The Nuclear equation
fh...@uncmed.med.unc.edu
Since many posters have made the assertion that politics plays a large
role in the "energy equation" (especially nuclear energy), I would like to
challange the basis of some of the statements recently made in this
news group.
For example John G. De Armond writes: (In context of explaining why US
reactors are inherrently safer than Chernobyl.)
>That is the critical design difference between
>the free world's reactor designs and the Soviets'.
What about the reactors at Hanford? I thought they were graphite
moderated, housed in buildings that have less containment capabilities than
most (all?) "commercial" reactors?
(An editorial note: John, are you "free" to open a high level waste dump on
"your" land? I'm sure it would be a commercial success :-) I think Chernobyl
clearly illustrated the fact that there is only ONE world, and that the
politics, and effects of nuclear technology cross political boundries.)
Should'nt we stop differentiating and separating US Commercial US reactors
from DOE, Gov't reactors, considering that all Soviet and most other
countries' reactors are "non-commercial". Don't DOE reactors put the
populace at some risk? Don't they produce waste also? Is'nt some of the
hostility to anything "nuclear" generated by these facilities? I make the
assertion that if we want to talk about the science of nuclear energy, then
we must include all reactors, whether or not they produce electricity for the
civilian power grid. I say this because, IMO, the waste "problem" is
probably the most significant factor in the politics of utilizing nuclear
energy, and most reactors produce, in addition to energy,
military, medical and/or research products.
Another common assertion: If US Nuclear plants were not over-regulated and
picked-on, the technology would fair better economically, and possibly safety
wise too. (I, personally would feel safer if High level wastes were burried
somewhere, rather than being stored in hundreds of "on-site", above ground
locations)
Again John Writes:
>The fact of the matter is that nuclear plants are incredibly reliable
>and safe. The alledged unreliability and safety problems are media
>fabrications for the most part.
I assume you mean well run, and properly regulated (supervised) plants.
Is'nt Chernobyl a nuclear plant? IMO that plant, and many others are *not*
"safe". Does'nt nuclear technology inherrently demand a higher degree of
cautiousness, than most other energy producing technologies? (This last
question was not meant to be retorical)
Finally,
Can some one give short answers (or pointers to the info) for the following ?:
What percentage of the total (world wide if possible) low, medium, and high
(separated into those categories) level nuclear wastes are produced by:
A. Reactors whose primary purpose is to supply electricity to civilian
populations.
B. Military related Activity.
C. Medical related Activity.
D. Research related Activity
E. Other.
-Frank Hage (fh...@med.unc.edu) Dept Of Biochemistry, UNC.
My excuse is I'm young, dumb and ignorant- What's yours?
John G. De Armond
>For example John G. De Armond writes: (In context of explaining why US
>reactors are inherrently safer than Chernobyl.)
>>That is the critical design difference between
>>the free world's reactor designs and the Soviets'.
> What about the reactors at Hanford? I thought they were graphite
>moderated, housed in buildings that have less containment capabilities than
>most (all?) "commercial" reactors?
Yes they are. They are also unrelated to power production. These reactors
are designed exlusively to produce plutonium; almost all heat is directed
toward heating the Colorado river. As most people schooled in the
technology know, the DOD weapons programs and civilian nuclear power
programs are completely separate and as different as night and day.
BTW, from the little bit I've read about the core physics of the
Hanford reactors, I do believe that they are designed to be inherently
stable in spite of the graphite moderation.
>(An editorial note: John, are you "free" to open a high level waste dump on
>"your" land? I'm sure it would be a commercial success :-)
I'd be glad to. Are you going to support my efforts in that area?
>I think Chernobyl
>clearly illustrated the fact that there is only ONE world, and that the
>politics, and effects of nuclear technology cross political boundries.)
Gee, all it shows me is that a poorly designed reactor operated by
poorly trained personnel and owned by a morally bankrupt government
will on occasion, fail.
>Should'nt we stop differentiating and separating US Commercial US reactors
>from DOE, Gov't reactors, considering that all Soviet and most other
>countries' reactors are "non-commercial". Don't DOE reactors put the
>populace at some risk? Don't they produce waste also? Is'nt some of the
>hostility to anything "nuclear" generated by these facilities? I make the
>assertion that if we want to talk about the science of nuclear energy, then
>we must include all reactors, whether or not they produce electricity for the
>civilian power grid. I say this because, IMO, the waste "problem" is
>probably the most significant factor in the politics of utilizing nuclear
>energy, and most reactors produce, in addition to energy,
>military, medical and/or research products.
There are many of us in the profession who are greatly disturbed at what
has been done in the defence community regarding nuclear operations and
waste disposal. As I've stated before, from my position of limited knowledge
of what has happend, some of the deeds done by the DOE would, if done in
the civilian side, result in people going to jail. Beyond that, I'm not
really qualified to comment further, as I have not been exposed to the
facts involved in particular instances. Unlike you and others who speak
from positions of ignorance and misinformation, I feel a responsibility
both to the country and to the process of science not to present data as
fact which indeed are based upon heresay, superstition, or plain lying.
And I do not consider the popular media to be a source of scientific
data. I now know what scientists a few generations ago faced as they
battled the religion of phlogisten.
>Another common assertion: If US Nuclear plants were not over-regulated and
>picked-on, the technology would fair better economically, and possibly safety
>wise too. (I, personally would feel safer if High level wastes were burried
>somewhere, rather than being stored in hundreds of "on-site", above ground
>locations)
It is obvious to any observer that the economics of nuclear would fare
must better had the era of nuclear hysteria not occured. One only
has to look at a plant like Browns Ferry, built before the hysteria
at a cost of about $300 million (on par with equivalent fossil capacity)
and compare it to, say, Plant Vogtle, a prime victim of the madness,
at a cost of >> $9 billion <<. While some of that cost is attributable
to mismanagement, most of it is a result "shooting at a moving target",
a target kept on the move by the hysterics.
As to safety, since the safety record of nuclear power in the free world
is unblemished, one can do little to improve it. (TMI, after all,
was an economic desaster and not a nuclear one.) Which is not to say
we don't keep trying; it is simply hard to show dramatic improvements
when one is already approaching perfection.
>My excuse is I'm young, dumb and ignorant?
Hmm, I would not have been so rude, but since you insist........
:-)
John
--
John De Armond, WD4OQC | We can no more blame our loss of freedom on congress
Radiation Systems, Inc. | than we can prostitution on pimps. Both simply
Atlanta, Ga | provide broker services for their customers.
{emory,uunet}!rsiatl!jgd| - Dr. W Williams | **I am the NRA**
John G. De Armond
>Yes they are. They are also unrelated to power production. These reactors
>are designed exlusively to produce plutonium; almost all heat is directed
>toward heating the Colorado river.
^^^^^^^^
Oops, as we all know, this should have been the Columbia river. Sorry.
JOhn
Robert Kinne
> ... almost all heat [from the reactors at Hanford] is directed
>toward heating the Colorado river.
Interesting. How does the heat manage to travel from the northwest
(where Hanford is sited) to the Colorado river, which runs across
the southwest?
[Vis a vis the Chernobyl reactors]
>Hanford reactors, I do believe that they are designed to be inherently
>stable in spite of the graphite modulation.
From published reports, the Chernobyl design is fairly similar to
that of the main reactors at Hanford. The Hanford designs are dated,
and represent the best technology of an earlier era. This is the
easiest criticism of the Chernobyl design, since they were built
substantially later. But that doesn't make Hanford a safer design.
> ...Unlike you and others who speak
>from positions of ignorance and misinformation, I feel a responsibility
A statement that reflects an arrogance that is certainly unjustified
by not knowing the difference between the Columbia and Colorado Rivers.
And this is the same person who once chastised me for having the
temerity to comment on the Tellico Dam, which he claimed was 'local',
and 'none of my business.' Tsk, tsk, John. "Pluck first the mote
from thine own eye."
"Being a king isn't as easy as it looks, Peachey."
Mike Smith
>As to safety, since the safety record of nuclear power in the free world
>is unblemished, one can do little to improve it. (TMI, after all,
>was an economic desaster and not a nuclear one.) Which is not to say
>we don't keep trying; it is simply hard to show dramatic improvements
>when one is already approaching perfection.
I, for one, will consider TMI to be a non-event in terms of nuclear
safety only after it's dead carcass is safetly taken apart and put
in a certified long term waste disposal site. Till then the jury
is still out on TMI.
Ask Silkwood how perfect nuclear safety has been ...
--
E. Michael Smith e...@apple.COM
'Whatever you can do, or dream you can, begin it. Boldness has
genius, power and magic in it.' - Goethe
I am not responsible nor is anyone else. Everything is disclaimed.
Mike Van Pelt
>Ask Silkwood how perfect nuclear safety has been ...
Yeah, really tragic case. Bad Vibes emitted by Evil Nuclear Stuff at
the Kerr-McGee plant reached out and shoved her car off the road.
Yeah, right.
Everything I've heard about the Silkwood case boils down to:
1) Wacked-out actions of a seriously disturbed individual (Silkwood),
2) Labor union power games, and
3) Bizarroid conspiracy theories.
Getting back to the "sci" part of this group's charter, would you mind
explaining how it is possible for plutonium oxide to be excreted in an
allegedly contaminated person's urine? (Hint: Solubility of plutonium
oxide can be found in the CRC handbook.) The plutonium oxide in the
urine sample obviously didn't come from anyone's kidneys.
--
"A people who expect to be ignorant Mike Van Pelt
and free expect what never will, Headland Technology
and never can, be." (was: Video Seven)
-- Thomas Jefferson ...ames!vsi1!v7fs1!mvp
John G. De Armond
>In article <20...@rsiatl.UUCP> j...@rsiatl.UUCP (John G. De Armond) writes:
>> ... almost all heat [from the reactors at Hanford] is directed
>>toward heating the Colorado river.
>Interesting. How does the heat manage to travel from the northwest
>(where Hanford is sited) to the Colorado river, which runs across
>the southwest?
Touche'. Of course, you'll notice that I corrected myself in a
subsequent post. Make you feel better? Hope so. It's a lot of
bother to let you get one right occasionally.
>>Hanford reactors, I do believe that they are designed to be inherently
>>stable in spite of the graphite modulation.
>From published reports, the Chernobyl design is fairly similar to
>that of the main reactors at Hanford. The Hanford designs are dated,
>and represent the best technology of an earlier era. This is the
>easiest criticism of the Chernobyl design, since they were built
>substantially later. But that doesn't make Hanford a safer design.
Similiar in that they both use uranium fuel and graphite moderation?
Ok, I'll give you that. From what I know about the core physics of
the Hanford reactors (admittedly skimpier than I'd like), the Hanford
cores are designed to exhibit a negative coeffecient of reactivity
and depends a bit more on the water that is in the core for moderation.
I also understand that the control rods represent a much larger chunk
of negative reactivity than did chernobyl. This information is
gleaned from several conversations I had with a collegue who worked
on the original design team of one of the latter reactors at Hanford
back right after the accident. (Yes, he's a certified, card-carrying
grey-beard :-) I suppose that if it's really that important to anyone,
I could try to locate this fellow and learn more.
The other major design feature at Hanford that makes the reactors exceedingly
safe is that there is no high pressure steam involved normally. Seems
like I remember one reactor being modified for low pressure steam production
but I'm not sure if that's still going or not. In any event, the cooling
water is normally at essentially ambient pressure plus pumping loss.
That makes steam explosions a bit harder to come by.
I guess this little exchange is illustrative of what is wrong with
the nuclear biz today. There are grevious problems at hanford. Problems
that should land people in jail. Example: The now (supposedly) stopped
practice of pumping high level transuranic wastes down deep wells into
the aquifer(sp). The problem is that the issues get clouded by ill-informed
loudmouths who shout "A chernobyl on our shores" which diverts attention
away from the real problems as well as occupying the time of people who
have much more constructive things to do. I wonder how many thousand
man-hours and million dollars have been spent proving yet again that
{Hanford,Savanna River} is safe to operate? I wonder how much progress
could have been made toward fixing the real problems had this energy and
resources not been diverted to such trivialities. Perhaps you (and many
others) should think about that for a bit.
