AIM-54 Phoenix missile
Sujay Vijayendra
the air-force developed a long range air to air missile like the phoenix? As
far as I know, the AIM-120 is about the longest range modern missile they
have in their arsenal.
Daryl Hunt
"Sujay Vijayendra" <svij...@purdue.edu> wrote in message
news:bncud0$die$1...@mozo.cc.purdue.edu...
The Air Force decided they didn't need anything longer rang than the
AIM-120. Since all new missiles were to be for both the AF and the Navy,
the AIM-155 which was the followon for the AIM-54 was cancelled in 1992.
Instead, the AIM-120 was to be used. T4eh AIM-155 was lighter and smaller
than the AIM-54.
The current AF AC did not have compatable elecrtronics for the AIM-54. And
the size and weight of the Phoenix didn't really work well for the F-16 nor
the F-15. The lighter AIM-120 fit the role that the AF decided it needed.
And it works on all Radar Fighters in both the AF and the Navy without
severe modifications.
Keith Willshaw
Because its a honking big , expensive missile designed
to kill Soviet bombers at long range. Each one is 13ft long
15inch dia and weighs in at around 1000lbs.
The AIM-120 is 12ft long , 7ich dia and weighs only 350
lbs. For a highly agile fighter the extra weight and drag
of the AIM-54 is a disadvantage that has to be considered
in the balance against it extra range. While I dont have
the figure to prove it I'd suggest AIM-54 us somewhat
less agile than the smaller missiles too, making it less useful
against small manoeveuring targets.
Keith
Alan Minyard
No longer needed. The AIM-54 required a specific radar, etc. It was a fleet
defense fighter designed to take out squadrons of Soviet bombers which
carried long range anti-ship missiles. That threat no longer exists.
The AIM-54 and the AWG-9 radar were both, originally, USAF programs,
but as needs were assessed and platforms evolved, it became a
USN project.
Al MInyard
Tom Cooper
originally, the AWG-9&AIM-54 combo was developed from the AN/ASG-18&AIM-47
combo, which was the first high-performance, long-range, LDSD PD radar ever.
The AIM-47, although developed from the (pretty nifty) Falcon family of USAF
AAMs, was probably the best and most effective up to its time.
Anyway, the AN/ASG-18 and AIM-47 were installed on three Lockheed YF-12A
interceptors, armed A-12 OXCART derivatives, preceeding the SR-71, which the
USAF evaluated in the mid 60's. The whole system proved very successful in
tests, and was even able to track ICBMs fired from Vandenberg AFB, even if
no actual shoot-downs were attempted. The system was backed up by two IRST
sensors, but these were dropped during the course of system testing. The
AN/ASG-18 was just as range-capable as the AWG-9, but, AFAIK could only deal
with a single target at a time. The AIM-47 actually out-ranged the AIM-54
due to its better kinematic performance - as much as the fact that the
YF-12s were usually underway at a speed of Mach 3.2 when launching (so that
the AIM-47 was tracked at speeds well over Mach 4.4).
The AIM-47 also utilized dual-mode SARH/IR terminal homing, and it has been
speculated that a 200kT nuclear warhead would have been fitted to production
weapons at some point in the development process. This ultimately turned out
to be both false and unnecessary, as on one occasion an AIM-47 trials round
skewered the vertical tail of a QB-47 target drone. With such accuracy
nobody needed nukes.
The proposed production F-12B interceptor was cancelled, and the YF-12s went
to NASA for high-speed research before Lockheed could begin evaluating the
AN/ASG-18 system in more intensive environments, such as heavy ECM.
Shortly after the USAF dropped the AN/ASG-18 and AIM-47 both were taken over
by the USN and then the development of the AWG-9 and AIM-54 was initiated.
Why were the AWG-9 and the AIM-54 not put into any other plane?
The answer is simple: needs at the time and the aircraft construction.
The AWG-9 was a huge system when designed for the F-111B, which was
developed for service aboard the USN carriers through the 1960s. Although
considerably updated and thus made lighter by almost 500kg, it remained a
huge system when it was put into the F-14, in 1969. And still, the F-14 was
not designed "around" the AWG-9 and the AIM-54, but first as a dogfighter,
armed with a gun, Sparrows and Sidewinders, to fight MiG-17s and MiG-21s.
Once this capability was developed, the designers went to find out how to
fit the AWG-9 and the AIM-54s on it. One of the results of this work became
the "paletts" on which the AIM-54s are mounted. Another was the largest
cockpit of any fighter aircraft ever.
Doing anything similar with any other type would not function for several
reasons. When designing the F-15, the USAF actually wanted to have an
aircraft like the F/A-18 later became, a dogfighter and a one-seater. Only
the shock from the appearance of the MiG-25 caused them to let the F-15
become as large as fast as it become, in order to be able to intercept
Foxbats. Clearly, the F-14 with its "long claws" would have been even better
for this task, but there was no way the USAF would buy a USN fighter (again,
like it did in the case of the F-4).
The F-16, on the contrary, was designed as a simple dogfighter, day-fighter
armed with the gun and Sidewinders only. Only after it entered service was
any separation testing for the use of Mk.82783/84 bombs done. All the
complex avionics was added to it even at a later stage.
Finally, the F/A-18 came into being as the YF-17, the competitor for the
same project like the F-16, which was then redesigned so to become suitable
to replace the A-7, but also support the F-14 in air-to-air. Consequently,
it was to be cheap and simple, not as complex as the F-14.
Tom Cooper
Co-Author:
Iran-Iraq War in the Air, 1980-1988:
http://www.acig.org/pg1/content.php
and,
Iranian F-4 Phantom II Units in Combat:
http://www.osprey-publishing.co.uk/title_detail.php/title=S6585
Paul F Austin
"Tom Cooper" wrote
>
> The AIM-47 also utilized dual-mode SARH/IR terminal homing, and it has
been
> speculated that a 200kT nuclear warhead would have been fitted to
production
> weapons at some point in the development process. This ultimately turned
out
> to be both false and unnecessary, as on one occasion an AIM-47 trials
round
> skewered the vertical tail of a QB-47 target drone. With such accuracy
> nobody needed nukes.
Optical nuke?
Tom Cooper
news:caymb.42503$h47....@bignews4.bellsouth.net...
What should that be?
Ed Rasimus
>Why were the AWG-9 and the AIM-54 not put into any other plane?
>
>The answer is simple: needs at the time and the aircraft construction.
>
>The AWG-9 was a huge system when designed for the F-111B, which was
>developed for service aboard the USN carriers through the 1960s. Although
>considerably updated and thus made lighter by almost 500kg, it remained a
>huge system when it was put into the F-14, in 1969. And still, the F-14 was
>not designed "around" the AWG-9 and the AIM-54, but first as a dogfighter,
>armed with a gun, Sparrows and Sidewinders, to fight MiG-17s and MiG-21s.
>Once this capability was developed, the designers went to find out how to
>fit the AWG-9 and the AIM-54s on it. One of the results of this work became
>the "paletts" on which the AIM-54s are mounted. Another was the largest
>cockpit of any fighter aircraft ever.
While I bow to your knowledge of the radar and AIM-54, as well as
history of the Iranian applications of the aircraft, I've got to
question some of your other assertions here.
Clearly by the time of production of the F-14, the anticipated threat
had migrated forward beyond MiG-17 and focussed more closely on 21,
23, 27 and future developments from the Soviet block. Additionally,
there was concern with free world designs used by swing
nations--aircraft like Mirage III and F-1, for example.
(As an aside, how does size of the radar or "paletts" for the Phoenix
result in a larger cockpit? Gotta say the F-105 cockpit was the
biggest single-seat office I ever saw and the F-15 operator station
isn't cramped, either.)
>
>Doing anything similar with any other type would not function for several
>reasons. When designing the F-15, the USAF actually wanted to have an
>aircraft like the F/A-18 later became, a dogfighter and a one-seater.
That is precisely what General Bellis and the F-15 design team created
in the F-15A, a world-class maneuverability dog-fighter and a single
seater. There was never anything else under consideration.
>Only
>the shock from the appearance of the MiG-25 caused them to let the F-15
>become as large as fast as it become, in order to be able to intercept
>Foxbats.
Hardly. The Eagle planform was heavily governed by the size of TabVee
shelters. The footprint of the aircraft fits very closely over the
footprint of the F-4. Intercept of the Foxbat was clearly a missile
matter and not one of aircraft performance. Early detection, long
range weapons and good intercept geometry were paramount. The speed of
the F-15 both initially and in the end product closely parallels the
top speed of the existing front-line fighters--just a bit over M-2.
>Clearly, the F-14 with its "long claws" would have been even better
>for this task, but there was no way the USAF would buy a USN fighter (again,
>like it did in the case of the F-4).
The F-14 was optimized for fleet air defense. It was designed for the
interceptor role. The F-15 was designed as a tactical fighter for air
superiority. There is a considerable difference in the detail of the
two missions. It shouldn't be construed as a question of service
rivalry.
>
>The F-16, on the contrary, was designed as a simple dogfighter, day-fighter
>armed with the gun and Sidewinders only. Only after it entered service was
>any separation testing for the use of Mk.82783/84 bombs done. All the
>complex avionics was added to it even at a later stage.
Sorry, but no. The F-16 (actually the lightweight fighter competition)
was to build a replacement for the F-4 fleet. The F-15 air superiority
fighter did the air/air mission and from its inception the F-16/F-17
programs were designed for ground attack. The "complex avionics" of
the CCIP conventional weapons release system were incorporated in the
first production A models.
>
Tom Cooper
> (As an aside, how does size of the radar or "paletts" for the Phoenix
> result in a larger cockpit? Gotta say the F-105 cockpit was the
> biggest single-seat office I ever saw and the F-15 operator station
> isn't cramped, either.)
I don't think I said that paletts for AIM-54s made the cockpit "large". But,
OK.
Then, let us not forget that the AWG-9 is not only a radar: I'm sure you
know better than me that it's actually a whole weapons system, _including_
the AWG-9 radar.
So, while the cockpits of F-105s and F-15s are certainly not as cramped as
that of the MiG-21 (quite on the contrary: that of the F-15 was definitely
the largest in a one-seat fighter until the appearance of the Su-27), they
are still neither as long nor as wide as that of the F-14. One of the
reasons was the need to squeeze all the 30+ "black boxes" (and these also
include no less but four large displays put into the cockpit) of the AWG-9A
into the airframe: these were distributed ahead, around, and - of course -
inside the cockpit. The AWG-9A simply had a much more volumen (and
capabillities) than the APG-63, and it needed the second crew-member to
operate it.
Don't get me wrong, but if these are not the reasons for the huge size of
the cockpit on the F-14, then I don't know what else should have been?
> >Doing anything similar with any other type would not function for several
> >reasons. When designing the F-15, the USAF actually wanted to have an
> >aircraft like the F/A-18 later became, a dogfighter and a one-seater.
>
> That is precisely what General Bellis and the F-15 design team created
> in the F-15A, a world-class maneuverability dog-fighter and a single
> seater. There was never anything else under consideration.
Nobody said anything else about the final F-15. I was talking about the size
as devised by the original FX request.
> >Only
> >the shock from the appearance of the MiG-25 caused them to let the F-15
> >become as large as fast as it become, in order to be able to intercept
> >Foxbats.
>
> Hardly. The Eagle planform was heavily governed by the size of TabVee
> shelters. The footprint of the aircraft fits very closely over the
> footprint of the F-4. Intercept of the Foxbat was clearly a missile
> matter and not one of aircraft performance. Early detection, long
> range weapons and good intercept geometry were paramount. The speed of
> the F-15 both initially and in the end product closely parallels the
> top speed of the existing front-line fighters--just a bit over M-2.
The footprint was of course to fit that of the F-4. But from what I read
about the history of F-15's the original idea was rather to get something
about the size of the later F-18, and certainly not planned to fly Mach 2.5.
These requirements were not the specifications that can be found in the
original FX. They were added after the Demodedovo '67, when at some stage
calls became known for the FX to become capable of Mach 3, in order to
directly match the Foxbat. Only resistance from the group that was running
the project kept the dogfighting capability as one of main requirements.
Ed, hell, you've been there: you know better than anybody here how much
attention was the USAF paying to air-combat being a part of the syllabus for
its pilots in the late 1960s - and also most of the early 1970s. The
interest was actually 0. Even such immensely important projects like
"dogfight Sparrow", Combat Tree and the AIM-9J were only half-heartedly
done....
Also, if you don't mind, but if the long-range weapons were one of the
matters considered "paramount", then the F-15 armed with AIM-7Es (F was
still a distant future at the time) was definitely an underdog compared to
both, the YF-12 and the F-14. Actually, until the APG-63 was improved the
F-14 could fire even AIM-9s from a longer range than the F-15...
> >Clearly, the F-14 with its "long claws" would have been even better
> >for this task, but there was no way the USAF would buy a USN fighter
(again,
> >like it did in the case of the F-4).
>
> The F-14 was optimized for fleet air defense. It was designed for the
> interceptor role. The F-15 was designed as a tactical fighter for air
> superiority. There is a considerable difference in the detail of the
> two missions. It shouldn't be construed as a question of service
> rivalry.
Well, theoretically not. But, in fact it was so. For example, the USAF FX
DCP (Development Concept Paper) from 1969 concluded that the "VFX is not
able to meet this requirement" (the requirement for the FX). Given that
neither the FX or VFX flew at the time they not only couldn't possibly know,
but then - if I we bring back the "paramount" aspect of long-range weapons -
the FX could've been dropped straight away.
Besides, while the final result of the F-14 became a plane "optimized for
fleet air defense" - this was foremost so by purpose, i.e. how the USN
intended to use it and how it trained its Tomcat crews, not by design.
Originally, the F-14 was designed as a dogfighter, and - despite all the
explanations around - even the F-14A with its nifty TF-30s was superior in
maneuver to the F-15 at anything but high-subsonic speeds.
(From discussions with pilots that flew both planes, however, it appears
that the F-14 was not as easy to fly successfully in the dogfight as the
F-15 (even if the weapons system of the original F-15A had quite some
problems with the man-machine interface, when compared to the F-14), and
this, as well as different subsequent upgrades in the Eagle cockpit is what
then "made" the F-15 being "accepted as a better dogfighter".)
> >The F-16, on the contrary, was designed as a simple dogfighter,
day-fighter
> >armed with the gun and Sidewinders only. Only after it entered service
was
> >any separation testing for the use of Mk.82783/84 bombs done. All the
> >complex avionics was added to it even at a later stage.
>
> Sorry, but no. The F-16 (actually the lightweight fighter competition)
> was to build a replacement for the F-4 fleet. The F-15 air superiority
> fighter did the air/air mission and from its inception the F-16/F-17
> programs were designed for ground attack. The "complex avionics" of
> the CCIP conventional weapons release system were incorporated in the
> first production A models.
The CCIP was included in the original weapons system, no dispute. But that
was not what I was talking about. As first, eiher the USAF never completed
separation testing for the Mk.82/83/84s on F-16s, or it never revealed the
results of this to quite a few of its foreign customers. Don't know what was
the reason, but I've heard several Israelis and the Dutch complaining they
had to complete the job (and this as late as the late-1980s). As second,
what I meant with "complex avionics" was certainly not the CCIP-mode: that's
something even the F-14A has got almost 20 years before any kind of
"Bombcat" thinking became known within the USN. "Complex avionics", IMHO, is
such stuff like APG-66-modes enabling the support of AIM-7s, and then
especially the LANTRIN, HARM-compatibility etc...
Bear in mind, Ed, that most of the youngsters today run around thinking the
F-16 was originally designed as what such versions like Block 40/50/60 are
today - which was definitely not something ever dreamed about in the early
1970s.
Scott Ferrin
Not again. LOL Besides it was IR and I got the impression Tarver was
talking about optical like a Maverick A or Walleye.
Scott Ferrin
wrote:
The cockpit of the Crusader III looked pretty big too.
George Ruch
If you look into the history of the F-111B and F-14, you'll find that the
Phoenix was designed specificality to integrate with the AWG-9 fire control
system. The AIM-120 was designed as a replacement/follow-on for the AIM-7.
/------------------------------------------------------------\
| George Ruch |
| "Is there life in Clovis after Clovis Man?" |
\------------------------------------------------------------/
Rick Folkers
lot closer than the max range of the Phoenix. Positive ID and friendly fire
in coalition circumstances certainly make it unlikely that anybody could use
a missile with a range of 80-100 NM. The origianl mission of the F-14 and
Phoenix was one of the few instances when you could expect to engage targets
at that kind of range. We can discuss for hours about fit to planes and
size of cockpits and radars but the mission of most AF sorties would not
permit firing of a missile at anywhere near the max range of the Phoenix.
"Sujay Vijayendra" <svij...@purdue.edu> wrote in message
news:bncud0$die$1...@mozo.cc.purdue.edu...
