Hiroshima - not all bad?
ste...@bowness.demon.co.uk
1945, and had left the city when the Americans dropped an atomb bomb on
it.
Would that have been a good thing? A miraculous escape?
Let us see how prominent theologian Richard Swinburne, a Professor at
Oxford University, answers that question on page 264 of his book 'The
Existence of God'...
'Suppose that one less person had been burnt by the Hiroshima atomic
bomb. Then there would have been less opportunity for courage and
sympathy;one less piece of information about the effects of atomic
radiation....'
But Richard, wouldn't there be one more person alive to show courage
and sympathy?
If everybody in the world was killed, who would take advantage of these
thousands of millions of opportuities to show courage and sympathy?
Perhaps God got the balance just right at Hiroshima? Not too many dead,
and certainly not one person too few....?
And should dead people really be counted in terms of 'information about
the effects of atomic radiation'?
Revd. Eric Potts
Without being able to put the quote in context, any comment risks being
wrong. But going solely on the bit that was quoted, I find the comment
appalling. I would guess that God does too!
Gareth McCaughan
[Steven Carr quotes Richard Swinburne as saying, inter alia:]
>> 'Suppose that one less person had been burnt by the Hiroshima atomic
>> bomb. Then there would have been less opportunity for courage and
>> sympathy;one less piece of information about the effects of atomic
>> radiation....'
...
[Eric:]
> Without being able to put the quote in context, any comment risks being
> wrong. But going solely on the bit that was quoted, I find the comment
> appalling. I would guess that God does too!
Unfortunately, the quotation above is pretty much typical
of Swinburne's writings on the subject of God and evil.
I suppose it's to his credit that he makes an apparently
serious attempt to address some of the hardest cases,
but it does rather beggar belief that a human being can
really think the way he seems to.
But that's one of the problems with theodicy: if you try
to explain how a perfectly good God can allow horrors, then
you inevitably end up justifying horrors. The principal
alternative is to shrug your shoulders and say "it's a
mystery". Moral corruption or intellectual abdication ...
not an agreeable choice :-).
--
Gareth McCaughan
.sig under construc
ste...@bowness.demon.co.uk
> ste...@bowness.demon.co.uk wrote:
>
> > Suppose one or two people had decided to go on a picnic that day in
> > 1945, and had left the city when the Americans dropped an atomb bomb on
> > it.
> >
> > Would that have been a good thing? A miraculous escape?
> >
> > Let us see how prominent theologian Richard Swinburne, a Professor at
> > Oxford University, answers that question on page 264 of his book 'The
> > Existence of God'...
> >
> >
> > 'Suppose that one less person had been burnt by the Hiroshima atomic
> > bomb. Then there would have been less opportunity for courage and
> > sympathy;one less piece of information about the effects of atomic
> > radiation....'
> Without being able to put the quote in context, any comment risks being
> wrong. But going solely on the bit that was quoted, I find the comment
> appalling. I would guess that God does too!
Swinburne went on to say that the more people who died, the more
grieving relatives there would be to campaign for peace.
Thank goodness we atheists are ignorant of the work of such
sofistikated theologians as Richard Swinburne, or else we too might
lose all sense of human values....
David A.
Gareth McCaughan <Gareth.M...@pobox.com> wrote:
>
> But that's one of the problems with theodicy: if you try
> to explain how a perfectly good God can allow horrors, then
> you inevitably end up justifying horrors. The principal
> alternative is to shrug your shoulders and say "it's a
> mystery". Moral corruption or intellectual abdication ...
> not an agreeable choice :-).
Why are theologians so attached to the idea that God is wholly good?
Even the most cursory reading of the Bible reveals that God is jealous,
vengeful and capricious but also capable of love and mercy. If this view
of God is accepted, then the formidable Problem of Evil just dissolves
away.
Gordon Hudson
news:87fycq9...@g.mccaughan.ntlworld.com...
> But that's one of the problems with theodicy: if you try
> to explain how a perfectly good God can allow horrors, then
> you inevitably end up justifying horrors. The principal
> alternative is to shrug your shoulders and say "it's a
> mystery".
Or to say its people who do bad things and God has never promised to stop
them.
Thats how I look at it and there is no contradiction therfore between bad
things happening and the gospel message.
That might be why I don't feel discouraged when limbs don't regrow ;)
Revd. Eric Potts
> Unfortunately, the quotation above is pretty much typical
> of Swinburne's writings on the subject of God and evil.
> I suppose it's to his credit that he makes an apparently
> serious attempt to address some of the hardest cases,
> but it does rather beggar belief that a human being can
> really think the way he seems to.
>
> But that's one of the problems with theodicy: if you try
> to explain how a perfectly good God can allow horrors, then
> you inevitably end up justifying horrors. The principal
> alternative is to shrug your shoulders and say "it's a
> mystery". Moral corruption or intellectual abdication ...
> not an agreeable choice :-).
;-)
Is it really intellectual abdication? And is the recognition of the
fact of horrors a justification of them, as far as believers are
concerned? I guess it depends on your pov.
If one believes in God, part of that belief is recognising that God is,
to use Anselm again, "that than which no greater can be conceived." On
the assumption that even the brightest person's intellectual capacity
is limited, it might be better to say "that which is beyond the
greatest that can be conceived"! In other words, the belief in God
requires not so much a God-of-the-gaps as a recognition that the very
best we can achieve must fall short of a clear understanding of God. In
other words, "it's a mystery"!
Of course, it is all to easy to use that as a cop-out. But there may
also come a point at which, after one's honest and best efforts, you
say, "I can go no further in understanding (at this time, perhaps,) and
this is the nearest I can get." To you that may seem like abdication.
In contrast, it may be simple humility before the vastness of
existence. I would say that such a response must be the last resort,
but it may still be the right response. Abdication? Or honesty?
Similarly with theodicy. Agreed, it is one of the most difficult areas
of theology. But if God makes sense to you (generic "you") then some
attempt has to be made, in full recognition of the limitations of
theology as suggested above. As I see it, theology is an art, not a
science, and we speak as poets not as physicists. You speak of God
"allowing" evil. Well, yes, insofar as it is a concomitant of creation,
God allows it.
But, as Mike and I have tried to say in our different ways, omnipotence
is not so much an attribute of God as a part of God's essence, and it
stands alongside creative love as another way of describing that
essence. It seems to me that God had/has only two choices: create a
world in which there is freedom, which will lead to evil; or do not
create a world at all. If that is right, then creating a world equals
allowing evil. But with that comes, in the Christian view, divine pain
and divine responsibility, such that God himself shares the cost of
evil with his creation (ie The Cross) and unfailingly forgives, heals
and gives eternal life. None of that is to minimise pain in the
slightest - to do that would be appalling, and it sounds a little as
though that is what Swinburne is doing. But it is to say that pain is
somehow intrinsic to existence. The only way to avoid it is for God not
to create at all.
Some people's suggested option, of creating a world without the
possibility of evil, is not a real option for the God in whom we
believe, since it is inconceivable without genuine freedom, and "my"
God does not create a world which is a mere plaything. It is free
people or nothing, not free people or puppets.
I am strongly inclined to go one stage further - and I stress this is a
personal view, and is in no way official. I question whether God had
any choice at all, even between creating and not creating. The reason I
say this is that I understand creative love to be indeed the very
essence of God, so that an uncreating God is an oxymoron. God is who
God is. To deny God a choice in that way is not a denial of
omnipotence, except in a purely technical, linguistic sense. God cannot
make a square triangle, not because he is without ability but because
by defintion a square is a square and a triangle is a triangle. God
cannot but create, not because he is not omnipotent but because
creating is what God does and is.
And such creativity is loving; it therefore involves freedom, pain and
ultimate redemption.
To call that justifying horror is, it seems to me, to stretch the words
beyond real meaning.
And, how do I *know* all this? I cannot prove any of it. But in my
experience of the world, of living, and of hurting, and of being
healed, it makes sense to me. That is all I can offer, poetry and not
physics, with an invitation to others to "taste and see, how gracious
is the Lord." If that which I taste appears as poison to another, so be
it. I am at least convinced that God does not in any way punish anyone
because their dietary requirements are not satisfied by the food on my
table.
ste...@bowness.demon.co.uk
<skip>
> But, as Mike and I have tried to say in our different ways, omnipotence
> is not so much an attribute of God as a part of God's essence, and it
> stands alongside creative love as another way of describing that
> essence. It seems to me that God had/has only two choices: create a
> world in which there is freedom, which will lead to evil; or do not
> create a world at all. If that is right, then creating a world equals
> allowing evil.
You mean God is so incompetent that he cannot create beings with free
will that choose good.
That can't be right , surely? After all, God is supposed to have a
Heaven full of such creatures.
<skip>
Gareth McCaughan
> Why are theologians so attached to the idea that God is wholly good?
> Even the most cursory reading of the Bible reveals that God is jealous,
> vengeful and capricious but also capable of love and mercy. If this view
> of God is accepted, then the formidable Problem of Evil just dissolves
> away.
Along with the best reason for actually worshipping God,
which might perhaps be why the theologians are reluctant
to take that tack :-).
Gareth McCaughan
> Thank goodness we atheists are ignorant of the work of such
> sofistikated theologians as Richard Swinburne,
^^^^^^^^^^^^
You've been in Germany too long, Steven. :-)
Gareth McCaughan
> "Gareth McCaughan" <Gareth.M...@pobox.com> wrote in message
> news:87fycq9...@g.mccaughan.ntlworld.com...
>
>> But that's one of the problems with theodicy: if you try
>> to explain how a perfectly good God can allow horrors, then
>> you inevitably end up justifying horrors. The principal
>> alternative is to shrug your shoulders and say "it's a
>> mystery".
>
> Or to say its people who do bad things and God has never promised to stop
> them.
The question isn't what God's promised to do, but what a being
as good as God is supposed to be could reasonably be expected
to do. (The priest and the Levite passed by the injured man
without helping; when challenged later by the Samaritan, they
said "Oh, but we never promised to help him!")
David A.
Gareth McCaughan <Gareth.M...@pobox.com> wrote:
But God has our eternal destiny in his hands. Isn't that a good enough
reason for worshipping him?
'My ways are not your ways, saith the Lord.' So why should the Lord
conform to our standards of good and evil?
By the way, in case anyone is wondering, I am not being facetious. In my
view these are genuine considerations.
DA
Kyril Jenner
news:1163234662.1...@m7g2000cwm.googlegroups.com...
> Suppose one or two people had decided to go on a picnic that day in
> 1945, and had left the city when the Americans dropped an atomb bomb on
> it.
>
> Would that have been a good thing? A miraculous escape?
>
> Let us see how prominent theologian Richard Swinburne, a Professor at
> Oxford University, answers that question on page 264 of his book 'The
> Existence of God'...
>
>
<pedant> Richard Swinburne is not a "theologian": his area is philosophy of
religion. He retired from his post at Oxford some years ago. </pedant>.
IMHO you will find a better approach in the works of the late D Z Phillips.
One memorable quote is something like: "a God who needs a theodicy is not a
God worth believing in." I cannot give a reference as the relevant book is
packed away during a house move.
Archimandrite Kyril Jenner
Gareth McCaughan
>>> Why are theologians so attached to the idea that God is wholly good?
>>> Even the most cursory reading of the Bible reveals that God is jealous,
>>> vengeful and capricious but also capable of love and mercy. If this view
>>> of God is accepted, then the formidable Problem of Evil just dissolves
>>> away.
>>
>> Along with the best reason for actually worshipping God,
>> which might perhaps be why the theologians are reluctant
>> to take that tack :-).
>
> But God has our eternal destiny in his hands. Isn't that a good enough
> reason for worshipping him?
No. Perhaps it's foolish not to be willing to worship mere
power, but I hope I wouldn't do so.
> 'My ways are not your ways, saith the Lord.' So why should the Lord
> conform to our standards of good and evil?
Well, if anything much like Christianity is right then there's
plenty in the Bible to suggest that our standards of good and
evil are derived from God's, and that human goodness is supposed
to be like divine goodness; and also that human goodness is
principally a matter of showing (practical) love and care to
other people, particularly ones in great need whom we can help.
Gareth McCaughan
> IMHO you will find a better approach in the works of the late D Z Phillips.
> One memorable quote is something like: "a God who needs a theodicy is not a
> God worth believing in." I cannot give a reference as the relevant book is
> packed away during a house move.
Could you explain that a little? Surely the need for a theodicy
is a function of how the world is (or, more precisely, how it
appears to us) rather than of how God is? In other words, it
isn't *God* who needs a theodicy; it's *theists*.
Did he perhaps mean "if you think you're entitled to ask for
any sort of justification from God, then you're not showing
him the respect he deserves"? (But seeking a theodicy isn't
about calling God to account; it's about understanding how
the world could be as it is if God is as he is said to be.)
