Free-will and Determinism co-exist
c.l.sears
exist. And when you think about it, it makes sense:
If I 'will' myself to fly, I sadly, do not fly. Why? Because my
deterministic environment has not provided me with the facilities to fly.
What I *can* do is to have the free will to build a plane.
I have free will, but its scope is constrained within the boundaries of a
deterministic environment.
Jim Bromer
"c.l.sears" <c.l....@ntlworld.com> wrote in message
news:Xkn68.6340$IY1.1...@news2-win.server.ntlworld.com...
I would agree to the extent that I am free to determine my own will, but I
can't make up my mind if I want to.
c.l.sears
"Jim Bromer" <jbr...@concentric.net> wrote in message
news:a3d0qn$j...@dispatch.concentric.net...
Neil W Rickert
>Since there are compelling arguments F & D, I can only conclude that both
>exist. And when you think about it, it makes sense:
I have not yet come upon any compelling arguments for determinism.
The evidence seems to be against it.
Michael Altarriba
When a process is deterministic, it will always produce an output Y
given a set of inputs [X]. When a process is stochastic, then Y is a
random value conditional upon [X]. So, what does "free will" mean in
this context? Does it mean that human behaviour is stochastic? If that
isn't what "free will" means, then what -does- it mean? I get the
feeling that "free will" is assuming some sort of dualistic description
of sentience whereby some sort of metaphysical "Mindstuff" interfaces
with our physical nervous systems.
Just what does it mean to speak of "free will" when dealing with a
purely material body operating via purely physical processes?
Zagan
> Let the weather decide!
[Zagan]
Which, of course, is was set by what a butterfly did 200 years ago. :^)
// Jim
--
|| Free Science Fiction
|| The Keepers of Forever
|| Read reviews & download Novel
|| www.atlantic.net/~jcd
Bhupinder Singh Anand
Neil et al
==========
So it would seem.
Here is some recent correspondence that may be of peripheral interest
on this subject. Although not directly addressing the issue at hand,
the unusual context in which the issue of "determinism and free-will"
is raised is fascinating!
(The salient points of this correspondence form a significant part of
the PREAMBLE to a paper titled PARADOX REGAINED: LIFE BEYOND GOEDEL'S
SHADOW whose abstract I intend offering as a short communication in
the Logic section at the International Congress of Mathematicians
2002, scheduled to be held 25thAug-3rd Sept at Beijing. An updated
version of this paper containing the PREAMBLE is accesible on the web
at http://alixcomsi.com/index01.htm. A downloadable PDF version
without the PREAMBLE is available at
http://arXiv.org/abs/math/0201307.)
<<<
Sent: 06 January 2002 1:20 AM
To: Perry Bezanis
Subject: Determinism and Godelian sentences
|| From: Perry Bezanis [mailto:pb...@compuserve.com]
|| Sent: 30 December 2001 2:13 AM
|| To: Bhupinder Singh Anand
|| Subject: A small problem that may be of interest to you.
|| No 'scientist' today (at least that I know of) believes in
determinism:
||
|| determinism n. The philosophical doctrine that every event,
|| act, and decision is the inevitable consequence of antecedents
|| that are independent of the human will.
|| (The American Heritage Dictionary
|| Copyright (c) 1986, 1987)
||
|| -which, in a simpler form reads (I think) something like-
||
|| All human consequence is a function of non-human precedence.
||
|| -the statement itself (a 'consequence') included.
||
|| Question:
|| I would like someone to consider subjecting this definition to
|| Godel's Undecidability Theorem -you, primarily, if possible, but
|| anyone else if not you. My 'more simple' statement will have to be
|| recast, I'm sure, but what I'd like to get back is something like
(or
|| better than) the blurb below which excerpted from June 1999
|| Scientific American's 'The Limits of Logic' by John Dawson Jr:
||
|| " This statement is unprovable.
||
|| The above can be coded as a numerical equation according to a
|| formula devised by Godel. The equation is not provable and
|| therefore affirms the meaning of the English-language
|| proposition. That means, however, that the statement is true."
"Goedelising" your sentence
===========================
Re your proposed "Goedelian" sentence built around the phrase:
"All human consequence is a function of non-human precedence."
A very loose way of interpreting this would be as:
(Ax)(x is a "human consequence" => (Ey)(y is a "non-human precedence"
& (y => x)))
If we define:
F(x) is true if and only if x is a "human consequence", and
G(y) is true if and only if y is a "non-human precedence",
where x and y are variables that "somehow" represent "actions" ranging
over the set of "human" and "non-human" "actions", then the above can
be symbolically expressed further as:
(Ax)(F(x) => (Ey)(G(y) & (y=>x))).
If we now postulate that the expression "(Ax)(F(x) => (Ey)(G(y) &
(y=>x)))" itself is some "human action" h, we then have that:
F(h) => (Ey)(G(y) & (y => h)).
Prima facie there is nothing remarkable or "Goedelian" about such an
assertion. It simply symbolises a Platonistic assertion about the
existence of a "non-human precedence" that caused the "human
consequence", namely the expression of "(Ax)(F(x) => (Ey)(G(y) &
(y=>x)))".
Thus there would seem little of interest to warrant devising a
rigorous theory that could formalise the above reasoning.
"Determinism" and "factual truth"
=================================
Nevertheless, you have raised two fascinating issues that are quite
commonly, and, I personally believe, misleadingly conceptualised
because of the very richness of both our conceptual ability as well as
our formal and informal languages of communication. Let me, again very
loosely, try to address them.
As I see it, "Determinism" involves the concepts of "factual truth"
and "perception".
We may choose to define "factual truths" - as Goedel does - in
Platonistic terms as a characteristic of "relationships" that "exist"
in some "absolute" sense (i.e. even in the absence of any "perceiver")
between the "objects" of an external "ontology" (both of which are
also taken to "exist" in some "absolute" sense).
However, we are then faced with cogent, reasonable and irrefutable
classical arguments both for and against the proposition that every
event, act, and decision is the inevitable consequence of antecedents
that are independent of the human will.
>>>
The above, possibly, is the meaning of C.L.Sears remark that both
free-will and determinism appear to co-exist (comfortably?).
<<<
Most 'scientists' today would be uncomfortable committing themselves
intellectually to either of these positions even as a working
hypothesis (although they may conceptualise ideas Platonistically for
psychological reasons of inducing within oneself a feeling of
temporary, even if illusory, certitude).
The reason: Commitment to a philosophy whose antithesis is "logically"
irrefutable would limit their ability to conceptualise the "essence"
of a universe that is accepted as beyond "complete" conceptualisation
(reflecting the belief that the only faithful "model" of the
"universe" is the "universe" itself).
Another alternative is to view "relationships" as belonging to
"perceptions" that we "selectively" assign to "objects" (that
themselves are conceptual "constructs") of an "ontology" (that is
similarly a conceptual "construct").
In other words, each "perception" is reasonably assumed to be a
"construct" based on a unique, one-of-a-kind, never-to-be-repeated
experience. "Factual truth" is then the "subjective" characteristic of
the expression of our constructed "perception" (loosely speaking, it
corresponds to what is common to the way we express our various
"perceptions"), rather than an "objective" characteristic of
"something" which we "perceive".
If we accept "free will" to imply that we are at liberty to choose
whether to "perceive" or not, and that each "perception", although
rooted in the external world, is essentially a mental "construct" that
is nowhere reflected in the external world, then every "perception"
actually "contains" a "factual truth", along with all its
"constituents".
To the extent that every decision to "perceive" gives rise to an
experience that involves exchange of energy at the "perception" point,
excercise of "free will" affects and significantly alters the energy
state of the entire universe "unpredictably" after each "perception"
(the "butterfly-in-China" effect).
The reason for the "unpredictability": Since each individual
"perception" involves Heisenberg's "uncertainty" principle, the "free
will" involved in a decision to "perceive" can only be conceptualised
by us in statistical terms.
On this view, the universe cannot be conceived, or expressed, by us as
"deterministic" in the classical sense.
>>>
Neil W Rickert
>Neil W Rickert <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> wrote in message news:<a3d2o4$peo$1...@husk.cso.niu.edu>...
>> "c.l.sears" <c.l....@ntlworld.com> writes:
>> >Since there are compelling arguments F & D, I can only conclude that both
>> >exist. And when you think about it, it makes sense:
>> I have not yet come upon any compelling arguments for determinism.
>> The evidence seems to be against it.
>Neil et al
>==========
>So it would seem.
>Here is some recent correspondence that may be of peripheral interest
>on this subject. Although not directly addressing the issue at hand,
>the unusual context in which the issue of "determinism and free-will"
>is raised is fascinating!
>(The salient points of this correspondence form a significant part of
>the PREAMBLE to a paper titled PARADOX REGAINED: LIFE BEYOND GOEDEL'S
>SHADOW whose abstract I intend offering as a short communication in
I'm not sure why you would want to connect this to Goedel's work.
Goedel's incompleteness theorem is about limitation in systems of
formal rules that we construct. The question of determinism is an
empirical question, about the behavior of the natural world, and is
independent of our construction of rules.
You might perhaps argue that Goedel's result demonstrates that there
are limitations on scientific laws that we may
{construct,develop,discover}. But it is not obvious how it could
constrain the natural world.
>"Determinism" and "factual truth"
>=================================
>Nevertheless, you have raised two fascinating issues that are quite
>commonly, and, I personally believe, misleadingly conceptualised
>because of the very richness of both our conceptual ability as well as
>our formal and informal languages of communication. Let me, again very
>loosely, try to address them.
>As I see it, "Determinism" involves the concepts of "factual truth"
>and "perception".
>We may choose to define "factual truths" - as Goedel does - in
>Platonistic terms as a characteristic of "relationships" that "exist"
>in some "absolute" sense (i.e. even in the absence of any "perceiver")
>between the "objects" of an external "ontology" (both of which are
>also taken to "exist" in some "absolute" sense).
From that perspective, the only "factual truths" available to us are
abstract truths, such as those used by Goedel. There could be no
empirical "factual truths" available to us, for we are forever stuck
inside our world and unable to access the world from the perspective
of the external ontologist.
>However, we are then faced with cogent, reasonable and irrefutable
>classical arguments both for and against the proposition that every
>event, act, and decision is the inevitable consequence of antecedents
>that are independent of the human will.
I think not. Determinists are perhaps impressed by the determinism
of our scientific laws. But these laws, even if correct, express
only internal relations. Moreover, their determinism as laws only
implies that the result is determined by the combination of the
inputs and the laws. You would have to know, from an externalist
viewpoint, how the inputs to our laws originate in order to be able
to conclude anything about determinism as an empirical claim.
Quinn DuPont
objective reality... I have no quarrels with this, its just something to
note. Further, one could turn to quantum theory for a bit of aid on the
subject. A current theory is that conciousness is attained through a
Bose-Einstein condensation of the water within the microtubules of the axon.
My understanding is that the B-E condensation (the proccess of which a laser
is created, rather than just "focussing" light, the photons are "lined up"
to create a non-diffusing beam) can create a unity of conciousness, thus
allowing for a determinist perspective of free will (paradoxical in terms,
sorry). Further, this allows for the process to be stochastic, however we
can attain a unity of conciousness though the process (without this theory,
I would find it difficult to see how a unified conciousness could arise from
a "random" or even stochastic proccess). The attractive property of this
theory is that it allows humans to have free will yet still remain well
within the scientific paradigm....It also removes any need for a dualist
approach, which suffers heavily against this theory as Ocham's razor is keen
indeed.
If anyone has an extensive background in B-E condensation or quantum
theories of the mind, I would apprieciate a reply to check my knowledge, I'm
rather green in the area.
Bhupinder Singh Anand
> ana...@vsnl.com (Bhupinder Singh Anand) writes:
> >Neil W Rickert <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> wrote in message news:<a3d2o4$peo$1...@husk.cso.niu.edu>...
> >> "c.l.sears" <c.l....@ntlworld.com> writes:
>
> >> >Since there are compelling arguments F & D, I can only conclude that both
> >> >exist. And when you think about it, it makes sense:
>
> >> I have not yet come upon any compelling arguments for determinism.
> >> The evidence seems to be against it.
>
> >Neil et al
> >==========
> >So it would seem.
>
> >Here is some recent correspondence that may be of peripheral interest
> >on this subject. Although not directly addressing the issue at hand,
> >the unusual context in which the issue of "determinism and free-will"
> >is raised is fascinating!
>
> >(The salient points of this correspondence form a significant part of
> >the PREAMBLE to a paper titled PARADOX REGAINED: LIFE BEYOND GOEDEL'S
> >SHADOW whose abstract I intend offering as a short communication in
>
> I'm not sure why you would want to connect this to Goedel's work.
Neil
====
why? Why?! WHY?!!
Damned if I know.
Perhaps, since I am currently obsessed with the implicit implications
of Goedel's reasoning, the universe appears an essentially
Goedel-centric "World according to G"!
(Thanks for placing things in perspective, and yet running with the
ball.)
>
> Goedel's incompleteness theorem is about limitation in systems of
> formal rules that we construct. The question of determinism is an
> empirical question, about the behavior of the natural world, and is
> independent of our construction of rules.
>
Yes. That is a reasonable thesis to take as a starting point. However,
it does contain Platonistic overtones as regards the (intuitively
implicit) distinction between what we "construct" and what we consider
"empirical".
A counter-Platonistic thesis - of interest to AI - would be that
"factual (or empirical) truth" belongs to our consciously constructed
intuitive "perceptions" just as abstractly as "formal (logical) truth"
belongs to our consciously constructed intellectual "formal systems"
(languages) of "communication".
In other words, "truth" does not "exist" outside "consciousness". Thus
there is no "factual (or empirical) truth" in the absence of conscious
intuitive "perception", just as there is no "formal (logical) truth"
in the absence of conscious intellectual "communication".
>
> You might perhaps argue that Goedel's result demonstrates that there
> are limitations on scientific laws that we may
> {construct,develop,discover}. But it is not obvious how it could
> constrain the natural world.
>
Yes. In fact I would argue further that Goedel's result not only does
not constrain our world of intuitively constructed body of "factual
(or empirical) truths", but it also does not constrain our
intellectually constructed body of "formal (or logical) truths".
The reason: I argue that Goedel's Generalisation Rule of Inference
essentially postulates as theorems formulas that translate as "true"
propositions over every element of every (unspecified) domain under
interpretation. If an interpretation has a non-constructive domain,
then Goedel's formal system essentially assigns non-verifiable "formal
(logical) truth" values to propositions that involve non-constructive
elements on the basis of constructive proof-sequences in the formal
system (which is assumed - and asserted by Goedel - to be constructive
and intuitionistically unobjectionable).
Clearly, from this point of view, such a formal system, and
particularly its non-intuitive theorems, are of limited relevance (and
practical use) to our languages where we essentially want to
faithfully communicate our intuitively constructed "factual
(empirical) truths" to another - since the essence of effective
communication is a common standard of constructive verifiability.
>
> >We may choose to define "factual truths" - as Goedel does - in
> >Platonistic terms as a characteristic of "relationships" that "exist"
> >in some "absolute" sense (i.e. even in the absence of any "perceiver")
> >between the "objects" of an external "ontology" (both of which are
> >also taken to "exist" in some "absolute" sense).
>
> From that perspective, the only "factual truths" available to us are
> abstract truths, such as those used by Goedel. There could be no
> empirical "factual truths" available to us, for we are forever stuck
> inside our world and unable to access the world from the perspective
> of the external ontologist.
>
Essentially, yes. However, that may not be the drawback it seems if we
treat "factual (or empirical) truths" as "subjective" abstract
concepts created by an individual intuition to reflect "perception",
and "formal (or logical) truths" as "objective" abstract concepts
created by an individual intelligence to reflect "communicability".
It does mean, however, questioning the concept of an "external
ontologist".
>
> >However, we are then faced with cogent, reasonable and irrefutable
> >classical arguments both for and against the proposition that every
> >event, act, and decision is the inevitable consequence of antecedents
> >that are independent of the human will.
>
> I think not. Determinists are perhaps impressed by the determinism
> of our scientific laws. But these laws, even if correct, express
> only internal relations. Moreover, their determinism as laws only
> implies that the result is determined by the combination of the
> inputs and the laws. You would have to know, from an externalist
> viewpoint, how the inputs to our laws originate in order to be able
> to conclude anything about determinism as an empirical claim.
>
Yes. That is how one would broadly put the case against
micro-determinism. But a "determinist" would reasonably ask "How does
any individual input affect the result at the macro (statistical)
level?". The "Butterfly-in-China" effect only argues that every
individual action affects the future of the universe uniquely, but in
unspecified, and possibly unspecifiable, ways. So it can still be
reasonably argued that the Universe is completely "deterministic" at
the macro-level in the above sense of being overall independent of the
human will.
An interesting question: Does Entropy imply macro-determinism?
Neil W Rickert
>Neil W Rickert <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> wrote in message news:<a3kln0$88r$1...@husk.cso.niu.edu>...
>> ana...@vsnl.com (Bhupinder Singh Anand) writes:
>> >Neil W Rickert <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> wrote in message news:<a3d2o4$peo$1...@husk.cso.niu.edu>...
>> >Here is some recent correspondence that may be of peripheral interest
>Neil
>====
>why? Why?! WHY?!!
>Damned if I know.
Actually, I do take the position that "truth" is a construct. And
there is certainly a sense in which our statements are constructed.
Still, if you are not a solipsist, then you would have to agree that
our constructs are constrained by reality. The question of
determinism then becomes the question of whether the constraints of
reality are total, or whether they still give us some freedom to
choose what we construct. You cannot reduce determinism to a purely
abstract question.
On the other hand, if you are a solipsist, I suppose you could
imagine up a completely deterministic world. Then you could use your
free will to knock it down, and then imagine up a completely
different deterministic world.
>> I think not. Determinists are perhaps impressed by the determinism
>> of our scientific laws. But these laws, even if correct, express
>> only internal relations. Moreover, their determinism as laws only
>> implies that the result is determined by the combination of the
>> inputs and the laws. You would have to know, from an externalist
>> viewpoint, how the inputs to our laws originate in order to be able
>> to conclude anything about determinism as an empirical claim.
>Yes. That is how one would broadly put the case against
>micro-determinism. But a "determinist" would reasonably ask "How does
>any individual input affect the result at the macro (statistical)
>level?". The "Butterfly-in-China" effect only argues that every
>individual action affects the future of the universe uniquely, but in
>unspecified, and possibly unspecifiable, ways. So it can still be
>reasonably argued that the Universe is completely "deterministic" at
>the macro-level in the above sense of being overall independent of the
>human will.
That argument is often given. But it is surely bogus. If there were
macro-level determinism, we would not be seeing reports of
micro-level indeterminism. For each such report is itself a
macro-level event that resulted from indeterminism.
>An interesting question: Does Entropy imply macro-determinism?
That does not make sense. You can perhaps ask whether the 2nd
law of thermodynamics implies macro-determinism, and maybe that is
what you intended.
But there is no such implication.
Bhupinder Singh Anand
> ana...@vsnl.com (Bhupinder Singh Anand) writes:
>
> >In other words, "truth" does not "exist" outside "consciousness". Thus
> >there is no "factual (or empirical) truth" in the absence of conscious
> >intuitive "perception", just as there is no "formal (logical) truth"
> >in the absence of conscious intellectual "communication".
>
> Actually, I do take the position that "truth" is a construct. And
> there is certainly a sense in which our statements are constructed.
> Still, if you are not a solipsist, then you would have to agree that
> our constructs are constrained by reality.
>
A good point that raises the question: When are our "constructs"
"constrained by 'reality'"?
If I accept the "pre-existence" of a Platonistic "reality" that is
independent of my "perception" and "constructs", then it would be
unreasonable to deny that my "perceptions" and "constructs" are
"constrained by 'reality'" in some objective sense.
However, if I extrapolate the quantum-mechanical thesis (confusing
Schroedinger's eternally bewildered, possibly schizophrenic,
'cat-no-cat' even further) and view "reality" as having been "created"
by my "perceptions" at the instance of the "perception", then in what
sense could I reasonably hold that my "constructs" of "factual
(intuitive) truths" - which reflect my "perceptions" - or my
"constructs" of "formal (logical) truths" - which reflect my "desire
to communicate" my "constructs" of "factual (intuitive) truths" - are
"constrained by 'reality'"?
>
> The question of determinism then becomes the question of whether the
> constraints of reality are total, or whether they still give us some
> freedom to choose what we construct. You cannot reduce determinism to
> a purely abstract question.
