Operation Anaconda
Yeff
Two different paragraphs from this month's Air
Force Magazine, in the article "The Air Power of
Anaconda":
First,
"Operation Anaconda's second flaw was that the plan
was not tightly coordinated with the air component.
The emerging plan for Anaconda had all the earmarks
of an operation planned almost exclusively within
the Army component and special forces. What Myers,
in his discussions with Hagenback, could not have
known was that the plan for Anaconda had not been
fully coordinated with the joint air component.
According to one officer, the Combined Air Operations
Center staff did not learn of Anaconda until a day
before the operation was due to start."
And,
"Strangling al Qaeda strongholds took more than ground
encirclement and movement to contact - it took a solid
pounding from air power, too. One clear lesson was that
air-ground coordination - a stunning success in the
earlier phases of Operation Enduring Freedom - was given
short shrift in the original planning for Operation
Anaconda. The 72-hour operation stretched over more
than two weeks, demanded intense air support, and might
well have had seen higher casualties had the joint air
support - from B-52s to F/A-18s to Apaches - not been
there when needed."
-----
Please tell me the above is only the opinion of an Air
Force centric magazine and not the truth of what really
happened. They didn't really plan that thing without
talking to the air component, did they?
-Jeff B.
yeff at erols dot com
Steve Conklin
Where the hell was the ALO in all this? That's his damn job to rep the
blue suiters and tell the Army what can and can not be done.
Steve
a snark@bangserver.na
You may have to wait a few years on the answer here.
Since the Planning for that Operation occurred
primarily at CENTCOM and IIRC it's unlikely anyone in
uma currently would be able to speak to this issue
directly even if the were with CENTCOM and privy to the
planning process there.
Also consider this, the magazine article is speaking
about a cordon & search operation that was still in its
earliest stages when the initial contact with the enemy
was made. For all anyone can know from open source
material, the Air Force Magazine article may be
correct, but then ask yourself why were there Air
Assets available to the two heliborne parties whose
aircraft were damaged and the personnel pinned down by
the Al Qaeda within minutes of that occurrence. Open
source material on the battle mentions that Air Cover
played a vital role in keeping those forces alive until
they were relieved and extricated a day or so later.
IMHO, It's still too early for a post-mortem by anyone
who did not have direct access to the planning and
intelligence that was available to the architects of
Operation Anaconda.
Snark
--
"The first principle of deception
is to aim to strengthen
an opponent's preconceptions."
Anthony Clayton
History of the Intelligence Corps p. 48.
Colin Campbell
>Please tell me the above is only the opinion of an Air
>Force centric magazine and not the truth of what really
>happened. They didn't really plan that thing without
>talking to the air component, did they?
Considering that the HQ that organized this was a 'joint' unit, I find
it hard to believe.
Could it be that the Air Force was simply not able to adapt to a
rapidly changing tactical situation?
--
"We are fighting today for security, for progress,
and for peace, not only for ourselves but for all
men, not only for one generation but for all
generations. We are fighting to cleanse the world
of ancient evils, ancient ills."
Franklin Delano Rosevelt
State of the Union Address - 1942
Yeff
a sn...@bangserver.na<ssn...@earthlink.net> wrote in
us.military.army:
> Also consider this, the magazine article is speaking
> about a cordon & search operation that was still in its
> earliest stages when the initial contact with the enemy
> was made. For all anyone can know from open source
> material, the Air Force Magazine article may be
> correct, but then ask yourself why were there Air
> Assets available to the two heliborne parties whose
> aircraft were damaged and the personnel pinned down by
> the Al Qaeda within minutes of that occurrence. Open
> source material on the battle mentions that Air Cover
> played a vital role in keeping those forces alive until
> they were relieved and extricated a day or so later.
The point of the article wasn't the lack of air, it was
the lack of planning on using air. Anaconda was supposed
to be a 72hr op, not the week-long+ fight it turned out
to be.
Actually, just checked the web and they've already
posted the September issue:
http://www.afa.org/magazine/Sept2002/0902anaconda.asp
That'll make it easier for us to discuss... what we
can discuss.