Or "if you're sure enough about God, you won't need a theodicy
to convince you that he's as he's said to be; it'll be so
obvious that all the world's suffering and evil is negligible
in the face of that obviousness"? (But whether this is true
for you isn't a function of how great you believe God to be
or of how great God is, but of what evidence -- or non-evidential
influences on your beliefs -- you happen to have.)
Or "no God worth believing in would care whether *we* were
able to find reasons for his actions"? (But the point isn't
whether God cares; it's that we do.)
I think I can come up with a few more interpretations of
that sort of level of plausibility, but none of them seems
plausible enough to be satisfying. What did Phillips mean?
David A.
Gareth McCaughan <Gareth.M...@pobox.com> wrote:
>
> Well, if anything much like Christianity is right then there's
> plenty in the Bible to suggest that our standards of good and
> evil are derived from God's, and that human goodness is supposed
> to be like divine goodness; and also that human goodness is
> principally a matter of showing (practical) love and care to
> other people, particularly ones in great need whom we can help.
I dunno, Gareth, I think it depends on the relative weights given to the
Old and New Testaments. Even then, I'm far from convinced the God of the
New Testament is all sweetness and light either.
Gareth McCaughan
[me:]
>> But that's one of the problems with theodicy: if you try
>> to explain how a perfectly good God can allow horrors, then
>> you inevitably end up justifying horrors. The principal
>> alternative is to shrug your shoulders and say "it's a
>> mystery". Moral corruption or intellectual abdication ...
>> not an agreeable choice :-).
[Eric:]
> Is it really intellectual abdication? And is the recognition of the
> fact of horrors a justification of them, as far as believers are
> concerned? I guess it depends on your pov.
Recognizing the fact of horrors need not be a justification
of them (obviously). But if one really believes that God is
in control and that he is perfectly good, it's hard to avoid
the conclusion that this world, complete with its horrors,
is what he wanted; and if it's what a perfectly good being
wanted then it must be good, right?
But of course there are options other than the ones I
mentioned ...
One can try to get around this by waving one's hands and
saying "free will" a lot, but I never found a way to make
this approach very coherent :-).
Or by saying that God isn't really omnipotent (this tends
to be what appeals to "free will" really amount to, but
it's not done to admit it). You actually need to go quite
a long way past "not altogether omnipotent" before you
make God weak enough to solve the problem, though.
Or by saying he isn't really perfectly good (or, equivalently
in practice, that his notion of goodness is very different
from ours). This has obvious problems of its own.
[about saying that God is way beyond what we can understand...]
> Of course, it is all too easy to use that as a cop-out. But there may
> also come a point at which, after one's honest and best efforts, you
> say, "I can go no further in understanding (at this time, perhaps,) and
> this is the nearest I can get." To you that may seem like abdication.
> In contrast, it may be simple humility before the vastness of
> existence. I would say that such a response must be the last resort,
> but it may still be the right response. Abdication? Or honesty?
I don't think there's anything wrong with saying that God
(if one has once decided that he's there) is far beyond our
understanding. What's an intellectual abdication is to use
that as a reason for stopping searching. Or to pretend that
it means there isn't a problem.
> Similarly with theodicy. Agreed, it is one of the most difficult areas
> of theology. But if God makes sense to you (generic "you") then some
> attempt has to be made, in full recognition of the limitations of
> theology as suggested above. As I see it, theology is an art, not a
> science, and we speak as poets not as physicists. You speak of God
> "allowing" evil. Well, yes, insofar as it is a concomitant of creation,
> God allows it.
You are welcome to be a poet or a physicist, as you please,
and I have no wish to take sides between the two. But, if
we're going to ask questions as important as whether God is
there or not, let's deal in facts; poets as well as physicists
can do that.
> But, as Mike and I have tried to say in our different ways, omnipotence
> is not so much an attribute of God as a part of God's essence, and it
> stands alongside creative love as another way of describing that
> essence.
If you have two things that are difficult to reconcile, declaring
them both to be parts of a single essence makes matters more,
not less, problematic. :-)
> It seems to me that God had/has only two choices: create a
> world in which there is freedom, which will lead to evil; or do not
> create a world at all. If that is right, then creating a world equals
> allowing evil.
I can't speak for anyone else, but what seems to me impossible
to make sense of if anything much like Christianity is right
isn't the mere existence of evil; perhaps indeed that's inevitable
if there's any sort of freedom. (Though I am unconvinced that
this argument can actually be made to work.) And if we interpret
"evil" broadly enough, some "evil" is inevitable as soon as you
have agents with different wants. No, the real difficulty seems
to me to be that there's much more, and much worse, evil than
appears to be explicable as an inevitable consequence of freedom.
> I am strongly inclined to go one stage further - and I stress this is
> a personal view, and is in no way official. I question whether God had
> any choice at all, even between creating and not creating.
So much for freedom :-).
> The reason I
> say this is that I understand creative love to be indeed the very
> essence of God, so that an uncreating God is an oxymoron. God is who
> God is. To deny God a choice in that way is not a denial of
> omnipotence, except in a purely technical, linguistic sense. God cannot
> make a square triangle, not because he is without ability but because
> by defintion a square is a square and a triangle is a triangle. God
> cannot but create, not because he is not omnipotent but because
> creating is what God does and is.
> And such creativity is loving; it therefore involves freedom, pain and
> ultimate redemption.
>
> To call that justifying horror is, it seems to me, to stretch the words
> beyond real meaning.
No, I don't think you're justifying horror. But I think you're
making claims about what's necessary, what's inevitable, without
any good grounds for believing them other than that they're
the best solution you can find to the problem of evil. If you
have (at least what seems to you to be) good enough reason for
believing that there *is* a perfectly good and infinitely powerful
God, then it's quite right for you to seek out whatever means you
can find to make sense of our unsatisfactory world without giving
up that belief. But the more desperate those means, the better
the antecedent reason you need to make searching for a reconciliation
a more reasonable course than abandoning theism :-).
> And, how do I *know* all this? I cannot prove any of it. But in my
> experience of the world, of living, and of hurting, and of being
> healed, it makes sense to me. That is all I can offer, poetry and not
> physics, with an invitation to others to "taste and see, how gracious
> is the Lord." If that which I taste appears as poison to another, so be
> it. I am at least convinced that God does not in any way punish anyone
> because their dietary requirements are not satisfied by the food on my
> table.
Fair enough, of course.
Gareth McCaughan
[me:]
>> Well, if anything much like Christianity is right then there's
>> plenty in the Bible to suggest that our standards of good and
>> evil are derived from God's, and that human goodness is supposed
>> to be like divine goodness; and also that human goodness is
>> principally a matter of showing (practical) love and care to
>> other people, particularly ones in great need whom we can help.
[David:]
> I dunno, Gareth, I think it depends on the relative weights given to the
> Old and New Testaments. Even then, I'm far from convinced the God of the
> New Testament is all sweetness and light either.
I agree. But the Bible *also* says that God is good, and that
we should be good, and that we should be like God, and that
goodness for us consists (crudely put) of being nice to one
another.
So: the Bible is not perfectly consistent with itself. I don't
regard this as news :-).
Trevor Jenkins
> > Old and New Testaments. Even then, I'm far from convinced the God of the
> > New Testament is all sweetness and light either.
>
> I agree. But the Bible *also* says that God is good, and that
> we should be good, and that we should be like God, and that
> goodness for us consists (crudely put) of being nice to one
> another.
Does it say "be good" or rather "be holy"? There's a difference between
those notions. In the account of Jesus talking with the rich young man
(Mark 10:17ff and the Luke parallel 18:18ff) he says "Why do you call me
good? ... No one is good--except God alone."
> So: the Bible is not perfectly consistent with itself. I don't
> regard this as news :-).
Au contraire.
Regards, Trevor
<>< Re: deemed!
Gareth McCaughan
> On 11 Nov 2006 23:09:28 +0000, Gareth McCaughan <Gareth.M...@pobox.com> wrote:
>> David A. wrote:
>>
>>> I dunno, Gareth, I think it depends on the relative weights given to the
>>> Old and New Testaments. Even then, I'm far from convinced the God of the
>>> New Testament is all sweetness and light either.
>>
>> I agree. But the Bible *also* says that God is good, and that
>> we should be good, and that we should be like God, and that
>> goodness for us consists (crudely put) of being nice to one
>> another.
>
> Does it say "be good" or rather "be holy"? There's a difference between
> those notions. In the account of Jesus talking with the rich young man
> (Mark 10:17ff and the Luke parallel 18:18ff) he says "Why do you call me
> good? ... No one is good--except God alone."
To be sure. I should have said "do good" rather than "be good",
perhaps. (A few instances where people are said, or told, to
do good: Luke 6:27, John 5:28, Romans 2:10, Galatians 6:10,
1 Thessalonians 5:15, 1 Timothy 5:10, Titus 2:7, Philemon 14,
Hebrews 13:16, 3 John 11.) -- Oh, and since you quote Luke's
gospel in support of not calling anyone good, I'll direct
you to Luke 6:45, Luke 23:49, and Acts 11:24 :-).
plast...@maxnet.co.nz
> Richard Swinburne, <blah blah blah>
Joeseph Stalin, Pol Pot, blah blah blah
Peter R (blah blah blah) :-)
plast...@maxnet.co.nz
> But that's one of the problems with theodicy: if you try
> to explain how a perfectly good God can allow horrors, then
> you inevitably end up justifying horrors. The principal
> alternative is to shrug your shoulders and say "it's a
> mystery". Moral corruption or intellectual abdication ...
> not an agreeable choice :-).
Yes or alternativly to shrug ones shoulders and say, "it's just the way
of things" which seems to me the only coherant atheist response.
Peter R
Gareth McCaughan
I don't think I understand. A theist who shrugs her shoulders
in response to the problem of evil is declining to respond to
an *apparent inconsistency* in her beliefs. What corresponding
thing are you saying atheists have to do?
Simon Robinson
> But that's one of the problems with theodicy: if you try
> to explain how a perfectly good God can allow horrors, then
> you inevitably end up justifying horrors. The principal
> alternative is to shrug your shoulders and say "it's a
> mystery". Moral corruption or intellectual abdication ...
> not an agreeable choice :-).
What exactly do you mean by 'justify' and why do you see it as a problem?
ISTM that looking at it from a utilitarian POV (I assume that's what
you're doing as I'm not sure what other POV you as an atheist could be
using?), the only problem occurs if as a result of your beliefs you
choose to either create more horrors or not to combat existing horrors,
that you would otherwise have done something about. That certainly
happens in some cases (eg. muslim terrorists, and extreme muslim or
Christian fundamentalists), but that looks to me like the exception
rather than the rule. More often what seems to happen is people
simultaneously:
1. Rationalize the evil in the world (eg. as a sign of sinful nature, or
as part of some divine plan that we don't understand)
2. Feel happier in themselves: Their rationalization of the existence of
evil means that they are less likely to feel dreadfully depressed
because of the evil around them that they can't prevent.
3. Are motivated by those same religious beliefs to fight the evil,
where it is possible to do so.
Of those, (1) by itself looks neutral, and (2) and (3) both look good.
So to repeat the question, how is all that a problem with theodicy? ;-)
Simon Robinson
> I don't think I understand. A theist who shrugs her shoulders
> in response to the problem of evil is declining to respond to
> an *apparent inconsistency* in her beliefs. What corresponding
> thing are you saying atheists have to do?
I'm fairly sure I recall at some point *after* your deconversion, you
made some comment on ukrc which implied you do believe that some things
are wrong, for no particular reason other than they are intrinsically
wrong. Am I correct? And if so, is that inconsistent with being an atheist?
Simon Robinson
> Why are theologians so attached to the idea that God is wholly good?
> Even the most cursory reading of the Bible reveals that God is jealous,
> vengeful and capricious but also capable of love and mercy. If this view
> of God is accepted, then the formidable Problem of Evil just dissolves
> away.
Well in my case I feel convinced of that because - it just feels that
that's the case. I'm not sure I can rationalize it beyond that. My
experience of God comes from within, from my innermost sensations, and
that inner experience tells me very clearly that God is absolutely good
and loving. I guess if theologians have any similar experience to me,
that could explain the attachment to the idea :-)
David A.
"Kyril Jenner" <ky...@mynachdysantelias.fsnet.co.uk> wrote:
>
> <pedant> Richard Swinburne is not a "theologian": his area is philosophy of
> religion. He retired from his post at Oxford some years ago. </pedant>.
I was interested to read at the bottom of the Wikipedia page on
Swinburne:
'His works were influential in the conversion of prominent philosopher
Antony Flew from atheism.'
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Swinburne>
To anyone who is acquainted with the extraordinary twists and turns of
Antony Flew's pronouncements on the subject of God, that is definitely a
back-handed compliment.
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antony_Flew>
DA
Gareth McCaughan
[me, employing just a touch of hyperbole:]
>> But that's one of the problems with theodicy: if you try
>> to explain how a perfectly good God can allow horrors, then
>> you inevitably end up justifying horrors. The principal
>> alternative is to shrug your shoulders and say "it's a
>> mystery". Moral corruption or intellectual abdication ...
>> not an agreeable choice :-).