>
Yes. The question of "determinism" is clearly meaningful and
significant within a Platonistic view of "reality". As you suggest, it
might even be impossible to express, or discuss, the concept
meaningfully in a world entirely of abstract "constructs" where we
enjoy, and excercise, "free will" without limitation.
> On the other hand, if you are a solipsist, I suppose you could
> imagine up a completely deterministic world. Then you could use your
> free will to knock it down, and then imagine up a completely
> different deterministic world.
>
Yes, this is conceivable. However, my very limited understanding of
"solipsists" is that they would prefer to part company when issues
involve attempts to "analyse" the "objective" nature of "reality".
They would rather address issues that involve attempts on how to
adequately "describe" the "subjective" "perceptions" that are, in a
sense, their "reality", expressed in "intuitive" and "formal" abstract
"constructs".
>
> >So it can still be reasonably argued that the Universe is completely
> >"deterministic" at the macro-level in the above sense of being overall
> >independent of the human will.
>
> That argument is often given. But it is surely bogus. If there were
> macro-level determinism, we would not be seeing reports of
> micro-level indeterminism. For each such report is itself a
> macro-level event that resulted from indeterminism.
>
Yes. A connection between instances of "free will" that abound around
us, and our instinctive sense of being but "pawns" in some gigantic
chessboard of a universe ruled by inexorable laws of an unknown, but
strongly felt, "destiny", is certainly difficult to "perceive" except
perhaps, curiously and paradoxically, through "blind" faith.
>
> >An interesting question: Does Entropy imply macro-determinism?
>
> That does not make sense. You can perhaps ask whether the 2nd
> law of thermodynamics implies macro-determinism, and maybe that is
> what you intended.
>
Sorry. That was indeed intended, but irresponsibly expressed. Thanks.
>
> But there is no such implication.
>
As an optimist, I would agree. But how would one adequately address
the issue when raised by a committed prophet of doom?
gmb
news:ecee0276.02021...@posting.google.com...
I was born into reality. Everything in predictable order. Then I
found out about false awakenings and saw a nearly perfect
reality being generated by my imagination. Nearly perfect
because I sensed that the reality I saw was not quite the
same as to what I am used to seeing in reality. In another
situation I had an out of body experience after I fainted. I
fainted, lost full control of my body, but my consciousness
fully remained during the experience. A loud ringing noise
and heard everything as if came from a bucket from very far.
I was fully awaken. I thought I was dead. Then I floated out
of my body and found a very similar situation to false awakening.
I saw my surroundings. But it did not feel the same real. I
also saw a silver thingy running from where I was floating
to my physical body. Weird. But, the moment I heard the
people around me say: "he is not dead", in an instant I
found myself in my body again. Slow separation. Instant
return. What does this tell you? My mind that generated
the image of the experience generates it based on chances.
But why does it feel so different to be out of body or having
false awakenings from actual reality? Because one involves
the physical body and it's "hardware", and the other is a
mental recreation only without having real senses to the
real world. But is reality real? Even if it is some simulation
that is meant to appear real, it is the only reality we know;
assuming of course that we share the same reality, and
how could we even test something like that? We share
the same physical world to start with. We share information
about the same environment and often attribute similar
appreciation and feelings about the world we experience.
> > The question of determinism then becomes the question of whether the
> > constraints of reality are total, or whether they still give us some
> > freedom to choose what we construct. You cannot reduce determinism to
> > a purely abstract question.
> >
>
> Yes. The question of "determinism" is clearly meaningful and
> significant within a Platonistic view of "reality". As you suggest, it
> might even be impossible to express, or discuss, the concept
> meaningfully in a world entirely of abstract "constructs" where we
> enjoy, and excercise, "free will" without limitation.
But the problems about free will surface exactly when one
encounters boundaries. I think it is an issue that involves
instincts. Instincts deal with and handle vast amounts of
information parallel at once. But when consciousness reaches
a limit in perception regarding one's own knowledge base,
free will in a way is blocked. I know I am trying to surface an
abstract issue, if I could be clearer about it, but don't know
how at this point. I guess I am just mumbling here for now.
George
gmb
news:zjKb8.3982$UT6....@rwcrnsc52.ops.asp.att.net...
Now watch. I return to the world of "I don't know". To the
boundaries of my world that I know. And weird things begin
happening to my behavior and mind. In a sense schisophrenic.
My imagination does not know what to make of the abstract
information and my imagination begins to play tricks on me.
It's like crossing the line of reality into the world of chaos
and random not natural things begin happening. I return to
the straightforward world that I see and saw from childhood,
and I return to being normal. I really have no idea if this
makes any sense to anyone here.
George
Neil W Rickert
>Neil W Rickert <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> wrote in message news:<a4m996$sn6$1...@husk.cso.niu.edu>...
>> ana...@vsnl.com (Bhupinder Singh Anand) writes:
>> >In other words, "truth" does not "exist" outside "consciousness". Thus
>> >there is no "factual (or empirical) truth" in the absence of conscious
>> >intuitive "perception", just as there is no "formal (logical) truth"
>> >in the absence of conscious intellectual "communication".
>> Actually, I do take the position that "truth" is a construct. And
>> there is certainly a sense in which our statements are constructed.
>> Still, if you are not a solipsist, then you would have to agree that
>> our constructs are constrained by reality.
>A good point that raises the question: When are our "constructs"
>"constrained by 'reality'"?
Roughly speaking, they are constrained by reality when we want them
to be so constrained. When we are trying to make as accurate a
representation of reality as we can, then obviously we want that
to be as constrained as possible.
For example, if we are taking a photograph we would normally want
reality to constrain the resulting photograph as much as possible.
On the other hand, if we are building a camera, we want as much
flexibility as possible, so as to be able to use a telephoto lens or
a wide angle lens. Still, our freedom is not complete, for if we
want to be able to use the camera to make useful photographs then we
are constrained by various requirements on focussing, etc.
>If I accept the "pre-existence" of a Platonistic "reality" that is
>independent of my "perception" and "constructs", then it would be
>unreasonable to deny that my "perceptions" and "constructs" are
>"constrained by 'reality'" in some objective sense.
>However, if I extrapolate the quantum-mechanical thesis (confusing
>Schroedinger's eternally bewildered, possibly schizophrenic,
>'cat-no-cat' even further) and view "reality" as having been "created"
>by my "perceptions" at the instance of the "perception", then in what
>sense could I reasonably hold that my "constructs" of "factual
>(intuitive) truths" - which reflect my "perceptions" - or my
>"constructs" of "formal (logical) truths" - which reflect my "desire
>to communicate" my "constructs" of "factual (intuitive) truths" - are
>"constrained by 'reality'"?
That's a pretty solipsistic view. A more reasonable idea is that we
construct our perceptions to usefully guide us in our behavior. And
for this, they need to be highly constrained by reality.
>> >An interesting question: Does Entropy imply macro-determinism?
>> That does not make sense. You can perhaps ask whether the 2nd
>> law of thermodynamics implies macro-determinism, and maybe that is
>> what you intended.
>Sorry. That was indeed intended, but irresponsibly expressed. Thanks.
>> But there is no such implication.
>As an optimist, I would agree. But how would one adequately address
>the issue when raised by a committed prophet of doom?
The 2nd law is a statistical law, about averages. You cannot make
specific predictions with it. Compare the Law of Large Numbers,
sometimes loosely referred to as the Law of Averages. You cannot use
it to predict the outcome of the next spin of the Roulette wheel,
although it will tell you something about averages after many spins.
Mark
>> The evidence seems to be against it.
Evidence is irrelevant. It's a trivial exercise to make anything
determinstic by adding to it, as a hidden variable, the complete list
of future outcomes. Then it's automatically true that whatever laws
govern its evolution, taken in conjunction with the hidden variable (the
list) completely determines its entire future course. Hell, you don't
even need laws, the list will do just fine. Of course, it helps to
have some laws anyway, to factor out the redundancy of the list.
Neil W Rickert
>>Neil W Rickert <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> wrote in message news:<a3d2o4$peo$1...@husk.cso.niu.edu>...
>>> I have not yet come upon any compelling arguments for determinism.
>>> The evidence seems to be against it.
>Evidence is irrelevant. It's a trivial exercise to make anything
>determinstic by adding to it, as a hidden variable, the complete list
>of future outcomes.
However, that has nothing much to do with the question of
determinism, usually take as whether all future outcomes are already
predetermined by past events.
IPmonger
Neil W Rickert <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> said:
> I have not yet come upon any compelling arguments for
> determinism. The evidence seems to be against it.
whop...@alpha2.csd.uwm.edu (Mark) replied:
> Evidence is irrelevant. It's a trivial exercise to make anything
> determinstic by adding to it, as a hidden variable, the complete list
> of future outcomes.
and Neil W Rickert <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> writes in response:
> However, that has nothing much to do with the question of
> determinism, usually take as whether all future outcomes are already
> predetermined by past events.
Determinism usually means that the set of actual outcomes - defined
as a strict subset of all possible outcomes - is generated by a factor
or factors which pre-existed the beginning of time. As with most
things, you'll find people (at least in recent years) falling along a
spectrum between strong (mechanistic) and weak (stochastic)
determinism.
For those who believe in God, determinism implies that God's will -
which pre-existed time - is the relevant factor which determines which
actual outcomes appear. This, in turn, implies that either:
a) humans have no autonomy (strong determinism) or
b) that autonomy is real, but is irrelevant (weak determinism)
There are suitable translations to other "higher powers or forces"
for those who do not subscribe to the notion of the Judeo-Christian
God. Many modern atheists who are determinists would track their
belief in determinism back to the Big Bang.
Strong determinists are rarer these days than they were even into
the late 19th and early 20th centuries. This strong determinism was
widely influenced by Newton's explanations of physics and the
improvements in technologies (machines) to manipulate the physical
world. The universe was seen as a giant mechanism that would
mindlessly carry out the actions which were designed into it.
Weak determinists tend to see dependency and causality between all
situations, usually through a misapplication of statistics. For
example, if flipping a coin repeatedly yields "tails", weak
determinists believe that "heads" is more likely to occur on the next
try. This position seems to be largely influenced by attempts to
raise the general level of knowledge of the average citizen of Western
countries. It has been reinforced by the drastic improvements in the
technologies (computers) for manipulating the intellectual world.
Weak determinism is an improvement over the formerly popular strong
determinism position, but both are at odds with the data that we can
observe from the universe around us. The most promising remaining
hope for weak determinists is chaos theory. Perhaps the dependency is
there, but is so weak that in local measurements it fails to appear;
only upon "zooming out" can we see that there is a larger pattern in
which it appears.
Determinism is hard to give up on as a philosophical viewpoint
because it is intimately tied to perceptions of causality. Denial of
determinism *seems* to imply a denial of causality to the more casual
observer. If there is a causal relationship between A & B and B & C,
this would *seem* to imply that one exists between A & C. The question
of whether or not causality is transitive is the same as whether or
not causality is non-local.
What does this mean for the AI minded? Each important question that
AI researches can be influenced by a deterministic perception. For
example:
What actually constitutes intelligence? "Ownership" of intelligence
is generally deemed to be something inherent in the entity exhibiting
said intelligent behavior. Interestingly, a belief in determinism
implies that no *activity* can ever demonstrate genuine intelligence
since it is all pre-determined. Therefore, no entity can inherently
"own" intelligence. All entities are equally intelligent in that we
are all just "computing" our particular piece of the universal
program. So, AI is nothing *more* than computer science, with humans
as a complicated computing device.
Of course, we are free to re-define our notion of intelligence to
encompass any activity that was generated by intelligence even if the
intelligence is not inherent in the entity performing the
action. [I.E. the Chinese Room *does* understand Chinese as a system,
even if no particular part does]. In this case, the intelligence
inherent in the system is either "owned" by God (as Master Designer)
or is purely accidental (random universe model). But, in either case,
AI becomes a means for exploring (and appreciating!) the inherent
intelligence of the "system."
However, absent a belief in determinism, AI becomes much more
exciting /to me/: AI becomes an opportunity to participate in the
creation of newly intelligent entities. To bring into being something
that previously did not exist and would not otherwise have developed.
And, in the process, to better understand my fellow humans - or was
that fellow AI constructs? :-)
-IPmonger
--
------------------
IPmonger
ipmo...@delamancha.org
gmb
news:m3bsenu...@cornelius.delamancha.org...
It's been the Roman Catholic church that attributed to the super-
power that the western civilization has grown into. To improve
the average intellectual level of people is based on the realization
of what constitutes to being civilized. A person unable to read
and write is a less beneficial to the citizen compared to a person
who is literate. More educated people can benefit the society
better. The internet culture has given a huge boom to information
recently. In fact, we are experiencing an information overload
already. Kids these days are far far more informed as a result.
Intelligence really narrows down to being informed about the
world and of the events in the world if that is what you mean
here.
That is stupid. Because we react based on our available knowledge
to situations. That knowledge is owned in our frame. From our frame
of reference the Universe is chaotic. If there would be no surprises,
than there would be no intelligence. So once we can predict the
weather in the Universe with perfect accuracy, we may be talking
about not being intelligent. Oh, but then God (all knowing) would
not be intelligent either. So nothing we speak here makes too
much sense, does it?
George
Jim Balter
If you a take pan off the fire, I predict that it will cool down.
> Compare the Law of Large Numbers,
> sometimes loosely referred to as the Law of Averages. You cannot use
> it to predict the outcome of the next spin of the Roulette wheel,
> although it will tell you something about averages after many spins.
--
<J Q B>
IPmonger
George,
I had some trouble following your commentary. Comments in-line.
"gmb" <g...@nomail.com> writes:
> It's been the Roman Catholic church that attributed to the
> super-power that the western civilization has grown into.
Perhaps you meant to say "contributed" rather than "attributed"?
> To improve the average intellectual level of people is based on the
> realization of what constitutes to being civilized. A person unable
> to read and write is a less beneficial to the citizen compared to a
> person who is literate. More educated people can benefit the society
> better.
This is true.
> The internet culture has given a huge boom to information recently.
> In fact, we are experiencing an information overload already. Kids
> these days are far far more informed as a result.
While it is true that there has been an information explosion
triggered by the ready availability of the Internet, information !=
education. Information is a necessary precondition of education, but
it is not sufficient by itself. Intelligence requires applying a
mental model of the world to the information at hand. Education is
teaching others how to form mental models.
> Intelligence really narrows down to being informed about the world
> and of the events in the world if that is what you mean here.
I have a hard time defining intelligence in abstract - it seems like
intelligence is something that exists only in a given context, which
seems to be what you're saying here.
However, my point was that the mental models people use to
understand the world have evolved over time. As the level of
education of the average person has increased in the West, the mental
models have changed. Indeed, since the Industrial Revolution, they
have tended to track the advances of technology.
> That is stupid.
Are you saying that the conclusion is stupid? Or that my
understanding of determinism and it's implication is flawed?
> Because we react based on our available knowledge to situations.
> That knowledge is owned in our frame.
Are you saying that we are "owners" of intelligence within our frame
of reference? Or are you saying that that our "frame" - including us
- collectively owns the intelligence?
> From our frame of reference the Universe is chaotic. If there
> would be no surprises, than there would be no intelligence. So once
> we can predict the weather in the Universe with perfect accuracy, we
> may be talking about not being intelligent.
Do you mean chaotic in the sense of random/unpredictable? Or do you
mean chaotic in the sense of Chaos Theory?
> Oh, but then God (all knowing) would not be intelligent either. So
> nothing we speak here makes too much sense, does it?
Not necessarily, since God != the universe. Therefore, God is not
limited by the properties of the universe. Indeed, one could easily
speculate that a creator of a completely deterministic universe might
have created *multiple* universes - some deterministic and some
non-deterministic.
The existence of any single non-deterministic universe implies that
God is also non-deterministic. However, the *absence* of a
non-deterministic universe does *not* imply that God is completely
deterministic. I find it difficult to imagine that a God who was
completely deterministic would be intelligent - in any sense of the
word.
Mark
>However, that has nothing much to do with the question of
>determinism, usually take as whether all future outcomes are already
>predetermined by past events.
Which, however, has everything to do with the question of determinism,
since part of that predetermination may include an explicit listing of
all future outcomes.
Bhupinder Singh Anand
> ana...@vsnl.com (Bhupinder Singh Anand) writes:
>
> >A good point that raises the question: When are our "constructs"
> >"constrained by 'reality'"?
>
> Roughly speaking, they are constrained by reality when we want them
> to be so constrained. When we are trying to make as accurate a
> representation of reality as we can, then obviously we want that
>
> ... A more reasonable idea is that we construct our perceptions to usefully
> guide us in our behavior. And for this, they need to be highly constrained
> by reality.
>
This raises an interesting question: Is it _really_ "meaningful", or
"useful", to talk of a common "Reality", implicitly implying a
"common" ontological domain?
Would it reflect our "experiences" more faithfully if, instead, we
somehow individualise the domains of our "interpretations" to reflect
your "reality", my "reality" etc.?
In other words, should our formal languages be divorced completely
from the concept of representing "Reality", in the sense that we
restrict the domain of any formal system (language) to contain only
"commonly constructible elements"?
The concept of "reality" woud then be reflected only in individual
interpretations, each of which would be both unique and non-standard
by definition, with no two interpretations being isomorphic?
The significance of such a paradigm shift would be that our languages
would no longer be intended to represent and describe "Reality", but
only that which is common to your "perception" of your "reality", my
"perception" of my "reality", etc.
Concepts such as "truth", "consistency", "completeness" etc. could
then be characteristics of our modes of communication, rather than
characteristics of the "content" of our communication.
>
> The 2nd law is a statistical law, about averages. You cannot make
> specific predictions with it. Compare the Law of Large Numbers,
> sometimes loosely referred to as the Law of Averages. You cannot use
> it to predict the outcome of the next spin of the Roulette wheel,
> although it will tell you something about averages after many spins.
>
Yes, indeed. In fact all laws, on the above view, would perhaps be
statistically arrived at, reflecting only that which is common to our
"experiences".
gmb
Good questions. Thanks. I'll think about them.
George
Daniel
Are you talking about things this funny dictionary definition?
: determinism n. The philosophical doctrine that every event,
: act, and decision is the inevitable consequence of antecedents
: that are independent of the human will.
: (The American Heritage Dictionary
: Copyright (c) 1986, 1987)
This is clearly pseudoscientific by modern standards (not to mention
crazy by any standards) because it assumes that there is something
called "the human will" can can be separated from nature, in order for
nature (the antecedents) to be unaffected by it... and then goes
further and declares it irrelevant anyway.
I'd define determinism as something like: The philosophical doctrine
that anything you observe is bound by the laws of nature, and
emphasises that the human will is not exempt from this, and hence the
behaviour of human beings is predictable to whatever degree any other
aspect of nature is predictable.
Anyone itching to mention QM, please note the second clause... if you
think QM says nature is inherently unpredictable, then I guess people
are as well. I don't think QM says that at all - I think it says that
if you insist on interpreting very small things as localised
particles, and you ask "where is the particle," then the answer will
be unpredictable. If you are happy to interpret very small things as
waves, then those waves evolve perfectly predictably, just like light
waves.
But personally I think that's irrelevant. Brains are (a) internally
very complicated and (b) have a very complicated relationship with
their environment.
It's (b) that is the real killer for the idea of simulating a brain
and predicting its future states. You need to drive it with the same
inputs as you run it for the simulated timespan, so you need to
simulate the whole detectable environment over that time, or else it
would diverge rapidly (butterfly effect.)
So what is your definition of determinism, what is a compelling
argument against it, and what evidence is there against it?
Neil W Rickert
>Neil W Rickert <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> wrote in message news:<a3d2o4$peo$1...@husk.cso.niu.edu>...
>> "c.l.sears" <c.l....@ntlworld.com> writes:
>> >Since there are compelling arguments F & D, I can only conclude that both
>> >exist. And when you think about it, it makes sense:
>> I have not yet come upon any compelling arguments for determinism.
>> The evidence seems to be against it.
>Are you talking about things this funny dictionary definition?
>: determinism n. The philosophical doctrine that every event,
>: act, and decision is the inevitable consequence of antecedents
>: that are independent of the human will.
>: (The American Heritage Dictionary
>: Copyright (c) 1986, 1987)
>This is clearly pseudoscientific by modern standards (not to mention
>crazy by any standards) because it assumes that there is something
>called "the human will" can can be separated from nature, in order for
>nature (the antecedents) to be unaffected by it... and then goes
>further and declares it irrelevant anyway.