PS: the difference between your Tellico River fubar and my Columbia
river slipup is that a) you didn't have a clue as to what you spoke, and
b) you WERE meddling in local affairs. At least I realized my mistake
and corrected it. Will you do the same?
John G. De Armond
>In article <20...@rsiatl.UUCP> j...@rsiatl.UUCP (John G. De Armond) writes:
>I, for one, will consider TMI to be a non-event in terms of nuclear
>safety only after it's dead carcass is safetly taken apart and put
>in a certified long term waste disposal site. Till then the jury
>is still out on TMI.
Actually, the TMI event will be concluded when a new core is installed
and the reactor put back into service, as is the long range plan.
>Ask Silkwood how perfect nuclear safety has been ...
Funny you'd mention that, not that it has anything to do with nuclear
power. I have a friend and collegue, Dr. Louis Rancitelli, now Director
of the Nuclear Labs at the Battelle Memorial Institute in Columbus, OH.
Lou was the head of the independent investigative team that looked into
the circumstances of Silkwood. (Other achievements include heading up
the team of scientists that conducted the chemical evaluations of the Apollo
moon rocks.) There were a few small details that came out in their report
that somehow managed to miss the media and missed being included in the
propaganda movie about her. Let's look at a few facts uncovered in that
investigation:
First, the radioassay of body tissue done at autopsy showed some interesting
patterns. There was a high concentration of refined Pu particles on the
surfaces of the upper bronchial (sp) tubes in her lungs. There was almost
no concentration of any radioactive material in the deep recesses of her
lungs. Secondly, there was very high concentrations of Pu dust in her
bathroom and bedroom but almost none anywhere else in her house and none
in her car or in her locker at work. In case it has not dawned on you yet,
this is almost irrefutable evidence of intentional, acute, self-contamination
administered immediately before she died.
The particle sizes found in her bronchial tubes would be rapidly eliminated
in normal lung discharge, normally in a few days. The damaging particles,
those in the few-to-sub-micron size ranges, which penetrate deep and become
lodged, were non-existent. Additionally, little contamination was found
in her digestive tract, a normal endpoint for excreted lung contamination.
The isotopic mix and particle sizes of the contamination indicate that
the source was refined sinter feed. In other words, she probably stole
a small sample of Pu from the production area and self-contaminated herself.
This would be consistent with her behavior as a union activist and
troublemaker.
The other finding of significance is that the autopsy found a mixture of
booze and barbituates in her blood and stomach that if extrapolated
to full absorption, would have likely been fatal. Of course, it made
much better press to say that she was run off the road and died under
mysterious conditions but the fact is, she simply stoned herself and
passed out at the wheel.
Anyone who is interested in the report should contact the Battelle
Institute and obtain a copy. Sorry I don't have a number; my
nuclear papers are for the most part, in storage.
Though this is a pretty grevious fabrication on the part of the anti-nukes
and the media, it is by no means unusual. For another example, one
should contact the public relations department of Illinois Power and
ask for the "60 minutes" rebuttal tape. They will loan a copy to most
anyone interested.
In this incident, "60 minutes" came to IP obstensibly to film
a segment on construction delays at one of their facilities. They
spent quite some time filming the utility president and the plant manager.
Illinois Power cooperated with CBS but because they had a well-founded
distrust of the media, they tagged a camera team of their own along to
film over the shoulders of the "60 minutes" crew. As it turned out,
"60 minutes" was there to film material for a rabidly anti-nuclear
segment. That's OK, or at least somewhat ethical if that is as far as
they go.
The really disgusting part is that they edited the statements of the
president and plant manager, even to the point of inserting or deleting
the word "not" in order to make them appear to say the opposite of
what was really said. They also fabricated conversations by splicing
together sentences from several conversations taken in different contexts.
And they mixed one question with another answer.
IP was so outraged that they produced a video which showed in split screen
format, what was really filmed over the shoulder of the CBS crew, complete
with continous timecode, and on the other side, what "60 minutes" produced.
IP's intent was to buy commercial time on the networks to present their
case. None of the networks would sell them time so they've resorted to
distributing the video through word-of-mouth. Anyone truely interested
in the facts of this debate, especially as relates to the media, should
obtain a copy of this video, study it, and show it to as many people
as possible.
John
Oh, almost forgot...
((Poof!)) :-)
Mike Smith
Ah, such a big strike from such a small piece of bait ... reminds me of
this trout stream in the Sierras where ...
In article <21...@rsiatl.UUCP> j...@rsiatl.UUCP (John G. De Armond) writes:
>e...@Apple.COM (Mike Smith) writes:
>>Ask Silkwood how perfect nuclear safety has been ...
>Funny you'd mention that, not that it has anything to do with nuclear
>power.
No, of course not, plutonium just falls from the sky, absolutely nothing
to do with nuclear power ... silly me.
>I have a friend and collegue, Dr. Louis Rancitelli, now Director
[resume of Dr. Rancitelli deleted]
>There were a few small details that came out in their report
>that somehow managed to miss the media and missed being included in the
>propaganda movie about her.
I haven't seen the movie, so I can't comment on the veracity of it.
(Don't like Cher and not too fond of the rest of the cast ... )
>Let's look at a few facts uncovered in that investigation:
>First, the radioassay of body tissue done at autopsy showed some interesting
>patterns. There was a high concentration of refined Pu particles on the
>surfaces of the upper bronchial (sp) tubes in her lungs. There was almost
>no concentration of any radioactive material in the deep recesses of her
>lungs. Secondly, there was very high concentrations of Pu dust in her
>bathroom and bedroom but almost none anywhere else in her house and none
>in her car or in her locker at work.
Ah facts. Wonderful. What is the fact that _I_ most care about?
There is no doubt that somehow Pu was removed from where it was
supposed to be and put in a private home and person. I don't care
what the motivations were or who did it. It was done. This is
clear evidence that the stuff wasn't being guarded very well.
>In case it has not dawned on you yet,
>this is almost irrefutable evidence of intentional, acute, self-contamination
>administered immediately before she died.
Um, excuse me, but I think this is a conclusion, not a fact. It could
also have been forced on her by someone else. I don't think it was,
but it is a plausable alternative theory. (Just as the self
administration scenario is a theory, not a fact.)
>The particle sizes found in her bronchial tubes would be rapidly eliminated
>in normal lung discharge, normally in a few days. The damaging particles,
>those in the few-to-sub-micron size ranges, which penetrate deep and become
>lodged, were non-existent. Additionally, little contamination was found
>in her digestive tract, a normal endpoint for excreted lung contamination.
>The isotopic mix and particle sizes of the contamination indicate that
>the source was refined sinter feed.
More nice facts. Yup, the stuff sure does look like it was taken
from a nice secure nothing to worry about nuclear industry plant
right under the noses of whoever was supposed to be guarding the place.
Not something to raise my level of comfort with their security/safety.
>In other words, she probably stole
>a small sample of Pu from the production area and self-contaminated herself.
>This would be consistent with her behavior as a union activist and
>troublemaker.
More theory and conclusion; not fact. There are other theories, but
the theories don't matter. The fact is that Pu left a plant and
no one caught it. Not safe. Even if it is an 'inside job' by a
crazed maniac (even worse, really, why was she hired then? Shoddy
personelle practices?)
>The other finding of significance is that the autopsy found a mixture of
>booze and barbituates in her blood and stomach that if extrapolated
>to full absorption, would have likely been fatal.
But how did it get there? That isn't known. (One presumes it was
self administered, but that isn't a fact, it is a conclusion.) And
why was it there? Did she know she had been contaminated and chose
suicide? That's another theory, but we don't know the facts.
>Of course, it made
>much better press to say that she was run off the road and died under
>mysterious conditions but the fact is, she simply stoned herself and
>passed out at the wheel.
No, not a fact; a theory and conclusion. It may be a well founded
theory, but it isn't a fact. The fact is that she left the road.
Why is not known, but theories abound.
>John
>
>Oh, almost forgot...
>((Poof!)) :-)
Oh, almost forgot...
(!poof) (ask a Unix programmer what a leading ! means ...)
The Pu got out of the plant. Someone failed. Not safe.
Richard A Hammond
>The Pu got out of the plant. Someone failed. Not safe.
This in reference to the Silkwood case.
May I suggest that John went for the wrong issue. He focused
on facts when they aren't the problem in the nuclear debate.
The problem is one of double standards.
Mike suggests that he won't tolerate (I hope I summarize his
implied position properly) a nuclear power system which has
any problems, i.e. is not 100% safe.
This is an impossible standard, one that we don't hold solar,
wind or anything else to.
I doubt if the people would be out in the same force against
wind energy if a worker on a wind turbine fell off the tower
and was killed.
Or, against solar if it was discovered that there was a rise
in birth defects in an area near where solar cells were being
manufactured.
And yet, those people are just as injured (or dead) as they
would be if they were killed/injured by radioactive materials.
I don't know what to do about it. It certainly makes me angry
every time I read about coal miners dying or oil well workers
killed, or people killed by the explosion of the propane pipeline
down the road and yet nobody calls for the shutdown of
the oil industry or coal industry for "safety" problems.
Cheers,
Rich Hammond
John G. De Armond
>The Pu got out of the plant. Someone failed. Not safe.
Interesting logic. I've never really heard any safeguards expert discuss
the safeguards concerns regarding someone using Pu to commit (delayed)
suicide. I'm not sure that the scenario of a Karen Silkwood being wrapped
in high explosive and made into an implosion bomb is credible. In other
words, smuggling via body cavity transport (the most likely transport mechanism)
is not considered a serious safeguards threat - except, of course, here
in the netherland of Usenet. Perhaps we should. I can envision a couple
of detection schemes but they involve irradiating humans with low level
neutrons - and the greenies wouldn't like that. Upon further thought,
perhaps we should put this "problem" in perspective. Perhaps the goal
of nuclear safety would be better served by not engaging in such demagoguery.
We do agree on one point, though. Hiring Karen Silkwood was a mistake.
Even worse was K-M's not firing her after determining that she
was a troublemaker. I guess that in the context of nuclear risk
sterility, managers cannot be allowed to have compassion.
To pull this back to the original thread, you might also want to
justify you original statement that the "silkwood incident" was an
example of the {evil,danger} of the nuclear power industry. I missed
that in your last rebuttal.
John
Mike Smith
>In article <81...@goofy.Apple.COM> e...@Apple.COM (Mike Smith) writes:
>>The Pu got out of the plant. Someone failed. Not safe.
>This in reference to the Silkwood case.
>May I suggest that John went for the wrong issue. He focused
>on facts when they aren't the problem in the nuclear debate.
>The problem is one of double standards.
Yes, he went for the facts; which was exactly what I was expecting,
and liberaly laced them with theory and conclusion, which was what
I was hoping for. He should have dodged the Silkwood details and
gone for a 'reasonable safety' standard of performance.
>Mike suggests that he won't tolerate (I hope I summarize his
>implied position properly) a nuclear power system which has
>any problems, i.e. is not 100% safe.
Not quite. I'm very willing to tolerate a less than 100% safe
nuclear industry; but my standards were not the issue.
John G. De Armond wrote:
>>As to safety, since the safety record of nuclear power in the free world
>>is unblemished, one can do little to improve it. (TMI, after all,
>>was an economic desaster and not a nuclear one.) Which is not to say
>>we don't keep trying; it is simply hard to show dramatic improvements
>>when one is already approaching perfection.
This strongly implies that he believes the nuclear industry is
'approaching perfection' and has a completely 'unblemished' record.