[Simon:]
> What exactly do you mean by 'justify' and why do you see it as a problem?
I mean "give a justification for". I see it as a problem because
it's a Bad Thing to get yourself into a state in which you can
seriously propose that (say) Auschwitz was a good thing on balance.
> ISTM that looking at it from a utilitarian POV (I assume that's what
> you're doing as I'm not sure what other POV you as an atheist could be
> using?),
I'm not, on the whole, a utilitarian, but utilitarianism will
do well enough :-).
> the only problem occurs if as a result of your beliefs you
> choose to either create more horrors or not to combat existing
> horrors, that you would otherwise have done something about.
No, I think that's an oversimplification. Adjusting your
morality to justify horrors may have effects on your attitude
to smaller-scale evils too.
> That
> certainly happens in some cases (eg. muslim terrorists, and extreme
> muslim or Christian fundamentalists), but that looks to me like the
> exception rather than the rule. More often what seems to happen is
> people simultaneously:
>
> 1. Rationalize the evil in the world (eg. as a sign of sinful nature,
> or as part of some divine plan that we don't understand)
> 2. Feel happier in themselves: Their rationalization of the existence
> of evil means that they are less likely to feel dreadfully depressed
> because of the evil around them that they can't prevent.
> 3. Are motivated by those same religious beliefs to fight the evil,
> where it is possible to do so.
>
> Of those, (1) by itself looks neutral, and (2) and (3) both look good.
I think #1 is bad in itself, because it encourages the idea
that "the evil in the world" isn't so bad a thing after all,
being all part of God's plan.
If #2 is true then I suppose it's a good thing. I see no
evidence that it is. But avoiding depression about the world's
evils by deciding that they aren't so bad after all seems
likely (but here I have no evidence either) to make one
*less* motivated to do something about them, contrary to
your #3.
#3 is certainly a good thing, but I don't think it has
anything to do with theodicy.
Gareth McCaughan
[me:]
>> I don't think I understand. A theist who shrugs her shoulders
>> in response to the problem of evil is declining to respond to
>> an *apparent inconsistency* in her beliefs. What corresponding
>> thing are you saying atheists have to do?
[Simon:]
> I'm fairly sure I recall at some point *after* your deconversion, you
> made some comment on ukrc which implied you do believe that some
> things are wrong, for no particular reason other than they are
> intrinsically wrong. Am I correct? And if so, is that inconsistent
> with being an atheist?
I certainly do believe that some things are wrong. I'm not sure
whether you mean that *I have* "no particular reason" to think
they're wrong, or that *there is* no particular reason why they're
wrong; neither seems particularly close to what I think, but
let's suppose for the sake of argument that both are; that there's
some thing I regard as wrong (1) without having a particular
justification for that belief and (2) without having any explanation
of what makes it wrong. I don't see any inconsistency with atheism
there. Perhaps I'm just being blind, though; can you explain what
the inconsistency is?
Gareth McCaughan
> Well in my case I feel convinced of that because - it just feels that
> that's the case. I'm not sure I can rationalize it beyond that. My
> experience of God comes from within, from my innermost sensations, and
> that inner experience tells me very clearly that God is absolutely
> good and loving.
Why should you (or anyone else) trust these "innermost sensations"?
Have you been able to test them against reality and check that they're
reliable, for instance?
David A.
Simon Robinson <em...@via.my.web.site> wrote:
Private experience has to be respected, but of course it is just that,
private. And when you're a theologian, you presumably have to give
preference to public sources like the Bible. The latter can of course be
interpreted in many different ways, as our discussions in this group
amply demonstrate, and it is no doubt part of a theologian's job to make
his or her interpretations sound persuasive to as wide an audience as
possibe.
DA
David A.
Gareth McCaughan <Gareth.M...@pobox.com> wrote:
> Kyril Jenner wrote:
>
> > IMHO you will find a better approach in the works of the late D Z Phillips.
> > One memorable quote is something like: "a God who needs a theodicy is not
> > a
> > God worth believing in." I cannot give a reference as the relevant book
> > is
> > packed away during a house move.
>
> Could you explain that a little? Surely the need for a theodicy
> is a function of how the world is (or, more precisely, how it
> appears to us) rather than of how God is? In other words, it
> isn't *God* who needs a theodicy; it's *theists*.
I have just discovered that somebody who does not believe God is wholly
good is known as a dystheist.
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eutheism_and_dystheism>
I also discovered on-line the following paper by Phillips: *The Problem
of Evil: A Critique of Swinburne*, but, not having read Swinburne, it
doesn't mean an awful lot to me.
<http://mind.ucsd.edu/syllabi/02-03/01w/readings/phillips.pdf>
plast...@maxnet.co.nz
> >> But that's one of the problems with theodicy: if you try
> >> to explain how a perfectly good God can allow horrors, then
> >> you inevitably end up justifying horrors. The principal
> >> alternative is to shrug your shoulders and say "it's a
> >> mystery". Moral corruption or intellectual abdication ...
> >> not an agreeable choice :-).
Me
> > Yes or alternativly to shrug ones shoulders and say, "it's just the way
> > of things" which seems to me the only coherant atheist response.
Gareth
> I don't think I understand. A theist who shrugs her shoulders
> in response to the problem of evil is declining to respond to
> an *apparent inconsistency* in her beliefs. What corresponding
> thing are you saying atheists have to do?
The inconsistancy, ISTM, is atheists preaching at Christians from some
imagined moral high ground when the vast proportion of Christians,
because of thier faith, are getting on with actually trying to make a
difference to the evil in the world.
The inconsistancy, ISTM, is when an atheist presents as negative,
Christians having the courage to accept that they can't fully reconcile
their faith, using pure reason, with some of what happens in the world,
while not having the courage to accept that, using pure reason, they
themselves have nothing left that can meaningfully be called
"morality".
Peter R
Kyril Jenner
> Kyril Jenner wrote:
>
>> IMHO you will find a better approach in the works of the late D Z
>> Phillips.
>> One memorable quote is something like: "a God who needs a theodicy is
>> not a
>> God worth believing in." I cannot give a reference as the relevant book
>> is
>> packed away during a house move.
>
> Could you explain that a little? Surely the need for a theodicy
> is a function of how the world is (or, more precisely, how it
> appears to us) rather than of how God is? In other words, it
> isn't *God* who needs a theodicy; it's *theists*.
>
That would, I think, be part of what Phillips meant. Unfortunately, my
copies of books by Phillips and Swinburne are somewhere in a stack of 1500
books at my new house five miles away awaiting the moving later this week of
the bookcases to hold them.
It may help to start by looking at some of the differences in the approaches
of Swinburne and Phillips.
Swinburne is avowedly Christian. The last I heard was that he was received
into the Orthodox Church some years ago. However, in much of his published
work on philosophy of religion (notwithstanding that he was "Nolloth
Professor of the Philosophy of the Christian Religion") he focuses on a form
of Theism, using a sort of minimalist concept of God derived from what he
regards as being common to the major montheistic religions. This reduced
view of God I find somewhat problematical as having little to do with the
God in whom I believe [1]. In some of his writings I have also been struck
by his apparent lack of knowledge of some parts of Christian doctrine.
Phillips, by contrast, always tried to keep his personal beliefs out of his
philosophical discussion. His approach was to look at what people actually
said and how they spoke about God. His arguments and discussions are often
very subtle and need to be looked at carefully and in detail to get to what
he is saying.
In this context, working from the memory of what I read several years ago, I
think that part of what Phillips is saying here is that if you have a
concept of a God who needs a theodicy then your concept of God is
inadequate, i.e. you have not really understood what is meant by "God".
You will need to read the whole of what Phillips wrote to get the full drift
of his argument.
Archimandrite Kyril Jenner
[1] One of the problems I see in much of the discussion with atheists is
that the God that the atheists appear not to believe in, I do not believe in
either, but probably for a different reason. Many people's concepts of God
appear to be too narrow. A good starting point for looking at this aspect
is a little book that I read about 45 years ago called "Your God is Too
Small" by J B Phillips.
David A.
"Kyril Jenner" <ky...@mynachdysantelias.fsnet.co.uk> wrote:
>
> In this context, working from the memory of what I read several years ago, I
> think that part of what Phillips is saying here is that if you have a
> concept of a God who needs a theodicy then your concept of God is
> inadequate, i.e. you have not really understood what is meant by "God".
> You will need to read the whole of what Phillips wrote to get the full drift
> of his argument.
Please forgive me if I'm miles off, since my acquaintance with
Phillips's thought is fleeting, indirect and took place many years ago.
I had the impression that he followed Simone Weil in her (somewhat
Gnostic) idea that in creating the universe, God absented himself from
it, thus becoming a powerless observer of what he himself had created.
In such a case, of course, the need for theodicy no longer exists, as
God's omnipotence is severely compromised.
In the final analysis, in order to explain away evil in the world, it
all boils down to what deviations from traditional orthodoxy one is
prepared to contemplate.
D. Albo
Gareth McCaughan
> I also discovered on-line the following paper by Phillips: *The Problem
> of Evil: A Critique of Swinburne*, but, not having read Swinburne, it
> doesn't mean an awful lot to me.
> <http://mind.ucsd.edu/syllabi/02-03/01w/readings/phillips.pdf>
If all it does is to give you the impression that Swinburne's
theodicy is one of cheery smug superficiality masquerading as
depth and compassion, then it will have done the job it needs
to :-).
Kyril Jenner
news:da014b1983-13727...@text.news.blueyonder.co.uk...
> In article <ej7v03$pk6$1...@aioe.server.aioe.org>,
> "Kyril Jenner" <ky...@mynachdysantelias.fsnet.co.uk> wrote:
>>
>> In this context, working from the memory of what I read several years
>> ago, I
>> think that part of what Phillips is saying here is that if you have a
>> concept of a God who needs a theodicy then your concept of God is
>> inadequate, i.e. you have not really understood what is meant by "God".
>> You will need to read the whole of what Phillips wrote to get the full
>> drift
>> of his argument.
>
> Please forgive me if I'm miles off, since my acquaintance with
> Phillips's thought is fleeting, indirect and took place many years ago.
> I had the impression that he followed Simone Weil in her (somewhat
> Gnostic) idea that in creating the universe, God absented himself from
> it, thus becoming a powerless observer of what he himself had created.
> In such a case, of course, the need for theodicy no longer exists, as
> God's omnipotence is severely compromised.
>
(a) I do not recall any reference to Simone Weil (but it is some years since
I last read any of Phillips' work);
(b) I do not think Phillips ever put forward such a view as being his own -
his practice was always to try to maintain a professional detachment;
(c) Such a view seems extremely simplistic, and certainly does not fit with
my recollection of why Phillips thought there was no need for a theodicy.
> In the final analysis, in order to explain away evil in the world, it
> all boils down to what deviations from traditional orthodoxy one is
> prepared to contemplate.
>
Why do you want to explain it away?
Archimandrite Kyril Jenner
Gareth McCaughan
> That would, I think, be part of what Phillips meant. Unfortunately, my
> copies of books by Phillips and Swinburne are somewhere in a stack of 1500
> books at my new house five miles away awaiting the moving later this week of
> the bookcases to hold them.
Congratulations on the new house. I know just how you feel;
I am typing this in a room full of boxes of books, and we
haven't even ordered the bookcases for them yet. (But the
order is going in tomorrow.)
> It may help to start by looking at some of the differences in the approaches
> of Swinburne and Phillips.
>
> Swinburne is avowedly Christian. The last I heard was that he was received
> into the Orthodox Church some years ago. However, in much of his published
> work on philosophy of religion (notwithstanding that he was "Nolloth
> Professor of the Philosophy of the Christian Religion") he focuses on a form
> of Theism, using a sort of minimalist concept of God derived from what he
> regards as being common to the major montheistic religions. This reduced
> view of God I find somewhat problematical as having little to do with the
> God in whom I believe [1]. In some of his writings I have also been struck
> by his apparent lack of knowledge of some parts of Christian doctrine.
I think far too much philosophical writing on broad questions
like the existence of God deals with what I call Generic Philosophical
Theism, which is understandable but sometimes problematic since,
roughly speaking, no one believes in Generic Philosophical Theism.
Real theisms generally have extra resources to draw on, and extra
difficulties, in comparison with Generic Philosophical Theism.
> Phillips, by contrast, always tried to keep his personal beliefs out of his
> philosophical discussion. His approach was to look at what people actually
> said and how they spoke about God. His arguments and discussions are often
> very subtle and need to be looked at carefully and in detail to get to what
> he is saying.
So far, so good :-).
> In this context, working from the memory of what I read several years ago,
> I think that part of what Phillips is saying here is that if you have a
> concept of a God who needs a theodicy then your concept of God is
> inadequate, i.e. you have not really understood what is meant by "God".
I still don't understand what that means; I don't think any serious
theist has a concept of a God-who-needs-a-theodicy, but that doesn't
reduce theists' need for a theodicy. But I'm repeating myself, and
clearly I should just go and read Phillips;
> You will need to read the whole of what Phillips wrote to get the full drift
> of his argument.