Ed Rasimus
Great comments Tom (damn, if we keep this up, RAM might become a
military aviation newsgroup again instead of a he-said/she-said troll
roost!) Some snipping (hopefully without losing context) and responses
below:
>Ed,
>
>> (As an aside, how does size of the radar or "paletts" for the Phoenix
>> result in a larger cockpit? Gotta say the F-105 cockpit was the
>> biggest single-seat office I ever saw and the F-15 operator station
>> isn't cramped, either.)
>
>Then, let us not forget that the AWG-9 is not only a radar: I'm sure you
>know better than me that it's actually a whole weapons system, _including_
>the AWG-9 radar.
>
>So, while the cockpits of F-105s and F-15s are certainly not as cramped as
>that of the MiG-21 (quite on the contrary: that of the F-15 was definitely
>the largest in a one-seat fighter until the appearance of the Su-27), they
>are still neither as long nor as wide as that of the F-14. One of the
>reasons was the need to squeeze all the 30+ "black boxes" (and these also
>include no less but four large displays put into the cockpit) of the AWG-9A
>into the airframe: these were distributed ahead, around, and - of course -
>inside the cockpit. The AWG-9A simply had a much more volumen (and
>capabillities) than the APG-63, and it needed the second crew-member to
>operate it.
There is the rub, the second crew-man. The Navy had a dedicated RIO
cadre and seemed to have a lot less difficulty with the two-man
concept than the USAF. The abortive attempt to put pilots in the
stick-equipped back seat of F-4s had left a terrible taste in the
figurative mouth of the AF and the orientation was strictly for a
single seat airplane.
Now, given that, I'll have to argue that the state of the ergonomic
art at the time was that an effective single seat cockpit could be
designed to manage the sensor/weapons suite. Certainly the success of
both the Eagle and the Viper seem to confirm this.
>
>> >Only
>> >the shock from the appearance of the MiG-25 caused them to let the F-15
>> >become as large as fast as it become, in order to be able to intercept
>> >Foxbats.
>>
>> Hardly. The Eagle planform was heavily governed by the size of TabVee
>> shelters. The footprint of the aircraft fits very closely over the
>> footprint of the F-4. Intercept of the Foxbat was clearly a missile
>> matter and not one of aircraft performance. Early detection, long
>> range weapons and good intercept geometry were paramount. The speed of
>> the F-15 both initially and in the end product closely parallels the
>> top speed of the existing front-line fighters--just a bit over M-2.
>
>The footprint was of course to fit that of the F-4. But from what I read
>about the history of F-15's the original idea was rather to get something
>about the size of the later F-18, and certainly not planned to fly Mach 2.5.
>These requirements were not the specifications that can be found in the
>original FX. They were added after the Demodedovo '67, when at some stage
>calls became known for the FX to become capable of Mach 3, in order to
>directly match the Foxbat. Only resistance from the group that was running
>the project kept the dogfighting capability as one of main requirements.
Certainly there were mods to the specs and a capability like Foxbat
would cause some concern. But, there was also the "high/low" mix
debate going on in the bowels of the Pentagon. Some were arguing for
high tech sophistication in small "force multiplier" numbers while
others were supporting the F-5 simple, agile, low cost, deploy in
large numbers concept. Clearly the Eagle went high tech and the
results over the ensuing years support that position. While the F-5 is
everyman's sports car, if you want to go to war for real, take the
F-15.
>
>Ed, hell, you've been there: you know better than anybody here how much
>attention was the USAF paying to air-combat being a part of the syllabus for
>its pilots in the late 1960s - and also most of the early 1970s. The
>interest was actually 0. Even such immensely important projects like
>"dogfight Sparrow", Combat Tree and the AIM-9J were only half-heartedly
>done....
I'd have to debate the priorities a bit. The speed with which the AF
brought ECM pods, ARMs, RWR and Weasels to the table makes me think
that a lot of stuff was on the front burner. Ditto for PGM
development. The air/air stuff was coming quickly, but arguably might
have taken a back seat to the air/mud because (despite the losses to
MiGs) there was less of a threat from aircraft than SAMs and flak.
AIM-7E-2, the "dogfight Sparrow" was available in '72 when I checked
out in the F-4 and guys had been flying the AIM-7E with interlocks out
for several years already. Tree was deployed for Linebacker and
J-birds were on most of the air/air tasked F-4s. Also, first
production run TCTO-566 LES/TISEO airplanes were showing up in the
summer of '72, so there was some emphasis.
>
>Also, if you don't mind, but if the long-range weapons were one of the
>matters considered "paramount", then the F-15 armed with AIM-7Es (F was
>still a distant future at the time) was definitely an underdog compared to
>both, the YF-12 and the F-14. Actually, until the APG-63 was improved the
>F-14 could fire even AIM-9s from a longer range than the F-15...
But, of course, the YF-12 and F-14 were both interceptors and
certainly no one will consider the -12 to be a dog-fighter.
>
>> The F-14 was optimized for fleet air defense. It was designed for the
>> interceptor role. The F-15 was designed as a tactical fighter for air
>> superiority. There is a considerable difference in the detail of the
>> two missions. It shouldn't be construed as a question of service
>> rivalry.
>
>Besides, while the final result of the F-14 became a plane "optimized for
>fleet air defense" - this was foremost so by purpose, i.e. how the USN
>intended to use it and how it trained its Tomcat crews, not by design.
>Originally, the F-14 was designed as a dogfighter, and - despite all the
>explanations around - even the F-14A with its nifty TF-30s was superior in
>maneuver to the F-15 at anything but high-subsonic speeds.
"anything but high-subsonic speeds" is ruling out where all reasonable
dog-fighting is done! If you aren't doing it at "high-subsonic" speed,
you're going to die in short order. The Tom, just like the F-4B and J
before was typically tasked to take off, proceed to a CAP and orbit
120 miles from the boat waiting to be directed by an E-2C to a threat
inbound. With the Phoenix added to the weapons suite, the air defense
gained the capability to defend against anti-shipping missiles like
Kelt and Kitchen.
Certainly the Tom had a good close in combat capability. I remember
the first encounter I had with one in the Med. I was running against
America at very low altitude and watched the Tom come in against me
from eleven o'clock. As always I was fast and had just told my WSO
that he was no threat and was going to overshoot big-time when the
wings came forward, went all white with condensation and the
bat-turned into my six. I was impressed!
Over the years while I was running exercises for the NATO Southern
Region at USAFE Hq, I handled a lot of USAF/USN exercises and the
outcome of Eagle-vs-Toms was always the same. The Toms got the
long-range intercept credits and the Eagles got lots of video of Toms
with pipper-burns.
>
>(From discussions with pilots that flew both planes, however, it appears
>that the F-14 was not as easy to fly successfully in the dogfight as the
>F-15 (even if the weapons system of the original F-15A had quite some
>problems with the man-machine interface, when compared to the F-14), and
>this, as well as different subsequent upgrades in the Eagle cockpit is what
>then "made" the F-15 being "accepted as a better dogfighter".)
Tactics were esssential to getting the F-15 success rate up. I was
aware of a distinct difference during the period I was in USAFE Hq
between the Bitburg and Soesterburg units. Bit was very tentative in
their employment while the 32nd TFS was aggressive and creative in
their tactics.
Ditto a couple of years later when I got quite a bit of DACT with the
Eagles while I was flogging an AT-38 at Holloman. While an Eagle 1-v-1
would always best the Talon (or for that matter, an Aggressor F-5E),
when we went 2-v-2, the 49th Wing's restrictive tactics made it easy
for an experienced pair of Talons to get regular kills. (Barring, of
course, BVR Sparrow credits.)
>> Sorry, but no. The F-16 (actually the lightweight fighter competition)
>> was to build a replacement for the F-4 fleet. The F-15 air superiority
>> fighter did the air/air mission and from its inception the F-16/F-17
>> programs were designed for ground attack. The "complex avionics" of
>> the CCIP conventional weapons release system were incorporated in the
>> first production A models.
>
>The CCIP was included in the original weapons system, no dispute. But that
>was not what I was talking about. As first, eiher the USAF never completed
>separation testing for the Mk.82/83/84s on F-16s, or it never revealed the
>results of this to quite a few of its foreign customers. Don't know what was
>the reason, but I've heard several Israelis and the Dutch complaining they
>had to complete the job (and this as late as the late-1980s).
Don't know what their problem was, but with the Mk 80 series LD/GP
bombs being the primary conventional munition and with the expressed
preference in the period for "smart system/dumb bomb" technology, I
can't see that being possible. In fact, Osirik was 1981 and the
Israeli seemed to do OK with Mk-84 dumb bombs coming off cleanly!
>As second,
>what I meant with "complex avionics" was certainly not the CCIP-mode: that's
>something even the F-14A has got almost 20 years before any kind of
>"Bombcat" thinking became known within the USN. "Complex avionics", IMHO, is
>such stuff like APG-66-modes enabling the support of AIM-7s, and then
>especially the LANTRIN, HARM-compatibility etc...
No question there, that AIM-7 capability and the LANTIRN suite were
complex capability enhancements.
>
>Bear in mind, Ed, that most of the youngsters today run around thinking the
>F-16 was originally designed as what such versions like Block 40/50/60 are
>today - which was definitely not something ever dreamed about in the early
>1970s.
Gotta agree 100%. Of course, I also can't imagine running around with
everything you say and do being recorded on video from start to
shutdown....coulda been embarrassing!
>
Scott Ferrin
>Over the years while I was running exercises for the NATO Southern
>Region at USAFE Hq, I handled a lot of USAF/USN exercises and the
>outcome of Eagle-vs-Toms was always the same. The Toms got the
>long-range intercept credits and the Eagles got lots of video of Toms
>with pipper-burns.
Any idea how it went when the F-14 got F110s?
John Carrier
> was to build a replacement for the F-4 fleet. The F-15 air superiority
> fighter did the air/air mission and from its inception the F-16/F-17
> programs were designed for ground attack. The "complex avionics" of
> the CCIP conventional weapons release system were incorporated in the
> first production A models.
I'll disagree on this point. The F-16/17 were designed to provide a cheaper
alternative and augment the expensive F-14/15 (Remember this buzz phrase:
"hi lo mix?"). They were originally designed as less complex air
superiority aircraft ... simple dogfighters ... with lesser radar and
(any?) BVR capability. The mud missions were designed in later.
R / John
Scott Ferrin
wrote:
Was suppose to have Sidewinders and gun only. I remember somebody
wanted a BVR missile on it so they tested one of the early ones with
two Sparrows mounted between the main gear IIRC (It was SOMEWHERE on
the belly and there aren't that many places they'd fit :-) )
Alan Minyard
With a P1T0 tube??
Al Minyard
Drewe Manton
news:1hfnpvsolp8t0chus...@4ax.com:
> (It was SOMEWHERE on
> the belly and there aren't that many places they'd fit :-) )
>
They were actually mounted *on* the main undercarriage doors! Must've been
excellent fun loading them. . .
--
Regards
Drewe
"Better the pride that resides
In a citizen of the world
Than the pride that divides
When a colourful rag is unfurled"
Ed Rasimus
To be honest, no. Certainly improved thrust (and less
stalling/roll-back) should translate into better ratios. I was out of
the business by the time the new engines came on line. Of course, that
also means F-15C models with better performance as well and AIM-120
for longer range shots from the AF side.
Juvat
Ed posted
>> The F-16 (actually the lightweight fighter competition)
>> was to build a replacement for the F-4 fleet. The F-15 air superiority
>> fighter did the air/air mission and from its inception the F-16/F-17
>> programs were designed for ground attack. The "complex avionics" of
>> the CCIP conventional weapons release system were incorporated in the
>> first production A models.
John Carrier elaborated:
>I'll disagree on this point. The F-16/17 were designed to provide a cheaper
>alternative and augment the expensive F-14/15 (Remember this buzz phrase:
>"hi lo mix?"). They were originally designed as less complex air
>superiority aircraft ... simple dogfighters ... with lesser radar and
>(any?) BVR capability. The mud missions were designed in later.
I give the nod to John's post in strict terms of how John Boyd
proposed the LWF...*no* radar, heaters and gun...then limted radar,
heaters, gun.
But as Ed says, by the time the USAF had the funding for the winner of
the F-16/F-17 competition the *program* was for an F-4 replacement. GD
publicity photos of Full Scale Development (FSD) aircraft show the
array of surface attack weapons planned. And from the gitgo (Jan 1979)
the 16th TFTS at Hill was doing the air-to-mud thing. And the primary
DOC of all the F-4 units (in 1980) re-equipping to the Viper was
air-to-mud.
Juvat
Juvat
Manton blurted out:
>They were actually mounted *on* the main undercarriage doors! Must've been
>excellent fun loading them. . .
In Detail & Scale Vol 3 by Bert Kinzey...page 58 and 59 there are
photos showing three different carriage tests. Wingtip, stations 3 &
7, and as you noted on the main gear doors. The only test firing
picture shows this last configuration.
One of the pictures shows an old style wingtank (looks like the type
carried by F-100s, but inverted) and the gear mounted AIM-7s.
All pictures are of YF-16s...small radome.
Juvat
José Herculano
> art at the time was that an effective single seat cockpit could be
> designed to manage the sensor/weapons suite. Certainly the success of
> both the Eagle and the Viper seem to confirm this.
If a complex weapons system like the B-2 can be very effectively employed by
just 2 crew members, I have little doubt that the fighter mission can be
very well flown by a single seater with today's technology. And that always
prompts me to scratch my head in disbelief at the F/A-18F Super-Hornet. The
Navy is replacing the Tomcat squadrons with like numbers of squadrons with
the single-seater (E) and twin-seater (F). And the expected enhanced rear
crew station for the Super-Bug is somewhere in the future... meaning that
double-seater Super-Bugs, at this date, basically carry a passenger on the
back. It might be a highly qualified and capable passenger, but the added
value over the single-seater is minimal and doesn't compensate the fuel it
looses. Maybe wiser heads can correct me...
_____________
José Herculano
Jim Atkins
than worthless. Seem to recall they were used very briefly in Nam and were
found to be incapable of shooting anything down. Think about it- if the
Sparrow (mediocre at best) was seen as a big improvement, how lousy must
Falcon have been.
--
Jim Atkins
Twentynine Palms CA USA
"Outside of a dog, a book is man's best friend.
Inside of a dog, it's too dark to read."
- Groucho Marx
José Herculano
> stalling/roll-back) should translate into better ratios. I was out of
> the business by the time the new engines came on line. Of course, that
> also means F-15C models with better performance as well and AIM-120
> for longer range shots from the AF side.
The F-14B and D gained a whole lot in thrust-to-weight, but more than that,
the bird can be flown agressively at the edge. TF-30 equiped F-14A have a
whole lot of maneuvering limitations due to very sensitive engine responses
to airflow variations on the intakes. A lot of accidents have officially
happened due to engine stalls while maneuvering, and the widely spaced
engine exhausts on the Turkey led to assimetric loads outside the aircraft
flying parameters... the TF-30 may have been a nice engine for the F-111,
but for a fighter like the Tomcat was inadequate on the extreme. The F110
doesn't mind those airflow changes at all.
The F-14D was tested with AIM-120. A "cost-saving" measure prevented the
fleet from getting the minimal wiring and software changes for AIM-120
deployment.
_____________
José Herculano
John Carrier
> >>Region at USAFE Hq, I handled a lot of USAF/USN exercises and the
> >>outcome of Eagle-vs-Toms was always the same. The Toms got the
> >>long-range intercept credits and the Eagles got lots of video of Toms
> >>with pipper-burns.
> To be honest, no. Certainly improved thrust (and less
> stalling/roll-back) should translate into better ratios. I was out of
> the business by the time the new engines came on line. Of course, that
> also means F-15C models with better performance as well and AIM-120
> for longer range shots from the AF side.
Got tapped by a pair of F-15's when I was on a non-tanker supported mission
(as far as I knew) of indeterminate duration. Stayed in military and did my
duty as an uncooperative target. Not much later I got my tanker and an EAT,
found my nemesis and returned the favor of the pipper burns.
In the ACM arena, a well and patiently flown F-15 was certainly superior to
the Turkey, but not as much as you might think. The larger engines erase
that advantage.
R / John
José Herculano
> than worthless. Seem to recall they were used very briefly in Nam and were
> found to be incapable of shooting anything down. Think about it- if the
> Sparrow (mediocre at best) was seen as a big improvement, how lousy must
> Falcon have been.
Although the Falcon had both radar and infrared variants, the usage on the
Phantom was the infrared one, and the replacement was the Sidewinder. The
Falcon had at least one kill in Vietnam, but was hell to use. The seeker
head had to be cooled, IIRC, at least one minute before launch, and then had
a small window of employment... either shoot it then, or carry it around as
lugage. It had some advantages over the Sidewinder in its intended role -
interceptor missile, bomber-shooter. It was carried for many years
afterwards in the belly of the F-106. But has a tactical fighter missile, it
was better to forget it.
