Methodological Naturalism, for Tim Wallace et al.
Steven J.
Tim Wallace has attacked the assumption of naturalism made in
mainstream modern science, claiming that this assumption
arbitrarily excludes attempts to find valid alternatives to
evolutionary theories. This is an attempt to set forth and
defend the principles of methodological naturalism. I have
divided the "assumption of naturalism" into four separate
assumptions, and ordered these assumptions according to their
importance. To deny the first is to deny any possibility of
science, and the second is of scarcely lesser importance. The
others can admit of exceptions and still permit the scientific
investigation of nature. Critiques of this schema and my
defense of it are welcomed.
(1) God is not trying to deceive us. It may seem odd to start
the list with a theological proposition, but it worked for
Descartes, and arguments between creationists and evolutionists
sooner or later always come back to this point. God has not
constructed the universe so that our study of it will yield
false conclusions; he has not built lies into the very structure
of the heavens and the earth. Of course, an atheist would
regard this as trivial: if God does not exist, He obviously
cannot be trying to do anything at all. Most theists, however,
would regard it as an essential attribute of God. To deny it
would be to undercut the whole point of creationism or theistic
science, since these doctrines hope to call scientists back to
trust in God. Refuse to grant assumption (1), and trust in God
is ipso facto unwarrented. Note that this assumption, in and of
itself, does not forbid miracles, i.e. nondeceptive
interventions of God in His creation. Denying this assumption
makes it impossible for us to be certain of ANYTHING we observe;
science, theistic or naturalistic, would be impossible.
(2) Anything which CAN be explained in terms of the known laws
of nature, IS correctly so explained. This assumption might
seem more arbitrary. It is, however, the assumption on which we
investigate the phenomena of daily life. Police investigating
an apparent crime scene assume the dead body on the floor used
to belong to a living person (not that the very existence of the
corpse is a mystery about which no assumptions are justified),
that the fingerprints were left by fingers (not by miracles or
unknown natural forces), and that stolen property of the
deceased found in the suspect's closet did not teleport itself
there. Assumption (2) does not require that things
unexplainable by the laws of nature cannot be miracles. Indeed,
the whole idea of miracles (interventions in the natural order
to show the sovreignity and purpose of God) requires that there
BE a natural order, and that not everything be a miracle. A
miracle can uphold a prophet's claim to speak for God, only if
we assume that day-to-day events, which can be explained by the
observed regularities of nature, are NOT miraculous. The
prophet raises a dead man, which cannot be explained by natural
law; I draw water from a well, and demand that you tell me why
this does not prove MY divine credentials. Assumption (2)
provides the answer. If we cannot be sure that known natural
laws explain what they seem to explain, we cannot even know that
there ARE natural laws, or explanatons for anything. Again,
science of any kind would be impossible.
(3) The know laws of nature apply at all times and everywhere.
This DOES rule out miracles, unless we posit the possibility of
exceptions. Note that unless these exceptions are rare, we are
again in a position of being unable to discover that there even
ARE laws of nature. Thus assumption (3), even allowing
exceptions to it, must be a default assumption in any attempt to
do science. Note also that claims of miracles implicitly
require that natural law have only rare and extraordinary
exceptions, otherwise the claim "this prophet raises the dead,
he must be from God," could be met with, "how do you know the
dead guys didn't get better by themselves." Again, miracles
should be distinguishable from nonmiracles by investigation; the
miracles should not have obvious naturalistic explanations. The
Catholic Church, which accepts the idea that miracles occur,
investigates claims for miracles on precisely this assumption.
(4) Any phenomena which cannot be explained by known laws of
nature are explained by unknown (but presumably knowable) laws
of nature. This is a relatively new addition to the principles
of methodological naturalism; it grew out of the rise of modern
science, as old mysteries were dispelled by the discovery of new
natural laws. Obviously, as stated, assumption (4) disallows
claims of miracles; its use for that purpose dates back at least
to Hume. For this reason, there has been some resistance to
this assumption; the desire to retain unexplained natural
phenomena as evidence for miracles gave rise to the phrase "God
of the Gaps." The tendency of this God to shrink with the
advance of science has led to a decline in opposition to this
assumption, although all theists and supernaturalist must assume
that exceptions exist to it. Again, miracles require, to have
any importance, a background of natural law established by God;
even a theistic science must assume that further laws of nature
will be discovered, and that not every fact which cannot be
explained by current science must be ascribed to a miracle. On
occasion, creationists have, indeed, tried to use assumption (4)
to deal with evidence adduced by evolutionists. For example,
there are apparently quite purposeless pseudogenes shared by
humans and other primates in a pattern suggestive of common
descent. The argument has been made that the purposelessness of
these genes is ONLY apparent; further discoveries will reveal
their (God-given) purpose. In general, evolutionists respond to
this argument with all the respect shown be creationists to the
claim that future discoveries will provide a naturalistic
explanation for abiogenesis.
Creationist are more and more reluctant to discard these
assumptions as one moves up to list, although few if any
creationists reject ANY of these assumptions in every case. I
think no creationist will allow a claim, under (4), that
unsolved problems with evolutionary theories will be solved with
time. Many will insist that (3) did not hold, even as a general
rule, in the distant past. On the other hand, those who are
most confident that the known laws of nature actually prohibit
evolution are quite content to allow (1) and (2). For example,
Answers in Genesis believes that evidence shows that the speed
of light has altered in the past, and thus that many proofs of
the great age of the universe are invalid under (1) and (2).
The ICR, with a sounder grasp of science, knows that no evidence
for a change of lightspeed (or, indeed, for a change of
radioactive decay rates) exists, posits a few exceptions to (2),
claiming that while the apparent age of the universe COULD be
explained by actual great age, it is better explained by
assuming that God created a mature and functioning universe.
The false appearance of age is a side effect, not an intended
effect; God is assumed not to be trying to create a false
appearance, and assumption (1) is maintained without
exceptions.
The intelligent design advocates are the most intellectually
sophisticated creationists, and the most desparate. They
recognize, for example, that an omniscient and omnipotent God
should be able to create a world with a less consistent and
extreme "maturity." To deal with this, the ID advocates are all
old-earth creationists. On the other hand, to deal with a
multitude of apparently ill-designed features of the creation
(e.g. the retina of the vertebrate eye, which is apparently
installed backwards from the way a competent engineer would do
it), ID advocates Johnson and Behe have forbidden ANY
assumptions about the the Designer's intentions. This
implicitly allows exceptions to (1), which, as noted, implicitly
demolishes the entire purpose of creationism. Their goal of a
theistic science is, more obviously than that of the young-earth
creationists, impossible; their TOTAL rejection of naturalism
(or at least, the demanding of endless exceptions to every
assumption) guts the possibility of either science or religion.
The YECs, for their part, have another problem. Their "model"
is not a theory. It does not make predictions which can be
tested. Creation scientists do not look for confirmation or
falsification of their hypotheses based on the creation model.
Instead, they look for facts which pose problems for
evolutionary theories, and assume that these count as evidence
for creation. There search implies a recognition that
evolutionary theories are proper theories; they could be, if not
falsified, at least disconfirmed and discomfitted, by the
discovery of, for example, human footprints or fossils in
Mesozoic strata. But until something can be specified which
would, at least, pose a severe problem for a creationist
explanation, there will not be a true creationist theory or
model. There will only be a preference for explanations which
are chosen, not because they fit the evidence best, but because
they fit the theology best.
Creationists (and perhaps some evolutionists) will probably
bject to this analysis of what assumptions are necessary to do
science. At the very least, they will argue that "creation
science" is compatible with assumptions (1) and (2). I have in
this article only hinted at reasons why I do not believe this is
so.
-- Steven J.
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Chris Ho-Stuart
The rest of this message is nothing but a repeat of the
nominated post.
hrgr...@my-deja.com
Chris Ho-Stuart <host...@sky.fit.qut.edu.au> wrote:
POTM nomination seconded.
The rest of this message is nothing but a repeat of the nomination
post ...
> POTM nomination. I am also emailing this to po...@talkorigins.org
> The rest of this message is nothing but a repeat of the
> nominated post.
HRG.
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
Hiddenfate
I think this is overall an excellent post; however, I must disagree with one
portion:
You wrote:
"The YECs, for their part, have another problem. Their "model"
is not a theory. It does not make predictions which can be
tested. Creation scientists do not look for confirmation or
falsification of their hypotheses based on the creation model."