It is hard to reconcile this with a nuclear core meltdown in the
same breath, yet John chose to take that difficult position.
I simply chose to point out that perfection is a difficult standard
to be held to... Yes, I did indulge in a bit of baiting tactics and
my motives were largely driven by the galling arrogance of John's
posting style. (for example, the following:
>>Unlike you and others who speak
>>from positions of ignorance and misinformation, I feel a responsibility
>>both to the country and to the process of science not to present data as
>>fact which indeed are based upon heresay, superstition, or plain lying.
this is hardly the posting style of someone who is working to be
reasonable and understanding of all sides.)
For my tactics and motivation I beg forgiveness, it was wrong of me to
succumb to the desire to trip him up. I'll try to be better.
I will try to avoid slipping into the debating game and will work to
keep my posting oriented more toward the issues and less toward the process.
It was also wrong of John to state that the record was unblemished
when it has at least one blemish on it. (I, for one, consider the
theft of Pu to be a blemish). And while he did put a disclaimer
of 'approaching' on his statement of perfection; the context, to
me, read with the emotional zeal of a True Believer. It is hard
to resist taking pot shots at someone who claims perfection (or
near perfection) in anything that involves people. I saw a chance
to set him up for a cheap shot and took it. I shouldn't have.
It's not nice.
>This is an impossible standard, one that we don't hold solar,
>wind or anything else to.
And that I don't hold nuclear to (though some folks do) but that John
seemed to think nuclear could meet...
We should use the same standards for all industries and both sides
should avoid extremist positions, but I fear that human nature doesn't
lend itself well to that behaviour.
Richard A Hammond
energy is unsafe. Correct me if I'm wrong, but wasn't the plant
Silkwood worked at a weapons related plant? Did it have anything
at all to do with commercial nuclear power?
In other words, having failed to find something to seriously
assault in commercial systems, Mike has to go drag in an
unrelated (except by the key word nuclear) problem.
Being upset at John's manner of presenting himself is OK, but if
this is the best counter-example, I'd give the debating points
to John ;-).
Rich Hammond
John G. De Armond
>Not quite. I'm very willing to tolerate a less than 100% safe
>nuclear industry; but my standards were not the issue.
>John G. De Armond wrote:
>>>As to safety, since the safety record of nuclear power in the free world
>>>is unblemished, one can do little to improve it. (TMI, after all,
>>>was an economic desaster and not a nuclear one.) Which is not to say
>>>we don't keep trying; it is simply hard to show dramatic improvements
>>>when one is already approaching perfection.
>This strongly implies that he believes the nuclear industry is
>'approaching perfection' and has a completely 'unblemished' record.
>It is hard to reconcile this with a nuclear core meltdown in the
>same breath, yet John chose to take that difficult position.
If I may intrude again, let's attempt to understand the difference between
operational success and nuclear safety. TMI was an operational disaster.
It was an economic disaster. It was above and beyond all else, a political
disaster. But it was a stunning tribute to the inherent nuclear
saftey built into the design of the plant. The accident proved that
the design is sufficiently conservative to be considered inherently
safe. At no point during the accident was any civilians at risk from
other than government and media generated emotional trauma. At no
point in the accident was any person outside the plant boundary exposed
to more than the regulatory limit for radiation, at the time 5 mr/year.
At no point during the accident was any radiation worker exposed to
more than the administrative limit for radiation exposure - a limit
considerably lower than the legal limit. Additionally, no civilian
OR radiation worker has ever been injured or overexposed to radiation
in connection with power generation. In my book, I rates as
perfection.
Even in terms of operational problems, the TMI event is lost in the
noise compared to the several thousand reactor-years of safe operation
throughout the industry. By any metric other than emotional, even
this record fits the definition of "approaching perfection." Nothing
else in our lives, not even sleeping, can make claim to such a degree
of safety.
>>>Unlike you and others who speak
>>>from positions of ignorance and misinformation, I feel a responsibility
>>>both to the country and to the process of science not to present data as
>>>fact which indeed are based upon heresay, superstition, or plain lying.
Gee, most scientists and engineers I know consider this position to be
a statement of ethical and professional responsibility and surely not
arrogance.
BTW, if you think my style is harsh, you should present a paper for
peer review sometime. I'm a saint compared to that environment.
Paul Hager
]In article <20...@rsiatl.UUCP> j...@rsiatl.UUCP (John G. De Armond) writes:
]]As to safety, since the safety record of nuclear power in the free world
]]is unblemished, one can do little to improve it. (TMI, after all,
]]was an economic desaster and not a nuclear one.) Which is not to say
]]we don't keep trying; it is simply hard to show dramatic improvements
]]when one is already approaching perfection.
]I, for one, will consider TMI to be a non-event in terms of nuclear
]safety only after it's dead carcass is safetly taken apart and put
]in a certified long term waste disposal site. Till then the jury
]is still out on TMI.
If I may inject myself into what seems to be heading toward a
flame war, it is not quite correct to say that nuclear power in
the free world has an unblemished safety record unless qualified
by saying "commercial" nuclear power and "non-nuclear" accidents.
Somewhere I have a list of US reactor accidents that have resulted
in fatalities including the military test reactor (can't remember
the name but will look it up on request) that experienced a major
reactivity insertion followed by a steam explosion that killed 3 (??)
people.
--
paul hager hag...@iuvax.cs.indiana.edu
*** Combat global warming -- build nuclear power plants ***
John Moore
]
]The Pu got out of the plant. Someone failed. Not safe.
]
Sigh...
I can go to the store and purchase Cyanide and then sprinkle it around.
Not safe.
Automobiles crash. Not safe.
Coal fired boilers can explode. Not safe.
Karen Silkwood, a worker at
the plant, apparently was able to remove a very small amount
of a potent toxin (Pu). To go from this to the argument that
nuclear power is NOT SAFE is ridiculous.
*FLAME ON*
LIFE is "NOT SAFE". So &&$% what?
*FLAME OFF*
--
John Moore HAM:NJ7E/CAP:T-Bird 381 {asuvax,mcdphx}!anasaz!john jo...@anasaz.UUCP
Voice: (602) 951-9326 (day or eve) FAX:602-861-7642 Advice: Long palladium,
USnail: 7525 Clearwater Pkwy, Scottsdale, AZ 85253 ......: Short petroleum
Opinion: Support ALL of the bill of rights, INCLUDING the 2nd amendment!
David Chase
> ... it is not quite correct to say that nuclear power in
>the free world has an unblemished safety record unless qualified
>by saying "commercial" nuclear power and "non-nuclear" accidents.
True, but it appears that military organizations are generally not
what I'd call "safety-first" outfits. We don't judge commercial
aviation by the safety record of military aviation, do we? The
classification of accidents seems to be somewhat subject to the whims
of the classifier -- the *worst* industrial accidents in this country
have been non-nuclear, but that could just be because of the relative
sizes of the two industries.
Those interested in a detailed discussion of various accidents might
check out _Normal Accidents_ by Charles Perrow; I believe it's back in
print. I think his bias is somewhat anti-nuclear, but he argues it
well. (He also doesn't say very nice things about shipping, either.)
David
Mike Smith
>In article <81...@goofy.Apple.COM> e...@Apple.COM (Mike Smith) writes:
>]
>]The Pu got out of the plant. Someone failed. Not safe.
>]
>Sigh...
>Karen Silkwood, a worker at
>the plant, apparently was able to remove a very small amount
>of a potent toxin (Pu). To go from this to the argument that
>nuclear power is NOT SAFE is ridiculous.
>*FLAME ON*
>LIFE is "NOT SAFE". So &&$% what?
>*FLAME OFF*
I don't expect nuclear power to be any safer than any other commonly
accepted risks. That is MY standard. Other folks have other standards.
John G. De Armond felt that nuclear was unblemished and near perfect.
That was his standard. Absolute safety is very hard to achieve.
However the Pu got out of the plant, it was placed where it was a
hazard to at least one person. This is not absolute safety. I find
it acceptable safety, but feel that it did not constitute an unblemished
record (the standard set by JGDA). You may flame if you wish, so what.
John G. De Armond
>I don't expect nuclear power to be any safer than any other commonly
^^^^^
>accepted risks. That is MY standard. Other folks have other standards.
>John G. De Armond felt that nuclear was unblemished and near perfect.
>That was his standard. Absolute safety is very hard to achieve.
>However the Pu got out of the plant, it was placed where it was a
>hazard to at least one person. This is not absolute safety. I find
>it acceptable safety, but feel that it did not constitute an unblemished
>record (the standard set by JGDA). You may flame if you wish, so what.
So Mike, please tell us, what does a Plutonium refining plant have to
do with nuclear power? I think some of us less informed indivuduals
missed that connection, having been led to believe by the evil assault
media that plutonium was used only for weapons and not for power reactors.
Inquiring minds want to know.
BTW, I really like your choice of words. "Pu got out of the plant"
and "was placed where it was a hazard..". You think those little critters
just grew legs and hiked out?
Mike Smith
>e...@Apple.COM (Mike Smith) writes:
>
>>I don't expect nuclear power to be any safer than any other commonly
> ^^^^^
>>accepted risks. That is MY standard. Other folks have other standards.
>>John G. De Armond felt that nuclear was unblemished and near perfect.
>>That was his standard. Absolute safety is very hard to achieve.
>>However the Pu got out of the plant, it was placed where it was a
>>hazard to at least one person. This is not absolute safety. I find
>>it acceptable safety, but feel that it did not constitute an unblemished
>>record (the standard set by JGDA). You may flame if you wish, so what.
>So Mike, please tell us, what does a Plutonium refining plant have to
>do with nuclear power? I think some of us less informed indivuduals
>missed that connection, having been led to believe by the evil assault
>media that plutonium was used only for weapons and not for power reactors.
>Inquiring minds want to know.
Take a look at "The Curve of Binding Energy" for the connection.
As you are no doubt well aware, Pu is formed in power reactor cores
as well as in reactors designed to make Pu for bombs. Reprocessing
plants are designed to recover both the unused Uranium and the Pu
isotopes. Some isotopes are easier to make bombs from than others.
The Pu less suited to bomb making will, eventually, be used for
power generation.
The plant that the Pu got out of was a private facility and part of
the nuclear industry (assuming is came from Silkwoods place of
employment). If they cannot keep bomb material safe, and cannot
hire stable people to handle it; how safe can they be with reactor
fuel which is much less sensitive? The division between power and
bomb facilities is decreasing over time. I expect that we are already
at a point where it is hard to draw good lines between them. There
is one nuclear industry, and it is not perfectly safe. It has
blemishes. Safe enough? Probably, but more would be better.
>BTW, I really like your choice of words. "Pu got out of the plant"
>and "was placed where it was a hazard..". You think those little critters
>just grew legs and hiked out?
Nope. 'I got eggs for breakfast' doesn't imply that they walked onto
my plate... someone put them there. 'Pu got out' is similarly neutral
as to what person 'placed' it 'where it was a hazard'.
Curt Lindner
>>
>
>Take a look at "The Curve of Binding Energy" for the connection.
>As you are no doubt well aware, Pu is formed in power reactor cores
>as well as in reactors designed to make Pu for bombs. Reprocessing
>plants are designed to recover both the unused Uranium and the Pu
>isotopes. Some isotopes are easier to make bombs from than others.
>The Pu less suited to bomb making will, eventually, be used for
>power generation.
>
As those of us in the biz are also aware, none of the commercial reactors
in this country use reprocessed fuel, nor will they in the anywhere near
future. The only reprocessing going on in this country is for the
defense and Navy Nuke programs, and even that is almost nil.
It is extremely cheaper to mine fresh Uranium that to reprocess old
spent fuel. Also, the fuel in use in commercial reactors today
is used for a longer period of time than it was in the beginning.
The spent fuel being removed from reactors today only contains about
1 to 1.5 percent U-235, the fissile isotope, compared to the 3.5 to
5 percent it began with.