_____________
José Herculano
R
"John Carrier" <jx...@comcast.net> wrote in message
news:WuOdna1aP5F...@comcast.com...
YF-17 (Northrop P 530) were originally part of the LWF (Light Weight
Fighter) program. This was to demonstrate what could be built and at what
cost. The goal was a smaller and cheaper fighter to augment the large and
expensive F-15. The LWF program was only to see what could be built and was
not a search for a new aircraft. Early in 1974 the ACF (Air Combat Fighter)
program came into being. with the YF-16 being announced the winner in Dec
1974. There was also a lot of interest from NATO countries looking for a
replacement for the F104. At this point it was not known how successful the
F-16 could be modified for the ground attack role.
The Navy liked this idea so much that they started the VFX program in 1974,
but so the Air Force couldn't say the Navy copied them, the Navy chose the
F-18 (larger development of the YF-17) in early 1975. Sometime in late 1976
Northrop started a program to find a buyer for its land based F-17 Cobra.
And that's the truth as I know it.
Red
R
"José Herculano" <herc...@mail.telepac.pt> wrote in message
news:3f9c450a$0$11255$a729...@news.telepac.pt...
AIM 9 during the Vietanm years.
Yeah and the AIM 26A had a slightly more powerful warhead. ;-)
So did the 26B.
Red Rider
Scott Ferrin
wrote:
There's probably some photos in there of the YF-16 with an F101 engine
in it. The lighter weight (of the aircraft) and more thrust than a
-229 made it pretty impressive I'd guess.
Thomas Schoene
news:csZmb.10677$IA2.6...@twister.southeast.rr.com
> The Navy liked this idea so much that they started the VFX program in
> 1974, but so the Air Force couldn't say the Navy copied them, the
> Navy chose the F-18 (larger development of the YF-17) in early 1975.
> Sometime in late 1976 Northrop started a program to find a buyer for
> its land based F-17 Cobra.
The Navy program was VFAX, not VFX, because attack was always part of the
plan. They were replacing A-7s as well as F-4s, after all, and could not
afford a second pure fighter on carrier decks. But Congress directed them
to use one of the Air Force LWF candidates, reasoning that these were
already tested and would not require as much development effort. The Navy
didn't much care for either design, but opted for the YF-17 as making the
best of a bad situation. In effect, they were hiring McDDonnell Douglas
(now teamed with Northrop) to turn the YF-17 into a carrier-compatible
aircraft. It seems that McAir essentially designed a new plane with a
striking resemblance to the YF-17 (that may be an exageration, but only
just). This became the F/A-18.
Northrop then tried to market a land-based version of this new aircraft as
the F-18L. Though lighter than the carrier-based F/A-18, this was still
heavier than the old YF-17 Cobra. They did use a YF-17 as a marketing tool
for the F-18L, but the production aricraft would have been rather different.
Joe Baugher's history of the F/A-18 is very valuable on these issues:
http://home.att.net/~jbaugher4/f18.html
--
Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail
"If brave men and women never died, there would be nothing
special about bravery." -- Andy Rooney (attributed)
Tom Cooper
"Ed Rasimus" <ras...@adelphia.net> wrote in message
news:2mtmpv403dkgritn7...@4ax.com...
> On Sat, 25 Oct 2003 21:31:25 GMT, "Tom Cooper" <t...@acig.org> wrote:
>
> Great comments Tom (damn, if we keep this up, RAM might become a
> military aviation newsgroup again instead of a he-said/she-said troll
> roost!)
It's very much my pleasure, Ed!
I'll do also some snips, as I see we agree on quite a few things.
> There is the rub, the second crew-man. The Navy had a dedicated RIO
> cadre and seemed to have a lot less difficulty with the two-man
> concept than the USAF. The abortive attempt to put pilots in the
> stick-equipped back seat of F-4s had left a terrible taste in the
> figurative mouth of the AF and the orientation was strictly for a
> single seat airplane.
>
> Now, given that, I'll have to argue that the state of the ergonomic
> art at the time was that an effective single seat cockpit could be
> designed to manage the sensor/weapons suite. Certainly the success of
> both the Eagle and the Viper seem to confirm this.
Actually, in the case of the Eagle, the ergonomics was not really "perfect"
straight away. Rembember that after the AIMVAL/ACEVAL the McD has got a
(pretty long) list of what needs to be improved in the cockpit, including -
between others - the radar and fire-control-system controls. At the time,
these were all considered as poorer and more complex than on the F-14.
And, by the time the USAF F-15s were usually beaten in dogfights with USN
F-14s hands down.
> >The footprint was of course to fit that of the F-4. But from what I read
> >about the history of F-15's the original idea was rather to get something
> >about the size of the later F-18, and certainly not planned to fly Mach
2.5.
> >These requirements were not the specifications that can be found in the
> >original FX. They were added after the Demodedovo '67, when at some stage
> >calls became known for the FX to become capable of Mach 3, in order to
> >directly match the Foxbat. Only resistance from the group that was
running
> >the project kept the dogfighting capability as one of main requirements.
>
> Certainly there were mods to the specs and a capability like Foxbat
> would cause some concern. But, there was also the "high/low" mix
> debate going on in the bowels of the Pentagon. Some were arguing for
> high tech sophistication in small "force multiplier" numbers while
> others were supporting the F-5 simple, agile, low cost, deploy in
> large numbers concept. Clearly the Eagle went high tech and the
> results over the ensuing years support that position. While the F-5 is
> everyman's sports car, if you want to go to war for real, take the
> F-15.
Somewhere around 1968, there was indeed the first trace of the "high/low"
mix, with the FX being "widened" to become a swing-wing monster with a t/o
weight of something like 27.000kg and Mach 3 capability. Simultaneously the
idea of the LWF (Light-Weight Fighter" was born. Then the whole stuff was
mixed into the F-15: the LWF came back in the early 1970s, after the
cost-explosion caused by the inflation.
Originally, however, the FX was always to jump into the footsteps of the
P-51 and F-86.
> I'd have to debate the priorities a bit. The speed with which the AF
> brought ECM pods, ARMs, RWR and Weasels to the table makes me think
> that a lot of stuff was on the front burner. Ditto for PGM
> development. The air/air stuff was coming quickly, but arguably might
> have taken a back seat to the air/mud because (despite the losses to
> MiGs) there was less of a threat from aircraft than SAMs and flak.
Agreed: based on Vietnam experienes, the priority was air-to-ground, and
organizing and equipping strike packages that could "safely" penetrate areas
defended by a dense concentration of the SAM/radar-guided-AAA.
> AIM-7E-2, the "dogfight Sparrow" was available in '72 when I checked
> out in the F-4 and guys had been flying the AIM-7E with interlocks out
> for several years already. Tree was deployed for Linebacker and
> J-birds were on most of the air/air tasked F-4s. Also, first
> production run TCTO-566 LES/TISEO airplanes were showing up in the
> summer of '72, so there was some emphasis.
That's all right too. However, the "dogfight Sparrow" was - just like the
AIM-9J - only half-hearteldy tested. I.e., while the generals were talking
about them as "dogfight weapons", they were tested only at medium or high
altitudes and against non-maneuvering targets. So, both weapons were sent to
SEA without all being known about them. Later, much later, after all the
experiences from SEA were seriously studied, and much more testing of both
weapons being done, then the AIM-7E-2/4 and AIM-9J-1 as well as the AIM-9Ps
became really excellent dogfighting weapons, and so, you'll not hear any of
the Iranians (just for example) who used them in the 1980s complaining at
all.
Re. Tree: surely, they introduced it in the SEA actually already in 1971,
but only in very small numbers (eight F-4Ds with the Tripple Nickel). The
system became widespread in SEA only during the summer of 1972, by the time
the MiGs were really scarce in the skies even over the RP.6, not to talk
about whole North Vietnam. So, there was not much use of it any more (also
due to the fact that the remaining MiGs were not using their IFF as much as
before), and the planes were involved mainly in air-to-ground again. By 1973
the APX-80 was hardly known even to the Israelis - which could have badly
needed it especially when in October of the same year the Arabs came in in
huge - but very tight - formations, which were causing quite some problems
to Israeli GCI-stations.
Besides, the matter seems to have been almost forgotten within the USAF
already by 1976: remember the F-15-pilots starting to use telescopes in
their cockpits instead. Obviously, by 1979 the NCTR became the topic of the
day (despite the fact that it wasn't functioning 100% even in 1999). Others,
however, remain absolutely convinced about the Tree until today. Being
specialized in the topic of the IPGW (1980-1988), I couldn't avoid learning
a lot about projects like CT/Clear Horizont/Second View on F-4s and F-14s
sold to Iran, for example, and I must say they used them with immense
success (especially as the Iraqis were flying around with their
IFF-transponders lightning like Chrismas Trees all the times).
So, while the USAF was doing something on the topic of the air-to-air,
that's not at dispute here: in fact the USAF put together many tremendous
systems. It is just so that the stuff was either slowly introduced, or
dropped soon after, or not tested-out. This, because the priority was
somewhere else. Given all of this, it's actually a wonder that anything like
F-15 could've been fielded at the time...
> "anything but high-subsonic speeds" is ruling out where all reasonable
> dog-fighting is done! If you aren't doing it at "high-subsonic" speed,
> you're going to die in short order.
Sorry Ed, by all respoect, I'm not so sure about this. Certainly, it is a
very good method in peace-time exercises. But I don't think that more than
5-10% of war-time dogfighting done in the last 20 years would confirm this.
As a matter of fact, I talked with quite a few folks who were dogfighting in
different wars of the 1980s, and these do not think that dogfighting at high
subsonic speeds (or dogfighting at all), makes much sence. In fact, most of
them preferred the efficiency of the initial "slash attack". If there was
anything left after this one, they'd then use low-speed/high AoA turns to
point their weapons at another target and the superior acceleration to start
another attack. So, while the opponents were turning around them at high
subsonic speeds, they were swiftly repositioning and shooting down one after
the other... The tactics proved superior even against numerically superior
opponents - and this dozens of times.
But then, to the best of my knowledge, the USAF fought only one dogfight
ever since 1972, and that ended with the MiG-29 flying into the ground...
> The Tom, just like the F-4B and J
> before was typically tasked to take off, proceed to a CAP and orbit
> 120 miles from the boat waiting to be directed by an E-2C to a threat
> inbound. With the Phoenix added to the weapons suite, the air defense
> gained the capability to defend against anti-shipping missiles like
> Kelt and Kitchen.
Yes, and that - as well as the following few paragraphs of your post
actually explain why: after a series of mishaps caused by the combo of
engine problems/pilots mistakes etc. the high AoA/low speed maneuvering was
pretty much restricted in the USN's F-14s community from late 1970s-early
1980s. Safety became paramount, and so the gents there haven't trained
flying in regimes where their planes excelled. I.e. they started dogfighting
at high subsonic speeds, where the F-15 is superior. As said above, the F-14
was nowhere as easy to fly successfully in the dogfight as the F-15: the
pilot really needs to know his stuff, and take immense care about each and
every throttle movement all the time, or the plane will either stall or the
engine explode. That caused problems to many of the less-experienced fliers,
and was frequently ending in accidents. Pilots with (far) more experience
(and quite some guts) on the type, however, haven't had problems pulling the
plane into 70° AoA, doing "bat turns" at nothing more but 70kts and turning
180° in few seconds only, just for example, in order to reposition and point
their weapons at the enemy.
> Tactics were esssential to getting the F-15 success rate up. I was
> aware of a distinct difference during the period I was in USAFE Hq
> between the Bitburg and Soesterburg units. Bit was very tentative in
> their employment while the 32nd TFS was aggressive and creative in
> their tactics.
Truth: after the Vietnam War the USAF was permanently improving its
air-combat tactics, while that of the USN actually degenerated to a degree.
It must be mentioned here, however, that many exercises involving USN
F-14-units had pretty strange RoEs, to say at least. In more than 50% of the
cases the Tomcats were not permitted to use AIM-54s at all, so even this
advantage was removed right away, and their opponents were not acting the
way they would act in the case of the war and if having to expect to get
under a threat of long-range shots. I know about several specific cases
where trully stupid things were done: in one a single F-14 was sent against
a pair of F-15s that were in a climb to 30.000ft and more, because somebody
aboard the carrier wanted to see "if the Tomcat can split the Eagles". What
should have been the purpose of that "exercise" I don't know, but surely as
hell the Tomcat was "shot down" before long.
So also in the IIPGW, in 1992: although equipped with the CT, the F-14s were
considered as "not suitable" of "safe" long-range engagements against an air
force that was flying with its IFF-transponders "on" all the time. Why?
Well, because the NCTR-equipped F-15C MSIP-IIs should have had the needed
long-range EID-capability even if it was known that this was far from
functioning perfectly... Strange, to say at least...
> Don't know what their problem was, but with the Mk 80 series LD/GP
> bombs being the primary conventional munition and with the expressed
> preference in the period for "smart system/dumb bomb" technology, I
> can't see that being possible. In fact, Osirik was 1981 and the
> Israeli seemed to do OK with Mk-84 dumb bombs coming off cleanly!
Indeed: the Israelis completed the separation testing for the Mk.84s in
order to be able to hit Osirak with these weapons!
The Mk.83 separation testing was completed by the Dutch after one of their
"Lawn Darts" got a better part of one of his ventral fin clipped away by a
(live) bomb that went astry.
Tony Volk
> > "anything but high-subsonic speeds" is ruling out where all reasonable
> > dog-fighting is done! If you aren't doing it at "high-subsonic" speed,
> > you're going to die in short order.
> Sorry Ed, by all respoect, I'm not so sure about this. Certainly, it is a
> very good method in peace-time exercises. But I don't think that more than
> 5-10% of war-time dogfighting done in the last 20 years would confirm
this.
> As a matter of fact, I talked with quite a few folks who were dogfighting
in
> different wars of the 1980s, and these do not think that dogfighting at
high
> subsonic speeds (or dogfighting at all), makes much sence. In fact, most
of
> them preferred the efficiency of the initial "slash attack". If there was
> anything left after this one, they'd then use low-speed/high AoA turns to
> point their weapons at another target and the superior acceleration to
start
> another attack. So, while the opponents were turning around them at high
> subsonic speeds, they were swiftly repositioning and shooting down one
after
> the other... The tactics proved superior even against numerically superior
> opponents - and this dozens of times.
It's always seemed very unusual to me that the super-maneuverability of
current Russian fighters gets so much bad press from many writers (and some
pilots). I can try and get names (I have them somewhere), but I'm sure
we're all familiar with general comments about how current super-maneuvers
look pretty at airshows, but mean f**k all in real combat. The old "speed
(energy) is life" dictum dominates. However, Tom's comments draw light to
my thoughts on the matter (again, only as a deadly flight-sim ace and avid
reader) that in current dogfights, conventional energy management is less
effective than pointing your nose and getting off a missile ASAP.
It would seem to me that blowing through the merge and maintaining
energy would be much less effective than doing a maneuver that wasted your
energy but gave you terrific turn rates and/or high AoA (e.g., circle,
cobra-type high AoA maneuvers). Doing so allows you to fire the very agile,
and very capable (from a seeking point of view) IR missiles at your
opponent. These missiles surely have enough energy to be deadly at any
reasonable dogfighting range (assuming you're not making Mach 2 slashing
attacks on each other). So by quickly getting a missile in the air, you've
got a chance of killing your opponent, and you've got a great way to keep
him pointed away from you while superior thrust-weight ratios give you back
your lost energy (to make a follow-up attack if required). Surely, even if
the bandit is still extending, you can lob an R-77, -27, or AIM-120 at them.
The idea that you'd need speed/energy to counter "unexpected" opponents
appears less plausible with modern combat (low number of fighters combined
with quality of SA provided by data links and airborne radar). The same
high thrust-weight ratios should let you quickly get back your energy after
your missiles have splashed the current bandit (I'll assume that your
wingman is keeping his wingman busy). So the combination of super-agility,
very capable missiles, and very high thrust-weight ratios seem to me to
represent a significant shift in the way dogfights should occur (from an
emphasis on energy management to quick nose-pointing and snap missile
shots). No longer are we dealing with primarily nose-tail engagements (due
to weapons limitations), with large numbers of fighters, that do not have
today's high thrust-weight ratios.
I'm aware that some CF-18 pilots in the RCAF have expressed genuine
concern with regards to the AoA abilities of the Su-27 family in close-in
engagements (RAF pilots I've met also speak grimly on the topic), and I also
know that typically, US pilots (and especially Eagle pilots) refer to a
dogfight as something that happens only if you've screwed up your BVR
engagement. I'm also aware that high speed initially gives you a better
chance of achieving that most deadly advantage, surprise. However, I'd be
interested to know if there still is the mentality that speed/energy is life
or has this changed(inside a dogfight, I'm aware of how important speed is
in BVR, as well as in deciding whether or not an engagement will occur in
the first place, and generally agree that speed is life)? How much does the
choice of the F-22 over the F-23 reflect this kind of mentality? I'd be
interested in hearing further opinions on this matter. Regards,
Tony
p.s.- Tom, you talked briefly about it, but I'd love to find out more about
how the TF-30's performed (or didn't!) for the Iranians in dogfights
Ed Rasimus
<avolkremove...@planetavp.com> wrote:
> A few armchair comments for this great thread inserted below.