There is nothing pseudo-scientific about that. Dictionary
definitions do not claim to be scientific. They are intended as a
usage guide to people. As long as "human will" is commonly used in
ordinary speech, it is alright to make reference to that in a
dictionary definition.
I do disagree with the definition. Philosophers often argue about
whether determinism denies the possibility of free will. There is
something wrong with a definition of determism that ignores the
distinctions that are commonly made between the two.
>I'd define determinism as something like: The philosophical doctrine
>that anything you observe is bound by the laws of nature, and
>emphasises that the human will is not exempt from this, and hence the
>behaviour of human beings is predictable to whatever degree any other
>aspect of nature is predictable.
After your complaint about the dictionary use "the human will", you
go ahead and use it anyway :-( . The problem with your definition is
that what the right hand giveth ("is predictable"), the left hand
taketh away ("to whatever degree ...").
>Anyone itching to mention QM, please note the second clause... if you
>think QM says nature is inherently unpredictable, then I guess people
>are as well. I don't think QM says that at all - I think it says that
>if you insist on interpreting very small things as localised
>particles, and you ask "where is the particle," then the answer will
>be unpredictable. If you are happy to interpret very small things as
>waves, then those waves evolve perfectly predictably, just like light
>waves.
Wow! You are confused. Try predicting which atom in a chunk of
radium will be next to decay, and try predicting exactly when it will
decay.
>But personally I think that's irrelevant. Brains are (a) internally
>very complicated and (b) have a very complicated relationship with
>their environment.
>It's (b) that is the real killer for the idea of simulating a brain
>and predicting its future states. You need to drive it with the same
>inputs as you run it for the simulated timespan, so you need to
>simulate the whole detectable environment over that time, or else it
>would diverge rapidly (butterfly effect.)
>So what is your definition of determinism, what is a compelling
>argument against it, and what evidence is there against it?
I don't try to define determinism. The vague dictionary definitions
will have to do. In my opinion, no precise definition is possible,
and the concept is an ill conceived one.
Neil W Rickert
>Neil W Rickert <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> wrote in message news:<a4ogpp$rp0$2...@husk.cso.niu.edu>...
>> ana...@vsnl.com (Bhupinder Singh Anand) writes:
>> >A good point that raises the question: When are our "constructs"
>> >"constrained by 'reality'"?
>> Roughly speaking, they are constrained by reality when we want them
>> to be so constrained. When we are trying to make as accurate a
>> representation of reality as we can, then obviously we want that
>> to be as constrained as possible. ...
>> ... A more reasonable idea is that we construct our perceptions to usefully
>> guide us in our behavior. And for this, they need to be highly constrained
>> by reality.
>This raises an interesting question: Is it _really_ "meaningful", or
>"useful", to talk of a common "Reality", implicitly implying a
>"common" ontological domain?
I'm not sure why there has to be any implication of a common
*ontological* domain.
>Would it reflect our "experiences" more faithfully if, instead, we
>somehow individualise the domains of our "interpretations" to reflect
>your "reality", my "reality" etc.?
We live in communities, and we communicate with one another. If we
claim that we each have only our own private reality, then that would
rule out communication.
We have a common understanding of reality because of our mutual
communication. What is common, or shared, is what we can (more or
less) agree upon. Whatever is entirely private is incommunicable.
I suggest that "reality" simply refers to what we are able to
mutually communicate. The idealist (in the style of Berkeley) and
the naive realist can each have very different ontological
assumptions. Yet what they discuss can serve as a common reality,
even if there is no common underlying ontological domain on which
they can agree.
>In other words, should our formal languages be divorced completely
>from the concept of representing "Reality", in the sense that we
>restrict the domain of any formal system (language) to contain only
>"commonly constructible elements"?
Hmm. In my opinion, our formal languages are automatically divorced
from reality. They can represent only an abstract reality. Our
formal languages are not capable of representing our experiences. We
can represent our experiences, and bring that representation to our
formal discussions. But the formal languages themselves do not
represent anything in the real world.
>The concept of "reality" woud then be reflected only in individual
>interpretations, each of which would be both unique and non-standard
>by definition, with no two interpretations being isomorphic?
Take P as your private reality. Take Q as my private reality. For
the moment, we shall assume that these exist, for the sake of our
discussion.
We each discuss things about reality. And we agree about much.
We might say that there is some function F which maps your reality
into to content of agreeable speech. And similarly, there is a
function G that maps my private reality into agreeable speech
(conversation where we can agree).
In order for us to be able to share in agreeable speech, we must blur
some distinctions. You might be able to distinguish between x and y
in your P. But, to allow communication, you find that F(x) = F(y).
This introduces an equivalence relation. Say that x ~ u if F(x) =
F(y). Denote by R_F, that equivalence relation. Similarly, I have
an equivalence relation R_G.
We can take the quotient spaces. For you, that will be P/R_F, and
for me that will be Q/R_G. These quotient spaces are isomorphic, and
our shared language implements the isomorphism. The word "reality"
then just refers to either of these quotient spaces, treated as
equivalent. That your ontological committments are to P, and mine
are to Q, is only of private interest.
This is, of course, a gross simplification. Agreement in speech is
never perfect, and we are never certain where there is disagreement.
>The significance of such a paradigm shift would be that our languages
>would no longer be intended to represent and describe "Reality", but
>only that which is common to your "perception" of your "reality", my
>"perception" of my "reality", etc.
>Concepts such as "truth", "consistency", "completeness" etc. could
>then be characteristics of our modes of communication, rather than
>characteristics of the "content" of our communication.
Philosophy has made a mess of "truth". The main traditions of
philosophy come from a creationist view, where reality is what God
perceives, and truth is what God says is true. Although most
comtemporary philosophers disavow creationism, they have failed to
eradicate its influence in their assumptions. Thus most of
philosophy rests on a bogus notion of "truth".
Bhupinder Singh Anand
> Neil W Rickert wrote:
> > The 2nd law is a statistical law, about averages. You cannot make
> > specific predictions with it.
>
> If you a take pan off the fire, I predict that it will cool down.
>
JIM
===
You have a point there.
I suspect that Neil was implying "logical consequence" within a
"formal system" containing the 2nd Law, rather than the "physical
causality" we experience from which the "formal system" is, in a
sense, "extracted".
What is interesting is that, possibly for both ease and richness of
communication, we find it more effective to use the same words in
differing contexts. These may sometimes lead to absurd conclusions.
However, they also, occasionally and refreshingly, lead to unexpected
insights into the broader implications not only of our expression, but
sometimes also of our intent.
Daniel
> sp...@earwicker.com (Daniel) writes:
>
> >I'd define determinism as something like: The philosophical doctrine
> >that anything you observe is bound by the laws of nature, and
> >emphasises that the human will is not exempt from this, and hence the
> >behaviour of human beings is predictable to whatever degree any other
> >aspect of nature is predictable.
>
> After your complaint about the dictionary use "the human will", you
> go ahead and use it anyway :-( .
We're talking about a viewpoint developed in reaction to the idea of
free will. It is about reducing free will to a mythical, invented
construct. This is the main point of it! My complaint was not that the
dictionary definition referred to human will, but that it left open
the possibility of the existence of human will. The real implication
of determinism is that free human will can be entirely discarded when
considering how the world works.
You just think determinism is junk but you're not prepared to say much
about why, is that a fair summary?
> The problem with your definition is
> that what the right hand giveth ("is predictable"), the left hand
> taketh away ("to whatever degree ...").
I'm simply avoiding claiming that the world is inherently
"predictable" given that predictability is another thorny question.
Like I say, determinism is about putting human beings in their proper
place, not one of the fundamental forces of nature. It doesn't
necessarily make them predictable any more than weather is
predictable.
> >Anyone itching to mention QM, please note the second clause... if you
> >think QM says nature is inherently unpredictable, then I guess people
> >are as well. I don't think QM says that at all - I think it says that
> >if you insist on interpreting very small things as localised
> >particles, and you ask "where is the particle," then the answer will
> >be unpredictable. If you are happy to interpret very small things as
> >waves, then those waves evolve perfectly predictably, just like light
> >waves.
>
> Wow! You are confused. Try predicting which atom in a chunk of
> radium will be next to decay, and try predicting exactly when it will
> decay.
I'm confused? To paraphrase myself: "If you insist on asking when and
where the next decay will occur, the answer will be unpredictable."
Maybe I'm confused, or maybe you skipped a couple of sentences when
you read my post, I don't know.
Or maybe I'm just talking about rejecting the
objective-collapse-of-the-wavefunction stuff invoked by Penrose, and
you're linking radioactive decay to the operation of the brain! Do you
have fission products flying out of your ears?
Neil W Rickert
>Neil W Rickert <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> wrote in message news:<a4u3k9$fl6$1...@husk.cso.niu.edu>...
>> sp...@earwicker.com (Daniel) writes:
>> >I'd define determinism as something like: The philosophical doctrine
>> >that anything you observe is bound by the laws of nature, and
>> >emphasises that the human will is not exempt from this, and hence the
>> >behaviour of human beings is predictable to whatever degree any other
>> >aspect of nature is predictable.
>> After your complaint about the dictionary use "the human will", you
>> go ahead and use it anyway :-( .
>We're talking about a viewpoint developed in reaction to the idea of
>free will. It is about reducing free will to a mythical, invented
>construct. This is the main point of it! My complaint was not that the
>dictionary definition referred to human will, but that it left open
>the possibility of the existence of human will.
It is not the job of a dictionary to settle those questions.
> The real implication
>of determinism is that free human will can be entirely discarded when
>considering how the world works.
This is disputed. That is to say, it has been disputed and will no
doubt be disputed in the future. There is a point of view known a
"compatibilism" which claims that free will is compatible with
determinism. See, for example, Dennett's book "Elbow Room: the
Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting".
>You just think determinism is junk but you're not prepared to say much
>about why, is that a fair summary?
What I said, was that "the evidence seems to be against it." The
proponents of determinism rarely offer supportive empirical
evidence. They mainly offer rhetoric. But if you would care to
offer some empirical evidence for determinism, there might be some
things I could say about that.
>> The problem with your definition is
>> that what the right hand giveth ("is predictable"), the left hand
>> taketh away ("to whatever degree ...").
>I'm simply avoiding claiming that the world is inherently
>"predictable" given that predictability is another thorny question.
>Like I say, determinism is about putting human beings in their proper
>place, not one of the fundamental forces of nature. It doesn't
>necessarily make them predictable any more than weather is
>predictable.
And have you appointed yourself God, that you should put people in
their "proper place"?
>> >Anyone itching to mention QM, please note the second clause... if you
>> >think QM says nature is inherently unpredictable, then I guess people
>> >are as well. I don't think QM says that at all - I think it says that
>> >if you insist on interpreting very small things as localised
>> >particles, and you ask "where is the particle," then the answer will
>> >be unpredictable. If you are happy to interpret very small things as
>> >waves, then those waves evolve perfectly predictably, just like light
>> >waves.
>> Wow! You are confused. Try predicting which atom in a chunk of
>> radium will be next to decay, and try predicting exactly when it will
>> decay.
>I'm confused? To paraphrase myself: "If you insist on asking when and
>where the next decay will occur, the answer will be unpredictable."
>Maybe I'm confused, or maybe you skipped a couple of sentences when
>you read my post, I don't know.
But if you look at only the gamma radiation from a radioactive
substance, and view that only as a wave phenomenon, it is still not
predictable. Your statement above appears to say otherwise.
>Or maybe I'm just talking about rejecting the
>objective-collapse-of-the-wavefunction stuff invoked by Penrose, and
Okay. I reject that too.
>you're linking radioactive decay to the operation of the brain! Do you
Where did I link radioactive decay to the operation of the brain? Or
are you making this up as you go along?
pk
stop thinking of GOD as an almighty entity. The minute we start to put
attributes we are actually engraving imperfections. We must think in terms
of energy and processes........news:m3vgcus...@cornelius.delamancha.org...
Jim Balter
>
> Jim Balter <j...@digisle.net> wrote in message news:<3C70E0AD...@digisle.net>...
> > Neil W Rickert wrote:
> > > The 2nd law is a statistical law, about averages. You cannot make
> > > specific predictions with it.
> >
> > If you a take pan off the fire, I predict that it will cool down.
> >
>
> JIM
> ===
>
> You have a point there.
>
> I suspect that Neil was implying "logical consequence" within a
> "formal system" containing the 2nd Law, rather than the "physical
> causality" we experience from which the "formal system" is, in a
> sense, "extracted".
There are no *logical* consequences in the physical world.
Taken that way, we can't predict anything.
All physical laws are statistical in their application to
the physical world because the state of the physical world
is uncertain. But if we take the physical laws and some
hypothetical detailed description of the state of the universe,
and focus on a specific pan that has just been removed from
the fire, we can *logically deduce* the probability that,
at time t1, it will be "cool", however specified.
The 2nd law is a shorthand, a synopsis of the physical laws
and what they imply about heat transfer. As such, its
predictions are no less valid than predictions from the
physical laws that it summarizes.
> What is interesting is that, possibly for both ease and richness of
> communication, we find it more effective to use the same words in
> differing contexts. These may sometimes lead to absurd conclusions.
> However, they also, occasionally and refreshingly, lead to unexpected
> insights into the broader implications not only of our expression, but
> sometimes also of our intent.
Yes indeedy. But what we most often see, as in this case, is that
people apply concepts inconsistently in ways that favor one proposition
or the other -- much of what seems "logical" simply isn't to be trusted.
--
<J Q B>
Bhupinder Singh Anand
>
> Bhupinder Singh Anand wrote:
> >
> > Jim Balter <j...@digisle.net> wrote in message news:<3C70E0AD...@digisle.net>...
> > >
> > > Neil W Rickert wrote:
> > > >
> > > > The 2nd law is a statistical law, about averages. You cannot make
> > > > specific predictions with it.
> > >
> > > If you a take pan off the fire, I predict that it will cool down.
> > >
> >
> > "formal system" containing the 2nd Law, rather than the "physical
> > causality" we experience from which the "formal system" is, in a
> > sense, "extracted".
>
> There are no *logical* consequences in the physical world.
> Taken that way, we can't predict anything.
> All physical laws are statistical in their application to
> the physical world because the state of the physical world
> is uncertain. But if we take the physical laws and some
> hypothetical detailed description of the state of the universe,
> and focus on a specific pan that has just been removed from
> the fire, we can *logically deduce* the probability that,
> at time t1, it will be "cool", however specified.
> The 2nd law is a shorthand, a synopsis of the physical laws
> and what they imply about heat transfer. As such, its
> predictions are no less valid than predictions from the
> physical laws that it summarizes.
>
JIM
===
Yes, of course. That also raises another interesting point.
Our direct experience with hot pans is that they invariably cool down
(that is what lets me enjoy a cup of steaming, nearly scalding tea on
a cold winter morning).
So how does our current description of the process ascribe a
probability to the cooling-down process? Such a description clearly,
in a sense even "logically", implies that I might some day take a pan
off the fire and (if Red Tavia's God were to be in a particularly
mischievious mood, but felt kindly towards Tavia) find it heating up
even further!
If I really could experience the 2nd Law as a "physical law", similar
to my experience with "gravity" when I jump from a height, it might
just take the edge off my enjoyment of a cup of steaming-hot tea on a
cold winter morning!
So how should we go about distinguishing between our physical
experiences of "reality", which seem to be based on individual,
unique, never-to-be-exactly-repeated, one-off, sensory "perceptions",
and our intellectual, abstract "constructs" that attempt to describe,
and in a sense "capture", the common "essence" of our experiences in a
communicable language?
Jim Balter
The probability of this is less than the probability that, say,
we will only imagine it happening due to our neurons entering an
unlikely state. So for any practical purpose, the probability
is zero.
> If I really could experience the 2nd Law as a "physical law", similar
> to my experience with "gravity" when I jump from a height,
Feeling pans cool is *exactly* like experiencing gravity.
When you jump, you *could* hover -- after all, the location of the
atoms of your body and of the earth and of the rest of the universe
is not strictly determined. Note that the inverse square law applies
to point masses, but the universe isn't made of such. The "center of
mass" of an object is a fiction -- hell, "objects" are a fiction;
but a damn convenient one, because, for all practical purposes
at the mid-level where we live (when we're not conducting
physics experiments), reality coincides with fiction for objects
and gravity and cooling pans (by which I mean that the fiction
always yields accurate predictions; one need not commit to
any particular ontology in re "reality").
> it might
> just take the edge off my enjoyment of a cup of steaming-hot tea on a
> cold winter morning!
It "might", with an effective probability of zero.
> So how should we go about distinguishing between our physical
> experiences of "reality", which seem to be based on individual,
> unique, never-to-be-exactly-repeated, one-off, sensory "perceptions",
> and our intellectual, abstract "constructs" that attempt to describe,
> and in a sense "capture", the common "essence" of our experiences in a
> communicable language?
They're both inferences to the best explanation.
You might read David Deutsch's _The Fabric of Reality_
for an accessible discussion of this fundamental concept,
and why it serves better than induction.
--
<J Q B>
Daniel
>>Neil W Rickert <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> wrote in message
>news:<a4u3k9$fl6$1...@husk.cso.niu.edu>...
>>> sp...@earwicker.com (Daniel) writes:
>>> >I'd define determinism as something like: The philosophical
doctrine
>>> >that anything you observe is bound by the laws of nature, and
>>> >emphasises that the human will is not exempt from this, and hence
the
>>> >behaviour of human beings is predictable to whatever degree any
other
>>> >aspect of nature is predictable.
>>> After your complaint about the dictionary use "the human will",
you
>>> go ahead and use it anyway :-( .
>>We're talking about a viewpoint developed in reaction to the idea of
>>free will. It is about reducing free will to a mythical, invented
>>construct. This is the main point of it! My complaint was not that
the
>>dictionary definition referred to human will, but that it left open
>>the possibility of the existence of human will.
>
>It is not the job of a dictionary to settle those questions.
I'm not asking it to settle any questions, merely to be clear about
the meaning of a particular word. A self-contradictory definition is
probably a bad one.
>>You just think determinism is junk but you're not prepared to say
much
>>about why, is that a fair summary?
>
>What I said, was that "the evidence seems to be against it." The
>proponents of determinism rarely offer supportive empirical
>evidence. They mainly offer rhetoric. But if you would care to
>offer some empirical evidence for determinism, there might be some
>things I could say about that.
I would say that determinism, by its nature, is something for or
against which it is impossible to produce "evidence."
This gets us somewhere, because I certainly can't claim that there is
any evidence for it. But I'm still intruiged that you claim "the
evidence seems to be against it." What do you mean by this?
>Like I say, determinism is about putting human beings in their proper
>place, not one of the fundamental forces of nature. It doesn't
>necessarily make them predictable any more than weather is
>predictable.
>
>And have you appointed yourself God, that you should put people in
>their "proper place"?
Well, none of these opinions are my own. I'm talking about the
attitutude typically attributed to determinists. The controversial
aspect of determinism is that determinists attack people's sense of
self or freedom.
(If I were a determinist, I would of course deny putting anyone in
their place, not having the free will to make such decisions.)
No need to switch radiation types - alpha and beta radiation can be
made to interfere just like waves. And guess what - the interference
is utterly predictable.
That paragraph, despite having nothing to do with my original
question, seems to be giving you difficulties. It has a structure like
this:
IF [CONDITION A]
THEN X
OTHERWISE Y
Now, condition A is "Wave-like, large scale, long time periods." X is
"predictable" and Y is "unpredictable."
You appear to be challenging it by saying: "How can you claim that
when condition A doesn't hold, X still holds true?" e.g. the claim
that radiation measured in terms of individual decay events is
predictable. Which plainly I'm not saying, am I?
I'm saying that summed-over quantum events, despite the individual
events being unpredictable, produce utterly predictable aggregated
statistics, which is why, for instance, you are able to press the keys
on your computer keyboard and create electric currents that ultimately
have precisely the desired affect on the states of computers thousands
of miles away. I can read your postings. None of the character symbols
in your postings are in an indeterminate state. And yet electrons were
involved! It must be a miracle... It strikes me that people who invoke
quantum mechanics in the operation of the brain to avoid
predictability are missing something: Quantum mechanics is unavoidably
involved in everything at the most fundamental level, and yet many
things are predictable despite this.
>>Or maybe I'm just talking about rejecting the
>>objective-collapse-of-the-wavefunction stuff invoked by Penrose, and
>
>Okay. I reject that too.