>The plant that the Pu got out of was a private facility and part of
>the nuclear industry (assuming is came from Silkwoods place of
>employment). If they cannot keep bomb material safe, and cannot
>hire stable people to handle it; how safe can they be with reactor
>fuel which is much less sensitive? The division between power and
>bomb facilities is decreasing over time. I expect that we are already
>at a point where it is hard to draw good lines between them. There
>is one nuclear industry, and it is not perfectly safe. It has
>blemishes. Safe enough? Probably, but more would be better.
>
Be assured that there is more than one nuclear industry. The defense
plants are regulated (sic) by the DOE, the commercial industry by
the NRC, the two have no interaction with one another.
If you don't think the plutonium from/in spent fuel is safe, why don't
you go try to get your hands on a fuel assembly. You'd be dead before
you got within 6 feet of it.
>
>Nope. 'I got eggs for breakfast' doesn't imply that they walked onto
>my plate... someone put them there. 'Pu got out' is similarly neutral
>as to what person 'placed' it 'where it was a hazard'.
>--
BTW, eggs have been shown to cause high cholesterol levels which lead
to heart disease and DEATH. I'd think twice before eating them
again.
>
>E. Michael Smith e...@apple.COM
>
John G. De Armond
>>So Mike, please tell us, what does a Plutonium refining plant have to
>>do with nuclear power? I think some of us less informed indivuduals
>>missed that connection, having been led to believe by the evil assault
>>media that plutonium was used only for weapons and not for power reactors.
>>Inquiring minds want to know.
>Take a look at "The Curve of Binding Energy" for the connection.
>As you are no doubt well aware, Pu is formed in power reactor cores
>as well as in reactors designed to make Pu for bombs.
Yes, and almonds contain cyanide - just like the gas chamber. So?
Nice try at a diversion but if I may play Ted Koppel for a moment and
redirect your attention back to the question at hand, again I ask,
What does the diversion of weapons-grade Pu from a bomb plant have to
do with nuclear power? Direct answers appreciated.
>Reprocessing
>plants are designed to recover both the unused Uranium and the Pu
>isotopes. Some isotopes are easier to make bombs from than others.
>The Pu less suited to bomb making will, eventually, be used for
>power generation.
Total fiction. The civilian and weapons programs are vertically segregated
from top to bottom. Most of this segregation is artificial and is directed
at just such political inanities. It is logical and reasonable that
both programs could share resources and facilities but they are kept
totally and utterly separate solely for political reasons.
To the scientific issue, you and I both know - in your case, because it
has been explained to you in this forum - that the mixed Pu isotopes in
a reactor core are totally unsuited for bomb use. You should further
know that it is not necessary to separate the isotopes of Pu, U, and Th
during reprocessing. Indeed, separation could never be economically
justified. Thermal reactors will run just fine on mixed isotope fuel.
In the case of reprocessing for power reactors, it is not even necessary
to remove the low cross section fission products. These fission
products would have an added benefit from a diversion aspect of making
the reprocessed fuel too hot to handle without remote equipment.
>The plant that the Pu got out of was a private facility and part of
>the nuclear industry (assuming is came from Silkwoods place of
>employment).
Actually, K-M operates that plant for the DOE. The facilities and the
inventory belong to the government.
>If they cannot keep bomb material safe, and cannot
>hire stable people to handle it; how safe can they be with reactor
>fuel which is much less sensitive?
Not that it makes much difference but if KS had been a civilian nuclear
employee, the annual psych test we all must pass in order to gain
unescourted access to safety-related facilities would most likely
have screened her out. Yet another difference between the military
and civilian programs - though DOE is finally starting to do the
same kind of personnel screening.
>The division between power and
>bomb facilities is decreasing over time. I expect that we are already
>at a point where it is hard to draw good lines between them.
As usual, you are incorrect. What similiarities exist generally have
had to do with DOE adopting the more stringent practices and procedures
of the civilian side.
You know, Mike, it would save us both a lot of time any you some
embarrisment if you would do just a bit of research before posting -
and, of course, decline from posting about things for which you have
no knowledge. 10CFR20 is an excellent place to start reading.
Mike Smith
>e...@Apple.COM (Mike Smith) writes:
>>Reprocessing
>>plants are designed to recover both the unused Uranium and the Pu
>>isotopes. Some isotopes are easier to make bombs from than others.
>>The Pu less suited to bomb making will, eventually, be used for
>>power generation.
I can see where it would be possible to interpret my prior statment as
meaning 'separate the isotopes and only use the Pu240 as reactor fuel'.
That is not what was meant. I was stating that the Uranium and Pu are
recovered from spent fuel in a reprocessing plant and the Pu will be
used, eventually, to make more power (since it's isotopic mix is less
suited to bomb making). This is not a statement that Pu for bombs is
recovered from commercial reactor fuel at reprocessing plants. The
'Pu less suited' refers to the isotopic mix, not to a single isotope.
Please forgive the lack of clarity. Perhaps I should have said
"This Pu, being less suited to bomb making due to it's isotopic mix,"...
>Total fiction. The civilian and weapons programs are vertically segregated
>from top to bottom. Most of this segregation is artificial and is directed
^^^^^^^^^^
[...]
Which is my point. The technologies and people freely travel
between the two sectors of the nuclear industry. Or are you
saying that there is no exchange of personnel and knowledge,
no company in both the military and private nuclear sectors?
(Or, as you put it, 'programs')
>To the scientific issue, you and I both know - in your case, because it
>has been explained to you in this forum - that the mixed Pu isotopes in
>a reactor core are totally unsuited for bomb use.
You are making assumptions about my information sources that are not
warranted. I knew that it was difficult (and reputed to be impossible)
to make a bomb from power reactor fuel derived Pu long before I heard
of netnews. The information showing that it is possible comes from
someone who made bombs for a living. Yes, it is a lousy bomb; but
it can be done (per Dr. Taylor). I don't put any particular emphasis
on this issue. It is an interesting sidelight on things but has no
practical implications that I can see. As has already been pointed out:
Why make a bomb when chemicals are so easy?
I was rather surprised to discover that it could be done and thought
it was an interesting statement from the book, that is all.
>You should further
>know that it is not necessary to separate the isotopes of Pu, U, and Th
>during reprocessing.
And, indeed I do! In "The Curve of Binding Energy" they describe
reprocessing as separating the U from the Pu; but not the isotopes.
Isotopic separation for most elements is hard.
[discussion of reactors and isotopes deleted, since it is based on a
misunderstanding]
>>If they cannot keep bomb material safe, and cannot
>>hire stable people to handle it; how safe can they be with reactor
>>fuel which is much less sensitive?
>Not that it makes much difference but if KS had been a civilian nuclear
>employee, the annual psych test we all must pass in order to gain
>unescourted access to safety-related facilities would most likely
>have screened her out. Yet another difference between the military
>and civilian programs - though DOE is finally starting to do the
>same kind of personnel screening.
i.e. becoming more like the other {sector,industry,program}.
Also, I think you meant that: [if K.Silkwood had been an employee in
the civilian nuclear {sector,industry} ...] since, as I understand it,
she was in fact a 'civilian nuclear employee'. (Of a private company doing
work under military contract in the military {sector,industry}.)
>As usual, you are incorrect.
I'm being nice these days, perhaps you could too? Name calling isn't
productive. Or are you still sore about the aluminum foil...
(Still no corrosion)
>You know, Mike, it would save us both a lot of time any you some
>embarrisment if you would do just a bit of research before posting -
^^
>and, of course, decline from posting about things for which you have
>no knowledge.
I feel no embarrassment, and so there is none to save. We have evident
differences of opinion about what constitutes an industry vs. a sector
of an industry, you dissagree with Dr. Taylor on bomb design potential,
and there was a misunderstanding of what I stated about reprocessing;
that is all.
What constitutes an industry in not easy to define and is not a natural
law so I suspect that we will continue ot have a difference of opinion.
If you wish to dispute Dr. Taylor, please post your source and where it
is available; I will gladly read it. Im a non-partisan in the issue
of bombs from reactor fuel, but would be interested knowing of any
changes from the mid 1970's that might have obsoleted Dr. Taylors
position. It's an interesting nuclear trivia question; but probably
has little to do with energy or society.
Per misunderstandings, they happen but can be clarified.
Curt Lindner
>>>Reprocessing
>>>plants are designed to recover both the unused Uranium and the Pu
>>>isotopes. Some isotopes are easier to make bombs from than others.
>>>The Pu less suited to bomb making will, eventually, be used for
>>>power generation.
>
>I can see where it would be possible to interpret my prior statment as
>meaning 'separate the isotopes and only use the Pu240 as reactor fuel'.
>That is not what was meant. I was stating that the Uranium and Pu are
>recovered from spent fuel in a reprocessing plant and the Pu will be
>used, eventually, to make more power (since it's isotopic mix is less
>suited to bomb making). This is not a statement that Pu for bombs is
>recovered from commercial reactor fuel at reprocessing plants. The
>'Pu less suited' refers to the isotopic mix, not to a single isotope.
>Please forgive the lack of clarity. Perhaps I should have said
>"This Pu, being less suited to bomb making due to it's isotopic mix,"...
>
Mike, listen to me this time. Plutonium is NOT used in commercial
power reactors. I said this just a post or two ago. Commercial
reactors do not use recycled fuel in ANY form. It's much more
expensive to recycle fuel than to mine and enrich fresh uranium.
Got it???
>
>You are making assumptions about my information sources that are not
>warranted. I knew that it was difficult (and reputed to be impossible)
>to make a bomb from power reactor fuel derived Pu long before I heard
>of netnews. The information showing that it is possible comes from
>someone who made bombs for a living. Yes, it is a lousy bomb; but
>it can be done (per Dr. Taylor). I don't put any particular emphasis
>on this issue. It is an interesting sidelight on things but has no
>practical implications that I can see. As has already been pointed out:
>Why make a bomb when chemicals are so easy?
>
You first have to obtain the materials in question. Lets see you or
ANYONE force there way into a plant with a 20 ton shielded fuel cask,
lower it into the storage pool, load the fuel into the cask, close the
cask, put it on a flatbed trailer, drive to the nearest reprocessing plant
then go through the hundreds of steps necessary to reprocess the fuel,
then make the bomb.
You make it sound as if anyone who knows the workings of an atomic bomb
could go out and build one! That is by far the easiest part of the process
as I have outlined above. No army in the civilized world could make it
throught all the steps without being stopped. Just because the bomb
COULD be made dosen't mean there is any likelyhood that anyone can
obtain the material in the first place.
>
>>You should further
>>know that it is not necessary to separate the isotopes of Pu, U, and Th
>>during reprocessing.
>
>And, indeed I do! In "The Curve of Binding Energy" they describe
>reprocessing as separating the U from the Pu; but not the isotopes.
>Isotopic separation for most elements is hard.
>
No harder than seperating U from Pu, as the seperation process is based
on the difference in atomic weights.
>
>>>If they cannot keep bomb material safe, and cannot
>>>hire stable people to handle it; how safe can they be with reactor
>>>fuel which is much less sensitive?
>
When was any bomb material stolen, it seems I saw a reference to this,
but I don't remember what it is. Its not commercial though, must be
government.
>>Not that it makes much difference but if KS had been a civilian nuclear
>>employee, the annual psych test we all must pass in order to gain
>>unescourted access to safety-related facilities would most likely
>>have screened her out. Yet another difference between the military
>>and civilian programs - though DOE is finally starting to do the
>>same kind of personnel screening.
>
>i.e. becoming more like the other {sector,industry,program}.
>
DOE has had an FBI screened security clearence for YEARS.
>
>
>>You know, Mike, it would save us both a lot of time any you some
>>embarrisment if you would do just a bit of research before posting -
> ^^
>>and, of course, decline from posting about things for which you have
>>no knowledge.