>
>> > "anything but high-subsonic speeds" is ruling out where all reasonable
>> > dog-fighting is done! If you aren't doing it at "high-subsonic" speed,
>> > you're going to die in short order.
>> Sorry Ed, by all respoect, I'm not so sure about this. Certainly, it is a
>> very good method in peace-time exercises. But I don't think that more than
>> 5-10% of war-time dogfighting done in the last 20 years would confirm
>this.
>> As a matter of fact, I talked with quite a few folks who were dogfighting
>> in different wars of the 1980s, and these do not think that dogfighting at
>> high subsonic speeds (or dogfighting at all), makes much sence. In fact, most
>> of them preferred the efficiency of the initial "slash attack". If there was
>> anything left after this one, they'd then use low-speed/high AoA turns to
>> point their weapons at another target and the superior acceleration to
>> start another attack. So, while the opponents were turning around them at high
>> subsonic speeds, they were swiftly repositioning and shooting down one
>> after the other... The tactics proved superior even against numerically superior
>> opponents - and this dozens of times.
Well, I can't disagree with anything you've said (except for the
"repositioning and shooting down one after the other..") You missed my
regular and frequent rants in this forum that "dogfighting" is stupid.
The preferred sequence of event is always: first shoot BVR, second
shoot in the face at first opportunity WVR, third slash through with
high angle gun shot, fourth separate and reposition. Lather, rinse,
repeat. But, don't "turn and burn" with an opponent if you can
possible avoid it. If you do turn, follow the Israeli maxim of not
staying for more than 30-45 degrees of turn. At all times stay fast.
Do not dissipate total energy, although you may exchange kinetic for
potentical occasionally.
Given all that, the underlying principle remains, always stay at or
above your aircraft's corner velocity. Failure to do so, even with
high T/W systems is foolish. This isn't a game. It's living and dying.
>
> It's always seemed very unusual to me that the super-maneuverability of
>current Russian fighters gets so much bad press from many writers (and some
>pilots). I can try and get names (I have them somewhere), but I'm sure
>we're all familiar with general comments about how current super-maneuvers
>look pretty at airshows, but mean f**k all in real combat. The old "speed
>(energy) is life" dictum dominates.
As the Baron often said, "anything else is rubbish." Speed is life.
Period! Slowing down to kill one adversary only means that you are now
vulnerable to the adversary's wingman. No one should be in a combat
arena without mutual support.
> However, Tom's comments draw light to
>my thoughts on the matter (again, only as a deadly flight-sim ace and avid
>reader) that in current dogfights, conventional energy management is less
>effective than pointing your nose and getting off a missile ASAP.
Correct, but don't confuse pointing and shooting with squandering
your energy.
> It would seem to me that blowing through the merge and maintaining
>energy would be much less effective than doing a maneuver that wasted your
>energy but gave you terrific turn rates and/or high AoA (e.g., circle,
>cobra-type high AoA maneuvers).
It's the wingman! The threat is always paired (at the minimum.)
Slowing leads to vulnerability. Better to separate and reposition for
an attack at high energy.
> Doing so allows you to fire the very agile,
>and very capable (from a seeking point of view) IR missiles at your
>opponent. These missiles surely have enough energy to be deadly at any
>reasonable dogfighting range (assuming you're not making Mach 2 slashing
>attacks on each other). So by quickly getting a missile in the air, you've
>got a chance of killing your opponent, and you've got a great way to keep
>him pointed away from you while superior thrust-weight ratios give you back
>your lost energy (to make a follow-up attack if required).
Did I mention the wingman?
> The idea that you'd need speed/energy to counter "unexpected" opponents
>appears less plausible with modern combat (low number of fighters combined
>with quality of SA provided by data links and airborne radar). The same
>high thrust-weight ratios should let you quickly get back your energy after
>your missiles have splashed the current bandit (I'll assume that your
>wingman is keeping his wingman busy).
First assumption (low plausibility of unknowns) is wrong. Nothing
attracts maggots like a swirling fight with missile cons visible for
miles. Second assumption regarding wingmen is wrong. It happens that
engagement break up into multiple one-v-ones, but the desired
situation is to maintain mutual support. If support breaks down, the
priority should be to separate.
> So the combination of super-agility,
>very capable missiles, and very high thrust-weight ratios seem to me to
>represent a significant shift in the way dogfights should occur (from an
>emphasis on energy management to quick nose-pointing and snap missile
>shots). No longer are we dealing with primarily nose-tail engagements (due
>to weapons limitations), with large numbers of fighters, that do not have
>today's high thrust-weight ratios.
You are basically correct here, but you still shouldn't be squandering
energy. The engagements aren't turn & burn with the offensive
dedicated to sweetening the tracking shot and the defensive
frantically trying to defeat solution. They are, by definition, going
to be slashing attack with high off-boresight excursions by weapons.
The ability to defeat the threat is linked to high energy state. No
energy, no missile defense. You die.
> I'm aware that some CF-18 pilots in the RCAF have expressed genuine
>concern with regards to the AoA abilities of the Su-27 family in close-in
>engagements (RAF pilots I've met also speak grimly on the topic), and I also
>know that typically, US pilots (and especially Eagle pilots) refer to a
>dogfight as something that happens only if you've screwed up your BVR
>engagement.
Can I hear an AMEN?
> I'm also aware that high speed initially gives you a better
>chance of achieving that most deadly advantage, surprise. However, I'd be
>interested to know if there still is the mentality that speed/energy is life
>or has this changed(inside a dogfight, I'm aware of how important speed is
>in BVR, as well as in deciding whether or not an engagement will occur in
>the first place, and generally agree that speed is life)? How much does the
>choice of the F-22 over the F-23 reflect this kind of mentality? I'd be
>interested in hearing further opinions on this matter. Regards,
Having been on F-23 development, I don't get the last question. Both
systems were high stealth, supercruise required, high agility, passive
sensors and generally BVR oriented as first option. The desires
somewhat outstripped the technology capability, but the aircraft
didn't have a lot of difference in performance.
There are tradeoffs between stealth and agility. The two concepts
aren't mutually exclusive, but optimizing both is a difficult
aerodynamic task. With less currrent capability to meet the exotic
goals of the program, the result is a skewing of the production
aircraft toward agility. Either proposal could do that.
Ed Rasimus
<avolkremove...@planetavp.com> wrote:
> A few armchair comments for this great thread inserted below.
>
>> > "anything but high-subsonic speeds" is ruling out where all reasonable
>> > dog-fighting is done! If you aren't doing it at "high-subsonic" speed,
>> > you're going to die in short order.
>> Sorry Ed, by all respoect, I'm not so sure about this. Certainly, it is a
>> very good method in peace-time exercises. But I don't think that more than
>> 5-10% of war-time dogfighting done in the last 20 years would confirm
>this.
>> As a matter of fact, I talked with quite a few folks who were dogfighting
>> in different wars of the 1980s, and these do not think that dogfighting at
>> high subsonic speeds (or dogfighting at all), makes much sence. In fact, most
>> of them preferred the efficiency of the initial "slash attack". If there was
>> anything left after this one, they'd then use low-speed/high AoA turns to
>> point their weapons at another target and the superior acceleration to
>> start another attack. So, while the opponents were turning around them at high
>> subsonic speeds, they were swiftly repositioning and shooting down one
>> after the other... The tactics proved superior even against numerically superior
>> opponents - and this dozens of times.
Well, I can't disagree with anything you've said (except for the
"repositioning and shooting down one after the other..") You missed my
regular and frequent rants in this forum that "dogfighting" is stupid.
The preferred sequence of event is always: first shoot BVR, second
shoot in the face at first opportunity WVR, third slash through with
high angle gun shot, fourth separate and reposition. Lather, rinse,
repeat. But, don't "turn and burn" with an opponent if you can
possible avoid it. If you do turn, follow the Israeli maxim of not
staying for more than 30-45 degrees of turn. At all times stay fast.
Do not dissipate total energy, although you may exchange kinetic for
potentical occasionally.
Given all that, the underlying principle remains, always stay at or
above your aircraft's corner velocity. Failure to do so, even with
high T/W systems is foolish. This isn't a game. It's living and dying.
>
> It's always seemed very unusual to me that the super-maneuverability of
>current Russian fighters gets so much bad press from many writers (and some
>pilots). I can try and get names (I have them somewhere), but I'm sure
>we're all familiar with general comments about how current super-maneuvers
>look pretty at airshows, but mean f**k all in real combat. The old "speed
>(energy) is life" dictum dominates.
As the Baron often said, "anything else is rubbish." Speed is life.
Period! Slowing down to kill one adversary only means that you are now
vulnerable to the adversary's wingman. No one should be in a combat
arena without mutual support.
> However, Tom's comments draw light to
>my thoughts on the matter (again, only as a deadly flight-sim ace and avid
>reader) that in current dogfights, conventional energy management is less
>effective than pointing your nose and getting off a missile ASAP.
Correct, but don't confuse pointing and shooting with squandering
your energy.
> It would seem to me that blowing through the merge and maintaining
>energy would be much less effective than doing a maneuver that wasted your
>energy but gave you terrific turn rates and/or high AoA (e.g., circle,
>cobra-type high AoA maneuvers).
It's the wingman! The threat is always paired (at the minimum.)
Slowing leads to vulnerability. Better to separate and reposition for
an attack at high energy.
> Doing so allows you to fire the very agile,
>and very capable (from a seeking point of view) IR missiles at your
>opponent. These missiles surely have enough energy to be deadly at any
>reasonable dogfighting range (assuming you're not making Mach 2 slashing
>attacks on each other). So by quickly getting a missile in the air, you've
>got a chance of killing your opponent, and you've got a great way to keep
>him pointed away from you while superior thrust-weight ratios give you back
>your lost energy (to make a follow-up attack if required).
Did I mention the wingman?
> The idea that you'd need speed/energy to counter "unexpected" opponents
>appears less plausible with modern combat (low number of fighters combined
>with quality of SA provided by data links and airborne radar). The same
>high thrust-weight ratios should let you quickly get back your energy after
>your missiles have splashed the current bandit (I'll assume that your
>wingman is keeping his wingman busy).
First assumption (low plausibility of unknowns) is wrong. Nothing
attracts maggots like a swirling fight with missile cons visible for
miles. Second assumption regarding wingmen is wrong. It happens that
engagement break up into multiple one-v-ones, but the desired
situation is to maintain mutual support. If support breaks down, the
priority should be to separate.
> So the combination of super-agility,
>very capable missiles, and very high thrust-weight ratios seem to me to
>represent a significant shift in the way dogfights should occur (from an
>emphasis on energy management to quick nose-pointing and snap missile
>shots). No longer are we dealing with primarily nose-tail engagements (due
>to weapons limitations), with large numbers of fighters, that do not have
>today's high thrust-weight ratios.
You are basically correct here, but you still shouldn't be squandering
energy. The engagements aren't turn & burn with the offensive
dedicated to sweetening the tracking shot and the defensive
frantically trying to defeat solution. They are, by definition, going
to be slashing attack with high off-boresight excursions by weapons.
The ability to defeat the threat is linked to high energy state. No
energy, no missile defense. You die.
> I'm aware that some CF-18 pilots in the RCAF have expressed genuine
>concern with regards to the AoA abilities of the Su-27 family in close-in
>engagements (RAF pilots I've met also speak grimly on the topic), and I also
>know that typically, US pilots (and especially Eagle pilots) refer to a
>dogfight as something that happens only if you've screwed up your BVR
>engagement.
Can I hear an AMEN?
> I'm also aware that high speed initially gives you a better
>chance of achieving that most deadly advantage, surprise. However, I'd be
>interested to know if there still is the mentality that speed/energy is life
>or has this changed(inside a dogfight, I'm aware of how important speed is
>in BVR, as well as in deciding whether or not an engagement will occur in
>the first place, and generally agree that speed is life)? How much does the
>choice of the F-22 over the F-23 reflect this kind of mentality? I'd be
>interested in hearing further opinions on this matter. Regards,
Having been on F-23 development, I don't get the last question. Both
systems were high stealth, supercruise required, high agility, passive
sensors and generally BVR oriented as first option. The desires
somewhat outstripped the technology capability, but the aircraft
didn't have a lot of difference in performance.
There are tradeoffs between stealth and agility. The two concepts
aren't mutually exclusive, but optimizing both is a difficult
aerodynamic task. With less currrent capability to meet the exotic
goals of the program, the result is a skewing of the production
aircraft toward agility. Either proposal could do that.
>
Tom Cooper
"Tony Volk" <avolkremove...@planetavp.com> wrote in message
news:bni4ec$10mbg9$1...@ID-209907.news.uni-berlin.de...
<snip>
> p.s.- Tom, you talked briefly about it, but I'd love to find out more
about
> how the TF-30's performed (or didn't!) for the Iranians in dogfights
From what I know so far (bear in mind that the research is still very much
going on), I'd say that during one out of ten air combats in which Iranian
F-14s were involved something would happen to one of the engines.
They experienced all the usual stuff caused by the poor stall margin of the
TF-30: afterburner pops resulting in catastrophic engine stall, engine
compressor stalls at high AoA, flame-outs during IFR, turbine failures etc.
And this not only once, or two, but dozens of times: just for example, one
pilot alone experienced no less but three catastrophic engine stalls on the
same F-14A between 1980 and 1993, two of which already after the war, when
he had no less but 2.000 hours in combat.
Two additional remarks in response to Ed:
> Well, I can't disagree with anything you've said (except for the
> "repositioning and shooting down one after the other..") You missed my
> regular and frequent rants in this forum that "dogfighting" is stupid.
Obviously I did. ;-))
> The preferred sequence of event is always: first shoot BVR, second
> shoot in the face at first opportunity WVR, third slash through with
> high angle gun shot, fourth separate and reposition. Lather, rinse,
> repeat. But, don't "turn and burn" with an opponent if you can
> possible avoid it. If you do turn, follow the Israeli maxim of not
> staying for more than 30-45 degrees of turn. At all times stay fast.
> Do not dissipate total energy, although you may exchange kinetic for
> potentical occasionally.
In the case of the Iranians, there were several problems, and these were
obviously the reasons why they couldn't go 100% according to this doctrine:
- in 50% of cases they were underway alone (without wingman), and facing at
least four or six, often enough between eight and 14 opponents;
- their main opponents in dogfights were Mirage F.1s and MiG-23s: both were
poor in turning, but excellent in acceleration and maintaining high subsonic
speeds - or MiG-21s, which could do good breaks, but were very poor in
acceleration
- the Iraqis were very-well aware of the AWG-9's weakness when tracking a
target flying at low level away from it - if working in the high-PRF mode
So the usual engagement looked something like this:
- if the Tomcat was armed with the AIM-54, the first missile would usually
be launched from ranges between 20 and 70km (although, I've got a still from
a TISEO-video, taken by wingman F-4, showing an AIM-54 going off over a
MiG-23 after being fired from a range of only 6.400m!)
- then the F-14 would approach to 12nm to launch the first Sparrow
- the AIM-9P was not an all-aspect weapon, while - when engaged by F-14s the
Iraqis were usually running for life at a speed of heat and lowest possible
level; so as next the Tomcat would slash through the enemy formation, do a
Bat-turn, Immelman, or something of the kind in order to turn around, and
then accelerate in order to catch the opponents and attack with Sidewinders
from behind
By that time, the Iraqi formations were usually completely scattered, with
what is left of them (usually pairs) moving like a pack of sardines: if the
leader turned left, everybody else was turning left. Reverse turns were
frequently also done, and many IrAF planes lost because of this mistake.
Seldom, very seldom would any Iraqi turn back to engage: this could happen
only if the pilot felt cornered, or one of his really close buddies was
cornered and calling for help.
So, in the essence - and except they flew MiG-21s - you´ve had the Iraqis
flying high-speed straight, high-speed turn, high-speed straight, and the
Iranians flying high-speed straight, low-speed U-turns, acceleration,
high-speed straight. The thing functioned (with a SINGLE exception in eight
years of the war!) because of many reasons, including excellent and
realistic training of Iranian F-14-crews and their mutual support (within
the cockpit), poor Iraqi AAMs, the superior maneuverability and acceleration
of the F-14 etc., etc.
