Gareth McCaughan and the Problem of Evil
vrep...@hotmail.com
locked horns a couple of years ago on my book. Since that time I
started my blog, www.dangerousidea.blogspot.com, and haven't been here.
On my site I issued this challenge, and got devoted several posts to
it, mostly last summer.
http://dangerousidea.blogspot.com/2006/07/challenge-to-advocates-of-_115393915812229042.html
A Challenge to Advocates of the Argument from Evil
I'd like to make an methodological point in discussions of the problem
of evil, a part of the Plantingian legacy. If the theist begins by
offering explanations of the existence of evil, and the discussion
focuses on the adequacy of these explanations, the theist puts himself
at an unfair disadvantage. If I as a defender of the argument from
reason were to say that since we don't now have a detailed explanation
of the evolution of the brain, the argument from reason succeeds, I
would be rightly criticized. I would be accused of the God the the Gaps
fallacy. The same principle applies here to the argument from evil. The
correct procedure, it seems to me, is to ask the atheist to present
his/her argument against theism. Is it a logical argument, a
probabilistic argument, or some other kind of argument. Show me the
argument, let me see what the premises are and what the conclusion is.
Then an explanation, or a possible explanation, for evil might be
required. Or not, depending on the structure of the argument. So I'm
going to issue a challenge to atheists. Give me your version of the
argument from evil. Numbered premises please.
And, of course, I want to be given some good reasons why I should
accept all the premises.
Here's what I am getting at. The argument from evil is supposed to have
a special pride of place amongst arguments concerning theism, both pro
and con. Every version of the argument from evil that I saw put on my
blog seemed to me to have questionable premises which seemed to me to
indicate that the argument was inadequate, even absent any throughgoing
across-the-board explanation for some particular evils, such as the
Asian tsunami in 2004. To make matters worse for the atheological
argument, the atheist has to appeal to some moral premise (A perfectly
good being eliminates evil as far as possible) which he must either
contend is objectively true (which in my view compromises naturalism)
or appeals to a value that all theists, or maybe all Christians accept.
Some people think that this sort of thing is true by definition, but I
am unpersauded of those claims.
Now I am not at all sure that a good version of the argument from evil
can't be developed that doesn't have some disconfirmatory impact on
theism. It's just a whole heck of a lot harder than it looks. I think
if you greet the problem of evil with the type of skepticism that I
have every right to expect that my own favorite argument will receive
from its critics, it proves to be overrated.
A good volume of essays on the evidential argument from evil came out
in the 90s, edited by Daniel Howard-Snyder:
http://www.amazon.com/Evidential-Argument-Indiana-Philosophy-Religion/dp/0253210283
But I think the idea that the AFE is really powerful, unlike your
average theistic argument, or even just your average philosophical
argument (like Wittgenstein's private language argument), is generated
by the idea that somehow, if the theist can't explain all of human
suffering and give God's reason for permitting it, theism is thought to
be deficient.
Michael J Davis
Gareth is a new Father, and has had e-mail problems recently. But we
hope to be in touch soon. Some other of us are still very interested,
and will be looking at your site.
(I see Steven Carr got there earlier!)
Blessings
Mike
<on the feast of St Michael>
(scuse me for top posting everyone!)
In message <1159489197.7...@e3g2000cwe.googlegroups.com>,
"vrep...@hotmail.com" <vrep...@hotmail.com> writes
>I read Gareth's account of his own deconversion. Of courses, he and I
>locked horns a couple of years ago on my book. Since that time I
>started my blog, www.dangerousidea.blogspot.com, and haven't been here.
>On my site I issued this challenge, and got devoted several posts to
>it, mostly last summer.
>http://dangerousidea.blogspot.com/2006/07/challenge-to-advocates-of-_115
>393915812229042.html
>
>A Challenge to Advocates of the Argument from Evil
[The reply-to address is valid for 30 days from this posting]
--
Michael J Davis
http://www.trustsof.demon.co.uk
<><
For this is what the Lord has said to me,
"Go and post a Watchman and let
him report what he sees." Isa 21:6
<><
Mark Goodge
keyboard and typed:
>Victor, great to hear from you - welcome back!
>
>Gareth is a new Father,
A new father, surely, unless you're implying something that I'm pretty
sure Gareth would reject :-)
Mark
--
Please give me one! http://www.pleasegivemeone.com
"I know I can be afraid but I'm alive"
Michael J Davis
Mark Goodge <use...@listmail.good-stuff.co.uk> writes
>On Fri, 29 Sep 2006 16:14:08 +0100, Michael J Davis put finger to
>keyboard and typed:
>
>>Victor, great to hear from you - welcome back!
>>
>>Gareth is a new Father,
>
>A new father, surely, unless you're implying something that I'm pretty
>sure Gareth would reject :-)
LOL! I noticed that when I read the posting. Sorry, I washed my hands
today and now can't do a thing with them!
Mike
Kendall K. Down
"vrep...@hotmail.com" <vrep...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> To make matters worse for the atheological
> argument, the atheist has to appeal to some moral premise (A perfectly
> good being eliminates evil as far as possible) which he must either
> contend is objectively true (which in my view compromises naturalism)
> or appeals to a value that all theists, or maybe all Christians accept.