It is plainly evident that YECs do indeed make predictions which can (and have)
been tested. Sadly for them, these tests easily falsify their model. YEC has
been falsified in a multitude of ways. I will agree that YECs have blinded
themselves to radiometric dating, the order of the geologic column,
dendrochronology, and a host of other sciences which easily falsify YEC. Yet
YEC is indeed falsifiable.
Now, creationism in general is not falsifiable. Norm Johnson in _Darwin on
Trial_ feels that "evolutionists" are being contradictory when Judge Overton's
ruling included the fact that creationism does not lend itself to falsification
and (along with other factors) is therefore not scientific.
What Johnson misses (and is perhaps missed in your post) is that creationism in
general makes many claims, not merely one. Certainly, many of the religious
claims such as God's existence are well outside the realm of science and are
not falsifiable. Yet, it is obvious that creationism (at least YEC) makes many
claims that are testable and are falsifiable. And indeed, falsified.
take care.
Jim Hornibrook
Steven J.
hidde...@aol.com (Hiddenfate) wrote:
>Hello.
>
>I think this is overall an excellent post; however, I must
disagree with one
>portion:
>
>You wrote:
>
>is not a theory. It does not make predictions which can be
>tested. Creation scientists do not look for confirmation or
>falsification of their hypotheses based on the creation model."
>
position is more precisely phrased than mine. I did not mean
that no falsifiable predictions could be derived from the
Genesis account, read literally. Rather, I meant that "creation
science" consists, in practice, of attempts to explain away the
evidence rather than to seek explanations for it.
Lucas Johnson
methodological naturalistic assumption of modern science.
[Steven J.] "I have divided the 'assumption of naturalism' into
four separate assumptions, and ordered these assumptions
according to their importance."
Well I disagree with you right off the bat, (1) is emphatically
not the most important assumption of methodological naturalism.
Personally, I would rate that assumption as a possible (2) with the
basic derivation of methodological naturalism as a corollary to
empirical study as (1) (I notice that you didn't provide such an
argument.)
[Steve] "(1) God is not trying to deceive us. It may seem odd to
start the list with a theological proposition, but it worked for
Descartes, and the arguments between creationists and
evolutionists sooner or later always come back to this point."
I have no substantive objection to this. As a theist, I agree that
God is not a willful deceiver.
[Steve] "God has not constructed the universe so that our study
of it will yield false conclusions; he has not built lies into the
very structure of the heavens and the earth."
First of all, the pronoun for God is "He" not "he". Second, in that
particular context the common usage is not "the earth" but simply
"earth" (As in "the heavens and earth"). Other than that, I would
disagree with your assertion that creationists must accept that God
created an intelligible world. While I am not a creationist, it is
perfectly _possible_ for a fundamentalist to take this position
(perhaps not logically so, but...). For instance,
"Let no one deceive himself. If anyone among you considers himself
wise in this age, let him become a fool so as to become wise. For
wisdom of this world is foolishness in the eyes of God, for it is
written: 'He catches the wise in their own ruses,' and again: 'The Lord
knows the thoughts of the wise, that they are vain.'"
[I Corinthians 3:18-20]
"Therefore, God is sending them a deceiving power so that they may
believe the lie, that all who have not believed the truth but have
approved wrongdoing may be condemned."
[II Thessalonians 2:11-12]
While I would obviously disagree with such an interpretation of the
Scriptures, it is technically possible to ascribe to such a position.
This is partially because such a proposition _does not_ actually
follow from methodological naturalism. One can believe that God
used empirically accessible phenomenon in order to create a false
impression (not that I actually believe this). This is a theological
statement, not an empirical one predicated on the assumption of
naturalism, and as such it is accepted as an article of faith (by a
great many theists, myself included, I might add) and can just as
easily be rejected as such. Really, I'm baffled that you included
this one at all (and even more so that you put it first). It has
nothing to do with the basic propositions of methodological
naturalism; it has more to do with Divine ethics than anything else.
[Steve] "Of course, an atheist would regard this as trivial: if God
does not exist, He obviously cannot be trying to do anything at all."
Obviously, so why did you include this? Are _you_ an atheist?
What does this have to do with methodological naturalism?
[Steve] "Most theists, however, would regard it as an essential
attribute of God. To deny it would be to undercut the whole point
of creationism or theistic science, since these doctrines hope to
call scientists back to trust in God."
I hope everyone sees the subtle non sequitur. You go from
"most theists..." to "the whole point of creationism..." without
any argument whatsoever supporting the assertion that the
beliefs of mainstream religion are essentially equivalent to
those of religious creationists. This is simply false. Most of the
canons of creationism require the explicit rejection of those of
mainstream religion. [1] There is no reason to think creationists
couldn't (or wouldn't) do so in this case.
Your claim that _scientists_ are target for creationary polemics
is also questionable. It is patent that scientists will never be
convinced that the earth is 6000 years old, or in a fixity of species.
It is not, and never was, the intention of creationist evangelism to
turn scientists back to God. After all, scientists are simply the
agents of the Devil anyhow ;) Even Henry Morris make it clear
that the _ordinary Christian_ is the target of creationist polemics
(and that strategy has been rather successful!):
"Evolution teaches that the Bible has errors and cannot be trusted.
Christians need to have their questions answered and doubts removed.
_Churches, seminaries and denominations_ need to be called back
under the authority of the Book that they have been taught to doubt.
That is the real message of creationism." [emphasis added]
[Morris H., Acts and Facts, June 1995]
[Steve] "Refuse to grant assumption (1), and trust in God is ipso facto
unwarranted."
This does not follow. Actually, if we allow the possibility that God
Deceived us in the natural world, then the only reliable information we
CAN have is that from God. As a result the only people who would have
access to the "truth" would be God and His mouthpieces on earth. Trust
in God would not only not be "unwarranted" it would be the only tenable
trust possible. Perhaps this is the conclusion creationists want people
to accept. [???]
[Steve] "Denying this assumption makes it impossible for us to be
certain of ANYTHING we observe; science, theistic or naturalistic,
would be impossible."
Technically, it is impossible to be _certain_ of "ANYTHING" now. While
Our justification in believing in a round earth may be _near_ 100%, it
is not in any manner a _certainty._ Issues in science are not resolved
to complete certainty because it is based upon inference from the data,
and not deduction from givens. This would be true regardless of a
belief,
or disbelief, in (1). However, a belief in (1) would most definitely
_increase_ confidence in scientific inferences.
[Steve] "Anything which CAN be explained in terms of the known laws
of nature, IS correctly so explained."
Whoa! This is not a universal truth at all. The orbits of the planets
Are explicable in terms of the Ptolemic system of epicycles, and,
at the time, it was the "known" law of nature. [2] It does not thereby
follow that the planets DO move in epicycles. This theory of knowledge
does not allow for any type of revision of the "known laws" of the
universe, and as such fails to be extensible to the degree necessary for
scientific discovery.
Yet, if we accept that the "known laws" can change. Then, at least in
theory, the "known laws" could change in such a way as to explain a
phenomenon in terms that are antithetical to that of the previous
explanation. Since all that is required is consilience with the "known
laws" in order to be correct. We would have two antithetical
explanations, BOTH BE CORRECT under such a theory of
knowledge. As such it can only be ascertained that your theory of
science is just a simplistic caricature of real science, and further,
that
it is patently false.
Perhaps you meant to say:
"ALL OTHER THINGS BEING EQUAL, the explanation that
fits within the basic framework of science, TENDS TO BE THE
RIGHT ONE."
In this case, I have no objection.
[Steve] "This assumption might seem more arbitrary. It is, however,
the assumption on which we investigate the phenomenon of daily life....
Assumption (2) does not require that things unexplainable by the laws
of nature cannot be miracles. Indeed, the whole idea of miracles
(interventions in the natural order to show the sovreignity [sic] and
purpose of God) requires that there BE a natural order, and that not
everything be a miracle."
Now I think I better understand what you are trying to say. You are
_trying_ (in a rather circuitous manner) to say that methodological
naturalism requires that phenomenon be decomposable into
explanations via natural causes. This is uncontroversial, but you made
your point seem ambiguous by using the phrase "known laws", and it
is still false because such natural laws could be unknown (indeed, if
they were ALL known, there would be no need for science) or could
be natural phenomenon that are not based upon nomological
constraints but simply random occurrences (for instance, weather is
a phenomenon that can be explained via natural causes [i.e. not
supernatural] but which cannot be put into an actual law, at least a
deterministic one).