D. Jones
BTW, I know it was from sometime ago, but I really enjoyed reading
your comments on the F-105. [Subj: Re: Aircraft You Have Flown
(Impressions); Newsgroups: rec.aviation.military, sci.military.naval]
GregD
>
> There's probably some photos in there of the YF-16 with an F101 engine
> in it. The lighter weight (of the aircraft) and more thrust than a
> -229 made it pretty impressive I'd guess.
I believe the F101 engine was flown/tested on FSD #1 (75-0745), not
on either one of the YF-16 prototypes.
GregD
Ed Rasimus
>So, in the essence - and except they flew MiG-21s - you´ve had the Iraqis
>flying high-speed straight, high-speed turn, high-speed straight, and the
>Iranians flying high-speed straight, low-speed U-turns, acceleration,
>high-speed straight. The thing functioned (with a SINGLE exception in eight
>years of the war!) because of many reasons, including excellent and
>realistic training of Iranian F-14-crews and their mutual support (within
>the cockpit), poor Iraqi AAMs, the superior maneuverability and acceleration
>of the F-14 etc., etc.
>
> Tom Cooper
And, of course, we must note that a high percentage of Iranian pilots
were USAF trained while the Iraqi were Soviet trained. During the
years I was in Air Training Command at Williams, we had a large number
of Iranian students come through the program. Some better than others,
but all getting the USAF T-37/T-38 syllabus and then progressing to
operational qualification at a USAF course as well.
Interestingly, my first foreign student when I returned from my F-105
tour and became a T-37 IP, was a Moroccan. He had been through the
Soviet pilot training course already and had more than 900 hours in
MiGs--15 and 17! He had more than twice as many hours in fighters than
I did! Nevertheless, he was never allowed to solo in the T-37 and
during the formation phase, while he could hang on the wing better
than a lot of IPs, he was totally incapable of leading a training
formation.
When he advanced to T-38s, the higher-ups decided to let him solo in
the Talon. On about his third solo sortie, he jumped out of the
airplane. The airplane landed inverted, with full flaps down, full
forward trim, both throttles in AB and both engine fuel controls
cavitated and the engines flamed out. The determination was that he
was trying to see how long he could fly inverted (despite the dash-1
prohibition against inverted flight over 30 second.) When the engines
flamed out, he tried a "tiger airstart" by going to AB, but they
wouldn't relight because of the cavitation of the fuel controls. He
panicked and jumped out, costing us the airplane.
He was washed out and returned to Morocco. The reason he was taking US
pilot training after all those hours and already graduating from
Soviet training was that he had bailed out of a MiG-17 after hitting
the roof of his girl friend's house in Morocco doing a buzz job.
Tony Volk
You missed my
> regular and frequent rants in this forum that "dogfighting" is stupid.
Best fun in simulators, but I totally agree with you where real life is
concerned!
> The preferred sequence of event is always: first shoot BVR, second
> shoot in the face at first opportunity WVR,
I agree completely. Which makes much of the following moot in real
life, but still fun to discuss!
third slash through with
> high angle gun shot, fourth separate and reposition.
I would say third, turn like hell and get a missile on you. Screw
missile defense, your best defense is a good offense. If your wingman can
attack me, what's my wingman doing? Why isn't he covering me by sending
your wingman an AIM-9 or R-73? While you two are slashing and extending,
we've used as much energy as possible to get our noses pointed at you first
(within the limits of our missile's abilities). Our noses are now pointing
at you, my missile is launched, and you now have to use that energy you've
saved to dodge the missile. Your slash kept you out of guns range, but
certainly not out of missile range (especially considering that the AIM-120
and R-77 are agile enough to be used in a dogfight). I have the leisure of
regaining my energy, or shooting another missile, or getting out of dodge,
etc. My wingman is occupying your wingman. I'll keep launching missiles
until they connect, while you are frantically on the defense against my
missiles. This shouldn't take more than a minute or so, which means any
other planes more than 10 miles away won't be here (assuming a speed of 600
mph). If there are planes closer than 10 miles, well then that's a
different story, but that seems to be a very rare event in modern (1990- )
engagements.
I guess I could sum up my position by taking offense over defense.
Offense in firing a missile ASAP vs. saving energy to defeat one, offense in
having both fighters engage (this is certainly the case with recent U.S. BVR
engagements), and offense in ending the engagement ASAP instead of saving
energy for surprise bandits.
> Correct, but don't confuse pointing and shooting with squandering
> your energy.
It is my understanding that achieving maximum instantaneous rate of turn
will use up your energy (correct me if I'm wrong).
> First assumption (low plausibility of unknowns) is wrong. Nothing
> attracts maggots like a swirling fight with missile cons visible for
> miles. Second assumption regarding wingmen is wrong. It happens that
> engagement break up into multiple one-v-ones, but the desired
> situation is to maintain mutual support. If support breaks down, the
> priority should be to separate.
Well, other than Iran-Iraq, and Bekka, (both 80's), I can't think of any
big furballs that have happened recently. Certainly, one could get enough
SA from AWACS to make a rapid judgement about the likelihood of your
dogfight getting crashed by more bandits in the near future. And I'm
confused about the wingman support. In an era of all-aspect IR missiles, it
seems to me that your best defense is to go on the offense, meaning that
your wingman should be doing more than just covering your six, he should be
actively trying to remove threats on his own. I thought one of the
advantages of the leuce-deuce was to allow both planes to bring their
weapons to bear on the enemy simultaneously? The pilots' comments I've read
regarding USAF engagements in the last 10 or so years (Gulf & Balkans) all
speak of near-simultaneous engagement (mostly BVR), so why wouldn't it be
fair to assume that my wingman takes your wingman, leaving me no worries
about "spending" my energy on getting my nose (and missiles) pointed at you?
> You are basically correct here, but you still shouldn't be squandering
> energy. The engagements aren't turn & burn with the offensive
> dedicated to sweetening the tracking shot and the defensive
> frantically trying to defeat solution. They are, by definition, going
> to be slashing attack with high off-boresight excursions by weapons.
> The ability to defeat the threat is linked to high energy state. No
> energy, no missile defense. You die.
I agree about defeating the missile, but would it not be better to fire
a missile before your opponent and thus not have to face a reply from him
(assuming he's not suicidal enough to delay his dodge by firing at you), and
thus not have to worry a lick about your energy (wingman and others
discussed above)?
How much does the
> >choice of the F-22 over the F-23 reflect this kind of mentality? I'd be
> >interested in hearing further opinions on this matter. Regards,
> Having been on F-23 development, I don't get the last question. Both
> systems were high stealth, supercruise required, high agility, passive
> sensors and generally BVR oriented as first option. The desires
> somewhat outstripped the technology capability, but the aircraft
> didn't have a lot of difference in performance.
> There are tradeoffs between stealth and agility. The two concepts
> aren't mutually exclusive, but optimizing both is a difficult
> aerodynamic task. With less currrent capability to meet the exotic
> goals of the program, the result is a skewing of the production
> aircraft toward agility. Either proposal could do that.
I knew you were on the team, which is why I asked (didn't that used to
be in your signature a long time ago?). It has been reported that the F-23s
emphasis on speed and stealth was not as well accepted by the TAC (and
TAC-dominated ACC) as the F-22s more balanced emphasis that included
super-maneuverability through thrust vectoring (referred to tongue in cheek
as giving the USAF what it wanted, instead of what it asked for). The
fighter generals wanted to move a little further away from a pure BVR
fighter (a move that I think has its pluses and its cons). Heck, I'd love
it if you spilled the beans on the F-23 as far as you legally could! Thanks
for the comments Ed (and Tom). I appreciate that you're a pro talking to an
amateur, but hey, at least we're talking tactics and not logistics! ;)
Cheers,
Tony
Tom Cooper
> And, of course, we must note that a high percentage of Iranian pilots
> were USAF trained while the Iraqi were Soviet trained. During the
> years I was in Air Training Command at Williams, we had a large number
> of Iranian students come through the program. Some better than others,
> but all getting the USAF T-37/T-38 syllabus and then progressing to
> operational qualification at a USAF course as well.
As a matter of fact, all the Iranian F-5, F-4 and F-14 pilots that qualified
before 1978 were trained in the USA. They usually started with T-38s, then
went on to F-5s (either in the USA or at home). The F-14-pilots were trained
by the VF-124 and VF-101. Nobody would get even a rear seat in the F-4
without at least 400 hours on fast jets: front seat only after 400
additional hours in the rear (bear in mind the IIAF had the USAF-philosophy
of putting two pilots into the Phantom, not a pilot and a WSO). To get the
place in the front seat of the F-14 one needed at least 1.000 hours plus
between two and four tours with the USAF, USN, IDF/AF, RAF, Luftwaffe etc.
So, what they've got in F-14s were really experienced people. BTW, by 1978
also up to 80% of their pilots were qualified on all three main types.
The situation started to change only because of the F-16 program: in
preparation for acquizition of the first 160 Falcons they started training a
huge number of new pilots, majority of these in Iran. Most of these,
however, never finished their pilot-training (in fact, quite a few joined
the revolution and became "morale" officers, Mullah's watchdogs, all the
time keeping an eye on the "Shah-pilots" during the war with Iraq).
> When he advanced to T-38s, the higher-ups decided to let him solo in
> the Talon. On about his third solo sortie, he jumped out of the
> airplane. The airplane landed inverted, with full flaps down, full
> forward trim, both throttles in AB and both engine fuel controls
> cavitated and the engines flamed out. The determination was that he
> was trying to see how long he could fly inverted (despite the dash-1
> prohibition against inverted flight over 30 second.) When the engines
> flamed out, he tried a "tiger airstart" by going to AB, but they
> wouldn't relight because of the cavitation of the fuel controls. He
> panicked and jumped out, costing us the airplane.
The Moroccans lost a great deal of their good pilots after the coup attempt
in 1972: at the time several of their early F-5-pilots intercepted the
Boeing 727 carrying the King from a visit in France, and shot it up,
damaging two engines and most of the tail. The plane landed safely and the
King then purged the FARM massively. They started recovering only during the
1980s, when the air force became badly needed because of the war in West
Sahara. The need for pilots was such at the time that the FARM became the
first Arab air force to have female pilot.
monkey
decision to turn or run will be made long before the merge. If the
decision to run is made, the pass will be min sep as fast as possible.
If the desision is to fight, the merge will be at or near corner (325
KCAS for the CF-18). Though we always fight in elements for mutual
support, you would be a fool to not fight your bast turning jet as the
engaged man. Third, when was the last time a NATO?coalition pilot was
allowed to use a BVR weapon, e.g. VID was not required?
John Penta
>The Moroccans lost a great deal of their good pilots after the coup attempt
>in 1972: at the time several of their early F-5-pilots intercepted the
>Boeing 727 carrying the King from a visit in France, and shot it up,
>damaging two engines and most of the tail. The plane landed safely and the
>King then purged the FARM massively. They started recovering only during the
>1980s, when the air force became badly needed because of the war in West
>Sahara. The need for pilots was such at the time that the FARM became the
>first Arab air force to have female pilot.
They still have female pilots?
On the same note, I recall a case in Israel where a female went to the
Supreme Court and eventually got admitted into pilot training; What's
the numbers in terms of females in combat ait units there?
John
Jeff Crowell
> I would say third, turn like hell and get a missile on you. Screw
> missile defense, your best defense is a good offense.
I don't care what you're flying, if you "turn like' hell" you have blown
off all your energy, or at least enough that you can't do anything
about me if you even get a glimpse.
> If your wingman can attack me, what's my wingman doing?
If your wingman is off medal-hunting, who's covering your butt?
> While you two are slashing and extending,
> we've used as much energy as possible to get our noses pointed at you
first
> (within the limits of our missile's abilities). Our noses are now
pointing
> at you, my missile is launched, and you now have to use that energy you've
> saved to dodge the missile.
Ed's kept his energy and you've lost a lot of yours getting your nose
pointed at him... amazing what that much delta v does to a missile's range.
> Your slash kept you out of guns range, but
> certainly not out of missile range (especially considering that the
AIM-120
> and R-77 are agile enough to be used in a dogfight). I have the leisure
of
> regaining my energy, or shooting another missile, or getting out of dodge,
> etc. My wingman is occupying your wingman. I'll keep launching missiles
> until they connect, while you are frantically on the defense against my
> missiles.
Uh-huh. And while your head is up and locked, my section comes
through the fight at the speed of heat and thoroughly ruins your day.
It's the one you don't see that kills you.
You are betting your life that it's just you 'n' him, and it just may not
be so. Regardless of AWACS or any other technology, you can't
ever be sure how many bad guys are in the fight.
Jeff
Ed Rasimus
<avolkremove...@planetavp.com> wrote:
Great comments, Tony. We're trying hard to raise the level of
discourse here and maybe it will pay off. It's apparent that you've
thought a lot about this. I've just got a brief response.
>
> I would say third, turn like hell and get a missile on you. Screw
>missile defense, your best defense is a good offense.
There are a load of cliches about that. Boots Blesse is noted for "no
guts, no glory" and of course there is "fortune favors the bold."
Here's my timid response: "I didn't always win, but I never lost."
You can't be afraid of your shadow, and you're out there to do a job,
but if the odds aren't in your favor, it is prudent to rethink the
situation. I'm proud that in more than 250 combat missions, 150 of
which were to MiG/SAM country, I never lost a member of my
flight--never a leader that I was supporting, never a wingman that I
was dragging to war. It might be luck, it might be skill, it might
just be coincidence.
> I knew you were on the team, which is why I asked (didn't that used to
>be in your signature a long time ago?). It has been reported that the F-23s
>emphasis on speed and stealth was not as well accepted by the TAC (and
>TAC-dominated ACC) as the F-22s more balanced emphasis that included
>super-maneuverability through thrust vectoring (referred to tongue in cheek
>as giving the USAF what it wanted, instead of what it asked for). The
>fighter generals wanted to move a little further away from a pure BVR
>fighter (a move that I think has its pluses and its cons). Heck, I'd love
>it if you spilled the beans on the F-23 as far as you legally could! Thanks
>for the comments Ed (and Tom). I appreciate that you're a pro talking to an
>amateur, but hey, at least we're talking tactics and not logistics! ;)
With regard to "bean spilling", I was on ATF development at Northrop
in '87-'88 during Dem/Val and left before the FSD phase started (Full
Scale Development). A lot changed when the heavy iron rolled out the
hangar door.
I don't think TAC was driving the decision. Acquistion in those days
was through Systems Command and input came from all three operator
commands (TAC/PACAF/USAFE). We regularly had customer visitations and
both demos and discussions. They came in and took briefings, talked
requirements and flew our simulators. A lot was devoted to concepts of
operations and the influence was heavily oriented toward
stealth--shoot and scoot without ever being detected.
My suspicion to this day is that the choice was driven by Lockheed's
prior stealth production of F-117 and Northrop's poor record of
delivery on B-2 and other programs. While the -23 was arguably
superior in many ways, there was serious question about deliverability
compared to Lockheed.
Alan Minyard
>
>The Navy liked this idea so much that they started the VFX program in 1974,
>but so the Air Force couldn't say the Navy copied them, the Navy chose the
>F-18 (larger development of the YF-17) in early 1975. Sometime in late 1976
>Northrop started a program to find a buyer for its land based F-17 Cobra.
>
>And that's the truth as I know it.
>
>Red
>
Al Minyard
Alan Minyard
If all of this were true, the Harrier would be the world's premier dog fighter.
it is not.
Al Minyard
Tony Volk
> discourse here and maybe it will pay off. It's apparent that you've
> thought a lot about this. I've just got a brief response.
I've always enjoy reading your posts, as well as those of the folks here
who care more about discussing aviation than political platforms, personal
attacks, or screwy conspiracy theories.
> There are a load of cliches about that. Boots Blesse is noted for "no
> guts, no glory" and of course there is "fortune favors the bold."
> Here's my timid response: "I didn't always win, but I never lost."
. I'm proud that in more than 250 combat missions, 150 of
> which were to MiG/SAM country, I never lost a member of my
> flight--never a leader that I was supporting, never a wingman that I
> was dragging to war. It might be luck, it might be skill, it might
> just be coincidence.
I agree 100% with your comments, and I'm sure you would've hung it out
as far as needed to do a critical job (e.g., shoot down a rogue Bear) or to
save a buddy. My comments are only meant to reflect that I think the best
way to never lose is to be 100% aggressive in modern ACM (assuming of course
that you've been screwed into ACM). You should be very, very proud of your
combat record, that's quite the achievement! Your last comment reminds me
of Yeager's "I'd rather be lucky than good any day!". I'm sure that while
there was some luck involved in your record, just as with Yeager, there's a
heck of a lot of skill involved too. You don't play Weasel and get off
lucky (well, maybe G.I. Basel did that one time ;) ).
A lot was devoted to concepts of
> operations and the influence was heavily oriented toward
> stealth--shoot and scoot without ever being detected.
Definitely the way to fight.