An interesting idea. Of course if there is no God, disasters are morally
neutral; I think, however, that if you posit a good God - as Christianity
does - then disasters do require an explanation.
> But I think the idea that the AFE is really powerful, unlike your
> average theistic argument, or even just your average philosophical
> argument (like Wittgenstein's private language argument), is generated
> by the idea that somehow, if the theist can't explain all of human
> suffering and give God's reason for permitting it, theism is thought to
> be deficient.
Yes, it is self-evidently foolish, because how can a mere human be expected
to understand the ways and purposes of God?
Alas, Gareth appears to have vanished for the time being.
God bless,
Kendall K. Down
--
================ ARCHAEOLOGICAL DIGGINGS ===============
| Australia's premier archaeological magazine |
| http://www.diggingsonline.com |
========================================================
ste...@bowness.demon.co.uk
> Yes, it is self-evidently foolish, because how can a mere human be expected
> to understand the ways and purposes of God?
You've got a tongue haven't you? You can always ask.
Kendall K. Down
ste...@bowness.demon.co.uk wrote:
Indeed, but like asking Gareth to explain mathematics, would I understand
the explanation?
ste...@bowness.demon.co.uk
> In message <1159622717.1...@m73g2000cwd.googlegroups.com>
> ste...@bowness.demon.co.uk wrote:
>
> > > Yes, it is self-evidently foolish, because how can a mere human be expected
> > > to understand the ways and purposes of God?
>
> > You've got a tongue haven't you? You can always ask.
>
> Indeed, but like asking Gareth to explain mathematics, would I understand
> the explanation?
That would depend upon whether you had been made in the image of a
maths-teacher or not, surely?
Dianelos Georgoudis
From theism's point of view the argument from evil is problematic not
so much because it is a powerful argument in the abstract sense, but
rather because it is so emotionally powerful. People (before as well as
after Plantinga cut the argument down to size) still get convinced that
God does not exist because of this argument. That's the problem.
A simple form of the argument is this:
1. If God exists then the whole of reality is perfect.
2. The whole of reality is not perfect.
3. Therefore God does not exist.
The Old Testament answer is that premise #1 is false: "The world was
not meant by God to be like it is; it became like this when Adam and
Eve through their disobedience to God brought suffering and death into
the world." But this answer is not convincing anymore. People ask: "How
could God fail in creating the world He meant to?", or "Why did not God
build all people like Mother Teresa?", or "How should Adam and Eve know
that it was evil to disobey God and eat from the tree of knowledge of
good evil before actually eating from that tree?", or "Why did God put
that tree in the garden in the first place - couldn't he predict that
Adam and Eve would disobey and eat from it?", or even "Why did God
allow the serpent into the garden?".
I think premise #1 is unassailable. Which leaves premise #2. Here too
there is the argument that when gratuitous suffering happens it's
really all to the best, but that it is not possible for our little
minds to understand why is it all to the best. But this defense from
stupidity is not very powerful nowadays. People ask: "Why did not God
create us intelligent enough to understand these things?" and more
basically "Why did not God create us intelligent enough to know about
His existence in the first place?" (the so-called argument from
ignorance). Of course there is a circular answer: We are not
intelligent enough to understand why God created us not intelligent
enough ;-) Anyway, as a practical matter the point is that most people
find these answers unconvincing.
A position some theists take is this: God has created a world in which
our experience of the spirit can be so powerful that it is emotionally
possible to see and follow the path towards God even while
intellectually being unable to counter the argument from evil. Which is
a fine position to take. Still I believe there exists an intelligible
answer to the argument from evil, and that it is about explaining why
the world, such as it is, is indeed perfect.
Simon Woods
> vrep...@hotmail.com wrote:
> > Here's what I am getting at. The argument from evil is supposed to have
> > a special pride of place amongst arguments concerning theism, both pro
> > and con. Every version of the argument from evil that I saw put on my
> > blog seemed to me to have questionable premises which seemed to me to
> > indicate that the argument was inadequate, even absent any throughgoing
> > across-the-board explanation for some particular evils, such as the
> > Asian tsunami in 2004. To make matters worse for the atheological
> > argument, the atheist has to appeal to some moral premise (A perfectly
> > good being eliminates evil as far as possible) which he must either
> > contend is objectively true (which in my view compromises naturalism)
> > or appeals to a value that all theists, or maybe all Christians accept.
> > Some people think that this sort of thing is true by definition, but I
> > am unpersauded of those claims.
> >
> > Now I am not at all sure that a good version of the argument from evil
> > can't be developed that doesn't have some disconfirmatory impact on
> > theism. It's just a whole heck of a lot harder than it looks. I think
> > if you greet the problem of evil with the type of skepticism that I
> > have every right to expect that my own favorite argument will receive
> > from its critics, it proves to be overrated.
> >
> From theism's point of view the argument from evil is problematic not
> so much because it is a powerful argument in the abstract sense, but
> rather because it is so emotionally powerful. People (before as well as
> after Plantinga cut the argument down to size) still get convinced that
> God does not exist because of this argument. That's the problem.
>
> A simple form of the argument is this:
>
> 1. If God exists then the whole of reality is perfect.
> 2. The whole of reality is not perfect.
