Chinese Capabilities for Computer Network Operations and Cyber Espionage
Yona Maro
The PLA’s sustained modernization effort over the
past two decades has driven remarkable transformation within the force
and put the creation of modern command, control, communications,
computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR)
infrastructure at the heart of the PLA’s strategic guidelines for long
term development. This priority on C4ISR systems modernization, has in
turn been a catalyst for the development of an integrated information
warfare (IW) capability capable of defending military and civilian
networks while seizing control of an adversary’s information systems
during a conflict.
The effects of preemptive penetrations may not
be readily observable or detected until after combat has begun or after
Chinese computer network attack (CNA) teams have executed their tools
against targeted networks. Even if circumstantial evidence points to
China as the culprit, no policy currently exists to easily determine
appropriate response options to a large scale attack on U.S. military or
civilian networks in which definitive attribution is lacking. Beijing,
understanding this, may seek to exploit this gray area in U.S.
policymaking and legal frameworks to create delays in U.S. command
decision making.
Earlier in the past decade, the PLA adopted a
multi-layered approach to offensive information warfare that it calls
Integrated Network Electronic Warfare or INEW strategy. Now, the PLA is
moving toward information confrontation as a broader conceptualization
that seeks to unite the various components of IW under a single warfare
commander. The need to coordinate offensive and defensive missions more
closely and ensure these missions are mutually supporting is driven by
the recognition that IW must be closely integrated with PLA campaign
objectives.