> IMHO, It's still too early for a post-mortem by anyone
> who did not have direct access to the planning and
> intelligence that was available to the architects of
> Operation Anaconda.
True, but it's more interesting than erron bashing. ;-)
Yeff
Colin Campbell<col...@linkline.com> wrote in
us.military.army:
> Considering that the HQ that organized this was a 'joint' unit, I find
> it hard to believe.
>
> Could it be that the Air Force was simply not able to adapt to a
> rapidly changing tactical situation?
It wasn't the Air Force that was left out of the planning,
it was the entire air component. Deconflicting *all* the
tac-air, Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine takes planning
and shouldn't be done ad hoc:
"For Operation Anaconda as a whole, contact with the enemy demonstrated
the need for more airpower, far exceeding the plan for a 72-hour
campaign. By Sunday, bombers, fighters, and gunships were stacking up
in the area estimated by the Pentagon to be only about 70 square
miles--about the size of the District of Columbia."
Colin Campbell
The original plan was for a 72 hour campaign. But then events threw
that plan out the window, the AF needs to be adaptable enough to
rapidly change gears.
The impression I get was that the AF was not able to 'keep up' with
events on the ground.
a snark@bangserver.na
>
> On Tue, 03 Sep 2002 20:55:36 GMT,
> a sn...@bangserver.na<ssn...@earthlink.net> wrote in
> us.military.army:
>
> > Also consider this, the magazine article is speaking
> > about a cordon & search operation that was still in its
> > earliest stages when the initial contact with the enemy
> > was made. For all anyone can know from open source
> > material, the Air Force Magazine article may be
> > correct, but then ask yourself why were there Air
> > Assets available to the two heliborne parties whose
> > aircraft were damaged and the personnel pinned down by
> > the Al Qaeda within minutes of that occurrence. Open
> > source material on the battle mentions that Air Cover
> > played a vital role in keeping those forces alive until
> > they were relieved and extricated a day or so later.
>
> The point of the article wasn't the lack of air, it was
> the lack of planning on using air. Anaconda was supposed
> to be a 72hr op, not the week-long+ fight it turned out
> to be.
>
Actually, Anaconda itself was supposed to last much
longer than 72 hours. That's some rugged terrain and a
lot of places to hide. They're still searching the
area today from what I can tell in the Army PIO
releases.
> Actually, just checked the web and they've already
> posted the September issue:
> http://www.afa.org/magazine/Sept2002/0902anaconda.asp
>
> That'll make it easier for us to discuss... what we
> can discuss.
>
Good, although I have to check the PIO and other
releases for open source documents (always a pain in
the butt since I'm looking for specific information).
> > IMHO, It's still too early for a post-mortem by anyone
> > who did not have direct access to the planning and
> > intelligence that was available to the architects of
> > Operation Anaconda.
>
> True, but it's more interesting than erron bashing. ;-)
>
> -Jeff B.
> yeff at erols dot com
Yes, it is. I'll take a look at the article in its
entirety then.
DeadMeat
"Colin Campbell" <col...@linkline.com> wrote in message
news:jeeanu84khbiaohup...@4ax.com...
> On Tue, 3 Sep 2002 18:04:53 -0400, Yeff <ye...@myrealbox.com> wrote:
>
> > On Tue, 03 Sep 2002 13:56:58 -0700,
> > Colin Campbell<col...@linkline.com> wrote in
> > us.military.army:
> >
> >> Considering that the HQ that organized this was a 'joint' unit, I find
> >> it hard to believe.
> >>
> >> Could it be that the Air Force was simply not able to adapt to a
> >> rapidly changing tactical situation?
> >
> >It wasn't the Air Force that was left out of the planning,
> >it was the entire air component. Deconflicting *all* the
> >tac-air, Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine takes planning
> >and shouldn't be done ad hoc:
> >
> >"For Operation Anaconda as a whole, contact with the enemy demonstrated
> >the need for more airpower, far exceeding the plan for a 72-hour
> >campaign. By Sunday, bombers, fighters, and gunships were stacking up
> >in the area estimated by the Pentagon to be only about 70 square
> >miles--about the size of the District of Columbia."