> 3. Therefore God does not exist.
<snip>
> A position some theists take is this: God has created a world in which
> our experience of the spirit can be so powerful that it is emotionally
> possible to see and follow the path towards God even while
> intellectually being unable to counter the argument from evil. Which is
> a fine position to take. Still I believe there exists an intelligible
> answer to the argument from evil, and that it is about explaining why
> the world, such as it is, is indeed perfect.
I'm not sure that it is just theists who have a problem. There is also
a problem for non-theists - given the truth of cause and effect (a
deterministic system), why should I ever feel/sense etc that anything
is ever wrong? Perhaps the statement/contemplation/problem is a bit
more 'koan-istic'. There certainly seem to be many who claim to have
transcended the problem but they also seem to refuse to permit
intellect to run ahead of experience.
Dianelos Georgoudis
> Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
[snip]
> > A position some theists take is this: God has created a world in which
> > our experience of the spirit can be so powerful that it is emotionally
> > possible to see and follow the path towards God even while
> > intellectually being unable to counter the argument from evil. Which is
> > a fine position to take. Still I believe there exists an intelligible
> > answer to the argument from evil, and that it is about explaining why
> > the world, such as it is, is indeed perfect.
>
> I'm not sure that it is just theists who have a problem. There is also
> a problem for non-theists - given the truth of cause and effect (a
> deterministic system), why should I ever feel/sense etc that anything
> is ever wrong? Perhaps the statement/contemplation/problem is a bit
> more 'koan-istic'. There certainly seem to be many who claim to have
> transcended the problem but they also seem to refuse to permit
> intellect to run ahead of experience.
What complicates this issue is that a good argument can be made that if
or when we manage to simulate the evolution of intelligence within a
digital computer (which of course is a completely deterministic
mechanism) then we will almost certainly observe the evolution of
ethical beliefs in it too. In any case I think determinism is not the
issue, but rather materialism. Materialism, either of the strong kind
(only material things exist) or the weak kind (anything that exists can
be explained using materialist language), is a worldview that excludes
the existence of God and is indeed the worldview of the vast majority
of non-theists. The problem for materialism is not so much the
existence of ethical feeling, but rather the existence of any feeling
in the first place. It's experience itself - the fact that we are
conscious beings - which is the evidence for the existence of God which
stares us in the face every waking second of our lives. Indeed this
fundamental fact of life makes nonsense of the often repeated
non-theistic claim that "there is no evidence for the existence of God".
Richard Dudley
Why do you think that this argument is less powerful nowadays ? Seems
jolly watertight from where I'm standing !
> People ask: "Why did not God
> create us intelligent enough to understand these things?"
The answer I'd give is that its not a lack of intelligence, merely a
lack of will to understand. Romans 1 gives us an explanation I believe.
> and more
> basically "Why did not God create us intelligent enough to know about
> His existence in the first place?" (the so-called argument from
> ignorance).
But what if he did, and its not actually a matter of intelligence,
rather one of common sense?
> Of course there is a circular answer: We are not
> intelligent enough to understand why God created us not intelligent
> enough ;-) Anyway, as a practical matter the point is that most people
> find these answers unconvincing.
Well surely what most people find convincing or not isn't a convincing
way of getting at the truth, is it ?
> A position some theists take is this: God has created a world in which
> our experience of the spirit can be so powerful that it is emotionally
> possible to see and follow the path towards God even while
> intellectually being unable to counter the argument from evil. Which is
> a fine position to take. Still I believe there exists an intelligible
> answer to the argument from evil, and that it is about explaining why
> the world, such as it is, is indeed perfect.
Oh, so you do agree with me in the end then ? That the world is
perfect, its just the way most people see it is warped ? That the
'problem of evil' is simply a reflection of distorted perceptions ?
Richard
Michael J Davis
Dianelos Georgoudis <dian...@tecapro.com> writes
>Simon Woods wrote:
>> Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
>[snip]
>> > A position some theists take is this: God has created a world in which
>> > our experience of the spirit can be so powerful that it is emotionally
>> > possible to see and follow the path towards God even while
>> > intellectually being unable to counter the argument from evil. Which is
>> > a fine position to take. Still I believe there exists an intelligible
>> > answer to the argument from evil, and that it is about explaining why
>> > the world, such as it is, is indeed perfect.
>>
>> I'm not sure that it is just theists who have a problem. There is also
>> a problem for non-theists - given the truth of cause and effect (a
>> deterministic system), why should I ever feel/sense etc that anything
>> is ever wrong? Perhaps the statement/contemplation/problem is a bit
>> more 'koan-istic'. There certainly seem to be many who claim to have
>> transcended the problem but they also seem to refuse to permit
>> intellect to run ahead of experience.
>
>What complicates this issue is that a good argument can be made that if
>or when we manage to simulate the evolution of intelligence within a
>digital computer (which of course is a completely deterministic
>mechanism) then we will almost certainly observe the evolution of
>ethical beliefs in it too.
I'm not sure whose simulations you are suggesting, but AIUI any 'ethical
beliefs that emerge tend to be built into the premises or into the
language used. Otherwise how could the observers recognise the 'ethical'
belief when it emerged?
