Michiel,
It's great that you've found this, but please keep in mind that this
project is highly experimental, so don't change your plans too much to
rely on it. Rather, if there are ideas we can work on together, I think
that would be best.
-Ben
Sauropod looks like a cool concept. I just had a read through of the docs.
I do like the ACL model, am currently going through the OAuth 2.0 spec
to see if they also allow something similar ... will post back after
I've increased my knowledge! :)
Looks like lots of people are working towards similar goals, some work
to do, but it seems reasonable that we can have this aligned (at least
at a high level) by the next protocol release (April)
In general I think there are 3 visibilities that are *really* useful
1 Private
==========
Kind of goes without saying that the user should have some private
storage ability.
Encryption is a bonus. Dropbox do some aes but they have the key.
2 Public
=========
This is normally added with most cloud stuff ive seen (amazon, u1, dropbox etc.)
Kind of also speaks for itself
3 Friends
=========
Somewhere between a nice to have, and a must.
This is less ubiquitous, however I'd say there's strong reasoning behind it.
Facebook grew in popularity as essentially a shared space among
friends. This alone could be a strong motivation, it's the 'social'
thing to do, not to mention the ability to go viral through friend
connections.
I know dropbox allows shared access to files. Google circles raises
the bar even further, but may be overkill for a first version.
A good way to achieve this, imho, is access control lists. I checked
over the weekend with the OAuth list and they said this is possible
using OAuth. Read / Write web spaces such as data.fm are already
implementing first versions of access control lists too. I have
already found this to be very useful in starting to implment apps.
So I think (1) and (2) are natural extensions of cloud storage over
HTTP. (3) may be newer but I think there's growing call and good
motivation. Just my $0.02 :)
This remind me the unix user-group-others priviledges, isn't it?
Sended from my Android cell phone, please sorry the lack of format on the text and my fat thumbs :-P
2) should we use OAuth (like remoteStorage) or fenced data partitions (like sauropod) for deciding which app can write where? I already discussed with Jan yesterday that before we can continue discussing scenarios like this one, we first need to see what it looks like. Let me create a "myfavourite..." demo about this question, then it will be easier to talk about it.
I'll report back as soon as i have a demo to show about the second question (probably in about a week), so we can research/discuss it jointly.
This is very similar to stuff we've been exploring.
I've also been toying with the idea that BrowserID could replace, in a
user-centric way, the "dance" portion of OAuth. This is so raw I haven't
even posted it on the dev-identity list, but since we're discussing
OAuth here, I'm wondering what your take is? Might BrowserID be the
right place to present a dialog that says "do you want to allow site A
to authenticate as you to site B?"
-Ben
I've also been toying with the idea that BrowserID could replace, in a
user-centric way, the "dance" portion of OAuth. This is so raw I haven't
even posted it on the dev-identity list, but since we're discussing
OAuth here, I'm wondering what your take is? Might BrowserID be the
right place to present a dialog that says "do you want to allow site A
to authenticate as you to site B?"
-Ben
I think you're talking about click-jacking, because the only way that a
phishing action causes a true action to occur is either by stealing the
credentials, or by framing the real site with a fake overlay.
We do extensive clickjacking protection on BrowserID, and when the
dialog goes native, of course, clickjacking will be inherently impossible.
Let me know if that answers your question. And maybe it's time for me to
take this thread to dev-identity :)
-Ben
So modern browsers already support the X-FRAME_OPTIONS HTTP header [1]
that strictly prevents framing/clickjacking, and we have that deployed
already on BrowserID. That should be a solid solution to this problem.
When we go native with the dialog (and yes, we do expect this at least
on Firefox in the second half of 2012), the protection will be at least
as strong.
-Ben
[1] https://developer.mozilla.org/en/The_X-FRAME-OPTIONS_response_header
I've also been toying with the idea that BrowserID could replace, in a
user-centric way, the "dance" portion of OAuth.
I'm wondering what your take is? Might BrowserID be the
right place to present a dialog that says "do you want to allow site A
to authenticate as you to site B?"