gods exist
> > because most of them are small statues.
>
> While you will assert once again that words get a single true meaning
> from the meaning fairy who speaks only to you and then only if you
> aren't recording the conversation.
I don't see where Eric does this. The word god to most people does
not mean a small statue that people workship, but some sort of
supernatural being. Your definition of god here is certainly
unconventional, and confuses things, by introducing another definition
for god, when the word idol covers this sort of 'god'.
> Words get meaning from common usage and common usage varies with
> context and user. If we are discussing the subject matter of atheism
> the most appropriate meanings for lower case god are
> 1. Object of religious worship.
> 2. Being with great supernatural power.
>
> If we are discusing who is or is not an atheist only the first
> definition makes sense because if we use the second we end in classing
> idol worshipers, anamists and emperor worshipers as atheists because
> they deny the Christian god.
If someone is an idol worshipper they almost certainly are not
atheists, because they would believe in some sort of god, as in the
second definition, or a similar one, and the idol would be a symbol of
god, or somehow involved in workshiping their god, or a particular
god. I don't know enough about anamists to judge whether they should
be classed as atheists or not, and with emperor workship, this seems
consistent with atheism, unless the emperor is god, or somehow has
some sort of contact with god, so the worship of such an emperor would
involve belief in a god, under the second definition, or one of the
usual definition of a god.
Such people would never call themselves
> atheists and there is no justification for our doing so. And why
> should we as atheists give special status to the Christian god?
The second definition gives no special status to the Christian god, as
supernatural god covers a lot of ground.
> In fact for people who don't believe in the supernatural as a
> tautology about the structure of science and who use the methods of
> science as the only source of knowledge about the universe to use the
> second definiton at all is circular and dishonest. I include it only
> because so many atheists use it and definitions are a matter of
> reporting not legislation. Proper reporting includes silly usage such
> as atheist as an insult.
Supernatural is a useful word, because people know what you mean when
you talk about the supernatural. If science can explain god in a
natural way, then things will change, and we will need another
definition, but supernatural is useful as it stands. There are also
other definition of god that give an idea of what we mean by god, such
as a supreme being, a sentient being which can can control the
universe at will, for example, or we could simply leave god as fairly
vague, and decide what is a god on a case by case basis.
Also, you appear to be talking about atheists being those who only use
science to find out about the universe. Firstly, I think this
definition could be said to cover no-one, as most people get
information from other people, and may believe what they hear, without
testing things scientifically, if it is someone they trust. Secondly,
if it covers some people, it seems unneccesarily retrictive, and means
that atheist does not just cover the god question.
Another point, is that this definition leaves us to define workship,
and religion, both of which are fairly vague, probably more so than
god.
>
> One of the many colorful beings I don't believe in as an atheist is
> the meaning fairy. When I want to know what a word means I use
> dictionaries and listen to people speak. When the dictionary disagrees
> with me I realize the authors are literate people who consulted many
> sources and used computer searches in doing so and it is likely they
> not I are right. I realize the line items represent many contexts and
> users and picking the right one for a given context is not always
> easy.
>
> Send me scientific evidence of the meaning fairy and I'll back right
> down.
No meaning fairy is needed to decide to stick with the conventional
definition of atheists, that they use themselves, that of someone who
doesn't believe in a god, where god is defined in the more
conventional way, such as a sentient being that created the universe,
or has power to alter the universe at will. Sentience is a
characteristic that seem neccesary for something to be a god, to
distinguish it from the operation of natural forces, and the power to
alter the universe at will is to make it clear that this is not the
same sort of power that humans have over the universe.
Scott Davidson
In article 66ae...@posting.google.com, c...@geodesic.com (Charles Fiterman) writes:
>epe...@acm.org (Eric Pepke) wrote in message news:<ef37f531.02030...@posting.google.com>...
>> c...@geodesic.com (Charles Fiterman) wrote in message news:<735ad38a.02022...@posting.google.com>...
>>
>> > The formal descriptions of atheism all seem to lack something. "I
>> > don't believe in gods" is a normal description of atheism with both
>> > "gods" and "believe in" left vague.
>>
>> Please, just for the sake of nostalgia, assert once again that gods exist
>> because most of them are small statues.
>
>While you will assert once again that words get a single true meaning
>from the meaning fairy who speaks only to you and then only if you
>aren't recording the conversation.
Hi Charles,
It seems like old times.
I rather think that you are the one who is forcing a single meaning onto the word god.
I for one can quite accept that a small statue is a "god" without any supernatural
component. This type of god I believe in. It is when you associate a supernatural,
spiritual component to the clearly existing physical component that atheism
comes into play. A theist believer in an idol god believes that this entity has both a physical and supernatural component. An atheist disbeliever believes in only the
physical component.
A worhipper of a picture of Marilyn Monroe say (showing my age here) who is only
"worshipping" the physical, can still be an atheist.
>
>Words get meaning from common usage and common usage varies with
>context and user. If we are discussing the subject matter of atheism
>the most appropriate meanings for lower case god are
> 1. Object of religious worship.
> 2. Being with great supernatural power.
>
>If we are discusing who is or is not an atheist only the first
>definition makes sense because if we use the second we end in classing
>idol worshipers, anamists and emperor worshipers as atheists because
>they deny the Christian god. Such people would never call themselves
>atheists and there is no justification for our doing so. And why
>should we as atheists give special status to the Christian god?
I do not see why you are claiming that non-Christian gods can't
have great supernatural power. Clearly the worshippers of Zeus thought
that he had this. I think we both agree that the Christian god is just one more god
that we don't believe in.
Saying that, I would say that if we needed to define "god," a being of great
supernatural power is a reasonable definition, understanding that the word "great" can cause all sorts of problems. However, I don't see why we as atheists should even try
to define the word god. "god" appears to be the union of various theists gods, with
sometimes contradictory powers and capabilities. It is not the job of the atheist
to align these beliefs - we can just say that we do not believe in any of these gods.
However, I think the intersection of the properties of these gods includes, at least,
some supernatural power. The deification of a Roman emperor involved assigning him
some supernatural power, at the least immortality.
>
>In fact for people who don't believe in the supernatural as a
>tautology about the structure of science and who use the methods of
>science as the only source of knowledge about the universe to use the
>second definiton at all is circular and dishonest. I include it only
>because so many atheists use it and definitions are a matter of
>reporting not legislation. Proper reporting includes silly usage such
>as atheist as an insult.
>
I fail to see why including supernaturalism in reporting what other people believe
is either circular or dishonest. Could you explain this a bit more?
>One of the many colorful beings I don't believe in as an atheist is
>the meaning fairy. When I want to know what a word means I use
>dictionaries and listen to people speak. When the dictionary disagrees
>with me I realize the authors are literate people who consulted many
>sources and used computer searches in doing so and it is likely they
>not I are right. I realize the line items represent many contexts and
>users and picking the right one for a given context is not always
>easy.
>
>Send me scientific evidence of the meaning fairy and I'll back right
>down.
>
IIRC, your definition of atheist is one who neither worships nor serves any god.
This appears to have major problems. Satan neither worships nor serves God in the
Christian myth. Is Satan an atheist by your definition? In Dogma, the Angel of
Death arguably neither serves nor worships God. (He wants to get back to heaven,
but perhaps that is for other reasons - like cute angels?) Would you consider him
to be an atheist?
Scott #1045
Dick Duggan
"Robert Wood" <rgw...@rogers.com> wrote in message
news:3C89B202...@rogers.com...
>
> If they exist, they are not supernatural. Anything that
> exists is a part of nature. To me, by definition, supernatural
> does not exist, as it is beyond nature. Nature is all existance,
> the universe. There can be nothing outside of the universe, by
> definition - universe means ALL THINGS, throughout space and time.
>
> Mind you, my answer to the meaningless question of why does the
> universe exist is: by defintion, the universe is all existance,
> (no one can argue against that statement), and non-existance,
> by definition again, does not exist, therefore the universe
> is a logical necessity.
OK, but that leaves two questions. There has been some scientific
speculation in the last few years that this is not the only universe. If
proved true that would mean you need to use a word like "existance" where
you now use "universe".
Also, why couldn't the universe (existence) be an empty set? The question
really should be how does it come to be non-empty.
>
> Compare that answer to the relgious response - because god
> wants it too, which falls on the blade of question - why
> does god exist.
>
> Ultimately, for me, I see that the religious approach does
> not actually answer any questions; but provides good reasons
> for humans to be nasty to each other.
Agreed on both counts.
- Dick
Martin
> Words get meaning from common usage and common usage varies with
> context and user. If we are discussing the subject matter of atheism
> the most appropriate meanings for lower case god are
> 1. Object of religious worship.
> 2. Being with great supernatural power.
>
> If we are discusing who is or is not an atheist only the first
> definition makes sense because if we use the second we end in classing
> idol worshipers, anamists and emperor worshipers as atheists because
> they deny the Christian god. Such people would never call themselves
> atheists and there is no justification for our doing so. And why
> should we as atheists give special status to the Christian god?
Be careful not to equate the christian god to every monotheist god.
We see a lot more discussion on the christian god in particular around
here because the majority of the theists that participate are
christians, and because the majority of the atheists that participate
live in a place where christianism is the dominant religion.
When someone calls himself an atheist, the thing that is beyond doubt
from the start, if he speaks truly, is that he doesn't believe in any
god. That is really the minimum the word implies.
You're trying to define atheism so that it excludes "idol worshipers,
animists and emperor worshipers". The reason why you're doing that, I
am not sure, but it seems to be something to the effect of "'we' don't
want 'them' in our 'camp'", which is utterly silly. Don't try to
identify yourself to atheism to a greater extent than that which
atheism encompasses can imply; and atheism shouldn't be thought to
encompass anything more than the disbelief in god(s).
I'm sorry to say, but one who worships an emperor, but doesn't
consider the emperor to be a god, is *not* a theist because of his
worship, even if you feel that this type of person 'pollutes' the
atheist 'camp'... (a type of thinking I would strongly encourage to
abandon). Where there is no idea of god(s), the concepts of theism
and atheism do not apply, can not apply.
It looks sometimes as if you have the tendency to consider atheism in
terms of 'good' and 'bad'; which inclusions would make it 'bad', which
exclusions could make it 'better'. This you shouldn't do. It can
only cloud the reasoning.
A superstitious person, for example one who avoids black cats from
fear of bad luck, can very well be an atheist, because his
superstition can exclude any consideration of divinity. An animist
who believes in souls can very well be an atheist, because the concept
of soul can also exclude considerations of divinity. It looks as if
you're trying to exclude those people of what you consider your
'camp', simply because you disapprove of the way they think.
As for the idol worshipper, it would be the nature of his beliefs that
defines him as a theist or a non-theist in regard to his worshipping
activity. If the worshipper conceives the idol as representing or as
being itself of a divine nature, he is a theist, if he does not, he
can very well be an atheist.
Atheists can be spiritual people too, you know.
Automort
>There has been some scientific
>speculation in the last few years that this is not the only universe. If
>proved true that would mean you need to use a word like "existance" where
>you now use "universe".
I don't know how you could prove it, but, OK, change the terminology.
>why couldn't the universe (existence) be an empty set? The question
>really should be how does it come to be non-empty.
>
Beats me. I'm not even sure what this means.
Charles Fiterman
> OK, but that leaves two questions. There has been some scientific
> speculation in the last few years that this is not the only universe. If
> proved true that would mean you need to use a word like "existance" where
> you now use "universe".
In this context the universe means the results of the big bang.
Speculation about other universes comes from things like a speedup in
the expansion of the universe which looks on the face of it as though
the universe was being subjected to forces from the outside. Forces
from the outside are also central to things like manifold theory in
explaining interactions in physics.
A theory without consequences is simply nonsense and nonsense has no
place on the probability line. "Twas brilling in the slithy toves." is
nonsense, those aren't even words. "Twas not brilling in the slithy
toves." is no better and the same goes for "Fourty percent chance of
brilling in the slithy toves this weekend."
John Hicken
> > > You're using Christian terms and context without realizing it. You are
> > > implicitly saying any religion not structured like Christianity is
> > > uninteresting and atheism doesn't have to take it into account. I call
> > > this "Not what I was raised as atheism."
> >
> > I am not saying that at all. I am using the word idol, because it is a
> > better wrord than god to describe an object of religious workship, as
> > it has a fairly established meaning, and the word god already conveys
> > a different meaning.
>
> An idol is simply a kind of god just as poodles are a kind of dog. You
> misunderstand physically observable gods. Some are images of spirits,
> some are worshiped as themselves. Divine emperors fulfill their
> central claims. So does the sun as a giver of life.
An idol is only a type of god, if you choose a rather odd definition
of god, and you have not justified using this definition, rather than
the conventional one. If they are images of spirits, they are not
god's in themselves. Also, if an idol is workshipped as itself, that,
I would think, requires that it is more than just a physical object,
but has some sort of power, so it could possibly be classed as a god.
A divine emperor is not usually a god, but has some power or authority
given by god, or a god. There are some emperor's though who might
have been thought to be god's in their own right.
> As a child a Pima Shaman told me "These things (earth, sun, wind and
> sky) are gods in the traditional religion of our people. We respect
> that tradition." Obviously those gods do what they are expected to do,
> keep a traditional culture alive.
If the earth, sun and wind have some sort of supernatural power, they
probably would be gods in the conventional sense.
> I have no right to tell people what they should worship or what to
> expect of their gods. I have the right to abstain. I have the right to
> laugh like a hyena. I have the right to be revolted. But people can
> run their religions as the wish. They can chose their priests as they
> wish, decorate their churches as they wish and worship anything they
> want.
I am not saying that people's rights to their religion should be
restricted either. However, some religions are perfectly compatible
with atheism, those that do not include a god in the usual sense of
the word.
> I can think of nothing more revolting than politicians. The most
> revolting sort of politician is the unelected variety. The most
> revolting of unelected politicians are those who strut about calling
> themselves gods.
Who are these people? I don't know of any politician who claims to be
god, at least not in the sense of have supernatural power. Also,
surely an unelected politician is a contradiction in terms, as such a
person would probably be a dictator, or such like.
> But people who worship power don't care where it
> comes from or how it is used. They are worshiped as gods so gods they
> are just as a child molesting priest is still a priest until removed
> by who ever does that in their religion.
Again, I don't know of anyone who worships any politician as a god, in
the sense that they expect that this person have supernatural power,
although some people may look up to them. Perhaps you could tell me
who you are referring to.
Brian Holtz
> Anything that exists is a part of nature. To me, by definition,
> supernatural does not exist, as it is beyond nature.
> Nature is all existance, the universe.
This simplistic definition of 'supernatural' as
necessarily non-existent simply does not correspond to
either philosophical or common usage, as I have
repeatedly demonstrated in the "JH: Design Argument" thread.
> Mind you, my answer to the meaningless question of why
> does the universe exist is:
The question is not known to be meaningless. A possibly
meaningful answer is roughly that the universe exists
(more precisely, is perceived to exist) because it is
possible. However, this raises the question: why is any
universe possible? The answer might be roughly that
absolute impossibility -- the state of affairs in which
nothing is possible -- is itself not possible. Why
might absolute impossibility not be possible? The answer
might be roughly that if nothing truly were possible,
then absolute impossibility would not be possible, implying
that at least something must be possible. But if anything
is possible, then it seems the universe we perceive should
be no less possible than anything else. Whether the universe
we perceive existed or not, it as a merely possible universe
would be perceived by its merely possible inhabitants
no differently than it as an actual universe would
be perceived by its actual inhabitants. (By analogy,
the thoughts and perceptions of a particular artificial
intelligence in a simulated universe would be the same
across identical "runs" of the simulation, regardless of
whether we bothered to initiate such a "run" once, twice
-- or never.)
Thus, the universe might merely be the undreamed possible
dream of no particular dreamer.
I don't yet consider this a satisfactory answer to the
question of why is there -- or why does there appear to be --
something rather than nothing, but it is at least as
satisfactory as theistic answers derived from ontological
considerations of the concept of God.
> non-existance, by definition again, does not exist,
> therefore the universe is a logical necessity.
The actual existence of our particular universe is hardly
a logical necessity. Nor is it a logical necessity that
at least one thing (whether God or a universe) actually
exist. However, my discussion above might
be taken as an argument that the mere possibility of our
particular universe is a logical necessity, and that
such a universe would appear the same to its inhabitants
whether it existed or not.
Tony Griffin
> Of course. For one thing, what increases our control over things is moral.
So Tony Soprano's use of intimidation and violence is moral?
Tony
Automort
>So Tony Soprano's use of intimidation and violence is moral?
>
In order to stop him you'd have to use intimidation and violence. Is THAT
moral? It increases everyone else' safety when gangsters are dead or
imprisoned.
Dick Duggan
"Automort" <auto...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:20020313042916...@mb-mu.aol.com...
> From: "Dick Duggan" ddu...@attbideletethispart.com
>
> >There has been some scientific
> >speculation in the last few years that this is not the only universe. If
> >proved true that would mean you need to use a word like "existance" where
> >you now use "universe".
>
> I don't know how you could prove it, but, OK, change the terminology.
I agree, but it's the difficulty that people often get into here. The point
is that since the God that some hereabouts believe in exists but is not part
of the universe, He is part of existence and not part of the universe.
>
> >why couldn't the universe (existence) be an empty set? The question
> >really should be how does it come to be non-empty.
> >
>
> Beats me. I'm not even sure what this means.
:-) I mean that you can prove logically that a universe *must* exists since
the term just means whatever is, but why is there anything *in* it?
- Dick
Mark Richardson
(John Hicken) wrote:
>
>An idol is only a type of god, if you choose a rather odd definition
>of god, and you have not justified using this definition, rather than
>the conventional one.
Charles definition is as conventional and ancient as yours.
I don't think you can declare one definition of god - of the many
listed in any good dictionary as "the" definition.
That's not an argument - its a straight out assertion.
Charles argument is that his definition is broader and includes non
christian/jewish/muslim conceptions of god.
Remember atheism is older than christianity!
> If they are images of spirits, they are not
>god's in themselves.
In your opinion.
I disagree.
(I am an atheist by the way)
I would say they are gods - someones gods - just not my gods.
> Also, if an idol is workshipped as itself, that,
>I would think, requires that it is more than just a physical object,
>but has some sort of power, so it could possibly be classed as a god.
In your opinion - it still fits many of the dictionary definitions of
god - just not the one appropriate to Yahweh but I am not a christian
and don't privilege one god "type" over another.
>If the earth, sun and wind have some sort of supernatural power, they
>probably would be gods in the conventional sense.
And if not they could still be gods with natural powers!
>Who are these people?
The Pharaohs, the Caesars, the Inca, Emperor Hirohito of Japan...
Also arguably Hitler, Stalin and Moa Tse Tung.
Did Emperor Hirohito have supernatural powers?
No.
Was (Is?) Empereor Hirohito a god?
Yes - that is a matter of historical fact.
(Ask a Japanese person who was alive during WWII - read the diary of a
Kamakaze pilot.)
> I don't know of any politician who claims to be
>god, at least not in the sense of have supernatural power.
They don't have to claim to be a god or claim to have supernatural
powers for people to worship/treat them as gods.
A god isn't something that claims to be a god - a god is something
treated as a god.
For example:
The Sun has never claimed to be a god - but it has temples built to it
and sacrifices made to it and prayers offered up to it.
In return it shines on the earth and warms it and makes plants grow.
You may say these are not supernatural powers, but apparently the
people who pray to the Sun don't understand the distinction or care.
>Also,
>surely an unelected politician is a contradiction in terms,
Absolutely not!
> as such a
>person would probably be a dictator, or such like.
>
Why isn't a dictator a politician?
Are you really saying Adolf Hitler (Or Mussolini or Franco or Colonel
Gadafi or Fidel Castro or Suddam Hussien...) was NOT a
Politician???????