>In any case I think determinism is not the
>issue, but rather materialism. Materialism, either of the strong kind
>(only material things exist) or the weak kind (anything that exists can
>be explained using materialist language), is a worldview that excludes
>the existence of God and is indeed the worldview of the vast majority
>of non-theists. The problem for materialism is not so much the
>existence of ethical feeling, but rather the existence of any feeling
>in the first place. It's experience itself - the fact that we are
>conscious beings - which is the evidence for the existence of God which
>stares us in the face every waking second of our lives. Indeed this
>fundamental fact of life makes nonsense of the often repeated
>non-theistic claim that "there is no evidence for the existence of God".
I agree. There are several indicatives for the existence of God. They
are:-
1. The existence of everything
2. The anthropic principle
3. The existence of consciousness
4. The free will paradox
5. The ethical imperative
6. The abstract concept of beauty and the numinous
7. The experience and observations of many believers.
None are convincing per se, but together they present an experiential
challenge.
Against this is the problem of evil.
ste...@bowness.demon.co.uk
> From theism's point of view the argument from evil is problematic not
> so much because it is a powerful argument in the abstract sense, but
> rather because it is so emotionally powerful. People (before as well as
> after Plantinga cut the argument down to size) still get convinced that
> God does not exist because of this argument.
Plantinga didn't do any such thing.
Christian philosophy professors have emailed me to say that Plantinga's
methods can also be used to prove that the idea of everybody only
having one leg is logically consistent with our memory and senses
telling us that almost everybody has two legs.
In which case Plantinga's methods have little to do with reality...
> A simple form of the argument is this:
>
> 1. If God exists then the whole of reality is perfect.
> 2. The whole of reality is not perfect.
> 3. Therefore God does not exist.
> The Old Testament answer is that premise #1 is false: "The world was
> not meant by God to be like it is; it became like this when Adam and
> Eve through their disobedience to God brought suffering and death into
> the world." But this answer is not convincing anymore. People ask: "How
> could God fail in creating the world He meant to?", or "Why did not God
> build all people like Mother Teresa?",
We are constantly told that God has created many angels that have never
sinned.
So it is easy for God to create beings that never sin.
> or "How should Adam and Eve know
> that it was evil to disobey God and eat from the tree of knowledge of
> good evil before actually eating from that tree?", or "Why did God put
> that tree in the garden in the first place - couldn't he predict that
> Adam and Eve would disobey and eat from it?", or even "Why did God
> allow the serpent into the garden?".
Or why did God not put angels with flaming swords to keep Adam and Eve
away from the tree.
Apparently God can put angels around trees without interfering with
free will.
> I think premise #1 is unassailable. Which leaves premise #2. Here too
> there is the argument that when gratuitous suffering happens it's
> really all to the best, but that it is not possible for our little
> minds to understand why is it all to the best. But this defense from
> stupidity is not very powerful nowadays. People ask: "Why did not God
> create us intelligent enough to understand these things?" and more
> basically "Why did not God create us intelligent enough to know about
> His existence in the first place?" (the so-called argument from
> ignorance). Of course there is a circular answer: We are not
> intelligent enough to understand why God created us not intelligent
> enough ;-)
I always knew there was a really good reason why God allows abortion.
It seemed like a gratiutious evil to me , one which caused untold
suffering.
But I am glad I know now that there is a very good reason to allow
evils like abortion.
Just I am not intelligent enough to grasp what it is.
Dianelos Georgoudis
The idea is as follows: It appears that intelligence and culture evolve
through the same laws of biological evolution. To verify this
assumption one could in principle take a large computer and simulate in
it an environment with resources the consumption of which requires
intelligence to some degree. Simulate in this environment primitive
beings and let natural selection take its course. What will happen? I
believe we shall observe the evolution of generations of ever more
intelligent beings in the computer, including the evolution of language
and ethical thinking. Now it's questionable whether we shall be able to
understand their language but ethical behavior itself (e.g. altruistic
behavior) will be easy to spot.
Why do I believe this? Firstly, because Darwinian evolution is a very
powerful idea that appears capable of explaining the evolution of human
intelligence and culture too. Certainly there are no good arguments why
the evolution of human intelligence and culture cannot be explained by
the same principles used by Darwinian evolution. Secondly for inductive
reasons: almost everything we observe has already been explained on
materialistic principles and it's reasonable to expect that our
observation of human intelligence and culture can and will be explained
in this manner too. Thirdly, I suppose because I have read too many of
Stanislaw Lem's books.
Now, let's assume I am right. Would this affect the moral argument for
the existence of God? Yes and no. If one accepts that ethical
principles are meaningful by themselves then the moral argument still
works. But the non-theist is free to insist that ethical principles
have no meaning beyond the way they evolved, and that this way can be
understood on strictly materialist principles.
I think materialism can in principle explain everything we observe but
cannot explain the fact that we observe in the first place, the fact
that there is conscious experience, which of course theism does
explain. Now materialists claim that even though the problem of
consciousness has not been solved by science it eventually will, but
there are many arguments that show this is wishful thinking. I think in
time the more knowledgeable materialists will realize that materialism
is an incomplete ontology, but I expect many of them will insist that
the solution is to expand materialism towards some spiritual level
rather than accept the traditional view of God as the explanation of
conscious experience. In this I think they will be both right and wrong
- but the main point is that time works against the current version of
non-theism: its intellectual underpinning, namely materialism, already
suffers from internal tension (it appears incapable of producing a
coherent or even objective worldview) and will in time be discarded as
a serious belief structure.