Put in this manner, this is simply a logical requirement for beginning
empirical study. However, phenomenon do not need a _law_ to be
studied on the basis of naturalism. After all, what are the laws of
evolution? (Actually, there are people working on this like Goodwin
and Kauffman, but it is not necessary for it to be science). The real
question would be, how we would know which law a phenomenon
was based upon (and thus whether or not it fit within the scientific
framework), _until we have already studied it scientifically?_ This
seems to be a retrospective coronation, and as such is meaningless as
a guide for research. I suggest that you reformulate (2) based upon my
criticisms, it is quite weak and this could be taken advantage of by
creationists.
[Steve] "(3) The know [sic] laws of nature apply at all time and
everywhere."
This is utterly and emphatically false. You are conflating the epstemic
(methodological) form of naturalism, which sets restrictions on
scientific research, with the ontic (ontological) form of naturalism,
which sets restrictions upon reality. In no way does empiricism
logically necessitate that the laws of nature apply everywhere and at
all times. This is a metaphysic beyond the level of scientific
explanation (see John Wilkin's explanation of the difference in these
two forms on the t.o. Archive). Since this is not, and cannot be, a part
of methodological naturalism, this should and indeed must be
removed from this list. This is essentially equal to atheism (actually
it is basically a form of logical positivism). It is _not_ equal to
science.
[Steve] "(4) Any phenomena which cannot be explained by known
laws of nature are explained by unknown (but presumably knowable)
laws of nature."
There is nothing really wrong with this.
[Steve] "For example, there are apparently quite purposeless
pseudogenes shared by humans and other primates in a pattern
suggestive of common descent. The argument has been made [by
creationists] that the purposelessness of these genes is ONLY
apparent; further discoveries will reveal their (God-given) purpose."
Further discoveries, HAVE revealed the purpose of such "pseudogenes".
One possible purpose could be one of facilitation in evolutionary
changes. The probability of crossover increases as a product of the
increasing distance between any two genes on a chromosome in question.
Since these "pseudogenes" separate the translated genes in such a way,
they increase the probability that novel genetic combinations will
occur.
Also, there IS evidence that such "junk DNA" (as it is pejoratively
Referred to) is very purposeful. Two Science articles come to mind,
"Mining Treasures from Junk DNA" (February 4, 1994) and an
editorial "Hints of a Language in Junk DNA" (November 25, 1994).
These articles described the work of Eugene Stanley of Boston
University who used statistical techniques borrowed from linguistics
and found evidence that much of the nonprotein-coding DNA (or
"junk") has informational characteristics resembling those of a human
language. Additionally, the fact that the nonprotein-coding sequences
have been conserved over millions of years, actually lends credence to
their being _important_ in organisms (else, why wouldn't have selection
eliminated them by now?).
Overall, this is really not all that exceptional. You bring up some good
points but they get lost in all the ruffage. Perhaps if you try again
you might succeed, until then I will consider your arguments to be
hollow.
Awaiting your reply,
Lucas Johnson
-- Notes --
[1] The core premise of "creation science" is that God the creator and
God the savior are two separable entities. This is heresy, pure and
simple. It is NOT possible to scientifically research the creator God
independently from his Saving Works. Yet this is exactly what
creationists insist is the case when they hawk their wares to school
boards, insisting that creationism is a secular theory of origins that
need not be taught in a spiritual context. At the Arkansas trial,
theologian Langdon Gilkey testified that to the extent creationists
hold this view they come "very close, yes, very close indeed to the
_first, and worst, Christian heresy._" that had originally been
committed by the Gnostics of the second century. (Quote from
Gilkey, Creationism on Trial: Evolution and God at Little Rock,
(Winston Press : Minneapolis), 1995, p. 104).
[2] Assuming that we had enough epicycles, and that such
aberrations as the phases of Venus could be explained in such a
context. (Of course, one reason that it was rejected is because it
_couldn't_ do so.)
----------------
We learn only ignorance, we teach knowledge.
Steven J.
>This is in response to your previous posting on the
>methodological naturalistic assumption of modern science.
>
article, it will benefit greatly from your criticism and the
reflections it provoked. Please note that the article was
subtitled, for Tim Wallace et. al. Tim is one of this
newsgroup's resident creationists; the article was intended
especially the young-earth creationists (YECs), although I do
not know that any of them actually noticed it. This explains
certain aspects of the organization and phrasing of the article.
>
By the way, I was raised as a creationist, and read popular
"creation science" texts as a teenager. The assumptions, as I
have listed them, grew out of attempts to understand what *I*
assumed, when I decided to reject creationism and embrace
evolutionary theories. One's own tacit assumptions are
difficult to identify and express clearly, and I may have done
less well than I hoped. My assumption, in any case, was that my
underlying assumptions were widely shared among creationists,
and that by examining their beliefs in light of these basic
assumption, they could see the errors of creationism. I realize
the vainglorious vanity of this hope, by the way.
>
>>[Steven J.] "I have divided the 'assumption of naturalism'
>>into four separate assumptions, and ordered these assumptions
>>according to their importance."
>
>Well I disagree with you right off the bat, (1) is emphatically
>not the most important assumption of methodological naturalism.
>Personally, I would rate that assumption as a possible (2) with
>the basic derivation of methodological naturalism as a
>corollary to empirical study as (1) (I notice that you didn't
>provide such an argument.)
>
human reason," since absent that assumption there is no point to
doing science. This assumption might be false if one or more of
the following were true:
>
(a) The universe might be utterly chaotic (this is not, so far
as I can see, compatible with the idea that we can even try to
do science). This is rarely advanced as an argument by
advocates of creationist or theistic science, so I posited no
special assumptions to deal with this possible problem.
>
(b) Something or someone might be deliberately causing us to
misperceive reality. While never put this way by creationists,
it is the result of both the "appearance of age" arguments of
YECs and the strictures of ID advocates that we can assume
nothing of the intentions of the Creator. This is the
background of assumption (1), as stated in the article.
>
(c) In addition, certain aspects of the reality might be beyond
the ability of science to study. This might include questions
of origins. It is often suggested by YECs that unique,
nonrecurring events in prehistory might not be researchable by
the normal methods of science; assumption (3) was intended to
address this possibility.
>
Finally, some aspects of the universe might be simply be beyond
our ability to understand. This is suspected by many
methodological naturalists, but is not suspected to pose a
problem for most of the topics discussed in this NG. I did not,
therefore, deal much with this problem, though assumption (4)
touches on it.
>
I assumed that any creationist posting to this NG believed that
science was possible to some extent; therefore I concentrated on
those subsidiary assumptions which might be questioned. I set
the order of the assumptions by the apparent willingness of
various creationists to discard them. Assumption (4) is listed
last, as the most likely to be rejected out of hand. Assumption
(1) is the LEAST likely to be challenged, and therefore claims
pride of place.
>
>>[Steve] "(1) God is not trying to deceive us. It may seem odd
>>to start the list with a theological proposition, but it
>>worked for Descartes, and the arguments between creationists
>>and evolutionists sooner or later always come back to this
>>point."
>
>I have no substantive objection to this. As a theist, I agree
>that God is not a willful deceiver.
>
>>[Steve] "God has not constructed the universe so that our
>>study of it will yield false conclusions; he has not built
>>lies into the very structure of the heavens and the earth."
>
>First of all, the pronoun for God is "He" not "he". Second, in
>that particular context the common usage is not "the earth" but
>simply "earth" (As in "the heavens and earth"). Other than
>that, I would disagree with your assertion that creationists
>must accept that God created an intelligible world. While I am
>not a creationist, it is perfectly _possible_ for a
>fundamentalist to take this position (perhaps not logically so,
>but...). For instance,
>
capitalization; usenet does not encourage careful editing.
Second, I was alluding to Genesis 1:1, and correctly. Thirdly,
most creationists are unwilling to deny that God created an
intelligible world; it might be logically possible, but it would
make apologetics very problematic. It is not, in fact, clear
that if God made a world impervious to human reason, that we
could trust Him to provide us with an intelligible guide to it.
Creationists, in my experience, are very reluctant to challenge
assumption (1).
always turn into discussions of Divine ethics, and because
Divine intervention is the most plausible reason for a seemingly
understandable universe which in fact human reason can only
understand falsely.
>
>>[Steve] "Of course, an atheist would regard this as trivial:
>>if God does not exist, He obviously cannot be trying to do
>>anything at all."
>
>Obviously, so why did you include this? Are _you_ an atheist?
>What does this have to do with methodological naturalism?
>
first assumption of methodological naturalism. Furthermore,
creationists are keenly aware that many evolutionists are
atheists, and that atheists practice methodological
naturalism. Hence I attempt to show how atheists can hold
theological assumptions.
