Vincent Conitzer talk, 11/06, 4:00pm
David Kempe
while not technically a theoretician, Vincent's work is sufficiently close to
the kind of stuff theoreticians like these days to warrant an announement.
Vincent Conitzer from Duke University will give a CS colloquium this week:
Title: Computing Game-Theoretic Solutions
Time: Thursday, 11/06/2008, 4:00pm
Location: SSL 150
The abstract is below.
I am looking forward to seeing many of you there.
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Abstract:
Computer scientists are increasingly confronted with settings where multiple
self-interested parties (humans or software agents) interact, especially in the
context of the Internet. Examples include auctions, exchanges, elections, and
other negotiation protocols, as well as job scheduling, routing, and webpage
ranking. In these settings, the optimal course of action for one agent
generally depends on what the other agents do, resulting in a tricky
circularity. Game theory provides various notions of how agents should act in
such domains. However, especially from an AI perspective, these concepts become
useful only when we can compute the solutions that they prescribe. In this
talk, I will review several standard game-theoretic solution concepts,
including dominance, iterated dominance, Nash equilibrium, and Stackelberg
strategies. I will also discuss algorithms and complexity results for computing
these solutions.
--
David Kempe <dke...@usc.edu>