> My suspicion to this day is that the choice was driven by Lockheed's
> prior stealth production of F-117 and Northrop's poor record of
> delivery on B-2 and other programs. While the -23 was arguably
> superior in many ways, there was serious question about deliverability
> compared to Lockheed.
Good to know, thanks for the info! I wonder if the same was true for
the more exotic Boeing X-32 in the F-35 competition. Well, thanks again
for the good discussion Ed. Have a good one,
Tony
Tony Volk
make it clear enough).
> I don't care what you're flying, if you "turn like' hell" you have blown
> off all your energy, or at least enough that you can't do anything
> about me if you even get a glimpse.
I can get off a missile before you can, and that's a heck of a
something!
> If your wingman is off medal-hunting, who's covering your butt?
He's covering me by being aggressive. Proactive defense vs. reactive.
> Ed's kept his energy and you've lost a lot of yours getting your nose
> pointed at him... amazing what that much delta v does to a missile's
range.
Velocity shouldn't be a big issue in ACM ranges. If it is too far for a
heater, I'll lob an active-seeker MRAAM.
> Uh-huh. And while your head is up and locked, my section comes
> through the fight at the speed of heat and thoroughly ruins your day.
> It's the one you don't see that kills you.
> You are betting your life that it's just you 'n' him, and it just may not
> be so. Regardless of AWACS or any other technology, you can't
> ever be sure how many bad guys are in the fight.
I would argue that this would make it even more imperative to do
everything possible to end the fight ASAP. If I can use all my energy to
make a kill on the 2nd turn (after merge), then I'm better prepared to react
to any incoming threats than if I'm still caught up in a confusing and
energy-demanding dogfight. You can argue different scenarios and how they
might change the tactics, but as a basic rule of thumb with modern jets,
avionics, and missiles, I'd say it's best to go for the throat and do
everything to be within the right parameters to fire your missiles ASAP.
Regards,
Tony
Tony Volk
fighter.
> it is not.
No offense Al, but you're not giving me enough information to be helpful
with this comment. As a very quick reply, I would say first that the
Harrier has proven itself to be a very dangerous a-a opponent. Second, I
would argue that many of the traits of the Harrier would be found in a
premier dog fighter (although I'm afraid I don't have detailed performance
data on the Harrier). However, more modern designs (Su-37, F-22) have
thrust vectoring, with higher t-w ratios, better avionics, more fuel, better
AoA performance (I'd assume), and better missiles. So should you have said,
the Harrier would posses qualities that make it a dangerous dogfighter in
modern ACM, I would immediately agree, and I think both history and training
results would back me up. But as the Harrier lacks several of the key items
I mentioned in my analysis, it doesn't follow that it'd be the perfect test
of my theory.
Tony
Tony Volk
> going on), I'd say that during one out of ten air combats in which Iranian
> F-14s were involved something would happen to one of the engines.
Thanks for the info Tom. Any chance you're working on a book on the
F-14 specifically? Cheers,
Tony
Ed Rasimus
<avolkremove...@planetavp.com> wrote:
> You don't play Weasel and get off
>lucky (well, maybe G.I. Basel did that one time ;) ).
>
G.I. was a strike pilot, not a Weasel. (And, I'm only a Weasel by
association, not by AFSC.) G.I. was shot down during his first tour on
mission #87 I believe.
He's still kicking, but not in the best of health. I hear from him
occasionally through a River Rats list-server. First class guy. Proud
to know him.
John Carrier
"Tom > They experienced all the usual stuff caused by the poor stall margin
of the
> TF-30: afterburner pops resulting in catastrophic engine stall, engine
> compressor stalls at high AoA, flame-outs during IFR, turbine failures
etc.
>
> And this not only once, or two, but dozens of times: just for example, one
> pilot alone experienced no less but three catastrophic engine stalls on
the
> same F-14A between 1980 and 1993, two of which already after the war, when
> he had no less but 2.000 hours in combat.
Usual stuff? The TF-30 was not the best engine, but in five years of flying
the F-14 with it installed I only experienced one case of compressor stall.
It was instantly recoverable with reduction of AOA (and repeatable at 28
units AOA ... an NQR motor). I've been in tail slides, pegged AOA, 750KIAS
accelerating (canoes slow you down), 1.88IMN accelerating (gradual reduction
of throttles to avoid exceeding artificial NATOPS speed limit). Not a great
engine, certainly not enough thrust for the airframe, but not as bad as you
report.
OTOH, I would not recommend abrupt throttle movements at the corners of the
flight envelope. That issue was pretty much resolved by the F-110 ... the
motor the airframe really deserved.
I'd say the "usual stuff" might be a function of maintenance quality or lack
thereof.
R / John
Paul J. Adam
<avolkremove...@planetavp.com> writes
>> I don't care what you're flying, if you "turn like' hell" you have blown
>> off all your energy, or at least enough that you can't do anything
>> about me if you even get a glimpse.
>
> I can get off a missile before you can, and that's a heck of a
>something!
Missile effectiveness is a pretty direct function of the energy of the
launching aircraft. There's a reason why (for example) ground-launched
Chapparal SAMs are credited with much less range than air-launched
Sidewinders, despite being the same missile.
If you launch your missile from a slow platform, and then demand it
makes a hard turn right off the rail as well, then you just birthed it
with a serious energy deficit: while the same missile launched from a
fast aircraft at a target pretty much ahead, has much more chance of
intercepting.
(Conversely, a fast target is hard to catch and has lots of ability to
turn speed into turn; a slow target is much more like unto a sitting
duck)
>> Ed's kept his energy and you've lost a lot of yours getting your nose
>> pointed at him... amazing what that much delta v does to a missile's
>range.
>
> Velocity shouldn't be a big issue in ACM ranges. If it is too far for a
>heater, I'll lob an active-seeker MRAAM.
You're making this decision in the space of a few eyeblinks: either blow
past and think about repositioning, or make a high-G turn to get your
nose pointed in the general direction of the foe.
Firstly, do you have _time_ to then calculate relative envelopes, select
the best weapon, set up the switchology and fire?
Secondly, does your MRAAM reliably support a high-off-boresight
short-range engagement with a low-speed high-G launch?
Thirdly, assuming you fire at each other, do you want to be fast
(increasing missile lethality and your own survivability) or slow
(handicapping your weapons and carving into your ability to evade)?
Historically, the A6M was remarkably good at pointing its nose at the
enemy... but if the enemy blew through with enough crossing velocity,
they remained very hard to hit. Similar factors apply even in the
missile age: speed is life, not least because it can be turned into
height or angles to evade an incoming missile while adding to the
lethality of own weapons.
Once you're slow, you're vulnerable: even if you _can_ zap a seriously
threatening missile at the enemy, your ability to escape his shot is
grossly reduced.
>> Uh-huh. And while your head is up and locked, my section comes
>> through the fight at the speed of heat and thoroughly ruins your day.
>> It's the one you don't see that kills you.
>> You are betting your life that it's just you 'n' him, and it just may not
>> be so. Regardless of AWACS or any other technology, you can't
>> ever be sure how many bad guys are in the fight.
>
> I would argue that this would make it even more imperative to do
>everything possible to end the fight ASAP.
Including "don't squander energy". If he's fast and you're slow, your
missiles are disadvantaged, reducing each shot's Pk while making you
more vulnerable to counterfire. To win, stay fast.
>If I can use all my energy to
>make a kill on the 2nd turn (after merge), then I'm better prepared to react
>to any incoming threats than if I'm still caught up in a confusing and
>energy-demanding dogfight.
Do not get into a dogfight.
Simple as that. Fight through the merge, blow through, then either
extend away or come back for another pass. Slowing down for a turning
fight just invites an unexpected enemy to kill you: if the enemy starts
turning hard, he just expended his speed and you know where to find him
for a while.
>You can argue different scenarios and how they
>might change the tactics, but as a basic rule of thumb with modern jets,
>avionics, and missiles, I'd say it's best to go for the throat and do
>everything to be within the right parameters to fire your missiles ASAP.
Trouble is, one of those parameters is "as fast and as high as possible"
- because the more energy a missile has, the more lethal it is.
Deliberately going slow is _not_ getting into missile parameters, it's
castrating your weapons.
--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill
Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk
Tony Volk
> >lucky (well, maybe G.I. Basel did that one time ;) ).
> G.I. was a strike pilot, not a Weasel. (And, I'm only a Weasel by
> association, not by AFSC.) G.I. was shot down during his first tour on
> mission #87 I believe.
G.I. got to play Weasel one mission, much to his apparent dismay
(initially). After the first Shrike shot, he was on the wrong side of his
lead when his lead broke (was briefed that lead breaks left, so he should be
on the right, but he ended up on the left), so he went up in the vertical.
Quickly losing speed, he watched with horror as a SAM tracked him. His lead
told him (using his name and not callsign, which signaled to G.I. a real
disaster) to bring it down, but he didn't have the energy (couldn't resist
that little plug). At the top of the loop, jamming his rudder and praying,
he saw the SAM explode as their Shrikes hit its guiding radar. He brought
the Thud back down, and as they started another approach, he whispered, "Do
we have to", but didn't key his mike (perhaps a literary embellishment, but
a nice testimony to the fact that he was a real human being who feared death
and did his job any way). As they come off target, GI calls- "Otter Lead, I
can't catch you. What's your speed?" Lead- "A thousand miles per hour" GI-
"Oh." A nice laugh to break the tension of the chapter! The weasels gave
him a SAM Slayer badge for his work.
All this is from his book. A great read! Cheers,
Tony
p.s.- his book states that he flew 78-1/2 missions (1/2 for his last mission
where he flew the outbound part)
Tony Volk
> Missile effectiveness is a pretty direct function of the energy of the
> launching aircraft.
Let me make an even more direct function. Missile effectiveness is an
absolute direct function of whether or not it's on your rails on in the air.
> Firstly, do you have _time_ to then calculate relative envelopes, select
> the best weapon, set up the switchology and fire?
In modern fighters, this shouldn't be a problem for well-trained pilots
(the F-22 has engagement envelopes, etc.). In fact, the F-22's software is
reportedly designed to do just that more or less automatically.
> Secondly, does your MRAAM reliably support a high-off-boresight
> short-range engagement with a low-speed high-G launch?
If the enemy is beyond the range of a short-range IR missile, you have a
much lower chance of having to resort to a high-angle, high-g launch than in
a quick slashing attack. And even then, the AIM-120C and R-77 are
reportedly quite agile.
> Thirdly, assuming you fire at each other, do you want to be fast
> (increasing missile lethality and your own survivability) or slow
> (handicapping your weapons and carving into your ability to evade)?
This is the critical assumption. You are NOT firing at each other.
Because of your energy-gobbling turn, your missile is in the air first. He
can see it, and he'd have to be an idiot, insanely good, and/or a Kamikaze
to return fire instead of immediately initiating a break turn. Even if you
bluff a shot a little outside of your parameters, can HE judge whether it
has sufficient energy? Not very likely (and that'd be one HECK of a
gamble!). So you've put him on the defensive, eliminating the need to avoid
his missile (see previous conversations for his wingman and other players),
and making him use up energy while you can safely regain yours.
The BEST way to avoid his missile is to make sure it never comes off his
rail. Dodging one of today's advanced missiles is an iffy proposition, it
is far better to gain the offensive, and stay in the driver's seat. You can
regain all the energy you like while he's breaking away from your
missile(s). So again, I think the best idea is to get your weapons in the
air (within reasonable, if not optimum, parameters) ASAP without worrying
about saving energy to dodge his missile or defeat other bandits. That's
the best way to win (and survive) a modern dogfight IMHO (bearing in mind
that I have no access to classified missile/aircraft performance data).
Regards,
Tony
Tom Cooper
Yep: "Iranian F-14 Units in Combat" is to be published by Osprey, in "Combat
Aircraft" series, sometimes in the spring next year.
Tom Cooper
"John Carrier" <jx...@comcast.net> wrote in message
news:QLydnZyDsYM...@comcast.com...
Shouldn't this depend on the engine version too (see bellow)?
AFAIK, there were earlier TF-30s, which were really notorious for compressor
stalls, and there were later versions...
> OTOH, I would not recommend abrupt throttle movements at the corners of
the
> flight envelope. That issue was pretty much resolved by the F-110 ... the
> motor the airframe really deserved.
>
> I'd say the "usual stuff" might be a function of maintenance quality or
lack
> thereof.
Certainly, there were immense problems with the maintenance, foremost due to
the lack of qualified technical personnel (in percentage, the Iranians
haven't lost as many flying crews, as ground personnel due to the
revolution), but - IMHO - the main problem were actually the engines. They
still had some TF-30-412s, even if most of the fleet was equipped
with -414s.
Tom Cooper
"John Penta" <pen...@uofs.edu> wrote in message
news:lo9spv43do0jdjifr...@4ax.com...
> On Mon, 27 Oct 2003 22:56:37 GMT, "Tom Cooper" <t...@acig.org> wrote:
>
> >The Moroccans lost a great deal of their good pilots after the coup
attempt
> >in 1972: at the time several of their early F-5-pilots intercepted the
> >Boeing 727 carrying the King from a visit in France, and shot it up,
> >damaging two engines and most of the tail. The plane landed safely and
the
> >King then purged the FARM massively. They started recovering only during
the
> >1980s, when the air force became badly needed because of the war in West
> >Sahara. The need for pilots was such at the time that the FARM became the
> >first Arab air force to have female pilot.
>
> They still have female pilots?
They rather "had" them: there were three ladies flying Mirage F.1CH/EHs in
the 1980s. Don't know what's going on there now to this topic.
> On the same note, I recall a case in Israel where a female went to the
> Supreme Court and eventually got admitted into pilot training; What's
> the numbers in terms of females in combat ait units there?
Sincerely: I don't have a slightest clue how many female pilots are there
with the IDF/AF. I only know they have them since something like six years,
initially mainly as navs, but meanwile also as combat pilots.
Sorry, I'm kind of "speclized" in "other" Middle Eastern and African air
forces (but the Israelis).
Juvat
Volk" blurted out:
> Let me make an even more direct function. Missile effectiveness is an
>absolute direct function of whether or not it's on your rails on in the air.
OK...so an AAM can't kill if it's still on the rail. But you *can*
surely piss away a missile if you're going to simply point and
pickle.
> In modern fighters, this shouldn't be a problem for well-trained pilots
>(the F-22 has engagement envelopes, etc.). In fact, the F-22's software is
>reportedly designed to do just that more or less automatically.
Just for the sake of discussion...are we *ONLY* discussing operational
fighters and missiles? Or are you embracing everything on the chalk
board...meaning you're giving some adversary the latest and greatest
russian jet/missile combo and the good guys get the latest "wish you
were dead" AAM?
> If the enemy is beyond the range of a short-range IR missile, you have a
>much lower chance of having to resort to a high-angle, high-g launch than in
>a quick slashing attack.
I'm missing something. You're the bad-guy, real world, and I'm simply
an F-16 guy. I've got more wingmen (I really do!) and AWACS, SADL,
adaptive RWR and towed decoys...and a healthier supply of AAMs in the
logistics pipeline...and some pretty decent air-to-air training. The
biggest advantage IMO is the last one.
You're a DPRK MiG-29 guy that flies a mean jet...and you get almost 24
hours of flying a YEAR.
If I'm decent I'll shoot some slammers your way, get you on the
defensive first (maybe you'll fly right into one); I'll drag or beam
or grinder and let another pair of F-16s get an unobserved shot.
If *we* can keep you "at arm's length" and keep you hard maneuvering
your jet, I feel pretty good about beating your dick into the dirt.
> This is the critical assumption. You are NOT firing at each other.
You mean we came to the merge and NOBODY fired? Or simply we both
arrived unscathed and have now passed each other?
>Because of your energy-gobbling turn, your missile is in the air first. He
>can see it, and he'd have to be an idiot, insanely good, and/or a Kamikaze
>to return fire instead of immediately initiating a break turn.
You're hacking a square corner, I'm keeping my energy up and check
turned enough to maintain a tally...at least until you are "nose on."
I'm guessing you'd blow up from missile fired by the trailing F-16s
somewhere in your turn while you're padlocked on me.
You never said I was limited to an artificial 2-v-2.
> Even if you bluff a shot a little outside of your parameters, can HE judge whether it
>has sufficient energy? Not very likely (and that'd be one HECK of a
>gamble!).
Sure, all of us would react defensively...I'm dragging a towed decoy.
And perhaps your radar's auto-acq mode locked onto your wingman during
the turn (been there...done that).
> So you've put him on the defensive, eliminating the need to avoid
>his missile (see previous conversations for his wingman and other players),
>and making him use up energy while you can safely regain yours.
I suspect that your MiG-29 formation is more defensive than my F-16
flight. YMMV
>The BEST way to avoid his missile is to make sure it never comes off his
>rail.
You bet.
>Dodging one of today's advanced missiles is an iffy proposition, it
>is far better to gain the offensive, and stay in the driver's seat.