That is a truly bizarre statement.
>Again, I don't know of anyone who worships any politician as a god, in
>the sense that they expect that this person have supernatural power,
>although some people may look up to them. Perhaps you could tell me
>who you are referring to.
Charles isn't saying that they have supernatural powers - he is saying
they are gods.
You are beating up on a strawman.
It is you that is saying that a god *must* have supernatural powers -
Charles has never said that.
Mark.
--
Mark Richardson mDOTrichardsonATutasDOTeduDOTau
Member of S.M.A.S.H.
(Sarcastic Middle aged Atheists with a Sense of Humour)
-----------------------------------------------------
Automort
> you can prove logically that a universe *must* exists since
>the term just means whatever is, but why is there anything *in* it?
It still seems to mean little or nothing, but then, so does theism.
Charles Fiterman
> given by god, or a god. There are some emperor's though who might
> have been thought to be god's in their own right.
Divine emperors ARE gods. According to
the official biography Caesar Augustus' mother fell asleep in the
temple of Apollo and was there impregnated by the god. Divine emperors
are the source of all ethics. That's right good by definition just
like the deist god and the Christian god. Get a biography of emperor
Herihieto or Stalin or Hitler. They were taken as the source of all
ethics, the definition of good.
Charles Fiterman
I'm not limiting myself to rejecting monotheism, polytheism is just as
relevant.
> We see a lot more discussion on the christian god in particular around
> here because the majority of the theists that participate are
> christians, and because the majority of the atheists that participate
> live in a place where christianism is the dominant religion.
>
> When someone calls himself an atheist, the thing that is beyond doubt
> from the start, if he speaks truly, is that he doesn't believe in any
> god. That is really the minimum the word implies.
I agree but mean something else by "believe in". I don't believe in
idols in the sense I don't believe in fortune tellers. I don't believe
in gods means I don't serve or worship any, they aren't a source of
ethics or inspiration. It doesn't mean I have a revisionist version of
Roman history so I can say Germanicus Caesar wasn't a god.
> You're trying to define atheism so that it excludes "idol worshipers,
> animists and emperor worshipers". The reason why you're doing that, I
> am not sure, but it seems to be something to the effect of "'we' don't
> want 'them' in our 'camp'", which is utterly silly. Don't try to
> identify yourself to atheism to a greater extent than that which
> atheism encompasses can imply; and atheism shouldn't be thought to
> encompass anything more than the disbelief in god(s).
I don't want anybody called an atheist who doesn't call themself an
atheist. We aren't an insult or an obsinity. The head of Florida
atheists had a license plate that said "atheist" for 18 years. People
complained that is was offensive and the state took it away.
Muddy Boggs
"Charles Fiterman" <c...@geodesic.com> wrote
> ...
> From the viewpoint of atheism all gods must be roughly equal or we end
> up claiming animists and druids as members.
>
Atheism doesn't make "claims" of any sort. Athism is simply the absence of
the particular belief that any particular theist true-believer has.
> Start with a figure ground notion of atheism. Eliminate the Christians
> and the Jews and the Moslems and the ancestor worshipers and the
> emperor worshipers and the animists and the Duids etc. and you are
> left with the atheists. The religions are the figure and we are the
> ground.
>
> Does this even make sense as a group? Can you define it in a shorter
> way? Astoundingly you can. Atheists don't serve or worship gods or
> spirits while those other people all do.
>
The problem implicit in your definition is that it takes it for granted that
these alleged gods and spirits might be real, and that atheists just don't
serve or worship them.
The Atheism Web points out that "Atheism is characterized by an absence of
belief in the existence of gods."
http://www.infidels.org/news/atheism/intro.html
As Thomas Huxley said a hundred years ago, in his excoriation of the
Christian belief, "Agnosticism and Christianity," all that is essential to
agnosticism is to point out the logical principle that anybody like the
Christian is wrong to say that she is certain of the truth of her "God"
proposition unless she can provide evidence that justifies that certainty.
http://aleph0.clarku.edu/huxley/CE5/Agn-X.html
Both of those are examples of absence of belief in the
reality of gods.
Jesse Nowells
On Thu, 14 Mar 2002, Brian Holtz wrote:
> > Anything that exists is a part of nature. To me, by definition,
> > supernatural does not exist, as it is beyond nature.
> > Nature is all existance, the universe.
> This simplistic definition of 'supernatural' as
> necessarily non-existent simply does not correspond to
> either philosophical or common usage, as I have
> repeatedly demonstrated in the "JH: Design Argument" thread.
Supernaturalisms are assumptions about things that can't be readily
explained. We don't know all the "laws of nature" so how can we presume
that just because something can't be explained by a "law of nature" that
therefore it must be something with an extra-natural property? We might be
simply giving an answer to the wrong question & explaining away an
illusion.
> > Mind you, my answer to the meaningless question of why
> > does the universe exist is:
> The question is not known to be meaningless.
It may not be meaningless but it's not likely answerable. If god explains
why, why then does god exist? The question can go into infinite recursion.
> Thus, the universe might merely be the undreamed possible
> dream of no particular dreamer.
An undreamed dream of no particular dreamer is contradictory. If it is
undreamed then the universe is not a dream. If it is a dream, where
resides the dreamer & would there not be an infinite series of dreamers?
Tony Griffin
> ..... Whether the universe
> we perceive existed or not, it as a merely possible universe
> would be perceived by its merely possible inhabitants
> no differently than it as an actual universe would
> be perceived by its actual inhabitants. (By analogy,
> the thoughts and perceptions of a particular artificial
> intelligence in a simulated universe would be the same
> across identical "runs" of the simulation, regardless of
> whether we bothered to initiate such a "run" once, twice
> -- or never.)
>
> Thus, the universe might merely be the undreamed possible
> dream of no particular dreamer.
>
> I don't yet consider this a satisfactory answer to the
> question of why is there -- or why does there appear to be --
> something rather than nothing, ....
Nor I. The artificial intelligence of your analogy must have an existent
computer at some basic level, or it simply collapses into non-existence.
We can't peel a non-existent onion and end up with something (can we?).
One might also ask if something is possible if there is no-one to consider it
so. :)
> ... but it is at least as
> satisfactory as theistic answers derived from ontological
> considerations of the concept of God.
That, I'd agree with.
Tony
Tony Griffin
But you said "what increases our control over things is moral", which I took to
mean "everything that increases our control over things is moral". If you just
mean that some things of this nature are moral, then I'd agree, but that's quite
trivial, as some of pretty much anything is moral.
Tony
Brian Holtz
"Jesse Nowells" <jnow...@transbay.net> wrote
> We don't know all the "laws of nature" so how can we presume
> that just because something can't be explained by a "law of
> nature" that therefore it must be something with an
> extra-natural property?
We don't "presume [..] it must"; we just provisionally
conclude it is supernatural if that's what the available
evidence tells us. If new evidence becomes available, our
provisional conclusions might change. Science does this all
the time. The fact that all empirical conclusions are
provisional does not justify asserting that this particular
kind of provisional conclusion (supernaturality) should
never be believed under any possible circumstances.
> If god explains why, why then does god exist?
The concept of God can only explain why there is something
rather than nothing if it can be shown that God is a
self-caused first cause. Nobody has shown this.
> > Thus, the universe might merely be the undreamed possible
> > dream of no particular dreamer.
>
> An undreamed dream of no particular dreamer is contradictory.
It's no more contradictory than an uncounted possible number
with no particular counter.
> If it is undreamed then the universe is not a dream.
A possible dream is still a possible dream even if it has never
been dreamed.
--
br...@holtz.org
http://humanknowledge.net
Jim Rogers
...
> I don't want anybody called an atheist who doesn't call themself an
> atheist. We aren't an insult or an obsinity. The head of Florida
> atheists had a license plate that said "atheist" for 18 years. People
> complained that is was offensive and the state took it away.
Update: He got the license plate back! Florida's DMV decided to start
up a review board for plates that get complaints before deciding to
take them away. This was at least part in response to letters they got
protesting the action, including one from a fellow member of Atheists
of Northern Colorado. Woohoo! Sometimes just making a little noise is
all it takes. Here's the reply he got:
------------------------------------------------
> Thank you for your comments regarding the recall of the
> personalized plate configuration "ATHEIST". Upon further
> review by management, the decision to cancel this
> personalized plate has been reversed. It has been
> determined that the plate does not fall within the
> criteria of an obscene or otherwise objectionable plate.
>
> The department is reviewing license plate recall
> procedures in order to avoid recall errors and better
> serve our customers. A departmental review board will be
> formed to review all license plates recommended for recall
> prior to the recall of the license plate. The personalized
> license plate "ATHEIST" would have qualified for review by
> such a committee.
>
> Again, thank you for taking the time to express your
> concerns regarding this matter.
>
> Thanks.
>
> Division of Motor Vehicles
Mark Richardson
<muddy...@nospamhotmail.com> wrote:
>
>The problem implicit in your definition is that it takes it for granted that
>these alleged gods and spirits might be real, and that atheists just don't
>serve or worship them.
>
The Emperor Hirohito is real I have seen photographs and movie film
images of him.
The God of the christians isnt real - but why give their god special
treatment?
An atheist should disbelieve *all* gods real and imginary or else it
is truly meaningless label.
>The Atheism Web points out that "Atheism is characterized by an absence of
>belief in the existence of gods."
>http://www.infidels.org/news/atheism/intro.html
>
So anyone who acknowledges the existence of the Sun is not an atheist.
Or
The definition is not complete and exhaustive but merely indicative.
>
>As Thomas Huxley said a hundred years ago, in his excoriation of the
>Christian belief, "Agnosticism and Christianity," all that is essential to
>agnosticism is to point out the logical principle that anybody like the
>Christian is wrong to say that she is certain of the truth of her "God"
>proposition unless she can provide evidence that justifies that certainty.
>http://aleph0.clarku.edu/huxley/CE5/Agn-X.html
>
>Both of those are examples of absence of belief in the
>reality of gods.
>
We are not talking about being non-christian (the only god Huxley was
concerned with was the Jewish/christian/muslim God) we are talking
about being atheist.
An atheist disbelieves in *all* gods not just the immaterial one of
christianity.
Brian Holtz
"Tony Griffin" <tgri...@pipeline.com> wrote
> > ..... Whether the universe
> > we perceive existed or not, it as a merely possible universe
> > would be perceived by its merely possible inhabitants
> > no differently than it as an actual universe would
> > be perceived by its actual inhabitants. (By analogy,
> > the thoughts and perceptions of a particular artificial
> > intelligence in a simulated universe would be the same
> > across identical "runs" of the simulation, regardless of
> > whether we bothered to initiate such a "run" once, twice
> > -- or never.)
>
> The artificial intelligence of your analogy must have an existent
> computer at some basic level, or it simply collapses into non-existence.
But what does "non-existence" mean for a possible world? "Existence"
or "actuality" is an indexical: to say that something "exists" or
"is actual" is just to say that it has a certain relationship
(causal) to the things in "this" (i.e. the indexed) world.
I suspect that for a possible world, "possible existence" and
"actual existence" (whatever the latter might mean) would be
indistinguishable, both to those outside that world and those
inside it. And since indistinguishables should be considered
identical, it would follow that the possibility of a world
implies its existence.
This is what I meant by the analogy that the inhabitants
of a simulation could not tell the difference between the
simulation being run twice and the simulation being run never.
> One might also ask if something is possible if there is
> no-one to consider it so. :)
Possibility within a given world (or logical model) seems
well-defined, and doesn't depend on being considered by a
mind or personality. But the possibility or actuality of
an entire possible world may be a notion to which our
usual within-world notions of possibility/actuality cannot
trivially be applied.
--
br...@holtz.org
http://humanknowledge.net
Jesse Nowells
On Thu, 21 Mar 2002, Brian Holtz wrote:
> "Jesse Nowells" <jnow...@transbay.net> wrote
> > We don't know all the "laws of nature" so how can we presume
> > that just because something can't be explained by a "law of
> > nature" that therefore it must be something with an
> > extra-natural property?
> We don't "presume [..] it must"; we just provisionally
> conclude it is supernatural if that's what the available
> evidence tells us.
But that's not what the available evidence necessarily tells anyone.
Supernaturalisms are a presupposition that do not arise out of any
real inquiry. It's the equivalent of saying in the pre-flight era that
flying is possible by quasi-magical means.
> If new evidence becomes available, our provisional conclusions might
> change. Science does this all the time. The fact that all empirical
> conclusions are provisional does not justify asserting that this
> particular kind of provisional conclusion (supernaturality) should
> never be believed under any possible circumstances.
One can claim that things should be belived in based on an expediency that
doesn't have anything to do with inquiry. In order to believe in
supernaturalisms one has to already believe in the conclusion that
supernaturalisms draw about reality. Relevation is not inquiry; it's just
run-away subjectivism.
> > If god explains why, why then does god exist?
> The concept of God can only explain why there is something
> rather than nothing if it can be shown that God is a
> self-caused first cause. Nobody has shown this.
Look, if god always existed or there is an infinite chain of causes, none
of that explains why there is something rather than nothing.
> > An undreamed dream of no particular dreamer is contradictory.
> It's no more contradictory than an uncounted possible number
> with no particular counter.
Then call it a possible dream, rather than an undreamed dream as if it is
yet to be dreamed by some dreamer.
> > If it is undreamed then the universe is not a dream.
> A possible dream is still a possible dream even if it has never
> been dreamed.
The universe apparently exists so how could it be a dream yet to be
dreamed?
Jesse Nowells
On Thu, 21 Mar 2002, Brian Holtz wrote:
> > The artificial intelligence of your analogy must have an existent
> > computer at some basic level, or it simply collapses into non-existence.
> But what does "non-existence" mean for a possible world? "Existence"
> or "actuality" is an indexical: to say that something "exists" or "is
> actual" is just to say that it has a certain relationship (causal) to
> the things in "this" (i.e. the indexed) world.
A possible world can possibly exist or not. AI without hardware or
instrumentality is improbable. Signifying the possibility of improbable
things signifies nothing except empty supposition.
> I suspect that for a possible world, "possible existence" and "actual
> existence" (whatever the latter might mean) would be
> indistinguishable, both to those outside that world and those inside
> it.
There is no actuality inside a non-existent world & there is no actuality
ouside of existing world.
> And since indistinguishables should be considered identical, it
> would follow that the possibility of a world implies its existence.
Actuality & possibility are not indistinguishable because they don't have
the same meaning, so a possible world can only imply possible existence,
not actual existence.
> This is what I meant by the analogy that the inhabitants
> of a simulation could not tell the difference between the
> simulation being run twice and the simulation being run never.
The inhabitants would never be instantiated in a simulation that is never
ran so it wouldn't be possible for the inhabitants to consider anything in
the case of a simulation that is never ran.
> But the possibility or actuality of an entire possible world may be a
> notion to which our usual within-world notions of
> possibility/actuality cannot trivially be applied.
How is possibility or consideration of possibilities "within-world"
notions? A possible world possibly exists & therefore if it exists is not
within the actual world but *is* the actual world.
Tony Griffin
>
> "Tony Griffin" <tgri...@pipeline.com> wrote
> > The artificial intelligence of your analogy must have an existent
> > computer at some basic level, or it simply collapses into non-existence.
>
> But what does "non-existence" mean for a possible world? "Existence"
> or "actuality" is an indexical: to say that something "exists" or
> "is actual" is just to say that it has a certain relationship
> (causal) to the things in "this" (i.e. the indexed) world.
> I suspect that for a possible world, "possible existence" and
> "actual existence" (whatever the latter might mean) would be
> indistinguishable, both to those outside that world and those
> inside it. And since indistinguishables should be considered
> identical, it would follow that the possibility of a world
> implies its existence.
"Non-existence" should mean the same for a possible world as for any other
surely? If you wish to define "existent" as "having a causal relationship to the
world containing the observer that makes the existent/non-existent definition",
then so be it (see below*), but I still don't follow your argument. You seem to
be suggesting that everything possible must exist, which seems to be obviously
false.
How can you apply the term "actual existence" to a (merely) possible world
(choose your own definition of "actual" here)? All you can say is that it is
possible. If you can then go on to test its existence (by any criteria you
choose) then it becomes either existent or non-existent, and in either case it
remains possible.
I truly don't follow your assertion about indistinguishability. We can't observe
anything about a possible world until it has been shown to exist. Indeed, by
your definition of existence, the observation establishes the existence. So, a
possible world is nothing but a mental pattern until its existence has been
established. I don't see how the possibility of "distinguishing" arises between
a merely possible world and an existing world.
Here's a simplification that may help me. It is possible that there is a fox
running across my back yard (this happens from time to time). If I don't go and
look out of my window, its existence is unconfirmed. By your argument, does it
exist until I go and look, and then suddenly it either continues to exist or
magically blinks out of existence?
*I understand your definition of existence to be something like this: If I can
detect the existence of something, then it exists. If I can't, then it doesn't.
The more common definition suggests that two objects that never interact can
both exist, which supposes the existence of an independant observer, which by
definition does not exist. So, to an observer in world A, world B does not exist
and vice versa. Is this close?
>
> This is what I meant by the analogy that the inhabitants
> of a simulation could not tell the difference between the
> simulation being run twice and the simulation being run never.
This seems to be like saying that if we have the only machine that is capable of
making widgets, but we never switch it on, widgets nevertheless exist. How can
the inhabitants of the simulation "tell" *anything* if the simulation is never
run? They are never brought into existence.
>
> > One might also ask if something is possible if there is
> > no-one to consider it so. :)
>
> Possibility within a given world (or logical model) seems
> well-defined, and doesn't depend on being considered by a
> mind or personality. But the possibility or actuality of
> an entire possible world may be a notion to which our
> usual within-world notions of possibility/actuality cannot
> trivially be applied.
This seems to clash with your definition of existence. If the existence of
something depends on its causal relationship with something else, then why
should not a possibility depend on the formulation of its possibility in some
mind? (I'm not too serious about this one). :)
Could you define "world" as you use it here? I suspect this may be related to my
incomprehension.
Tony
Brian Holtz
> > > We don't know all the "laws of nature" so how can we presume
> > > that just because something can't be explained by a "law of
> > > nature" that therefore it must be something with an
> > > extra-natural property?
>
> > We don't "presume [..] it must"; we just provisionally
> > conclude it is supernatural if that's what the available
> > evidence tells us.
>
> But that's not what the available evidence necessarily tells anyone.
I didn't say that's what the currently-available evidence
necessarily tells anyone. I said that's what the hypothetically-
available evidence could possibly tell someone.
> > The fact that all empirical
> > conclusions are provisional does not justify asserting that this
> > particular kind of provisional conclusion (supernaturality) should
> > never be believed under any possible circumstances.
>
> One can claim that things should be belived in based on an
> expediency that doesn't have anything to do with inquiry.
Is it "an expediency that doesn't have anything to do with inquiry"
to believe in electric charge, just because it is (for now) the
simplest explanation that is consistent with all the evidence?
> In order to believe in supernaturalisms one has to already
> believe in the conclusion that
> supernaturalisms draw about reality.
False. I don't already believe in any such conclusions, but I can
describe the possible evidence that would make me (and just about
anybody) believe in the supernatural.
> > The concept of God can only explain why there is something
> > rather than nothing if it can be shown that God is a
> > self-caused first cause. Nobody has shown this.
>
> Look, if god always existed or there is an infinite chain of causes, none
> of that explains why there is something rather than nothing.
Please read what I wrote. I said "a self-caused first cause" would
explain why there is something rather than nothing. This is true
almost by definition. Do you dispute it?
> > > > the universe might merely be the undreamed possible
> > > > dream of no particular dreamer.
>
> > > An undreamed dream of no particular dreamer is contradictory.