Um. Isn't "the whole of what Phillips wrote" really rather a lot?
(The Wikipedia article on Phillips lists 24 books.) I already have
something like 100 books in my to-be-read pile (maybe it's 200...),
and while I'm always interested to learn of new approaches to the
problem of evil I'm not sure I have time to read Phillips's complete
works. Would, say, "The problem of evil and the problem of God"
be sufficient to get a handle on his ideas?
> [1] One of the problems I see in much of the discussion with atheists is
> that the God that the atheists appear not to believe in, I do not believe in
> either, but probably for a different reason. Many people's concepts of God
> appear to be too narrow. A good starting point for looking at this aspect
> is a little book that I read about 45 years ago called "Your God is Too
> Small" by J B Phillips.
Yup, that's a common response to atheists. I think there are a few
separate things going on here. For instance:
1. An atheist may choose to present her case in terms of notions
of God that are easy to shoot down. An intelligent theist is
likely to be operating with a more sophisticated notion of God.
2. A theist may have a somewhat flexible notion of God, changing
his view of omnipotence depending on whether he's encouraging
a congregation to trust in God or responding to an atheist on
the problem of evil. So the god the atheist criticizes may not
be one the theist believes in *at that moment*.
3. An atheist may respond to #2 (whether it actually happens or
is just how she perceives things) by scoffing at sophisticated
God-notions and regarding them as evasions.
plast...@maxnet.co.nz
> I certainly do believe that some things are wrong. I'm not sure
> whether you mean that *I have* "no particular reason" to think
> they're wrong, or that *there is* no particular reason why they're
> wrong; neither seems particularly close to what I think, but
> let's suppose for the sake of argument that both are; that there's
> some thing I regard as wrong (1) without having a particular
> justification for that belief and (2) without having any explanation
> of what makes it wrong. I don't see any inconsistency with atheism
> there. Perhaps I'm just being blind, though; can you explain what
> the inconsistency is?
*If* both those things were true (as I certainly believe the 2nd one
is) then it does seem somewhat inconsistant to me for atheists to
constantly bang on at Christians about morality as if they had some
kind of high ground on the matter.
Yes I agree there is a problem in terms of explaining rationaly how God
can be all powerful and all loving and still be the Creator of a world
full of so much evil, but so what? That neither proves or disproves
that Christians are wrong and it would seem far more consistant, if
Atheists are so worried about evil, to turn there efforts into solving
their own problem in this regard. Namely that while some of them seem
so fond of spouting platitudes about what's right and wrong, they have
absolutely no solid basis in which to ground their assertions.
Peter R
Gareth McCaughan
[after I remarked that neither of the principal options
available to Christians faced with the problem of evil
is very appealing:]
>>> Yes or alternativly to shrug ones shoulders and say, "it's just the way
>>> of things" which seems to me the only coherant atheist response.
>
> Gareth
>> I don't think I understand. A theist who shrugs her shoulders
>> in response to the problem of evil is declining to respond to
>> an *apparent inconsistency* in her beliefs. What corresponding
>> thing are you saying atheists have to do?
>
> The inconsistancy, ISTM, is atheists preaching at Christians from some
> imagined moral high ground when the vast proportion of Christians,
> because of their faith, are getting on with actually trying to make
> a difference to the evil in the world.
I can't speak for any atheist other than myself, but for
my part the "imagined moral high ground" is purely in your
own imagination. I don't think I'm any better than you are.
> The inconsistancy, ISTM, is when an atheist presents as negative,
> Christians having the courage to accept that they can't fully reconcile
> their faith, using pure reason, with some of what happens in the world,
> while not having the courage to accept that, using pure reason, they
> themselves have nothing left that can meaningfully be called
> "morality".
So Christians keep telling me, and then they[1] have the audacity
to tell me that *I* am claiming the moral high ground over *them*.
Defining someone else as "having nothing left that can meaningfully
be called morality" is about as clear a case of claiming the moral
high ground as can be imagined. Unless perhaps saying that Christians
"because of their faith, are getting on with actually trying to
make a difference to the evil in the world" (with, as it seems
to me, the clear implication that atheists, lacking that faith,
are not trying to make a difference to the evil in the world)
is a clearer example.
[1] Well, OK: in this instance, you. Thankfully, not all
Christians feel obliged to brand me an amoralist.
You might like to take a look in your own eye while you're
pointing out defects in mine.
plast...@maxnet.co.nz
> Recognizing the fact of horrors need not be a justification
> of them (obviously). But if one really believes that God is
> in control
Yes well that's the point isn't it. Christians *don't* believe God is
in control. In terms of human affairs we are in control.
> and that he is perfectly good, it's hard to avoid
> the conclusion that this world, complete with its horrors,
> is what he wanted;
Not wanted but certainly accepted and I admit that's a problem.
> and if it's what a perfectly good being
> wanted then it must be good, right?
It would be if that's what He "wanted" but I don't follow why you think
that?
Peter R
Gareth McCaughan
> Gareth
>> Recognizing the fact of horrors need not be a justification
>> of them (obviously). But if one really believes that God is
>> in control
>
> Yes well that's the point isn't it. Christians *don't* believe God is
> in control. In terms of human affairs we are in control.
In discussion with non-Christians, Christians frequently
say that "Christians don't believe ..." all sorts of things.
If I were to put all these things together, then I think
the conclusion would be that Christians don't believe
in Christianity :-).
Sure, one way of dealing with the problem of evil is
to say that God is nowhere near as powerful as he has
traditionally been supposed to be. I think weakening
God enough to solve the problem leaves you with a
being it feels odd to call "God", though.
>> and that he is perfectly good, it's hard to avoid
>> the conclusion that this world, complete with its horrors,
>> is what he wanted;
>
> Not wanted but certainly accepted and I admit that's a problem.
Then I think we are disagreeing only about word choices.
Which is a fine thing to disagree about, but I've already
used up my ration of uk.r.c word pedantry for the evening...
>> and if it's what a perfectly good being
>> wanted then it must be good, right?
>
> It would be if that's what He "wanted" but I don't follow why you think
> that?
Well, I don't; I don't think there is any such being :-).
David A.
"Kyril Jenner" <ky...@mynachdysantelias.fsnet.co.uk> wrote:
>
> (a) I do not recall any reference to Simone Weil (but it is some years since
> I last read any of Phillips' work);
>
> (b) I do not think Phillips ever put forward such a view as being his own -
> his practice was always to try to maintain a professional detachment;
>
> (c) Such a view seems extremely simplistic, and certainly does not fit with
> my recollection of why Phillips thought there was no need for a theodicy.
Maybe I am wrongly attributing to Phillips the views of his teacher,
J.R. Jones, to whose chair of philosophy at Swansea Phillips succeeded.
Jones's main influences in this area, as I recall, were Wittgenstein,
Weil and Tillich. In any case, Phillips has figured among those whose
opponents have called them 'Wittgensteinian fideists' because they tend
to regard religious discourse as a self-contained language game in
Wittgenstein's sense; for them, 'God is love' is not so much a statement
of fact as a rule for the correct use of the term 'God'. The obvious
objection to such an assertion is of course the hardly disputable fact
that the vast majority of believers who utter the phrase do seriously
believe that they are making a statement of fact about the nature of the
deity, and it could be argued that it is highly elitist of such
philosophers to claim to know better than ordinary believers what they
mean when they use religious language.
JohnDM
For I have the silly idea the Two Mushroom Clouds are indicative of
Satan, the Adversary.
So if Satan is not mentioned as the influence for the atomic bombing of
both Hiroshima and Nagasaki according to this Christian message board,
then it says a lot about the mind-set of the Christians who post here.
Sad
JohnDM
PS
The "I am that I am" is a statement which says "I am the God of both
Books"
PPS
The number cruching for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima at 8:16 am
(local time) August 6, 1945 and the bombing of Nagasaki at 11:02 am
(local time) August 9, 1945 when locked in precisely to four time
markers, the Order of the Illuminati, the Skull and Bones, Alfred Pike,
and the Bohemians reveals in a very simple calculation by using the
1,362 key, (Blood, Moon, Jupiter and South Tower) the number 1,263.5
days, (x 2 is Death at 19 x 19 x 7).
Thus the spirit of Satan killed the Two Witnesses after 1,260 days
(time, times and a half a time), and after 3.5 days dead, the Two
Witnesses were given new life by God, thus showing the world that God
has victory over Death.
It is rather satisfying to see the Adversary's four time and dates used
again and again to cause "Number Form to Follow Measurement Function."
God and the measuring of the Temple and the Life, Death and Life of the
Two Witnesses.
The Two Witnesses
1 Then there was given me a measuring rod like a staff; and someone
said, "Get up and measure the temple of God and the altar, and those
who worship in it.
2 "Leave out the court which is outside the temple and do not measure
it, for it has been given to the nations; and they will tread under
foot the holy city for forty-two months.
3 "And I will grant authority to my two witnesses, and they will
prophesy for twelve hundred and sixty days, clothed in sackcloth."
4 These are the two olive trees and the two lampstands that stand
before the Lord of the earth.
5 And if anyone wants to harm them, fire flows out of their mouth and
devours their enemies; so if anyone wants to harm them, he must be
killed in this way.
6 These have the power to shut up the sky, so that rain will not fall
during the days of their prophesying; and they have power over the
waters to turn them into blood, and to strike the earth with every
plague, as often as they desire.
7 When they have finished their testimony, the beast that comes up out
of the abyss will make war with them, and overcome them and kill them.
8 And their dead bodies will lie in the street of the great city which
mystically is called Sodom and Egypt, where also their Lord was
crucified.
9 Those from the peoples and tribes and tongues and nations will look
at their dead bodies for three and a half days, and will not permit
their dead bodies to be laid in a tomb.
10 And those who dwell on the earth will rejoice over them and
celebrate; and they will send gifts to one another, because these two
prophets tormented those who dwell on the earth.
11 But after the three and a half days, the breath of life from God
came into them, and they stood on their feet; and great fear fell upon
those who were watching them.
12 And they heard a loud voice from heaven saying to them, "Come up
here." Then they went up into heaven in the cloud, and their enemies
watched them.
Kendall K. Down
"David A." <da014...@blueyonder.co.uk> wrote:
> Why are theologians so attached to the idea that God is wholly good?
> Even the most cursory reading of the Bible reveals that God is jealous,
> vengeful and capricious but also capable of love and mercy. If this view
> of God is accepted, then the formidable Problem of Evil just dissolves
> away.
Hmmmm. I would affirm that God is wholly good; I would also point out that
"good" may be different from how many people understand it. They think of
fairy godmothers and get all upset when God doesn't conform to their Aunt
Sally. Me, I see destroying the wicked and getting upset when your specially
chosen and privileged people turn away from you, as evidence of goodness.
God bless,
Kendall K. Down
--
================ ARCHAEOLOGICAL DIGGINGS ===============
| Australia's premier archaeological magazine |
| http://www.diggingsonline.com |
========================================================
Kendall K. Down
Gareth McCaughan <Gareth.M...@pobox.com> wrote:
> I agree. But the Bible *also* says that God is good, and that
> we should be good, and that we should be like God, and that
> goodness for us consists (crudely put) of being nice to one
> another.
That is certainly crudely put. The Bible also defines goodness as punishing
crime, inflicting the death penalty for certain actions, and so on.
> So: the Bible is not perfectly consistent with itself. I don't
> regard this as news :-).
You can only say that by disregarding parts of it.
Kendall K. Down
Gareth McCaughan <Gareth.M...@pobox.com> wrote:
> The question isn't what God's promised to do, but what a being
> as good as God is supposed to be could reasonably be expected
> to do.
Well, one thing I would expect a good God to do is punish and destroy the
wicked - yet I seem to recall that you made hell one of the reasons for
thinking that God is not good.
Simon Woods
Could they change? If so what does that say of God's absolute goodness
etc etc?
Kyril Jenner
> Kyril Jenner wrote:
>
>> You will need to read the whole of what Phillips wrote to get the full
>> drift
>> of his argument.
>
> Um. Isn't "the whole of what Phillips wrote" really rather a lot?
I just meant on this topic. Essentially one chapter in one book.
Possibly a few other bits to get the context.
Archimandrite Kyril Jenner
Gareth McCaughan
> In message <87lkmh9...@g.mccaughan.ntlworld.com>
> Gareth McCaughan <Gareth.M...@pobox.com> wrote:
>
>> The question isn't what God's promised to do, but what a being
>> as good as God is supposed to be could reasonably be expected
>> to do.
>
> Well, one thing I would expect a good God to do is punish and destroy the
> wicked - yet I seem to recall that you made hell one of the reasons for
> thinking that God is not good.