Indeed...I used SADL to acquire you BVR, I shot at you without
triggering your RWR.
> You can regain all the energy you like while he's breaking away from your
>missile(s).
Given a choice, I engaged you with a big altitude difference. If I
ramped down on you, I'm gonna keep running like a scalded ass ape. If
you ramp down on me as we merge, I like the idea that your nose is
buried below the horizon as you try to square the corner. You'll be
soooo slow as you pull on the pole trying to get your nose pointed
"uphill" at me spiralling above you (you're off my wingtip...at arm's
length). This too works in real jets. You will become the "grape's
grape."
>So again, I think the best idea is to get your weapons in the
>air (within reasonable, if not optimum, parameters) ASAP without worrying
>about saving energy to dodge his missile or defeat other bandits.
Indeed...that's why I came with more playmates than you, am dragging
towed decoys, left my radar in STBY while BVR, stayed fast.
>That's the best way to win (and survive) a modern dogfight IMHO...
That actually sounds pretty close to the F-16 mantra twenty years ago,
regarding a dogfight (if you found yourself in one). The logic goes
like this.
1] Am I inside the bandit's turn circle?
Yes...go kill him cause he can't out-turn you.
No...fly to his turn circle...now go kill him cause he can't out-turn
you.
In the final analysis you may indeed get one F-16 to your credit. But
you will die fairly soon for the DPRK.
Fun discussion.
Juvat
JD
different the former concentrates on turn radius performance and slow
speed maneuverability around the boat at low and medium altitudes.
While the latter (USAF), concentrates on turn rate at faster speeds
and at higher altitudes.
Current F15 drivers that I have spoken to do go slow in a dogfight
depending on the aircraft. Of course, the gist of a turn radius
fighter is to turn inside one's adversary thus preferring a one circle
fight.
Nevertheless, the F15's strength primarily lies in the transonic
regime whereas the F14's strength is in the mid to high subsonic
regime. The F15 is better by several degrees of turn rate over the F14
in this area while going slower, the F14 has several degrees of turn
rate better than the F15. Going to low subsonic speeds, the F15 is a
tad better. Going over the M1.1, the F14 is better. What's interesting
is that the peak turn rates are equal at combat alittude.
Max SEP for both aircraft is the middle of the transonic regime,
which, in fact, they are very similar (referring about the F14 F110
engine).
During the early stages of ACM/EVAL in 79, the F14A had more than
twice the engagements than that of the F15 since the aircraft had to
refuel. This was primarily due to the internal fuel capacity
differences since both aircraft didn't have external tanks. The USAF's
solution to increase the amount of engagements was to add the
centerline tank which somewhat evened up the scores.
Now to those piper shots, regardless of aircraft, how do you rate a
kill? I have seen some F15 HUD dogfight footage in which the pilot
calls a kill with a heater yet in reality there was no way he could've
hit the plane due to the speed and aspect of the aircraft as he was
flying slower. By the time the missile leaves the rail, the targeted
aircraft will already be out of the constraints of the seeker.
jd
Alan Minyard
You are advocating bleeding energy in tight turns in order to achieve "first
launch". The Harrier is the current leader in such maneuvers, as it can sit
in one place and rotate around the vertical axis at will. While the Harrier
can be useful against such birds as the Mirage, it cannot live in the same
sky with a F-15, 16,18, etc. In addition, I have never heard of a Harrier jock
sitting still and rotating while shooting heaters. I am with the folks who
maintain that conserving one's energy is critical in ACM.
Al Minyard
phil hunt
> Boy, I'm sure getting a lot of mileage out of my posts!
>
>> Missile effectiveness is a pretty direct function of the energy of the
>> launching aircraft.
>
> Let me make an even more direct function. Missile effectiveness is an
>absolute direct function of whether or not it's on your rails on in the air.
>
>> Firstly, do you have _time_ to then calculate relative envelopes, select
>> the best weapon, set up the switchology and fire?
>
> In modern fighters, this shouldn't be a problem for well-trained pilots
>(the F-22 has engagement envelopes, etc.). In fact, the F-22's software is
>reportedly designed to do just that more or less automatically.
I would imagine it wouldn't be too difficult for the software to
automatically select which missile to fire -- does it do this in
any modern fighters?
> This is the critical assumption. You are NOT firing at each other.
>Because of your energy-gobbling turn, your missile is in the air first. He
>can see it, and he'd have to be an idiot, insanely good, and/or a Kamikaze
>to return fire instead of immediately initiating a break turn. Even if you
>bluff a shot a little outside of your parameters, can HE judge whether it
>has sufficient energy? Not very likely (and that'd be one HECK of a
>gamble!). So you've put him on the defensive, eliminating the need to avoid
>his missile (see previous conversations for his wingman and other players),
>and making him use up energy while you can safely regain yours.
This suggests to me that in general, the fisrt person to get a
missile off is at a big advantage. In which case, doesn't that
indicate that the way to go is long range missiles such as Meteor?
>That's
>the best way to win (and survive) a modern dogfight IMHO (bearing in mind
>that I have no access to classified missile/aircraft performance data).
A lot can be implied by unclassified data. For example, a piloted
aircraft can't accelerate at more than about 9 gees, because it
doesn't do the pilot's health any good, whereas missiles can
accelerate much more. You can work out an aircraft's acceleration
in the direction it's travelling, from it's engine thrust and max
speed (which give you its drag at that thrust). Similarly, it's
(I imagine) possible to get a reasonable estimate of acceleration
for a rocket, given its top speed, and the mass of the propellant.
--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: <zen2...@zen.co.ku>, but first subtract 275 and reverse
the last two letters).
phil hunt
>In message <bnmjn1$12rdkg$1...@ID-209907.news.uni-berlin.de>, Tony Volk
><avolkremove...@planetavp.com> writes
>>> I don't care what you're flying, if you "turn like' hell" you have blown
>>> off all your energy, or at least enough that you can't do anything
>>> about me if you even get a glimpse.
>>
>> I can get off a missile before you can, and that's a heck of a
>>something!
>
>Missile effectiveness is a pretty direct function of the energy of the
>launching aircraft. There's a reason why (for example) ground-launched
>Chapparal SAMs are credited with much less range than air-launched
>Sidewinders, despite being the same missile.
I imagine this is a lot less true for long range missiles such as
Phoenix or Meteor.
Paul J. Adam
<ph...@invalid.email.address> writes
>On Tue, 28 Oct 2003 22:50:39 +0000, Paul J. Adam <news@jrwlyn
>ch.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>>Missile effectiveness is a pretty direct function of the energy of the
>>launching aircraft. There's a reason why (for example) ground-launched
>>Chapparal SAMs are credited with much less range than air-launched
>>Sidewinders, despite being the same missile.
>
>I imagine this is a lot less true for long range missiles such as
>Phoenix or Meteor.
Not at all. The more energy a missile has when it tries to intercept,
the more chance it has to score a kill: just as true for a long-range
weapon as a short-range missile.
Just pause and consider a target forty miles away and at 40,000 feet;
will your missile arrive with more energy if you fire it from sea level
or co-altitude? From 200 knots or 600 knots? And is it pointed at the
threat or does it have to turn onto the bearing?
The two sources of energy for a missile are its own motor (fixed and
constant for a given weapon) and the speed and altitude of its launch
platform.
Harry Andreas
<inv...@spamtrap.dev.null> wrote:
> Just pause and consider a target forty miles away and at 40,000 feet;
> will your missile arrive with more energy if you fire it from sea level
> or co-altitude? From 200 knots or 600 knots? And is it pointed at the
> threat or does it have to turn onto the bearing?
>
> The two sources of energy for a missile are its own motor (fixed and
> constant for a given weapon) and the speed and altitude of its launch
> platform.
Also add altitude and vector of the target. Shooting down is as much
an advantage as ownship speed.
--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur
Paul J. Adam
<avolkremove...@planetavp.com> writes
> Boy, I'm sure getting a lot of mileage out of my posts!
>> Missile effectiveness is a pretty direct function of the energy of the
>> launching aircraft.
>
> Let me make an even more direct function. Missile effectiveness is an
>absolute direct function of whether or not it's on your rails on in the air.
Wasted shots are wasted shots. You only have a finite weapon load: when
it's gone, you're a helpless flying target.
There are good reasons to snapshoot a weapon at a threat, even if you're
not able to guide it. But there are also times that doing so is at best
a wasted shot, and at worst a positive hazard to your own side (an
autonomous missile lofted into the blue will tend to attack any target
it sees, and they aren't yet able to read insignia).
>> Firstly, do you have _time_ to then calculate relative envelopes, select
>> the best weapon, set up the switchology and fire?
>
> In modern fighters, this shouldn't be a problem for well-trained pilots
>(the F-22 has engagement envelopes, etc.). In fact, the F-22's software is
>reportedly designed to do just that more or less automatically.
Warming up a missile, providing it with a firing solution, and getting
it off the rail is not an instantaneous process. While quicker than it
used to be, you often still need time to get thermal batteries fired and
warmed up, seekers pointing in the right direction, and data messages
passed to and fro.
Switching between types exacerbates this problem, and may cause problems
when your software selects a radar-homer based on the
apparently-splendid radar echo of the target... while the pilot fumbles
for the manual override, because his radar is actually tracking the
target's towed decoy.
>> Secondly, does your MRAAM reliably support a high-off-boresight
>> short-range engagement with a low-speed high-G launch?
>
> If the enemy is beyond the range of a short-range IR missile, you have a
>much lower chance of having to resort to a high-angle, high-g launch than in
>a quick slashing attack. And even then, the AIM-120C and R-77 are
>reportedly quite agile.
So for BVR engagements, you want to squander the energy you're about to
urgently need in order to point your nose and fire back - rather than
surviving and evading (while your wingman fires back)?
>> Thirdly, assuming you fire at each other, do you want to be fast
>> (increasing missile lethality and your own survivability) or slow
>> (handicapping your weapons and carving into your ability to evade)?
>
> This is the critical assumption. You are NOT firing at each other.
>Because of your energy-gobbling turn, your missile is in the air first.
What alerted you to the enemy's presence (the target and any friends)
and how are you confident that there are not already birds inbound?
Is his nose pointed at you? If so, you'll get counterfired whether you
like it or not, and your bat-turn will probably get you killed when his
missile arrives.
> He
>can see it, and he'd have to be an idiot, insanely good, and/or a Kamikaze
>to return fire instead of immediately initiating a break turn.
Actually, depending on range and his aspect, the break turn may come
much later in the engagement. His evasion sequence might well include a
shot back on the same "no point dying with missiles on the rails"
principle. And, of course, what is his wingman doing?
Bear in mind that one response to your shot is to turn tail and run; at
longer ranges it's quite possible to outdistance a missile shot.
Meanwhile, you're slow and helpless while your target's wingmen fire
back.
>Even if you
>bluff a shot a little outside of your parameters, can HE judge whether it
>has sufficient energy? Not very likely (and that'd be one HECK of a
>gamble!).
But then, at those ranges the enemy has more time to think over his
countermeasures (aided by your wilful reduction in weapon lethality) and
to plan his counterattack.
Would you have been better off taking a shot thirty seconds later, but
with much more chance of a kill and more chance to survive a return
shot?
>So you've put him on the defensive, eliminating the need to avoid
>his missile (see previous conversations for his wingman and other players),
>and making him use up energy while you can safely regain yours.
Trouble is, air combat is a tag-team wrestle rather than a solo duel
(with the partner willing to jump into the ring anytime)
Meanwhile, how many missiles did you start with? You've now got at least
one less, in exchange for a shot with poor Pk. The US may have a
seemingly-bottomless supply of weapons, but most nations do not.
Are you and your wingman _both_ making brutal turn-and-shoot moves? How
long did you spend (a) making sure this really was a 2v2 and there
weren't actually four threats or a second section out there, (b)
co-ordinating your fire so that you do engage all the threats and (for
instance) don't both fire at the same aircraft, leaving the other
unengaged?
And the point remains... a missile fired from a slow aircraft at a fast
target will struggle to hit, compared to a missile fired from a fast
aircraft at a slow target. One reason modern Western missiles are highly
lethal is that the pilots are trained to use them properly and to fire
Taking a shot of opportunity is thoroughly sensible. Wasting energy to
take a shot at a poor target... is not.
> The BEST way to avoid his missile is to make sure it never comes off his
>rail.
By all means, but wasting your own weapons is not a successful means to
that end.
>Dodging one of today's advanced missiles is an iffy proposition, it
>is far better to gain the offensive, and stay in the driver's seat.
But you don't do that by marginal low-energy shots. And you make
yourself _much_ more vulnerable if you _start_ the fight by making
yourself a sitting duck.
Bear in mind that "air superiority" is a means to an end, not an end in
itself. If you make a savage turn and a low-energy shot at a passing
raid, they may well be able to simply turn away, accelerate and blow by
you (and you won't have the energy to pursue, having wasted it in that
initial turn) - and they go on to bomb their target, which it was your
job to prevent.
Better by far to shout for backup while flying a more restrained
pursuit, and making the most of your fuel and missile load in killing
them or forcing them to abort.
> You can
>regain all the energy you like while he's breaking away from your
>missile(s).
No, you can't: I think you've got an excessive optimism about
acceleration rates.
>So again, I think the best idea is to get your weapons in the
>air (within reasonable, if not optimum, parameters) ASAP without worrying
>about saving energy to dodge his missile or defeat other bandits. That's
>the best way to win (and survive) a modern dogfight IMHO (bearing in mind
>that I have no access to classified missile/aircraft performance data).
How are you detecting the foe to make this manoeuvre? (Hint - your
sensors look forward, but can be detected over a much larger arc)
Tony Volk
directly, I'll ask that you refer to previous posts for answers to many of
your questions. That is, if you read the entire thread, you'll find that
I've already addressed many of your questions.
> Wasted shots are wasted shots. You only have a finite weapon load: when
> it's gone, you're a helpless flying target.
I wouldn't call a shot that puts you in the driver's seat wasted.
> Warming up a missile, providing it with a firing solution, and getting
> it off the rail is not an instantaneous process. While quicker than it
> used to be, you often still need time to get thermal batteries fired and
> warmed up, seekers pointing in the right direction, and data messages
> passed to and fro.
You'd have the same problem when making high-speed slashing passes, so
your point is moot.
while the pilot fumbles
> for the manual override, because his radar is actually tracking the
> target's towed decoy.
Towed decoy is not for IR as far as I know (and most IR missiles have
robust enough AI to defeat flares), and in any case, I have no knowledge of
operational decoys, especially those suitable to a high-g dogfight (I'd love
to hear about any such decoys if they exist).
> > He
> >can see it, and he'd have to be an idiot, insanely good, and/or a
Kamikaze
> >to return fire instead of immediately initiating a break turn.
His evasion sequence might well include a
> shot back on the same "no point dying with missiles on the rails"
> principle.
I would classify anyone who decided to continue maneuvering for a shot
before dodging a missile en route as an idiot, insanely good, and/or a
Kamikaze.
> Bear in mind that one response to your shot is to turn tail and run; at
> longer ranges it's quite possible to outdistance a missile shot.
If he runs from your missile, you have a nice easy tail shot for a
MRAAM. Sweet!
> >Even if you
> >bluff a shot a little outside of your parameters, can HE judge whether it
> >has sufficient energy? Not very likely (and that'd be one HECK of a
> >gamble!).
> But then, at those ranges the enemy has more time to think over his
> countermeasures (aided by your wilful reduction in weapon lethality) and
> to plan his counterattack.
What ranges? In a dogfight the ranges allow more time to think???
> Meanwhile, how many missiles did you start with? You've now got at least
> one less, in exchange for a shot with poor Pk. The US may have a
> seemingly-bottomless supply of weapons, but most nations do not.
Oh COME ON. Conserve missiles for later flights? I don't think so!
I'd LOVE to hear a general tell their soldiers not to make less than 100%
shots on the enemy so that the missiles can be saved for later pilots! As
for the plane in question, it has at least one more IR missile, perhaps 3
more. Given the positional advantage gained by the enemy having to avoid
your first shot, you can now take your time with the second shot.
> Taking a shot of opportunity is thoroughly sensible. Wasting energy to
> take a shot at a poor target... is not.
The idea is to take a shot to create an opportunity. A crude analogy
would be throwing a low-percetange jab to set up a hook (assuming that your
jab was credible enough that the opponent had to duck/block it).
> > You can
> >regain all the energy you like while he's breaking away from your
> >missile(s).
> No, you can't: I think you've got an excessive optimism about
> acceleration rates.
His loss of energy in his evasive break is probably greater than your
gain of energy through worry-free unloaded acceleration. Bear in mind I'm
talking about the newest generation of fighters that have superb t-w ratios
and excellent acceleration.
I think that address all the unique questions you've asked. BVR, the
likelihood of different scenarios, wingmen, etc. were addressed in previous
posts. Cheers,
Tony
John Carrier
> an advantage as ownship speed.