>
> The original plan was for a 72 hour campaign. But then events threw
> that plan out the window, the AF needs to be adaptable enough to
> rapidly change gears.
>
> The impression I get was that the AF was not able to 'keep up' with
> events on the ground.
Or was it that the Army was ill suited for the operation.
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a snark@bangserver.na
>
> On Tue, 03 Sep 2002 13:56:58 -0700,
> Colin Campbell<col...@linkline.com> wrote in
> us.military.army:
>
> > Considering that the HQ that organized this was a 'joint' unit, I find
> > it hard to believe.
> >
> > Could it be that the Air Force was simply not able to adapt to a
> > rapidly changing tactical situation?
>
> It wasn't the Air Force that was left out of the planning,
> it was the entire air component. Deconflicting *all* the
> tac-air, Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine takes planning
> and shouldn't be done ad hoc:
>
I've finished reading the article by Ms. Rebecca Grant
in the AF Times you've cited.
First of all there are some editorializations that have
occurred by Ms. Grant in her article. The following
paragraph contains several such editorializing
comments.
CENTCOM's plan for eliminating al Qaeda pockets would
be a "movement to contact" as Army Gen. Tommy R.
Franks, CENTCOM head, later termed it. Instead of a
single, traditional front line, the objective was to
take key positions and form a screen around several
known caves, compounds, and other al Qaeda strongholds.
"This is a sizable pocket of al Qaeda that needs to be
dealt with," Central Command spokesman Rear Adm. Craig
R.Quigley told the New York Times. "We have studied
this place for some time."
Editorializations 1: CENTCOM's plan for eliminating al
Qaeda pockets would be a "movement to contact" as Army
Gen. Tommy R. Franks, CENTCOM head, later termed it.
Fact: The concept of Operation Anaconda as stated by
CENTCOM was a cordon and search operation, whereas in
this sentence she uses an out of context quote by Gen.
Franks to describe it as a movement to contact which is
what it became when the cordoning forces encountered
enemy forces.
Editorializations 2: The "objective of Operation
Anaconda was not to form a screen around several around
several known caves, compounds, and other al Qaeda
strongholds."
The objective was to contain, fix, and eliminate the
mixed Al Qaeda and Taliban forces that were
concentrating in and around the Shah i Khot valley.
> "For Operation Anaconda as a whole, contact with the enemy demonstrated
> the need for more airpower, far exceeding the plan for a 72-hour
> campaign. By Sunday, bombers, fighters, and gunships were stacking up
> in the area estimated by the Pentagon to be only about 70 square
> miles--about the size of the District of Columbia."
I'm still unclear about the supposed 72 hour "campaign"
since nowhere in the US Army open source documents have
I found such a reference other than that the initial
movements to cordon the area would take about 72
hours.
All in all, there are many more editorializations
contained in the description of the battles during the
operation. One must wonder why, if there was no Air
Coordination plan that there were Air units (AH-64s)
available to support the aborted
demonstration/diversionary attack at Sirkankel and why
there was a Combat Air Patrol orbiting nearby with
available refueling when the incident at Takur Gar took
place. That sounds suspiciously like a lot more air
coordination than zero was in place here.
Remember that its budget season again and the various
services are all trying to get in their spin on recent
events to better position themselves at the
Congressional feed troughs.
RTO Trainer
That's almost word for word what I heard from my CG ar JRTC 5 or 6
times, just in present tense. Interesting.
Yeff
us.military.army:
> The original plan was for a 72 hour campaign. But then events threw
> that plan out the window, the AF needs to be adaptable enough to
> rapidly change gears.
>
> The impression I get was that the AF was not able to 'keep up' with
> events on the ground.
Turn it around and you see what I'm getting at: suppose the
CAOC had put together a plan for a major attack that included
ground forces but didn't include the ground forces in the
planning until a day before the operation kicked off? Don't
you think there'd be some concern about a break-down in planning?