>
> > It's no more contradictory than an uncounted possible number
> > with no particular counter.
>
> Then call it a possible dream
I did; you dropped the "possible". My original statement is restored
above.
> rather than an undreamed dream as if it is
> yet to be dreamed by some dreamer.
A possible dream that has never been dreamed by any dreamer
is indeed "undreamed" -- i.e. not dreamed. Nothing I said
implies that the undreamed dream is due to eventually be
dreamed.
> > A possible dream is still a possible dream even if it has never
> > been dreamed.
>
> The universe apparently exists so how could it be a dream yet to be
> dreamed?
As I said earlier: Whether the universe
we perceive existed or not, it as a merely possible universe
would be perceived by its merely possible inhabitants
no differently than it as an actual universe would
be perceived by its actual inhabitants. (By analogy,
the thoughts and perceptions of a particular artificial
intelligence in a simulated universe would be the same
across identical "runs" of the simulation, regardless of
whether we bothered to initiate such a "run" once, twice
-- or never.)
--
br...@holtz.org
http://humanknowledge.net
Brian Holtz
Under what definition of "exist"? You simply have not answered my
question.
> Signifying the possibility of improbable
> things signifies nothing except empty supposition.
It's hardly "empty supposition" to distinguish the impossible
from the possible-but-improbable.
> There is no actuality inside a non-existent world & there is
> no actuality ouside of existing world.
I doubt that you can give non-question-begging definitions of
"actuality" and "existent/existing" that would make this
statement true.
> Actuality & possibility are not indistinguishable because
> they don't have the same meaning
They of course have distinguishable meanings within a given
(possible or "the actual") world. But can you explain the
difference between them when used across (i.e. applied to)
possible worlds themselves?
> The inhabitants would never be instantiated in a simulation
> that is never ran
But the possible inhabitants would still have their possible
thoughts, and those possible thoughts would appear the same
to those possible inhabitants as actual thoughts would appear
to actual inhabitants. That is, the thoughts that are to
be thunk in a simulation do not change in content just by
running the simulation.
> How is possibility or consideration of possibilities
> "within-world" notions?
Within a world, "actual/existent" just means causally related
to the rest of the world, and "possible" means (as always)
not self-contradictory. So as applied to entire worlds,
"possible" again means not self-contradictory, but "actual/existent"
cannot mean causally related to the rest of "the" (or any) world,
because worlds are defined as being causally separate.
So what does "actual/existent" mean when applied to entire
possible worlds?
> A possible world possibly exists & therefore if it exists is not
> within the actual world but *is* the actual world.
To say this you need a definition of "actual/existent" that when
applied to possible worlds shows that there could only be one
such world, and then you'd have to be able to show that the
world we perceive is not merely possible but is indeed "actual".
Good luck!
--
br...@holtz.org
http://humanknowledge.net
Brian Holtz
> > But what does "non-existence" mean for a possible world? "Existence"
> > or "actuality" is an indexical: to say that something "exists" or
> > "is actual" is just to say that it has a certain relationship
> > (causal) to the things in "this" (i.e. the indexed) world.
> > I suspect that for a possible world, "possible existence" and
> > "actual existence" (whatever the latter might mean) would be
> > indistinguishable, both to those outside that world and those
> > inside it. And since indistinguishables should be considered
> > identical, it would follow that the possibility of a world
> > implies its existence.
>
> "Non-existence" should mean the same for a possible world
> as for any other surely?
And that is...?
> You seem to be suggesting that everything possible must exist
In a sense, yes. This view is called modal realism, and to me
seems reasonable with one strong proviso: that "exist" here
is only being used in the quite vague sense in which we say
"our universe exists", and is not necessarily being used in
the quite precise sense in which we say that any particular
thing in our universe "exists".
> How can you apply the term "actual existence" to a (merely)
> possible world (choose your own definition of "actual" here)?
My point is that I see no definition of "actual" (as in "an actual
world") that distinguishes it from "possible".
> If you can then go on to test its existence [..]
By definition, one can only perform empirical tests on one's own world,
and not any other. So by "distinguishable" I don't mean empirically,
but rather semantically.
> by your definition of existence, the observation establishes
> the existence [..]
My definition of existence (as causally related) only applies within
a world, and cannot apply across worlds (which are by definition
causally unrelated).
> I don't see how the possibility of "distinguishing" arises between
> a merely possible world and an existing world.
Exactly. And because they are indistinguishable in what they mean
(and not just how we might observe them), "a possible world" and
"an existent world" appear to mean the same thing.
> does [the fox] exist until I go and look, and then suddenly it
> either continues to exist or magically blinks out of existence?
A fox can be presumed to be (or not be) causally related to
the rest of our universe whether or not you look at it.
As I said above, such a notion of existence is not applicable
to worlds.
> *I understand your definition of existence to be something
> like this: If I can detect the existence of something, then
> it exists. If I can't, then it doesn't.
My definition is precisely that to exist is to have with the
rest of the universe a causal relationship, even if it the
relationship is only past, future, or contingent. Causal
relationships are indeed detectable in principle (or else
the entity in question is by parsimony deemed non-existent).
> The more common definition suggests that two objects that
> never interact can both exist,
That is indeed a common usage, but when I ask for
an explanation of what it means, all I get are appeals
to intution instead of an actual definition.
> So, to an observer in world A, world B does not exist
> and vice versa. Is this close?
I would say: to someone in world A, nothing in world B exists.
The "existence" of world B itself depends on what one means
by the "existence" of a world.
> > This is what I meant by the analogy that the inhabitants
> > of a simulation could not tell the difference between the
> > simulation being run twice and the simulation being run never.
>
> This seems to be like saying that if we have the only machine
> that is capable of making widgets, but we never switch it on,
> widgets nevertheless exist.
No, you're crossing worlds. I'm not saying that unsimulated
inhabitants nevertheless exist in the simulator's world; I'm
saying they as possible inhabitants exist in their possible world.
> How can the inhabitants of the simulation "tell" *anything*
> if the simulation is never run?
If there is no phenomenological difference to them whether
their simulation is run once, twice, or never, then our
phenomenology cannot necessarily be taken as evidence that
our universe is "actual" (whatever that might mean)
instead of merely possible.
> They are never brought into existence.
Only in the sense of existence within the simulator's
higher-level world -- in which the simulation is embedded
and to which it has a causal relationship. But a possible
world is by definition not embedded in any other world.
> > But the possibility or actuality of
> > an entire possible world may be a notion to which our
> > usual within-world notions of possibility/actuality cannot
> > trivially be applied.
>
> This seems to clash with your definition of existence.
That's my point: you have to scope the usual definition of
existence as being an explicitly within-world notion, which
cannot be applied to worlds themselves. For worlds themselves
we need some other notion of existence, and any such notion
seems to be indistinguishable from mere possibility.
> why should not a possibility depend on the formulation of its
> possibility in some mind? (I'm not too serious about this one).
Because a possibility is defined with respect to logical consistency,
and is independent of consideration by particular minds.
> Could you define "world" as you use it here?
By "world" here I mean something like what in logic is called a
"model": a set of well-formed formulas associated with
1) a non-empty set of objects/things/entities (the domain), and
2) a mapping of all the constants, predicates, and functions
in the wffs to constants, relations, and functions defined
in the domain.
An even closer idea is the ontological notion of a universe:
the transitive closure of some circumstances and events
according to their causal relatedness.
--
br...@holtz.org
http://humanknowledge.net
Tony Griffin
> > "Non-existence" should mean the same for a possible world
> > as for any other surely?
>
> And that is...?
Um, that it is not possible in that world? OK, I see where you are going, maybe.
No, perhaps it doesn't mean the same. I now think that the term "existence" is
not applicable to an entity in a possible world until we have established the
existence of the world itself ...
>
> > You seem to be suggesting that everything possible must exist
>
> In a sense, yes. This view is called modal realism, and to me
> seems reasonable with one strong proviso: that "exist" here
> is only being used in the quite vague sense in which we say
> "our universe exists", and is not necessarily being used in
> the quite precise sense in which we say that any particular
> thing in our universe "exists".
How is it vague to say "our universe exists"? If we can say that parts of the
universe exist, how is it any vaguer to say that the sum of these parts exist,
even though we may not be able to establish what all these parts are? In fact,
we could consider that as the universe may be considered to be "everything that
exists", then "the universe exists" is a tautology.
>
> > How can you apply the term "actual existence" to a (merely)
> > possible world (choose your own definition of "actual" here)?
>
> My point is that I see no definition of "actual" (as in "an actual
> world") that distinguishes it from "possible".
Er, possible and interacted (interactable) with?
What bothers me is the idea that I can imagine pretty much anything that is not
logically contradictory and then claim it exists. Does God exist?
>
> > If you can then go on to test its existence [..]
>
> By definition, one can only perform empirical tests on one's own world,
> and not any other. So by "distinguishable" I don't mean empirically,
> but rather semantically.
OK. Like a green eight tentacled Martian is distinguishable from a blue six
tentacled Martian, even though we have seen neither and have strong reasons to
suppose neither exists?
>
> > by your definition of existence, the observation establishes
> > the existence [..]
>
> My definition of existence (as causally related) only applies within
> a world, and cannot apply across worlds (which are by definition
> causally unrelated).
Oh. I thought you were using the definition to suggest that other worlds didn't
exist. Pardon me.
>
> > I don't see how the possibility of "distinguishing" arises between
> > a merely possible world and an existing world.
>
> Exactly. And because they are indistinguishable in what they mean
> (and not just how we might observe them), "a possible world" and
> "an existent world" appear to mean the same thing.
That's not quite what I meant. I said that the possibility of distinguishing
them did not arise. Thus it is as inaccurate to say they are indistinguishable
as to say that they are distinguishable. So, the best we can say is that a
possible world is possible, and that we don't (and cannot) determine whether it
exists.
> > *I understand your definition of existence to be something
> > like this: If I can detect the existence of something, then
> > it exists. If I can't, then it doesn't.
>
> My definition is precisely that to exist is to have with the
> rest of the universe a causal relationship, even if it the
> relationship is only past, future, or contingent. Causal
> relationships are indeed detectable in principle (or else
> the entity in question is by parsimony deemed non-existent).
I'd go along with this, at least for the sake of the discussion. I do agree with
you in your discussion of parsimony (with jh) by the way. When there are two
theories, and all indications give neither any advantage, then we choose the
simpler. Whether subsequent evidence proves one to be more accurate is neither
here nor there. At that later time, the parity no longer exists; it is destroyed
by the new evidence.
>
> > The more common definition suggests that two objects that
> > never interact can both exist,
>
> That is indeed a common usage, but when I ask for
> an explanation of what it means, all I get are appeals
> to intution instead of an actual definition.
>
> > So, to an observer in world A, world B does not exist
> > and vice versa. Is this close?
>
> I would say: to someone in world A, nothing in world B exists.
> The "existence" of world B itself depends on what one means
> by the "existence" of a world.
It means the common usage of the word, else all becomes vague mumbo-jumbo. It
can only be established, however by interaction, which destroys the separation
inherent in the description of them as "worlds". This suggests that such
existence can only be described, as you say, as a possibility. I still strongly
feel, though, that to describe this possibility as existence is premature. "It
possibly exists" is the limit.
> > This seems to be like saying that if we have the only machine
> > that is capable of making widgets, but we never switch it on,
> > widgets nevertheless exist.
>
> No, you're crossing worlds. I'm not saying that unsimulated
> inhabitants nevertheless exist in the simulator's world;
Why are the simulator and its products in different worlds? They are causally
related - directly so.
> I'm
> saying they as possible inhabitants exist in their possible world.
This is the same thing as above - we need to establish the existence of the
simulation as a whole before we have anything to say about the existence of its
parts. Its possibility is simply a logical conclusion, and says nothing about
existence IMO.
>
> > How can the inhabitants of the simulation "tell" *anything*
> > if the simulation is never run?
>
> If there is no phenomenological difference to them whether
> their simulation is run once, twice, or never, then our
> phenomenology cannot necessarily be taken as evidence that
> our universe is "actual" (whatever that might mean)
> instead of merely possible.
I disagree that there is no difference. Between running once, twice, ... n
times, maybe (I'd have to think about that, there is a time factor), but never
seems a stretch. When one hand claps, how does the second hand feel? :)
>
> > They are never brought into existence.
>
> Only in the sense of existence within the simulator's
> higher-level world -- in which the simulation is embedded
> and to which it has a causal relationship. But a possible
> world is by definition not embedded in any other world.
It may or it may not be. Embedding does not preclude possibility. You are
possible, surely, and I assume you are embedded in this world. Or by "possible"
do you mean "logically possible but not yet shown to exist"?
>
> > > But the possibility or actuality of
> > > an entire possible world may be a notion to which our
> > > usual within-world notions of possibility/actuality cannot
> > > trivially be applied.
> >
> > This seems to clash with your definition of existence.
>
> That's my point: you have to scope the usual definition of
> existence as being an explicitly within-world notion, which
> cannot be applied to worlds themselves. For worlds themselves
> we need some other notion of existence, and any such notion
> seems to be indistinguishable from mere possibility.
Hmmm. If existence (within a world) is defined as having a causal relationship
with other parts of that world, then as you say we cannot extend that definition
to other worlds. Why though, must we have a definition of existence about other
worlds? Possibility is fair enough, but in common parlance we would just say
that we don't know whether the other world exists and, again by definition,
that's all that we can ever say. Perhaps we would say that the possibility
exists? :)
> > Could you define "world" as you use it here?
[...]
> An even closer idea is the ontological notion of a universe:
> the transitive closure of some circumstances and events
> according to their causal relatedness.
Ok, thanks. That's pretty close to what I thought you meant. I've been
visualising this as a universe in the physical sense ... IOW what resulted (and
will result) from the Big Bang (or whatever the next theory may be). Another Big
Bang would create another universe that could never touch ours.
Tony
Brian Holtz
> > > "Non-existence" should mean the same for a possible world
> > > as for any other surely?
> >
> > And that is...?
>
> Um, that it is not possible in that world? OK, I see where
> you are going, maybe. No, perhaps it doesn't mean the same.
Right; I don't see how it can.
> I now think that the term "existence" is
> not applicable to an entity in a possible world until
> we have established the existence of the world itself ...
But how do we establish such existence? What does it mean
for a world to "exist"?
> How is it vague to say "our universe exists"?
Because it's not clear what would verify (or falsify) this
statement, other than the observation "we are in it". But
this just makes "our universe exists" equivalent to
"this is our universe".
> If we can say that parts of the
> universe exist, how is it any vaguer to say that the sum
> of these parts exist[?]
Because the existence of any given part is defined with respect
to the other parts. What is the existence of the sum defined
with respect to?
> as the universe may be considered to be "everything that
> exists", then "the universe exists" is a tautology.
Right; this shows that the notion of "existence" that we apply
to things inside the universe simply cannot be applied to
a universe itself. More precisely, when applied to a universe,
"existence" becomes explicitly indexical. Existence is in
fact implicitly indexical, because to say something exists
is to say it has a causal relationship with the rest of
the things in the universe, and one of those things is the
speaker.
> > My point is that I see no definition of "actual" (as in "an actual
> > world") that distinguishes it from "possible".
>
> Er, possible and interacted (interactable) with?
Yes, "interactable with" is a good paraphrase of "having a causal
relationship with", but universes by definition cannot interact
(i.e. have a causal relationship) with each other.
> What bothers me is the idea that I can imagine pretty much
> anything that is not logically contradictory and then claim
> it exists.
More precisely, you can imagine any logically possible universe
and then claim that it "exists" in the sense that it is
indeed logically possible (since that's all I'm saying "exists"
means for universes).
> Does God exist?
Do universes containing god(s) "exist" in the sense of being
logically possible? Yes. Do any gods exist in our universe?
Apparently not.
> > by "distinguishable" I don't mean empirically, but semantically.
>
> Like a green [..] Martian is distinguishable from a blue [one],
> even though we [..] have strong reasons to suppose neither exists?
Right.
> > because they are indistinguishable in what they mean
> > (and not just how we might observe them), "a possible world" and
> > "an existent world" appear to mean the same thing.
>
> it is as inaccurate to say they are indistinguishable
> as to say that they are distinguishable.
It is only inaccurate to say they are semantically indistinguishable
if you can tell me what the semantic difference is. But I don't
think we can. In his new book Invariances, the late great
Robert Nozick made "some quite speculative first attempts at
an answer", but assumed some not-fully-justified premises
and ended up with only a framework describing what an answer
might be like.
> I'd go along with [your definition of existence], at least for
> the sake of the discussion.
I'm always looking for other definitions of "existence" to compare
it with, so if you ever find any, let me know.
> I do agree with you in your discussion of parsimony (with jh)
> by the way. [..] Whether subsequent evidence proves one to
> be more accurate is neither here nor there. At that later
> time, the parity no longer exists
Right. I almost feel bad for challenging the poor guy to
give an example of the simplest theory not being
considered correct, since the ceteris paribus condition
effectively guarantees that he cannot do so.
> I still strongly feel, though, that to describe this
> possibility as existence is premature.
It's definitely not "existence" in the ordinary sense of
"having a causal relationship to me and the things in my
universe".
> "It possibly exists" is the limit.
In the absence of a meaningful definition of "exists" for
universes, I would say that the only other available option
is to speak of other universes only as (im)possible, and
never as (non-)existent.
> > I'm not saying that unsimulated
> > inhabitants nevertheless exist in the simulator's world;
>
> Why are the simulator and its products in different worlds?
> They are causally related - directly so.
Simulated inhabitants indeed exist in the simulator's world.
Unsimulated inhabitants do not.
> we need to establish the existence of the
> simulation as a whole before we have anything to say about
> the existence of its parts.
Yes, the simulation has to exist in the simulator's universe
for the simulated things to exist in the simulator's universe.
But a merely possible simulation that is not actually run
in any universe's simulator is itself its own possible universe,
and our discussion shows that for (other) universes, possibility and
existence are semantically indistinguishable.
> Its possibility is simply a logical conclusion, and says
> nothing about existence IMO.
You have to either 1) say that existence is not defined for
universes (and that one can never say that any particular possible
universe "does not exist"), or 2) give me a definition of
existence (other than possibility) that applies to possible
universes.
> > If there is no phenomenological difference to them whether
> > their simulation is run once, twice, or never, then our
> > phenomenology cannot necessarily be taken as evidence that
> > our universe is "actual" (whatever that might mean)
> > instead of merely possible.
>
> Between running once, twice, ... n
> times, maybe [..], but never seems a stretch.
Consider a simulation in which one simulated inhabitant
is destined to think "I am thinking right now and therefore
this universe is actual". What difference could it make
to the phenomenological content of that thought if the
simulation is run or not? Isn't the thought the same
whether or not the simulation is run?
Or consider a simulation
which is deterministic in both temporal directions,
and whose initial state is a moment right after an
inhabitant would have had such a thought. (That is, the
initial state is such that if the simulator were run
backwards instead of forwards, the above thought is
among the first things that get simulated.) What difference
could it make to the phenomenology of the inhabitant
that the simulation was initialized to a point "after"
he had the thought instead of before? His subsequent
mental states are identical to the case in which
the simulation is instead started from a point
"before" the thought.
Note that I here assume functionalism -- i.e. that
mental states are functional states consisting of
causal relations among pieces of information that
are in principle independent of their substrate.
The successive states in a simulation can be seen
(under the rules of the simulation) as having the
necessary causal relations.
> > a possible
> > world is by definition not embedded in any other world.
>
> It may or it may not be.
A "possible world" embedded in another world is not an
entire "world" at all, but rather a strict subset of a world.
One can faithfully simulate a given world inside another
world, but a stipulated simulation of a world does not meet
the definition of a world, because it does not include
some things (namely, the simulator) with which
it has a causal relationship.