>
> --
> Harry Andreas
> Engineering raconteur
Not as much as you'd think. Increased air density shrinks missile
envelopes.
R / John
phil hunt
>In message <slrnbpvl91...@cabalamat.cabalamat.org>, phil hunt
><ph...@invalid.email.address> writes
>>On Tue, 28 Oct 2003 22:50:39 +0000, Paul J. Adam <news@jrwlyn
>>ch.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>>>Missile effectiveness is a pretty direct function of the energy of the
>>>launching aircraft. There's a reason why (for example) ground-launched
>>>Chapparal SAMs are credited with much less range than air-launched
>>>Sidewinders, despite being the same missile.
>>
>>I imagine this is a lot less true for long range missiles such as
>>Phoenix or Meteor.
>
>Not at all. The more energy a missile has when it tries to intercept,
>the more chance it has to score a kill: just as true for a long-range
>weapon as a short-range missile.
>
>Just pause and consider a target forty miles away and at 40,000 feet;
>will your missile arrive with more energy if you fire it from sea level
>or co-altitude? From 200 knots or 600 knots? And is it pointed at the
>threat or does it have to turn onto the bearing?
After travelling 40 miles, both missiles ewill be doing about the
same speed, I imagine. Though the one that starts higher will get
there quicker, and with more fuel (and therefore potential to
manouvre) remaining.
So it depends whether you count KE or KE + chemical PE.
But you asre right in the sense that launching high and fast gives a
greater kill probability.
phil hunt
But the increased air density also reduces the speed of the
target; wouldn't these effects roughly cancel out?
John Carrier
> >envelopes.
>
> But the increased air density also reduces the speed of the
> target; wouldn't these effects roughly cancel out?
Not as much as you'd think.
It depends upon the target speed and its aspect, doesn't it? A low altitude
stream raid (multiple sea skimmers, perhaps submarine launched) head on at
.9IMN required careful management of the launch parameters (first shot
relatively high, subsequent shots lower), the radar scan volume, and
(eventually) removal of radar support for the first shot(s) to insure
successful engagement of all the targets.
Low altitude severely limits range. Sidewinder envelopes can get below 1/2
mile with a fast, opening target at low altitude. Rear quarter shots are
limited by motor burn time (in this regard, AMRAAM is pretty nice, assuming
it doesn't have any speed gate issues ala Sparrow ... wouldn't know, never
carried one). The target is effected by speed limitations (An F-14 can
easily do 1.8 ... around 1200 KTAS ... at higher altitudes, 800KIAS low),
but its engines sustain the speed.
R / John
Jeff Crowell
> Jeff, I think you've missed the point of a lot of my post (or I didn't
> make it clear enough).
With respect, I think you missed mine... while you're
maneuvering aggressively against Ed's section, mine
can ruin your day.
There is no way for you to be sure that the guy you're
fighting is the only one around.
Jeff
Jeff Crowell
> In addition, I have never heard of a Harrier jock
> sitting still and rotating while shooting heaters.
Understanding that you are exaggerating on purpose,
it's worth keeping in mind that a 'winder needs
SOME relative wind to maintain attitude off the rail.
While this may be less true of thrust-vectoring missiles,
it's still worth keeping in mind.
Jeff
Jeff Crowell
> Oh COME ON. Conserve missiles for later flights? I don't think so!
> I'd LOVE to hear a general tell their soldiers not to make less than 100%
> shots on the enemy so that the missiles can be saved for later pilots! As
> for the plane in question, it has at least one more IR missile, perhaps 3
> more. Given the positional advantage gained by the enemy having to avoid
> your first shot, you can now take your time with the second shot.
Well, to apply Ed's dictum that air superiority is something you do
on the way to the target (apologies to Ed if I've mangled that), I'd be
worrying about conserving missiles for later in the ***flight*** rather
than pissing them away in low-Pk shots. I'm gonna be a sad puppy
if I'm Winchester on the way home and the bad guy's still there (or
there's more of 'em than I expected).
But if we're fighting a high-intensity war at the end of a long logistical
tail,
it's not such an outlandish thought to worry about where the next ride's
ordnance is coming from.
On top of all that, it's one thing to go play with wall-to-wall missiles for
a MIGSWEEP, quite another to self-escort with 2 heaters and
2 Slammers or some such, along with your real payload. Which is the
real reason you actually manned up today? The bombs or the air-to-air
stuff?
Jeff
Yeff
> Which is the real reason you actually manned up today?
To crush your enemies, see them driven before you, and to hear the
lamentations of their women!
-Jeff B. (with thanks to both Conan and Gengis Khan)
yeff at erols dot com
Tony Volk
> fighting is the only one around.
Again, arguments regarding the scope of my comments and my assumptions
are to be found in previous emails. You're asking me questions about
assumptions and/or conclusions that I believe I've already addressed. I
think I have explained my position as well as I possibly can without writing
an entire essay on the matter. If you disagree with my assumptions and/or
conclusions, so be it. Either way, this'll be my last post on this thread.
Regards,
Tony
Juvat
blurted out:
> Again, arguments regarding the scope of my comments and my assumptions
>are to be found in previous emails. You're asking me questions about
>assumptions and/or conclusions that I believe I've already addressed.
Well I read all of your posts here, and you kinda glossed over the big
picture. You assume that AWACS will give you total SA, or enough to
know if you're going to be fighting 2 v 2 v X. I suggested you're now
a low time DPRK MiG-29 driver (no AWACS for you...) would you still
bet everything on getting slow?
And you said your wingman is going to be given free authority to
engage (which indeed happens at times and all you have is radio mutual
support). Not always a great plan if your wingie is the FNG.
> I think I have explained my position as well as I possibly can without writing
>an entire essay on the matter.
Sure, you made some assumptions about maintaining a high level of SA
as you square the corner to take a missile shot. But when Bob Lodge &
Roger Locher were closing in on MiG #4 (10 May 1972) they didn't hear
their wingman (Markle/Eaves) yelling about the MiG-19 lobbing cannon
shells at Lodge/Locher. Guess it didn't help that Locher was video
taping the attack on their 4th MiG (that they never got).
> If you disagree with my assumptions and/or conclusions, so be it.
Fair enough...you presented ONE gameplan. It might work against an
inferior opponent, where you have absolute SA (there's only two of
them left). My point? There is no ONE single solution, but your
gameplan is fraught with more peril that it requires...IMO.
Juvat
Scott Ferrin
wrote:
>> >Not as much as you'd think. Increased air density shrinks missile
Kinda gives you an appreciation of the AIM-47. A long ranged missile
fired at Mach 3+ and 80,000ft+ I still think that the YF-12 was one
of the best "might have beens".
phil hunt
>
>Kinda gives you an appreciation of the AIM-47. A long ranged missile
>fired at Mach 3+ and 80,000ft+ I still think that the YF-12 was one
>of the best "might have beens".
Didn't it take ages to fuel the thing, making it incapable of
scrambling quickly?
phil hunt
>> >Not as much as you'd think. Increased air density shrinks missile
>> >envelopes.
>>
>> But the increased air density also reduces the speed of the
>> target; wouldn't these effects roughly cancel out?
>
>Not as much as you'd think.
>
>It depends upon the target speed and its aspect, doesn't it? A low altitude
>stream raid (multiple sea skimmers, perhaps submarine launched) head on at
>.9IMN
What's this?
Harry Andreas
<sfe...@xmission.com> wrote:
> On Thu, 30 Oct 2003 13:38:28 -0600, "John Carrier" <jx...@comcast.net>
> wrote:
> >It depends upon the target speed and its aspect, doesn't it? A low altitude
> >stream raid (multiple sea skimmers, perhaps submarine launched) head on at
> >.9IMN required careful management of the launch parameters (first shot
> >relatively high, subsequent shots lower), the radar scan volume, and
> >(eventually) removal of radar support for the first shot(s) to insure
> >successful engagement of all the targets.
> >
> >Low altitude severely limits range. Sidewinder envelopes can get below 1/2
> >mile with a fast, opening target at low altitude. Rear quarter shots are
> >limited by motor burn time (in this regard, AMRAAM is pretty nice, assuming
> >it doesn't have any speed gate issues ala Sparrow ... wouldn't know, never
> >carried one). The target is effected by speed limitations (An F-14 can
> >easily do 1.8 ... around 1200 KTAS ... at higher altitudes, 800KIAS low),
> >but its engines sustain the speed.
>
> Kinda gives you an appreciation of the AIM-47. A long ranged missile
> fired at Mach 3+ and 80,000ft+ I still think that the YF-12 was one
> of the best "might have beens".
Interesting aircraft and great at it's design purpose, but too operationally
limited as a fighter or interceptor.
John Carrier
Generally engaged from head-on.
R/ John
"phil hunt" <ph...@invalid.email.address> wrote in message
news:slrnbq56hk...@cabalamat.cabalamat.org...
Peter Stickney
"John Carrier" <jx...@comcast.net> writes:
> A number of targets in column, at low altitude and at a high subsonic speed.
> Generally engaged from head-on.
And spread out enough in time that you can't engage several at once,
and there won't be time to finish the current engagement and get the
next whatever (airplane/missile) coming inbound. Manual systems, that
rely on human observers to watch teh scopes and vector the
interceptors or assign SAM targets are particularly vulnerable to this
method of attacking. (Each controller can really only handle one or
two targets at a time)
>
> R/ John
>
> "phil hunt" <ph...@invalid.email.address> wrote in message
> news:slrnbq56hk...@cabalamat.cabalamat.org...
>> On Thu, 30 Oct 2003 13:38:28 -0600, John Carrier <jx...@comcast.net> wrote:
>> >> >Not as much as you'd think. Increased air density shrinks missile
>> >> >envelopes.
>> >>
>> >> But the increased air density also reduces the speed of the
>> >> target; wouldn't these effects roughly cancel out?
>> >
>> >Not as much as you'd think.
>> >
>> >It depends upon the target speed and its aspect, doesn't it? A low
> altitude
>> >stream raid (multiple sea skimmers, perhaps submarine launched) head on
> at
>> >.9IMN
>>
>> What's this?
>>
>>
>> --
>> "It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
>> people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
>> (Email: <zen2...@zen.co.ku>, but first subtract 275 and reverse
>> the last two letters).
>>
>>
>
>
--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster
Paul F Austin
"Harry Andreas" <and...@computer.org> wrote in message
news:andreas-3110...@147.16.85.59...
I'm not sure I understand. At the time the USAF was procuring the
replacement for the F106 in the late seventies, I saw the results of cost
and effectiveness evaluations of several alternatives: F12/AIM-47,
BF-1/AIM-54(lots of them), F14, F15/Sparrow and....F16/Sparrow. Against the
cannonical Backfire threat in the North Atlantic basin, the F12 performed
hugely well. On a cost/benefits trade, the results for most threats was
pretty much in the order shown above.
Of course, the USAF selected the F16/Sparrow which showed up worst in every
scenario I saw. That spoke volumes on how seriously the USAF took the late
seventies bomber threat.
The BF-1A was interesting: huge aperature for the AWG-9 set and IRRC, 24
AIM-54s. The increased antenna gain raised the various RADAR ranges by about
50%.
Peter Stickney
ph...@invalid.email.address (phil hunt) writes:
> On Fri, 31 Oct 2003 01:13:20 -0700, Scott Ferrin <sfe...@xmission.com> wrote:
>>
>>Kinda gives you an appreciation of the AIM-47. A long ranged missile
>>fired at Mach 3+ and 80,000ft+ I still think that the YF-12 was one
>>of the best "might have beens".
>
> Didn't it take ages to fuel the thing, making it incapable of
> scrambling quickly?
With the Blackbirds, it's not so much fuel as it is the ancilliary
stuff, for example the Tri-Ethyl Borane needed to get the fuel burning (And
is Nasty Evil Stuff, handled more carefully (and much more dangerous)
than Nuclear Waste, and the hydraulic fluid, which is barely liquid
at most ambient temperatures and must be heated before flight on
standard days. Launching an A-12/F-12/SR-71 was a major operation, in
some ways more of a Space Launch than scrambling an airplane.
It's possible that special alert facilities could have been built for
them, with all the necessary reservoirs and preheaters & such, but
that would have tied the airplanes to specific fixed bases, and not
allowed them to deploy to dispersal sites in times of high alert.
Having your interceptors permanently stuck in known locations is just
hanging a giant ICBM target on that location.
Paul J. Adam
<pe...@adelphia.net> writes
>In article <Mo6dnawxGvr...@comcast.com>,
> "John Carrier" <jx...@comcast.net> writes:
>> A number of targets in column, at low altitude and at a high subsonic speed.
>> Generally engaged from head-on.
>
>And spread out enough in time that you can't engage several at once,
>and there won't be time to finish the current engagement and get the
>next whatever (airplane/missile) coming inbound.
That's the goal of the attackers, but how reliably can they achieve it?
Pause and think how hard it is to do a comms-out multi-axis attack that
achieves anything like a simultaneous time-on-target, against an alert,
wary and aggressive enemy.
>Manual systems, that
>rely on human observers to watch teh scopes and vector the
>interceptors or assign SAM targets are particularly vulnerable to this
>method of attacking. (Each controller can really only handle one or
>two targets at a time)
Attacking has the same problem. Easy to co-ordinate a handful of
aircraft, but how to achieve a wide arc of simultaneous attacks with a
common TOT?
phil hunt
>In article <slrnbq56oq...@cabalamat.cabalamat.org>,
> ph...@invalid.email.address (phil hunt) writes:
>> On Fri, 31 Oct 2003 01:13:20 -0700, Scott Ferrin <sfe...@xmission.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>Kinda gives you an appreciation of the AIM-47. A long ranged missile
>>>fired at Mach 3+ and 80,000ft+ I still think that the YF-12 was one
>>>of the best "might have beens".
>>
>> Didn't it take ages to fuel the thing, making it incapable of
>> scrambling quickly?
>
>With the Blackbirds, it's not so much fuel as it is the ancilliary
>stuff, for example the Tri-Ethyl Borane needed to get the fuel burning (And
>is Nasty Evil Stuff, handled more carefully (and much more dangerous)
>than Nuclear Waste,
Did it ever dissolve the pilot, like the Me 163's fuel did?
John Carrier
speed.
> > Generally engaged from head-on.
>
> And spread out enough in time that you can't engage several at once,
> and there won't be time to finish the current engagement and get the
> next whatever (airplane/missile) coming inbound. Manual systems, that
> rely on human observers to watch teh scopes and vector the
> interceptors or assign SAM targets are particularly vulnerable to this
> method of attacking. (Each controller can really only handle one or
> two targets at a time)
With a good system, and a skilled crew, its doable. And a challenge none
the less. OTOH, shooting a Mach 3 bogey at 70K+ was interesting as well.
R / John
Harry Andreas
<pfau...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
> > > Kinda gives you an appreciation of the AIM-47. A long ranged missile
> > > fired at Mach 3+ and 80,000ft+ I still think that the YF-12 was one
> > > of the best "might have beens".
> >
> > Interesting aircraft and great at it's design purpose, but too
> operationally
> > limited as a fighter or interceptor.
>
> I'm not sure I understand. At the time the USAF was procuring the
> replacement for the F106 in the late seventies, I saw the results of cost
> and effectiveness evaluations of several alternatives: F12/AIM-47,
> BF-1/AIM-54(lots of them), F14, F15/Sparrow and....F16/Sparrow. Against the
> cannonical Backfire threat in the North Atlantic basin, the F12 performed
> hugely well. On a cost/benefits trade, the results for most threats was
> pretty much in the order shown above.
>
> Of course, the USAF selected the F16/Sparrow which showed up worst in every
> scenario I saw. That spoke volumes on how seriously the USAF took the late
> seventies bomber threat.
>
> The BF-1A was interesting: huge aperature for the AWG-9 set and IRRC, 24
> AIM-54s. The increased antenna gain raised the various RADAR ranges by about
> 50%.
First of all, I have no axe to grind, just so you know. My company had the
radar
and weapons system for all but the F-16/Sparrow, and the weapons for first 3
too.
I was focusing on some of the same issues that Pete pointed out, about basing,
launch, re-fueling, etc. all practical matters that (IIRC) were pretty much
ignored in the initial study. People sometimes think the Blackbird was a
super-aircraft because it flew so fast, but try to do a 3 minute scramble
in one.
And that was the mission they were being considered for.
Also, what about re-engagements, or alternate targeting?
What was it's turning radius again? It takes how long to get back on target?
Once you point this thing at a target, it's awfully tough to re-direct.
BTW, I agree wholeheartedly with your assessment of the F-16 in the ADF
role. It was nonsense of the first order. It's probably still nonsense today
even if the F-16 is carrying AMRAAM. Aircraft range too short, engagement
time too limited, weapons envelope (IIRC) non-existent. If your GCI is not
perfect, you miss.