And, apparently, the air component (not just the Air Force)
*was* able to keep up with events on the ground. There was
probably a lot of wasted resources (if sorties stacking up
is true) but they were there putting bombs on target. But
if there'd been more time to plan the ATO could've been
fragged more efficiently.
Yeff
> > It wasn't the Air Force that was left out of the planning,
Okay, that's the kind of stuff I hoped to find out
with this discussion. Thanks.
> > "For Operation Anaconda as a whole, contact with the enemy demonstrated
> > the need for more airpower, far exceeding the plan for a 72-hour
> > campaign. By Sunday, bombers, fighters, and gunships were stacking up
> > in the area estimated by the Pentagon to be only about 70 square
> > miles--about the size of the District of Columbia."
>
> I'm still unclear about the supposed 72 hour "campaign"
> since nowhere in the US Army open source documents have
> I found such a reference other than that the initial
> movements to cordon the area would take about 72
> hours.
>
> All in all, there are many more editorializations
> contained in the description of the battles during the
> operation. One must wonder why, if there was no Air
> Coordination plan that there were Air units (AH-64s)
> available to support the aborted
> demonstration/diversionary attack at Sirkankel and why
> there was a Combat Air Patrol orbiting nearby with
> available refueling when the incident at Takur Gar took
> place. That sounds suspiciously like a lot more air
> coordination than zero was in place here.
It's one thing to have the pilots sit down before
the flight and go over potential targets and procedures,
including mapping specific targets to specific weapons.
It's quite another to just have whatever's in the available
CAP (2 Eagles and a Spectre initially) and organic to the
attacking force when the battle starts.
I think the point about having a plan that relies heavily
on the forces in contact coordinating with tac-air and
those forces not being well trained in that type of fight
(Northern Alliance vice US Army) is also valid.
It all worked out in the end but it seems (from the article)
that there were plenty of ways it could've (should've?) gone
much better.
> Remember that its budget season again and the various
> services are all trying to get in their spin on recent
> events to better position themselves at the
> Congressional feed troughs.
That goes without saying. <g>
a snark@bangserver.na
>
> On Tue, 03 Sep 2002 15:40:31 -0700,
> Colin Campbell<col...@linkline.com> wrote in
> us.military.army:
>
> > The original plan was for a 72 hour campaign. But then events threw
> > that plan out the window, the AF needs to be adaptable enough to
> > rapidly change gears.
> >
> > The impression I get was that the AF was not able to 'keep up' with
> > events on the ground.
>
> Turn it around and you see what I'm getting at: suppose the
> CAOC had put together a plan for a major attack that included
> ground forces but didn't include the ground forces in the
> planning until a day before the operation kicked off? Don't
> you think there'd be some concern about a break-down in planning?
>
Somehow, that scenario wouldn't be consistent with the
level of coordination and planning Air Operations
during the previous parts of the campaign had been
given. It is entirely possible that for the first part
of the operation, where the forces to create the cordon
were being set in place, air activity would be kept to
a minimum to allow the movement of the forces into
their respective positions with little or no
preparatory fire to draw as little attention to the
movements as possible. Remember, that Air Assets were
being used more like the classical use of Artillery
throughout operations in Afghanistan as Gen. Franks had
eschewed transporting the heavy artillery assets of
both the 187th of the 101st and 10th Mtn. Air Forces
were generally included in the supporting arms
paragraphs of the Operations Orders for both the
traditional Air Support role and that of Artillery.
> And, apparently, the air component (not just the Air Force)
> *was* able to keep up with events on the ground. There was
> probably a lot of wasted resources (if sorties stacking up
> is true) but they were there putting bombs on target. But
> if there'd been more time to plan the ATO could've been
> fragged more efficiently.