>
>>[Steve] "Most theists, however, would regard it as an
>>essential attribute of God. To deny it would be to undercut
>>the whole point of creationism or theistic science, since
>>these doctrines hope to call scientists back to trust in God."
>
>I hope everyone sees the subtle non sequitur. You go from "most
>theists..." to "the whole point of creationism..." without any
>argument whatsoever supporting the assertion that the beliefs
>of mainstream religion are essentially equivalent to those of
>religious creationists. This is simply false. Most of the
>canons of creationism require the explicit rejection of those
>of mainstream religion. [1] There is no reason to think
>creationists couldn't (or wouldn't) do so in this case.
>
>creator and God the savior are two separable entities. This is
>heresy, pure and simple. It is NOT possible to scientifically
>research the creator God independently from his Saving Works.
>Yet this is exactly what creationists insist is the case when
>they hawk their wares to school boards, insisting that
>creationism is a secular theory of origins that need not be
>taught in a spiritual context. At the Arkansas trial,
>theologian Langdon Gilkey testified that to the extent
>creationists hold this view they come "very close, yes, very
>close indeed to the "_first, and worst, Christian heresy._"
>that had originally been committed by the Gnostics of the
>second century. (Quote from Gilkey, Creationism on Trial:
>Evolution and God at Little Rock, (Winston Press :
>Minneapolis), 1995, p. 104).
>
creationism. I DID mean to claim that creationists share
beliefs about God with other theists. I disagree with your
point; I do not think most fundamentalist creationists are
correctly described by Gilkey's quote. The Gnostic heresy
separated God the Creator from God the Saviour by making them
different and antagonistic beings. "Creation science" seeks to
separate the general revelation of God (the created universe, as
interpreted by creation science) and the special revelation of
God (the Bible, as interpreted by them). I disagree strongly
with their interpretations of both, but I would stop short of
calling them heretics, at least on this ground. The distinction
they make is quite orthodox, as far as it goes; only their
interpretations of these revelations are perverse. And I think
also that most scientific creationists would be strongly averse
to rejecting assumption (1) as stated.
>
>Your claim that _scientists_ are target for creationary
>polemics is also questionable. It is patent that scientists
>will never be convinced that the earth is 6000 years old, or in
>a fixity of species. It is not, and never was, the intention of
>creationist evangelism to turn scientists back to God. After
>all, scientists are simply the agents of the Devil anyhow ;)
>Even Henry Morris make it clear that the _ordinary Christian_
>is the target of creationist polemics (and that strategy has
>been rather successful!):
>
the doubt. I do not question your assessment of YEC goals and
methods, but both the YECs and the ID advocates proclaim an
intention to rebuild science on theistic and supernaturalistic
assumptions. Whether this can be done as a practical matter, or
whether they are even sincerely trying to do it, is less the
point than whether such a goal is logically coherent. Could
such a science exist, even in theory, given the universe as it
actually is?
>
>"Evolution teaches that the Bible has errors and cannot be
>trusted. Christians need to have their questions answered and
>doubts removed. _Churches, seminaries and denominations_ need
>to be called back under the authority of the Book that they
>have been taught to doubt. That is the real message of
>creationism." [emphasis added]
>
>[Morris H., Acts and Facts, June 1995]
>
>>[Steve] "Refuse to grant assumption (1), and trust in God is
>>ipso facto unwarranted."
>
>This does not follow. Actually, if we allow the possibility
>that God Deceived us in the natural world, then the only
>reliable information we CAN have is that from God. As a result
>the only people who would have access to the "truth" would be
>God and His mouthpieces on earth. Trust in God would not only
>not be "unwarranted" it would be the only tenable trust
>possible. Perhaps this is the conclusion creationists want
>people to accept. [???]
>
grounds shall we give for trusting Him on anything? If He gave
us a lying world, why not a lying Book? Creationist themselves
ask, how could either evangelism or apologetics be possible if
God's creation and His Word were in contradiction? The whole
point of "creation science" is to argue that there IS no
contradiction between Fundamentalist interpretations of
scripture and true science. I was raised a creationist; I think
I understand their thinking. The Fundamentalists do not WANT a
deceitful God. The ID advocates do not want one either, I
think; their position is laced with more contradictions than
that of the creation scientists.
>
>>[Steve] "Denying this assumption makes it impossible for us to
>>be certain of ANYTHING we observe; science, theistic or
>>naturalistic, would be impossible."
>
>Technically, it is impossible to be _certain_ of "ANYTHING"
>now. While Our justification in believing in a round earth may
>be _near_ 100%, it is not in any manner a _certainty._ Issues
>in science are not resolved to complete certainty because it is
>based upon inference from the data, and not deduction from
>givens. This would be true regardless of a belief,
>or disbelief, in (1). However, a belief in (1) would most
>definitely _increase_ confidence in scientific inferences.
>
>
>>[Steve] "Anything which CAN be explained in terms of the known
>>laws of nature, IS correctly so explained."
>
>Whoa! This is not a universal truth at all. The orbits of the
>planets Are explicable in terms of the Ptolemic system of
>epicycles, and, at the time, it was the "known" law of nature.
>[2] It does not thereby follow that the planets DO move in
>epicycles. This theory of knowledge does not allow for any type
>of revision of the "known laws" of the universe, and as such
>fails to be extensible to the degree necessary for scientific
>discovery.
>
>Yet, if we accept that the "known laws" can change. Then, at
>least in theory, the "known laws" could change in such a way as
>to explain a phenomenon in terms that are antithetical to that
>of the previous explanation. Since all that is required is
>consilience with the "known laws" in order to be correct. We
>would have two antithetical explanations, BOTH BE CORRECT under
>such a theory of knowledge. As such it can only be ascertained
>that your theory of science is just a simplistic caricature of
>real science, and further, that it is patently false.
>
>Perhaps you meant to say:
>
>"ALL OTHER THINGS BEING EQUAL, the explanation that fits within
>the basic framework of science, TENDS TO BE THE RIGHT ONE."
>
>In this case, I have no objection.
>
was aiming for something more along the lines of Occam's razor,
I think. Perhaps I should say, "One should not assume that the
observed regularities of nature (no matter how well or badly
your theories can account for them) have been violated unless
there is no other way to account for the evidence."
>
>>[Steve] "This assumption might seem more arbitrary. It is,
>>however, the assumption on which we investigate the phenomenon
>>of daily life.... Assumption (2) does not require that things
>>unexplainable by the laws of nature cannot be miracles.
>>Indeed, the whole idea of miracles (interventions in the
>>natural order to show the sovreignity [sic] and purpose of
>>God) requires that there BE a natural order, and that not
>>everything be a miracle."
>
>Now I think I better understand what you are trying to say. You
>are _trying_ (in a rather circuitous manner) to say that
>methodological naturalism requires that phenomenon be
>decomposable into explanations via natural causes. This is
>uncontroversial, but you made your point seem ambiguous by
>using the phrase "known laws", and it is still false because
>such natural laws could be unknown (indeed, if they were ALL
>known, there would be no need for science) or could be natural
>phenomenon that are not based upon nomological constraints but
>simply random occurrences (for instance, weather is a
>phenomenon that can be explained via natural causes [i.e. not
>supernatural] but which cannot be put into an actual law, at
>least a deterministic one).
>
>
>Put in this manner, this is simply a logical requirement for
>beginning empirical study. However, phenomenon do not need a
>_law_ to be studied on the basis of naturalism. After all, what
>are the laws of evolution? (Actually, there are people working
>on this like Goodwin and Kauffman, but it is not necessary for
>it to be science). The real question would be, how we would
>know which law a phenomenon was based upon (and thus whether or
>not it fit within the scientific framework), _until we have
>already studied it scientifically?_ This seems to be a
>retrospective coronation, and as such is meaningless as a guide
>for research. I suggest that you reformulate (2) based upon my
>criticisms, it is quite weak and this could be taken advantage
>of by creationists.
>
here. Perhaps I should have used your phrase "natural causes."
I thought my examples would make my meaning clearer than would a
torrent of words on seeking out cause and effect, and inductive
and deductive reasoning. My basic point, relative to
creationism, is that, e.g. in the absence of any shred of good
evidence that radioisotope decay rates or lightspeed can vary,
we should not assume that they have in fact varied just to make
the evidence fit our theory.
>
>>[Steve] "(3) The know [sic] laws of nature apply at all time
>>and everywhere."