> You are possible, surely, and I assume you are embedded in
> this world.
Indeed, but I am not a world unto myself (though it may
appear that I think I am ;-).
> Why though, must we have a definition of existence about other
> worlds?
As I said above, we need not -- as long as we can suppress the
intuition that there is a difference between a given other
world "existing" or not.
I personally cannot suppress that intuition, but on close
examination I find that intuition identical to the intuition
that there is a difference between a given other world
being possible or not.
> Perhaps we would say that the possibility exists? :)
This is an area that I'm still trying to figure out. Logical
possibility seems pretty well-defined (with respect to logical
models as I mentioned before), but ontological possibility
is fuzzier, for pretty much the same reasons that the existence
of possible worlds is fuzzy.
--
br...@holtz.org
http://humanknowledge.net
Paul Holbach
> The question is not known to be meaningless. A possibly
> meaningful answer is roughly that the universe exists
> (more precisely, is perceived to exist) because it is
> possible. However, this raises the question: why is any
> universe possible? The answer might be roughly that
> absolute impossibility -- the state of affairs in which
> nothing is possible -- is itself not possible. Why
> might absolute impossibility not be possible?
The famous dictum "Ex nihilo nihil fit." is indeed far from being
necessarily true since nothing qua being nothing cannot prevent
anything from becoming something. So there might well be inherent
probabilistic propensities of "nothingness" (though according to
physics there is no literally absolute emptiness) which are capable of
initiating a self-transformation into ontological "somethingness".
Maybe the primordial void simply felt like becoming something
substantial one day... ;-)
regards
PH
Jim Rogers
> "Brian Holtz" <br...@holtz.org> wrote
> > The question is not known to be meaningless. A possibly
> > meaningful answer is roughly that the universe exists
> > (more precisely, is perceived to exist) because it is
> > possible. However, this raises the question: why is any
> > universe possible? The answer might be roughly that
> > absolute impossibility -- the state of affairs in which
> > nothing is possible -- is itself not possible. Why
> > might absolute impossibility not be possible?
> The famous dictum "Ex nihilo nihil fit." is indeed far from being
> necessarily true since nothing qua being nothing cannot prevent
> anything from becoming something. So there might well be inherent
> probabilistic propensities of "nothingness" (though according to
> physics there is no literally absolute emptiness) which are capable of
> initiating a self-transformation into ontological "somethingness".
> Maybe the primordial void simply felt like becoming something
> substantial one day... ;-)
Thanks for making my head spin. According to jh, that primordial void
that "felt like becoming something substantial one day" had to have
been omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent. Nothingness couldn't
prevent contradictory properties either, could it? Now we know how jh
posits God: all one need do is divide zero by zero, and any conclusion
is possible.
Jim
Paul Holbach
> Paul Holbach wrote:
> > The famous dictum "Ex nihilo nihil fit." is indeed far from being
> > necessarily true since nothing qua being nothing cannot prevent
> > anything from becoming something. So there might well be inherent
> > probabilistic propensities of "nothingness" (though according to
> > physics there is no literally absolute emptiness) which are capable of
> > initiating a self-transformation into ontological "somethingness".
> > Maybe the primordial void simply felt like becoming something
> > substantial one day... ;-)
>
> Thanks for making my head spin. According to jh, that primordial void
> that "felt like becoming something substantial one day" had to have
> been omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent. Nothingness couldn't
> prevent contradictory properties either, could it? Now we know how jh
> posits God: all one need do is divide zero by zero, and any conclusion
> is possible.
(Contradictory properties such as "being a square circle" can
impossibly be real.)
The kind of Nothing I bear in mind is certainly not divine since
nothing is divine. By the way, the idea of absolute nothingness cannot
be given a logically consistent interpretation, for the following
statement is self-contradictory: "There is an x possessing a property
y such that y is incompatible with being x." In plain terms: "There is
something possessing the property of being nothing such that being
nothing is incompatible with being something." is logical nonsense. In
other words: Nothing has the property of being nothing, for being
absolutely nothing would mean the absolute absence of any property,
including "being nothing". A positive state of absolute nothingness,
that is the objective absence of absolutely everything, is logically
impossible. The statement "Nothingness exists" is utterly
"self-nullifying".
regards
PH
Robert Wood
>
> The famous dictum "Ex nihilo nihil fit." is indeed far from being
> necessarily true since nothing qua being nothing cannot prevent
> anything from becoming something. So there might well be inherent
> probabilistic propensities of "nothingness" (though according to
> physics there is no literally absolute emptiness) which are capable of
> initiating a self-transformation into ontological "somethingness".
> Maybe the primordial void simply felt like becoming something
> substantial one day... ;-)
>
> regards
> PH
Well, actually there is a probabilistic propensity of nothingness
to somethingness. It is found in the quantum mechanics of
free space. Particles are constantly popping into and out
of existance....and it is a physically measurable effect.
Apart from hard empirical physics, there is also the second-string
the argument: Existance (i.e. THE UNIVERSE) is a logical
necessity as, by definition, non-existance does not exist.
[\]Robert Wood
The St. Lawrence River - fresh, warm, visible diving.
http://www.magma.ca/~rgwood
Tony Griffin
> By the way, the idea of absolute nothingness cannot
> be given a logically consistent interpretation, for the following
> statement is self-contradictory: "There is an x possessing a property
> y such that y is incompatible with being x." In plain terms: "There is
> something possessing the property of being nothing such that being
> nothing is incompatible with being something." is logical nonsense. In
> other words: Nothing has the property of being nothing, for being
> absolutely nothing would mean the absolute absence of any property,
> including "being nothing". A positive state of absolute nothingness,
> that is the objective absence of absolutely everything, is logically
> impossible. The statement "Nothingness exists" is utterly
> "self-nullifying".
I don't intend to be rude, but this is the sort of stuff that brings philosophy
into disrepute. Its like Xeno's paradox - each logical step seems to make sense,
but arrows do hit you if you run away from them.
Its intuitively and observably obvious that a given space can contain nothing.
Tony
Brian Holtz
> "There is something possessing the property of being nothing
> such that being nothing is incompatible with being something."
> is logical nonsense.
I think you're confusing ontological existence and logical
existence. The first "is" in your sentence connotes logical
existence, while the first "being" in your sentence connotes
ontological existence.
By your reasoning, wouldn't talk of holes be "logical
nonsense"?
> being absolutely nothing would mean the absolute absence of
> any property, including "being nothing".
I don't see why the notion of (uninstantiated) properties
would be self-contradictory if it were the case that nothing
had ontological existence and so no property were actually
(i.e. ontologically) instantiated.
I think the more interesting case is not absolute nothingness
but absolute impossibility: that not only nothing exists,
but nothing is even possible. It seems one might be able
to show that absolute impossibility is self-contradictory,
even if absolute nothingness isn't.
(Perhaps by "absolute nothingness" you don't simply mean
a possible world in which nothing ontologically exists,
but rather the logical non-existence of any possible worlds.
I would call the latter case "absolute impossibility" instead.)
> A positive state of absolute nothingness, that is the objective
> absence of absolutely everything, is logically impossible.
1. What do "positive" and "objective" contribute to this statement?
2. How can you demonstrate that nothingness is impossible?
Consider a possible world in which only one thing exists.
Why would it be impossible for that thing to cease existing,
and thus leave nothing in existence?
--
br...@holtz.org
http://humanknowledge.net
Brian Holtz
> there is a probabilistic propensity of nothingness
> to somethingness. It is found in the quantum mechanics of
> free space.
A space that is subject to the laws of quantum mechanics is
not nothingness, but rather is already somethingness.
> there is also the second-string
> the argument: Existance (i.e. THE UNIVERSE) is a logical
> necessity
How so? Most philosophers seem to believe the opposite.
> as, by definition, non-existance does not exist.
The same argument could be used to show that holes
do not exist.
--
br...@holtz.org
http://humanknowledge.net
Buridan
"Paul Holbach"
> > [rogers]Thanks for making my head spin. According to jh, that primordial
void
> > that "felt like becoming something substantial one day" had to have
> > been omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent.
>>
I have not said any such thing. Stop attributing claims to
me that I have not made.
> > Nothingness couldn't
> > prevent contradictory properties either, could it? Now we know how jh
> > posits God: all one need do is divide zero by zero, and any conclusion
> > is possible.
>
You have been pressed again and again to provide a demonstration
in support of the claim of contradictory properties, but have
been unable to do so.
[..]
> The kind of Nothing I bear in mind is certainly not divine since
> nothing is divine. By the way, the idea of absolute nothingness cannot
> be given a logically consistent interpretation, for the following
> statement is self-contradictory: "There is an x possessing a property
> y such that y is incompatible with being x." In plain terms: "There is
> something possessing the property of being nothing such that being
> nothing is incompatible with being something." is logical nonsense.
>
This is desperately muddled. Your formulation above is
certainly nonsense, but that does not establish your
conclusion that "nothingness *cannot* be given a logically
consistent interpretation". The correct way to say that
nothing exists is to say , as Ward does, that it is not
the case that there is anything that falls under any description.
>In
> other words: Nothing has the property of being nothing, for being
> absolutely nothing would mean the absolute absence of any property,
> including "being nothing".
>
No, the verbal form 'nothing exists' leads the naive to suppose
that there is at least one thing exists, and that that falls under some
description 'nothing'. But that is to commit the reification fallacy:
of supposing that all nouns must efer to something, therefore 'nothing'
must refer to a sort of something.
jh
Jim Rogers
> Paul Holbach wrote:
> > The famous dictum "Ex nihilo nihil fit." is indeed far from being
> > necessarily true since nothing qua being nothing cannot prevent
> > anything from becoming something. So there might well be inherent
> > probabilistic propensities of "nothingness" (though according to
> > physics there is no literally absolute emptiness) which are capable of
> > initiating a self-transformation into ontological "somethingness".
> > Maybe the primordial void simply felt like becoming something
> > substantial one day... ;-)
>
> to somethingness. It is found in the quantum mechanics of
> free space. Particles are constantly popping into and out
> of existance....and it is a physically measurable effect.
Yes, but that "nothingness" has properties, "quantum foam" or
whatever, so isn't truly nothingness, is it?
Jim
Paul Holbach
> "Paul Holbach" <paulholba...@freenet.de> wrote:
> I think you're confusing ontological existence and logical
> existence. The first "is" in your sentence connotes logical
> existence, while the first "being" in your sentence connotes
> ontological existence.
"There is an x ..." is the verbal formulation of the existential
quantifier which is a logical formula but nevertheless an ontological
statement establishing the fact that a particular property is
instantiated, ie the property in question has at least one instance
such that "n´s exist." is true, with n being the name of any such
property instance. Accordingly, to be is to have at least one positive
property: Being is being something positive. In the light of this the
precise formulation of my sentence above reads a s follows:
"Nothingness exists." is logically equivalent "There is an x
instantiating positively the property of not instantiating any
positive property whatsoever."
That statement is self-contradictory for obvious reasons since
everything is something (positive) and nothing IS nothing (which is
more than a tautology here).
> By your reasoning, wouldn't talk of holes be "logical
> nonsense"?
Superficially, it is tempting to regard holes as real instances of
nothingness, but that´s entirely misleading. Holes do not exist in
themselves or "on their own" but only relative to something
pre-existent which has a hole, ie instantiates the property of
holeyness. Holes can only be identified owing to there being a
recognizable contrast within something. So you can easily recognize a
hole in a wall if there is a wall because the "existence" of the hole
- qua being nothing else but a wall property - is totally dependent on
the existence of the wall. One can impossibly remove the wall and
preserve the hole, for being a hole consists in nothing more than in
there being something holey. Holes are simply structural contrasts
which are ontologically absolutely dependent on what there already is
(their "substratum"). Just try to conceive of a hole surrounded by
nothing...
> I don't see why the notion of (uninstantiated) properties
> would be self-contradictory if it were the case that nothing
> had ontological existence and so no property were actually
> (i.e. ontologically) instantiated.
Well, if absolutely nothing existed, there would certainly be no
notion of uninstantiated properties either... ;-)
Seriously, if you ontologized "nothing" as nothingness, you´d predict
OF something that it has the positive property of having no positive
property whatsoever, and, again, that´s a self-contradiction.
Everything existent is something, ie in order for anything to be
existent it must necessarily be something, ie possess at least one
positive property, for it is impossible to constitute the existence of
an entity by combining only negative properties. Nothing existent
consists only of negative properties since negation is logically
secondary to affirmation. Any negative property presupposes the
realization of some positive property, by which the former is
logically excluded.
(By the way, that´s the reason why the theological "via negativa",
that is the attempt to establish God´s existence by ascribing only
negative properties *to him*, is doomed to fail, for if you know
nothing positive about something, you cannot even know any negative
property. For example, if someone asked me how I would be (logically)
able to know that I´m non-female, I would reply that due to my being
male my being female is logically excluded. But if I didn´t know that
I´m male, I couldn´t definitely know that I´m non-female since it
could well the case that I´m a woman.)
> I think the more interesting case is not absolute nothingness
> but absolute impossibility: that not only nothing exists,
> but nothing is even possible. It seems one might be able
> to show that absolute impossibility is self-contradictory,
> even if absolute nothingness isn't.
We know that there is something (the universe) so there can impossibly
have been any real state of absolute impossibility, for if that had
been the case before the Big Bang, there would´ve certainly never been
any universe since everything real is logically possible, that is not
impossible. The idea of absolute impossibility is as
self-contradictory as the idea of absolute nothingness:
"There is a possible state x such that absolutely nothing is
possible." is illogical since if nothing were possible, even
impossibility itself would be impossible.
> (Perhaps by "absolute nothingness" you don't simply mean
> a possible world in which nothing ontologically exists,
> but rather the logical non-existence of any possible worlds.
> I would call the latter case "absolute impossibility" instead.)
An empty set contains nothing but it´s still something, namely a set.
It´s conceptual existence, ie its being a logical concept is
independent of the fact that it has a zero-extension; that is,
ontologically, it refers to nothing.
Now, I´ve become aware that you´re distinguishing between possible and
actual worlds both of which you regard as equally "existent". But I
think there is only one world being both possible and actual, namely
reality, which is the only world with full-blooded existence. In my
opinion it´s somewhat misleading to speak of pure possibilities as
being on a par with actualities because I deem it necessary to always
keep the ontological difference between entities of logical
imagination ("mundus imaginalis") and entities of reality in mind.
"There is an actual world, in which I, as a non-impotent man, am
actually capable of fathering a child." is translated by possible
worlds theory into "There is a possible world, in which I, as a
non-impotent man, father a child." But one must be wary of reading
this as "There is a possible world, in which I, as a non-impotent man,
ACTUALLY father a child." because the latter formulation would blur
the ontological distinction whose importance I´ve emphasized above.
David Lewis seems to hold that possible and actual worlds are equally
real in a non-homonymous way, but I´m somehow reluctant to subscribe
to modal realism.
> > A positive state of absolute nothingness, that is the objective
> > absence of absolutely everything, is logically impossible.
>
> 1. What do "positive" and "objective" contribute to this statement?
Here, you could leave them out without really changing the statement´s
meaning.
> 2. How can you demonstrate that nothingness is impossible?
> Consider a possible world in which only one thing exists.
> Why would it be impossible for that thing to cease existing,
> and thus leave nothing in existence?
This one thing could leave nothing in existence concerning itself, but
there´d still be the empty possible world. So, one might be tempted to
argue that nothingness is possible because there´s a possible world
with no inhabitants (which would be an analogue to an empty
mathematical set). But that´s an erroneous belief because if anything
remains, be it an empty set or an empty possible world, that´s no
state of absolute absence. An empty set - by definition - has no
elements, but it is nonetheless an object of mathematical discourse.
A true state of absolute logical nothingness would require the
complete subtraction of the possible world itself; but this would lead
to the inevitable self-annihilation of possible world semantics.
Therefore, there´s no logical tenable concept of absolute nothingness
the latter of which can neither exist logically nor ontologically.
Try to imagine a possible world where there is no possible world...
Again, negation is logically secondary to affirmation.
regards
PH
Paul Holbach
> "Paul Holbach"
> This is desperately muddled. Your formulation above is
> certainly nonsense, but that does not establish your
> conclusion that "nothingness *cannot* be given a logically
> consistent interpretation".
Have you ever noticed that you consider any opinion contrary to yours
to be "certainly nonsense"?! If you´re so certain that I must
certainly be a complete idiot certainly babbling around, then why are
you bothering with me at all?!
> The correct way to say that
> nothing exists is to say , as Ward does, that it is not
> the case that there is anything that falls under any description.
That´s equivalent to. "It is the case that there is nothing that falls
under any description."
That´s equivalent to: "There is nothing that falls under any
description."
That´s equivalent to: "Nothing falls under any description."
That´s equivalent to. "Everything falls under no description."
(If nothing is red, then everything is not red.)
In virtue of what positive fact does everything fall under no
description? Negative facts cannot exist absolutely on their own
because they necessarily presuppose at least some positive fact by
which they are logically excluded. Where there is no such affirmation,
there can be no logical meaningful negation either!
"Nothing exists." is an affirmative statement equivalent to "There is
something existent which has some positive property p such that having
p is incompatible with being existent." But there can be no such
positive property p!
> No, the verbal form 'nothing exists' leads the naive
...Oh miserable naughty naive me... :-(
> to suppose
> that there is at least one thing exists, and that that falls under some
> description 'nothing'. But that is to commit the reification fallacy:
> of supposing that all nouns must efer to something, therefore 'nothing'
> must refer to a sort of something.
I know that nouns such as "Unicorn" do not refer to anything.
There´s no problem with "not" and "nothing" as purely logical terms,
but any attempt of defining a consistent concept of ontological
nothingness is doomed to fail. By the way, ontology is the study of
what IS the case and NOT of what is not the case. So you cannot
paraphrase an ontological claim such as "Nothingness exists." with a
statement beginning with "It is not the case that ... ." as you have
done. You need to ascertain at least some positive facts first before
being able to ascertain some negative ones! There is no first negation
prior to the first affirmation!
regards
PH
Paul Holbach
> I don't intend to be rude, but this is the sort of stuff that brings
> philosophy
> into disrepute. Its like Xeno's paradox - each logical step seems to make sense,
> but arrows do hit you if you run away from them.
Either my steps are logically correct or they aren´t so.
You´re always welcome to prove me wrong!
(By the way, philosophical arguments should be as simple as possible,
but not simpler...)
> Its intuitively and observably obvious that a given space can contain nothing.
Vacuum physics tells a different story. Their "nothing" has turned out
to be quite an astonishing something.
Furthermore, as long as there is anything "given", it´s obvious that
this is not a state of absolute nothingness. Only if there were no
space with nothing in it, there would be *absolutely nothing*.
regards
PH
Paul Holbach
> Well, actually there is a probabilistic propensity of nothingness
> to somethingness. It is found in the quantum mechanics of
> free space. Particles are constantly popping into and out
> of existance....and it is a physically measurable effect.
As Brian has already pointed out, the kind of "nothingness" vacuum
physics deals with is certainly not *absolutely nothing*. But
generally, you´re right.
> Apart from hard empirical physics, there is also the second-string
> the argument: Existance (i.e. THE UNIVERSE) is a logical
> necessity as, by definition, non-existance does not exist.
I believe that our universe and any other parallel universe there
might be are contingent, ie they don´t exist necessarily. But I am
convinced that there is a primordial "apeiron" or some kind of
universal "Tao", that is an inexhaustible, eternal, non-personal,
unconscious "One" governing "the way of cosmic being". I know that
such high-flown metaphysical speculation is close to poetic effusion
so I´d better remain silent about it. But since I think that there is
no divine being and there can be no state of absolute nothingness,
there must indeed be some kind of eternal nature. But I also think
there´s no such thing as absolute knowledge and therefore we will
always be incapable of comprehending the entirety of being.
regards
PH
Brian Holtz
> It seems one might be able
> to show that absolute impossibility is self-contradictory
The goal would be to show the falsity of the statement
1. It is possible that nothing is possible.
We must distinguish between logical and ontological possibility.