You recall incorrectly. I think the notion of hell, particularly
in its eternal-conscious-torment form, is odious, but I also
think one can believe in God, and even be a reasonably orthodox
Christian, without believing in hell, and especially without
believing in eternal conscious torment, so the odiousness of
hell isn't much of an argument against theism or Christianity.
plast...@maxnet.co.nz
> >> Recognizing the fact of horrors need not be a justification
> >> of them (obviously). But if one really believes that God is
> >> in control
Me
> > Yes well that's the point isn't it. Christians *don't* believe God is
> > in control. In terms of human affairs we are in control.
Gareth
> In discussion with non-Christians, Christians frequently
> say that "Christians don't believe ..." all sorts of things.
> If I were to put all these things together, then I think
> the conclusion would be that Christians don't believe
> in Christianity :-).
Er I think it is pretty much the orthodox position to believe that God
has abdicated "control" of human affairs. So if "Christianity" is to be
considered that which loosly aligns itself to Christian orthodoxy my
assertion proves exactly the opposite to what your saying.
> Sure, one way of dealing with the problem of evil is
> to say that God is nowhere near as powerful as he has
> traditionally been supposed to be. I think weakening
> God enough to solve the problem leaves you with a
> being it feels odd to call "God", though.
Once again the orthodox position is that He "can" but chooses not to
for the greater good.
Peter R
Gareth McCaughan
> In message <87hcx57...@g.mccaughan.ntlworld.com>
> Gareth McCaughan <Gareth.M...@pobox.com> wrote:
>
>> I agree. But the Bible *also* says that God is good, and that
>> we should be good, and that we should be like God, and that
>> goodness for us consists (crudely put) of being nice to one
>> another.
>
> That is certainly crudely put. The Bible also defines goodness as punishing
> crime, inflicting the death penalty for certain actions, and so on.
I repeat my previous comment:
>> So: the Bible is not perfectly consistent with itself. I don't
>> regard this as news :-).
>
> You can only say that by disregarding parts of it.
I think that's incorrect.
plast...@maxnet.co.nz
> >> I don't think I understand. A theist who shrugs her shoulders
> >> in response to the problem of evil is declining to respond to
> >> an *apparent inconsistency* in her beliefs. What corresponding
> >> thing are you saying atheists have to do?
Me
> > The inconsistancy, ISTM, is atheists preaching at Christians from some
> > imagined moral high ground when the vast proportion of Christians,
> > because of their faith, are getting on with actually trying to make
> > a difference to the evil in the world.
Gareth
> I can't speak for any atheist other than myself, but for
> my part the "imagined moral high ground" is purely in your
> own imagination. I don't think I'm any better than you are.
Thinking one has the moral high ground and thinking one is better than
others are two completely different things ISTM. I don't think you or
any other resident Atheist thinks they are better than me or anyone
else here. You or they might but I have seen no evidence of it and
quite frankly I'm happy to accept 100% your assertion that you don't.
Atheists (including yourself) not thinking they have some kind of moral
high ground however is far less convincing based on the evidence I see
in this group.
Me
> > The inconsistancy, ISTM, is when an atheist presents as negative,
> > Christians having the courage to accept that they can't fully reconcile
> > their faith, using pure reason, with some of what happens in the world,
> > while not having the courage to accept that, using pure reason, they
> > themselves have nothing left that can meaningfully be called
> > "morality".
Gareth
> So Christians keep telling me, and then they[1] have the audacity
> to tell me that *I* am claiming the moral high ground over *them*.
> Defining someone else as "having nothing left that can meaningfully
> be called morality" is about as clear a case of claiming the moral
> high ground as can be imagined.
Yes well you see that's an interesting comment from where I sit because
while a large portion of what I wrote is entirely subjective I think
that particular assertion is based in pure reason something you seem
very happy to use as your basis for no longer being a Christian but
very unhappy to have used to show the foibles of your new found belief
system.
> Unless perhaps saying that Christians
> "because of their faith, are getting on with actually trying to
> make a difference to the evil in the world" (with, as it seems
> to me, the clear implication that atheists, lacking that faith,
> are not trying to make a difference to the evil in the world)
> is a clearer example.
Yes that's a fair comment. I can see how you could get that implication
from what I said but I hope you will take my word for it that that was
not meant to be implied in any way. I think on the whole Christians
*and* Atheists are getting on with it, despite what you point out to be
the inconsistancies that Christians have in there theolgy and the lack
of any basis for being moral that I believe Atheism suffers from.
>
> [1] Well, OK: in this instance, you. Thankfully, not all
> Christians feel obliged to brand me an amoralist.
Excuse me!!?? Please feel free to show me where I branded you as any
such thing!?
> You might like to take a look in your own eye while you're
> pointing out defects in mine.
I'm sad you've taken this so personally and I apologise that I have put
it all so poorly for you to take it that way.
I do get frustrated and somewhat pissed of with the constant Atheist
bullshit about how Christians faith and the evils of the world can't be
reconciled, (and as I said I agree, they can't but so what?) and I do
think Atheists have their own problems concerning morality, namely that
they have nothing to ground it in....... BUT both these things are my
feelings about Atheism generally so once again I apologise if I worded
my comments in such a way as to make the whole thing feel like an
attack on you personally.
Revd. Eric Potts
> Revd. Eric Potts wrote:
>
> <skip>
>
>
> > But, as Mike and I have tried to say in our different ways, omnipotence
> > is not so much an attribute of God as a part of God's essence, and it
> > stands alongside creative love as another way of describing that
> > essence. It seems to me that God had/has only two choices: create a
> > world in which there is freedom, which will lead to evil; or do not
> > create a world at all. If that is right, then creating a world equals
> > allowing evil.
>
> You mean God is so incompetent that he cannot create beings with free
> will that choose good.
>
> That can't be right , surely? After all, God is supposed to have a
> Heaven full of such creatures.
Of course he can and does do so. Or have you never chosen good? ;-) But
the whole point of free will is that they can choose otherwise. If they
could only choose good, they would be mere puppets.
As for Heaven, I haven't yet been there so I really cannot comment! :-)
plast...@maxnet.co.nz
> Well, one thing I would expect a good God to do is punish and destroy the
> wicked -
Would you expect a good God to let the wicked off "scot-free" (anyone
know the etymology of that?) because someone else wasn't wicked and
said they'd take the punishment for the wicked person?
Peter R
Gareth McCaughan
>>> Yes well that's the point isn't it. Christians *don't* believe God is
>>> in control. In terms of human affairs we are in control.
>>
>> In discussion with non-Christians, Christians frequently
>> say that "Christians don't believe ..." all sorts of things.
>> If I were to put all these things together, then I think
>> the conclusion would be that Christians don't believe
>> in Christianity :-).
>
> Er I think it is pretty much the orthodox position to believe that God
> has abdicated "control" of human affairs. So if "Christianity" is to be
> considered that which loosely aligns itself to Christian orthodoxy my
> assertion proves exactly the opposite to what your saying.
The belief that God has not abdicated "control" of human
affairs may be found ...
- In the Bible (for instance: Psalm 47; Romans 13)
- In the Creeds (where God is described as "almighty")
- In hymns and songs (for instance, the Christmas carol
"Joy to the world": "He rules the world with truth
and grace, / And makes the nations prove / The glories
of his righteousness / And wonders of his love")
- In any number of books -- but unfortunately almost all
my books are currently in boxes, so I can't support this
claim.
>> Sure, one way of dealing with the problem of evil is
>> to say that God is nowhere near as powerful as he has
>> traditionally been supposed to be. I think weakening
>> God enough to solve the problem leaves you with a
>> being it feels odd to call "God", though.
>
> Once again the orthodox position is that He "can" but chooses not to
> for the greater good.
Ah -- so he is in control, he can do as he pleases, and
what he pleases is to do nothing. I don't see how that
gets him off the hook. "Your Honour, I admit that my
client saw Mr Smith struggling in the water and made
no attempt whatever to save him from drowning; but you
have to understand that long ago my client made a
decision not to lift a finger to help anyone who is
drowning, and therefore no blame can be attached to him."
Gareth McCaughan
OK. What book would you recommend? "The problem of evil and the
problem of God" seems a promising title; would that be a good
place to go digging?
Gareth McCaughan
> Gareth
>> I certainly do believe that some things are wrong. I'm not sure
>> whether you mean that *I have* "no particular reason" to think
>> they're wrong, or that *there is* no particular reason why they're
>> wrong; neither seems particularly close to what I think, but
>> let's suppose for the sake of argument that both are; that there's
>> some thing I regard as wrong (1) without having a particular
>> justification for that belief and (2) without having any explanation
>> of what makes it wrong. I don't see any inconsistency with atheism
>> there. Perhaps I'm just being blind, though; can you explain what
>> the inconsistency is?
>
> *If* both those things were true (as I certainly believe the 2nd one
> is) then it does seem somewhat inconsistant to me for atheists to
> constantly bang on at Christians about morality as if they had some
> kind of high ground on the matter.
What do you mean by "having some kind of high ground"? You
keep saying this, but I just don't know what you mean. Can
you explain the actual problem in some other words, perhaps?
> Yes I agree there is a problem in terms of explaining rationaly how God
> can be all powerful and all loving and still be the Creator of a world
> full of so much evil, but so what? That neither proves or disproves
> that Christians are wrong
It seems to me like a good reason to think there's something
badly wrong with Christianity, or at least any version of
Christianity that says God is all-powerful and all-loving.
Proof and disproof don't come into it; you don't get those
outside pure mathematics.
> and it would seem far more consistant, if
> Atheists are so worried about evil, to turn there efforts into solving
> their own problem in this regard. Namely that while some of them seem
> so fond of spouting platitudes about what's right and wrong, they have
> absolutely no solid basis in which to ground their assertions.
We've been through this before, and my recollection -- which
may be wrong, of course; memory plays such tricks -- is that
you agreed that Christianity doesn't, in the end, provide any
more solid basis for grounding assertions about good and evil.
(Because if you try to use God as a foundation without putting
any other notion of good and evil first, you end up having to
accept whatever morals the most powerful entity there is demands,
and that feels very wrong.)
Finding a solid basis for assertions about right and wrong
is bloody hard. Maybe it's impossible. But I have yet to see
any good reason why it's harder for atheists than it is for
Christians. So it's not "our own" problem; it's yours too.
But I'm not sure quite what the problem is here. That
atheists waste their time and effort on something that's
really a problem for Christians? (Not me: I spent lots
of time and effort thinking about the problem of evil
when I was a Christian and trying to work out whether
I could honestly remain one; since then I've given it
much less thought.) That atheists dare to point out
something they see as a problem with Christianity?
(Whyever shouldn't we?) That atheists shouldn't point
out problems with Christianity before having solved
all the world's hard philosophical problems? Or what?
Gareth McCaughan
>>> The inconsistancy, ISTM, is atheists preaching at Christians from some
>>> imagined moral high ground when the vast proportion of Christians,
>>> because of their faith, are getting on with actually trying to make
>>> a difference to the evil in the world.
>>
>> I can't speak for any atheist other than myself, but for
>> my part the "imagined moral high ground" is purely in your
>> own imagination. I don't think I'm any better than you are.
>
> Thinking one has the moral high ground and thinking one is better than
> others are two completely different things ISTM. I don't think you or
> any other resident Atheist thinks they are better than me or anyone
> else here. You or they might but I have seen no evidence of it and
> quite frankly I'm happy to accept 100% your assertion that you don't.
> Atheists (including yourself) not thinking they have some kind of moral
> high ground however is far less convincing based on the evidence I see
> in this group.
So what *do* you mean by "thinking that they have some kind
of moral high ground"? (I've asked the same question elsewhere
in the thread; please feel free to answer it only once if you
wish!)
>>> The inconsistancy, ISTM, is when an atheist presents as negative,
>>> Christians having the courage to accept that they can't fully reconcile
>>> their faith, using pure reason, with some of what happens in the world,
>>> while not having the courage to accept that, using pure reason, they
>>> themselves have nothing left that can meaningfully be called
>>> "morality".
>>
>> So Christians keep telling me, and then they[1] have the audacity
>> to tell me that *I* am claiming the moral high ground over *them*.
>> Defining someone else as "having nothing left that can meaningfully
>> be called morality" is about as clear a case of claiming the moral
>> high ground as can be imagined.
>
> Yes well you see that's an interesting comment from where I sit because
> while a large portion of what I wrote is entirely subjective I think
> that particular assertion is based in pure reason something you seem
> very happy to use as your basis for no longer being a Christian but
> very unhappy to have used to show the foibles of your new found belief
> system.
I'm sorry, but I don't understand that paragraph at all.
- If your assertion is "based in pure reason", how does
that stop it being an attempt to claim the moral
high ground?
- How am I supposed to know that your assertion is based
in pure reason, when you haven't presented any reasoning
(pure or impure) that supports it?
- On what basis are you making the remarks you do about
what makes me happy or unhappy? I think your claim
about atheists having "nothing left that can meaningfully
be called morality" is wrong, that's all. (I can hardly
be exhibiting a problem with having pure reason used to
show something, when you haven't shown anything using
pure reason. You've just made an assertion and claimed
that it's backed up by pure reason. Perhaps it is, but
you haven't shown me.)