> >In any case I think determinism is not the
> >issue, but rather materialism. Materialism, either of the strong kind
> >(only material things exist) or the weak kind (anything that exists can
> >be explained using materialist language), is a worldview that excludes
> >the existence of God and is indeed the worldview of the vast majority
> >of non-theists. The problem for materialism is not so much the
> >existence of ethical feeling, but rather the existence of any feeling
> >in the first place. It's experience itself - the fact that we are
> >conscious beings - which is the evidence for the existence of God which
> >stares us in the face every waking second of our lives. Indeed this
> >fundamental fact of life makes nonsense of the often repeated
> >non-theistic claim that "there is no evidence for the existence of God".
>
> I agree. There are several indicatives for the existence of God. They
> are:-
>
> 1. The existence of everything
> 2. The anthropic principle
> 3. The existence of consciousness
> 4. The free will paradox
> 5. The ethical imperative
> 6. The abstract concept of beauty and the numinous
> 7. The experience and observations of many believers.
>
> None are convincing per se, but together they present an experiential
> challenge.
I dislike the idea of probabilistic arguments for the existence of God.
Further some arguments, such as the anthropic principle, are based on
an erroneous conception of what science is about. Science is about
creating powerful mathematical models that describe our objective
observations. In short science is strictly descriptive; it answers
"how" questions, not "why" questions. Indeed science may one
day discover mathematical models that explain how this or that
fundamental constant came to have the values they have. But science is
not about answering questions such as why these constants have exactly
the values that are necessary for the evolution of life. Within the
context of science, the context in which we encounter these fundamental
constants, such questions are meaningless.
>
> Against this is the problem of evil.
Unfortunately though this single argument is powerful enough to
convince people that God does not exist.
Dianelos Georgoudis
I suppose because people nowadays are less prepared to accept beliefs
on the authority of others.
> > People ask: "Why did not God
> > create us intelligent enough to understand these things?"
>
> The answer I'd give is that its not a lack of intelligence, merely a
> lack of will to understand. Romans 1 gives us an explanation I believe.
Don't you think that many people who don't understand why there is
gratutious suffering (say a small child dying from cancer) would dearly
like to understand? Or maybe you would like to explain what Romans 1
explains, for I don't understand it.
> > and more
> > basically "Why did not God create us intelligent enough to know about
> > His existence in the first place?" (the so-called argument from
> > ignorance).
>
> But what if he did, and its not actually a matter of intelligence,
> rather one of common sense?
As it's a fact that so many people don't really believe in the
existence of God it can't be so *common* sense.
> > Of course there is a circular answer: We are not
> > intelligent enough to understand why God created us not intelligent
> > enough ;-) Anyway, as a practical matter the point is that most people
> > find these answers unconvincing.
>
> Well surely what most people find convincing or not isn't a convincing
> way of getting at the truth, is it ?
Right. The sad point though remains that this one argument (the problem
of evil) appears to be more powerful in changing minds than all the
theistic arguments taken together.
> > A position some theists take is this: God has created a world in which
> > our experience of the spirit can be so powerful that it is emotionally
> > possible to see and follow the path towards God even while
> > intellectually being unable to counter the argument from evil. Which is
> > a fine position to take. Still I believe there exists an intelligible
> > answer to the argument from evil, and that it is about explaining why
> > the world, such as it is, is indeed perfect.
>
> Oh, so you do agree with me in the end then ? That the world is
> perfect, its just the way most people see it is warped ? That the
> 'problem of evil' is simply a reflection of distorted perceptions ?
Yes, I agree with you.
Dianelos Georgoudis
> Dianelos Georgoudis wrote
>
> > From theism's point of view the argument from evil is problematic not
> > so much because it is a powerful argument in the abstract sense, but
> > rather because it is so emotionally powerful. People (before as well as
> > after Plantinga cut the argument down to size) still get convinced that
> > God does not exist because of this argument.
>
> Plantinga didn't do any such thing.
>
> Christian philosophy professors have emailed me to say that Plantinga's
> methods can also be used to prove that the idea of everybody only
> having one leg is logically consistent with our memory and senses
> telling us that almost everybody has two legs.
I am not sure what they meant. Actually the fact that we remember or
see most people having two legs does not constitute a logical proof
that they do in fact have two legs. But that's not how Plantinga's
argument works. He accepts the premise that evil exists, but shows that
even so an all-good and all-powerful God *may* logically exist. As he
explains his argument is a defense, not a theodicy.
> In which case Plantinga's methods have little to do with reality...
Here is the point. Before Plantinga's argument many philosophers
claimed that the problem of evil logically proves that God (having the
fundamental properties of being all-powerful and all-good) does not
exist. Plantinga proved using cold logic that this is not true: the
problem of evil fails to logically prove that God does not exist. After
his publishing his arguments these philosophers stopped claiming that
the problem of evil constitutes a logical proof of the non-existence of
God, but only that it constitutes an evidentiary proof for the
non-existence of God. So Plantinga did cut their argument down to size.
