On the Matter of the Necessity of the Biafran War { RE: Nigeria - "a mere geographical expression?" or a matter of definition
Mobolaji ALUKO
THE NECESSITY OF THE BIAFRAN WAR
ByG. Ugo Nwokeji
gnwo...@epas.utoronto.ca
Dept. of History, University of Toronto, Canada
First posted to: Multiple recipients of list
igbo...@mcfeeley.cc.utexas.edu
Thu Dec 26 10:33:24 1994
Personalizing Nigerian history is a favourable past-time for many. This tendency has come out clearly recently on Naijanet, especially regarding the Biafran War of 1967-70. This contribution is, in a way, an embelishment of Ukobasi Orji's rough chronology of the 1966-67 crisis. It also touches on the rejoinder by one other politicIZED scientist, Bolaji Aluko.
On Wed, 19 Apr 1995, Mobolaji E. Aluko wrote in extending Orji's argument:
> (1) WAS OUR OJUKWU MADE INTO A "FALL GUY" HERE ? HOW COULD
> SUCH A FINAL SERIOUS DECISION BE PUT ON ONE SHOULDER ?
> I SUSPECT THAT IT WAS MORE LIKE: LEAD US OR GET OUT
> OF THE WAY ! PERSONAL ACCOUNT (AGAIN MY FATHER)
> INDICATES THAT THE TIDE WAS BY THEN TOO FAR FOR HIM TO STEM,
> AND HE IN FACT FEARED FOR HIS LIFE IF HE DID NOT GO ALONG WITH THE SECESSION.
>
> Bolaji Aluko
>
Aluko's analysis is accurate on this score. His position should have answered a lot of questions. It does not seem to have done so for many who hear with one ear but let what they hear escape through the other. One is not suggesting that the tendency to blame Ojukwu for the war is confined to Naijanet. Some dramatis personae on both sides of the crisis also express this view. For instance, war-time federal commander, Brigadier Ben Adekunle, told *This Week* magazine in 1987 that the war arose out of personality conflict between Ojukwu and Gowon. Two ex-Biafran senior commanders, Col. I.N.C.A. and Col. E.O. (full names withheld), who in 1989 spoke to me on Ojukwu's role in the declaration of Biafra, also centred their analyses on the person of Ojukwu. For reasons that are given in the Footnote below, I had to accept their interpretation of this particular matter. These reasons are derived directly from these men's own separate accounts rendered to me in 1989. Moreover, their accounts are inconsistent with the historical record, that is, the well-known events of 1966-67 and their implications. My failure to accept their interpretations does not detract respect for these men.
Col. I.N.C.A. said that secession was not necessary at the time. He did not say why but gave me the impression that it should be obvious. He refused to elaborate. On the other hand, Col. E.O., said that secession was necessary, but he disagreed with the timing. He did not say why but insisted that "Ojukwu, with his education, would have been able to appease his people until they were ready." Col. E.O. did not say how Ojukwu could have done this, but continued, "That's what we are talking about. ... Why did he join the army with [a] masters [degree]? ... The man was looking for something."
Let us see the merits of Col. E.O.'s analysis. To be sure, Ojukwu was ambitious. He admitted this fact in an interview held in Umuahia on 4 November 1968. This is no news. The lack of ambition is not a virtue. Suffice it to say that in 1967 the question of ambition is secondary to what had happened to easterners and what was happening to them. To date, there has been no conclusive evidence suggesting that Ojukwu was bent on creating Biafra in order to satisfy some inordinate ambition. Available evidence points otherwise. After the initial phase of the pogroms in the north in July-August 1966, Ojukwu urged eastern survivors to return to the north after conferring with his friend, Ado Bayero (the Emir of Kano). (Ojukwu had just appointed this man the Chancellor of the UNN, as a replacement to Zik.) The easterners who heeded Ojukwu's call met more massacres. There is no need to revisit the pogroms of 1966 here. It is sufficient to say, a vast majority of easterners were disenchanted with a Nigeria that did not guarantee them freedom of life and property.