>
>This is utterly and emphatically false. You are conflating the
>epstemic (methodological) form of naturalism, which sets
>restrictions on scientific research, with the ontic
>(ontological) form of naturalism, which sets restrictions upon
>reality. In no way does empiricism logically necessitate that
>the laws of nature apply everywhere and at all times. This is a
>metaphysic beyond the level of scientific explanation (see John
>Wilkin's explanation of the difference in these two forms on
>the t.o. Archive). Since this is not, and cannot be, a part of
>methodological naturalism, this should and indeed must be
>removed from this list. This is essentially equal to atheism
>(actually it is basically a form of logical positivism). It is
>_not_ equal to science.
>
which is supposed to clarify and defend it, and notes that
exceptions need not be excluded a priori. At first this was
collapsed into assumption (2); it was separated because
creationists are more likely to assume, without good evidence,
exceptions to the observed regularities of nature in the distant
past than in the present. I should perhaps rephrase it, "in the
absence of good evidence that the observed regularities of
nature have NOT applied in some time or place not directly
observable, one should assume that they HAVE applied as they do
here and now." Better?
>
>>[Steve] "(4) Any phenomena which cannot be explained by known
>>laws of nature are explained by unknown (but presumably
>>knowable) laws of nature."
>
>There is nothing really wrong with this.
>
decisively as the previous assumption. It is David Hume's final
salvo against the possibility of miracles: if a verified event
could be proved to have violated the observed regularities of
nature, that would merely show that hitherto unobserved
regularities of nature held sway in this instance. I mentioned
it precisely BECAUSE possible exceptions must be admitted if
supernaturalism is to be salvaged as a possibility.
>
>>[Steve] "For example, there are apparently quite purposeless
>>pseudogenes shared by humans and other primates in a pattern
>>suggestive of common descent. The argument has been made [by
>>creationists] that the purposelessness of these genes is ONLY
>>apparent; further discoveries will reveal their (God-given)
>>purpose."
>
>Further discoveries, HAVE revealed the purpose of such
>"pseudogenes". One possible purpose could be one of
>facilitation in evolutionary changes. The probability of
>crossover increases as a product of the increasing distance
>between any two genes on a chromosome in question. Since these
>"pseudogenes" separate the translated genes in such a way, they
>increase the probability that novel genetic combinations will
>occur.
>
that is a function but not a purpose of pseudogenes; evolution
is not an end in itself. From the standpoint of ID-driven
evolution, that is an interesting possibility. I suspect that
most creationists would not be interested in a Designer who
worked through evolution so completely (though Behe might).
>
>Also, there IS evidence that such "junk DNA" (as it is
>pejoratively Referred to) is very purposeful. Two Science
>articles come to mind, "Mining Treasures from Junk DNA"
>(February 4, 1994) and an editorial "Hints of a Language in
>Junk DNA" (November 25, 1994). These articles described the
>work of Eugene Stanley of Boston University who used
>statistical techniques borrowed from linguistics and found
>evidence that much of the nonprotein-coding DNA (or "junk") has
>informational characteristics resembling those of a human
>language. Additionally, the fact that the nonprotein-coding
>sequences have been conserved over millions of years, actually
>lends credence to their being _important_ in organisms (else,
>why wouldn't have selection eliminated them by now?).
>
quite useless to the organisms it uses as vehicles, and still be
selected because it's good at copying itself. In other words,
this DNA could be purely parasitic on the coding parts of the
genome. Tapeworms aren't very useful to people, but this hasn't
caused THEM to go extinct. This is not a argument for purpose
in noncoding DNA. The informational characteristics of such DNA
is very interesting, though I do not know what it might mean.
>
>Overall, this is really not all that exceptional. You bring up
>some good points but they get lost in all the ruffage. Perhaps
>if you try again you might succeed, until then I will consider
>your arguments to be hollow.
>
contain that word. Nonetheless, I again thank you for taking
the time and effor to reply to my article, and for your
comments. You make some excellent points, and I hope to make
use of them in future posts, especially if our local YECs ever
reply to the article themselves.
>
>Awaiting your reply,
>
>Lucas Johnson
>
-- Notes --
>
>
>[2] Assuming that we had enough epicycles, and that such
>aberrations as the phases of Venus could be explained in such a
>context. (Of course, one reason that it was rejected is because
>it _couldn't_ do so.)
>----------------
>We learn only ignorance, we teach knowledge.
>
>
teach...@my-deja.com
hidde...@aol.com (Hiddenfate) wrote:
> Hello.
>
> I think this is overall an excellent post; however, I must disagree
with one
> portion:
>
> You wrote:
>
> is not a theory. It does not make predictions which can be
> tested. Creation scientists do not look for confirmation or
> falsification of their hypotheses based on the creation model."
>
(and have)
> been tested. Sadly for them, these tests easily falsify their
model. YEC has
> been falsified in a multitude of ways. I will agree that YECs have
blinded
> themselves to radiometric dating, the order of the geologic column,
> dendrochronology, and a host of other sciences which easily falsify
YEC. Yet
> YEC is indeed falsifiable.
>
Perhaps it might be phrased "Creationists do not believe that their
model is falsifiable, no matter what." This is, of course, what makes
their model and methodology non-scientific.
Great article, btw.
--Bill Davis
Lucas Johnson
[SJR] "This is not a [sic] argument for purpose in noncoding DNA."
Okay, strictly speaking you're correct. That was not an argument for
purpose per se, but it does put the burden of proof on the "junkist" to
show that such a highly ordered system in the DNA could have arisen
without being selected (ie. purely by random drift) and without being
put there by an intelligent agent. If you can give me an instance where
the "selfish gene" hypothesis alone has increased informational
complexity to a level even near that of human language, I would be very
interested to see it. (Full bibliographic references to the
peer-reviewed scientific literature please.)
[SJR] "The informational characteristics of such DNA is very
interesting, though I do not know what it might mean."
I proposed a hypothesis explaining these characteristics, namely
directed evolution, you have no alternative but the intellectually
worthless "parasite" argument. You seem to be arguing for anti-design
based upon an ignorance of how the genetical system works. This is
basically a "Chance of the Gaps" argument with no more redeemable
qualities than its theistic counterpart.
[SJR] "'Ruffage?' I need an unabridged dictionary; mine does not contain
that word."
Eek! I didn't mean "ruffage" I meant "refuse", which is the worthless or
useless part of something. Thanks for that correction. I must have been
off in space by the time I reached the end of my response. I don't even
think "ruffage" is a real word (I'll have to look it up sometime).
[SJR] "Nonetheless, I again thank you for taking the time and effor
[sic] to reply to my article, and for your comments. You make some
excellent points, and I hope to make use of them in future posts,
especially if our local YECs ever reply to the article themselves."
Your welcome. I reciprocate the thanks; you have caused me to think
about these issues more deeply as well and for that I am eternally
grateful. You have my permission to use any of the ideas in this (or any
other article of mine) in responses to YECs (including Wallace) as long
as you cite where the idea came from.
On another note, I reread your original post and you referred to the
"inverted retina" argument. I am working on a comprehensive argument for
directed evolution and upon researching the issue I have found evidence
that displaces the consensus opinion on this issue among evolutionists
(and that supports directed evolution). I would argue that the
ostensible bad design of the human eye is actually the best under
metabolic considerations. [1] When I eventually post it I hope that your
critical comments will be helpful to me. (I am also considering writing
an article regarding Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and
the use of his ideas of "paradigm" shifts by the postmodern ID
creationists.)
Awaiting your reply,
Lucas Johnson
-- Notes --
[1] The cephalopod eye is often pointed to as being oriented
"correctly". While the human eye is "inverted". A very informative
discussion regarding the cephalopod eye is contained in Wells (1962).
The argument is false but in a subtle way. The invertebrates have a
"correct" orientation of the retina largely as a result of their lower
metabolism. While humans as a result of their higher metabolism must
have their retinas pointed toward the retinal epithelium and coroidal
blood sinuses in order to provide more oxygen to the eyes. The
positioning of the photoreceptors in outer section of the retina (the
"inverted retina") where they are in intimate contact with the
choriocapillaris is a specific adaptation designed to provide abundant
quantities of oxygen to photoreceptors commensurate with their metabolic
needs. No other manner to deliver oxygen efficently can be imagined (and
the "correct" orientation would actually be _deleterious_ in this
situation), and this is why especially in high metabolic animals, one
sees the "inverted retina" dominate. It isn't physically _possible_ for
it to be "correctly" oriented in high-metabolic animals like humans.
Again this is just a sketch, you will have to wait for my article to get
all the information that I have collected.
-- Resources --
[-- One of the best philosophical inquiries into quantum mechanics --]
Albert, David. Quantum Mechanics and Experience. (Harvard University
Press: Cambridge), 1992.