Good, then we are both "rejectionists," if anything. Coming back to my
original line of enquiry, so far you have rejected determinism despite
also stating that you think it is impossible to define, and you have
also encountered evidence against it. What do you think determinism
is, and why do you think it is safe to reject it? And what is the
evidence against it? And for that matter, how can there be evidence
against it?
>>you're linking radioactive decay to the operation of the brain! Do
you
>
>Where did I link radioactive decay to the operation of the brain? Or
>are you making this up as you go along?
Of course I am, partly. I am not seriously suggesting that you are
linking radioactive decay to the operation of the brain. It was a joke
on the tendency of picking a statement out of context in order to have
something easier to reply to - note how you've done it again! You had
to chop the "Or maybe" from the start of my sentence to make it work.
Now, about determinism... (see questions above.)
Neil W Rickert
>>sp...@earwicker.com (Daniel) writes:
>>>Neil W Rickert <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> wrote in message
>>>You just think determinism is junk but you're not prepared to say
>much
>>>about why, is that a fair summary?
>>What I said, was that "the evidence seems to be against it." The
>>proponents of determinism rarely offer supportive empirical
>>evidence. They mainly offer rhetoric. But if you would care to
>>offer some empirical evidence for determinism, there might be some
>>things I could say about that.
>I would say that determinism, by its nature, is something for or
>against which it is impossible to produce "evidence."
>This gets us somewhere, because I certainly can't claim that there is
>any evidence for it. But I'm still intruiged that you claim "the
>evidence seems to be against it." What do you mean by this?
The world does not seem to be the one that determinists claim it
should be. Roughly speaking, that we exist is evidence for free
will. That is, free will and consciousness appear to be closely
linked.
>>Like I say, determinism is about putting human beings in their proper
>>place, not one of the fundamental forces of nature. It doesn't
>>necessarily make them predictable any more than weather is
>>predictable.
>>And have you appointed yourself God, that you should put people in
>>their "proper place"?
>Well, none of these opinions are my own. I'm talking about the
>attitutude typically attributed to determinists. The controversial
>aspect of determinism is that determinists attack people's sense of
>self or freedom.
>(If I were a determinist, I would of course deny putting anyone in
>their place, not having the free will to make such decisions.)
But usually authors who take a determinist position do seem to be
trying to put people in their place. For example, Honderich, "How
free are you?" has a chapter where he tells you what you can do about
it, now that you know you don't have free will. This seems oddly
contradictory, for it would require free will to do anything about
it.
In any case, free will is usually connected to responsibility. An
author, in publishing a book, takes responsibility for what is
written. Roughly speaking, when a determinist writes a book denying
free will, the author is announcing
Here, by my own free will, I do announce that neither you nor
I have free will.
And that seems contradictory.
>>But if you look at only the gamma radiation from a radioactive
>>substance, and view that only as a wave phenomenon, it is still not
>>predictable. Your statement above appears to say otherwise.
>No need to switch radiation types - alpha and beta radiation can be
>made to interfere just like waves. And guess what - the interference
>is utterly predictable.
But it is not.
>That paragraph, despite having nothing to do with my original
>question, seems to be giving you difficulties. It has a structure like
>this:
>IF [CONDITION A]
> THEN X
> OTHERWISE Y
>Now, condition A is "Wave-like, large scale, long time periods." X is
>"predictable" and Y is "unpredictable."
>You appear to be challenging it by saying: "How can you claim that
>when condition A doesn't hold, X still holds true?" e.g. the claim
>that radiation measured in terms of individual decay events is
>predictable. Which plainly I'm not saying, am I?
>I'm saying that summed-over quantum events, despite the individual
>events being unpredictable, produce utterly predictable aggregated
>statistics, which is why, for instance, you are able to press the keys
>on your computer keyboard and create electric currents that ultimately
>have precisely the desired affect on the states of computers thousands
>of miles away. I can read your postings. None of the character symbols
>in your postings are in an indeterminate state. And yet electrons were
>involved! It must be a miracle... It strikes me that people who invoke
>quantum mechanics in the operation of the brain to avoid
>predictability are missing something: Quantum mechanics is unavoidably
>involved in everything at the most fundamental level, and yet many
>things are predictable despite this.
Okay. But then you are completely changing the claim. The earlier
claim was that it is "utterly predictable." In normal use, that word
"utterly" implies to the highest degree possible. That's quite
different from saying that it is broadly predictable -- long term
averages are predicable, but the details are not.
But it is not even broadly predictable.
If we take the day to day electro-magnetic radiation, that is
sensitive to the cloud cover. And the cloud cover is not
predictable. If you go to an even broader view, averages over many
years, that still depends on the climate, and the climate is not
predictable. I'm suggesting that this predictability is little more
than myth.
>>>Or maybe I'm just talking about rejecting the
>>>objective-collapse-of-the-wavefunction stuff invoked by Penrose, and
>>Okay. I reject that too.
>Good, then we are both "rejectionists," if anything. Coming back to my
>original line of enquiry, so far you have rejected determinism despite
>also stating that you think it is impossible to define, and you have
>also encountered evidence against it. What do you think determinism
>is, and why do you think it is safe to reject it? And what is the
>evidence against it? And for that matter, how can there be evidence
>against it?
The observed lack of predictability is evidence against determinism.
It may be less than conclusive, but it still counts as evidence. The
apparent dependence of science on the free will of the investigator
would seem to oppose claims that there is scientific evidence for
determinism.
Daryl McCullough
>The world does not seem to be the one that determinists claim it
>should be. Roughly speaking, that we exist is evidence for free
>will.
I don't see that at all.
>That is, free will and consciousness appear to be closely
>linked.
I don't see how any of this follows. I agree that the
world doesn't seem to be deterministic, but I would say
that it is quantum phenomena, rather than the existence
of consciousness, that indicates that determinism is false.
I don't see any connection between determinism and
consciousness.
Just to make it clear what I mean by "determinism":
A system is deterministic if future behavior is
uniquely determined by present conditions and future
external influences. So determinism doesn't imply anything
about our ability to *predict* the future (because predicting
the future would require perfect knowledge of initial
conditions and external influences).
>But usually authors who take a determinist position do seem to be
>trying to put people in their place. For example, Honderich, "How
>free are you?" has a chapter where he tells you what you can do about
>it, now that you know you don't have free will. This seems oddly
>contradictory, for it would require free will to do anything about
>it.
No, it would require that Honderich's words are able to
some effect on the reader's future thoughts. I don't see
where nondeterminism is involved at all.
>In any case, free will is usually connected to responsibility.
Mistakenly, I think. I don't see any connection
between nondeterminism and a concept of responsibility.
>The observed lack of predictability is evidence against determinism.
Yes, I agree with that.
>It may be less than conclusive, but it still counts as evidence. The
>apparent dependence of science on the free will of the investigator
I don't think that there is any such dependence, if by "free will"
you mean to imply the negation of determinism.
--
Daryl McCullough
CoGenTex, Inc.
Ithaca, NY
Neil W Rickert
>Neil says...
>>The world does not seem to be the one that determinists claim it
>>should be. Roughly speaking, that we exist is evidence for free
>>will.
>I don't see that at all.
>>That is, free will and consciousness appear to be closely
>>linked.
>I don't see how any of this follows. I agree that the
>world doesn't seem to be deterministic, but I would say
>that it is quantum phenomena, rather than the existence
>of consciousness, that indicates that determinism is false.
>I don't see any connection between determinism and
>consciousness.
>Just to make it clear what I mean by "determinism":
>A system is deterministic if future behavior is
>uniquely determined by present conditions and future
>external influences. So determinism doesn't imply anything
>about our ability to *predict* the future (because predicting
>the future would require perfect knowledge of initial
>conditions and external influences).
Okay. But what you defined is "deterministic system", rather than
"determinism". In most of the philosophical discussions on
determinism, it is the latter that is being discussed, not the
former.
It seems that we may be talking past one another.
Daryl McCullough
>But what you defined is "deterministic system", rather than
>"determinism". In most of the philosophical discussions on
>determinism, it is the latter that is being discussed, not the
>former.
What then does "determinism" mean, if not the claim that
the universe is a deterministic system?
Neil W Rickert
>>But what you defined is "deterministic system", rather than
>>"determinism". In most of the philosophical discussions on
>>determinism, it is the latter that is being discussed, not the
>>former.
>What then does "determinism" mean, if not the claim that
>the universe is a deterministic system?
Presumably, that is what is intended. But consider your definition:
A system is deterministic if future behavior is uniquely
determined by present conditions and future external
influences.
It is far from obvious, how to apply the concepts "future behavior",
"present conditions" and "future external influences" to the universe
as a whole.
Daryl McCullough
There are degrees of obviousness, I guess. The concept of
determinism above is a lot more straight-forward than the
concept of free will, which never made any sense at all to
me.
Curt Welch
> Neil says...
> >
> >da...@cogentex.com (Daryl McCullough) writes:
> >
> >>What then does "determinism" mean, if not the claim that
> >>the universe is a deterministic system?
> >
> >Presumably, that is what is intended. But consider your definition:
> >
> > A system is deterministic if future behavior is uniquely
> > determined by present conditions and future external
> > influences.
> >
> >It is far from obvious, how to apply the concepts "future behavior",
> >"present conditions" and "future external influences" to the universe
> >as a whole.
Guys, I thought "determinism" was obvious. It's the concept that
all future states are predictable from the current state.
There's also evidence which I don't understand that the world we live
is is in fact not detrministic (it's unclear to me whether it's not
deterministic or whether it's simply imposible for us to know since
we are part of the world). But how the universe works has nothing
to do with the uderstanding of determinisim in my mind. It's trivial
to create a simulation of a world which is deterministic.
> There are degrees of obviousness, I guess. The concept of
> determinism above is a lot more straight-forward than the
> concept of free will, which never made any sense at all to
> me.
You don't understand free will? It's trivial. Do you feel you have the
power to decide what you are going to do next? Most people do. That's
free will. What on earth is so hard to understand about that? Well, OK,
what's hard to understand I guess is how that maps to reality, and to
understand that you have to understand AI, (or human intelligence), and
that of course is not simple (yet).
Determinisim is insteresting because it seems to contradict our notion of
free will. In fact, the contradiction is just an illusion. It's not a
contradiction at all. It's quite possible to simulate a deterministic
world which contains AI machines that have free will. At least I'm sure
that is true. Though I don't know how it could be proved.
But even if it could be proved, that doesn't help up very much in dealing
with the AI issue in the real world which is either not determinestic, or
which it is belived that it has been proved that we can not prove if it is
deterministic? I guess...
Anyhow, though I didn't read the start of this thead, I do belive that
"Free-will and Determinism" can co-exist, but that we can't prove or
disprove it because until we solve the AI problem, there's no way to define
"free-will" in a way to allow it become a proof.
But, as a quick example (not a proof), a toy car that has a sensor to tell
it when it has bummped into a wall, and is then programmed to randomly pick
a different direction to go in when it hits a wall, has some free will and
is using it to decide what to do next. In a determinstic world "the
randomness" is actually deterministic as well, but the car can still use a
complex information sorce to pick different directions evey time it hits a
wall and still function.
That car is not AI. And most people would not call that behavior free-well
because they would throw into the definition the need to not only have
free-will, but to be sell aware of your free-will. Well, I think that's
bogus. The car has free-will in a determinstic world even if it doesn't
know it's has free-will. But that's just a debate of the symantics and
meaing of free will.
If you must be self aware for the term free-will to apply, then that
requires AI. And I belive that is also possible in a determinstic world.
But that is not so easy to prove. To prove that, you then have to prove
what self-aware is. You can't get to the end of that debate without solving
the AI problem first.
BTW, "solving the AI problem" means we all "know" and agree on what AI is -
i.e., what it is that makes the human brain act like it does.
--
Curt Welch http://CurtWelch.Com/
cu...@kcwc.com Webmaster for http://NewsReader.Com/
Daryl McCullough
>You don't understand free will? It's trivial. Do you feel you have the
>power to decide what you are going to do next? Most people do. That's
>free will.
I don't see how you can call it trivial. What does it
*mean* to say that "you have the power to decide"? Do you mean
that before you take an action, you feel an internal process
of "making a decision" to take that action? So, having free will
just means that actions are preceded by decision-making
processes?
Curt Welch
> cu...@kcwc.com says...
>
> >You don't understand free will? It's trivial. Do you feel you have the
> >power to decide what you are going to do next? Most people do. That's
> >free will.
>
> I don't see how you can call it trivial. What does it
> *mean* to say that "you have the power to decide"?
I call it trivial because we are humans and it's a concept
which is very easy for most humans to understand.
Understanding, and converting meaning into strong mathamatical models is
not the same thing. It's trivial to understand, but very hard to convert
the definition into a strong mathematical model. That is the AI problem.
Any concept relating to a process of the brain like "thought" or "sole", or
"I" or "consciousness" or "God" or "time" or "reality" runs into the same
problems of definition. You can't really answer those questions until you
first answer the question "how does the brain work". At best you just
create circular definitions.
That's what "I think, therefor I am" is all about. It means your ability
to think is what creates your abilty "to be". And to really understand
either, you have to first understand the brain. Or, it means "I have
no fucking clue what thinking is or what 'I am' means, but I think
they are both realted to the same thing". :)
> Do you mean
> that before you take an action, you feel an internal process
> of "making a decision" to take that action? So, having free will
> just means that actions are preceded by decision-making
> processes?
I mean that when you take an action, you decide, and not me, what
action to take. "Free-will" means you have the power to make your
own decisions. You think, therefor you have free-will. :)
Daryl McCullough
>
>da...@cogentex.com (Daryl McCullough) wrote:
>> cu...@kcwc.com says...
>>
>> >You don't understand free will? It's trivial. Do you feel you have the
>> >power to decide what you are going to do next? Most people do. That's
>> >free will.
>>
>> I don't see how you can call it trivial. What does it
>> *mean* to say that "you have the power to decide"?
>
>I call it trivial because we are humans and it's a concept
>which is very easy for most humans to understand.
I think that you and I are using different definitions
of the key words "easy" and "understand". I doubt that
the average person understands what "free will" means.
>Understanding, and converting meaning into strong mathamatical models is
>not the same thing. It's trivial to understand, but very hard to convert
>the definition into a strong mathematical model. That is the AI problem.
>
>Any concept relating to a process of the brain like "thought" or "sole", or
>"I" or "consciousness" or "God" or "time" or "reality" runs into the same
>problems of definition.
And I would say that we don't really understand any of
those things.
Curt Welch
> >I call it trivial because we are humans and it's a concept
> >which is very easy for most humans to understand.
>
> I think that you and I are using different definitions
> of the key words "easy" and "understand". I doubt that
> the average person understands what "free will" means.
> >Any concept relating to a process of the brain like "thought" or "sole",
> >or "I" or "consciousness" or "God" or "time" or "reality" runs into the
> >same problems of definition.
>
> And I would say that we don't really understand any of
> those things.
That's a fair definition of "understand" - especially in an AI group. :)
Daniel
>>against which it is impossible to produce "evidence."
>>This gets us somewhere, because I certainly can't claim that there
is
>>any evidence for it. But I'm still intruiged that you claim "the
>>evidence seems to be against it." What do you mean by this?
>
>The world does not seem to be the one that determinists claim it
>should be. Roughly speaking, that we exist is evidence for free
>will. That is, free will and consciousness appear to be closely
>linked.
I'm guessing, so correct me if I'm wrong, but you are saying that your
own introspection - contemplating how it feels to be a human being -
has lead you to the conclusion that the mechanism of thinking is not
subject to deterministic physical laws. Is that a fair summary?
Consider the fact that you can change what a person is thinking by
poking around in their head with a probe or by stimulating their brain
with an electric current. The subject/victim will report seeing
colours, smelling odours, or suddenly being struck by strong memories.
These experiments have been done and that is what happens. This is
evidence that what we are thinking is "determined" (loaded word!) by
the state of our brains, and the state can be affected by physical
actions. If you don't poke around in there, the unusual phenomenon
doesn't occur. So the physical action determines the subjective mind
experience. Does this work for you as evidence that is relevant in
this area? Personally I'd say it (at least) means that a deterministic
viewpoint is more constructive if you want any hope of understanding
what's happening there.
>But usually authors who take a determinist position do seem to be
>trying to put people in their place. For example, Honderich, "How
>free are you?" has a chapter where he tells you what you can do about
>it, now that you know you don't have free will. This seems oddly
>contradictory, for it would require free will to do anything about
>it.
If you did anything about it, you'd be doing it because you read it in
his book. So it's not quite that simple.
If I challenge you saying "Why did you just eat that apple?" you can
either say, "Because I was hungry," in which case we have a cause and
effect, which is compatible with determinism, or you could say "I have
no idea why I ate it. I'm not even hungry. It makes no sense. I must
be crazy." This is also quite compatible with determinism - if there
are determinstic processes happening in your body that you have no
knowledge of, these are bound to extend into your brain, i.e. there
are things happening in your brain that you are not directly aware of.
This raises serious questions about the reliability of the
"introspective insight" that you appeared to be invoking above.
If you are never able to supply a rationale for your behaviour, then
we have an extreme case - you are more similar to an entirely random
process than an "intelligent" one. For example, a cloud cannot tell us
why it chose to rain over a particular city, but there's no urgent
need to propose non-deterministic physical laws to explain the fact
that it rained over a particular city. It's going to rain somewhere,
whether the world is deterministic or not. Apparent randomness in a
deterministic system is even easier to accept than rational behaviour.
The problem is that free will and the lack of it are indistinguishable
"from the outside," but free will seems very convincing "from the
inside." You, at least, seem convinced. But things that seem to be
"obviously true" sometimes aren't. This is why we perform experiments
or construct proofs.
>In any case, free will is usually connected to responsibility. An
>author, in publishing a book, takes responsibility for what is
>written. Roughly speaking, when a determinist writes a book denying
>free will, the author is announcing
>
> Here, by my own free will, I do announce that neither you nor
> I have free will.
>
>And that seems contradictory.
I think you've in inserted the "by my own free will," because you
presuppose its existence. The author of such a book would probably
prefer this:
"Here, due to being compelled by insights I am powerless to deny, I do
announce... etc."
i.e. they had to adopt the opinion expressed in the book because it
follows from their observations. They certainly didn't have enough
free will to say anything different. People do things "for a reason" -
if they regularly do things without a good reason, we start to regard
them as less intelligent. Rational behaviour means "doing things for a
reason." This doesn't contradict determinism at all. It's almost a
restatement of determinism, as applied to the mind. Locating the chain
of cause and effect in the actions you take.
>>>But if you look at only the gamma radiation from a radioactive
>>>substance, and view that only as a wave phenomenon, it is still not
>>>predictable. Your statement above appears to say otherwise.
>>No need to switch radiation types - alpha and beta radiation can be
>>made to interfere just like waves. And guess what - the interference
>>is utterly predictable.
>
>But it is not.
What do you mean? Do you mean "to someone who doesn't know how"? I've
personally spent hours replicating such boring experiments and seen
the same patterns. You can determine the lattice structure of crystals
by throwing various kinds of radiation through them (even if you do it
one quanta at a time) and looking at the interference patterns that
build up on the photograph. I've done that too. Even more boring. You
always get the same patterns for the same kind of crystal (or rather,
you get a set of 2D projections that depend precisely on the
orientation of the crystal.)
>If we take the day to day electro-magnetic radiation, that is
>sensitive to the cloud cover. And the cloud cover is not
>predictable. If you go to an even broader view, averages over many
>years, that still depends on the climate, and the climate is not
>predictable. I'm suggesting that this predictability is little more
>than myth.
I'd go along with that, certainly. All discussions of predictability
have this "in principle" clause tacked on the end, and this makes them
essentially irrelevent with regard to brains as well as the weather.
But crucially, the weather can be modelled as a deterministic system
without losing the apparently random behaviour of real weather. That
is, a deterministic weather system and a non-deterministic one are
qualitatively indistinguishable. It all looks random to us.
What's the difference between weather and people? People are
marginally more predictable. Does this make them less deterministic,
or more deterministic?
>The observed lack of predictability is evidence against determinism.
>It may be less than conclusive, but it still counts as evidence.
Given that unpredictability is perfectly compatible with determinism
(a fact popularly known as chaos) I'm tempted to throw that evidence
out of court.
>The apparent dependence of science on the free will of the
investigator
>would seem to oppose claims that there is scientific evidence for
>determinism.