An estimated thirty thousand had been murdered in other parts of Nigeria. Their relatives were not happy. Millions had returned empty-handed as refugees from other parts of Nigeria. Easterners' property had been "abandoned" for looting in other parts of Nigeria. Millions were looking up to Ojukwu to provide the kind of leadership that would lead to the fair resolution of this problem. On 19 October 1966, Gowon imposed a food blockade on Eastern Nigeria. On 31 October, Ojukwu wrote the other military governors inviting them to a meeting either in Port Harcourt or Calabar. The idea was to discuss the problems of course. Meanwhile, he also sent delegates for talks with representatives of other regions. These delegates were talking until the eastern participants felt unsafe to continue, or so they said. But tell me why I should not believe them. On 4 October, Gowon turned down the eastern proposal for confederation. UNN students began to protest chanting that "the push is complete." In effect, they were reminding Ojukwu of his earlier caveat that the east would not secede unless "pushed out".
These demonstrations continued all around the region. On new Years' eve 1967, Ojukwu warned that time was "running out while the ship of state is drifting." These were the circumstances that foreshadowed Aburi. At Aburi, Ojukwu pressed his case. He did so successfully because he had one, not necessarily, as Kirk-Greene put it, that Ojukwu was "the cleverest" or had "skillful histrionics and superior intellectual adroitness." Indeed, this characterization of Ojukwu vis a vis the other actors is true. (In fact, Brigadier Adekunle said that it was because Gowon was indolent.) But I cannot see what Ojukwu could have done if he had no case. Ojukwu went to Aburi as the sole representative of a people struggling for survival. He successfully negotiated self-determination for them. On the other hand, Gowon had ascended the highest throne in the land. He was beginning to feel comfortable in that post. The majrity of non-eastern elites were also comfortable. The fleeing easterners had abandoned property, civil and military positions which people from other parts of the country were quick to fill. While his colleagues of the SMC were wishing away the past, Ojukwu was serious consolidating his argument on that past. Ojukwu's success at Aburi owed more to the logic of immediate circumstances than to his political brinksmanship.
Back in the east, this success shored up Ojukwu's popularity. Rather than offset this popularity, Gowon's unilateral repudiation of the agreements fueled it. The crisis deepened because the interests of the two sides were diametrically opposed, in part, arising from the meddling of external interests. As easterners clamoured "On Aburi We Stand," the rest of the country clamoured for its repudiation. Ojukwu warned in a broadcast that, if by 31 March 1967, the federal side had not implemented Aburi, he would take "whatever measures may be necessary to give effect to those agreements." Ojukwu started to issue the "Survival Edicts" aimed at countering the federal blockade.
The federal government declared a state of emergency in the Eastern Region and announced the creation of 12 states on 26 May 1967. In response, Ojukwu presented three options for the consideration of the Joint Secession of the Council of Chiefs and Elders. These were: (1) accepting the terms of the North and Gowon and, therefore, submitting to the domination of the North; (2) continuing the stalemate and to drift; and (3) to ensure the survival of the people of Eastern Nigeria by asserting their autonomy. It is now history that the assemblymen and chiefs chose the third option. On 30 May 1967, Ojukwu proclaimed the independent state of Biafra. If one accepts the ambition thesis, then the Joint Session had given legitimacy to Ojukwu's inordinate desires.
But one cannot successfully condemn Ojukwu's action in presenting these options without suggesting [viable] alternatives that Ojukwu may have left out in his submission to the Joint Session. Could Ojukwu have postponed secession? In view of the federal government measures, such a postponement would have been unwarranted. For instance, the creation of states was unilateral and designed to undermine the geographical basis of Eastern Nigeria. Apart, from secession, the only option left to Ojukwu was to step down. This would have been dishonorable at a time when Easterners' grievances had not been addressed. In these circumstances, the real option open to Ojukwu was resignation. But this was dishonourable. People who never wished the easterners to live may continue to vent their frustration on Ojukwu for fulfilling a responsibility. This is how Nigerians come across when they scapegoat Ojukwu for leading their war of survival. No one can in good faith single Ojukwu out as a "former rebel," except if we accept that such a person is a crass ignoramus. One does not have to be Igbo or easterner, or their friends to see this fact.