>> Unless perhaps saying that Christians
>> "because of their faith, are getting on with actually trying to
>> make a difference to the evil in the world" (with, as it seems
>> to me, the clear implication that atheists, lacking that faith,
>> are not trying to make a difference to the evil in the world)
>> is a clearer example.
>
> Yes that's a fair comment. I can see how you could get that implication
> from what I said but I hope you will take my word for it that that was
> not meant to be implied in any way. I think on the whole Christians
> *and* Atheists are getting on with it, despite what you point out to be
> the inconsistancies that Christians have in there theolgy and the lack
> of any basis for being moral that I believe Atheism suffers from.
OK; my apologies if I was oversensitive.
>> [1] Well, OK: in this instance, you. Thankfully, not all
>> Christians feel obliged to brand me an amoralist.
>
> Excuse me!!?? Please feel free to show me where I branded you as any
> such thing!?
What other word would you suggest using for someone who has
nothing that can meaningfully be called morality?
>> You might like to take a look in your own eye while you're
>> pointing out defects in mine.
>
> I'm sad you've taken this so personally and I apologise that I have put
> it all so poorly for you to take it that way.
> I do get frustrated and somewhat pissed off with the constant Atheist
> bullshit about how Christians faith and the evils of the world can't be
> reconciled, (and as I said I agree, they can't but so what?) and I do
> think Atheists have their own problems concerning morality, namely that
> they have nothing to ground it in....... BUT both these things are my
> feelings about Atheism generally so once again I apologise if I worded
> my comments in such a way as to make the whole thing feel like an
> attack on you personally.
OK; accepted. (And I'm sure you'll accept my similarly conditional
apology: if the problem is incompetent reading or interpretation
on my part, I'm very sorry.)
Gareth McCaughan
> Would you expect a good God to let the wicked off "scot-free" (anyone
> know the etymology of that?)
Yes, Google does. Google knows everything. All hail Google!
http://www.worldwidewords.org/qa/qa-sco1.htm
http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/scot%20free.html
http://alt-usage-english.org/excerpts/fxscotfr.html
David A.
"Kendall K. Down" <webm...@diggingsonline.com> wrote:
>
> I see destroying the wicked and getting upset when your specially
> chosen and privileged people turn away from you, as evidence of goodness.
I'm sure a lot of us would appreciate a god that would reward the
faithful and punish the wicked; however, I fear that our hopes are not
ell founded, as Jehovah, the present incumbent, is showing no signs of
wanting to give up his job any time soon.
DA
Simon Robinson
> Gareth McCaughan <Gareth.M...@pobox.com> wrote:
>
>> The question isn't what God's promised to do, but what a being
>> as good as God is supposed to be could reasonably be expected
>> to do.
>
> Well, one thing I would expect a good God to do is punish and destroy the
> wicked -
Of course. Because two wrongs always make a right, don't they...
Kendall K. Down
"David A." <da014...@blueyonder.co.uk> wrote:
> I'm sure a lot of us would appreciate a god that would reward the
> faithful and punish the wicked; however, I fear that our hopes are not
> ell founded, as Jehovah, the present incumbent, is showing no signs of
> wanting to give up his job any time soon.
Good. I've no complaints about how He is running affairs.
Kendall K. Down
Simon Robinson <em...@via.my.web.site> wrote:
> > Well, one thing I would expect a good God to do is punish and destroy the
> > wicked -
> Of course. Because two wrongs always make a right, don't they...
No. Because punishing and destroying the wicked stops them doing it again.
Just like capital punishment - only more final.
Kendall K. Down
"plast...@maxnet.co.nz" <plast...@maxnet.co.nz> wrote:
> Would you expect a good God to let the wicked off "scot-free" (anyone
> know the etymology of that?) because someone else wasn't wicked and
> said they'd take the punishment for the wicked person?
No, but if He did do it, I'd be eternally grateful.
plast...@maxnet.co.nz
> > Would you expect a good God to let the wicked off "scot-free" (anyone
> > know the etymology of that?) because someone else wasn't wicked and
> > said they'd take the punishment for the wicked person?
>
Ken
> No,
Me neither, doesn't seem that consistant with "goodness" does it?
Peter R
Simon Robinson
> In message <4rsojvF...@mid.individual.net>
> Simon Robinson <em...@via.my.web.site> wrote:
>
>>> Well, one thing I would expect a good God to do is punish and destroy the
>>> wicked -
>
>> Of course. Because two wrongs always make a right, don't they...
>
> No. Because punishing and destroying the wicked stops them doing it again.
> Just like capital punishment - only more final.
Punishing by itself often does not stop people doing something again.
Destroying certainly would stop someone doing something again, but it
will do that by itself, without any need to add the 'punishing' as well.
So what's the purpose of the punishing?
Besides, there are other ways you could stop someone doing something
again. eg. remove the desire on the part of the person to do so, which
I'd imagine God is quite capable of doing. (The standard argument
against that is it interferes with free will. But then so does
destroying someone, so that argument isn't going to work here).
And of course, that's even before we start looking at the way that, once
again, your argument depends on an arbitrary division of people into
'wicked' people and 'not wicked' people. As has been pointed out to you
in previous discussions, such a division simply doesn't work in practice
(unless you take it to be totally arbitrary, some kind of divine whim on
who gets to be classed as 'wicked').
Patrick Herring
I like Wittgenstein's remark, that he couldn't understand why people
went on about an eternity in hell when 15 minutes was quite enough.
--
Patrick Herring, http://www.anweald.co.uk
zen christianity: http://www.anweald.co.uk/zenchristianity/
Gareth McCaughan
> I like Wittgenstein's remark, that he couldn't understand why people
> went on about an eternity in hell when 15 minutes was quite enough.
Very aphoristic chap, Wittgenstein. :-)
Kendall K. Down
Simon Robinson <em...@via.my.web.site> wrote:
> Punishing by itself often does not stop people doing something again.
It may not stop the perpetrator, but it may well stop someone else from
doing it. News of people being sued for downloading mp3s has stopped a good
few other people from doing the same.
Mark Goodge
keyboard and typed:
>In message <4s01tuF...@mid.individual.net>
> Simon Robinson <em...@via.my.web.site> wrote:
>
>> Punishing by itself often does not stop people doing something again.
>
>It may not stop the perpetrator, but it may well stop someone else from
>doing it. News of people being sued for downloading mp3s has stopped a good
>few other people from doing the same.
Except, of course, that no-one has been sued for downloading mp3s. So
such reports are mere scaremongering.
Mark
--
Visit: http://www.FridayFun.net - jokes, lyrics and ringtones
"I'm so tired of acting tough"
Simon Robinson
> In message <4s01tuF...@mid.individual.net>
> Simon Robinson <em...@via.my.web.site> wrote:
>
>> Punishing by itself often does not stop people doing something again.
>
> It may not stop the perpetrator, but it may well stop someone else from
> doing it. News of people being sued for downloading mp3s has stopped a good
> few other people from doing the same.
Destroying the perpetrator is likely to do that too (otherwise capital
punishment would have no deterrent effect). So that still doesn't give
any grounds for your claim that a good God would punish as well as
destroy. You still haven't shown that punishing will achieve anything
that destroying can't achieve by itself.
Kendall K. Down
Mark Goodge <use...@listmail.good-stuff.co.uk> wrote:
> Except, of course, that no-one has been sued for downloading mp3s. So
> such reports are mere scaremongering.
Well, they have been threatened with being sued and have paid fairly large
sums of money to avoid it.
Mark Goodge
keyboard and typed:
>In message <616ol2p7qekqa9h7o...@news.markshouse.net>
> Mark Goodge <use...@listmail.good-stuff.co.uk> wrote:
>
>> Except, of course, that no-one has been sued for downloading mp3s. So
>> such reports are mere scaremongering.
>
>Well, they have been threatened with being sued and have paid fairly large
>sums of money to avoid it.
Not even that. The people who have been the target of threatened legal
action have been those who make large numbers of files available for
others to download.
Mark
--
Visit: http://www.CorporateContact.info - phone and email contacts for Amazon, Paypal, eBay and lots of other hard-to-contact organisations
"Don't hold on to your past"
Simon Robinson
> Simon Robinson wrote:
>> Well in my case I feel convinced of that because - it just feels that
>> that's the case. I'm not sure I can rationalize it beyond that. My
>> experience of God comes from within, from my innermost sensations, and
>> that inner experience tells me very clearly that God is absolutely good
>> and loving. I guess if theologians have any similar experience to me,
>> that could explain the attachment to the idea :-)
>
> Could they change? If so what does that say of God's absolute goodness
> etc etc?
I don't know. Obviously if my interpretation is screwed up and eg. those
feelings are a delusion, then I guess it would be possible for them to
change, but (equally obviously) I don't believe that's the case. If my
interpretation of those innermost sensations is correct, then that would
seem to imply they could not change, because they inevitably effect an
underlying reality that isn't going to change, although perhaps I could
become unaware of those sensations.
Certainly there was a time (up to age 23-ish) when I was an atheist, so
something must've been different to then. Looking back, my
perception/interpretation is that I wasn't aware of or didn't pay
attention to those sensations. My suspicion is that if I'd looked deep
enough inside me, I would've found them at any time, but obviously
that's speculation and I have no way to either prove or disprove my
suspicions (even to myself).
Simon Robinson
> Simon Robinson wrote:
>
>> Well in my case I feel convinced of that because - it just feels that
>> that's the case. I'm not sure I can rationalize it beyond that. My
>> experience of God comes from within, from my innermost sensations, and
>> that inner experience tells me very clearly that God is absolutely
>> good and loving.
>
> Have you been able to test them against reality and check that they're
> reliable, for instance?
Interesting question. Testing reliability against whether God exists is
difficult because there's not much else to compare with for determining
the answer to that question! I regard it as significant that I have been
able to form a theology which both seems to be consistent with those
innermost sensations and which seems to me to explain the world around
me better than any alternative theories. If I hadn't been able to do
that, then I'd probably be more inclined to question those sensations ;-)
But I suspect your question is really about whether those 'innermost
sensations' have told me anything that is independently verifiable. My
experience suggests that is the case. In particular, around the time of
my conversion from atheism to Christianity, a couple of things happened
to me that I found extremely hard to explain by any conventional means
[1]. Generally it's something like, I feel deep inside that something
will happen [usually: to me] and it turns out that it does, although my
rational analysis would suggest that the predicted thing is unlikely.
Actually I should clarify. I don't think inner sensations are all the
same, and quite a lot of them I find are unreliable. I would say from
experience that those feelings/intuition that I have that are temporary,
or that I have at the same time as feeling any extreme of emotion (be it
elation, anger, depression, etc.) are not at all reliable. OTOH those
sensations that last more permanently, and that I experience when I'm in
a calm, thoughtful, state of mind, do seem to be > 50% reliable (And
those sensations also seem to be the ones that feel 'deepest'). My
sensation of God seems to very firmly fall into the latter category:
I've been aware of it, on-and-off, for 18 years. And it often seems to
be at its strongest when I'm not aware of any other strong emotion.
(Obviously all the usual provisos about analyzing personal experiences.
I'm aware that it's very hard to prove anything here and there's always
scope for someone to say 'coincidence' or 'there was some other source
of information you took in without thinking about it' or 'but you only
remember the times that it worked out, not the times when your feelings
were wrong'. All I can say is I'm aware of those issues, I try to bear
them in mind, and yet I remain convinced there is something more in my
experiences. There's that something about ones own experiences which
it's impossible to communicate :-( )
Simon
http://www.simonrobinson.com
[1] Yeah I'm being vague. Sorry. This is a public newsgroup and I have
my limits to what I feel comfortable revealing in public about my
personal life, even at the cost of loss of convincing-ness to my
arguments. If you do seriously want to follow up, you might find me more
open on email ;-)
Simon Robinson
> Simon Robinson wrote:
> [Simon:]
>> I'm fairly sure I recall at some point *after* your deconversion, you
>> made some comment on ukrc which implied you do believe that some
>> things are wrong, for no particular reason other than they are
>> intrinsically wrong. Am I correct? And if so, is that inconsistent
>> with being an atheist?
>
> I certainly do believe that some things are wrong. I'm not sure
> whether you mean that *I have* "no particular reason" to think
> they're wrong, or that *there is* no particular reason why they're
> wrong; neither seems particularly close to what I think, but
> let's suppose for the sake of argument that both are;
I'd much rather know what you do actually think :-) The problem I have,
and the motivation for my question, is that you say you believe some
things are wrong. Yet based on what I understand about what you believe
about the nature of the Universe, I'm stumped as to what basis you have
for determining that something is intrinsically wrong. I know you've
tried to explain a couple of times but I still don't understand.
> that there's
> some thing I regard as wrong (1) without having a particular
> justification for that belief and (2) without having any explanation
> of what makes it wrong. I don't see any inconsistency with atheism
> there. Perhaps I'm just being blind, though; can you explain what
> the inconsistency is?