So first consider
2. It is logically possible that nothing is logically possible.
We are particularly interested in its corollary
3. It is logically possible that no world is logically possible.
This is equivalent to
4. It is logically possible that any world must be self-contradictory.
Truth is (I think) defined with respect to logical models
(i.e. worlds). A statement is (I think) true with respect to
a model only if that model is not self-contradictory. So for
(4) to be true, there must be a model (i.e. world) that is
not self-contradictory. One such world W would be the world
consisting only of all possible descriptions of worlds,
each description of course containing self-contradiction.
The very existence of that non-self-contradictory world
falsifies the claim of (4) that any world must be self-contradictory.
Indeed, W would by definition recursively contain a description
of itself, which must by definition contain a contradiction.
But the more interesting statement to disprove is
A. It is logically possible that no world is ontologically possible.
This seems equivalent to
B. It is logically possible that any ontologically existent
world must be self-contradictory.
What does "ontological existence" mean when applied to a world?
I'm sympathetic to modal realism: the view that the ontological
existence of a world is indistinguishable from its logical
possibility. If this view is right, then (B) is equivalent
to (4), which we seem to be able to show is false. Thus we
conclude
I. It is not logically possible that any ontologically existent
world must be self-contradictory.
II. At least one ontologically existent world must not be
self-contradictory.
III. At least one ontologically existent world must be logically
possible.
IV. It is logically necessary that at least one world is
ontologically possible.
(IV) does not seem like an analytic truth, and yet its truth
seems necessary. If synthetic a priori truth is possible,
then (IV) would be my candidate for it.
--
br...@holtz.org
http://humanknowledge.net
Rudy172
>Date: 4/17/02 6:11 AM Eastern Daylight Time
>Message-id: <000f01c1e3d0$3f7f61e0$0200...@smateo1.sfba.home.com>
>The same argument could be used to show that holes
>do not exist.
I'm not defending either argument as I'd first want to make sure that everyone
involved were agreed on their meanings for "nothing" and "exists" - but are you
saying there is "nothing" in a hole?
Paul Holbach
> This is desperately muddled. Your formulation above is
> certainly nonsense, but that does not establish your
> conclusion that "nothingness *cannot* be given a logically
> consistent interpretation". The correct way to say that
> nothing exists is to say , as Ward does, that it is not
> the case that there is anything that falls under any description.
1) "It is not the case that there is anything that falls under any
description."
is logically equivalent to
2) "It is the case that there is nothing that falls under any
description."
is logically equivalent to
3) "There is nothing that falls under any description."
is logically equivalent to
4) "Nothing falls under any description."
is logically equivalent to
5) "Everything does not fall under any description."
is logically equivalent to
6) "Everything falls under no description."
But if everything falls under no description, then it is nonetheless
logical that everything falls under the description of not falling
under any description at least.
If everything falls under the description of not falling under any
description, then everything falls under some description.
And if everything falls under some description, then nothing falls
under no description.
"Everything falls under no description."
contradicts
"Nothing falls under no description." (which has been deduced from 6)
So there´s a self-contradiction and your interpretation of
"Nothingness exists." is illogical!
So I want to state my opinion that there can be no logically
consistent ontological concept of nothingness even more precisely:
"Nothingness exists." = "Nothingness is instantiated."
is logically equivalent to
"There is an x possessing some positive property p which entails the
possession of the negative property of being inexistent."
This is a particular case of the general formula:
"There is an x possessing the positive property y which entails the
possession of the negative property z."
Examples:
a) x=my dog/y=being a dog/z=being a non-cat:
"My dog possesses the positive property of being a dog which entails
the possession of the negative property of being a non-cat." is true.
b) x=Paul Holbach/y=male/z=being non-female:
"Paul Holbach possesses the positive property of being male which
entails the possession of the negative property of being non-female."
is true.
c) x=my favourite t-shirt/y=white/z=non-black:
"My favourite t-shirt possesses the positive property of being white
which entails the possession of the negative property of being
non-black." is true.
But there is absolutely no positive property y such that "There is an
x possessing the positive property y which entails the possession of
the negative property of being inexistent." is true.
Therefore, "Nothingness exists." is necessarily false!
By the way, one ought to be attentive to the logical distinction
between the existence of a concept and the existence of an object.
Accordingly, the noun phrase "empty set" is conceptually existent, ie
intensionally well-defined within the semantics of a natural or formal
language, but an object *empty set* is ontologically inexistent due to
its zero-extension. So "Empty sets exist." is just as necessarily
false in the ontological sense as "Nothingness exists." The purely
logical concept "empty set" is tenable according to an anti-realist
interpretation of mathematics, whereas the object *empty set* must be
abandoned.
regards
PH
Tony Griffin
> > I now think that the term "existence" is
> > not applicable to an entity in a possible world until
> > we have established the existence of the world itself ...
>
> But how do we establish such existence?
We could only establish it's existence by observing it, which denies that it is
a separate world. Thus, we can't.
> What does it mean for a world to "exist"?
As defined, it's existence can only be a conjecture to any observer outside that
world.
>
> > How is it vague to say "our universe exists"?
>
> Because it's not clear what would verify (or falsify) this
> statement, other than the observation "we are in it". But
> this just makes "our universe exists" equivalent to
> "this is our universe".
I would have said that it makes it equivalent to "we observe it", which is your
definition of existence. We can theoretically observe everthing in our universe
(world), which is what defines it as our world.
>
> > If we can say that parts of the
> > universe exist, how is it any vaguer to say that the sum
> > of these parts exist[?]
>
> Because the existence of any given part is defined with respect
> to the other parts. What is the existence of the sum defined
> with respect to?
All the parts. I observe all the grains of sand in a pile of sand, thus each one
exists. The pile of sand is defined as all the grains that comprise it, thus I
have observed the pile, thus it exists. Which (applying this to the universe)
leaves me, and I can get someone else to observe me, or state that I mean
possible observation, or fall back on "cogito ergo sum".
> > as the universe may be considered to be "everything that
> > exists", then "the universe exists" is a tautology.
>
> Right; this shows that the notion of "existence" that we apply
> to things inside the universe simply cannot be applied to
> a universe itself. More precisely, when applied to a universe,
> "existence" becomes explicitly indexical. Existence is in
> fact implicitly indexical, because to say something exists
> is to say it has a causal relationship with the rest of
> the things in the universe, and one of those things is the
> speaker.
Yes.
>
> > > My point is that I see no definition of "actual" (as in "an actual
> > > world") that distinguishes it from "possible".
> >
> > Er, possible and interacted (interactable) with?
>
> Yes, "interactable with" is a good paraphrase of "having a causal
> relationship with", but universes by definition cannot interact
> (i.e. have a causal relationship) with each other.
Right. Therefore they cannot be tested for existence except internally.
Therefore they cannot be said to either exist or not exist.
>
> > What bothers me is the idea that I can imagine pretty much
> > anything that is not logically contradictory and then claim
> > it exists.
>
> More precisely, you can imagine any logically possible universe
> and then claim that it "exists" in the sense that it is
> indeed logically possible (since that's all I'm saying "exists"
> means for universes).
Alright then. I'm just don't going from "possible" to "existing" (in any sense),
because that is not the accepted meaning of the word, thus it tends to confuse.
>
> > Does God exist?
>
> Do universes containing god(s) "exist" in the sense of being
> logically possible? Yes. Do any gods exist in our universe?
> Apparently not.
Or, gods exist *outside* universes (whatever that might mean). :)
> > > because they are indistinguishable in what they mean
> > > (and not just how we might observe them), "a possible world" and
> > > "an existent world" appear to mean the same thing.
> >
> > it is as inaccurate to say they are indistinguishable
> > as to say that they are distinguishable.
>
> It is only inaccurate to say they are semantically indistinguishable
> if you can tell me what the semantic difference is. But I don't
> think we can. In his new book Invariances, the late great
> Robert Nozick made "some quite speculative first attempts at
> an answer", but assumed some not-fully-justified premises
> and ended up with only a framework describing what an answer
> might be like.
They are semantically distinguishable because the words "possible" and
"existing" mean different things. We have agreed that possible universes (apart
from this one) cannot be tested for existence (by us). Thus we can't say they
exist. We can just say they are possible. I seem to be repeating myself here,
but its the same reply.
>
> > I'd go along with [your definition of existence], at least for
> > the sake of the discussion.
>
> I'm always looking for other definitions of "existence" to compare
> it with, so if you ever find any, let me know.
Only the common usage definition. The problem with it is that it is such a
"basic" word that it is difficult to define further. (There may be a
lexicological(?) term for what I mean by "basic". I'm talking about words that
rest so closely on our external experience that it is difficult to define them
any further without circularity. OK, all definitions are circular eventually,
but these words become immediately.)
> In the absence of a meaningful definition of "exists" for
> universes, I would say that the only other available option
> is to speak of other universes only as (im)possible, and
> never as (non-)existent.
This is where I've been going all along. I agree.
> > we need to establish the existence of the
> > simulation as a whole before we have anything to say about
> > the existence of its parts.
>
> Yes, the simulation has to exist in the simulator's universe
> for the simulated things to exist in the simulator's universe.
> But a merely possible simulation that is not actually run
> in any universe's simulator is itself its own possible universe,
> and our discussion shows that for (other) universes, possibility and
> existence are semantically indistinguishable.
See above. I would say that the un-run (!) simulation is merely possible and
does not exist until it is run. Facetiously, my experience as a programmer
suggests that we can't even be sure of its possibility until we test the program
by running it!
>
> > Its possibility is simply a logical conclusion, and says
> > nothing about existence IMO.
>
> You have to either 1) say that existence is not defined for
> universes (and that one can never say that any particular possible
> universe "does not exist"), or 2) give me a definition of
> existence (other than possibility) that applies to possible
> universes.
I've been saying the former.
> Consider a simulation in which one simulated inhabitant
> is destined to think "I am thinking right now and therefore
> this universe is actual". What difference could it make
> to the phenomenological content of that thought if the
> simulation is run or not? Isn't the thought the same
> whether or not the simulation is run?
Its the same only because we can examine the program and note that if it were
run this would happen. In a sense, we *are* running the simulation in our minds.
If we *don't* examine the program we don't have a clue what the
possibly-simulated inhabitant would think.
>
> Or consider a simulation
> which is deterministic in both temporal directions,
> and whose initial state is a moment right after an
> inhabitant would have had such a thought. (That is, the
> initial state is such that if the simulator were run
> backwards instead of forwards, the above thought is
> among the first things that get simulated.) What difference
> could it make to the phenomenology of the inhabitant
> that the simulation was initialized to a point "after"
> he had the thought instead of before? His subsequent
> mental states are identical to the case in which
> the simulation is instead started from a point
> "before" the thought.
Is this a variation on "last-Tuesday-ism"?
>
> Note that I here assume functionalism -- i.e. that
> mental states are functional states consisting of
> causal relations among pieces of information that
> are in principle independent of their substrate.
> The successive states in a simulation can be seen
> (under the rules of the simulation) as having the
> necessary causal relations.
Hmm, I'll have to think about that. It seems to me that time really does go
forwards when you run the simulation in reverse. Simulator time, that is. To the
simulated people, time would appear to go backwards, or would it? They would
have no consciousness of "future" events as these would be stripped away by the
"reversing" process. So they would, in any instant, perceive time as going
forwards, in other words they would have a present state and apparent memeories
of the "past" and this would be indistinguishable from the simulator running
backwards.
Is this relevant, I ask myself? I think so. The point is that memories of past
events do not establish the existence of those events.
>
> > > a possible
> > > world is by definition not embedded in any other world.
> >
> > It may or it may not be.
>
> A "possible world" embedded in another world is not an
> entire "world" at all, but rather a strict subset of a world.
> One can faithfully simulate a given world inside another
> world, but a stipulated simulation of a world does not meet
> the definition of a world, because it does not include
> some things (namely, the simulator) with which
> it has a causal relationship.
OK, granted.
>
> > You are possible, surely, and I assume you are embedded in
> > this world.
>
> Indeed, but I am not a world unto myself (though it may
> appear that I think I am ;-).
Heh, heh.
>
> > Why though, must we have a definition of existence about other
> > worlds?
>
> As I said above, we need not -- as long as we can suppress the
> intuition that there is a difference between a given other
> world "existing" or not.
Fair enough. I would rather make a clear statement that such existence cannot be
established, but OK.
>
> I personally cannot suppress that intuition, but on close
> examination I find that intuition identical to the intuition
> that there is a difference between a given other world
> being possible or not.
I don't (find it so), but there we are.
Incidentally, how would you analyze the following situation: Two worlds
interact, thus becoming one world. One of these worlds is ours. We can now
affirm the existence of the other world (now part of ours). Can we now say that
the world existed *before* the interaction was possible? Can we define the
existence of a possible world in terms of possible future interaction (ie the
rules changing)? I'm not sure if this makes any sense, just asking for your
thoughts. :)
>
> > Perhaps we would say that the possibility exists? :)
>
> This is an area that I'm still trying to figure out. Logical
> possibility seems pretty well-defined (with respect to logical
> models as I mentioned before), but ontological possibility
> is fuzzier, for pretty much the same reasons that the existence
> of possible worlds is fuzzy.
Yes. So we are restricted to logical possibility when defining other worlds?
This seems right.
Tony
Paul Holbach
> "Brian Holtz" <br...@holtz.org> wrote:
>
> > It seems one might be able
> > to show that absolute impossibility is self-contradictory
>
> The goal would be to show the falsity of the statement
> 1. It is possible that nothing is possible.
> We must distinguish between logical and ontological possibility.
Logical possibility is de dicto possibility, that is the possibility
of truths: "possibly (Fa)"
Ontological possibility is de re possibility, that is the possibility
of things: "a is (possibly-F)"
Furthermore, it is useful to subdivide ontological possibility into
metaphysical and physical possibility, the former of which means "in
accordance with synthetic a priori truths" and the latter "in
accordance with nature/not violating any scientific law".
> So first consider
> 2. It is logically possible that nothing is logically possible.
> We are particularly interested in its corollary
> 3. It is logically possible that no world is logically possible.
> This is equivalent to
> 4. It is logically possible that any world must be self-contradictory.
> Truth is (I think) defined with respect to logical models
> (i.e. worlds). A statement is (I think) true with respect to
> a model only if that model is not self-contradictory. So for
> (4) to be true, there must be a model (i.e. world) that is
> not self-contradictory.
I fully agree. A self-contradictory system can impossibly yield any
truths and so is no logical system at all.
> One such world W would be the world
> consisting only of all possible descriptions of worlds,
> each description of course containing self-contradiction.
> The very existence of that non-self-contradictory world
> falsifies the claim of (4) that any world must be self-contradictory.
> Indeed, W would by definition recursively contain a description
> of itself, which must by definition contain a contradiction.
Self-contradiction excludes the possibility of existence, and that愀
why the empty set, defined as the set of all entities not identical
with themselves, is in fact empty, that is its elements do not exist
(but the empty set does, even though it has no elements.).
Just try to conceive of the world (in your logical sense of "world")
of all impossible worlds.
Is it possible or impossible?
If the former, then there is at least one possible world and
impossibly none.
If the latter, then it is an impossible world itself, that is
"self-containing" such that it renders its own existence impossible
(as opposed to the empty set).
Therefore, regardless of whether you affirm or negate the question,
there is no such thing as a true world of absolute impossibility.
> But the more interesting statement to disprove is
> A. It is logically possible that no world is ontologically possible.
> This seems equivalent to
> B. It is logically possible that any ontologically existent
> world must be self-contradictory.
> What does "ontological existence" mean when applied to a world?
> I'm sympathetic to modal realism: the view that the ontological
> existence of a world is indistinguishable from its logical
> possibility.
I do have some interpretative problem with this because in my opinion
logical possibility (ie non-self-contradiction) entails merely
metaphysical possibility (possibility of synthetic a priori truths in
the Kantian sense) but not physical possibility (that which is
possible by virtue of the actual nature of matter), even though both
metaphysical and physical possibility (+actuality) entail logical
possibility. However, logical possibility entails neither metaphysical
nor physical existence. So I惴 not quite sure what you mean by
"indistinguishable", for I fail to see that any actual existence can
be inferred from logicality alone. Of course, one could stipulate an
identity between "existence" and "logical possibility" - as modal
realists do - such that it becomes legitimate to speak of logically
possible worlds whose existence is warranted by their sheer logicality
alone. But modal realism also teaches that one ought to be very
careful in order not to confuse the broad ontological sense of
"existence" ("being there") and the narrow one ("being actual").
Whether such a distinction is fruitful or not is debatable, but for
the sake of your argument I惴 prepared to accept the basic assumptions
of modal realism.
> If this view is right, then (B) is equivalent
> to (4), which we seem to be able to show is false. Thus we
> conclude
> I. It is not logically possible that any ontologically existent
> world must be self-contradictory.
> II. At least one ontologically existent world must not be
> self-contradictory.
> III. At least one ontologically existent world must be logically
> possible.
> IV. It is logically necessary that at least one world is
> ontologically possible.
>
> (IV) does not seem like an analytic truth, and yet its truth
> seems necessary. If synthetic a priori truth is possible,
> then (IV) would be my candidate for it.
I consider your argument as sound.
We扉e never been that unanimous in judging before. ;-)
By the way, the truth of IV also follows from the actual existence of
our world alone since "Everything actual is logically possible." is a
logically necessary truth and "There is an actual world which is
impossible." is a logically necessary falsehood. It愀 rather obvious
that if all worlds were ontologically impossible (for whatever
reason), then there wouldn愒 be any actual world. But the hardcore
fact that there actually is at least one world, namely ours, cannot be
reasonably doubted. Hence, there is no such thing as absolute
ontological impossibility and since ontological possibility entails
logical possibility there cannot be any world of absolute logical
impossibility either.
regards
PH
Brian Holtz
> "There is an x ..." is the verbal formulation of the existential
> quantifier which is a logical formula but nevertheless an ontological
> statement establishing the fact that a particular property is
> instantiated
Instantiated in the relevant logical model. Whether that
model corresponds to actuality is a separate question --
one of ontology, not logic.
> to be is to have at least one positive property
In logic, to be is to be the value of a variable that is
bound under some particular model.
> Superficially, it is tempting to regard holes as real instances of
> nothingness, but that´s entirely misleading.
And to "superficially" reify nothingness is *not* "misleading"?
> if absolutely nothing existed, there would certainly be no
> notion of uninstantiated properties either...
There would be no actual thoughts or conversations about
properties, but property instantiation would not suddenly
become logically self-contradictory. That would only happen if
there were no possible world instantiating the property, but
the fact that an (or the) existent world is empty
doesn't imply that no worlds are possible.
> We know that there is something (the universe) so there
> can impossibly have been any real state of absolute
> impossibility, for if that had been the case [..]
You are illicitly assuming that temporality would obtain
even in a state of absolute impossibility. Absolute
impossibility would (if it weren't self-contradictory)
imply no temporality.
> "There is a possible state x such that absolutely nothing is
> possible." is illogical since if nothing were possible, even
> impossibility itself would be impossible.
That is a fair summary of the more rigorous and detailed
argument I posted last week.
> The idea of absolute impossibility is as
> self-contradictory as the idea of absolute nothingness
I don't see how it would be self-contradictory for
nothing to exist.
> I think there is only one world being both possible and actual,
> namely reality, which is the only world with full-blooded existence.