The investigator can't choose the results of their experiments with
their supposed free will. They have to write down what they see. So
science is dependent on the careful avoidance of "free will." So how
is it apparent that science is dependent on the free will of the
investigator?
Neil W Rickert
>>da...@cogentex.com (Daryl McCullough) wrote:
>>> cu...@kcwc.com says...
>>> >You don't understand free will? It's trivial. Do you feel you have the
>>> >power to decide what you are going to do next? Most people do. That's
>>> >free will.
>>> I don't see how you can call it trivial. What does it
>>> *mean* to say that "you have the power to decide"?
>>I call it trivial because we are humans and it's a concept
>>which is very easy for most humans to understand.
>I think that you and I are using different definitions
>of the key words "easy" and "understand". I doubt that
>the average person understands what "free will" means.
The average person doesn't have any problems. It's the philosophers
and computer scientists who have managed to confuse themselves to the
extent that they have trouble with the concept.
Daryl McCullough
>>I think that you and I are using different definitions
>>of the key words "easy" and "understand". I doubt that
>>the average person understands what "free will" means.
>
>The average person doesn't have any problems.
I disagree. As I said, I don't think that the
average person has any idea what "free will"
means. The average person doesn't use the term,
except when he's trying to be philosophical.
James Hunter
Daryl McCullough wrote:
The average person uses it all the time, since
wanko philosophers who "know"
what "free will" means have to date
come up with 1000 different "understandings" of
the pathetic and the useless concept of
co-existent "free will", and that which
they are obviously recursively clueless of which
is probability theory.
Jim Balter
> (If I were a determinist, I would of course deny putting anyone in
> their place, not having the free will to make such decisions.)
How does determinism, or belief in determinism, favor making one
sort of claim or another? Your thinking here is quite incoherent.
In fact, a determinist might find herself offering arguments
against determinism, even ones she finds quite flawed, and believe
that she has no choice but to do so.
--
<J Q B>
Jim Balter
> In any case, free will is usually connected to responsibility. An
> author, in publishing a book, takes responsibility for what is
> written. Roughly speaking, when a determinist writes a book denying
> free will, the author is announcing
>
> Here, by my own free will, I do announce that neither you nor
> I have free will.
>
> And that seems contradictory.
Only because you've put contradictory words into someone's mouth.
One can announce that no one has free will without claiming
that the announcement was a product of free will.
--
<J Q B>
Jim Balter
>
> Neil says...
> >But usually authors who take a determinist position do seem to be
> >trying to put people in their place. For example, Honderich, "How
> >free are you?" has a chapter where he tells you what you can do about
> >it, now that you know you don't have free will. This seems oddly
> >contradictory, for it would require free will to do anything about
> >it.
>
> No, it would require that Honderich's words are able to
> some effect on the reader's future thoughts. I don't see
> where nondeterminism is involved at all.
Consider core wars -- the actions of one program cause
various reactions from other programs. It would be silly to
suppose that the actions of the first program are pointless
because the second program is deterministic. In fact, it is
the predictability of programs, and humans, that makes
stimulating them in various ways effective.
--
<J Q B>
Neil W Rickert
>>>I would say that determinism, by its nature, is something for or
>>>against which it is impossible to produce "evidence."
>>>This gets us somewhere, because I certainly can't claim that there
>is
>>>any evidence for it. But I'm still intruiged that you claim "the
>>>evidence seems to be against it." What do you mean by this?
>>The world does not seem to be the one that determinists claim it
>>should be. Roughly speaking, that we exist is evidence for free
>>will. That is, free will and consciousness appear to be closely
>>linked.
>I'm guessing, so correct me if I'm wrong, but you are saying that your
>own introspection - contemplating how it feels to be a human being -
>has lead you to the conclusion that the mechanism of thinking is not
>subject to deterministic physical laws. Is that a fair summary?
That's a bad guess. I certainly have not said anything that would
suggest this. I'm not even sure how one would go about
"contemplating how it feels to be a human being". As I see it, free
will has to do with behavior and the basis for that behavior, not
with "how it feels."
>Consider the fact that you can change what a person is thinking by
>poking around in their head with a probe or by stimulating their brain
>with an electric current. The subject/victim will report seeing
>colours, smelling odours, or suddenly being struck by strong memories.
>These experiments have been done and that is what happens. This is
>evidence that what we are thinking is "determined" (loaded word!) by
>the state of our brains, and the state can be affected by physical
>actions. If you don't poke around in there, the unusual phenomenon
>doesn't occur. So the physical action determines the subjective mind
>experience. Does this work for you as evidence that is relevant in
>this area? Personally I'd say it (at least) means that a deterministic
>viewpoint is more constructive if you want any hope of understanding
>what's happening there.
That seems to be an attempt to debunk a view that you wrongly ascribed
to me. I see no point in commenting.
>>But usually authors who take a determinist position do seem to be
>>trying to put people in their place. For example, Honderich, "How
>>free are you?" has a chapter where he tells you what you can do about
>>it, now that you know you don't have free will. This seems oddly
>>contradictory, for it would require free will to do anything about
>>it.
>If you did anything about it, you'd be doing it because you read it in
>his book. So it's not quite that simple.
If I didn't have free will, I wouldn't have read his book. It is
that simple.
Without free will, it is possible that the pair of eyes from my body
might have moved above the pages of the book, and neural activity
might have occurred as a result. To say that *I* read the book, is
to say that there is an *I* which can be credited with having read
the book. "Free will" is just the notion that such a crediting is
appropriate. The denial of free will denies that there is such an
*I*, it denies that there is anything to reading a book other than
the motion of the eyes, and it denies that there is any information
picked up other than the pattern of blackness and whiteness reflected
from varying parts of the page.
The three things
consciousness -- that there is an *I*
free will -- that the *I* is to be credited with the reading
intentionality -- that the syntactical marks on the paper express
meaningful information about things in the world
all go together. You either accept them all or you deny them all.
If there is no such thing as free will, then Honderich did not write
that book. A mindless mechanical automoton made meaningless marks on
paper. If you take the view that consciousness is an epiphenomenon,
as many deniers of free will do, then Honderich might have been aware
of interesting interpretations of those meaningless marks on paper.
But, according to the deniers of free will, he had no control
whatsover on what marks would have been made. It would therefore be
a mistake to credit him with authorship of the book.
>The problem is that free will and the lack of it are indistinguishable
>"from the outside," but free will seems very convincing "from the
>inside."
To the contrary, free will is quite distinguishable from the
outside. And so far artifacts produced by AI folk have failed to
exhibit such free will. Note that I am not asserting that an
artifact could not exhibit free will -- merely that so far none
have.
> This is why we perform experiments
>or construct proofs.
Oops! You just contradicted yourself. As a denier of free will, you
should be saying that mindless natural physical forces have the
effect that certain physical human bodies carry out actions that are
described as performing experiments or as constructing proofs. But
saying that there is a *we* involved in the performing of experiments
or the constructing of proofs is nothing more than a useful
attribution, intended as part of the "Just So" story implied by the
use of a "why".
If there is no free will, all "why" accounts that explain human
behavior in ordinary human terms are no more than "Just So" stories.
For the "why" accounts attribute the behavior to decisions which are
not possible without the ability to make those decisions (i.e.
without free will).
----------------
>>>>But if you look at only the gamma radiation from a radioactive
>>>>substance, and view that only as a wave phenomenon, it is still not
>>>>predictable. Your statement above appears to say otherwise.
>>>No need to switch radiation types - alpha and beta radiation can be
>>>made to interfere just like waves. And guess what - the interference
>>>is utterly predictable.
>>But it is not.
>What do you mean? Do you mean "to someone who doesn't know how"? I've
>personally spent hours replicating such boring experiments and seen
>the same patterns. You can determine the lattice structure of crystals
>by throwing various kinds of radiation through them (even if you do it
>one quanta at a time) and looking at the interference patterns that
>build up on the photograph. I've done that too. Even more boring. You
>always get the same patterns for the same kind of crystal (or rather,
>you get a set of 2D projections that depend precisely on the
>orientation of the crystal.)
Wow! You are very confused.
If I produce a random source of radiation as input to your apparatus,
that input will be unpredictable (because it is random). The output
radiation, after passing through the crystals, will still be
unpredictable. The lattice structure of the crystal will reliably
change the radiation, so that the output radiation has some
regularities in it that were not present in the input. That the
output has some regularities, does not demonstrate that the output is
predictable. That the presence of these regularities is predictable
does not demonstrate that the output radiation itself is
predictable. Your apparatus works, because it has been designed to
be sensitive to these particular regularities in the output
radiation, and to be relatively insensitive to the unpredictable
aspects of the output radiation.1
>>If we take the day to day electro-magnetic radiation, that is
>>sensitive to the cloud cover. And the cloud cover is not
>>predictable. If you go to an even broader view, averages over many
>>years, that still depends on the climate, and the climate is not
>>predictable. I'm suggesting that this predictability is little more
>>than myth.
>I'd go along with that, certainly. All discussions of predictability
>have this "in principle" clause tacked on the end, and this makes them
>essentially irrelevent with regard to brains as well as the weather.
>But crucially, the weather can be modelled as a deterministic system
>without losing the apparently random behaviour of real weather.
Well, sure. But do keep in mind that these deterministic models of
the weather don't work -- that is, they do not fit the actual
observed weather. The models are getting better, but they are still
very far from being exact fits.
>>The observed lack of predictability is evidence against determinism.
>>It may be less than conclusive, but it still counts as evidence.
>Given that unpredictability is perfectly compatible with determinism
>(a fact popularly known as chaos) I'm tempted to throw that evidence
>out of court.
But then you are left with zero evidence for determinism, and clear
evidence that you are unwilling to examine evidence against
determinism.
>>The apparent dependence of science on the free will of the
>investigator
>>would seem to oppose claims that there is scientific evidence for
>>determinism.
>The investigator can't choose the results of their experiments with
>their supposed free will. They have to write down what they see.
No, that's wrong. Without free will, the investigator has to write
down what he has to write down. There is no telling whether that is
what he saw.
Daryl McCullough
>If I didn't have free will, I wouldn't have read his book. It is
>that simple.
>
>Without free will, it is possible that the pair of eyes from my body
>might have moved above the pages of the book, and neural activity
>might have occurred as a result.
And, it is possible that in response to what you read, your fingers
might have moved so as to type something like "if I didn't have
free will, I wouldn't have read his book".
In other words, without free will, it is possible that absolute
nothing observable would be any different than the way it is now.
So how can you say that there is evidence for free will, when
nothing we observe (other than through introspection) is dependent
on its existence? But you also seem to be denying that introspection
has anything to do with your evidence for free will: you say
[Daniel]
>>I'm guessing, so correct me if I'm wrong, but you are saying that your
>>own introspection - contemplating how it feels to be a human being -
>>has lead you to the conclusion that the mechanism of thinking is not
>>subject to deterministic physical laws. Is that a fair summary?
>That's a bad guess. I certainly have not said anything that would
>suggest this. I'm not even sure how one would go about
>"contemplating how it feels to be a human being". As I see it, free
>will has to do with behavior and the basis for that behavior, not
>with "how it feels."
If we ignore introspection, then what evidence is there for
free will?
>To say that *I* read the book, is to say that there is an *I*
>which can be credited with having read the book.
No, it could be just a convenient manner of speaking.
>"Free will" is just the notion that such a crediting is
>appropriate. The denial of free will denies that there is such an
>*I*,
No, it doesn't.
>it denies that there is anything to reading a book other than
>the motion of the eyes,
No, it doesn't.
>and it denies that there is any information
>picked up other than the pattern of blackness and whiteness reflected
>from varying parts of the page.
No, it doesn't.
>The three things
>
> consciousness -- that there is an *I*
> free will -- that the *I* is to be credited with the reading
> intentionality -- that the syntactical marks on the paper express
> meaningful information about things in the world
>
>all go together. You either accept them all or you deny them all.
Who says?
>If there is no such thing as free will, then Honderich did not write
>that book. A mindless mechanical automoton made meaningless marks on
>paper.
And fellow mindless automata, scanning those meaningless marks,
would type things such as "Honderich wrote a book denying the
existence of free will".
It is ridiculous to say that marks on a page are meaningless.
The dance of a honeybee is meaningful---it tells other bees
where to go to find a field of flowers. If at some level a
bee can be thought of as a mindless automaton, that doesn't
negate the meaning of its dance.
>If you take the view that consciousness is an epiphenomenon,
>as many deniers of free will do, then Honderich might have been aware
>of interesting interpretations of those meaningless marks on paper.
>But, according to the deniers of free will, he had no control
>whatsover on what marks would have been made. It would therefore be
>a mistake to credit him with authorship of the book.
The mindless automata don't care that it's a mistake.
>>The problem is that free will and the lack of it are indistinguishable
>>"from the outside," but free will seems very convincing "from the
>>inside."
>
>To the contrary, free will is quite distinguishable from the
>outside.
No, it is not.
>And so far artifacts produced by AI folk have failed to
>exhibit such free will.
The failures of AI have nothing to do with whether
they exhibit free will or not.
>Oops! You just contradicted yourself. As a denier of free will, you
>should be saying that mindless natural physical forces have the
>effect that certain physical human bodies carry out actions that are
>described as performing experiments or as constructing proofs.
That is about as silly as saying
If you really believed in physics, you wouldn't say
"Lightning from the cloud struck a tree" you would say:
"There was an exchange of electrical charge between
a suspension of water droplets in the atmosphere and
a rigid structure of carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen and
oxygen."
There is such a thing as the appropriate level of discourse.
>But
>saying that there is a *we* involved in the performing of experiments
>or the constructing of proofs is nothing more than a useful
>attribution, intended as part of the "Just So" story implied by the
>use of a "why".
>If there is no free will, all "why" accounts that explain human
>behavior in ordinary human terms are no more than "Just So" stories.
You seem to not understand the concept of levels of description.
Daniel
I really must learn to put <humour> tags around my attempts at
humour... it beats people telling me I'm confused and incoherent all
the time.
Neil W Rickert
>Neil says...
>>If I didn't have free will, I wouldn't have read his book. It is
>>that simple.
>>
>>Without free will, it is possible that the pair of eyes from my body
>>might have moved above the pages of the book, and neural activity
>>might have occurred as a result.
>And, it is possible that in response to what you read, your fingers
>might have moved so as to type something like "if I didn't have
>free will, I wouldn't have read his book".
Right.
>In other words, without free will, it is possible that absolute
>nothing observable would be any different than the way it is now.
It's possible. But it is very improbable.
The view that we are actually responsible for making our decisions
fits our observations very well. If we are not responsible for those
decisions, and if it is only an illusion that we are making the
decisions, then it is a remarkable coincidence that it fits so well.
Of course there is also the possibility that it doesn't fit that well
at all; that we are poor observers, but not having free will we
midjudge the situation. But if you are going to assume this, you
might as well become a solipsist.
>>To say that *I* read the book, is to say that there is an *I*
>>which can be credited with having read the book.
>No, it could be just a convenient manner of speaking.
If we don't have any choice in the words we speak, then convenience
doesn't enter the matter at all.
Jim Balter
Fine, then others, notably Rickert, are confused and incoherent,
because they say these things seriously.
Years ago, before the great reorganization of usenet, a debate about free will
very similar to this one was going on in talk.philosophy,
and one Laura Creighton wrote, without a hint of irony,
"If I thought I had no free will, I'd shoot myself!"
--
<J Q B>
Jim Balter
>
> da...@cogentex.com (Daryl McCullough) writes:
> >Neil says...
>
> >>If I didn't have free will, I wouldn't have read his book. It is
> >>that simple.
> >>
> >>Without free will, it is possible that the pair of eyes from my body
> >>might have moved above the pages of the book, and neural activity
> >>might have occurred as a result.
>
> >And, it is possible that in response to what you read, your fingers
> >might have moved so as to type something like "if I didn't have
> >free will, I wouldn't have read his book".
>
> Right.
>
> >In other words, without free will, it is possible that absolute
> >nothing observable would be any different than the way it is now.
>
> It's possible. But it is very improbable.
You category mistakes are quite amusing.
> The view that we are actually responsible for making our decisions
> fits our observations very well.
If it is possible that absolute nothing observable would be any
different than the way it is now, then observational fit is irrelevant.
> If we are not responsible for those
> decisions, and if it is only an illusion that we are making the
> decisions, then it is a remarkable coincidence that it fits so well.
Not at all, since the alternate model fits the evidence just as well.
> Of course there is also the possibility that it doesn't fit that well
> at all; that we are poor observers, but not having free will we
> midjudge the situation.
Having free will can't lend more accuracy to our judgments.
> But if you are going to assume this, you
> might as well become a solipsist.
I just love how you toss out this non sequitur crap.
I don't know how many years I've read this forum and seen you
write something to the effect of "If you don't agree with me,
your mother wears army boots".
> >>To say that *I* read the book, is to say that there is an *I*
> >>which can be credited with having read the book.
>
> >No, it could be just a convenient manner of speaking.
>
> If we don't have any choice in the words we speak, then convenience
> doesn't enter the matter at all.
Read "concise" or "efficient" for "convenient". Sheesh.
--
<J Q B>
Neil W Rickert
>I just love how you toss out this non sequitur crap.
>I don't know how many years I've read this forum and seen you
>write something to the effect of "If you don't agree with me,
>your mother wears army boots".
That would be exactly the number of years you've been having
delusions about what you read in this forum.
Daryl McCullough
>
>da...@cogentex.com (Daryl McCullough) writes:
>>Neil says...
>
>>>If I didn't have free will, I wouldn't have read his book. It is
>>>that simple.
>>>
>>>Without free will, it is possible that the pair of eyes from my body
>>>might have moved above the pages of the book, and neural activity
>>>might have occurred as a result.
>
>>And, it is possible that in response to what you read, your fingers
>>might have moved so as to type something like "if I didn't have
>>free will, I wouldn't have read his book".
>
>Right.
>
>>In other words, without free will, it is possible that absolute
>>nothing observable would be any different than the way it is now.
>
>It's possible. But it is very improbable.
I don't see that at all. It seems to me that the difference
is just words---what words you use to describe things. There
is a vocabulary of intentionality: purpose, goal, meaning,
decision, etc. There's a different physical vocabulary:
atoms, forces, motion, etc. One and the same situation can
be described differently using the two different vocabularies.
A world with free will and a world without free will are
two different descriptions of the *same* world, it seems
to me.
>The view that we are actually responsible for making our decisions
>fits our observations very well.
Right. The vocabulary of intentionality is useful.
>If we are not responsible for those decisions, and if it
>is only an illusion that we are making the decisions, then
>it is a remarkable coincidence that it fits so well.
Dropping the vocabulary of "responsibility" doesn't affect
predictions about what is likely or unlikely at all. Given
a robot programmed to be a babysitter, you can use the vocabulary
of responsibility "Robbie is a responsible babysitter. He would
never allow the children to come to harm." That doesn't mean
that Robbie does anything other than what he was programmed to
do.
>Of course there is also the possibility that it doesn't fit that well
>at all; that we are poor observers, but not having free will we
>midjudge the situation. But if you are going to assume this, you
>might as well become a solipsist.
There is the possibility that the usefulness of intentional
language has nothing to do with the existence of free will.
>>>To say that *I* read the book, is to say that there is an *I*
>>>which can be credited with having read the book.
>
>>No, it could be just a convenient manner of speaking.
>
>If we don't have any choice in the words we speak, then convenience
>doesn't enter the matter at all.
I think you are confusing different levels of description. The language
of convenience and intentionality and meaning doesn't contradict the
language of strict determinism.
Daniel
>suggest this. I'm not even sure how one would go about
>"contemplating how it feels to be a human being". As I see it, free
>will has to do with behavior and the basis for that behavior, not
>with "how it feels."
In that case I am going to have to try and work out the outer
boundaries on exactly what you believe, and work my way inwards to
something more specific, like a kind of binary search.
Does a dead body have free will?
Are you able to think of reasons why you do things?
>Well, sure. But do keep in mind that these deterministic models of
>the weather don't work -- that is, they do not fit the actual
>observed weather. The models are getting better, but they are still
>very far from being exact fits.
No two real hurricanes exactly match each other, do they? So is the
second one in fact fake?
>The three things
>
> consciousness -- that there is an *I*
> free will -- that the *I* is to be credited with the reading
> intentionality -- that the syntactical marks on the paper express
> meaningful information about things in the world
>
>all go together. You either accept them all or you deny them all.