I'm not certain, that's why I was asking the question ;-) Beyond the
fact that you don't think any God exists, I'm not overly clear on the
details of what you do believe. I tend to assume you're a materialist
because I can't think of any non-materialist non-God options. Feel free
to enlighten me :-)
I guess the thing that looks to me like it may be an inconsistency (and
therefore an inconsistency on your part if it's what you believe) is
that, I can't see any way that any materialist view of the Universe
could lead to any absolute morality as a consequence. So ISTM that it
would be inconsistent to say
1. I believe in materialism as the explanation for the Universe. The
physical Universe and the physical objects within it are all that there is.
2. Some things are absolutely right or wrong.
It's inconsistent because (2) looks like it implies there must be
something (other than the physical world) that exists, that could be the
thing that gives rise to the wrongness of certain actions.
Simon Robinson
> I don't know. Obviously if my interpretation is screwed up and eg. those
> feelings are a delusion, then I guess it would be possible for them to
> change, but (equally obviously) I don't believe that's the case. If my
> interpretation of those innermost sensations is correct, then that would
> seem to imply they could not change, because they inevitably effect an
> underlying reality that isn't going to change, although perhaps I could
> become unaware of those sensations.
Ummm, that was suppose to say '...they inevitably REFLECT an underlying
reality...'
Gareth McCaughan
>>> Well in my case I feel convinced of that because - it just feels that
>>> that's the case. I'm not sure I can rationalize it beyond that. My
>>> experience of God comes from within, from my innermost sensations, and
>>> that inner experience tells me very clearly that God is absolutely
>>> good and loving.
>>
>> Why should you (or anyone else) trust these "innermost sensations"?
>> Have you been able to test them against reality and check that they're
>> reliable, for instance?
>
> Interesting question. Testing reliability against whether God exists
> is difficult because there's not much else to compare with for
> determining the answer to that question!
Bingo :-).
> I regard it as significant
> that I have been able to form a theology which both seems to be
> consistent with those innermost sensations and which seems to me to
> explain the world around me better than any alternative theories. If I
> hadn't been able to do that, then I'd probably be more inclined to
> question those sensations ;-)
Noted. How significant that is would seem to depend on how
disconfirmable your theology actually is. I mean, if what
you've done is to come up with a theology that fits your
"innermost sensations" (how do you know they're really
*innermost*, by the way?) and that doesn't make enough
contact with the external world that anything could actually
shake it much, then that doesn't seem like such a startling
achievement, and it seems plausible that quite different
"innermost sensations" could have elicited a very different
but equally coherent theology, so that the coherence of your
theology wouldn't be much evidence for the reliability of
those sensations and your interpretation of them; but if
you started with those innermost sensations, drew some
conclusions about God, and have time and again found them
surprisingly confirmed by reality, that would be much better
as evidence for the sensations and your interpretation of
them.
(Gosh, that was rather verbose. Sorry.)
> But I suspect your question is really about whether those 'innermost
> sensations' have told me anything that is independently verifiable.
That's pretty much it, yes. (Or refutable, or otherwise
somewhat assessable.)
> My experience suggests that is the case. In particular, around the time
> of my conversion from atheism to Christianity, a couple of things
> happened to me that I found extremely hard to explain by any
> conventional means [1]. Generally it's something like, I feel deep
> inside that something will happen [usually: to me] and it turns out
> that it does, although my rational analysis would suggest that the
> predicted thing is unlikely.
Interesting. (The footnote suggested that a few more details
might be available by private e-mail. I'd be interested, but
please don't feel obliged to pour out private stuff to someone
you've only ever met once...)
At this point I wrote some stuff about the possibilities
of coincidence, having subconsciously noticed relevant things,
and so on; but I see you'd anticipated me:
> (Obviously all the usual provisos about analyzing personal
> experiences. I'm aware that it's very hard to prove anything here and
> there's always scope for someone to say 'coincidence' or 'there was
> some other source of information you took in without thinking about
> it' or 'but you only remember the times that it worked out, not the
> times when your feelings were wrong'.
Bingo again :-).
> All I can say is I'm aware of
> those issues, I try to bear them in mind, and yet I remain convinced
> there is something more in my experiences. There's that something
> about ones own experiences which it's impossible to communicate :-( )
Can you say anything about why it is that you remain convinced?
I mean: have you tried to assess the relevant probabilities
(ferociously difficult at the best of times, of course) and
decided that it's all still too unlikely to be explained naturally?
Or is it more that you remain convinced *independently* of such
reasonings, as it were?
Gareth McCaughan
> Gareth McCaughan wrote:
>> Simon Robinson wrote:
>
>> [Simon:]
>>> I'm fairly sure I recall at some point *after* your deconversion, you
>>> made some comment on ukrc which implied you do believe that some
>>> things are wrong, for no particular reason other than they are
>>> intrinsically wrong. Am I correct? And if so, is that inconsistent
>>> with being an atheist?
>>
>> I certainly do believe that some things are wrong. I'm not sure
>> whether you mean that *I have* "no particular reason" to think
>> they're wrong, or that *there is* no particular reason why they're
>> wrong; neither seems particularly close to what I think, but
>> let's suppose for the sake of argument that both are;
>
> I'd much rather know what you do actually think :-) The problem I
> have, and the motivation for my question, is that you say you believe
> some things are wrong. Yet based on what I understand about what you
> believe about the nature of the Universe, I'm stumped as to what basis
> you have for determining that something is intrinsically wrong. I know
> you've tried to explain a couple of times but I still don't understand.
I'm not sure that I do either, and it's entirely possible that
on further reflection I'll decide that moral realism doesn't
work. (I'm quite sure that if that happens I won't stop regarding
things as wrong; I just won't see that as a judgement about
objective matters of fact. I still regard some things as
beautiful even though I don't think -- and have never thought,
so far as I can recall -- that beauty is objective rather than
(inter)subjective.)
>> that there's
>> some thing I regard as wrong (1) without having a particular
>> justification for that belief and (2) without having any explanation
>> of what makes it wrong. I don't see any inconsistency with atheism
>> there. Perhaps I'm just being blind, though; can you explain what
>> the inconsistency is?
>
> I'm not certain, that's why I was asking the question ;-) Beyond the
> fact that you don't think any God exists, I'm not overly clear on the
> details of what you do believe. I tend to assume you're a materialist
> because I can't think of any non-materialist non-God options. Feel
> free to enlighten me :-)
I'm a provisional materialist; that is, materialism seems very
plausible to me and I'm adopting it as a working hypothesis but
it could always turn out to be wrong. I think materialism and
moral realism are pretty much independent issues, though.
As for right and wrong, I'm a moral realist for fairly poor
reasons, namely that moral realism seems intuitively compelling
and I don't know of any particular reason to reject it. At some
point, I ought to have a good long think about that one; the
result might be that I reject moral realism. It isn't, in any
case, something I'm terribly certain about.
> I guess the thing that looks to me like it may be an inconsistency
> (and therefore an inconsistency on your part if it's what you believe)
> is that, I can't see any way that any materialist view of the Universe
> could lead to any absolute morality as a consequence. So ISTM that it
> would be inconsistent to say
>
> 1. I believe in materialism as the explanation for the Universe. The
> physical Universe and the physical objects within it are all that
> there is.
> 2. Some things are absolutely right or wrong.
>
> It's inconsistent because (2) looks like it implies there must be
> something (other than the physical world) that exists, that could be
> the thing that gives rise to the wrongness of certain actions.
Why does there need to be a *thing* that gives rise to the
wrongness of those actions? Indeed, how *could* any thing
give rise to the wrongness of certain actions? How, for
instance, could God do that? (Could he have made torture,
rape and lying right, or generosity and forgiveness wrong?)
Kendall K. Down
Gareth McCaughan <Gareth.M...@pobox.com> wrote:
> Why does there need to be a *thing* that gives rise to the
> wrongness of those actions? Indeed, how *could* any thing
> give rise to the wrongness of certain actions? How, for
> instance, could God do that? (Could he have made torture,
> rape and lying right, or generosity and forgiveness wrong?)
In view of the type of omnipotence that you espouse, I am surprised that you
need to ask such a question when the answer - again, according to your
published statements - is so obviously "Yes".
plast...@maxnet.co.nz
> > Once again the orthodox position is that He "can" but chooses not to
> > for the greater good.
Gareth
> Ah -- so he is in control, he can do as he pleases,
ISTM that those two things are not the same in the way that you are
implying.
> and what he pleases is to do nothing. I don't see how
> that gets him off the hook. "Your Honour, I admit that my
> client saw Mr Smith struggling in the water and made
> no attempt whatever to save him from drowning; but you
> have to understand that long ago my client made a
> decision not to lift a finger to help anyone who is
> drowning, and therefore no blame can be attached to him."
I thought you said in an earlier conversation we had that you, loosly
based your current ethics on utilatarianism? If so, to use a simple
utilitarian example, to let one person drown for the greater good of
millions is surely a perfectly acceptable response?
Peter R
Gareth McCaughan
> In message <87mz6of...@g.mccaughan.ntlworld.com>
> Gareth McCaughan <Gareth.M...@pobox.com> wrote:
>
>> Why does there need to be a *thing* that gives rise to the
>> wrongness of those actions? Indeed, how *could* any thing
>> give rise to the wrongness of certain actions? How, for
>> instance, could God do that? (Could he have made torture,
>> rape and lying right, or generosity and forgiveness wrong?)
>
> In view of the type of omnipotence that you espouse, I am surprised that you
> need to ask such a question when the answer - again, according to your
> published statements - is so obviously "Yes".
That seems like twaddle to me, but maybe I'm missing something.
Where have I ever said anything that implies that omnipotence,
properly understood, implies the ability to make torture right
and generosity wrong?
plast...@maxnet.co.nz
> > If Atheists are so worried about evil, to turn there efforts into solving
> > their own problem in this regard. Namely that while some of them seem
> > so fond of spouting platitudes about what's right and wrong, they have
> > absolutely no solid basis in which to ground their assertions.
Gareth
> We've been through this before, and my recollection -- which
> may be wrong, of course; memory plays such tricks -- is that
> you agreed that Christianity doesn't, in the end, provide any
> more solid basis for grounding assertions about good and evil.
> (Because if you try to use God as a foundation without putting
> any other notion of good and evil first, you end up having to
> accept whatever morals the most powerful entity there is demands,
> and that feels very wrong.)
I certainly didn't in my recollection agree with that!
I don't think think morality is based in what God "demands". For me it
is based in fulfilling that for which I was created.
Peter R
>
> Finding a solid basis for assertions about right and wrong
> is bloody hard. Maybe it's impossible. But I have yet to see
> any good reason why it's harder for atheists than it is for
> Christians. So it's not "our own" problem; it's yours too.
>
> But I'm not sure quite what the problem is here. That
> atheists waste their time and effort on something that's
> really a problem for Christians? (Not me: I spent lots
> of time and effort thinking about the problem of evil
> when I was a Christian and trying to work out whether
> I could honestly remain one; since then I've given it
> much less thought.) That atheists dare to point out
> something they see as a problem with Christianity?
> (Whyever shouldn't we?) That atheists shouldn't point
> out problems with Christianity before having solved
> all the world's hard philosophical problems? Or what?
plast...@maxnet.co.nz
> "plast...@maxnet.co.nz" wrote:
>
> >>> The inconsistancy, ISTM, is atheists preaching at Christians from some
> >>> imagined moral high ground when the vast proportion of Christians,
> >>> because of their faith, are getting on with actually trying to make
> >>> a difference to the evil in the world.
> >>
> >> I can't speak for any atheist other than myself, but for
> >> my part the "imagined moral high ground" is purely in your
> >> own imagination. I don't think I'm any better than you are.
> >
> > Thinking one has the moral high ground and thinking one is better than
> > others are two completely different things ISTM. I don't think you or
> > any other resident Atheist thinks they are better than me or anyone
> > else here. You or they might but I have seen no evidence of it and
> > quite frankly I'm happy to accept 100% your assertion that you don't.
> > Atheists (including yourself) not thinking they have some kind of moral
> > high ground however is far less convincing based on the evidence I see
> > in this group.
>
> So what *do* you mean by "thinking that they have some kind
> of moral high ground"? (I've asked the same question elsewhere
> in the thread; please feel free to answer it only once if you
> wish!)
>
For me it feels like Atheists are claiming some kind of moral high
ground when they say things like;
- But that's one of the problems with theodicy: if you try
- to explain how a perfectly good God can allow horrors, then
- you inevitably end up justifying horrors. The principal
- alternative is to shrug your shoulders and say "it's a
- mystery". Moral corruption or intellectual abdication ...
- not an agreeable choice :-).
> >> Defining someone else as "having nothing left that can meaningfully
> >> be called morality" is about as clear a case of claiming the moral
> >> high ground as can be imagined.
> >
> > Yes well you see that's an interesting comment from where I sit because
> > while a large portion of what I wrote is entirely subjective I think
> > that particular assertion is based in pure reason something you seem
> > very happy to use as your basis for no longer being a Christian but
> > very unhappy to have used to show the foibles of your new found belief
> > system.