>
>I feel no embarrassment, and so there is none to save. We have evident
>differences of opinion about what constitutes an industry vs. a sector
>of an industry, you dissagree with Dr. Taylor on bomb design potential,
>and there was a misunderstanding of what I stated about reprocessing;
>that is all.
>
>What constitutes an industry in not easy to define and is not a natural
>law so I suspect that we will continue ot have a difference of opinion.
>
Perhaps if you spent every working day IN the industry, you would know the
difference. The difference between DOE and DOD programs and the NRC
regulated commercial industry is like night and day. The ONLY interaction
they have wiht one another is on the level of technology exchange, computer
code updates, and the like (You DO know something about computers, Don't
you Mike???).
>If you wish to dispute Dr. Taylor, please post your source and where it
>is available; I will gladly read it. Im a non-partisan in the issue
>of bombs from reactor fuel, but would be interested knowing of any
>changes from the mid 1970's that might have obsoleted Dr. Taylors
>position. It's an interesting nuclear trivia question; but probably
>has little to do with energy or society.
>
Please see my above discussion about the likelyhood of stealing
bomb material from a nuclear plant.
>Per misunderstandings, they happen but can be clarified.
>--
What about NON-understanding?? Just because you read some book about
an old crow from the dark ages of the nuclear era written by some
anti-nuke looking to make a buck, doesn't mean you know the least
bit about nuclear energy or the physics behind it. Dr. Taylor
is not a godsend to the general public. So far, everything
you've quoted from him in the book has been available for 30 years
or more to the general public.
Let me know when you get your plan together for making that bomb.
I'll tell you where the closest plant is to get your Pu. :-)
Tom J Farish
A colleague who reads this net regularly has asked me to post a collection
of references relating to transmutation (and concurrent toxicity
reduction) of nuclear waste materials. If there is sufficient interest
expressed to me via e-mail, I will do so. There have been many studies
of the feasibility of using reactors to transmute long-half-life nuclides
to short-half-lives. In general the problem has been that the flux levels are
insufficient to burn most actinides efficiently. In addition the two
primary bad actors in the fission product department, Tc99 and I129 also
require large fluxes to burn more of them than you produce in the burner
reactor. Hence the idea of a beam-driven neutron source capable of
prducing thermal fluxes on the order of 10^16 are currently under study.
These systems have their own technical problems, but look as though they
may have significant advantages over reactor-based schemes.
If you are interested in obtaining the reference list, please email to
me directly...for the bandwidth god's sake, don't post.
If sufficient interest developes, I will post the list to this net.
Disclaimer: These are my opinions and they do not necessarily reflect
those of the Los Alamos National Laboratory.
Disclaimer disclaimer: Any society which needs disclaimers has too many
lawyers.
Thomas J. Farish
(505)665-4222
Los Alamos National Laboratory
MS M994
Los Alamos,
NM 87544
Mike Smith
>In article <82...@goofy.Apple.COM> e...@Apple.COM (Mike Smith) writes:
>>>>The Pu less suited to bomb making will, eventually, be used for
>>>>power generation.
>Mike, listen to me this time. Plutonium is NOT used in commercial
>power reactors. I said this just a post or two ago. Commercial
>reactors do not use recycled fuel in ANY form. It's much more
>expensive to recycle fuel than to mine and enrich fresh uranium.
I didn't say that it WAS used. I said that it will, EVENTUALLY, be
used. When the cost curves cross over it will be used.
See my subsequent LONG posting for an example where re-processing
and recyle of Pu was being done with a Japanese plant. I don't know
if it is still being planned or done; but at one time it was ...
>Got it???
Have you got it???
[per bomb making]
>You first have to obtain the materials in question. Lets see you or
>ANYONE force there way into a plant with a 20 ton shielded fuel cask,
[long description of stealing a reactor core deleted]
>then make the bomb.
The most likely source of materials would be theft in transit from
a re-processing plant; that eliminates your objection about stealing
a nuclear reactor ... :-)
I don't think it is at all likely that anyone would actually build
a bomb from stolen materials. I only hold that a bomb could be
made from such materials and that, at least at one time in the not
to distant past, theft was possible. (I'd love to see evidence that
the failures of the past have been fixed.)
>>And, indeed I do! In "The Curve of Binding Energy" they describe
>>reprocessing as separating the U from the Pu; but not the isotopes.
>>Isotopic separation for most elements is hard.
>No harder than seperating U from Pu, as the seperation process is based
>on the difference in atomic weights.
As I understand it, separation of U from Pu is done chemically, not
based on difference in atomic weights, and the isotopic separation is
much harder. See the 'LONG' posting for description of chemical
separation of U from Pu.
>When was any bomb material stolen, it seems I saw a reference to this,
>but I don't remember what it is. Its not commercial though, must be
>government.
I may have mis-understood JGdA's posting; but it was my understanding
that he believed that the Pu from KM (i.e.Silkwood) wasn't power
reactor Pu, but was military.
>>What constitutes an industry in not easy to define and is not a natural
>>law so I suspect that we will continue ot have a difference of opinion.
>Perhaps if you spent every working day IN the industry, you would know the
>difference. The difference between DOE and DOD programs and the NRC
>regulated commercial industry is like night and day. The ONLY interaction
>they have wiht one another is on the level of technology exchange, computer
>code updates, and the like (You DO know something about computers, Don't
>you Mike???).
Touchy, arn't we? There is more to the nuclear industry than what
American Agency regulates which domestic plant. While there is an
artificial separation of some facilities, there is much crossover in
personnel, companies, and R&D. Then there is the problematic point
of international companies and other governments. Perhaps you are
too close to the trees to see the forest? Again, please see the
'LONG' posting for examples of interaction and materials flows.
>>If you wish to dispute Dr. Taylor, please post your source and where it
>>is available; I will gladly read it. Im a non-partisan in the issue
>>of bombs from reactor fuel, but would be interested knowing of any
>>changes from the mid 1970's that might have obsoleted Dr. Taylors
>>position. It's an interesting nuclear trivia question; but probably
>>has little to do with energy or society.
>Please see my above discussion about the likelyhood of stealing
>bomb material from a nuclear plant.
Stealing it from a truck would be easier. (At least it was in the
past, but noone has posting anything stating what shipments of SNM
are like today.)
>>Per misunderstandings, they happen but can be clarified.
>What about NON-understanding?? Just because you read some book about
>an old crow from the dark ages of the nuclear era written by some
Ah, I see. 1974 is the Dark Ages of Nuclear... Gee, and I thought
that it was recent history ...
[more emoting deleted]
At least I have posted a source. It isn't just my opinion, so
personal attack on my skill in nuclear physics is meaningless.
If you don't like the source, please post your own.
>..., doesn't mean you know the least
>bit about nuclear energy or the physics behind it.
(BTW, I have had undergrad physics courses that talked about
nuclear reactions in a light treatment and a 'Geology of the
Solar Systems course' at UCD that went, in some depth,
into the nuclear processes in the life cycle of stars. Yeah,
it was mostly fusion rather than fission, but we had to know
one isotope from another and how they reacted. We also looked
at the curve of binding energy, not the book, the curve. I'm
no physics major, but I know a proton from an electron ... not
that it matters though, since I'm citing other authorities on
questions of physics.)
Kenneth Ng
: Take a look at "The Curve of Binding Energy" for the connection.
: As you are no doubt well aware, Pu is formed in power reactor cores
: as well as in reactors designed to make Pu for bombs. Reprocessing
: plants are designed to recover both the unused Uranium and the Pu
: isotopes. Some isotopes are easier to make bombs from than others.
: The Pu less suited to bomb making will, eventually, be used for
: power generation.
Take a look at "The Homemade Nuclear Bomb Syndrome", Nuclear Safety,
Vol 18 # 4, July-August 1977. To summarize: the spent fuel rods would not
be a likely target due to their radioactivity. The reprocessed plutoinium
suffers greatly from isotopes of Pu240 on up. Just 5% Pu240 mixed in
with 95% Pu239 gives a 2500 times the numbers of spontaneous fissions
per second compared to 100% Pu239.
The only way I can think of economically seperating Pu239 from Pu240
is with laser seperation (has anyone done a real test to see if it
can be done?). If you have laser seperation technology, I wouldn't use
Pu239, I'd use U235. You can get uranium ore cheaply, and you can use
a gun device, which is far simpler than an implosion device.
--
Kenneth Ng: Post office: NJIT - CCCC, Newark New Jersey 07102
uucp !andromeda!galaxy!argus!ken *** NOT k...@bellcore.uucp ***
bitnet(prefered) k...@orion.bitnet or k...@orion.njit.edu
John G. De Armond
>meaning 'separate the isotopes and only use the Pu240 as reactor fuel'.
>That is not what was meant. I was stating that the Uranium and Pu are
>recovered from spent fuel in a reprocessing plant and the Pu will be
>used, eventually, to make more power (since it's isotopic mix is less
>suited to bomb making). This is not a statement that Pu for bombs is
>recovered from commercial reactor fuel at reprocessing plants. The
>'Pu less suited' refers to the isotopic mix, not to a single isotope.
>Please forgive the lack of clarity. Perhaps I should have said
>"This Pu, being less suited to bomb making due to it's isotopic mix,"...
>
>warranted. I knew that it was difficult (and reputed to be impossible)
>to make a bomb from power reactor fuel derived Pu long before I heard
>of netnews. The information showing that it is possible comes from
>someone who made bombs for a living. Yes, it is a lousy bomb; but
>it can be done (per Dr. Taylor). I don't put any particular emphasis
Since this thread has turned a bit pedantic and since I like to be
scrupulously accurate, I'm going to reverse myself a bit. Yes, mike,
a bomb of sorts could be made from reactor-grade Pu. It would not
do much but yes, a device that would cause a chain reaction is
possible. I'll quote some lines from "The Making of the Atomic Bomb",
an excellent layman's text on the subject.
On page 461, Serber and Condon are discussing critical mass and reaction
rates. Serber calculated that an enrichment of U of at least 7% would
be necessary to make a critical assembly given that the mass is
infinite (assumes all neutrons are either absorbed or trigger another
reaction - none are lost from the mass.) Since commercial reactor
fuel is enriched in the range of 1.5% to 3.5%, no go here.
He goes on to note that if a mass 2 times supercritical were assembled
instanteously, the reaction would proceed to no more than 1% completion
before the mass would disintegrate and stop the reaction. 2 times
critical would be about 70 lbs of U-235 or 25 lbs of Pu-239.
A page further, he discusses practical problems regarding the
cannon-style bomb - the most likely to be built by a terrorist or
3rd world nation because of its simplicity. He premises that one
just-subcritial mass is blown together with another to form a mass
with a fermi K factor >>1. Assuming an assembly velocity of 3300 fps,
a very high velocity for a projectile weighing some 15 to 25 lbs, it
would take on the order of 1 thousanth of a second for the assembly to
occur. The problem is that the reaction would start as soon as a K > 1
was achieved and a stray neutron happened by, and would complete in
the time frame of a microsecond. "An explosion started by a
premature neutron will be all finished before there is time for the
pieces to move an appreciable distance". He goes on to note that with
bomb-grade Pu, a "fizzle" would yield perhaps 60 kilotones of force.
A bit of machbook calculation leads me to believe that a device
built from mixed Pu isotopes such as found in reactor fuel would
release perhaps a tenth of that energy.
So, we might get a bomb that releases 6 kt of explosive force. This
is about the equivalent to the terrorist bomb detonated in front of
the Beruit Marines headquarters. Would it go boom? Yep. Would it
destroy perhaps a block's worth of buildings? Yep. Would it
send the media and the greenies into a feeding frenzy of hand wringing?
Yep. Would it be any worse than what we've seen from terrorists to
date? Only slightly. And only from the perspective that some
size area would have to be decontaminated.