I do accept them all, as descriptions of what is happening at a useful
level, and I deny them all as fundamental or essential to the way the
universe works. That is, if you blew up the earth, you would also
destroy those three things, and all the other stuff in the universe
would go on about its business quite happily without so much as a
hiccup, and there would no longer be anything worthy of the shorthand
label "free will."
>If there is no such thing as free will, then Honderich did not write
>that book. A mindless mechanical automoton made meaningless marks on
>paper.
Where's the distinction? To be more honest, "A mindless mechanical
automoton that behaves indistinguishably from Honderich made
meaningless marks that just happen to look a lot like the meaningful
marks you normally get from Honderich."
And anyway, you got it wrong - the pen made the marks. No, the ink
did. No, the molecules of ink did. No, the paper did - without the
paper the ink wouldn't have anything to stick to.
What's the point trying to decide that one thing that "exists" is
responsible for everything you can mentally give a label to? What if
you are trying to label something that is constructed from billions of
tiny interactions you aren't directly aware of? Conciousness and free
will are good examples of this.
>But, according to the deniers of free will, he had no control
>whatsover on what marks would have been made. It would therefore be
>a mistake to credit him with authorship of the book.
But it might still be useful to identify the mindless mechanical
automoton as the thing that made the "meaningless" (and yet somehow
interesting) marks in the book. That way, if you enjoy reading the
marks it made, you know which automoton to go back to for more.
>>The problem is that free will and the lack of it are
indistinguishable
>>"from the outside," but free will seems very convincing "from the
>>inside."
>
>To the contrary, free will is quite distinguishable from the
>outside.
Or to put it another way, good survival strategies can be exhibited by
some deterministic systems. Let's call them living things to save time
in future.
>> This is why we perform experiments
>>or construct proofs.
>
>Oops! You just contradicted yourself. As a denier of free will, you
>should be saying that mindless natural physical forces have the
>effect that certain physical human bodies carry out actions that are
>described as performing experiments or as constructing proofs.
Yes, that too. I just find it quicker to say the shorter version.
Where's the contradiction?
I don't deny free will as a very convenient way to describe human
behaviour. But I can't help but also note that it is a construction,
made from little things that don't deserve the label "free will."
>If there is no free will, all "why" accounts that explain human
>behavior in ordinary human terms are no more than "Just So" stories.
>For the "why" accounts attribute the behavior to decisions which are
>not possible without the ability to make those decisions (i.e.
>without free will).
Well, take a look at a sentence. Undeniably, it IS a sequence of
symbols, i.e. letters selected from the alphabet and some punctuation
symbols. The symbols themselves don't mean anything. They are
undeniably there. And yet interpreted together, the sentence has
"meaning" - or is that just a "Just So" story?
If I look at your posting, I could see it as a collection of ideas, or
as a sequence of words, or as a sequence of symbols selected from a
set of about 60, or as a sequence of bits.
All of these levels of description are simultaneously true, or "in
existence," in so far as they are useful.
>The denial of free will denies that...
>... there is anything to reading a book other than
>the motion of the eyes, and it denies that there is any information
>picked up other than the pattern of blackness and whiteness reflected
>from varying parts of the page.
The pattern of blackness and whiteness makes its way through the eye
ball onto the retina, and from there to the visual cortex. Then things
get a little complicated - not only can we not sensibly describe what
happens, it doesn't seem likely it will ever be possible to "describe"
it in words, in anything like a useful way. But the chain of cause and
effect continues. The sheer messiness of it makes it more convenient
to just blandly label the whole caboodle as "free will."
Is that denial of free will, or a deeper understanding of it?
>Wow! You are very confused.
>
>If I produce a random source of radiation as input to your apparatus,
Then we have randomness. Er, well spotted. Do I need to read the rest?
Neil W Rickert
>Neil says...
>>da...@cogentex.com (Daryl McCullough) writes:
>>>Neil says...
>>>>If I didn't have free will, I wouldn't have read his book. It is
>>>>that simple.
>>>>Without free will, it is possible that the pair of eyes from my body
>>>>might have moved above the pages of the book, and neural activity
>>>>might have occurred as a result.
>>>And, it is possible that in response to what you read, your fingers
>>>might have moved so as to type something like "if I didn't have
>>>free will, I wouldn't have read his book".
>>Right.
>>>In other words, without free will, it is possible that absolute
>>>nothing observable would be any different than the way it is now.
>>It's possible. But it is very improbable.
>I don't see that at all. It seems to me that the difference
>is just words---what words you use to describe things.
That pretty much underscores the our differences in many c.a.p.
discussions. But it isn't just words. People who lose their ability
to speak, or perhaps who never acquired it, can still demonstrate
plenty of intelligence (and their exercise of free will) in their
non-speech behavior.
> There
>is a vocabulary of intentionality: purpose, goal, meaning,
>decision, etc. There's a different physical vocabulary:
>atoms, forces, motion, etc. One and the same situation can
>be described differently using the two different vocabularies.
I'll grant that once you eradicate all forms of behaviour other than
speech, you have eliminated most of the evidence for free will. You
have probably also killed the experimental subject.
Neil W Rickert
>>That's a bad guess. I certainly have not said anything that would
>>suggest this. I'm not even sure how one would go about
>>"contemplating how it feels to be a human being". As I see it, free
>>will has to do with behavior and the basis for that behavior, not
>>with "how it feels."
>In that case I am going to have to try and work out the outer
>boundaries on exactly what you believe, and work my way inwards to
>something more specific, like a kind of binary search.
>Does a dead body have free will?
It's a silly question.
>Are you able to think of reasons why you do things?
This is pretty much irrelevant. That one can construct rational
explanations after the fact does not demonstrate that those
explanations were the basis of the action. Even if they were the
basis for the action, this would not demonstrate a lack of free
will.
>>Well, sure. But do keep in mind that these deterministic models of
>>the weather don't work -- that is, they do not fit the actual
>>observed weather. The models are getting better, but they are still
>>very far from being exact fits.
>No two real hurricanes exactly match each other, do they? So is the
>second one in fact fake?
Is this silliness leading somewhere?
>>The three things
>> consciousness -- that there is an *I*
>> free will -- that the *I* is to be credited with the reading
>> intentionality -- that the syntactical marks on the paper express
>> meaningful information about things in the world
>>all go together. You either accept them all or you deny them all.
>I do accept them all, as descriptions of what is happening at a useful
>level, and I deny them all as fundamental or essential to the way the
>universe works. That is, if you blew up the earth, you would also
>destroy those three things, and all the other stuff in the universe
>would go on about its business quite happily without so much as a
>hiccup, and there would no longer be anything worthy of the shorthand
>label "free will."
There may be similar creatures on other planets somewhere in the
cosmos.
>>If there is no such thing as free will, then Honderich did not write
>>that book. A mindless mechanical automoton made meaningless marks on
>>paper.
>Where's the distinction? To be more honest, "A mindless mechanical
>automoton that behaves indistinguishably from Honderich made
>meaningless marks that just happen to look a lot like the meaningful
>marks you normally get from Honderich."
>And anyway, you got it wrong - the pen made the marks. No, the ink
>did. No, the molecules of ink did. No, the paper did - without the
>paper the ink wouldn't have anything to stick to.
>What's the point trying to decide that one thing that "exists" is
>responsible for everything you can mentally give a label to? What if
>you are trying to label something that is constructed from billions of
>tiny interactions you aren't directly aware of? Conciousness and free
>will are good examples of this.
I guess you don't believe you exist. And if you don't exist,
there isn't much point in my continuing this discussion.
>>To the contrary, free will is quite distinguishable from the
>>outside.
>Or to put it another way, good survival strategies can be exhibited by
>some deterministic systems. Let's call them living things to save time
>in future.
Living things are not deterministic systems under Balter's earlier
definition. If you have a definition that fits, would you
care to provide it.
>>If there is no free will, all "why" accounts that explain human
>>behavior in ordinary human terms are no more than "Just So" stories.
>>For the "why" accounts attribute the behavior to decisions which are
>>not possible without the ability to make those decisions (i.e.
>>without free will).
>Well, take a look at a sentence. Undeniably, it IS a sequence of
>symbols, i.e. letters selected from the alphabet and some punctuation
>symbols. The symbols themselves don't mean anything. They are
>undeniably there. And yet interpreted together, the sentence has
>"meaning" - or is that just a "Just So" story?
I see that we also disagree about the nature of language.
>>The denial of free will denies that...
>>... there is anything to reading a book other than
>>the motion of the eyes, and it denies that there is any information
>>picked up other than the pattern of blackness and whiteness reflected
>>from varying parts of the page.
>The pattern of blackness and whiteness makes its way through the eye
>ball onto the retina, and from there to the visual cortex. Then things
>get a little complicated - not only can we not sensibly describe what
>happens, it doesn't seem likely it will ever be possible to "describe"
>it in words, in anything like a useful way. But the chain of cause and
>effect continues. The sheer messiness of it makes it more convenient
>to just blandly label the whole caboodle as "free will."
>Is that denial of free will, or a deeper understanding of it?
Neither.
Jim Balter
Yup, there are those army boots.
Tell me, Neil, in all those years, hae you ever been wrong
about anything? Have you ever admitted it?
--
<J Q B>
Neil W Rickert
>Tell me, Neil, in all those years, hae you ever been wrong
>about anything? Have you ever admitted it?
Tell me, Jim, when did you last get out of jail, and how much did
you have to pay as a bribe?
Daryl McCullough
This is the claim that I'm trying to understand:
>
>da...@cogentex.com (Daryl McCullough) writes:
>>Neil says...
>>>>In other words, without free will, it is possible that absolute
>>>>nothing observable would be any different than the way it is now.
>
>>>It's possible. But it is very improbable.
Why is it improbable? What is an example of some
observation that is unlikely in the absence of free
will and *why* do you think it is unlikely?
>>I don't see that at all. It seems to me that the difference
>>is just words---what words you use to describe things.
>
>That pretty much underscores the our differences in many c.a.p.
>discussions. But it isn't just words. People who lose their ability
>to speak, or perhaps who never acquired it, can still demonstrate
>plenty of intelligence (and their exercise of free will) in their
>non-speech behavior.
I think that you misunderstand my comment. Let me distinguish
between two different systems: (1) the subject, which is the
system under investigation, and (2) the observers, who are doing
the investigation. For now, let's assume that the observers
have free will, are conscious, have intentions, are able to make
meaningful statements, are able to make decisions, etc. But the
observers are trying to determine whether the *subject* possesses
such mental qualities. For now, let's assume that the subject
is *not* one of the observers, but is perhaps an individual
from a different species, or is a robot, or something.
My point about things being "just words" is about the
words used to describe the subject. The observers can describe
the subject in mental terms, or they can describe the
subject in purely physical terms. We can argue about whether
one description or the other is more apt, or less awkward,
or more natural.
But I can't make sense of claims of the form "It is very
probable that the subject has free will".
> There
>>is a vocabulary of intentionality: purpose, goal, meaning,
>>decision, etc. There's a different physical vocabulary:
>>atoms, forces, motion, etc. One and the same situation can
>>be described differently using the two different vocabularies.
>
>I'll grant that once you eradicate all forms of behaviour other than
>speech, you have eliminated most of the evidence for free will.
What in the world are you talking about? I didn't
say anything about "eradicating behavior". I'm
talking about how we *describe* behavior.
>You have probably also killed the experimental subject.
Again, I have no idea what you are talking about. I'm
not talking about *doing* anything to the subject.
I started off this thread saying that what people
say about free will makes no sense whatsoever to me.
After reading what you have to say about it, my
claim is still true. It still seems to me that
talk about free will (whether by you or
by professional philosophers) is the worst
kind of bad philosophy.
Daryl McCullough
>
>sp...@earwicker.com (Daniel) writes:
>>>The three things
>
>>> consciousness -- that there is an *I*
>>> free will -- that the *I* is to be credited with the reading
>>> intentionality -- that the syntactical marks on the paper express
>>> meaningful information about things in the world
>
>>>all go together. You either accept them all or you deny them all.
>
>>I do accept them all, as descriptions of what is happening at a useful
>>level, and I deny them all as fundamental or essential to the way the
>>universe works.
That is exactly my position.
>>>If there is no such thing as free will, then Honderich did not write
>>>that book. A mindless mechanical automoton made meaningless marks on
>>>paper.
>
>>Where's the distinction?
There is none. The distinction is between two different levels
of description of the same phenomenon. The same system can
simultaneously be "A free-willed, conscious individual writing
a book" and "A mindless mechanical automaton making meaningless
marks on paper".
>>What's the point trying to decide that one thing that "exists" is
>>responsible for everything you can mentally give a label to? What if
>>you are trying to label something that is constructed from billions of
>>tiny interactions you aren't directly aware of? Conciousness and free
>>will are good examples of this.
>
>I guess you don't believe you exist.
He didn't say that, and he didn't imply that. You are confirming
my suspicion that you don't have any coherent idea about what
"free will" means.
Daniel
>
>It's a silly question.
Okay, which of the follow have free will? Explain the differences
between them with respect to free will.
1. Tree
2. Ant
3. Squirrel
>>Are you able to think of reasons why you do things?
>
>This is pretty much irrelevant. That one can construct rational
>explanations after the fact does not demonstrate that those
>explanations were the basis of the action.
By basis of the action, do you mean the thing that lead to the action?
The thing that had to happen first in order for the action to occur.
You sound like one of those crazy determinist people.
>>>Well, sure. But do keep in mind that these deterministic models of
>>>the weather don't work -- that is, they do not fit the actual
>>>observed weather. The models are getting better, but they are
still
>>>very far from being exact fits.
>>No two real hurricanes exactly match each other, do they? So is the
>>second one in fact fake?
>
>Is this silliness leading somewhere?
Well, we're relating "predicting the weather" to "making models of the
mind," and there's a difference. Suppose I made a deterministic model
of the mind. You seem to be saying that you would reject it as
inadequate if it didn't precisely copy the behaviour of an existing
person (so you could predict what they would do next.) But no human
exactly replicates the behaviour of any other, so this is an absurd
yardstick. This begs the question: so what makes you accept any new
person you meet as a "real" person?
>>>The three things
>>> consciousness -- that there is an *I*
>>> free will -- that the *I* is to be credited with the reading
>>> intentionality -- that the syntactical marks on the paper express
>>> meaningful information about things in the world
>>>all go together. You either accept them all or you deny them all.
>>I do accept them all, as descriptions of what is happening at a
useful
>>level, and I deny them all as fundamental or essential to the way
the
>>universe works. That is, if you blew up the earth, you would also
>>destroy those three things, and all the other stuff in the universe
>>would go on about its business quite happily without so much as a
>>hiccup, and there would no longer be anything worthy of the
shorthand
>>label "free will."
>
>There may be similar creatures on other planets somewhere in the
>cosmos.
"Similar"? On this planet there are millions of species. Which of
those are similar enough to qualify? i.e. there must be some boundary
between a species that has free will, and a species that does not have
free will. Give me an example of a borderline species that exhibits
"minimal" free will.
>>>If there is no such thing as free will, then Honderich did not
write
>>>that book. A mindless mechanical automoton made meaningless marks
on
>>>paper.
>>Where's the distinction? To be more honest, "A mindless mechanical
>>automoton that behaves indistinguishably from Honderich made
>>meaningless marks that just happen to look a lot like the meaningful
>>marks you normally get from Honderich."
>>And anyway, you got it wrong - the pen made the marks. No, the ink
>>did. No, the molecules of ink did. No, the paper did - without the
>>paper the ink wouldn't have anything to stick to.
>>What's the point trying to decide that one thing that "exists" is
>>responsible for everything you can mentally give a label to? What if
>>you are trying to label something that is constructed from billions
of
>>tiny interactions you aren't directly aware of? Conciousness and
free
>>will are good examples of this.
>
>I guess you don't believe you exist. And if you don't exist,
>there isn't much point in my continuing this discussion.
Give me an example of something that exists.
The only reason you have ever had to ascribe "existence" to me is that
you are reading newsgroup postings from me. If you believe those
exist, then you have all you need (and all you'll ever get) in order
to continue this discussion. What proof do you have that anyone
posting to this newsgroup "exists"? All you have is newsgroup
postings. Do they exist? What does the word "exist" mean in this
context?
>>>To the contrary, free will is quite distinguishable from the
>>>outside.
>>Or to put it another way, good survival strategies can be exhibited
by
>>some deterministic systems. Let's call them living things to save
time
>>in future.
>
>Living things are not deterministic systems under Balter's earlier
>definition. If you have a definition that fits, would you
>care to provide it.
I just had a hunt around google and couldn't find that definition. So
what are you asking for - a deterministic definition of a living
thing? Read Darwin.
>>>If there is no free will, all "why" accounts that explain human
>>>behavior in ordinary human terms are no more than "Just So"
stories.
>>>For the "why" accounts attribute the behavior to decisions which
are
>>>not possible without the ability to make those decisions (i.e.
>>>without free will).
>>Well, take a look at a sentence. Undeniably, it IS a sequence of
>>symbols, i.e. letters selected from the alphabet and some
punctuation
>>symbols. The symbols themselves don't mean anything. They are
>>undeniably there. And yet interpreted together, the sentence has
>>"meaning" - or is that just a "Just So" story?
>
>I see that we also disagree about the nature of language.
Do you deny that a sentence is a sequence of letters, punctuation and
spaces? Is that an untrue statement?
Supposing you accept that it is true (why do I get the feeling that's
a long shot?), does that have any affect on the ability of the
sentence to carry a meaning?
Neil W Rickert
>Neil says...
>This is the claim that I'm trying to understand:
>>da...@cogentex.com (Daryl McCullough) writes:
>>>Neil says...
>>>>>In other words, without free will, it is possible that absolute
>>>>>nothing observable would be any different than the way it is now.
>>>>It's possible. But it is very improbable.
>Why is it improbable? What is an example of some
>observation that is unlikely in the absence of free
>will and *why* do you think it is unlikely?
Poetry, scientific advance.
More generally, creativity.
No satisfactory account of creativity has ever been given that is
consistent with kind of world described by the deniers of free
will. I doubt that such an account is possible.
---------
>But I can't make sense of claims of the form "It is very
>probable that the subject has free will".
There is a current court case in texas, dealing with a prominent
case, where the jury will be having to make just such an assessment.
Neil W Rickert
>>>Does a dead body have free will?
>>It's a silly question.
>Okay, which of the follow have free will? Explain the differences
>between them with respect to free will.
>1. Tree
>2. Ant
>3. Squirrel
No biological creature is a deterministic system. As for free will,
it would seem plausible to apply that to the squirrel. The tree does
not make any decisions, so the question of free will does not even
enter. The ant is trickier, but too alien to us for us to have any
basis for making an assessment.
>>>Are you able to think of reasons why you do things?
>>This is pretty much irrelevant. That one can construct rational
>>explanations after the fact does not demonstrate that those
>>explanations were the basis of the action.
>By basis of the action, do you mean the thing that lead to the action?
The terminology is a little too vague.
>The thing that had to happen first in order for the action to occur.
>You sound like one of those crazy determinist people.
You clearly misunderstand my criticism of determinism. I am
certainly not rejecting causal explanations.
>>>>Well, sure. But do keep in mind that these deterministic models of
>>>>the weather don't work -- that is, they do not fit the actual
>>>>observed weather. The models are getting better, but they are
>still
>>>>very far from being exact fits.
>>>No two real hurricanes exactly match each other, do they? So is the
>>>second one in fact fake?
>>Is this silliness leading somewhere?
>Well, we're relating "predicting the weather" to "making models of the
>mind," and there's a difference.
Are we? You appear to have changed the subject. I didn't think
"models of the mind" had come up. I'm not even sure that "models of
the mind" makes much sense.
> You seem to be saying that you would reject it as
>inadequate if it didn't precisely copy the behaviour of an existing
>person (so you could predict what they would do next.) But no human
>exactly replicates the behaviour of any other, so this is an absurd
>yardstick. This begs the question: so what makes you accept any new
>person you meet as a "real" person?
I guess I have to spell it out.
A deterministic model of the weather (actually of the
atmosphere/ocean/whatever) can be very useful, even if its
predictions are a little off. Such a model can nevertheless be used
to help in better understanding the weather. However, unless it
*exactly* predicts the weather, it gives no evidence at all on the
question of whether the actual weather system is deterministic.
---------
>>Living things are not deterministic systems under Balter's earlier
>>definition. If you have a definition that fits, would you
>>care to provide it.