It seems quite untenable to claim that the actual world is
the only logically possible world.
> it´s somewhat misleading to speak of pure possibilities as
> being on a par with actualities
I don't claim 'possible' is a synonym of 'actual'. I claim
that there is no semantic difference between 'a possible
other world' and 'an actual other world'. If you know of
such a difference, please enlighten me.
> David Lewis seems to hold that possible and actual worlds are equally
> real in a non-homonymous way, but I´m somehow reluctant to subscribe
> to modal realism.
It does seem counter-intuitive, but I've yet to see a
semantic difference between 'a possible other world' and
'an actual other world'.
> > Consider a possible world in which only one thing exists.
> > Why would it be impossible for that thing to cease existing,
> > and thus leave nothing in existence?
>
> there´d still be the empty possible world. So, one might be tempted to
> argue that nothingness is possible because there´s a possible world
> with no inhabitants (which would be an analogue to an empty
> mathematical set). But that´s an erroneous belief because if anything
> remains, be it an empty set or an empty possible world, that´s no
> state of absolute absence. An empty set - by definition - has no
> elements, but it is nonetheless an object of mathematical discourse.
You're confusing an abstract description of a world (i.e. a logical
model -- see http://www.wikipedia.com/wiki/Model+theory) with the
world itself. Even if the only existent/actual
world is one whose domain set is empty -- i.e. even if nothing
exists -- that doesn't imply that one of the things in
the domain set is the empty domain set itself. It's simply not
a rule of model theory that the domain set of a model must
include itself.
> A true state of absolute logical nothingness would require the
> complete subtraction of the possible world itself
Just what, precisely, are you claiming is the difference between
absolute nothingness and a world (i.e. state of affairs) in
which no entity has ontological existence? To me, the
latter is in fact the definition of the former. It sounds as
if you instead define 'absolute nothingness' as a state of
affairs which is so non-existent that it does not even
qualify as a state of affairs. You can I suppose thus trivially
stipulate that for you the phrase 'absolute nothingness' is
self-contradictory, but that hardly demonstrates that it is
self-contradictory to speak of a state of affairs in which
no entity has ontological existence.
> Try to imagine a possible world where there is no possible world...
The state of affairs of nothing being possible is quite different
from the state of affairs of nothing existing. I tend to think
that the former is self-contradictory, but not the latter.
And, as with your position about actual infinitudes, the alleged
fact of this self-contradiction has somehow been omitted from every
philosophy reference work that I've ever read.
--
br...@holtz.org
http://humanknowledge.net
Paul Holbach
> "Paul Holbach" <paulholba...@freenet.de> wrote:
>
> Instantiated in the relevant logical model. Whether that
> model corresponds to actuality is a separate question --
> one of ontology, not logic.
OK, the question whether there actually is any x that verifies the
existential statement is one of science and can certainly not be
decided on purely logical grounds. That愀 why no ontological proof of
God愀 existence can work.
> > to be is to have at least one positive property
>
> In logic, to be is to be the value of a variable that is
> bound under some particular model.
Yes, that愀 Quine愀 famous dictum, which I consider to be virtually
complementary to my (informal) formulation.
> And to "superficially" reify nothingness is *not* "misleading"?
I could have bracketed nothingness, but I thought you悲 be the one
regarding holes as some sort of instantiated nothingness...
> There would be no actual thoughts or conversations about
> properties, but property instantiation would not suddenly
> become logically self-contradictory. That would only happen if
> there were no possible world instantiating the property, but
> the fact that an (or the) existent world is empty
> doesn't imply that no worlds are possible.
Sheer possible worlds (as opposed to the actual ones) are unreal, ie
they are existent only inasmuch as we imagine them as existent.
Possible worlds are mental contents of imagination and nothing more. I
know that you as a modal realist are not going to agree with me on
that, but you know that I惴 very doubtful about modal realism愀
special use of "existence" and "actuality". I think it愀 nonsense to
claim that sheer possible worlds are just as real as actual ones, ie
they exist in the same sense as actual worlds do. But that愀 exactly
what Lewis appears to hold. Furthermore, the logical concept of an
empty set is tenable but I don愒 think that the idea of an absolutely
empty world can be successfully defended. You cannot actually remove
all trees and preserve the wood from being annihilated itself. There
is no world of football if no-one is ever playing football.
> You are illicitly assuming that temporality would obtain
> even in a state of absolute impossibility. Absolute
> impossibility would (if it weren't self-contradictory)
> imply no temporality.
All I was saying is that if there were a state of absolute
impossibility, then there would be no actual world; but there is an
actual world and therefore there is no world of absolute
impossibility.
> I don't see how it would be self-contradictory for
> nothing to exist.
Please take a look at my explicit argument against Buridan.
> It seems quite untenable to claim that the actual world is
> the only logically possible world.
That愀 not what I扉e meant. We can imagine many worlds different from
our own and there may certainly be many other actual universes we
don愒 know (yet). If there is in fact more than one actual universe,
then each of those universes possesses real, full-blooded existence.
> I don't claim 'possible' is a synonym of 'actual'. I claim
> that there is no semantic difference between 'a possible
> other world' and 'an actual other world'. If you know of
> such a difference, please enlighten me.
A purely possible other world is a mind-dependent object of
imagination, whereas an actual other world is a mind-independent
entity. You seem to have mixed up an epistemological issue and an
ontological one. If you愉e a strict idealist, then being is being
perceived; and according to this standpoint any other world is only
actual if it is actually known by us. But according to external
realism the actuality of something is independent of its being known
as actual. Of course, it might be the case that we imagine another
world which happens to be actual without us ever being able to
recognize its actuality. Correspondingly, imaginary (possible) worlds
might coincide with actual ones, but they certainly need not do so.
Every actual world is possible, but not every possible world is
actual; and not every logically possible world is possibly actual (in
the metaphysical&physical sense).
I discern a clear semantic difference here.
> You're confusing an abstract description of a world (i.e. a logical
> model -- see http://www.wikipedia.com/wiki/Model+theory) with the
> world itself. Even if the only existent/actual
> world is one whose domain set is empty -- i.e. even if nothing
> exists -- that doesn't imply that one of the things in
> the domain set is the empty domain set itself. It's simply not
> a rule of model theory that the domain set of a model must
> include itself.
Since I believe that only particular things exist in the world, you
cannot subtract all particulars and retain the world. The purely
logical notion of an empty set cannot represent any real and positive
state of affairs. The empty set is defined as "everything which is not
identical with itself" and since that is a self-contradictory property
there are no possible elements of an empty set. Nothing illogical can
possibly be real and, correspondingly, an empty world with no existent
particulars in it would refer to a self-contradictory state of
affairs, but that愀 impossible because a self-contradictory *state of
affairs* is no state of affairs at all and so there cannot be any
world which is both empty and real.
> ...but that hardly demonstrates that it is
> self-contradictory to speak of a state of affairs in which
> no entity has ontological existence.
Again, please read my second reply to Buridan.
> The state of affairs of nothing being possible is quite different
> from the state of affairs of nothing existing. I tend to think
> that the former is self-contradictory, but not the latter.
> And, as with your position about actual infinitudes, the alleged
> fact of this self-contradiction has somehow been omitted from every
> philosophy reference work that I've ever read.
Both absolute impossibility and absolute nothingness are untenable
concepts.
regards
PH
Brian Holtz
> Sheer possible worlds (as opposed to the actual ones) are unreal, ie
> they are existent only inasmuch as we imagine them as existent.
How do you distinguish between possible worlds and "the actual
ones" that are not this one?
> Possible worlds are mental contents of imagination and nothing more.
The same could be said of "actual" worlds that are not this world.
> you as a modal realist are not going to agree with me on
> that, but you know that I惴 very doubtful about modal realism愀
> special use of "existence" and "actuality".
My commitment to modal realism rests only on the absence of
the distinction I asked about above. I don't know that no such
distinction is possible.
> it愀 nonsense to claim that sheer possible worlds are just as
> real as actual ones, ie they exist in the same sense as
> actual worlds do.
What's precisely "nonsense" is to claim that there is a difference
between other possible worlds and other actual worlds without
being able to say what that difference is.
> if there were a state of absolute
> impossibility, then there would be no actual world
I agree that the actual world is evidence that absolute
possibility does not obtain. I'm not sure I agree that
the actual world is evidence that absolute possibility
could not possibly obtain.
> > I don't see how it would be self-contradictory for
> > nothing to exist.
>
> Please take a look at my explicit argument against Buridan.
I might, but I want to avoid getting involved in any
more threads.
> there may certainly be many other actual universes we
> don愒 know (yet).
(How could we ever come to know that another universe is actual?)
> A purely possible other world is a mind-dependent object of
> imagination, whereas an actual other world is a mind-independent
> entity.
Whether a world is possible does not depend on any minds.
What you probably mean is "a merely possible world does not
have any existence independent of its possibility". But again:
what precisely does 'existence' (or 'actuality') mean when
applied to worlds, and how is it different from possibility?
> You seem to have mixed up an epistemological issue and an
> ontological one.
No, I'm just noticing that 1) the ontological term 'exist',
when precisely defined, only applies within worlds and not
to worlds themselves; and 2) the ontological phrase 'the actual
world' just means "this world".
> the actuality of something is independent of its being known
> as actual.
I agree that our physical experience is that the existence of
something is generally independent of knowledge or observations
of its existence. However, quantum theory provides some exceptions
to this general rule. More importantly, ontology should not
just assume this rule to be true. Indeed, if something's
existence is in principle absolutely impossible to know or
observe in any way, then a proper ontology should hold that
it does not exist, even if someone stipulates otherwise.
(This is the precise notion of 'exist' that I mentioned earlier
as being applicable only within worlds. If applied to worlds
themselves, it would claim by fiat that other worlds cannot exist.)
> Every actual world is possible, but not every possible world is
> actual
I'm still eagerly waiting to hear the difference between
'possible' and 'actual' when applied to worlds.
> I discern a clear semantic difference here.
There are definitely connotative differences between these words,
but I argue that such differences are a consequence of their
use within our familiar world and that such differences vanish
in the context of worlds themselves.
> Since I believe that only particular things exist in the world, you
> cannot subtract all particulars and retain the world.
Why not? Any possible world can be described by a model. What is
contradictory about a world described by a model with an empty
domain set?
> a self-contradictory *state of affairs* is no state of
> affairs at all and so there cannot be any
> world which is both empty and real.
I don't see how this follows. What I would instead conclude
is that absolute impossibility is self-contradictory.
> > the alleged fact of this self-contradiction has somehow been
> > omitted from every philosophy reference work that I've ever read.
>
> Both absolute impossibility and absolute nothingness are untenable
> concepts.
Is this supposed to be an explanation why the impossibility of
nothingness is omitted from philosophy reference works?
--
br...@holtz.org
http://humanknowledge.net
Paul Holbach
> The state of affairs of nothing being possible is quite different
> from the state of affairs of nothing existing. I tend to think
> that the former is self-contradictory, but not the latter.
> And, as with your position about actual infinitudes, the alleged
> fact of this self-contradiction has somehow been omitted from every
> philosophy reference work that I've ever read.
Interestingly, I扉e just come across a quotation from "On the
Plurality of Worlds" by David Lewis in the WWW:
"There can be nothing much [at a world]: just some homogeneous
unoccupied spacetime, or maybe only a single point of it. But nothing
much is still something, and there isn't a world at which there's
nothing at all." (p.73)
Here, Lewis explicitly denies the existence of *absolute nothingness*.
The crucial point of his statement is, of course, what he means
exactly by "some homogeneous unoccupied spacetime". "Unoccupied"
appears to mean the absence of all baryonic matter, but does it also
involve the absence of any energetic state of the quantum vacuum, be
it positive or negative? Does Lewis regard "unoccupied spacetime" as
some kind of ontological substance in itself which doesn愒 need any
material "self-emanation" in order for it to become really existent?
Or is spacetime just a cognitive framework, a Kantian form of
apprehension, which is transcendentally there prior to all possible
perception? As I have already said, I deem the logical concept of the
empty set consistent, but I can see no possible way of defending an
ontological concept of an empty world, for the world IS the entirety
of being itself and, therefore, if all beings cease to exist, then the
world itself must necessarily cease to exist, too. The empty set can
exist only by virtue of its being irreal, ie of its being nothing but
an abstract concept. But an ontological world is more than a
semiotically immanent entity since it possesses trans-semiotic,
mind-independent reality. It愀 illegitimate to reify the notion of
the empty set by fabricating *empty worlds*. One may substantialize
spacetime, regarding it as a ubiquitous, transcendental *fluid*, but
there can impossibly be anything like an mind-independent and empty
"cosmic container" called spacetime.
regards
PH
Brian Holtz
> > What is the existence of the sum defined with respect to?
>
> All the parts.
That's circular, because the existence of each part is defined
with respect to the other parts.
> I can get someone else to observe me, or state that I mean
> possible observation, or fall back on "cogito ergo sum".
None of these options removes the circularity, and each
reinforces the idea that, for universes, existence is
equivalent to indexicality.
> > logically possible (since that's all I'm saying "exists"
> > means for universes).
>
> that is not the accepted meaning of the word
But we've already agreed that the "accepted meaning of the
word" 'exists' does not apply to universes.
> Or, gods exist *outside* universes (whatever that might mean). :)
By definition of 'universe', everything that exists is
part of a/the universe.
> They are semantically distinguishable because the words "possible" and
> "existing" mean different things.
Not, apparently, when applied to entire worlds. I'm still trying
to discern any relevant difference.
> > I'm always looking for other definitions of "existence" to
> > compare it with, so if you ever find any, let me know.
>
> Only the common usage definition.
Common-usage definitions of 'exist' are tightly circular:
Merriam-Webster: exist -> real, be; be -> exist, real; real -> exist.
philsophypages.com: existence -> reality, being; reality -> is.
American Heritage: exist -> real, be; real -> actual -> exist;
be -> actual, real.
dictionary.com: exist -> be, real; be -> exist, real; real -> actual,
verifiable existence; actual -> exist
Cambridge: exist -> to be; have the ability to be known,
recognized or understood
allwords.com: exist -> present in the real world or universe
> words that rest so closely on our external experience that it
> is difficult to define them any further without circularity.
My definition of 'existence' doesn't encounter such
(of course inevitable) circularity anywhere above my
logical primitives (like 'term', 'property', 'relation')
and epistemological primitives (like 'attribution'),
all of which can probably be defined without any cycles that
loop back to include 'existence'.
> It seems to me that [simulator] time really does go
> forwards when you run the simulation in reverse.
I agree.
> Can we define the existence of a possible world in terms
> of possible future interaction
Indeed, I define "causally related" as ever having the
possibility of causal influence.
> > the only other available option
> > is to speak of other universes only as (im)possible, and
> > never as (non-)existent.
>
> This is where I've been going all along. I agree.
Jesse Nowells
On Tue, 30 Apr 2002, Brian Holtz wrote:
> > They are semantically distinguishable because the words "possible" and
> > "existing" mean different things.
> Not, apparently, when applied to entire worlds. I'm still trying
> to discern any relevant difference.
Statements about the existence of X or the possibility of X are all
contingent. But saying X is possible & X exists, is saying two different
things about X. It may be true that X is possible but that isn't saying
that X exists just because it's true that X is possible. So, you can't
interchange the terms exist & possible.
Paul Holbach
> "Paul Holbach" <paulholba...@freenet.de> wrote:
> How do you distinguish between possible worlds and "the actual
> ones" that are not this one?
I know that for Lewis "actual" is an indexical word, referring to
"what is here and now". Although he愀 been theoretically free to
stipulate this particular definition, one mustn愒 ignore the fact that
there is a *semantic oscillation* in the common meaning of "actual",
depending on its respective relations to temporality:
On the one hand, "actual" is virtually atemporal (ie not directly
linked to the presence), meaning "existing in fact and not merely
potential or possible, of the nature of fact, factual, taking place in
reality, real", and on the other hand it involves the presence more or
less directly, meaning "presently existing in fact and not merely
potential or possible, being or existing at the present moment".
This subtle difference might lead to some misunderstanding.
By stipulating "actual" as an indexical "here and now", Lewis has
integrated not only temporality but also spatiality into this concept.
Consequently, "There is an actual Paul-Holbach-body." would be read as
"This is the Paul-Holbach-body here and now." and - in case it愀 me
who愀 talking - "This is my body." Correspondingly, if we愉e talking
about *the universal body*, ie the universe, then Lewis reads "The
actual universe" as "our universe". In case there is not only our
universe but some other one, we couldn愒 use "actual" in order to
characterize the other sister-universe for the simple fact that the
latter is not ours, that is it愀 not here&now. It might be there
*now*, but it couldn愒 not be there *here* and, accordingly,
"actuality" is no *trans-world* notion. The inhabitants of any
universe can refer merely to entities inside their own universe but
not to their entire universe when compared with other separate, ie
causally unconnected universes there might be (Of course, if we would
actually discover another universe, there悲 be a causal connection
between the two.). Only if there were the possibility of a
meta-perspective from some meta-world encompassing both our and the
other universe, we would be justified in regarding them as equally
actual, ie *meta-here&meta-now*. What I扉e just outlined is the way a
modal realist is likely to argue.
My reply to that is as follows:
First of all, the definitions of "actual" I know normally do without
any explicit inclusion of spatiality that would necessarily turn it
into an indexical which can merely be employed in a restricted way.
Furthermore, as I扉e already mentioned in brackets, as soon as one
world has actually been discovered by inhabitants of the other world,
a causal relation (at least regarding information) between the two
worlds is established such that both worlds can be regarded as *one
two-world*. Hence there would be a more extensive spatial *hereness*
which would allow the employment of "actual" even in the restricted
Lewisian sense within the new interrelated two-world-world which is in
no need of a transcendental meta-world. The extension of what I refer
to when saying "This is my property." is variable but that doesn愒
change the meaning of its intension in case new things are added to
the extension. Now, a modal realist might object that I need to
presuppose an actual contact between two or more worlds in order to be
able to ascribe overall-actuality to them. That愀 right, in the strict
Lewisian sense of "actual" I would in fact have to postulate an
all-encompassing meta-world in which all non-related worlds are
embedded. Here, a modal realist might object that there can be no
further world beyond the single all-encompassing one and that it is
impossible in principle to attribute actuality to a world as a whole.
So my previously stated theory doesn愒 work at all. Well, I don愒
think this conclusion is inevitable because, although it is impossible
to look at the all-encompassing world (if our world is the only actual
one, then IT is the all-encompassing actuality.) from the outside, I
can nevertheless infer the actuality of the whole world from the
actuality of something within the world (and that at least something
exists, cannot be reasonably doubted). The actual existence of any
part of the world entails the actual existence of the whole world
regardless of how many parts there are. From "Some so-and-so actually
exists." follows that "A world exists.", and if it愀 the only actual
world, then "The world exists."; and if this something were the only
entity in the world, then it would be identical with the world (the
*onething-world*). So I惴 convinced that it does make sense to talk
about the existence of worlds as a whole. But certainly, as long as we
do not actually know whether there are any other actual worlds, we愉e
juggling with metaphysical possibilites and can only say with
certainty that at least one world exists, namely ours.
(By the way, a theist could argue that it is God who guarantees the
objective coexistence of all actual worlds by virtue of his his
trans-all-encompassing, absolute actuality... ;-))
> > Possible worlds are mental contents of imagination
> > and nothing more.
>
> The same could be said of "actual" worlds that are not this world.
I don愒 think so since "being actual" and "being nothing more than
possible" are incompatible.
> > it愀 nonsense to claim that sheer possible worlds are just as
> > real as actual ones, ie they exist in the same sense as
> > actual worlds do.
>
> What's precisely "nonsense" is to claim that there is a difference
> between other possible worlds and other actual worlds without
> being able to say what that difference is.