>
Throughout operations in Afghanistan, (Many reports of
this are contained in various news stories regarding
Tora Bora) sorties stacked up over the area as the
number of aircraft and munitions available exceeded the
number of identified and identifiable targets over a
given area. Also, there are some requirements under
the ROE that must be met regarding the targeting to
prevent accidental targeting of civilians.
a snark@bangserver.na
One of the problems that may have existed was that
although the village of Shah i Kot had been identified
as a point of concentration by Taliban and Al Qaeda
forces, there was no hard intelligence as to the
numbers, disposition, location, etc., that could be
used to set up targeting for Air Assets. This is
probably the reason that Operation Anaconda was set up
as a cordon and search operation. Far too many
unknowns and the presence of civilians throughout the
area to be searched. The best you could plan for under
those conditions would be to have Air Assets (Gunships
for close air support, fast movers and bombers in the
role normally played by heavy artillery.) ready to
provide supporting fires. This is probably why there
were no specific mission briefs prior to the sorties.
> It's quite another to just have whatever's in the available
> CAP (2 Eagles and a Spectre initially) and organic to the
> attacking force when the battle starts.
>
Remember the timing of the missions here. The force at
Sirkankel was to act as a diversionary force and to
block the Northern most passage, and was moving up to
where their jump off point when they were ambushed. (I
have some opinions on this for later if you'd like to
hear them.) The forces at Takur Gar were scouting the
designated LZs prior to the actual insertion of the
remaining cordoning forces and the first elements of
the search force. At this early stage of such an
operation it would be foolish to signal the intent to
mount a ground operation by preparatory fire whether by
non existent artillery or Air Assets. Also, are you
absolutely certain that only the 2 F-15s and Spectre
were in orbit over the AO? The AH-64s that supported
the forces engaged at Sirkankel came in rather quickly
to have been sitting at Bagram (AH-64s are much slower
movers than a jet) Also, the initial 2 F-15s were
replaced rather quickly upon expenditure of their
ordnance loads. Therefore, leading one to suspect
there were replacements either orbiting as the first
two went into their attack or on their way to the
area. I'm no expert on fighter aircraft but, from the
time it takes for an Army Aviation to get an attack
helicopter armed and ready for a mission my guess is
that it would have taken at least 20 minutes to get an
Air Force fighter ready for launch. Whereas, my
understanding is that the Air Force pretty much kept a
steady support of the teams trapped in Takur Gar from
the outset.
> I think the point about having a plan that relies heavily
> on the forces in contact coordinating with tac-air and
> those forces not being well trained in that type of fight
> (Northern Alliance vice US Army) is also valid.
>
Perhaps, but generally, the Special Operations
personnel attached to those United Front (Northern
Alliance troops were dispatched by Hamid Karzai to
support the operation later. The initial forces were
actually Eastern Alliance. All of which probably makes
no sense to you but it is a very important detail to
those in the AO.) were specifically trained in
coordinating Tac-Air assets and IIRC included Air Force
CCTs. While the scouting mission at Takur Gar
consisted of a mixed Navy, AF force. All of these
forces would have been highly skilled in the employment
of Air Assets. Some of the Special Forces teams and the
CCTs with the Northern (diversionary/blocking) force
made up of Afghani militiamen would have been using Air
Assets such as Fighter/Bombers, Heavy Bombers, and
Other Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps Air for from 4-5
months prior to this operation.
> It all worked out in the end but it seems (from the article)
> that there were plenty of ways it could've (should've?) gone
> much better.
>
There are always better ways to do something when
viewed in hindsight. That is the purpose of post
operation debriefings and reviews of after action
reports. Perhaps those lessons are currently being
used by the commanders on the ground in the current
less publicized cordon and search operations on-going
in that area.
> > Remember that its budget season again and the various
> > services are all trying to get in their spin on recent
> > events to better position themselves at the
> > Congressional feed troughs.
>
> That goes without saying. <g>
It is a very important consideration when reading this
and similar articles appearing in the Military Review
and other professional journals. As these will
undoubtedly be used to lobby Congress.
Steve Conklin
No plan survives first contact with the enemy.
Steve
Tank Fixer
<al4qht$t20$2...@bob.news.rcn.net>,
I think it was more the mis-conception that CAS would be able to
provide all the fire support required.
I note the 101st took some arty along this rotation.
--
--
Remember, Friendly fire, Isn't :