The unpreparedness of Biafra to withstand the rigours of independence at that time was widely known, even by Ojukwu himself. He took time to warn the Joint Session of the grave consequences of secession. (Don't mind that he would tell the world a few days later that no power in "Black Africa" could beat Biafra in war.) Most people in Eastern Nigeria realized that it was better to try and die fighting than just wait to be annihilated. The dangers were real. They were not merely "perceived", as i read often on Naijanet.
Ojukwu realized that the people were not looking for a wimp. A good number of capable officers could have filled the void, had Ojukwu created one. Some of these were the surviving executioners of the January 1966 coup such as Emmanuel Ifeajuna, Chukwuma Nzeogwu, Tim Onwuatuegwu and Ben Gbulie. There were also their Yoruba counterparts who had taken refuge in the east. These were Major Ademoyega, Col. Banjo, Lt. Olafemihon and Lt. Oyewole. All these January officers had no jobs or commands in the army parlance. (To give them commands to Nzeogwu & co. would be to give them power. Their remaining idle was not good as well.) I am sure that the saying, which my elementary school teacher later thought me, "an idle man is a devil's workshop," was already in vogue at the time. The January officers played cards and chequers. Nobody, including Ojukwu, was at ease with these men's presence. They had done it before and could well do it again. Actually, Major General Alex Madiebo, who later became the Biafran Army Commander, grumbles in his book that Ojukwu gave these men a lot of amenities in order to placate them. Proper attention has not been given to the implications the presence of these men may have had on the declaration of Biafra.
Both Col. I.N.C.A. and Col. E.O. were bitter with Ojukwu, for different reasons. Col. I.N.C.A. originally had a privileged position as Biafra's accredited arms purchaser in Lisbon. According to Col. I.N.C.A. himself, Mojekwu, who led a Biafran delegation to Europe, thought that it was absurd that such a well-trained, young major escounced in Europe while others were fighting the war. Col. I.N.C.A. made the necessary connections when Ojukwu recalled him a few days later. As the commander of a Biafran brigade in the bad days in 1968, Col. I.N.C.A. lost so much ground, men and equipment that Ojukwu found it necessary to summon the young colonel to account for his losses in the Oron-Ikot Ekpene-Uyo theartre. While going to meet Ojukwu at the State House, Umuahia, Col. I.N.C.A. did two suspicious things. First, he went with an unusually large convoy of troops. Second, he went in to meet Ojukwu, armed with a signal pistol. He was found to have a small arm when he went in to see Ojukwu, but was arrested. He remained in jail until the end of the war. He told me he had a pen-sized signal pistol, a non-offensive weapon.
Why I took Col. E.O.'s account with a pinch of salt was because he, a Sandhurst-trained regular, disliked all those university graduates, Ojukwu merely included, who "spoiled" the army as a result of political ambition. According to him, it was this section of the offier corps who masterminded the January 1966 coup. Col. E.O. was the Adjutant of the Ikeja-based battalion during that coup. He argued further that it was this ambition that drove Ojukwu into going to war. It is also clear that Col. E.O. did not quite like the prominence that Ojukwu gave to the Biafran officers like Joe Achuzia who had not been regulars in the Nigerian Army. Something else happened which Col.E.O. did not like.
In December 1968, when he was commanding the Otuocha-based 57 Brigade, he went to assume command of the Commando Division on the ostensible recommendation of Ojukwu. He found the Deputy GOC of the division, Col. Conrad Nwawo fully in charge. Col. E.O. went back to Otuocha and to his brigade a bitter man. Another grouse which Col. E.O. expressed against Ojukwu was that "Ojukwu led well, being that he made sure that nobody had any alternative [than to carry on with the war], especially those of us who were senior officers." It was Col. E.O.'s view that Ojukwu ordered the execution of some of his closest friends early during the war in order to instill fear into the Biafran officers. The executed men were Col. Victor Banjo, Major Ifeajuna, Major Philip Alale (Ojukwu's brother-in-law), and the star of the Biafran diplomatic corps, Sam Agbam.
G. Ugo Nwokeji
_____________________________________________________________________________
Ndi be anyi,
Now, Awo who is a god, made a statement which does not pass into the narrative that those peddling this revisionism wants us to accept, then an excuse has to be invented for his age and the time of his utterance.