Two words cannot be semantically non-different if the one entails the
other but not the other way round:
- For all x, if x is actual, then x is possible.
- Not for all x, if x is possible, then x is actual.
I think that愀 fairly obvious, isn愒 it?!
> I agree that the actual world is evidence that absolute
> possibility does not obtain. I'm not sure I agree that
> the actual world is evidence that absolute possibility
> could not possibly obtain.
You mean "absolute impossibility", don愒 you...?
OK, the fact that there is a world excludes that there has ever been a
state of absolute impossibility before the world came into existence.
But one might indeed want to figure out whether there could be some
future state of absolute impossibility after the world has ceased to
exist (although, according to the cosmologists, the universe is going
to exist forever, what would render an absolute impossibility even in
the future impossible).
> I might, but I want to avoid getting involved in any
> more threads.
It is here in THIS thread. Certainly, you don愒 need to read it, but
then please don愒 blame me for allegedly not having any substantial
argument against the possibility of absolute nothingness!
> > there may certainly be many other actual universes we
> > don愒 know (yet).
>
> (How could we ever come to know that another universe is actual?)
How a trans-world contact could be established is indeed an extremely
intricate epistemological issue.
Frankly, I have no idea how other actual worlds (if there are any) can
be known by us. If someone could definitely prove that the perception
of other actual worlds is impossible in principle, then we would be
left alone with the sheer logical possibility of such worlds without
ever being able to know whether there are actual worlds corresponding
to the possible ones imagined by us. This problem notwithstanding, the
ontological possibility of other actual worlds does not depend on our
epistemological possibility of gaining some objective knowledge about
them, even though I惴 generally wary about separating existence and
knowability completely.
> Whether a world is possible does not depend on any minds.
OK, whether the world of dinosaurs was physically possible didn愒
depend on our minds since there were no human minds at that time. But
this does only mean that there was a time when some biological
potential of mother nature was activated and realized. Accordingly,
natural/material possibilites are mind-independent properties (actual
potentials) of real beings, but purely logical, "free-floating"
trans-actual possibilites are mind-dependent, at least due to the fact
that logic presupposes (verbal) signs, and signs presuppose minds.
> What you probably mean is "a merely possible world does not
> have any existence independent of its possibility". But again:
> what precisely does 'existence' (or 'actuality') mean when
> applied to worlds, and how is it different from possibility?
I mean "a merely possible world is a fictional/imaginary world".
And what distinguishes a fictional from a real world?
You can愒 get killed by Darth Vader, but you can get killed by Bin
Laden.
The equation of "possible" and "actual" is illicit owing to their
non-symmetric entailment relations.
> No, I'm just noticing that 1) the ontological term 'exist',
> when precisely defined, only applies within worlds and not
> to worlds themselves; and 2) the ontological phrase 'the actual
> world' just means "this world".
ad 1) see above.
ad 2) As long as we don愒 know of any other actual world than ours, we
may interpret it this way. But if we take the possibility other actual
worlds into account, we悲 better say with regard to this world which
is ours "the only actual world relevant to us".
> I agree that our physical experience is that the existence of
> something is generally independent of knowledge or observations
> of its existence. However, quantum theory provides some exceptions
> to this general rule. More importantly, ontology should not
> just assume this rule to be true. Indeed, if something's
> existence is in principle absolutely impossible to know or
> observe in any way, then a proper ontology should hold that
> it does not exist, even if someone stipulates otherwise.
> (This is the precise notion of 'exist' that I mentioned earlier
> as being applicable only within worlds. If applied to worlds
> themselves, it would claim by fiat that other worlds cannot exist.)
As I扉e already remarked above, it愀 reasonable to postulate that
inexistence be the limit of knowability such that absolute
unknowability is equated with inexistence. (One could call this *the
principle of minimal idealism*.)
But the scope of the knowable would certainly expand rather quickly,
if new practical epistemological methods were developed.
> Why not? Any possible world can be described by a model. What is
> contradictory about a world described by a model with an empty
> domain set?
You need to distinguish between a possible theoretic description of an
empty world (which doesn愒 require the objective existence of an empty
world) and the possibility of an empty world itself. For instance, we
do have a consistent description of the empty set, although it does
not exist due to the self-contradictory property that is asssigned to
its elements (=non-self-identity). It愀 solely due to the theoretic
conceptualization of "empty world/set" that these *exist*. Such
logical entities possess only "immanent reality", that is they are
immanent in the human mind but beyond they do not correspond to
anything.
> I don't see how this follows. What I would instead conclude
> is that absolute impossibility is self-contradictory.
I fully agree with you on absolute impossibility. But it愀 also true
that nothing illogical can be ever be real; and since *absolute
nothingness* is a logically untenable concept absolute nothingness
can愒 be real.
> Is this supposed to be an explanation why the impossibility of
> nothingness is omitted from philosophy reference works?
Sorry, but that愀 a weak argument from authority. It may be omitted
from the reference works you happen to know, but there are other
philosophers who have negated the very logicality of *absolute
nothingness* (one famous of which is Henri Bergson), and philosophical
reference works do always mirror the personal views of their authors
to a certain degree. It愀 an essential characteristic of philosophy
that there is no such thing as the absolute metaphysical truth.
(BTW, almost everything Cantor said regarding the actually infinite
conflicted with the mathematical reference works of his times. Does
this circumstance alone prove him wrong...?)
Finally, here is an enhanced and concise formulation of my argument
against *absolute nothingness*:
Hypothesis H = "Nothingness exists." / "Nothing exists." (in the
ontological sense)
H is equivalent to "Everything does not exist."
This can formulated in an equivalent way such that
"Everything possesses some positive property P such that P entails the
possession of the negative property of being inexistent."
But there is no such property P; therefore H must be rejected!
I remind you of my dictum "To be is to be something.", that is in
order for anything to be existent it can impossibly possess only
negative properties. There is no first negation
prior to the first affirmation!
There愀 another argument showing that "Nothing exists." can never be
actually true:
"Nothing(ness) exists."
is equivalent to
"For all x, x(is P) and x(is inexistent)." (= S)
Whatever the unknown (positive) property P, there is no possible
truth-condition under which S is true, for if it were true, then S
itself wouldn愒 exist; and if S didn愒 exist, then S*="It is true that
S." wouldn愒 exist either!
Correspondingly, S is necessarily false because if S exists, then
something does exist; and if nothing exists, then S doesn愒 exist.
Therefore, S and nothingness can impossibly coexist, but any
existential claim can only be true under the condition that the state
of affairs it is intended to refer to coexists with the existential
claim itself; but in the case of absolute nothingness this is
impossible. So (absolute) nothingness can impossibly be a defensible
ontological concept.
(Sentences as complex signs certainly imply the existence of minds, so
a state of absolute nothingness would be such that neither worlds nor
minds exist.)
regards
PH
Jesse Nowells
On Sun, 28 Apr 2002, Brian Holtz wrote:
> How do you distinguish between possible worlds and "the actual
> ones" that are not this one?
A possible world is not necessarily an actual world but all actual worlds
are possible worlds.
Brian Holtz
> a quotation from "On the
> Plurality of Worlds" by David Lewis in the WWW:
> "There can be nothing much [at a world]: just some homogeneous
> unoccupied spacetime, or maybe only a single point of it. But nothing
> much is still something, and there isn't a world at which there's
> nothing at all." (p.73)
This sounds like nothing more than a stipulation about the term
'world'. How would this follow from any non-question-begging
definition of 'world'?
> does it also
> involve the absence of any energetic state of the quantum vacuum
Certainly. Our actual physics is hardly necessary physics, and
philosophers rightly have no qualms about considering it contingent.
> Or is spacetime just a cognitive framework, a Kantian form of
> apprehension, which is transcendentally there prior to all possible
> perception?
No, spacetime is a physical thing, and not just a cognitive framework.
> the world IS the entirety
> of being itself and, therefore, if all beings cease to exist, then the
> world itself must necessarily cease to exist, too.
A "world" is specified by a description, and I don't see why the
description can't be empty. Note that, by the identity of
indiscernables, there can only be one empty world; i.e. all
purportedly distinct empty worlds in fact have the same identity.
> The empty set can
> exist only by virtue of its being irreal, ie of its being nothing but
> an abstract concept. But an ontological world is more than a
> semiotically immanent entity since it possesses trans-semiotic,
> mind-independent reality.
This sounds a little too much like Continental philosophy for
me to consider it meaningful. :-)
--
br...@holtz.org
http://humanknowledge.net
Brian Holtz
> A possible world is not necessarily an actual world
Please give a definition of 'actual' that applies to worlds
and that makes this statement true.
--
br...@holtz.org
http://humanknowledge.net
Brian Holtz
> > Not, apparently, when applied to entire worlds. I'm still trying
> > to discern any relevant difference.
>
> But saying X is possible & X exists, is saying two different
> things about X.
It's certainly using two different words, but the difference in
their meaning derives from a definition of 'exists' that does
not apply to universes. If you don't believe me, then wheel
out your precise definition of 'exist' and we'll walk through
this.
--
br...@holtz.org
http://humanknowledge.net
Jesse Nowells
On Thu, 2 May 2002, Brian Holtz wrote:
> > A possible world is not necessarily an actual world
> Please give a definition of 'actual' that applies to worlds
> and that makes this statement true.
Actual applies to anything. You have to explain what special property you
may be applying to "worlds". Possible means something may or may not
exist. Actual means that something exists. What possibly may or may not
exists, exists or doesn't exists. So the above is self-evident. Whether
something actually exists is contingent. Do you habitually disassemble
your bicycle & then demand other people to ride it in its current state,
or what?
Jesse Nowells
On Thu, 2 May 2002, Brian Holtz wrote:
Exists means "to be". Possible mean "may or may not have the capacity or
property of being". To claim something exists is to say something has
being. To claim something is possible is to say something has the capacity
for being, but it's not a claim that something has being. What "exists" &
"possible" have in common is contingency.
Brian Holtz
> > Please give a definition of 'actual' that applies to worlds
> > and that makes this statement true.
>
> Actual means that something exists.
Yes, and if you've been following any of the relevant threads here,
you'll know that I've been challenging people to come up with a
definition of 'exists' that applies to worlds and not just to
the things in them.
Here is my definition of 'exist':
To exist is to have a causal relationship with the rest of the
universe. The universe is the maximal set of circumstances that
includes this statement and no subset of which is causally
unrelated to the remainder.
My definition of 'exist' doesn't encounter
(the of course inevitable) circularity anywhere above my
logical primitives (like 'term', 'property', 'relation')
and epistemological primitives (like 'attribution'),
all of which can probably be defined without any cycles that
loop back to include 'existence'. By contrast, these
dictionary definitions of 'exist' are toplevel synonym
cycles:
Merriam-Webster: exist -> real, be; be -> exist, real; real -> exist.
philsophypages.com: existence -> reality, being; reality -> is.
American Heritage: exist -> real, be; real -> actual -> exist;
be -> actual, real.
dictionary.com: exist -> be, real; be -> exist, real; real -> actual,
verifiable existence; actual -> exist
allwords.com: exist -> present in the real world or universe
So again: please give a definition of 'actual' or 'existent' that
isn't as blatantly circular as these dictionary definitions, and
that doesn't require causal relations (as mine does) with other
things (which worlds by definition cannot have).
Good luck. :-)
--
br...@holtz.org
http://humanknowledge.net
Paul Holbach
> This sounds like nothing more than a stipulation about the term
> 'world'. How would this follow from any non-question-begging
> definition of 'world'?
I´m not an authority on Lewis´ modal realism but I think he might have
had more in mind than just a stipulation. Maybe he really believes
that *the empty world* is an inconsistent ontological concept. As
opposed to pure logical terms ontological notions must be applicable
to real worlds which are totalities of ontic systems, ie of entities,
properties and relations.
> A "world" is specified by a description, and I don't see why the
> description can't be empty. Note that, by the identity of
> indiscernables, there can only be one empty world; i.e. all
> purportedly distinct empty worlds in fact have the same identity.
You´re right, there could be only one empty world just as there is
only one empty set.
Of course, you could simply declare "Let there be a world and let
there be nothing in it!", but you cannot simply push aside that the
existence of an ontic world doesn´t depend on any description by
minds. The empty logical set exists solely owing to its being
logically described in an immanent *reality* of the human intellect
but not beyond. An empty world instead would exist on its own prior to
any conceptual description. But what would be there in case nothing is
there? In order to be able to construct an empty world you would have
to posit at least something ontologically positive firstly whose
existence you would then have to negate secondly. But any such
ontological edifice is doomed to collapse because there´s nothing a
real empty world would consist of (if space and time are inseparable,
I think that spacetime and energymatter are inseparable too). Funnily
enough, if the cosmologists are right, the universe is going to become
virtually empty in the farthest future, with merely vacuum energy and
some few solitary particles being left over.
> This sounds a little too much like Continental philosophy for
> me to consider it meaningful. :-)
America is a continent too, isn´t it?! ;-)
What I was trying to say is that ontic worlds need no minds in order
to be ontologically possible/actual (since it´s not the human mind
that determines reality, but reality that determines the human mind),
but logical worlds (=syn formal models) and their respective
descriptions presuppose existent minds by which the former are
determined.
regards
PH
The Sophist
> Yes, and if you've been following any of the relevant threads here,
> you'll know that I've been challenging people to come up with a
> definition of 'exists' that applies to worlds and not just to
> the things in them.
>
> Here is my definition of 'exist':
>
> To exist is to have a causal relationship with the rest of the
> universe. The universe is the maximal set of circumstances that
> includes this statement and no subset of which is causally
> unrelated to the remainder.
To me, your definition of "exists" looks like a good definition of
"actual" but a poor definition of "exists." How does it cope with the
claim "there exists a least prime greater than 10?" It may also face
circularity problems as a definition of actuality, depending on your
account of causation, but circular definitions are not always
unenlightening.
--
Aaron Boyden
"I may have done this and that for sufferers; but always I seemed to
have done better when I learned to feel better joys."
-Thus spoke Zarathustra
Jesse Nowells
On Mon, 6 May 2002, Brian Holtz wrote:
> > > Please give a definition of 'actual' that applies to worlds
> > > and that makes this statement true.
> > Actual means that something exists.
> To exist is to have a causal relationship with the rest of the
> universe. The universe is the maximal set of circumstances that
> includes this statement and no subset of which is causally
> unrelated to the remainder.
That isn't a definition of "to exist". To exist means to have materiality.
To say my cat exists, one isn't defining the sum total of all materiality;
one is only asserting that my cat has substance.
> So again: please give a definition of 'actual' or 'existent' that
> isn't as blatantly circular as these dictionary definitions, and
> that doesn't require causal relations (as mine does) with other
> things (which worlds by definition cannot have).
If worlds existed they evidently would be subtotalities. So, you can talk
about universes, unicorns or ecto-plasmatic deities ad nauseam, it bears
no necessary relationship with any material circumstances.
Brian Holtz
> I know that for Lewis "actual" is an indexical word, referring to
> "what is here and now".
I doubt he means precisely "here and now", as opposed to just "this".
> although it is impossible
> to look at the all-encompassing world [..] from the outside, I
> can nevertheless infer the actuality of the whole world from the
> actuality of something within the world
Yes, being able to say "this" of anything in a world implies that the
world is "this" world.
> The actual existence of any
> part of the world entails the actual existence of the whole world
> regardless of how many parts there are.
But existence of the parts is defined with respect to the other parts.
There is nothing "other" with respect to which one can define the
existence of the world.
> > > Possible worlds are mental contents of imagination
> > > and nothing more.
> >
> > The same could be said of "actual" worlds that are not this world.
>
> I don´t think so since "being actual" and "being nothing more than
> possible" are incompatible.
Only by stipulation. Please identify this "something more than possible"
that constitutes actuality for a world.
> Two words cannot be semantically non-different if the one entails the
> other but not the other way round:
>
> - For all x, if x is actual, then x is possible.
> - Not for all x, if x is possible, then x is actual.
>
> I think that´s fairly obvious, isn´t it?!
Within the domain or scope that the words apply to, yes. Outside
that domain or scope, it's simply not applicable.
> > I agree that the actual world is evidence that absolute
> > possibility does not obtain. I'm not sure I agree that
> > the actual world is evidence that absolute possibility
> > could not possibly obtain.
>
> You mean "absolute impossibility", don´t you...?
Yes. (Oops.)
> OK, the fact that there is a world excludes that there has ever been a
> state of absolute impossibility before the world came into existence.
That's sort of what I meant by "the actual world is evidence that
absolute impossibility does not obtain". Note that you are
improperly promoting temporality to being something outside
the scope of discussion, where in fact temporality is just another
thing that one might consider possibly impossible.
> according to the cosmologists, the universe is going
> to exist forever, what would render an absolute impossibility
> even in the future impossible).
You are again confusing the issues of whether absolute impossibility
obtains (tenselessly) and whether it is possible.
> > (How could we ever come to know that another universe is actual?)
>
> How a trans-world contact could be established is indeed an extremely
> intricate epistemological issue.
No, it's simply impossible, by the definition of universe/world.
> > Whether a world is possible does not depend on any minds.
>
> purely logical, "free-floating"
> trans-actual possibilites are mind-dependent,
No, they are not.
> at least due to the fact
> that logic presupposes (verbal) signs, and signs presuppose minds.
Mind-created representations of logic indeed presuppose minds, but
the possibility of a world is independent of any minds, and
does not vary from mind to mind.
> And what distinguishes a fictional from a real world?
> You can´t get killed by Darth Vader
Nor can you get killed by an actual/real villain from another universe.
> > the ontological phrase 'the actual world' just means "this world".
>
> As long as we don´t know of any other actual world than ours, we
> may interpret it this way.
Well, by definition we cannot know about other actual worlds, so QED.
> it´s reasonable to postulate that
> inexistence be the limit of knowability such that absolute
> unknowability is equated with inexistence.
Right.
> But the scope of the knowable would certainly expand rather quickly,
> if new practical epistemological methods were developed.
"Absolute unknowability" is by definition immune to "new practical
epistemological methods".
> > Why not? Any possible world can be described by a model. What is
> > contradictory about a world described by a model with an empty
> > domain set?
>
> You need to distinguish between a possible theoretic description of an
> empty world (which doesn´t require the objective existence of an empty
> world) and the possibility of an empty world itself.
How else is a world's possibility *defined* except by correspondence to
a non-self-contradictory model of it? You're asking me to distinguish
between a definiendum and its definition!
> *absolute nothingness* is a logically untenable concept
I may or may not get around to digging up your proposed proof
of this, but I'm not confident it's any more convincing than
your proof of the impossibility of actual infinitudes. :-)
> > Is this supposed to be an explanation why the impossibility of
> > nothingness is omitted from philosophy reference works?
>
> Sorry, but that´s a weak argument from authority.
I do not claim that the consensus of the philosophical community
is infallible, but it would be silly to claim that such consensus
is not a good hint as to whether a position is defensible or not.
> philosophical reference works do always mirror the personal
> views of their authors to a certain degree.
Can you give examples of other philosophical issues for which
you think there is a conspiracy among contributers, editors,
and reviewers of philosophy reference works?
> It´s an essential characteristic of philosophy
> that there is no such thing as the absolute metaphysical truth.
Is this truth itself an "absolute metaphysical truth"?
Whether it is or not, you seem to consider it the sort of
"essential" consensus truth that you're trying to argue cannot
exist.
> Hypothesis H = "Nothingness exists." / "Nothing exists." (in the
> ontological sense)
> H is equivalent to "Everything does not exist."
> This can formulated in an equivalent way such that
> "Everything possesses some positive property P such that P entails the
> possession of the negative property of being inexistent."
> But there is no such property P; therefore H must be rejected!