> > A simple form of the argument is this:
> >
> > 1. If God exists then the whole of reality is perfect.
> > 2. The whole of reality is not perfect.
> > 3. Therefore God does not exist.
>
>
> > The Old Testament answer is that premise #1 is false: "The world was
> > not meant by God to be like it is; it became like this when Adam and
> > Eve through their disobedience to God brought suffering and death into
> > the world." But this answer is not convincing anymore. People ask: "How
> > could God fail in creating the world He meant to?", or "Why did not God
> > build all people like Mother Teresa?",
>
> We are constantly told that God has created many angels that have never
> sinned.
>
> So it is easy for God to create beings that never sin.
If so, why didn't God create humans as ethically strong as angels?
>
> > or "How should Adam and Eve know
> > that it was evil to disobey God and eat from the tree of knowledge of
> > good evil before actually eating from that tree?", or "Why did God put
> > that tree in the garden in the first place - couldn't he predict that
> > Adam and Eve would disobey and eat from it?", or even "Why did God
> > allow the serpent into the garden?".
>
> Or why did God not put angels with flaming swords to keep Adam and Eve
> away from the tree.
>
> Apparently God can put angels around trees without interfering with
> free will.
Yes. Or God could have put a very high wall around the tree. God could
have easily avoided the fall of Adam and Eve.
> > I think premise #1 is unassailable. Which leaves premise #2. Here too
> > there is the argument that when gratuitous suffering happens it's
> > really all to the best, but that it is not possible for our little
> > minds to understand why is it all to the best. But this defense from
> > stupidity is not very powerful nowadays. People ask: "Why did not God
> > create us intelligent enough to understand these things?" and more
> > basically "Why did not God create us intelligent enough to know about
> > His existence in the first place?" (the so-called argument from
> > ignorance). Of course there is a circular answer: We are not
> > intelligent enough to understand why God created us not intelligent
> > enough ;-)
>
> I always knew there was a really good reason why God allows abortion.
>
> It seemed like a gratiutious evil to me , one which caused untold
> suffering.
>
> But I am glad I know now that there is a very good reason to allow
> evils like abortion.
>
> Just I am not intelligent enough to grasp what it is.
I am not sure I follow you. How can you know that there is very good
reason that Gods allows some evil if you cannot grasp what that reason
is?
David A.
"Dianelos Georgoudis" <dian...@tecapro.com> wrote:
>
> Here is the point. Before Plantinga's argument many philosophers
> claimed that the problem of evil logically proves that God (having the
> fundamental properties of being all-powerful and all-good) does not
> exist.
Many philosophers? Which ones?
> Plantinga proved using cold logic that this is not true: the
> problem of evil fails to logically prove that God does not exist.
That's until somebody shows the faults in Plantinga's logic, assuming it
hasn't been done already.
Arguments for and against the existence of deities are a waste of time;
people believe or disbelieve for non-logical reasons. I would even apply
this to Spinoza and the deists.
DA
Richard Dudley
> > > People ask: "Why did not God
> > > create us intelligent enough to understand these things?"
> >
> > The answer I'd give is that its not a lack of intelligence, merely a
> > lack of will to understand. Romans 1 gives us an explanation I believe.
>
> Don't you think that many people who don't understand why there is
> gratutious suffering (say a small child dying from cancer) would dearly
> like to understand?
Yes, in the sense that I'd dearly like to be able to play all of
Chopin's Op.10 and Op.25 Etudes. In other words, I'd dearly like to but
I'm not so enamoured of them that I'll put in all the time and effort
that it requires, giving up time online in exchange ;-) Some things
require consistent application - understanding the nature of suffering
is one such.
> Or maybe you would like to explain what Romans 1
> explains, for I don't understand it.
Sure, I'll give you a potted version. Paul says that the eternal
qualities of deity are clearly perceived. Yet most people don't
perceive that - they consider it a debatable question rather than
something obvious. The reason that Paul gives for that is 'wickedness'.
I'd not put it so bluntly, rather I'd say it was unconscious
dishonesty. Believing false things creates perceptual distortions which
prevents people from directly perceiving the qualities of deity in the
world.
> > > and more
> > > basically "Why did not God create us intelligent enough to know about
> > > His existence in the first place?" (the so-called argument from
> > > ignorance).
> >
> > But what if he did, and its not actually a matter of intelligence,
> > rather one of common sense?
>
> As it's a fact that so many people don't really believe in the
> existence of God it can't be so *common* sense.
Righty. Common sense isn't really that common.
> > > Of course there is a circular answer: We are not
> > > intelligent enough to understand why God created us not intelligent
> > > enough ;-) Anyway, as a practical matter the point is that most people
> > > find these answers unconvincing.
> >
> > Well surely what most people find convincing or not isn't a convincing
> > way of getting at the truth, is it ?
>
> Right. The sad point though remains that this one argument (the problem
> of evil) appears to be more powerful in changing minds than all the
> theistic arguments taken together.
I don't consider it to be sad - its how things have been set up. If
people don't want to believe in God and don't want to take the time and
trouble and dedicate themselves to finding the truth, its their choice.
People can live relatively satisfying lives like that.