So assuming that a terrorist could get his hands on some enriched
Pu from a reactor, he could indeed build a device that would be the
most destructive device designed to date - but only after having
its effects magnified through the media.
But there is still one small problem. Pu is not refined from any
fuel cycle being considerd at this time. It is not necessary and would
be wastful to do so. The spent fuel is refined only to the extent
necessary to remove high cross section fission products and achieve
the desired enrichment.
So we're back to my original statement, to wit, In the real world (the
one I spend most of my time in.), a bomb fabricated from reactor fuel
is impossible.
John Moore
]is about the equivalent to the terrorist bomb detonated in front of
]the Beruit Marines headquarters. Would it go boom? Yep. Would it
]destroy perhaps a block's worth of buildings? Yep. Would it
]send the media and the greenies into a feeding frenzy of hand wringing?
]Yep. Would it be any worse than what we've seen from terrorists to
]date? Only slightly. And only from the perspective that some
]size area would have to be decontaminated.
Errr... john... 6kt ~= 1000*Beruit-marines-bomb ~= .5*Hiroshima.
More than a city block!
John G. De Armond
>In article <22...@rsiatl.UUCP] j...@rsiatl.UUCP (John G. De Armond) writes:
>]So, we might get a bomb that releases 6 kt of explosive force. This
>Errr... john... 6kt ~= 1000*Beruit-marines-bomb ~= .5*Hiroshima.
Uhhh, yep - at least half right. I'm going to learn about posting in
the early AM. As I recall, Hiroshima was ~20kt. Sorry about that
slip of the decimal point :-)
Still only a moderate blast. Plus I'm assuming that whomever builds
such a device knows what he is doing. Which is a big assumption.
I could probably safely move the decimal place another position
to the right and still be in the ballpark.
Matt Bartley
I recently read a British book about nuclear energy and energy issues.
It had a chapter about terrorists threatening reactors or making bombs.
It concluded that if terrorists tried to make a bomb, they'd have a
hell of a time getting the materials they needed. Then they'd have a
hard time industrially constructing the thing. Then they would have
to do experiments to find the isotopic concentrations of the stuff
they stole, etc. They'd probably blow themselves up before they got
one finished. It concluded that if terrorists really wanted a nuclear
bomb, instead of trying to make one, they'd try to steal one. It would
be a lot easier, but that would be a longshot too.
The remaining trouble with terrorist threats is what one guy I talked
to said. He said all they have to do is set up an artillery piece on
a nearby hill overlooking the power plant and start taking potshots.
I don't see much of a way around that. Just hopefully the military
would have time to attack and destroy the terrorists before they
nailed the reactor core.
--
Internet: mdbo...@portia.stanford.edu Matt Bartley
Bitnet: mdbomber%por...@stanford.bitnet 73, N6YWI
Kirk: "Spock! Where the hell's that power you promised?"
Spock: "One damn minute, Admiral." -- Star Trek IV : The Voyage Home
Phil Ngai
|The remaining trouble with terrorist threats is what one guy I talked
|to said. He said all they have to do is set up an artillery piece on
|a nearby hill overlooking the power plant and start taking potshots.
I believe a nuclear power plant's containment shell is built to
withstand a 747 crash. I would hope a SWAT team with a few snipers
could take out such terrorists before they do too much damage.
(do SWAT teams have flame throwers?)
--
Phil Ngai, ph...@amd.com {uunet,decwrl,ucbvax}!amdcad!phil
Another NRA extremist.
Mike Smith
>
>>I knew that it was difficult (and reputed to be impossible)
>>to make a bomb from power reactor fuel derived Pu long before I heard
>>of netnews. The information showing that it is possible comes from
>>someone who made bombs for a living. Yes, it is a lousy bomb; but
>>it can be done (per Dr. Taylor). I don't put any particular emphasis
>Since this thread has turned a bit pedantic and since I like to be
>scrupulously accurate, I'm going to reverse myself a bit. Yes, mike,
>a bomb of sorts could be made from reactor-grade Pu. It would not
>do much but yes, a device that would cause a chain reaction is
>possible. I'll quote some lines from "The Making of the Atomic Bomb",
>an excellent layman's text on the subject.
Thank you John. That is all I asked. It is unlikely that it would
ever be done. It would be stupid to try and make a bomb that way.
It would be difficult to get the materials (and probably suicidal).
All these things and more, we agree on. We also seem to agree that
it is, technically, possible.
>On page 461, Serber and Condon are discussing critical mass and reaction
>rates.
>He goes on to note that if a mass 2 times supercritical were assembled
>instanteously, the reaction would proceed to no more than 1% completion
>before the mass would disintegrate and stop the reaction. 2 times
>critical would be about 70 lbs of U-235 or 25 lbs of Pu-239.
>A page further, he discusses practical problems regarding the
>cannon-style bomb - the most likely to be built by a terrorist or
>3rd world nation because of its simplicity. He premises that one
>just-subcritial mass is blown together with another to form a mass
>with a fermi K factor >>1. Assuming an assembly velocity of 3300 fps,
>a very high velocity for a projectile weighing some 15 to 25 lbs, it
>would take on the order of 1 thousanth of a second for the assembly to
>occur. The problem is that the reaction would start as soon as a K > 1
>was achieved and a stray neutron happened by, and would complete in
>the time frame of a microsecond. "An explosion started by a
>premature neutron will be all finished before there is time for the
>pieces to move an appreciable distance". He goes on to note that with
>bomb-grade Pu, a "fizzle" would yield perhaps 60 kilotones of force.
>A bit of machbook calculation leads me to believe that a device
>built from mixed Pu isotopes such as found in reactor fuel would
>release perhaps a tenth of that energy.
The problem is particularly accute in power reactor fuel since the
'stray neutron' (s) are provided in abundance by the isotopic mix.
I think Dr. Taylor presumed that you would need an implosion device
to set of power reactor Pu and would want to get it post re-processing.
Implosion devices are much harder to make; but still not impossible.
Getting materials post re-processing is now very difficult to do
(as compared to 1970)...
>So, we might get a bomb that releases 6 kt of explosive force. This
>is about the equivalent to the terrorist bomb detonated in front of
>the Beruit Marines headquarters. Would it go boom? Yep. Would it
>destroy perhaps a block's worth of buildings? Yep. Would it
I think Dr. Taylors 'degign' was projected at 1 kiloton. The example
he used was taking out the World Trade Center. A bomb per building
isn't very efficient ...
>send the media and the greenies into a feeding frenzy of hand wringing?
>Yep. Would it be any worse than what we've seen from terrorists to
>date? Only slightly. And only from the perspective that some
>size area would have to be decontaminated.
A modern high explosive bomb in a barrel of PCB's would probably
be as damaging; but the press would be much worse for the nuke.
>So assuming that a terrorist could get his hands on some enriched
>Pu from a reactor, he could indeed build a device that would be the
>most destructive device designed to date - but only after having
>its effects magnified through the media.
Again, we agree. Gee, at this point I'm starting to feel a bit
bothered about the negative tone I took in the 'LONG' posting.
Since we are coming to agreement, please forgive any pointed or
flamish statements I may have made there...
>But there is still one small problem. Pu is not refined from any
>fuel cycle being considerd at this time. It is not necessary and would
>be wastful to do so. The spent fuel is refined only to the extent
>necessary to remove high cross section fission products and achieve
>the desired enrichment.
Um, excuse me. We're getting along so well up until here that I kind
of don't really want to bring this up ... but in a prior posting you
stated:
>>Let's dispose of this bizarre fantasy right off with a description
>>of what the French *really* do.
>>First, they reprocess the wastes, removing the plutonium to burn in
>>power plants. (Plutonium is not waste; it is valuable fuel, and it is
>>stupidly wasteful to throw it away. And no, you can't make a bomb with
>>power reactor plutonium; it contains too much Pu240 and Pu242.)
This, the way I read it at least, said that Pu IS being refined today
from a fuel cycle. Did you perhaps mean that, rather than the Pu
being removed, the other stuff was removed? Was this the cause of
the misunderstanding? How do the French really do it? Is it
separation of the Pu, or partial concentration of the Pu with removal
of the other fission products?
I would like to hear more about the present state of the art in
re-processing. Since the US kind of dropped its program on the
ground (at least the commercial sector one) what has developed?
Are the foreign plants similar to our old ones, or to new designs?
Have there been new fuel cycles developed to handle the problems
of U232 and U236 in enrichment cascades (or better enrichment plants)?
Are we still stacking up the Pu in storage, or are there ways to
reuse it today? (I will happily defer to someone 'in the
business' on most any issue of current technology. It doesn't
make it to the lay press for a long time ...)
>So we're back to my original statement, to wit, In the real world (the
>one I spend most of my time in.), a bomb fabricated from reactor fuel
>is impossible.
Um, I think this last disclaimer of the 'going to reverse myself a bit'
statement from above depends on what the French are doing. Your
original statement was in the context of an extant French reprocessing
plant that was stated as separating out Pu. If they are doing it
the way the U.S used to, then one could make a bomb from it.
If you would like to clarify that they are reprocessing in such a way
as to not yield concentrated Pu, then I would accept your qualifying
statements (that it couldn't be done from Pu from a re-processing
plant as designed today). Your original statement, however, just
said that power reactor Pu can't be used, without qualifications.
>>stupidly wasteful to throw it away. And no, you can't make a bomb with
>>power reactor plutonium; it contains too much Pu240 and Pu242.)
I will be glad to drop the subject now that we have agreed that a bomb
can be made from power reactor plutonium; but that it might require a
kind of reprocessing plant that is no longer built or being used.
(That is the case isn't it?)
Mike Smith
>jo...@anasaz.UUCP (John Moore) writes:
>>In article <22...@rsiatl.UUCP] j...@rsiatl.UUCP (John G. De Armond) writes:
>>]So, we might get a bomb that releases 6 kt of explosive force. This
>>Errr... john... 6kt ~= 1000*Beruit-marines-bomb ~= .5*Hiroshima.
>Uhhh, yep - at least half right. I'm going to learn about posting in
>the early AM. As I recall, Hiroshima was ~20kt. Sorry about that
>slip of the decimal point :-)
Per TCoBE pg. 15
"The bomb of Hiroshima, which was not efficiently designed,
fissioned only one per cent of its uranium and yielded only
thirteen kilotons."
end TCoBE quote
(don't worry, I'll buy another book Real Soon Now and start quoting
from something other than TCoBE ... ;-)
>Still only a moderate blast. Plus I'm assuming that whomever builds
>such a device knows what he is doing. Which is a big assumption.
>I could probably safely move the decimal place another position
>to the right and still be in the ballpark.
Yes, you would. Dr. Taylor came up with about 1 kt. which is close
enough to .6 kt. for your descriptions of damage to be about right.
(Gads! What is the world coming to; I'm using my source to support
Johns arguments... Has someone put something in my coffee??? 8-)
Mike Smith
>I recently read a British book about nuclear energy and energy issues.
>It had a chapter about terrorists threatening reactors or making bombs.
>The remaining trouble with terrorist threats is what one guy I talked
>to said. He said all they have to do is set up an artillery piece on
>a nearby hill overlooking the power plant and start taking potshots.
>I don't see much of a way around that. Just hopefully the military
>would have time to attack and destroy the terrorists before they
>nailed the reactor core.
The military would have along time to get there. Trying to crack
the containment with anything short of a kiloton nuke is gonna
take a long time ... It's several feet of reinforced concrete
(or so I've heard..)
Phil Ngai
|The military would have along time to get there. Trying to crack
|the containment with anything short of a kiloton nuke is gonna
|take a long time ... It's several feet of reinforced concrete
|(or so I've heard..)
By the way, the Israelis did bomb a Iraqi reactor which they
suspected of being used to make SNM. They took it out with a
1000 or 2000 pound bomb, I think. I don't know if the Iraqi
containment shell is as good as an American power plant, it
probably isn't since they aren't as worried about safety.