I'm not sure I buy (or even understand) your distinction between
"positive" and "negative" properties. Is there a summary of
this argument in any philosophy reference work you can point me
to?
> I remind you of my dictum "To be is to be something."
I'm not sure I buy this either. To logically be is to be the
value of a bound variable. To ontologically be is to have
causal relations with this sentence.
> "Nothing(ness) exists."
Reifying nothingness here seems like a mistake.
> is equivalent to
> "For all x, x(is P) and x(is inexistent)." (= S)
>
> Whatever the unknown (positive) property P, there is no possible
> truth-condition under which S is true, for if it were true, then S
> itself wouldn´t exist
You again seem to be confusing descriptions of worlds with the worlds
themselves.
> (Sentences as complex signs certainly imply the existence of minds,
There's definitely something wrong with a logical argument that
seems to assume that logic can only apply if minds exist.
--
br...@holtz.org
http://humanknowledge.net
Jesse Nowells
On Tue, 7 May 2002, Brian Holtz wrote:
> But existence of the parts is defined with respect to the other parts.
No, things are defined by their properties which doesn't necessarily
involved referring to speculations about totalities.
> > I don´t think so since "being actual" and "being nothing more than
> > possible" are incompatible.
> Only by stipulation. Please identify this "something more than possible"
> that constitutes actuality for a world.
Being actual & being possible are not incompatible because what is actual
is possible & what is possible may be actual.
Brian Holtz
Ideas, numbers, dreams, and fictional characters (qua characters) all
exist but aren't material.
--
br...@holtz.org
http://humanknowledge.net
Paul Holbach
> "Paul Holbach" <paulholba...@freenet.de> wrote:
>
> > I know that for Lewis "actual" is an indexical word, referring to
> > "what is here and now".
>
> I doubt he means precisely "here and now", as opposed to just "this".
But anything "this" refers to must be here and now, with the latter
being relative to the respective places and times of the utterance.
Indexicals require the presence of what they refer to. "Look, this is
John F. Kennedy!" cannot be true since he´s dead and gone (of course
you could point at a picture of him and say "Look, this is (a picture
of) JFK!".).
> Only by stipulation. Please identify this "something more than possible"
> that constitutes actuality for a world.
For instance, mere possibilia do not causally interact and cannot be
real objects of sensory perception. (of course you can watch a movie
and this watching is an act of external perception, but its content is
nonetheless fictitious.)
To me possible worlds (except for the actual one) are worlds of
imagination, ie logical phantasmata which are described realistically
but whose content is irreal, ie non-actual.
> > Two words cannot be semantically non-different if the one entails the
> > other but not the other way round:
> Within the domain or scope that the words apply to, yes. Outside
> that domain or scope, it's simply not applicable.
Words don´t apply to anything by virtue of themselves because they
require a user who makes them mean something. I think that Lewis´
definition is a tendentious semantic narrowing forced upon
"actuality". He is free to do so in order to promote his theory but
it´s simply not true that any other, more commonsensical definition
must be untenable.
By the way, how does a Lewisian deal with a sentence like "This is
actual."? - "This is this." or what...?
> That's sort of what I meant by "the actual world is evidence that
> absolute impossibility does not obtain". Note that you are
> improperly promoting temporality to being something outside
> the scope of discussion, where in fact temporality is just another
> thing that one might consider possibly impossible.
Maybe there was an *atemporal* era *before* the Big Bang but *now*
time is there and therefore it can impossibly have been impossible in
the *pre-cosmic past*; and since the cosmologists believe that space
is going to expand forever, time must be existent forever, too. That
means that there won´t be any impossibility of time in the future
either.
> You are again confusing the issues of whether absolute impossibility
> obtains (tenselessly) and whether it is possible.
Am I...?
> > How a trans-world contact could be established
> > is indeed an extremely
> > intricate epistemological issue.
>
> No, it's simply impossible, by the definition of universe/world.
It seems to be physically impossible but I fail to see that already
the definition of "universe" or "world" rules out the possibility of a
trans-world contact. What if two universes happened to collide as
galaxies often do and intersected in some regions of space?
> > Purely logical, "free-floating"
> > trans-actual possibilites are mind-dependent,
>
> No, they are not.
I´m sorry, but to claim that possible worlds are just as literally
real as the actual physical universe is an onto-logical perversion. I
know Lewis would comment on that that this was nothing but an
"incredulous stare" in the face of his modal realism, but nevertheless
that´s the point where I no longer feel capable of sympathizing with
him.
> Mind-created representations of logic indeed presuppose minds, but
> the possibility of a world is independent of any minds, and
> does not vary from mind to mind.
Of course, not every indiviudal mind possesses its private logic since
language&logic depend on the *social mind* of mankind, but there are
no signs and correspondingly no logical models in case there isn´t any
mind which produces them. Moreover, I´ve never claimed that the real
world itself needs minds in order for it to be able to exist. In fact
minds presuppose a real world.
> Nor can you get killed by an actual/real villain from another universe.
But if some shrewd extra-cosmic villain found a way of penetrating
into our universe, we´d be in actual danger, wouldn´t we?!
> "Absolute unknowability" is by definition immune to "new practical
> epistemological methods".
Yes, but we don´t know where the exact limits of knowability lie.
> How else is a world's possibility *defined* except by correspondence to
> a non-self-contradictory model of it? You're asking me to distinguish
> between a definiendum and its definition!
I was just emphasizing the important distinction between the logical
possibility of a formal model of an empty world and the ontological
possibility of an empty world.
> I may or may not get around to digging up your proposed proof
> of this, but I'm not confident it's any more convincing than
> your proof of the impossibility of actual infinitudes. :-)
In the course of history prophecies gathered from clairvoyance have
turned out not to be the most reliable advisors... :-)
> I do not claim that the consensus of the philosophical community
> is infallible, but it would be silly to claim that such consensus
> is not a good hint as to whether a position is defensible or not.
As a democrat I normally respect majority decisions but is there
really any such thing as THE metaphysical consensus?!
For example, philosophers of all camps have been quarrelling over
universals for hundreds of years, but still there are both realists,
nominalists and conceptualists feuding with each other.
> Can you give examples of other philosophical issues for which
> you think there is a conspiracy among contributers, editors,
> and reviewers of philosophy reference works?
Grr..., there´s certainly no conspiracy going on, but as far as
speculative metaphysics is concerned subjective, irrational tendencies
cannot be eliminated completely. Such a slight personal bias might be
explained psychologically and sociologically but there´s no
possibility of an absolute psychoanalytic self-objectification.
> I'm not sure I buy (or even understand) your distinction between
> "positive" and "negative" properties. Is there a summary of
> this argument in any philosophy reference work you can point me
> to?
My being male is a positive property I possess and my being non-female
(which is equivalent to my not being female) is a negative property I
possess. The problem with negative properties is that there are no
direct truth-conditions, ie there are no non-facts in the world that
could make a statement ascribing a negative property to something
true. But nevertheless it is true that I´m non-female. Thus the
analysis is as follows: The property of being male is incompatible
with being female such that "I´m male." and "I´m female." cannot be
both true concerning one and the same person. Therefore, my being
non-female is truly entailed by my being male. Through a lack genuine
truth-conditions, negative properties or negative statements
presuppose some positive property/fact in order to be possibly true.
There´s a concise article "non-being and nothing" (in "The Oxford
Companion to Philosophy", ed. Ted Honderich, p. 624f.) which fully
corresponds to what I hold.
I also found a very interesting article from the "Blackwell Guide to
Metaphysics", which is mainly about modality but also mentions the
incompatibility analysis regarding positive&negative properties:
http://www.georgetown.edu/faculty/ap85/papers/ActualAndPossible.html
> > I remind you of my dictum "To be is to be something."
>
> I'm not sure I buy this either. To logically be is to be the
> value of a bound variable. To ontologically be is to have
> causal relations with this sentence.
You can´t subscribe to "Being is property-instantiation."...?
Actually, that´s just a paraphrase of Quine´s dictum.
> Reifying nothingness here seems like a mistake.
I´ve taken the reified notion of nothing just in order to show what it
would lead to, namely logical untenability.
I think that´s sort of a reductio ad absurdum.
> You again seem to be confusing descriptions of worlds with the worlds
> themselves.
I beg you pardon?? Isn´t it me who´s always been emphasizing the
importance of that distinction?!
> There's definitely something wrong with a logical argument that
> seems to assume that logic can only apply if minds exist.
You may be practicing logic without simultaneously reflecting about
minds, but the latter are nonetheless necessary conditions of the
possibility of any logic: Logic presupposes semiotics and semiotics
presupposes mentality.
regards
PH
Brian Holtz
> > existence of the parts is defined with respect to the other parts.
>
> No, things are defined by their properties which doesn't necessarily
> involved referring to speculations about totalities.
Yes, things are defined by their properties, and the particular
property of ontological existence indeed refers to causal relatedness
to other things. Consider your criterion of "materiality". Matter
is that which has mass and occupies space, but mass and space are
in principle immeasurable and thus meaningless if there is only
one object.
> > Please identify this "something more than possible"
> > that constitutes actuality for a world.
>
> Being actual & being possible are not incompatible
Indeed, for a world they are indistinguishable.
--
br...@holtz.org
http://humanknowledge.net
Brian Holtz
> Maybe [Lewis] really believes
> that *the empty world* is an inconsistent ontological concept.
A demonstration of such inconsistency would be interesting.
> > A "world" is specified by a description, and I don't see why the
> > description can't be empty.
>
> the existence of an ontic world doesn´t depend on any description
> by minds.
(What work is 'ontic' doing in this sentence?) When we say that
a thing is specified by its description or properties, we're not
saying that the thing doesn't exist when those properties or
description are not being thought about.
> The empty logical set exists solely owing to its being
> logically described in an immanent *reality* of the human intellect
> but not beyond.
What is "an immanent *reality* of the human intellect".
> In order to be able to construct an empty world you would have
> to posit at least something ontologically positive firstly whose
> existence you would then have to negate secondly.
Why would I "have to"?
> ontic worlds need no minds in order
> to be ontologically possible/actual[..],
> but logical worlds (=syn formal models) and their respective
> descriptions presuppose existent minds by which the former are
> determined.
A world is only ontologically possible if it is logically
possible, and whether a world is logically possible is independent
of any mind.
--
br...@holtz.org
http://humanknowledge.net
Jim Rogers
> > To exist means to have materiality.
> Ideas, numbers, dreams, and fictional characters (qua characters) all
> exist but aren't material.
So how would you define "fictional"?
Jim
Jesse Nowells
On Wed, 8 May 2002, Brian Holtz wrote:
> > To exist means to have materiality.
> Ideas, numbers, dreams, and fictional characters (qua characters) all
> exist but aren't material.
Ideas only exist in minds, (which exist because of organic brains), or as
representations in symbols in records meant for exchange. All these
circumstances are grounded in materiality.
Paul Holbach
> Being actual & being possible are not incompatible
> because what is actual
> is possible & what is possible may be actual.
Everything actual is certainly possible since nothing impossible is
actual.
Nevertheless, "being actual" and "being NOTHING MORE (!) than
possible" are incompatible because nothing actual is MERELY possible
(since it愀 possible+actual) and nothing MERELY possible is actual
(since possibility doesn愒 entail actuality).
regards
PH
Brian Holtz
> All these circumstances are grounded in materiality.
Yes, so you probably meant "to exist means to be grounded in
materiality". As a materialist I agree that all existent things
are grounded in materiality, but that's still not what speakers
of English mean by 'exist'. For example, souls are not grounded
in materiality but would still be said to exist IF AND ONLY IF
they can have causal relationships with the rest of the universe.
--
br...@holtz.org
http://humanknowledge.net
Brian Holtz
> So how would you define "fictional"?
The same way Webster's does: invented by the imagination.
--
br...@holtz.org
http://humanknowledge.net
Paul Holbach
> "Paul Holbach" <paulholba...@freenet.de> wrote:
>
> > Maybe [Lewis] really believes
> > that *the empty world* is an inconsistent ontological concept.
>
> A demonstration of such inconsistency would be interesting.
Counterquestion: What would be the substance of *the empty world*?
> (What work is 'ontic' doing in this sentence?) When we say that
> a thing is specified by its description or properties, we're not
> saying that the thing doesn't exist when those properties or
> description are not being thought about.
I didn´t say anything different from exactly that.
Here, "ontic" means that I´m referring to the physical world and not
to a logical model which might also be called a "world".
> What is "an immanent *reality* of the human intellect".
One might call it "the mental world dwelling within ourselves" whose
contents do not necessarily represent anything mind-independently
real. So a synonym of "immanent" could be "intra-subjective" or better
"inter-subjective" (since language is not a private property).
By the way, I´ve borrowed the phrase "immanent reality" from a text by
Cantor.
> > In order to be able to construct an empty world you would have
> > to posit at least something ontologically positive firstly whose
> > existence you would then have to negate secondly.
>
> Why would I "have to"?
Because there´d be no other way to do so.
First posit a world and then subtract it from itself!
> A world is only ontologically possible if it is logically
> possible, and whether a world is logically possible is independent
> of any mind.
I think there´s an ambiguity in the term "ontological":
There´s a difference between "formal being" and "material being", the
former being attributed to the being of concepts whose contents are
mind-dependent and irreal (formal or irreferential concepts), and the
latter to concepts whose contents are mind-independent and real
(material or referential concepts).
The logical possibility of formal concepts entails their ontological
possibility (actually, the logical and the ontological possibility of
a formal concept are identical), but the logical possibility of
material concepts doesn´t entail the ontological possibility of a
thing a material concept is intended to refer to. Whether a concept is
regarded as formal or material depends on a meta-interpretation. For
instance, a nominalist regards <set> as a formal concept, there being
no language-independent thing *set*, and a Platonist regards <set> as
an existent material thing set (in the broadest sense of "material").
regards
PH
Brian Holtz
> > I doubt he means precisely "here and now", as opposed to just "this".
>
> But anything "this" refers to must be here and now
No, it need just be relative to here and now.
> > Please identify this "something more than possible"
> > that constitutes actuality for a world.
>
> For instance, mere possibilia do not causally interact and cannot be
> real objects of sensory perception.
An "actual" world can neither "causally interact" with us or be a
"real object of sensory perception".
> To me possible worlds (except for the actual one) are worlds of
> imagination, ie logical phantasmata which are described realistically
The same could be said of other "actual" worlds.
> but whose content is irreal, ie non-actual.
This is just a restatement of the stipulation that "merely possible"
implies "non-actual".
> it´s simply not true that any other, more commonsensical definition
> [of 'actual'] must be untenable.
In the absence of a non-question-begging definition of 'actual'
as applied to worlds, a provisional conclusion of untenability
is quite justified.
> By the way, how does a Lewisian deal with a sentence like "This is
> actual."? - "This is this." or what...?
"This is causally related to the rest of the universe."
(I never said that 'actual' was a synonym for 'this'.)
> > temporality is just another
> > thing that one might consider possibly impossible.
>
> there won´t be any impossibility of time in the future either.
You are (again) confusing 1) whether the impossibility of time
obtains and 2) whether it is possible. I.e. you are confusing
actuality with possibility (which are quite distinguishable
for things like temporality that are aspects of worlds, as
opposed to worlds themselves).
> > You are again confusing the issues of whether absolute impossibility
> > obtains (tenselessly) and whether it is possible.
>
> Am I...?
Yes.
> I fail to see that already
> the definition of "universe" or "world" rules out the possibility of a
> trans-world contact.
If two things have even the slightest possibility of causally
interacting, they are by definition in the same world.
> to claim that possible worlds are just as literally
> real as the actual physical universe is an onto-logical perversion.
To claim there is a difference between "possible worlds" and
"actual worlds" without being able to describe such a difference
is a linguistic self-deception.
> > the possibility of a world is independent of any minds, and
> > does not vary from mind to mind.
>
> language&logic depend on the *social mind* of mankind
The truths of logic are independent of the minds of human primates.
I defy you to state "the truths of logic are dependent on the
minds of human primates".
> there are no signs and correspondingly no logical models in case
> there isn´t any mind which produces them.
Is this supposed to constitute an argument that the possibility of
a world is somehow dependent on particular minds? Is this anything
more than the facile observation that signs are only produced by
sign-producers?
> if some shrewd extra-cosmic villain found a way of penetrating
> into our universe, we´d be in actual danger, wouldn´t we?!
Such a villain would by definition not be "extra-cosmic", but
rather would by definition always have been in our universe.
> > "Absolute unknowability" is by definition immune to "new practical
> > epistemological methods".
>
> Yes, but we don´t know where the exact limits of knowability lie.
I have a pretty good idea of where they lie:
http://humanknowledge.net/Thoughts.html#MindAndLimits
I also know that "absolute unknowability" lies BY DEFINITION
outside the limits of knowability.
> I was just emphasizing the important distinction between the logical
> possibility of a formal model of an empty world and the ontological
> possibility of an empty world.
And I was just emphasizing that there is no such distinction,
since what is logically possible is ontologically possible.
> There´s a concise article "non-being and nothing" (in "The Oxford
> Companion to Philosophy", ed. Ted Honderich, p. 624f.) which fully
> corresponds to what I hold.
How does one justify the article's claim that "every absence
requires an existent positive reality that logically excludes it"?
Doesn't this analysis make the mistake of assuming that
existence is a first-order predicate?
> I also found a very interesting article from the "Blackwell Guide to
> Metaphysics", which is mainly about modality but also mentions the
> incompatibility analysis regarding positive&negative properties:
> http://www.georgetown.edu/faculty/ap85/papers/ActualAndPossible.html
I'll take a look at it.
> > > I remind you of my dictum "To be is to be something."
> >
> > I'm not sure I buy this either. To logically be is to be the
> > value of a bound variable. To ontologically be is to have
> > causal relations with this sentence.
>
> You can´t subscribe to "Being is property-instantiation."...?
For logical being I can. For ontological being I don't.
> Actually, that´s just a paraphrase of Quine´s dictum.
Of course.
> > Reifying nothingness here seems like a mistake.
>
> I´ve taken the reified notion of nothing just in order to show what it
> would lead to, namely logical untenability.
> I think that´s sort of a reductio ad absurdum.
Nothing is not a thing; Nothing is the absence of all things.
> > You again seem to be confusing descriptions of worlds with the worlds
> > themselves.
>
> I beg you pardon?? Isn´t it me who´s always been emphasizing the
> importance of that distinction?!
You said "...then S itself wouldn't exist", where S is a sentence
describing the state of Nothingness. You're confusing Nothingness
with the sentence S that describes Nothingness. Nothingness could
obtain and S could still be true even if there are no actual
enunciations of S. A statement doesn't have to be enunciated to
be true.
> > There's definitely something wrong with a logical argument that
> > seems to assume that logic can only apply if minds exist.
>
> Logic presupposes semiotics and semiotics
> presupposes mentality.
(1) Logic can only apply if minds exist.
Do you claim (1), or not? Yes or no? If no, then what's your point?
If yes, then why not just say so?
--
br...@holtz.org
http://humanknowledge.net
Earle Jones
paulholba...@freenet.de (Paul Holbach) wrote:
> Jesse Nowells <jnow...@transbay.net> wrote in message
> news:<Pine.BSF.4.31.0205062113350.7342-100000@localhost>...
>
> > Being actual & being possible are not incompatible
> > because what is actual
> > is possible & what is possible may be actual.
>
> Everything actual is certainly possible since nothing impossible is
> actual.
> Nevertheless, "being actual" and "being NOTHING MORE (!) than
> possible" are incompatible because nothing actual is MERELY possible
> (since it´s possible+actual) and nothing MERELY possible is actual
> (since possibility doesn´t entail actuality).
>
> regards
> PH
>
*
Question: Does the above exchange contain any intelligent content?
Could it be possibly actual or actually possible?
earle
*