Another example of Bolaji Aluko and his compulsive dishonesty is here at play.
When he accuses Ojukwu of being immature in his decision to defend his people, he never cut the guy a slack in relation to his age and the circumstances surrounding his decisions.
In Bolaji's world and that of his co-wayfarers on this highway of cant: what is gravy for the goose is a luxury unaffordable to the gander. Ha che na mmadu bu ewu.
And he has the effrontery to accuse others of dishonesty; an ocean he swims in.
E jikwa m ogu!!!
Wonders shall never end.
Franklyne Ogbunwezeh
* ************** *************** ****************** *************** ***********
But there is no such thing as a pure fact, innocent of interpretation. Behind every fact presented to the world – by a teacher, a writer, anyone – is a judgment. The judgment that has been made is that this fact is important, and that other facts are not important and so they are omitted from the presentation.
Howard Zinn--- On Wed, 6/9/10, Mobolaji ALUKO <alu...@gmail.com> wrote:Subject: [NaijaElections] Re: [NIgerianWorldForum] RE: Nigeria - "a mere geographical expression?" or a matter of definition
To: NaijaP...@yahoogroups.comDate: Wednesday, June 9, 2010, 3:47 PM
Cc: naijael...@yahoogroups.com, rexma...@hotmail.com, "NIDOA" <NI...@yahoogroups.com>, "naijaintellects" <naijain...@googlegroups.com>, "OmoOdua" <Omo...@yahoogroups.com>, "Igietseme, Joseph (CDC/CCID/NCPDCID)" <jb...@cdc.gov>
Joseph Igietseme:It is almost madness that Awo's statement ("Nigeria is a mere geographical expression") at age 38 in a 1947 book, BEFORE Nigeria's Independence, before he attended ENDLESS Constitutional Conferences and Independence preparations starting in 1954 or so, before he became Leader of Opposition at the Federal Level in 1960, before he was Finance Minister 1967-71, before he ran for President (twice) in 1979 and 1983, and before he died in 1987, can still be quoted back to him endlessly as if it was his epithet against the impossibility of Nigeria transcending a "mere geographical expression", as if it is his curse on Nigeria.Na wa o!Obi Nwakanma says that I am a Nigerian Awoist and Tea-Party Republican, but an American Democrat. All I know is I am a Social Democrat, and if Awo was a Social Democrat - as I believe he was - then we are/were both Social Democrats.My admiration for Awo is confined to the POLITICAL AND PERSONAL DISCIPLINE that he exuded, the SUCCESS and BODY OF SPEECHES that he left behind, the CONCERN that he showed for those he ruled over and READINESS to explain his thought process to them, and the IMPRESSION he left in the minds of those who worked with him closely. I don't even know all of what Awoism stands for, but if it meant Social Welfarism - and I suspect what people mean as Awoism is his wish for political division of Nigeria into ethnic-based regions or states - then I am an Awoist.But more than anything, I SUPPORT a TRUE FEDERALISM in which as much power as possible is devolved to whatever smaller regions there are (however determined), with local control of resources. If that is Awoism, then I am an Awoist.T'okan, t'okan....Now let somebody tell me what ZIkism is, or AhmaduBelloism, or MaCauleyism. ...As an American citizen, I subscribe arduously to the right of the individual for the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, the responsibility of the individual to others and to government as determined through regular free, fair and credible elections, and the responsibility of government to ensure the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people within the US borders, particularly those least able to held themselves or most prone to oppression - Children, Women, Minorities and the Physical/Mentally Challenged.And that is why I am a Democrat, and not a Tea-Party Republican.And there you have it.Bolaji Aluko
On Wed, Jun 9, 2010 at 6:09 PM, Igietseme, Joseph (CDC/OID/NCPDCID) <jb...@cdc.gov> wrote:Prof Obi Nwakanma:
At this time and stage of the Nigerian project, it appears that it is well understood by all Nigerian patriots that Chief Obafemi Awolowo’s statement that “Nigeria is a mere geographical expression” was a “Call To Duty” at a time of challenge and uncertainty in the geographical location now well established as a sacrosanct and bona fide nation. In fact, Chief Awolowo was in the fore-front in the odyssey to Consummate and Stabilize the nation, by working with founding patriots such as Zik, Balewa, Ahmadu Bello, Mike Okpara, Enahoro, etc, and the nation’s stabilizers such as Yakubu Gowon, Obsanjo, Musa Yar’Adua, Ekwueme, Ukiwe, Bola Ige, Danjuma, Murtala, Joe Garba, Ogbemudia, and several others. So any honest and patriotic Nigerian reviewer MUST evaluate Chief Awolowo’s words and efforts in the proper context to be productive. Awo played his leadership role in establishing the nation of Nigerian, with nobility, courage and a great sense of responsibility; and he should be APPLAUDED and CELEBRATED, not caricatured by frequent allusion to a no-issue.