[-- A good overview of the philsophical impact of HUP among other things
--]
Jammer, Max. The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics. (Wiley: New York),
1974.
[-- A good overview of the philosophy consquences of chaos theory --]
Kellert, Stephen. In the Wake of Chaos. (University of Chicago Press:
Chicago), 1993.
[-- A good book on the philosophy of science and relativism --]
Laudan, Larry. Science and Relativism. (University of Chicago Press:
Chicago), 1990.
[-- Another good tome on philosophy --]
Leplin, Jarrett. Scientific Realism. (University of California Press:
Berkeley), 1984.
[-- For a good argument that the universe is inherently chaotic --]
Prigogine, Ilya. The End of Certainty. (The Free Press: New York). 1996.
[-- For a very deep yet non-technical introduction to chaos theory --]
Ruelle, David. Chance and Chaos. (Princeton University Press:
Princeton). 1991.
[-- Another good resource on the practical applications of chaos --]
Schroeder, Manfred. Fractals, Chaos, Power Laws. (W.H. Freeman: New
York). 1991.
[-- An in depth examination of the nervous system of cephalopods (and
the eye) --]
Wells, M.J. Brain and Behavior in Cephalopods. (Heinemann : Cambridge).
1962.
[end of second part]
Lucas Johnson
posting. I hope you have taken to heart the possible objections to your
posting, and have gained a deeper understanding of methodological
naturalism as a result. This had to be spilt up because to was so large
, this is the first part.
[My original] "This is in response to your [Steven J.'s] previous
posting on the methodological naturalistic assumption of modern
science."
[Steve J.'s Response] "I thank you for your response; if I repost a
version of this article, it will benefit greatly from your criticism and
the reflections it provoked."
I thank you for considering my criticisms of your original posting. I
figured you would rather it come from me than from a fundie (although I
happen to be a former fundamentalist).
[SJR] "Please note that the article was subtitled, for Tim Wallace et.
al. Tim is one of this newsgroup's resident creationists; the article
was intended especially [for] the young-earth creationists (YECs),
although I do not know that any of them actually noticed it."
You don't have to tell me, I am aware of Timothy Wallace. He is the
chief propagandist for the True.Origin site. I haven't actually
exchanged e-mails with him, but from what I read of the True.Origin
feedback, he doesn't seem to be educated in anything but rhetoric.
Since the posting touched on the philosophy of science, I believe that
it should have been responded to by anyone with interest in the subject.
Nonetheless you are correct that as of yet the creationists haven't
noticed it. Hopefully we can get a different perspective on the issue by
getting them to participate.
[SJR] "This explains certain aspects of the organization and phrasing of
the article.
"By the way, I was raised as a creationist, and read popular "creation
science" texts as a teenager."
I was raised as a creationist (YEC actually) as well. I was home
schooled by my fundamentalist parents who didn't want me exposed to the
"lies" of evolution in public (or even private) school. Upon pondering
about my former fundamentalism I decided to pull my old 8th grade
"science" textbook out of the attic and the following are some of the
canards that pervade the book. (Interestingly, I found some statements
regarding the veracity of observation as opposed to revelation. You
assert that fundamentalists can't logically hold the position of Divine
deception [not that they hold ANY logical position]. This serves as a
clear counter-example.)
"The final authority for the Christian is not man's observation, but
God's revelation. Man's senses are so easily fooled that it is
impossible to trust observations alone."
[Mulfinger, George and Donald M. Snyder, Earth Science for Christian
Schools, Second Edition, (Bob Jones University Press : Greenville, SC),
1992, p.viii]
"What a scientist dreams up in his mind is not necessarily what really
exists. Remember, his senses are fallible, and his cannot understand
God's creation fully or correctly. He sees everything through a clouded
glass (I Cor. 13:12)."
[Ibid. p.x]
"Often a scientist's prejudices (likes and dislikes) will determine what
type of model he will choose to develop. A creationist will choose a
different model than an evolutionist will to explain origins. The
authors of this book are Bible-believing Christians who accept the
creation account as recorded in the Scriptures. They have 'prejudiced'
this series toward creation and God's word. But keep in mind that
education is a process of prejudicing. The most highly educated person
is a very prejudiced person."
[Ibid. p.xi]
"The most important thing to remember is that all theories are based
upon faith. [Evolution and Creation are two such theories]...In what
will you choose to place your faith?"
[Ibid. p.98]
"When men reject the Word of God on the subject of origins, they cut
themselves off from the only true means of gaining any real knowledge of
the subject."
[Ibid. p.136]
"A major reason for exploring space has been to find evidence for life
on other planets. Evolutionists thought that on Mars especially life
might have begun to evolve. The entire space program has found nothing
to support evolution."
[Ibid. p.163]
"Why do unregenerate scientists tend to disregard the [Fall, Creation,
and Flood]?...First, man, by his sinful nature, does not like to face
reponsibility. By admitting that there is a supreme being who created
the universe, man must also admit that he is responsible to that being
and subject to the rules that He sets forth....Second, mankind does not
like to confront the fact of sin....Man needs someone more powerful than
himself to provide a way to overcome the problem of sin. And third, the
Flood proves that God does hold man accountable for his actions and that
He will judge him for his deeds. If man is simply here as a result of
accidental happenings, as the evolutionist would teach, then he is
simply a product of his environment and is not responsible for his
actions....And finally, the unregenerate mind would further theorize
that since he is simply a product of his environment, and since there
are really no absolute moral standards, then punishment is not something
to be feared."
[Ibid. p.247]
"Of course, any information that is contrary to the Bible is wrong."
[Ibid. p.252]
"Evolutionists will claim...that the environment really is not so
critical - that living organisms can learn to adapt to whatever
situation they find themselves in, given enough time. This is false. The
genes of an organism are totally unaware of environmental problems. The
genes would not be able to solve the problems even if they 'knew' about
them. Furthermore, it makes little sense to talk about long-term
adaptation if intolerable conditions would destroy an entire population
at the outset."
[Ibid. p.255]
"Until a person is willing to face the fact of supernatural creation -
complete, miraculous, and rapidly completed - he will not have a
realistic appeciation for the world in which he lives."
[Ibid. p.260]
I grow weary of such nonsense and I am utterly shocked looking back at
it now that I accepted such garbage as the inspired Word for so long.
Please note the source, if you haven't already, is _Bob Jones
University_. (The "Bible-believers" who until recently had a policy
barring interracial dating.) I was steeped in creationary polemics
probably more than even you were.
[SJR] "The assumptions, as I have listed them, grew out of attempts to
understand what *I* assumed, when I decided to reject creationism and
embrace evolutionary theories. One's own tacit assumptions are difficult
to identify and express clearly, and I may have done less well than I
hoped."
For this purpose, you probably did fine. As a general exposition of the
assumptions methodological naturalism, it was sufficent but improvable.
My intention was to encourage you to think more deeply about such issues
and as a result have a more complete understanding of MN.
[SJR] "My assumption, in any case, was that my underlying assumptions
were widely shared among creationists, and that by examining their
beliefs in light of these basic assumption [sic], they could see the
errors of creationism. I realize the vainglorious vanity of this hope,
by the way."
Idealism is not necessarily a bad thing.
[Steven J. Original] "I have divided the 'assumption of naturalism' into
four separate assumptions, and ordered these assumptions according to
their importance."
[MO] "Well I disagree with you right off the bat, (1) is emphatically
not the most important assumption of methodological naturalism.
Personally, I would rate that assumption as a possible (2) with the
basic derivation of methodological naturalism as a corollary to
empirical study as (1) (I notice that you didn't provide such an
argument.)"
[SJR] "Assumption (1) ought to be, 'the universe is understandable by
human reason,' since absent that assumption there is no point to doing
science."
Agreed, we were both initally wrong. Upon thinking about the situation,
I agree that this is the most important assumption in any rational
analysis of the universe, scientific or otherwise.
[SJR] "This assumption might be false if one or more of the following
were true:
"(a) The universe might be utterly chaotic (this is not, so far as I can
see, compatible with the idea that we can even try to do science)."
Hmmm...You really must define what you mean by "chaos". This is because
some would argue that (in the technical sense of the word) that the
universe is indeed "utterly chaotic" (cf. Prigogine (1996), Schroeder
(1991), etc.). Since these authors are scientists and their theories are
definitely scientific, I find it hard to accept this until you clarify
your position.
[SJR] "This is rarely advanced as an argument by advocates of
creationist or theistic science, so I posited no special assumptions to
deal with this possible problem.