Going a bit deeper, I don't believe arguments convince anyone.
Experiences convince people, arguments come along afterwards to explain
and describe those experiences.
> > > A position some theists take is this: God has created a world in which
> > > our experience of the spirit can be so powerful that it is emotionally
> > > possible to see and follow the path towards God even while
> > > intellectually being unable to counter the argument from evil. Which is
> > > a fine position to take. Still I believe there exists an intelligible
> > > answer to the argument from evil, and that it is about explaining why
> > > the world, such as it is, is indeed perfect.
> >
> > Oh, so you do agree with me in the end then ? That the world is
> > perfect, its just the way most people see it is warped ? That the
> > 'problem of evil' is simply a reflection of distorted perceptions ?
>
> Yes, I agree with you.
OK. So then, perhaps you already do understand Romans 1, just in a
slightly different guise.
Richard
ste...@bowness.demon.co.uk
> > Plantinga didn't do any such thing.
> I am not sure what they meant. Actually the fact that we remember or
> see most people having two legs does not constitute a logical proof
> that they do in fact have two legs. But that's not how Plantinga's
> argument works. He accepts the premise that evil exists, but shows that
> even so an all-good and all-powerful God *may* logically exist. As he
> explains his argument is a defense, not a theodicy.
Using exactly the same methods I can 'defend' the idea that everybody
has just one leg.
Is it rational to believe that we have just one leg?
Do you think people who claim that we have two legs, just because they
can see two legs, are being 'illogical' in an way?
I can defend an all-good Steven Carr as being compatible with people
seeing Steven Carr do bad things. Is that a defense?
I just use Plantinga's methods.
If not even God can 'prove' that Steven Carr is not all-good, why
should I have to beg forgiveness for my sins?
> Here is the point. Before Plantinga's argument many philosophers
> claimed that the problem of evil logically proves that God (having the
> fundamental properties of being all-powerful and all-good) does not
> exist. Plantinga proved using cold logic that this is not true: the
> problem of evil fails to logically prove that God does not exist.
No he didn't.
Only in the solipistic sense that , for all we know, everybody could
have just one leg.
A logic which denies that we can believe the evidence of our eyes is
the Doomsday-device of apologetics. Plantinga has destroyed the logical
argument from evil by destroying all logic..
> After
> his publishing his arguments these philosophers stopped claiming that
> the problem of evil constitutes a logical proof of the non-existence of
> God, but only that it constitutes an evidentiary proof for the
> non-existence of God. So Plantinga did cut their argument down to size.
People used to claim that theists were naked in view of the logical
argument from evil.
Plantinga has found a fig-leaf. True, he is not entirely naked, but he
is still in an embarrasing position.
And Plantinga's actual defense has huge holes in it.
<skip>
ste...@bowness.demon.co.uk
<big skip>
> I am not sure I follow you. How can you know that there is very good
> reason that Gods allows some evil if you cannot grasp what that reason
> is?
You may well ask Plantinga that. He is the one asking us to deny the
evidence of our eyes.
Just as there is no good reason to think that human beings having one
leg is logically compatible with our memory and senses telling us that
most human beings have two legs, there is no good reason to think that
an all-good God would not have prevented the Holocaust.
ste...@bowness.demon.co.uk
<skip>
> Sure, I'll give you a potted version. Paul says that the eternal
> qualities of deity are clearly perceived. Yet most people don't
> perceive that - they consider it a debatable question rather than
> something obvious. The reason that Paul gives for that is 'wickedness'.
> I'd not put it so bluntly, rather I'd say it was unconscious
> dishonesty. Believing false things creates perceptual distortions which
> prevents people from directly perceiving the qualities of deity in the
> world.
The world is finite, full of material, full of randomness and full of
wickedness.
Which qualities of deity does that reflect?
Simon Woods
You seem to be saying that the experience of awareness/consciousness is
transcendent and therefore the only explanation is the existence of a
transendent being to impart such an experience. As far as I can see
this is an assertion - that the experience of awareness is
transcendent. Obviously a materialist asserts the opposite. I'm
probably missing something but could you explain why awareness can't be
'just another property' of the material system. I tried to follow when
you were explaining to Gareth but I got a bit lost, I'm afraid!
Also, re the development of materialism, you'll know doubt be aware of
many ancient non-dualistic philosophies/religions which have no problem
seeng mind/body as one and not transcendent/imminent.
Richard Dudley
> Richard Dudley wrote:
> > Sure, I'll give you a potted version. Paul says that the eternal
> > qualities of deity are clearly perceived. Yet most people don't
> > perceive that - they consider it a debatable question rather than
> > something obvious. The reason that Paul gives for that is 'wickedness'.
> > I'd not put it so bluntly, rather I'd say it was unconscious
> > dishonesty. Believing false things creates perceptual distortions which
> > prevents people from directly perceiving the qualities of deity in the
> > world.
>
> The world is finite
How do you know ?
> full of material, full of randomness and full of
> wickedness.
Give one or two examples of wickedness you've noticed please. Oh, and
while you're about it, do explain what you mean by stating the world is
'full of randomness'.
> Which qualities of deity does that reflect?