Besides, at this time of the Nigerian enterprise, the challenge is DEVELOPMENT, as should be evident in progress in Critical sectors, especially key infrastructures such as regular electricity, road networks, mass transit system and self-reliance in food production. Progress in these key areas of national development will achieve two vital milestones: first, provide the foundational infrastructural base to stimulate and unleash the creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship of Nigerians, and set the stage for industrialization and true international recognition in production and world power status (I bet Nigeria will become the 9th Member of a New G9!); and second, progress in development will engender the ELUSIVE national unity Nigerians continue to debate, since national grids of road networks, mass transits, and other infrastructures will provide a NEW SET OF COMMON INTERESTS for all Nigerians, to adore, manage together, maintain, preserve and PROTECT! This is what National unity is all about!
That said, it is unfortunate that Nigeria still lacks a CRITICAL MASS of Visionary and Purposeful Leaders who don’t have to be Perfect! The SEARCH GOES ON! Take care. JUI (providing the vision for a Developed and United Nigerian Nation as envisaged by the founding patriots!)
From: NIgerianWorldForum@ yahoogroups. com [mailto:NIgerianWorldForum@ yahoogroups. com] On Behalf Of Rex Marinus
Sent: Wednesday, June 09, 2010 4:40 PM
To: nigerianworldforum@ yahoogroups. com
Subject: [NIgerianWorldForum ] Nigeria - "a mere geographical expression?" or a matter of definition
In the last ten years since the faction of the Nigerian military in uniform withrew to the b arracks and handed power to its retired fation, the debate about the future of Nigeria has raged. It is a debate that has been at the roots of the Nigerian enterprise since its formation in 1914, and since its political independen ce as a nation within the commonwealth in 1960, and since its putative claims as a sovereign republic in 1963: the question has been "what is Nigeria." Obafemi Awolowo called it "a mere geographical expression." This statement - "mere geographical expression" - is semantically meaningless since it fails to convey its particulars. But it hints at the fact that "Nigeria" is simply a named but indistinct entity. Yet, this is entirely curious given that nothing exists until it is named. Many, often playing the game of the the naked emperor, often tend to over analyse and over interpret the significance of this remarkably ineloquent definition of Nigeria. Nigeria as a nation began in 1914, the result of the amalgamation of conquered peoples and principalities subdued to the higher will of nation. Nigeria is thus, in the history of nations, but a mere babe. It is not even a teenager yet. It is crawling and teething. But to say it is without being is to use the terms "mere geographical expression."
Now, thye trouble with Nigeria is that is that wto spirits dwell within it: one, is the dying but equally vigorous spirit of the dead "empires" and "kingdoms" and "city states" that were subdued and brought into the new nation. Romantic adherents to this lost "empires"s still insist on sustaining old loyalties gto these primordial and really useless, and largely symbolic kindoms with their Oonis, Sultans, Obas, etc. One of the inevitable movements in the evolution of the nation of Nigeria will be to permanently abolish such fictitious empires and direct attention to the new myth of nation. It was this myth of the "volk" that politicians like Awolowo relied upon to create the ideas of "nations within nations" in which being Yoruba or Igbo or Edo or Fulani was transcendent rather than complimentary to being Nigerian. You would often hear the paradoxical claim, "you cannot be a good Nigerian until you re a good Yoruba." This is of course hogwash. There is nothing evil about being Igbo or Yoruba or Ijo etc, but within the fundamental charter of Nigeria's sovereignty from Britain - its Republican constitution is the very fundamental, modern idea of being in nation and being in history - it is to be "individual." In other words, it does not matter whether you are Igbo or Yoruba or Hausa, equality and freedom is as guaranteed as individual responsibility. The rights of the individual therefore includes the right of life, of movement, of association, of conscience, to vote and be voted for, and the freedoms that confer dignity to anyone, whether he is Pius Adesanmi living in Yagba or Yemetu or Agenebode or Owerrinta. It is the full rights of citizsenship.