"(b) Something or someone might be diliberately causing us to
misperceive reality. While never put this way by creationists, it is the
result of both the 'appearance of age' arguments of YECs and the
strictures of ID advocates that we can assume nothing of the intentions
of the Creator. This is the background of assumption (1), as stated in
the article."
I have previously objected to this principle. Upon reflecting on this
issue, and considering the fact that you have reformulated (1) (which
will now be referred to as (*1)) to be "the universe is understandable
by human reason," I would have to agree that _this_ would be false under
such conditions.
[SJR] "(c) In addition, certain aspects of the reality might be beyond
the ability of science to study. This might include questions of
origins."
I fail to see how this could demonstrate the falsity of (*1). After all,
the Heisenberg Uncertainity Principle states that there are aspects of
reality that are _inherently_ beyond the ability of science to know. The
HUP has not refuted MN, so why would the assertion that origins is
inexplicable do so?
[SJR] "It is often suggested by YECs that unique, nonrecurring events in
prehistory might not be researchable by the normal methods of science;
assumption (3) was intended to address this possibility.
"Finally, some aspects of the universe might simply be beyond our
ability to understand. This is suspected by many methodological
naturalists, but it is not suspected to pose a problem for most of the
topics discussed in this NG."
Then why did you include this precept among a list of situations where
(*1) might be false? (Your exact words were "This assumption [(*1)]
might be false if one or more of the following were true...".)
[SJR] "I did not, therefore, deal much with this problem, though
assumption (4) touches on it."
I disagree. (4) is as follows:
"(4) Any phenomena which cannot be _explained_ by known laws of nature
are _explained_ by unknown (BUT PRESUMABLY KNOWABLE) laws of nature."
[emphasis added]
[from <http://www.deja.com/threadmsg_md.xp?AN=613447875&fmt=text>]
I won't go into the whole "law" issue again, but as anyone can see this
does not deal with, or even touch on the "problem" of unknowability.
Firstly, it should be pointed out that the indeterministic quality of
chaotic systems does not arise from our ignorance of better
descriptions, there is a basic mathematical proof that such information
is inherently _unknowable_ (although possible indeterministic "laws"
could be built). The same goes for quantum theory and HUP (although I
won't go into such issues in depth _here_ you can see the references I
have already given or look for more if you're interested in the
subject).
Second, you don't seem to recognize the difference between
"understanding" and "explaining" phenomenon. For example, we can explain
how electrons orbit around atoms (to a degree), but we don't
_understand_ all the vagarities of it (and some of them will probably
never be known). (4) deals with explanation, while (*1) deals with
understanding. It is clear that these two concepts are not _directly_
related to one another (although some relation does exist). So your
appeal to (4) to defend (*1) seems unwarranted to me until you provide a
better argument for such an appeal.
[SJR] "I assumed that any creationist posting to this NG believed that
science was possible to some extent; therefore I concentrated on those
subsidiary assumptions which might be questioned. I set the order of the
assumptions by the apparent willingness of various creationists to
discard them."
I thought you said that you ordered them according to their
"importance"?
[SJR] "Assumption (4) is listed last, as the most likely to be rejected
out of hand. Assumption (1) is the LEAST likely to be challenged, and
therefore claims pride of place."
[-- Deleted remarks about assumption (1) --]
In its reformulated state (*1), I have no objection to it (really I had
no objection in the first place, I was merely pointing out possible
creationist objections). You have addressed the points I have brought up
well enough, and I don't wish to argue merely for the sake of argument
(although if you catch me on a good day I just might). Therefore, I
leave it to the creationists to object any further.
[-- Deleted correction of assumption (2) --]
[SJR] "Correction and clarification noted and accepted. Actually, I was
aiming for something more along the lines of Occam's razor, I think.
Perhaps I should say, 'One should not assume that the observed
regularities of nature (no matter how well or badly your theories can
account for them) have been violated unless there is no other way to
account for the evidence.'"
I still think that this is not properly stated. As I pointed out in my
previous posting, Ptolemic epicycles can technically explain the motions
of the planets (badly). Indeed, it is possible to extend ANY theory
indefinitely with ad hoc assumptions, everything from Newtonian
mechanics to Darwinism (so it is _always_ possible to account for the
data). Quine (1980 [1953]) pointed out that hypotheses cannot actually
be tested one by one against nature, so we could literally go on forever
in such a manner. [1] Your theory of knowledge doesn't address this and
if we disregard how "well" a theory accounts for the evidence, we
necessarily disregard most of the scientific process. You might consider
casting this in this way:
[Possible Improvement - Note: I haven't read this critically so there
might be errors, but it is simply a suggestion for future posts, not an
actual epistemology]
One should not assume that the observed regularities of nature have been
violated (and thus shown to be in need of replacement) unless there is a
better theory that fits the following criterion (it should be noted that
no one of these can show the advantages of one particular hypothesis
over another, instead it is a cumulative argument):
(A) Explanatory Scope: The new theory should, and indeed must, explain a
greater variety of phenomenon than its rivals in order to be considered
as a replacement to a previous theory.
Actually, this should be qualified, because it is important to recognize
that a particular explanation may be narrow in its scope and still be
good. For instance, programming my VCR to tape The Simpsons explains why
I have a large collection of such tapes. However, this does not explain
any other events (like Halley's Comet), but in the context it is a
perfectly good explanation of my collection. Explanations will have a
broader or narrower scope depending upon the sort of phenomenon in
question, so an absolute measure of scope is not in and of itself an
indication of a better explanation.
Rather I suggest that scope comes into play when we are comparing
alternate hypotheses attempting to explain the same data set. All other
things being equal, we should prefer H1 over H2 if H1 explains more of
the data set in question than does H2. For example, let's say that a
chemist gets a readout from an laser absorbtion analysis of an unknown
compound. H2 accounts for only part of the curve, while H1 accounts for
more. Obviously H1 will be favored, unless H2 is supported more by the
other criterion.
(B) Explanatory resolution: The new theory should be more precise and
explain in a more detailed manner the phenomenon in question in order to
be considered as a replacement.
Actually this dimension of theory assessment is not usually discussed
_explicitly_ in most epistemologies. Take the example of the telescope,
the resolution of a telescope or microscope refers to its ability to
distinguish points nearby each other (ambiguous cases). The clearness of
the image depends upon this property, and likewise clarity is also a
basic feature of good explanations. So the hypothesis with a higher
level of detail brings the data into focus better than a hypothesis with
a lower level of detail. This is probably one of the more important
criterion in regards to theory evaluation (at least in my humble
opinion).
For example, Darwinian evolutionary explanations require a considerable
amount of work. Flushing out genetic pathways, insuring that each step
is plausible and physically possible, etc. Requiring (sometimes
mathematical) precision in such explanations. However, it's purported
rival ID is completely nebulous and evasive of all detailed
explanations. This is a severe problem that plagues all creationary
theories. The fact that it is impossible to give a detailed description
of the process of creation, most definitely makes ID a weaker opponent
against evolution.
Let's take another example: Lamarckism. As a theory of common descent,
Lamarckism unifies the data in a similar manner to Darwinism, satisfying
(A), (unlike ID which fails (A) as well) but it gives no real detailed
way in which changes will be effected. Therefore, it fails to make any
risky falsifiable predictions, by making no predictions whatsoever! On
the other hand, Darwinism most emphatically does give a very detailed
description. We know of the types of genetic modifications that occur
(mutation, crossover, transposons, etc.) and, in most cases, we can
hypothesize which ones we think developed as a result of which types of
changes. No other theory of origins does this, that is significant.
... [Other criteria would go here]
There could be more criterion but my point is made. You should try and
show that creationism is unreasonable because it doesn't fit any of the
normal criterion of a replacement explanadum, and after all why should
_it_ be excluded from tests that every other theory (including
evolution) had to go through? Instead of simply asserting that we should
stay within already established theories of origins, instead focus on
the (un)reasonableness of _not_ staying with it. I think you will have
much more success with this strategy.
[-- The end of my demonstration --]
[-- Deleted more clarification of assumption (2) --]
[SJR] "The term 'natural law' is probably too vague and confusing here.
Perhaps I should have used your phrase 'natural causes.' I thought my
examples would make my meaning clearer than would a torrent of words on
seeking out cause and effect, and inductive and deductive reasoning."
I don't think is it too vague, I think it is too _specific_. It doesn't
apply to events that are not law-based, yet still important to
scientific theories. However, I'm sure that the word "law" would be more
easily understood than the more inclusive "cause" in this context, which
you yourself pointed out. Perhaps you should point out the possible
ambiguity in the word in your possible reposting (you might consider
keeping the word "law", if only for matters of pedagogy).