Its obvious you're not seeing many of the qualities of deity :-) Matter
( i.e. beingness ) and void ( non-beingness ) is one though. You'll
find the reason for missing the others to be simply explained in my
paragraph above.
Richard
Dianelos Georgoudis
> Dianelos Georgoudis wrote:
[snip]
> > or when we manage to simulate the evolution of intelligence within a
> > digital computer (which of course is a completely deterministic
> > mechanism) then we will almost certainly observe the evolution of
> > ethical beliefs in it too. In any case I think determinism is not the
> > issue, but rather materialism. Materialism, either of the strong kind
> > (only material things exist) or the weak kind (anything that exists can
> > be explained using materialist language), is a worldview that excludes
> > the existence of God and is indeed the worldview of the vast majority
> > of non-theists. The problem for materialism is not so much the
> > existence of ethical feeling, but rather the existence of any feeling
> > in the first place. It's experience itself - the fact that we are
> > conscious beings - which is the evidence for the existence of God which
> > stares us in the face every waking second of our lives. Indeed this
> > fundamental fact of life makes nonsense of the often repeated
> > non-theistic claim that "there is no evidence for the existence of God".
>
> You seem to be saying that the experience of awareness/consciousness is
> transcendent and therefore the only explanation is the existence of a
> transendent being to impart such an experience. As far as I can see
> this is an assertion - that the experience of awareness is
> transcendent. Obviously a materialist asserts the opposite. I'm
> probably missing something but could you explain why awareness can't be
> 'just another property' of the material system. I tried to follow when
> you were explaining to Gareth but I got a bit lost, I'm afraid!
Well here are some of the reasons why consciousness can't be just
another property of material systems:
1. All other properties of material systems can be described in
materialist language; consciousness cannot. It's reasonable to claim
that if a problem cannot be described within a paradigm of thought then
it can't be solved either.
2. All other properties of material systems are directly or indirectly
observable; that is there are always some means to detect whether a
property is present - or at the very least somebody can propose some
speculative idea about how to detect the presence of that property in a
material system. No so in the case of consciousness. For example nobody
has any idea at all about how to measure whether frogs have conscious
experiences or not. Or whether salt crystals growing in brine have
them. Conversely nobody has any idea about how to measure that at death
a person's conscious experience is extinguished. Or that under
general anesthesia patients are not having conscious experiences (the
fact that when they wake up they don't remember having had them is
quite irrelevant).
3. Scientific thought is about explaining observations. The problem of
consciousness refers to the fact that we observe in the first place.
That's a different kind of problem. Nobody has any idea of how
scientific thought could by applied here.
4. There are several problems that science has not yet solved, e.g. how
life started, or how the human brain produces intelligent behavior.
These are hard problems and it may take a long time to solve them.
Still nobody really doubts that these are scientific problems or that
science can in principle solve them. Also there are many scientists
actively working in solving them. Not so in the case of consciousness.
Scientists are practical people; they won't use their time
investigating a problem nobody can cast in scientific terms. It's
materialist philosophers who must try to solve this problem, and they
are really stuck.
5. Contrary to all other material properties, conscious experience is
about quality rather than quantity. Nobody has any idea how one could
test that two people who are looking at the same red wall have a
conscious experience that is in any way similar.
6. In all other problems that science has encountered it was easy to at
least achieve consensus that the problem exists. Not so in the case of
consciousness; materialists cannot even agree whether consciousness
represents a problem for materialism or not. (Which is not surprising
considering that the problem of consciousness cannot even be described
in materialistic terms.)
The above is a rather quick and dirty exposition. The best book I know
about the problem of consciousness is David Chalmer's "Facing Up to the
Problem of Consciousness". Incidentally David Chalmers is considered
one of the brightest philosophers in the field of the philosophy of
mind. You can read more about him in the following wikipedia article
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Chalmers
It's interesting to compare the concept of consciousness with the
concept of God. Materialists famously point out that the hypothesis
that God exists is not required to explain any objective observation.
But, equally, the hypothesis that conscious experience exists is not
required to explain any objective observation either. If the former
fact is sufficient reason for believing that God does not exist, so
would the latter fact be sufficient reason for believing that conscious
experience does not exist, which would strike most people as absurd.
Actually there are a few people who go as far as to claim that
conscious experience does not *really* exist but is only an illusion
(whatever that exactly means in this context). Quite a few materialists
claim that free will does not exist - indeed the hypothesis that free
will exists is not necessary to explain any objective observation
either, and it's easier to deny that free will exist than to deny
that conscious experience exists. In any case materialism pushes people
into making claims that to most people sound absurd. Not a good sign.
It appears that materialism is incapable or producing a coherent
worldview. (Worldview is the set of all propositions one accepts as
true.) But theism can.
> Also, re the development of materialism, you'll know doubt be aware of
> many ancient non-dualistic philosophies/religions which have no problem
> seeng mind/body as one and not transcendent/imminent.
I think the most powerful worldview is not based neither on materialism
nor on dualism, but on idealism. Contrary to what many people believe
idealism is fully compatible with science and technology (actually in
simplifies the scientific endeavor) - and is also fully compatible with
theism.
Simon Woods
<snip>
Thanks. I'll peruse this, and perhaps come back later or see how the
discussion progresses
Simon