Russ Cage
>By the way, the Israelis did bomb a Iraqi reactor which they
>suspected of being used to make SNM. They took it out with a
>1000 or 2000 pound bomb, I think.
It was more work than that. I am told that the Israelis used
several aircraft, and hit the containment with more than one
bomb. Ultra-precision bombing methods were used to make each
bomb deepen the hole the previous one made. The final bomb
or two actually got inside the containment and destroyed the
reactor and other contents.
--
Oversimplification doesn't solve problems, it just
(313) 662-4147 changes them into less tractable problems.
Russ Cage, Robust Software Inc. ru...@m-net.ann-arbor.mi.us
John Moore
]By the way, the Israelis did bomb a Iraqi reactor which they
]suspected of being used to make SNM. They took it out with a
]1000 or 2000 pound bomb, I think. I don't know if the Iraqi
]containment shell is as good as an American power plant, it
]probably isn't since they aren't as worried about safety.
There's quite a difference between putting a reactor out of
commission and causing a radiation release. I heard no reports
that the Iraqi reactor released radiation. I suspect that the
Israeli bombing destroyed the very extensive non-radioactive
systems of the plant. (anyone KNOW for sure?)
Daniel Mocsny
>I believe a nuclear power plant's containment shell is built to
>withstand a 747 crash. I would hope a SWAT team with a few snipers
Well, that is a good question. Most nuke plants are sited way out
in the boonies. I doubt if a swat unit could get to one real fast.
If the terrorists were real pros and well-coordinated, they would
probably have themselves well dug-in, and they would surely have
blocked and/or booby-trapped all the access roads. The SWAT team
would have to be choppered in. My guess would be that the
terrorists would have at least 10--15 minutes of clear shooting
before any effective defense could be organized. If they were
smart enough to take a bunch of hostages along, they could probably
forestall an air strike (assuming any air force or reserve aircraft
were nearby and could be scrambled).
A reactor containment building is a pretty solid structure. Mortar
rounds probably wouldn't leave much of dent in the several meters
of reinforced concrete the plant designers put up to contain vessel
contents in case of a vessel rupture. The terrorists would need a heavy
field piece with concrete-piercing rounds. Not a job for a single crazy
person, but a group of motivated professionals could make a real
mess.
Even if the terrorists did not breach the reactor vessel, they
could readily damage the plant enough to take it out of operation
for a while and cause a great economic loss. You don't want to
fire up your reactor if you've got cracks in the containment
building walls. And I don't know how long you'd need to repair and
recertify it, but I bet it's more than a week or two.
However, if terrorists want to create havoc, they have many softer
targets to attack. Telephone switches, transformer stations,
water reservoirs, etc., are just as critical as power plants, and
usually unguarded.
--
Dan Mocsny Snail:
Internet: dmo...@minerva.che.uc.edu Dept. of Chemical Engng. M.L. 171
dmo...@uceng.uc.edu University of Cincinnati
513/751-6824 (home) 513/556-2007 (lab) Cincinnati, Ohio 45221-0171
Daniel Mocsny
>the containment with anything short of a kiloton nuke is gonna
>take a long time ... It's several feet of reinforced concrete
>(or so I've heard..)
Maybe not so long. While conventional explosives would probably require
many direct hits to breach the containment building, munitions experts
have a LONG history of designing warheads for penetrating reinforced
concrete fortifications. Just before WWII, the Germans developed a
shell that could penetrate several meters of concrete before exploding.
They were going to use them in a frontal assault on the Maginot line,
but instead they took the detour through Belgium.
Kenneth Ng
: In article <1990May17.2...@portia.Stanford.EDU> mdbo...@portia.Stanford.EDU (Matt Bartley) writes:
: |The remaining trouble with terrorist threats is what one guy I talked
: |to said. He said all they have to do is set up an artillery piece on
: |a nearby hill overlooking the power plant and start taking potshots.
: I believe a nuclear power plant's containment shell is built to
: withstand a 747 crash. I would hope a SWAT team with a few snipers
: could take out such terrorists before they do too much damage.
: (do SWAT teams have flame throwers?)
For some real numbers, does anyone know how the containment building
on the Iraqui reactor that was bombed compares to containment buildings
in the US? I remember reading a report indicating that about half a
dozen laser guided 1000 lb bombs were used to destroy it.
To Matt: what's to prevent someone from using the same artillery piece
against a hydroelectric dam? Heck, just aim it against a city.
John G. De Armond
>Um, excuse me. We're getting along so well up until here that I kind
>of don't really want to bring this up ... but in a prior posting you
>stated:
>>>Let's dispose of this bizarre fantasy right off with a description
>>>of what the French *really* do.
>>>First, they reprocess the wastes, removing the plutonium to burn in
>>>power plants. (Plutonium is not waste; it is valuable fuel, and it is
>>>stupidly wasteful to throw it away. And no, you can't make a bomb with
>>>power reactor plutonium; it contains too much Pu240 and Pu242.)
Uh, that was not my posting. That was from my friend Curt Lindner of
NAC. Remember I tend to limit my discussion to domestic programs.
I'm really not too concerned with the rest of the world vis a vie.
I'll defer to Curt to discuss the details of the Super Phoenix program.
I don't follow it closely at all. But I'd bet that they do not refine
down to pure Pu or PuO2. I'd be that they refine down to mixed oxides
suitable for refab into fuel.
>Are we still stacking up the Pu in storage, or are there ways to
>reuse it today?
Worse, on the domestic scene, we're paying outrageous sums of money
to build huge pools to store the raw spent fuel at each site. The
worst of all possible worlds.
John G. De Armond
>Per TCoBE pg. 15
> "The bomb of Hiroshima, which was not efficiently designed,
> fissioned only one per cent of its uranium and yielded only
> thirteen kilotons."
Rhodes in "The making of the Atomic Bomb" quotes the yield at between
12.5 and 20 kt. I'm not sure anybody knows more precisely than that.
I am aware of some simulations and and modeling work that has been
done trying to work backwards from the distribution of leukemia
among the survivors to yield. I think most of this work centered
around the Nagasaki bomb, however. Maybe someone with better access to
records could enlighten us.
Kenneth Ng
: In article <83...@goofy.Apple.COM> e...@Apple.COM (Mike Smith) writes:
: [edit that it would almost take a nuke to crack a containment building]
:
: Maybe not so long. While conventional explosives would probably require
: many direct hits to breach the containment building, munitions experts
: have a LONG history of designing warheads for penetrating reinforced
: concrete fortifications. Just before WWII, the Germans developed a
: shell that could penetrate several meters of concrete before exploding.
: They were going to use them in a frontal assault on the Maginot line,
: but instead they took the detour through Belgium.
Actually, I heard (can anyone verify this?) that the containment buildings
are based on the design of WWII German submarine bunkers, that they would
withstand direct hits from the 1000 pound "Blockbuster" bombs. And from
the same person, that a special bomb had to be designed to penetrate these
structures.
Mike Smith
>|The military would have along time to get there. Trying to crack
>|the containment with anything short of a kiloton nuke is gonna
>|take a long time ... It's several feet of reinforced concrete
>|(or so I've heard..)
>
>By the way, the Israelis did bomb a Iraqi reactor which they
>suspected of being used to make SNM. They took it out with a
>1000 or 2000 pound bomb, I think. I don't know if the Iraqi
>containment shell is as good as an American power plant, it
>probably isn't since they aren't as worried about safety.
As I remember this from press accounts of the time, the Iraelis
bombed it before the containment was completed. This is from
vague memories from the nightly news; so I could be all wrong,
but I remember a great deal of suprise at the time about the
precision bombing required to lob a 1000 pound bomb trough
a small opening in the containment at mach (?) and low altitude...
Mike Smith
>In article <1990May19.0...@bach.amd.com> ph...@pepsi.amd.com (Phil Ngai) writes:
>]
>]By the way, the Israelis did bomb a Iraqi reactor which they
>]suspected of being used to make SNM. They took it out with a
>There's quite a difference between putting a reactor out of
>commission and causing a radiation release. I heard no reports
>that the Iraqi reactor released radiation. I suspect that the
>Israeli bombing destroyed the very extensive non-radioactive
>systems of the plant. (anyone KNOW for sure?)
I remember that the Israelis bombed prior to the loading of fuel. They
let the Iraqis spend as much money as possible on it; then took it out
'at the last minute.' I don't KNOW for sure; but this is what I
remember.
Mike Smith
>In article <83...@goofy.Apple.COM> e...@Apple.COM (Mike Smith) writes:
>>The military would have along time to get there. Trying to crack
>>the containment with anything short of a kiloton nuke is gonna
>>take a long time ... It's several feet of reinforced concrete
>Maybe not so long. While conventional explosives would probably require
>many direct hits to breach the containment building, munitions experts
>have a LONG history of designing warheads for penetrating reinforced
>concrete fortifications. Just before WWII, the Germans developed a
>shell that could penetrate several meters of concrete before exploding.
>They were going to use them in a frontal assault on the Maginot line,
Facinating. (in his best Spock voice ...:-)
Are such shells still inuse/ available? Did it take a Big Bertha gun
or were smaller guns so armed? Such a shell could change things; but
how available are they?
Mike Smith
>e...@Apple.COM (Mike Smith) writes:
>
>>Um, excuse me. We're getting along so well up until here that I kind
>>of don't really want to bring this up ... but in a prior posting you
>>stated:
>>>>Let's dispose of this bizarre fantasy right off with a description
>>>>of what the French *really* do.
>Uh, that was not my posting. That was from my friend Curt Lindner of
>NAC. Remember I tend to limit my discussion to domestic programs.
Mea Culpa. I didn't check the news headers right. I went fishing
for your original posting and thought I had found it; I goofed.
The text I attributed to you was posted by:
m...@hsv3.UUCP (Mike Van Pelt) in message-ID <26...@hsv3.UUCP>.
I'll see if I can find your correct original statement and fix my
posting error; but I think it has likely expired by now.
Daniel Mocsny
>In article <48...@uceng.UC.EDU> dmo...@minerva.che.uc.edu (Daniel Mocsny) writes:
>>Just before WWII, the Germans developed a
>>shell that could penetrate several meters of concrete before exploding.
>>They were going to use them in a frontal assault on the Maginot line,
>or were smaller guns so armed? Such a shell could change things; but
>how available are they?
A quick scan at the library didn't turn up anything on the German
concrete-piercing shells. I seem to remember reading about this in
a book called something like "German Secret Weapons of WWII".
From what I remember, the shell consisted of a long, thin shaft
of alloy steel with a transverse-mounted disk in the center (to
take up the cannon bore so it could be fired), and stabilizing
fins at the rear (of cross-section equal to the disk).
But I did find a reference to the American weapons used against
German fortifications in WWII.
Barnes, G.M., "Weapons of World War II," Van Nostrand, New York, 1947.
From p. 251:
"Another self-propelled vehicle developed by the Ordnance Department
was the 155 mm gun, which was also placed on the M4 tank chassis and
designated the M12. ... Our armies immediately found that these guns
were very important in breaking up German resistance. A special
concrete-piercing projectile had been developed for this high-powered
gun, which would penetrate 7 feet of reinforced concrete. By the time
our troops reached the German West Wall and encountered German pillboxes
by the hundreds, this weapon was one of the decisive tools used in their
destruction. Captured documents show that the Germans had considered
these pillboxes immune to artillery fire [my note: don't the Germans
even keep track of their own secret weapons? :-)], and their relatively
easy destruction by the 155 mm self-propelled gun M12, came as a great
surprise and disillusionment to the German troops. It had a serious
effect on their declining morale."