>I just had a hunt around google and couldn't find that definition.
My reference was to a posting by Jim Balter in this thread a few days
back.
> So
>what are you asking for - a deterministic definition of a living
>thing? Read Darwin.
Darwin does say anything of the kind.
>>I see that we also disagree about the nature of language.
>Do you deny that a sentence is a sequence of letters, punctuation and
>spaces? Is that an untrue statement?
Of course that is untrue, at least of natural languages. Children
speak in sentences before they have learned any alphabet. The
alphabet is an artificial construct to allow us to make written
records of linguistic expression. The alphabet is not itself part
of the language.
Jim Balter
You've totally lost it.
--
<J Q B>
Jim Balter
Conversations with Rickert almost always end up at the same place.
You've been taken for yet another ride, Daryl.
--
<J Q B>
Daryl McCullough
>No satisfactory account of creativity has ever been given that is
>consistent with kind of world described by the deniers of free
>will. I doubt that such an account is possible.
Replace the phrase "deniers of free will" by "supporters of
free will" and you have my response.
Daryl McCullough
>>But I can't make sense of claims of the form "It is very
>>probable that the subject has free will".
>
>There is a current court case in texas, dealing with a prominent
>case, where the jury will be having to make just such an assessment.
There has been a court cases to decide whether a professional psychic
deserved compensation for a trauma that resulted in the loss of her
powers. Does that mean that there is a coherent theory of psychic
powers?
I don't deny that people use the language of free will. I just
deny that they know what they are talking about when they do so.
And that goes for lawyers, law-makers and judges as well.
Glen M. Sizemore
> consistent with kind of world described by the deniers of free
> will. I doubt that such an account is possible.
But an "explanation" in terms of free-will is no explanation at all, and
"creativity" in behavior is no harder to explain then "creativity" in
evolution......Oh, I forgot, you're a creationist. Yeah, that makes sense.
You're a reasonably smart guy that nevertheless spews BS. Yup, that's
creationism alright.
Neil W Rickert <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> wrote in message
news:a5rcj9$qsp$1...@husk.cso.niu.edu...
Daniel
> sp...@earwicker.com (Daniel) writes:
>
> >>>Does a dead body have free will?
>
> >>It's a silly question.
>
> >Okay, which of the follow have free will? Explain the differences
> >between them with respect to free will.
>
> >1. Tree
> >2. Ant
> >3. Squirrel
>
> No biological creature is a deterministic system.
There are biological creatures so simple that they don't have anything
like a nervous system. They're more like clusters of organic chemical
processes, so simple that they in fact can't be classified as either
plant or animal, for example. Is it something to do with molecules
made of carbon, hydrogen and oxygen that is inherently
non-deterministic?
Pick an example of a deterministic system. What's the missing
ingredient that makes it deterministic when a biological creature is
not?
> As for free will,
> it would seem plausible to apply that to the squirrel. The tree does
> not make any decisions, so the question of free will does not even
> enter.
You seem to be saying that "possessing free will" and "being
non-deterministic" are not in fact attributes that have to be present
or absent together - some things may have one but not the other. Are
you saying a tree is non-deterministic but does not have free will?
This would make trees even more mysterious than people. There are
certain things they always do (shedding leaves, dropping seeds that
grow into more trees), but they neither do them because they want to,
nor because they have to. It's not our place to explain the miraculous
ways of the tree.
> The ant is trickier, but too alien to us for us to have any
> basis for making an assessment.
I agree - an ant is much simpler, for starters. Do you think a human
brain could be modified a step at a time until it was like an ant's
brain (or what passes for its brain)?
> A deterministic model of the weather (actually of the
> atmosphere/ocean/whatever) can be very useful, even if its
> predictions are a little off. Such a model can nevertheless be used
> to help in better understanding the weather. However, unless it
> *exactly* predicts the weather, it gives no evidence at all on the
> question of whether the actual weather system is deterministic.
If I put together a model of the weather, is it automatically
deterministic?
And things we find in nature, such as real weather systems, are not
demonstrably deterministic. We have no evidence that they are. (Your
criterion above is of course impossible to meet. To observe that our
model exactly predicts the weather, we would have to observe the two
indefinitely because the observable divergence may occur at any time
in the future.)
Relating this to "biological creatures", any *model* of them is
automatically deterministic. But the real thing is absolutely (as
you've stated) always non-deterministic.
So by deterministic, do you mean "man made copy"?
So it's as if you believe that the things that human beings put
together are of a fundamentally different nature to the things that
are already around.
> >>I see that we also disagree about the nature of language.
>
> >Do you deny that a sentence is a sequence of letters, punctuation and
> >spaces? Is that an untrue statement?
>
> Of course that is untrue, at least of natural languages. Children
> speak in sentences before they have learned any alphabet. The
> alphabet is an artificial construct to allow us to make written
> records of linguistic expression. The alphabet is not itself part
> of the language.
I'm thinking more about how you reconstruct meaning when all you have
is something like a newsgroup posting. It is delivered to you as a
sequence of letters, punctuation and spaces, yes? The letters and
punctuation are crucially important - missing a letter or two would
alter the meaning. For instance, you said:
> Darwin does say anything of the kind.
Which I think maybe should have said:
> Darwin doesn't say anything of the kind.
By missing out the sequence: n't the meaning was altered in a very
absolute way - it was inverted. So the meaning is encoded in the
sequence of symbols. So genuine meaning in a human sense can clearly
be encoded in a system based on a formal, fixed set of symbols.
When something has an underlying basis or mechanism that is fixed and
formalised in that way, you feel it isn't quite as good as something
more gloopy and messy. You say things like "A mindless mechanical
automaton made meaningless marks on paper" and that it would be "a
mistake to credit him with authorship of the book."
Newsgroup postings are sequences of symbols selected from the set:
26 uppercase letters
26 lowercase letters
About 20 punctuation symbols
Digit 0 through 9
Space
Does this automatically make them more fake than the kind of
communication made by a child before they know about the alphabet? Of
course not. The meaning is in precisely which symbols are chosen and
in what order they are placed.
So if people were made out of very small mindless mechanical building
blocks, why would it follow that they were mindless mechanical
automatons when considered at the scale of a whole human being?
Meaning survives in a newsgroup posting. Why can't humanity survive in
a deterministic mechanism?
Neil W Rickert
>> No satisfactory account of creativity has ever been given that is
>> consistent with kind of world described by the deniers of free
>> will. I doubt that such an account is possible.
>But an "explanation" in terms of free-will is no explanation at all, and
>"creativity" in behavior is no harder to explain then "creativity" in
>evolution......
Evolutionists have done a very good job of explaining that either.
Still, they have done better than behaviorists.
> ......Oh, I forgot, you're a creationist.
Most definitely not.
Neil W Rickert
>Neil W Rickert <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> wrote in message news:<a5rke6$1fc$1...@husk.cso.niu.edu>...
>> sp...@earwicker.com (Daniel) writes:
>> >>>Does a dead body have free will?
>> >>It's a silly question.
>> >Okay, which of the follow have free will? Explain the differences
>> >between them with respect to free will.
>> >1. Tree
>> >2. Ant
>> >3. Squirrel
>> No biological creature is a deterministic system.
>There are biological creatures so simple that they don't have anything
>like a nervous system. They're more like clusters of organic chemical
>processes, so simple that they in fact can't be classified as either
>plant or animal, for example.
You are right. They are incredibly simple. Nevertheless, they are
far more complex than anything man made.
> Is it something to do with molecules
>made of carbon, hydrogen and oxygen that is inherently
>non-deterministic?
No. It has to do with their being processes, or clusters of
processes, as you put it.
>Pick an example of a deterministic system.
I'll pick a Turing machine.
> What's the missing
>ingredient that makes it deterministic when a biological creature is
>not?
That fact that it is abstract.
>> As for free will,
>> it would seem plausible to apply that to the squirrel. The tree does
>> not make any decisions, so the question of free will does not even
>> enter.
>You seem to be saying that "possessing free will" and "being
>non-deterministic" are not in fact attributes that have to be present
>or absent together - some things may have one but not the other.
Right.
> Are
>you saying a tree is non-deterministic but does not have free will?
>This would make trees even more mysterious than people.
Not really. Free will has to do with making decisions. The tree
does not make decisions. There is no central coordination of the
activity of parts of the tree, such as would be required for it to
make decisions.
>> The ant is trickier, but too alien to us for us to have any
>> basis for making an assessment.
>I agree - an ant is much simpler, for starters. Do you think a human
>brain could be modified a step at a time until it was like an ant's
>brain (or what passes for its brain)?
I doubt that is possible.
>> A deterministic model of the weather (actually of the
>> atmosphere/ocean/whatever) can be very useful, even if its
>> predictions are a little off. Such a model can nevertheless be used
>> to help in better understanding the weather. However, unless it
>> *exactly* predicts the weather, it gives no evidence at all on the
>> question of whether the actual weather system is deterministic.
>If I put together a model of the weather, is it automatically
>deterministic?
It would depend on the model. We tend to make our models
deterministic, to the extent that we can, for that makes the models
more useful.
>And things we find in nature, such as real weather systems, are not
>demonstrably deterministic. We have no evidence that they are. (Your
>criterion above is of course impossible to meet. To observe that our
>model exactly predicts the weather, we would have to observe the two
>indefinitely because the observable divergence may occur at any time
>in the future.)
Agreed.
>Relating this to "biological creatures", any *model* of them is
>automatically deterministic.
That's not certain. It would depend on the kind of model.
>So it's as if you believe that the things that human beings put
>together are of a fundamentally different nature to the things that
>are already around.
That's a strange conclusion, and one not justified by anything I have
said.
>> >>I see that we also disagree about the nature of language.
>> >Do you deny that a sentence is a sequence of letters, punctuation and
>> >spaces? Is that an untrue statement?
>> Of course that is untrue, at least of natural languages. Children
>> speak in sentences before they have learned any alphabet. The
>> alphabet is an artificial construct to allow us to make written
>> records of linguistic expression. The alphabet is not itself part
>> of the language.
>I'm thinking more about how you reconstruct meaning when all you have
>is something like a newsgroup posting. It is delivered to you as a
>sequence of letters, punctuation and spaces, yes? The letters and
>punctuation are crucially important - missing a letter or two would
>alter the meaning. For instance, you said:
We are usually able to work around typos.
>> Darwin does say anything of the kind.
>Which I think maybe should have said:
>> Darwin doesn't say anything of the kind.
Good example of working around typos.
>By missing out the sequence: n't the meaning was altered in a very
>absolute way - it was inverted.
Obviously not, since you were able to work out what I intended. What
I accidently typed has obvious problems -- it isn't the sort of thing
anyone would say. So it was obvious that there was a typo
somewhere.
> So the meaning is encoded in the
>sequence of symbols. So genuine meaning in a human sense can clearly
>be encoded in a system based on a formal, fixed set of symbols.
Wow! That's an enormous leap to conclusions. You would need a clear
definition of "genuine meaning in a human sense" before you could
even begin to investigate the validity of your assertion.
>When something has an underlying basis or mechanism that is fixed and
>formalised in that way, you feel it isn't quite as good as something
>more gloopy and messy.
Where did I say that?
> You say things like "A mindless mechanical
>automaton made meaningless marks on paper" and that it would be "a
>mistake to credit him with authorship of the book."
I wouldn't give any credit to a gloopy mess either.
>Newsgroup postings are sequences of symbols selected from the set:
>26 uppercase letters
>26 lowercase letters
>About 20 punctuation symbols
>Digit 0 through 9
>Space
>Does this automatically make them more fake than the kind of
>communication made by a child before they know about the alphabet? Of
>course not. The meaning is in precisely which symbols are chosen and
>in what order they are placed.
Again, there is a huge leap to conclusions here.
Glen M. Sizemore
and
>"creativity" in behavior is no harder to explain then "creativity" in
>evolution......
NR: Evolutionists have done a very good job of explaining that either.
Still, they have done better than behaviorists.
GS: Really Neil? Suppose you tell me about such behavioristic attempts to
explain "creativity." After all, you seem to be speaking with a great deal
of authority here. I wonder if you could back it up?
Neil W Rickert <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> wrote in message
news:a60ukp$cef$1...@husk.cso.niu.edu...
Curt Welch
> sp...@earwicker.com (Daniel) writes:
> Not really. Free will has to do with making decisions. The tree
> does not make decisions. There is no central coordination of the
> activity of parts of the tree, such as would be required for it to
> make decisions.
I don't know how this might apply to your discussion, but I'd just though
I would point this out...
A tree does decide to drop it's leaves in the fall. It decides when to
grow them back in the spring. That looks like it could be called a form of
decision making to me. And since it decides for itself, I'd say the tree
has a type of free-will.
--
Curt Welch http://CurtWelch.Com/
cu...@kcwc.com Webmaster for http://NewsReader.Com/
Dawn Ullman
>Neil W Rickert <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> wrote:
>> sp...@earwicker.com (Daniel) writes:
>
>> Not really. Free will has to do with making decisions. The tree
>> does not make decisions. There is no central coordination of the
>> activity of parts of the tree, such as would be required for it to
>> make decisions.
>
>I don't know how this might apply to your discussion, but I'd just though
>I would point this out...
>
>A tree does decide to drop it's leaves in the fall. It decides when to
>grow them back in the spring. That looks like it could be called a form of
>decision making to me. And since it decides for itself, I'd say the tree
>has a type of free-will.
Has a tree told you this? only I wonder if it decides or if it is
decided for.
Again how do we know who/what decides/decided
We can only suggest how it could be. Deduced from what we suggest as
to know it to be.
It could be said that X causes Y.
then again it could also be said that it is Z that causes Y.
Cause and effect
Compatibilist / free will & determinism compatiable.
Incompatilists/ not compatiable with determinism
(would the tree want to say even if it could I wonder)
Curt Welch
> On 06 Mar 2002 00:02:45 GMT, cu...@kcwc.com (Curt Welch) wrote:
>
> >Neil W Rickert <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> wrote:
> >> sp...@earwicker.com (Daniel) writes:
> >
> >> Not really. Free will has to do with making decisions. The tree
> >> does not make decisions. There is no central coordination of the
> >> activity of parts of the tree, such as would be required for it to
> >> make decisions.
> >
> >I don't know how this might apply to your discussion, but I'd just
> >though I would point this out...
> >
> >A tree does decide to drop it's leaves in the fall. It decides when to
> >grow them back in the spring. That looks like it could be called a form
> >of decision making to me. And since it decides for itself, I'd say the
> >tree has a type of free-will.
>
> Has a tree told you this? only I wonder if it decides or if it is
> decided for.
I believe everthing works that way. In the case of a tree, how it is
"decided" is much simpler than how it is "decided" that I type this
message. But like the tree, we both have free well, but yet at a higher
level, we are forced to do what we do by by the greater forces of the
universe.
The universe may not be deterministic, but at the same time, that has
nothing to do with whether we have free will or not.
> Again how do we know who/what decides/decided
You are free to pick any point of reference. There is no single correct
point of reference. You might limit the idea of "free-will" based on the
idea of what "making a decision" is, but then you are left with defining
what that is. And in the AI context, since we don't really know how to
create AI, it gets damn hard to define that until we first figure out how
the brain works.
I can look at the problem from the point of view of my mind deciding to
write this message, or I can look at the problem from the point of view of
the universe creating my mind which then does what it does simply because
it is here and it acts under the same forces of nature which acts on
everything.
> We can only suggest how it could be. Deduced from what we suggest as
> to know it to be.
>
> It could be said that X causes Y.
> then again it could also be said that it is Z that causes Y.
>
> Cause and effect
> Compatibilist / free will & determinism compatiable.
> Incompatilists/ not compatiable with determinism
Strick determinsism is an abstract concept we have created which works for
describing a turing machine, but it's unclear if the universe is
deterministic or not. It seems that it is not, but maybe it is, and it's
just impossible for us to ever understand it because we are part of the
universe and some things which happen here are controled by forces outside
the part of the universe which we are able to see?
But whether it's deterministic or not we do know that all matter seems to
follow various universal laws. And I see no reason to believe that all my
actions and thoughts are nothing more than the matter of my brain following
those same universal laws, just like the matter of the tree is following
the same universal laws which lead it to drop it's leaves or grow new ones
because the weather turns cold or warm.
Dawn Ullman
So are you saying here that it is the forces of nature which act on
the tree dropping its leaves?
if so then is it that these forces of nature have decided that?
>> We can only suggest how it could be. Deduced from what we suggest as
>> to know it to be.
>>
>> It could be said that X causes Y.
>> then again it could also be said that it is Z that causes Y.
>>
>> Cause and effect
>
>> Compatibilist / free will & determinism compatiable.
>> Incompatilists/ not compatiable with determinism
>
>Strick determinsism is an abstract concept we have created which works for
>describing a turing machine, but it's unclear if the universe is
>deterministic or not. It seems that it is not, but maybe it is, and it's
>just impossible for us to ever understand it because we are part of the
>universe and some things which happen here are controled by forces outside
>the part of the universe which we are able to see?
>
>But whether it's deterministic or not we do know that all matter seems to
>follow various universal laws. And I see no reason to believe that all my
>actions and thoughts are nothing more than the matter of my brain following
>those same universal laws, just like the matter of the tree is following
>the same universal laws which lead it to drop it's leaves or grow new ones
>because the weather turns cold or warm.
I understand this maybe
so its universal laws then ?
so is it the universal laws consisting of properties and relations
Dawn
Curt Welch
> So are you saying here that it is the forces of nature which act on
> the tree dropping its leaves?
> if so then is it that these forces of nature have decided that?
Yes, bascially. I think the forces of nature is ultimatly what expalins
everything. But most the time, that's far to broad a concept to be
useful to us. So we look for simplifications we can make use of. We
try to assign causality to objects so we can figure out what we need
to to do control our world.
We say something "decided something" simply because once we do that,
we know what we need to manipulate if we want to change the outcome.
If you want to prevent the leaves from dropping in the fall, what might
we try to do to prevent that from happening? Once we figure out
what makes the decision to drop the leaves, we know what to try
and adjust.
> >But whether it's deterministic or not we do know that all matter seems
> >to follow various universal laws. And I see no reason to believe that
> >all my actions and thoughts are nothing more than the matter of my brain
> >following those same universal laws, just like the matter of the tree is
> >following the same universal laws which lead it to drop it's leaves or
> >grow new ones because the weather turns cold or warm.
>
> I understand this maybe
> so its universal laws then ?
>
> so is it the universal laws consisting of properties and relations
It's the universal laws of gravity and mass etc. Properties and relations
are things are brains creates to try and explain the world in a way
that will allows us to control it.
Dawn Ullman
>Dawn Ullman <D.Ul...@btinternet.com> wrote:
>
>> So are you saying here that it is the forces of nature which act on
>> the tree dropping its leaves?
>> if so then is it that these forces of nature have decided that?
>
>Yes, bascially. I think the forces of nature is ultimatly what expalins
>everything. But most the time, that's far to broad a concept to be
>useful to us. So we look for simplifications we can make use of. We
>try to assign causality to objects so we can figure out what we need
>to to do control our world.
>
>We say something "decided something" simply because once we do that,
>we know what we need to manipulate if we want to change the outcome.
>
>If you want to prevent the leaves from dropping in the fall, what might
>we try to do to prevent that from happening? Once we figure out
>what makes the decision to drop the leaves, we know what to try
>and adjust.
as some trees drop their leaves and some do not then the first thing
would be to look at the structure and elements that seperate the two.
that would be the beginning blocks of building up some understanding
of what, why and how.
>
>> >But whether it's deterministic or not we do know that all matter seems
>> >to follow various universal laws. And I see no reason to believe that
>> >all my actions and thoughts are nothing more than the matter of my brain
>> >following those same universal laws, just like the matter of the tree is
>> >following the same universal laws which lead it to drop it's leaves or
>> >grow new ones because the weather turns cold or warm.
>>
>> I understand this maybe
>> so its universal laws then ?
>>
>> so is it the universal laws consisting of properties and relations
>
>It's the universal laws of gravity and mass etc. Properties and relations
>are things are brains creates to try and explain the world in a way
>that will allows us to control it.
but in order to decide does one need a brain or is it the mind. then
what is the structure and elemnets of the mind and brain that seperate
the two?
(p.s can I just add...... Thanks ever so for your replies. As a mature
student (unable to socialise as much as one would like) it can seem a
bit of a lonely world when you have all these thoughts and ideas
flying around and no-one really to discuss them with. Thanks again for
your feedback. I am sure it will benefit my studies greatly.