[SJR] "My basic point, relative to creationism, is that, e.g. in the
absence of any shred of good evidence that radioisotope decay rates or
lightspeed can vary, we should not assume that they have in fact varied
just to make the evidence fit our theory."
Well I guess I should point out that general relativity _does not_
actually prohibit variation in the speed of light. So it CAN vary (that
emphatically does not mean that it does so in a systematic way in order
to make the universe seem older than it actually is as creationists
claim), and some inflationary models of the Big Bang do in fact posit
such a thing. Going back to your point, of course, you _are_ essentially
right, we shouldn't just pull ad hoc assumptions from thin air just to
make the data fit a conclusion. Theories should fit to the data, not
vice versa. However, if this is what you were trying to say with (2),
you didn't do it very well.
[SJO] "(3) The know [sic] laws of nature apply at all times and
everywhere."
[MO] "This is utterly and emphatically false. You are conflating the
epistemic (methodological) form of naturalism, which sets restrictions
on scientific research, with the ontic (ontological) form of naturalism,
which sets restrictions upon reality. In no way does empiricism
logically necessitate that the laws of nature apply everywhere and at
all times...."
[SJR] "In the version of the post I see, it is followed by a paragraph
which is supposed to clarify and defend it, and notes that exceptions
need not be excluded a priori."
Well let's look at the original post:
"(3) The know [sic] laws of nature apply at all times and everywhere.
This _____DOES_____ rule out miracles, unless we posit the possiblity of
exceptions. Note that unless these exceptions are rare, we are again in
a position of being unable to discover that there even ARE laws of
nature. Thus assumption (3), even allowing allowing exceptions to it,
must be a default assumption in any attempt to do science." [emphasis
added]
[from <http://www.deja.com/threadmsg_md.xp?AN=613447875&fmt=text>]
Well if we allow exceptions, then ipso facto the "known laws of nature
DO NOT apply at all times and everywhere." Only sometimes and
someplaces. The question then becomes: How do we know when a miracle
_has_ happened? You give a possible way to determine the difference
later in the post:
"Note also that claims of miracles implicitly require that natural law
have only rare and extraordinary exceptions, otherwise the claim 'this
prophet raises the dead, he must be from God,' could be met with 'how do
you know the dead guys didn't get better by themselves.' Again miracles
should be distinguishable from nonmiracles by investigation; the
_miracles should not have obvious naturalistic explanations_." [emphasis
added]
[from <http://www.deja.com/threadmsg_md.xp?AN=613447875&fmt=text>]
So the only way to tell if something is a miracle, is if it has no
natural explanation, but this is obviously faulty. First off, it is a
universal negative: "No natural explanation for phenomenon, P, is
possible so P must be the result of God." Universal negatives can not be
confirmed, ever, only refuted (for example, "Heavier-than-air flying
machines are not possible." -Lord Kelvin, 1895). Anyways, such an event
would probably be put classified as a (4)-type quandary instead of a
miracle. We could always claim that a better theory would come around
instead of accepting the occurance of a miracle. Instead of excluding
miracles _a priori_ you exclude them _a posteriori_, not much better in
my eyes. Considering that I cannot distinguish between (3) and
metaphysical naturalism (and I don't think anyone can), I stand behind
my previous statement, and I don't think that the rest of the paragraph
saved your argument in the slightest.
[SJR] "At first this was collapsed into assumption (2); it was separated
because creationists are more likely to assume, without good evidence,
exceptions to the observed regularities of nature in the distant past
than in the present. I should perhaps rephrase it, 'in the absence of
good evidence that the observed regularities of nature have NOT applied
in some time or place not directly observable, one should assume that
they HAVE applied as they do here and now.' Better?"
Much more so. But what would count as such "good evidence"? How would
you judge such evidence in light of assumption (4)?
[SJO] "(4) Any phenomena which cannot be explained by known laws of
nature are explained by unknown (but presumably knowable) laws of
nature."
[MO] "There is nothing really wrong with this."
[SJR] "Yet, admitted without exceptions, it denies miracles as
decisively as the previous assumption."
Upon reflection I am now withdrawing my provisional support of this
principle. It should be,
"Any phenomena which cannot be explained by appeals to the known
regularities of nature _could_ be explained by some unknown regularity.
However, if such an anomaly is not explained in a timely manner, or
appears to be intractable, non-scientific hypotheses should be
considered (based upon theory-evaluative criteria) as explanations."
Apparently, the conclusion you wish to make is that of
anti-supernaturalism, but it is entirely unwarranted as I have already
pointed out.
[SJR] "It is David Hume's final salvo against the possibility of
miracles: if a verified event could be proved to have violated the
observed regularities of nature, that would merely show that hitherto
unobserved regularities of nature held sway in this instance. I
mentioned it precisely BECAUSE possible exceptions must be admitted if
supernaturalism is to be salvaged as a possiblity."
So, you are excluding miracles _a priori_ from being explanations of
unexplanable (or at least unexplained) data. However, you have already
stated that (3) is not predicated on this a priori assumption. Why,
then, is (4)? It definitely does not follow that because H1 is wrong and
we have no other natural explanation of data set, D, that there _must_
be an H2, and that no Gs are even allowed to be considered. This is a
logical fallacy, and an attack upon theism itself. It has absolutely
nothing to do with MN, and I would venture to bet that even many
scientists would reject it. I do, however, find it interesting that you
never answered my question: Are you an atheist?
[SJO] "For example, there are apparently quite purposeless psuedogenes
shared by humans and other primates in a pattern suggestive of common
descent. The argument has been made [by creationists] that the
purposelessness of these genes is ONLY apparent; further discoveries
will reveal their (God-given) purpose."
[MO] "Further dicoveries, HAVE revealed the purpose of such
"pseudogenes". One possible purpose could be one of facilitation in
evolutionary changes. The probability of crossover increases as a
product of the increasing distance between any two genes on a chromosome
in question. Since these "psuedogenes" separate the translated genes in
such a way, they increased the probability that novel genetic
combinations will occur."
[SJR] "Thank you for this comment. From a naturalistic standpoint that
is a function but not a purpose of psuedogenes; evolution is not an end
in itself."
How do you know this? What _evidence_ is that based upon? I presented an
argument based upon biology, you responded with one based upon
philosophy. That is a very interesting disparity.
[SJR] "From the standpoint of ID-driven evolution, that is an
interesting possibility. I suspect that most creationists would not be
interested in a Designer who worked through evolution so completely
(though Behe might)."
Since I am a theistic evolutionist leaning towards guided evolutionism
this would be representative of my position. I see no problem with God
using old genes to effect new genetic structures, even you admit that it
is an interesting possibility. I will grant that creationists might not
accept such an explanation, but that is not germane to whether or not
psuedogenes have a purpose or not.
[-- Deleted references to Eugene Stanley's work on the similarities
between the sequences of nonprotein-coding sections of DNA and human
language. --]
[SJR] "Selection preserves successful replicators. 'Junk' DNA could be
quite useless to the organism it uses as vehicles, and still be selected
because it's good at copying itself."
From your use of the word "vehicle" to describe organisms, I can only
conclude that your mind has been invaded by the propaganda distributed
by Dawkins et. al. If an organism is wasting time replicating useless
genes than it would necessarily have a distinct selective disadvantage
against another organism. So selection would disproportionately favor
organisms without it. If however, such DNA segments _had_ a use then
they would be selected for. We see psuedogenes in present-day organisms,
so the only conclusion we can make is that such sequences DO have some
use. If we couldn't conclude usefulness based upon the existence of
genes in the genome, then we couldn't say that the gene that develops
the eye has a use. We would simply conclude that it's just good at
replicating itself. It doesn't really do anything. Right? That is, of
course, simply absurd.
[SJR] "In other words, this DNA could be purely parasitic on the coding
parts of the genome. Tapeworms aren't very useful to people, but this
hasn't caused THEM to go extinct."
First, upon what evidence do you base your belief that psuedogenes are
parasitic? None. Second, why would we even expect tapeworms to go
extinct? Tapeworms aren't genes, they are organisms, so the analogy is
clearly false. After all, according to the "Selfish Gene" hypothesis
(which you clearly support), the _organism_ is not itself subject to
selection, only the genome is selected for. Thus tapeworms still exist
because because they are _organisms_ not genes and thus cannot be
selected against as a result of natural selection. So your argument is
_itself_ refuted by Dawkins' hypothesis.
[End of first part]