Anyone who prevents that right breaks the fundamental charter of nation. It is an important aspect of this right that Awolowo sought to challenge when he thoroughly misunderstood the meaning of federalism. He was speaking more to a Bantustan nationhood when he declared, "the west for the westerners, the north for the northerners, the East for the Easterners and Nigeria for all of us." Perhaps, indeed, it was not that Awo misunderstood federalism, just that his followers misunderstood his attempts to simplify it, by talking about state rights and the principle of the devolution of powers. But what Awo did not clarify is the meaning of the "westerner" since the political west included even Igbo communities right by the banks of the Niger. Awo also did not take into consideration the nature of the modern nation beyond its affiliations in the "volk," which made it nececssary to fully dismantle all elements that seemed distinctly conflictual with the modern nation - like his support for the "traditional" monarchical institutions of the Yoruba with whom he created what Biodun Jeyifo might call "arrested modernity" or "arrested decolonization." This has haunted the full formation of Nigeria from ikts inception. It is also remarkable to me that Awoists like Dr. Mobolaji Aluko act, vote and affirm the aims of the Democrats here in the US, but given their positions on Nigeria and within the Nigerian context, he acts more like a Tea-Party Republican, on issues of state rights. Indeed, Awo would ave been, were he American, a Republican. Yet in the Nigerian context, those who have not carefully studied his politics ascribe all kinds of liberal and "progressive" ideas to him. This is not true.
But back to the meaning of Nigeria: Nigeria is a modern nation and registered in the Assembly of nations, until it becomes like Somalia, ungovernable. But even in its ungovernability, Somalia remains geographically intact, and may either be reconstituted by force or absorbed by a higher entity also by force. There have been an attempt to reorganize Nigeria through a civil war. It failed and it is important to mark the anxieties that have followed that failed attempt. But that anxiety will settle in the next two or more generations who will not recollect the war, and who will be confronted by a new anxiety: of being and nothingness - in other words, the existential conflict that afflicts a generation that will give up orthodox religion (they would have had a surfeit of it through their parents and would have seen its hollow and unsatisfying end) and the overwhelming meaning of living in the increasing margins of the postcolony. They will try to make sense of their new urbanity, for there have never been any other time in modern history that a diverse range of people are meeting and knowing themselves and living more intimately together in the space of the nation such as now. They will be guided more by class and economic questions rather than by sub-national or ethnic affiliations. So, all those who think that Lagos will "revert" to the Edo or the Yoruba will have to explain what that means exactly in the context of the nation. Indeed same goes for complex conurbations like Aba-Port-Harcourt, Kano, Jos, etc. We must see the current claims of the moment as the last acts of dissapearing communities which are being replaced by a new, more overwhelming national consciousness. There are those who say Nigeria has too many "nations" within it to fully function. It will not be the first or the only. There are many old nations with "nations" within them. My example will be a very old country like Ethiopia with many ethnicities -the Oromo, the Amhara, the Somali, the Guraje, the Tigray, the Wolata, etc. As for Atueyi's question about Hong-Kong and China: the example is not apt since Hong Kong was returned to China by the Brits at the fullness of the treaty of protection. The more apt question and example should be about Taiwan and China with their remarkable histories, and Taiwanese assertion of independence. With Lagos, the issue will be as complex, in the event that a succesor state other than the Federation of Nigeria lays a claim upon it. Its documents of cession in 1861 as well as it status as a colony ceded to Nigeria as a federal territory at the moment of amalgamation and independence will all come to play. But, we are dealing at the realms of speculation in this regard.
Obi Nwakanma
____________ _________ "If I don't learn to shut my mouth I'll soon go to hell, I, Okigbo, town-crier, together with my iron bell." --Christopher Okigbo
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