Dawn :-)
Curt Welch
> >It's the universal laws of gravity and mass etc. Properties and
> >relations are things are brains creates to try and explain the world in
> >a way that will allows us to control it.
>
> but in order to decide does one need a brain or is it the mind.
I'm not really sure how everyone else sees this. But to me, you need
mind. But you can't have a mind with out some sort of AI machine. The
brain of course is the one we know about.
> then
> what is the structure and elemnets of the mind and brain that seperate
> the two?
The brain is the physical machine which creates the mind. The mind
is simply an abstract idea. It's like a computer vs the software which
runs on it. Software is just a concept that on it's own can do nothing.
But run it on a computer and then you have a machine that can do something.
The brain (the hardware) is what creates intelligence. The mind is just
something we created to understand/describe what the brain is doing.
I think people would normally say that the mind makes decisions, but
everything the mind does is just something happening in the physcial brain.
When we say things like "the mind makes a decision", it's just our way of
trying to understand and explain what the brain is doing.
Daniel
> >made of carbon, hydrogen and oxygen that is inherently
> >non-deterministic?
>
> No. It has to do with their being processes, or clusters of
> processes, as you put it.
But a particular *kind* of process, one that cannot be modelled on a
Turing machine, is that right?
> >Pick an example of a deterministic system.
>
> I'll pick a Turing machine.
>
> > What's the missing
> >ingredient that makes it deterministic when a biological creature is
> >not?
>
> That fact that it is abstract.
Now I need to work out what you mean by "abstract" in this context.
It's obviously important to this discussion, given that you have
indicated that "abstractness" is the determining (oops) factor in
whether something is deterministic or not. So you are suggesting that
a person is not abstract. The problem is that I don't think you can
point at an object and say whether or not it is abstract. e.g. a
Turing machine is abstract in the sense that people don't normally
bother to build them; they typical exist as a useful idea for
discussing algorithmic processes. Do you think a laptop computer is
abstract? And why is it abstract when (say) a person isn't?
> > Are
> >you saying a tree is non-deterministic but does not have free will?
>
> >This would make trees even more mysterious than people.
>
> Not really. Free will has to do with making decisions. The tree
> does not make decisions. There is no central coordination of the
> activity of parts of the tree, such as would be required for it to
> make decisions.
"Central coordination" does exist in anything multicellular, because
every cell carries the same instructions. So all the cells are
following a "central" plan, except that different cells are built by
following different parts of the plan.
In fruit flies, each cell determines what part of the organism it
should grow into by detecting chemical asymmetries, which cause it to
"read" a different part of the DNA in order to build the right type of
cell for that piece of the organism, and this is most likely the same
for human embryos.
When you consider it from this perspective, natural selection requires
that organisms are deterministic, in the sense that something passed
from generation to generation must determine the structure and
behaviour of the organism, or in modern terms, the DNA determines
their ability to survive. If not, then the influence of the DNA on the
characteristics of the organism would be *effectively* random - that
is, there would be no way to relate a given DNA pattern to a greater
or lesser likelihood of surviving to reproduce. And so the selection
of one creature for survival over another wouldn't preserve the
qualities that allowed the survivor to win. Good survival traits would
never be captured - it would all just stay as an undifferentiated
soup. So the existence of organisms requires determinism.
> >> The ant is trickier, but too alien to us for us to have any
> >> basis for making an assessment.
>
> >I agree - an ant is much simpler, for starters. Do you think a human
> >brain could be modified a step at a time until it was like an ant's
> >brain (or what passes for its brain)?
>
> I doubt that is possible.
Do you think that ants and humans had a common ancestor? If so, you
merely trace back from the ant to that common ancestor, and then trace
forward from that ancestor to us. Any two living things, such as an
elephant and a mushroom, are obviously linked in this way. So why do
you doubt that it is possible? Unless you are a creationist, in which
case I apologise for wasting your time with something as pointless as
a _discussion_!
> >> A deterministic model of the weather (actually of the
> >> atmosphere/ocean/whatever) can be very useful, even if its
> >> predictions are a little off. Such a model can nevertheless be used
> >> to help in better understanding the weather. However, unless it
> >> *exactly* predicts the weather, it gives no evidence at all on the
> >> question of whether the actual weather system is deterministic.
>
> >If I put together a model of the weather, is it automatically
> >deterministic?
>
> It would depend on the model. We tend to make our models
> deterministic, to the extent that we can, for that makes the models
> more useful.
You say we "tend" to, which suggests the tantalising possibility that
we might learn to deliberately make non-deterministic models. This
would (by your previous reasoning) allow us to model the weather or
human beings. How might we make a non-deterministic model?
Gary Forbis
> Dawn Ullman <D.Ul...@btinternet.com> wrote:
> > then
> > what is the structure and elemnets of the mind and brain that seperate
> > the two?
>
> The brain is the physical machine which creates the mind. The mind
> is simply an abstract idea.
The mind isn't an abstract idea. It is that which holds absract ideas.
It is the temporal aggregate of qualia associated with a brain.
If you don't have qualia then you don't have a mind even if you
produce the same behavior by way of software on a computer.
Neil W Rickert
>> > Is it something to do with molecules
>> >made of carbon, hydrogen and oxygen that is inherently
>> >non-deterministic?
>> No. It has to do with their being processes, or clusters of
>> processes, as you put it.
>But a particular *kind* of process, one that cannot be modelled on a
>Turing machine, is that right?
Don't put words in my mouth.
The requirement that a process be capable of being modelled on a
Turing machine is a very weak one.
>> >Pick an example of a deterministic system.
>> I'll pick a Turing machine.
>> > What's the missing
>> >ingredient that makes it deterministic when a biological creature is
>> >not?
>> That fact that it is abstract.
>Now I need to work out what you mean by "abstract" in this context.
That's up to you.
>It's obviously important to this discussion, given that you have
>indicated that "abstractness" is the determining (oops) factor in
>whether something is deterministic or not.
We can make our abstract processes/systems do whatever we want them
to do. We don't have that luxury with real world processes.
> The problem is that I don't think you can
>point at an object and say whether or not it is abstract.
If you can point at an object, then it is not abstract.
> e.g. a
>Turing machine is abstract in the sense that people don't normally
>bother to build them;
You miss the point. People cannot build them. If it can be built,
it is not a Turing machine.
>> > Are
>> >you saying a tree is non-deterministic but does not have free will?
>> >This would make trees even more mysterious than people.
>> Not really. Free will has to do with making decisions. The tree
>> does not make decisions. There is no central coordination of the
>> activity of parts of the tree, such as would be required for it to
>> make decisions.
>"Central coordination" does exist in anything multicellular, because
>every cell carries the same instructions. So all the cells are
>following a "central" plan, except that different cells are built by
>following different parts of the plan.
Perhaps you don't understand the term "central coordination."
Curt Welch
> cu...@kcwc.com (Curt Welch) wrote in message
> news:<20020309182059.166$0...@newsreader.com>...
> > Dawn Ullman <D.Ul...@btinternet.com> wrote:
> > > then
> > > what is the structure and elemnets of the mind and brain that
> > > seperate the two?
> >
> > The brain is the physical machine which creates the mind. The mind
> > is simply an abstract idea.
>
> The mind isn't an abstract idea. It is that which holds absract ideas.
This sounds a lot like the unresolved debate I just had with Travler. What
prevents the "mind" from being both?
"mind" is just a word and associated with it, like all other words in
my mind, is a meaning. It's just one of many abstractions my mind has
created to help me understand how the world works. Because it's not
associated with a simple physcial object, I call it an abstract idea.
It's just another abstract concept about reality.
> It is the temporal aggregate of qualia associated with a brain.
Big scary words. :) Help me understand what you are saying there please.
Qualia is a word I'm not really famillar with though I've seen it thrown
around here before. It seems to mean "a property". Or,
in the way I've seen it used here, people seem to use it as the basic unit
of "knowledge" which the mind holds about everything -- the mind's
equivilent to the computers bit.
Are the "qualia" in the above sentence the properties of the brain, or are
they the properties of all items in the world which the brain has stored as
knowledge? i.e., everything a brain "knows"?
And are you using "temporal aggregate" as a way of saying you define the
mind to be everything a brain has known over it's entire life? If you
forget something, doesn't that make your mind different than it was before
you forgot it? So isn't the mind only defined by it's current knowledge
and abilities and not by what it was yesterday? So why would you try to
define it as the mind it was yesterday plus the mind it is today? To me,
it's only the mind it is now.
The mind collects information over time, but it also forgets it just about
as quickly.
> If you don't have qualia then you don't have a mind even if you
> produce the same behavior by way of software on a computer.
That seems meaningless to my limited mind. To me, if I were to try and map
that into the world of computers, you seem to be be saying "if you don't
have bits, you don't have a computer application even if your machine works
exactly like Microsoft Word". How could any machine that acted exactly
like a computer running Microsoft Word not have bits? And if it somehow
could simuliate Micorsoft Word without the logical equivelent of a "bit",
then how could you say it was not "a computer application"?
I'm not questing the need for "qualia", but I'm totaly lost when you imply
that a machine which had the same behavior as a mind and somehow assume it
worked without using "qualia".
"mind" is a word which I've never felt like I unerstood how different
people used the word. So I'm interested in understanind more about what
people think the word means.
For examaple, if we talk about an AI machine (which I of course like to
do), where does "mind" fit into the picture? For example, I believe that
AI simply requires the correct "Learning Algorithm" running on the correct
type of hardware to create intelligence (and consciousness - but we don't
need to go there). If I were to one day build this machine, it would start
off it's life with no knowledge about the world. It would only have it's
innate ability to learn. Over time, it would learn, and lets assume it
had human level abilities to learn, so after many years, it could join is
in these discussions. What is the "mind" of this machine? There's the
hardware which is the brain, and the software which tells the brain how to
work -- or it might simply be part of the hardware for performance reasons.
But then there is all the aquired knowledge which has, in effect, caused
the machine to be reprogrammed over time. The re-programming didn't change
the learning algorithm which it started with, that still works the same as
it did when it it was "born", but it has changed the machines behavior over
the years. It's a different machine after training becaue it now behavies
very differently than it did on the day it was born.
Is the "mind" represented by all the knowledge which this AI has aquired
over the years? This would imply it had no mind at birth. Or is it the
knowledge plus the learning algortihm?
I feel that the word "quail" would be associated with the knowledge
which this machine had aquired over time. But that "mind" would be better
described as the qualia plus the learning algorithm(s) of the machine which
creates the "quail" and stores it in the machine by reprograming the
behavior of the machine.
Any thoughts about my interpretations or mis-interpretations of these
ideas?
Jim Balter
> Qualia is a word I'm not really famillar with though I've seen it thrown
> around here before. It seems to mean "a property". Or,
> in the way I've seen it used here, people seem to use it as the basic unit
> of "knowledge" which the mind holds about everything -- the mind's
> equivilent to the computers bit.
>
> Are the "qualia" in the above sentence the properties of the brain, or are
> they the properties of all items in the world which the brain has stored as
> knowledge? i.e., everything a brain "knows"?
If you depend on Forbis to answer this, you will remain confused for a long time.
I offer
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia/
for an overview and
http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/quinqual.htm
for an analysis that I think you will find great sympathy with
(note that Dennett is seen as evil incarnate by Forbis and his ilk,
who see him as denying our humanity, although this view of Dennett
seems to be quite independent of actually having read what he wrote).
--
<J Q B>
Curt Welch
> > Are the "qualia" in the above sentence the properties of the brain, or
> > are they the properties of all items in the world which the brain has
> > stored as knowledge? i.e., everything a brain "knows"?
>
> I offer
>
> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia/
>
> for an overview and
>
> http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/quinqual.htm
Thanks Jim. I see the concept is not so well understood. I've got
a lot of reading to do now.... :)
Dawn Ullman
>forbi...@msn.com (Gary Forbis) wrote:
>> cu...@kcwc.com (Curt Welch) wrote in message
>> news:<20020309182059.166$0...@newsreader.com>...
>> > Dawn Ullman <D.Ul...@btinternet.com> wrote:
>> > > then
>> > > what is the structure and elemnets of the mind and brain that
>> > > seperate the two?
>> >
>> > The brain is the physical machine which creates the mind. The mind
>> > is simply an abstract idea.
>>
>> The mind isn't an abstract idea. It is that which holds absract ideas.
>
>This sounds a lot like the unresolved debate I just had with Travler. What
>prevents the "mind" from being both?
or does the mind mind the brain, kind of looks after it in someway.
as such part of the brain as a whole concept
>
>"mind" is just a word and associated with it, like all other words in
>my mind, is a meaning. It's just one of many abstractions my mind has
>created to help me understand how the world works. Because it's not
>associated with a simple physcial object, I call it an abstract idea.
>
>It's just another abstract concept about reality.
>
reality is diffecult
>> It is the temporal aggregate of qualia associated with a brain.
>
because it minds it maybe it doesn't so much experience things so
>Big scary words. :) Help me understand what you are saying there please.
>
>Qualia is a word I'm not really famillar with though I've seen it thrown
>around here before. It seems to mean "a property". Or,
>in the way I've seen it used here, people seem to use it as the basic unit
>of "knowledge" which the mind holds about everything -- the mind's
>equivilent to the computers bit.
>
Qualia to my knowledge is the sense of or how it feel, the experience
but i may stand corrected
Gary Forbis
> Curt Welch wrote:
>
> > Qualia is a word I'm not really famillar with though I've seen it thrown
> > around here before. It seems to mean "a property". Or,
> > in the way I've seen it used here, people seem to use it as the basic unit
> > of "knowledge" which the mind holds about everything -- the mind's
> > equivilent to the computers bit.
> >
> > Are the "qualia" in the above sentence the properties of the brain, or are
> > they the properties of all items in the world which the brain has stored as
> > knowledge? i.e., everything a brain "knows"?
>
> If you depend on Forbis to answer this, you will remain confused for a long time.
> I offer
>
> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia/
I like this one. It states the problem quite nicely.
> for an overview and
>
> http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/quinqual.htm
>
> for an analysis that I think you will find great sympathy with
> (note that Dennett is seen as evil incarnate by Forbis and his ilk,
No. Dennett isn't evil incarnate. He's self inconsistent, like
all eliminativists.
There is a chasm between "there is no known unique quale associated
with any particular distal cause" and "there are no qualia associated
with distal causes."
> who see him as denying our humanity, although this view of Dennett
> seems to be quite independent of actually having read what he wrote).
Believe what you will. I can't stop you and have given up trying.
Gary Forbis
cu...@kcwc.com (Curt Welch) wrote in message news:<20020311102439.948$PK...@newsreader.com>...
> forbi...@msn.com (Gary Forbis) wrote:
concerning "mind"
> > It is the temporal aggregate of qualia associated with a brain.
>
> Big scary words. :) Help me understand what you are saying there please.
> The mind collects information over time, but it also forgets it just about
> as quickly.
The mind is associated with the brain. The mind is the senses associated
with certain brain activities. It is the consciousness.
> > If you don't have qualia then you don't have a mind even if you
> > produce the same behavior by way of software on a computer.
>
> That seems meaningless to my limited mind. To me, if I were to try and map
> that into the world of computers, you seem to be be saying "if you don't
> have bits, you don't have a computer application even if your machine works
> exactly like Microsoft Word".
More like, if it's not using electricity it's not an electronic computer.
Computers needn't be electronic, you know.
> I'm not questing the need for "qualia", but I'm totaly lost when you imply
> that a machine which had the same behavior as a mind and somehow assume it
> worked without using "qualia".
We program computers completely without reference to qualia. The concept
just isn't needed to do our job. Computers might have qualia. I have
no way to tell and have seen no theory that would qualify as scientific.
Why does it matter to so many that computers have qualia when the
concept doesn't help us program them? OK, we talk about "sensors"
in relationship to computers but we know we are just talking about
switches and signals and transponders and the like. Few attribute
qualia to toggles, transisters, thermometers, etc. A map isn't the
territory but a map between qualia and machine state is sufficient
to produce the equivalent behavior. The map isn't even necessary.
Jim Balter
Replace "read" with "comprehended".
> Believe what you will. I can't stop you and have given up trying.
My beliefs about you and your mental states are derived from
your behavior, of course.
--
<J Q B>
Daniel
rather than going into it in any depth - what's the point of replying
in that way?
Should I conclude that "Neil W Rickert" is in fact an AI experiment?
Typical "conversation" programs use precisely the same tactics to
defend themselves against detection.
Or are you ever going to describe what you think about determinism? If
all you do is write down snappy but vague soundbites that only hint at
your position, then all I can usefully do is propose a more verbose
version and ask you if that's what you mean. That's not the same as
"putting words in your mouth."
My best guess so far is that you think determinism is something that
is present in a simple system, but disappears at some point when the
system becomes too complex to predict in practice. I'm clearly
labelling this as a "guess" (based on the limited evidence you've
given) - I'm not trying to paint a false picture of your view point.
I'm just trying to paint ANY picture of it, so you can add more
detail, correct it, etc.
Or do you simply not want to reveal what you think about determinism?
If so, I wish you'd said so last month when I first asked.
Neil W Rickert
>All these stock answers that appear to be about evading the discussion
>rather than going into it in any depth - what's the point of replying
>in that way?
If you want to discontinue the discussion, that's fine. But why end
with insults?
>Should I conclude that "Neil W Rickert" is in fact an AI experiment?
>Typical "conversation" programs use precisely the same tactics to
>defend themselves against detection.
>Or are you ever going to describe what you think about determinism?
I have been doing so.
To reiterate,
We live in a world that is well described by Murphy's law.
When you open your eyes you are confronted with a a priori case
against determinism.
It is up to the determinists to attempt to refute that a priori case.
> If
>all you do is write down snappy but vague soundbites that only hint at
>your position, then all I can usefully do is propose a more verbose
>version and ask you if that's what you mean. That's not the same as
>"putting words in your mouth."
Maybe if you actually provide real arguments for determinism, you
would get a discussion more to your liking.
>My best guess so far is that you think determinism is something that
>is present in a simple system, but disappears at some point when the
>system becomes too complex to predict in practice.
Then stop guessing. It should be clear, from what I have already
written in this thread, that I do not agree.
Mirai Shounen
I posted the same comments on another message on this list.
Basically what we call free will is nothing but a first person view of the
decision making capabilities that allow your brain to make decisions based
on experiences, memories and inputs.
Determinism does not interfere with free will; your ability to analyze the
past and draw conclusions based on evolved algorithms _relies_ on the
stability of math and particles.
From a third person's point of view, the "process" that constitutes your
brain is _incapable to escape the laws of physics_. But having free will
only requires analysis and decision making, NOT to escape the laws of
physics, without which the analysis would be meaningless.
From a third person point of view you could look at the "brain" process of
another being, and, if the situation wasn't too chaotic - but it is, almost
always - you could in principle trace a future life-line of the subject and
"predict" what they would do next. The fact that everything is so messy
makes this future life-line a very fuzzy one indeed; this difficulty to
"foresee" another's thought should not be thought as an added freedom in any
way.
So you could say that you are a hopeless automaton in the midst of an
influencing chaos. But this would only be true if you were a separate entity
from your brain, and your decision making was in some way constrained by the
physical processes regulating brain operations. Since you are not external
to your brain but you _ARE_ your brain - whatever this means - then you DO
have free will, you have freedom to take decisions based on your experience
and instincts.
This decision process cannot and does not need to happen externally to the
laws of physics - whether these be chaotic or deterministic or of any other
kind - but on the contrary it relies on the existence on rules that make
thought possible.
"James Hunter" <James....@Jhuapl.edu> wrote in message
news:3C7DAEBB...@Jhuapl.edu...
>
>
> Daryl McCullough wrote:
>
> > Neil says...
> > >
> > >da...@cogentex.com (Daryl McCullough) writes:
> >
> > >>I think that you and I are using different definitions
> > >>of the key words "easy" and "understand". I doubt that
> > >>the average person understands what "free will" means.
> > >
> > >The average person doesn't have any problems.
> >
> > I disagree. As I said, I don't think that the
> > average person has any idea what "free will"
> > means. The average person doesn't use the term,
> > except when he's trying to be philosophical.
>
> The average person uses it all the time, since
> wanko philosophers who "know"
> what "free will" means have to date
> come up with 1000 different "understandings" of
> the pathetic and the useless concept of
> co-existent "free will", and that which
> they are obviously recursively clueless of which
> is probability theory.
>
>
>
>