Some specs on the M12, 155 mm gun motor carriage, from p. 248:
Crew 6
weight 58 000 lb
length 22' 1"
width 8' 9"
height 8' 10"
ground contact 147"
tread (c. to c. of tracks)
83"
ground pressure 11.6 lb/in^2
Obviously not a suitcase weapon.
p. 85 of the book shows a photo with caption, "Fuze, concrete piercing,
M78."
Mike Van Pelt
:e...@Apple.COM (Mike Smith) writes:
:>Um, excuse me. ... but in a prior posting you stated:
:
:>>>Let's dispose of this bizarre fantasy right off with a description
:>>>of what the French *really* do.
:
:>>>First, they reprocess the wastes, removing the plutonium to burn in
:>>>power plants. (Plutonium is not waste; it is valuable fuel, and it is
:>>>stupidly wasteful to throw it away. And no, you can't make a bomb with
:>>>power reactor plutonium; it contains too much Pu240 and Pu242.)
:
:Uh, that was not my posting. That was from my friend Curt Lindner of NAC.
Nope, that was me.
--
Mike Van Pelt | "I am too controlled, I am too clear, I am too
Headland Technology | mature to be angry." -- Jesse Jackson.
(was: Video Seven) | [Clear? I didn't even know he was into Dianetics.]
...ames!vsi1!v7fs1!mvp
Matt Bartley
>: In article <1990May17.2...@portia.Stanford.EDU> mdbo...@portia.Stanford.EDU (Matt Bartley) writes:
>: |The remaining trouble with terrorist threats is what one guy I talked
>: |to said. He said all they have to do is set up an artillery piece on
>: |a nearby hill overlooking the power plant and start taking potshots.
>For some real numbers, does anyone know how the containment building
>on the Iraqui reactor that was bombed compares to containment buildings
>in the US? I remember reading a report indicating that about half a
>dozen laser guided 1000 lb bombs were used to destroy it.
>To Matt: what's to prevent someone from using the same artillery piece
>against a hydroelectric dam? Heck, just aim it against a city.
Nothing. They'd have a much easier time against the dam (anyone see
_Force 10 from Naverone_?). But a nuclear reactor would have a lot
more terror value. Also, it would be somewhat a challenge to find a
dam close enough to a major city to destroy it. And of course, they
could just play Beirut and empty their gun on a given city.
A large organized terrorist attack could do a staggering amount. Look
at what a handful of Earth Night Action vermin did. Destroyed
eletrical power over the entire Santa Cruze - Watsonville area. And
they did that by destroying only one minor electrical tower and one
big high tension wire tower. Think if they had destroyed a regional
substation! A really sophisticated attack could really screw things up,
very similar to what the earthquake did here. Destroy telephone stations,
block the very few decent roads out of the area, take out electrical power,
contaminate the big aqueducts taking water around the state, etc. A
lot of nasty potential.
Shaun Heath
>Facinating. (in his best Spock voice ...:-)
>Are such shells still inuse/ available? Did it take a Big Bertha gun
>or were smaller guns so armed? Such a shell could change things; but
>how available are they?
>--
I don't know about conventional shells, but I have heard that the U.S. is
working on nuke warheads that will penetrate enough earth/concrete/etc to
knockout an enemies deeply buried "assets".
I also read(I wish I could remember where) that the Israeli air raid might
have been flown to coverup agent-planted explosives. I don't recall
the level of completion of the plant.
>E. Michael Smith e...@apple.COM
Shaun
Rob Kleinschmidt
>
>A large organized terrorist attack could do a staggering amount.
>Look at what a handful of Earth Night Action vermin did. Destroyed
>eletrical power over the entire Santa Cruze - Watsonville area. And
>they did that by destroying only one minor electrical tower and one
>big high tension wire tower. Think if they had destroyed a regional
>substation!
I seem to recall that part of the problem was that PGE itself managed to
partially destroy a substation while attempting to repair the damage.
According to local news reports, a fire ocurred in a substation while
they were attempting to re-route power, and the fire was a significant
component in the long power outage.
> A really sophisticated attack could really screw things up,
>very similar to what the earthquake did here. Destroy telephone stations,
>block the very few decent roads out of the area, take out electrical power,
>contaminate the big aqueducts taking water around the state, etc. A
>lot of nasty potential.
I really do not think you have taken a good look at the damage done
by the earthquake.
I am strongly against acts of destruction, but given the general frequency
of power blackouts, the Earth Night action is signifiant only because
it was deliberate, and not because of the damage done.
>--
>Internet: mdbo...@portia.stanford.edu Matt Bartley
>Bitnet: mdbomber%por...@stanford.bitnet 73, N6YWI
> Kirk: "Spock! Where the hell's that power you promised?"
> Spock: "One damn minute, Admiral." -- Star Trek IV : The Voyage Home
Rob Kleinschmidt
Boulder Creek....Not just a home, it's an adventure !!!
David Lewis
[Description and explanation of a Pu "fizzle" bomb deleted]
> So, we might get a bomb that releases 6 kt of explosive force. This
> is about the equivalent to the terrorist bomb detonated in front of
> the Beruit Marines headquarters.
'scuse? 6kt? We're talking the equivalent explosive force of 6000 tons
of TNT? That terrorists got in the back of a 10-wheeler, which (if my
limited knowledge of trucks serves) will carry a load on the order of 15
tons? So is there a chemical explosive that is approximately 400 times
the power of TNT, or is someone off my an order of magnitude or two?
(Sorry, this is diverging from sci.energy, but I don't know of a group
sci.misc.bomb-making...)
--
David G Lewis ...!bellcore!nvuxr!deej
(@ Bellcore Navesink Research & Engineering Center)
"If this is paradise, I wish I had a lawnmower."
Beckman
>'scuse? 6kt? We're talking the equivalent explosive force of 6000 tons
>of TNT?
>the power of TNT, or is someone off my an order of magnitude or two?
the main point of why reactor-grade plutonium bombs wouldn't work if some
idiot/genius really succeeded in separating the Pu in a garage. But the
spontaneous neutron flux from the contaminating Pu isotopes would make the
detonation utterly unpredictable. See "The HOmemade NUclear Bomb Syndrome"
by W. Meyer et al. (U. of Mo.), Amer. Nucl. Soc., 1976, also reprinted in
Nuclear Technology around that time.
If terrorists want to try this next-to-impossible and stupid way,
which is dangerous mainly to the terrorists messing with it,
it will be a good thing, because it will keep them out of mischief with
more dangerous adventures.
On another matter, low-level radiation etc., it is not just a matter of
being informed on the actual details, but a simple matter of believing
that nature is consistent (comparing the regular doses one gets with those
of which the superstitious are frightened). If anyone does not believe in
the consistency of nature, what is he doing in a SCIENTIFIC group?
Petr Beckmann
A
SCI.energy?
Paul Hager
->In article <17...@nvuxr.UUCP> de...@nvuxr.UUCP (David Lewis) writes:
->>'scuse? 6kt? We're talking the equivalent explosive force of 6000 tons
->>of TNT?
->>[...] So is there a chemical explosive that is approximately 400 times
->>the power of TNT, or is someone off my an order of magnitude or two?
-> The small yield (compared to a weapons-grade plutonium bomb) is not
->the main point of why reactor-grade plutonium bombs wouldn't work if some
->idiot/genius really succeeded in separating the Pu in a garage. But the
->spontaneous neutron flux from the contaminating Pu isotopes would make the
->detonation utterly unpredictable. See "The HOmemade NUclear Bomb Syndrome"
->by W. Meyer et al. (U. of Mo.), Amer. Nucl. Soc., 1976, also reprinted in
->Nuclear Technology around that time.
-> If terrorists want to try this next-to-impossible and stupid way,
->which is dangerous mainly to the terrorists messing with it,
->it will be a good thing, because it will keep them out of mischief with
->more dangerous adventures.
-> [...]
-> Petr Beckmann
Dr. Beckmann makes some good points. In particular, the danger to
the terrorists that making such a bomb would entail. If, as critics
often posit, plutonium is "the most toxic substance known to man" (and
reactor-grade Pu, contaminated with non-Pu-239 nuclides, is much more
toxic than weapons-grade Pu) then isn't the most likely outcome that the
terrorists will die from the effects of this potent "toxin" long
before they succeed in constructing a bomb?
What is involved is a clash of rhetoric producing an internal
inconsistency -- either Pu REALLY is incredibly toxic, so toxic
that industrial technologies can't handle it safely or else it's
REALLY NOT so toxic to preclude a bunch of untrained terrorists using
ad hoc methods from using it to make a bomb.
--
paul hager hag...@iuvax.cs.indiana.edu
*** Combat global warming -- build nuclear power plants ***
John G. De Armond
>Dr. Beckmann makes some good points. In particular, the danger to
>the terrorists that making such a bomb would entail. If, as critics
>often posit, plutonium is "the most toxic substance known to man"
Pu is not even in the running for that title. Several common chemical
toxins are much more virulent, microgram for microgram, than Pu.
Botulin (sp) toxin, several venoms and any of the nerve gasses come immediately
to mind. See below.
>(and
>reactor-grade Pu, contaminated with non-Pu-239 nuclides, is much more
>toxic than weapons-grade Pu) then isn't the most likely outcome that the
>terrorists will die from the effects of this potent "toxin" long
>before they succeed in constructing a bomb?
>What is involved is a clash of rhetoric producing an internal
>inconsistency -- either Pu REALLY is incredibly toxic, so toxic
>that industrial technologies can't handle it safely or else it's
>REALLY NOT so toxic to preclude a bunch of untrained terrorists using
>ad hoc methods from using it to make a bomb.
The process of refining spent fuel into a useable form of Pu is very
hazardous and involves nasty chemicals and incredibly high levels of
radiation. This is the key impediment against diversion.
Given a quantity of (semi) refined Pu, most any person educated to the
collegate level of physics and capable of doing a bit of research could
fabricate a crude device. I have read at least one very good textbook on the
chemistry of Pu. IF you can set up a glovebox and maintain an inert
atmosphere, you can work Pu sufficiently well for making a pop.
Regarding the toxic properties of Pu, there have been several studies published
in the last few years looking at Pu workers who have absorbed milligram
quantities of Pu into their bodies during a lifetime of exposure. There have
also been several of workers acutely contaminated via industrial accidents.
The results of these studies indicate a somewhat higher risk of cancer than
for the public at large but my no means has anyone simply dropped over dead
from ingesting Pu. This effect would, of course, have to be detected in
order for Pu to legitimately hold the title of "most toxic chemical on
earth" since many other substances WILL exhibit the effect.
Matt Bartley
>In article <1990May22....@portia.Stanford.EDU> mdbo...@portia.Stanford.EDU (Matt Bartley) writes:
>>A large organized terrorist attack could do a staggering amount.
>>Look at what a handful of Earth Night Action vermin did. Destroyed
>>eletrical power over the entire Santa Cruze - Watsonville area. And
>>they did that by destroying only one minor electrical tower and one
>>big high tension wire tower. Think if they had destroyed a regional
>>substation!
>> A really sophisticated attack could really screw things up,
>>very similar to what the earthquake did here. Destroy telephone stations,
>>block the very few decent roads out of the area, take out electrical power,
>>contaminate the big aqueducts taking water around the state, etc. A
>>lot of nasty potential.
>I really do not think you have taken a good look at the damage done
>by the earthquake.
I was in the middle of it. Being here at Stanford, of course I rarely
see the outside world admittedly. What I was talking about here
was not what happened in our latest earthquake, but is likely in the
case of The Big One (TM). Likely? I don't really know, but it's
stuff like this that emergency services and comminications is very
concerned with whe doing drills and developing plans.
Obviously we got lucky Oct. 17 in comparison. But it seemed there was
a bit of it. It seemed very likely that all the roads leading out of
the Bay Area could be wrecked and there's be no way to leave except by
air. Which is of course exactly what they did to get supplies to
Watsonville. Watsonville was completely cut off by land, as was Santa
Cruz.