>
> I'm sorry, but I don't understand that paragraph at all.
> - If your assertion is "based in pure reason", how does
> that stop it being an attempt to claim the moral
> high ground?
*If* my assertion is based on reason then I am simply pointing out an
inconsistancy with the position some atheists, yourself included at
this point, seem to have in their thinking.
That may or may not give me the moral high ground....if it does then
yay for me and one up for the Christians :-)
> - How am I supposed to know that your assertion is based
> in pure reason, when you haven't presented any reasoning
> (pure or impure) that supports it?
To me reason seems to dictate that to have "morality" that is in any
way meaningful one has to have something to base it on. For me the idea
that we are created beings, that we are created for a purpose, and to
act in accordance or contrary to that purpose is what defines right and
wrong respectively, seems like a solid basis.
Whereas I'm sure your aware of the Marx, Engles maxim;
- All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned,
- and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses,
- his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind.
Nothing that the atheists here have ever put forward to me as the basis
for their morality has ever struck me, once looked at closely, as being
anything other than "air".
I'm sure I have mentioned before, but it seems important to say it
again, that I am in no way putting this forward as some kind of proof
argument against Atheism as Atheism can and does exist perfectly well
without including the idea of morality. Or indeed a proof argument
*for* Christianity, as while believing it might well give the comfort
of having a solid foundation for morality and meaning, such comfort in
no way implys its existence. All I am arguing for is that while
Christianity does have (a possibly imaginary) basis for it's morality,
Atheism does not, nothing more, nothing less, and, going back to your
question, as far as I can tell this is based on reason, perhaps faulty,
as opposed to some intuitive assertion.
> I think your claim
> about atheists having "nothing left that can meaningfully
> be called morality" is wrong, that's all.
Do you? You seem to imply in one of your posts to Simon that you are
holding to the idea that Atheism and absolute Morality are comfortable
bed partners, as a "working hypothasis" not a dogma?
> >> [1] Well, OK: in this instance, you. Thankfully, not all
> >> Christians feel obliged to brand me an amoralist.
> >
> > Excuse me!!?? Please feel free to show me where I branded you as any
> > such thing!?
>
> What other word would you suggest using for someone who has
> nothing that can meaningfully be called morality?
A Realist?
Peter R
Kendall K. Down
Gareth McCaughan <Gareth.M...@pobox.com> wrote:
> That seems like twaddle to me, but maybe I'm missing something.
> Where have I ever said anything that implies that omnipotence,
> properly understood, implies the ability to make torture right
> and generosity wrong?
Well you were certainly claiming the an omnipotent being should be able to
give His creatures freewill *and* at the same time control their behaviour.
Gareth McCaughan
> In message <87lkm68...@g.mccaughan.ntlworld.com>
> Gareth McCaughan <Gareth.M...@pobox.com> wrote:
>
>> That seems like twaddle to me, but maybe I'm missing something.
>> Where have I ever said anything that implies that omnipotence,
>> properly understood, implies the ability to make torture right
>> and generosity wrong?
>
> Well you were certainly claiming the an omnipotent being should be able to
> give His creatures freewill *and* at the same time control their behaviour.
1. I have no recollection of claiming that, and I rather doubt
that I was.
2. Whether I was or not, what has that to do with your claim
that omnipotence "according to [my] published statements"
implies the ability to make torture right and generosity
wrong?
3. Do you care at all whether the things you say are true or false?
Simon Robinson
> I'm not sure that I do either, and it's entirely possible that
> on further reflection I'll decide that moral realism doesn't
> work. (I'm quite sure that if that happens I won't stop regarding
> things as wrong; I just won't see that as a judgement about
> objective matters of fact. I still regard some things as
> beautiful even though I don't think -- and have never thought,
> so far as I can recall -- that beauty is objective rather than
> (inter)subjective.)
OK, understood.
[Me]
>> 1. I believe in materialism as the explanation for the Universe. The
>> physical Universe and the physical objects within it are all that
>> there is.
>> 2. Some things are absolutely right or wrong.
>>
>> It's inconsistent because (2) looks like it implies there must be
>> something (other than the physical world) that exists, that could be
>> the thing that gives rise to the wrongness of certain actions.
>
> Why does there need to be a *thing* that gives rise to the
> wrongness of those actions?
I guess one reason for thinking such a thing exists is that list of
which actions are morally wrong is pretty long and complex (as
illustrated eg. by the copyright debate). Usually we tend to try to
simplify that list by looking for some fundamental principles of what
makes something wrong - but by doing that, it looks to me like you're
*already* assuming that there is a thing that gives rise to the
wrongness of actions.
I think there's another issue though. ISTM the only alternative (to
saying that some 'thing' makes certain actions wrong) that is consistant
with moral realism is to hold that certain actions are just wrong,
without anything having made them wrong. In that case the wrongness of
the actions ends up as simply an axiom of your model of the world. Now,
yeah, you could construct a theory on that basis. Your complete model
certainly wouldn't be pure materialism, it would have to be materialism
+ something else (where as a minimum the 'something else' includes the
axiom that certain actions are wrong. Now I'm guessing you've realized
that since you say that you think materialism and moral realism are
pretty much independent issues.
Sure that's possible, and you could probably get such a model to be
consistent etc., but to me that seems like it'd be a very
philosophically unsatisfying view of the Universe, because of the way
you have multiple, apparently independent, axioms for it. Being
philosophically unsatisfying doesn't of course make it wrong, but it
does run counter to the thing that physics has historically been very
successful at explaining the Universe by looking for patterns that lead
to a 'simple' and philosophically satisfying theory.
Another issue (perhaps less important) is a common argument used by
atheists against theism is that our theory is more complicated than
necessary because theism invents some thing (a deity) that is outside
the physical universe and whose existence is experimentally untestable.
That argument applies equally to the moral-realist-without-causal-thing
position I've just described. That theory invents the concept that
certain actions are wrong, but that concept is also immune to
experimental verification (what experiment could you perform to
determine whether an action is intrinsically right or wrong?)
> Indeed, how *could* any thing
> give rise to the wrongness of certain actions? How, for
> instance, could God do that? (Could he have made torture,
> rape and lying right, or generosity and forgiveness wrong?)
Well that starts to beg the question of what it means to say that
something is wrong. The answer I would give is that God has a certain
nature and things are right or wrong according to whether they are
consistent with that nature. That would imply that the only way God
could make, say, rape, right is by changing his own nature. Could God do
that? That's running into pure speculation now, but my suspicion would
be the answer is 'no'.
Kendall K. Down
Simon Robinson <em...@via.my.web.site> wrote:
> Destroying the perpetrator is likely to do that too (otherwise capital
> punishment would have no deterrent effect). So that still doesn't give
> any grounds for your claim that a good God would punish as well as
> destroy. You still haven't shown that punishing will achieve anything
> that destroying can't achieve by itself.
Having given this some thought, I disagree. Take, for example, the
phenomenon of "suicide by police", where someone deliberately provokes the
police into shooting him (or her, though I think it is mainly him) because
he feels that life is no longer worth living. Such a person might well think
twice about his plan if he knew that in fact, instead of shooting, the
police would slowly and over a considerably period of time torture him to
death.
So yes, a quick and painless death will be less of a deterrant than a slow
and painful one.
Kendall K. Down
Gareth McCaughan <Gareth.M...@pobox.com> wrote:
> 2. Whether I was or not, what has that to do with your claim
> that omnipotence "according to [my] published statements"
> implies the ability to make torture right and generosity
> wrong?
The point is that while the rest of us live quite happily with the idea that
omnipotence has limits ("Can God make a stone so big that He cannot lift
it"), one of the bases on which you rejected Christianity was that an
omnipotent God should be able to do *any*thing.
Gareth McCaughan
> In message <87ac2k4...@g.mccaughan.ntlworld.com>
> Gareth McCaughan <Gareth.M...@pobox.com> wrote:
>
>> 2. Whether I was or not, what has that to do with your claim
>> that omnipotence "according to [my] published statements"
>> implies the ability to make torture right and generosity
>> wrong?
>
> The point is that while the rest of us live quite happily with the idea that
> omnipotence has limits ("Can God make a stone so big that He cannot lift
> it"), one of the bases on which you rejected Christianity was that an
> omnipotent God should be able to do *any*thing.
No, that's your (wilful? I can't tell) misunderstanding.
I have never thought that Christianity requires a notion
of omnipotence that enables God to do the logically
impossible, for instance. It's just that I think some
of the "maybe God isn't so omnipotent after all"
defences Christians offer to the argument from evil
are muddled and inadequate. Generally they require
restricting God's omnipotence in ways there's no good
reason to think God's omnipotence should be limited,
and still don't manage to restrict it enough to solve
the problem of evil anyway.
Simon Robinson
> Simon Robinson wrote:
> Noted. How significant that is would seem to depend on how
> disconfirmable your theology actually is. I mean, if what
> you've done is to come up with a theology that fits your
> "innermost sensations" (how do you know they're really
> *innermost*, by the way?)
I'm using 'innermost' metaphorically, as the word that best conveys the
sense of how those sensations feel. I guess if you want to pin it down
more, the analogy works because 'inner' is invisible to everyone else,
whereas 'outer' is the conscious personality, which is what other people
tend to see.
>> My experience suggests that is the case. In particular, around the time
>> of my conversion from atheism to Christianity, a couple of things
>> happened to me that I found extremely hard to explain by any
>> conventional means [1]. Generally it's something like, I feel deep
>> inside that something will happen [usually: to me] and it turns out
>> that it does, although my rational analysis would suggest that the
>> predicted thing is unlikely.
>
> Interesting. (The footnote suggested that a few more details
> might be available by private e-mail. I'd be interested, but
> please don't feel obliged to pour out private stuff to someone
> you've only ever met once...)
[Subtopic moved onto private email]
>> (Obviously all the usual provisos about analyzing personal
>> experiences. I'm aware that it's very hard to prove anything here and
>> there's always scope for someone to say 'coincidence' or 'there was
>> some other source of information you took in without thinking about
>> it' or 'but you only remember the times that it worked out, not the
>> times when your feelings were wrong'.
>
> Bingo again :-).
Surely you know me well enough by now to know that I'm not likely to be
caught out missing such obvious considerations ;-)
>> All I can say is I'm aware of
>> those issues, I try to bear them in mind, and yet I remain convinced
>> there is something more in my experiences. There's that something
>> about ones own experiences which it's impossible to communicate :-( )
>
> Can you say anything about why it is that you remain convinced?
> I mean: have you tried to assess the relevant probabilities
> (ferociously difficult at the best of times, of course) and
> decided that it's all still too unlikely to be explained naturally?
> Or is it more that you remain convinced *independently* of such
> reasonings, as it were?
Well yes I've tried looking at it an a probabilistic way. As you say,
it's very difficult; it'd involve making fairly wild guesses at lots of
probabilities, and I can't see that such could do more than give a few
possible hints.
I think there is something more to why I'm convinced. It's that whenever
I try to figure out 'rational' explanations in terms of things like
coincidences etc., I find that those explanations just don't gel with
what I feel I've experienced. They could certainly explain almost
anything that I'd put down on paper, but that's because what I put down
on paper always falls far short of capturing actual experience.
There is another thing too. Remember that I have other reasons for being
fairly sure that materialism is not correct (namely: I regard
materialism as incompatible with the fact of my consciously experiencing
my existence). Now from the POV of figuring out for myself what the
nature of the 'deep feelings' we're discussing is: Why would I spend
time trying to see if I can come up with an interpretation that is
consistent with a theory that I have other reasons for believing to be
incorrect anyway? I can see why I'd spend time engaged in such an
exercise in order to convince other people (such as yourself), but
mostly when I go into introspection mode, I'm trying to satisfy myself
that I have explored all the relevent possibilities etc.
Of course I have often mentally worked through the exercise of trying to
come up with materialism-consistent explanations of what I feel I've
experienced (partly in order to subject my beliefs to as many tests as
possible, partly because I used to be an atheist/materialist myself
once, and partly because I like to see if I can find arguments that
might convince other people <g>). The point I'm trying to make in that
last paragraph is that I suspect there's an implicit assumption in your
remarks that I should consider 'rational/materialist' explanations and
prefer such explanations if I can find them. It's not so obvious to me
that I should do that (although in practice I do look for such
explanations anyway).
Alec Brady
<1163266175....@k70g2000cwa.googlegroups.com>,
ste...@bowness.demon.co.uk wrote:
>You mean God is so incompetent that he cannot create beings with free
>will that choose good.
Or that he has some reason for not doing it by fiat.
>That can't be right , surely? After all, God is supposed to have a
>Heaven full of such creatures.
Are you speaking of angels? Traditionally they didn't all choose good.
Or do you mean saints? They come to be saints by the process of
salvation. We assume that God had a reason for wanting to use this
process rather than making saints ab initio, and I don't think you've
quite shown that that idea is obviously insane.
--
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