Armed forces to defend Britain not to serve the New World Order (NWO)
Robert Henderson
Published in Right Now! August 2004 issue 47
Armed forces to defend Britain not to serve the New World Order (NWO)
Robert Henderson
For the British political elite the loss of empire did not signal the
end of the imperial mentality. As a consequence, Britain's defence
capability continued for decades to be built upon the ridiculous
assumption that she still had the military responsibilities of a great
power. This has meant that until recently that Britain has shaped her
defence to be able to operate anywhere in the world, with a very
full range of expensive military toys such as aircraft carriers and
heavy tanks, neither of which is necessary for the defence of modern
Britain.
That policy was mistaken but not inherently dangerous. It cost the
British taxpayer a great deal of money spent unnecessarily, but it
did not in practice commit Britain to hazardous adventures or
leave Britain incapable of defending herself.
In Tony Blair's hands this "great power" mentality has transmuted
into an ideology what might be described as New World Order (NWO)
chic, whereby Britain's armed forces are no longer intended to protect
British territory but rather exist to operate as an arm of some
ill-defined international order. To call them defence forces is
rapidly becoming a misnomer. Equally important, the military
enterprises which our armed forces are being shaped to perform are
fraught with diplomatic, military and economic danger, not least
because they are likely to be taken in conjunction with the USA.
Creating the NWO force of tomorrow
The shaping of our armed forces to serve the NWO rather than British
needs is already well under way. This is exemplified by recent
equipment proposals which, at massive cost, lumber Britain with
weapons which are not needed. Two giant aircraft carriers have
already been ordered at a current estimated cost of œ13 billion and
a new "mini-tank" which can be lifted to foreign fields by air is
proposed at another œ6 billion (Sunday Telegraph London 5 10 03).
In addition to these vast equipment projects, Britain is committed to
providing a rapid-response force for "international emergencies" and is
being gradually lured, whatever Blair says, into an EU defence force.
The effect of this reshaping of our armed forces is to starve them of
the means to defend Britain. The aircraft carrier project alone will
take a quite disproportionate amount of the defence procurement budget
for many years, while the mini-tank project, if it goes ahead, will
result in the end of our heavy armour regiments altogether. The
situation is exacerbated by the cost to Britain of NWO enterprises such
as Iraq.
Already profound changes are in the offing. The Defence Secretary
Geoff Hoon announced in the Commons on 21 July a swingeing range of
cuts across all three services (see inset - bottom of email. To take the
place of these
conventional weapons and manpower are to be "hi-tech" weapons and
systems which will effectively make British forces an adjunct of the US
forces.
--
The defence policy Britain needs
It is improbable that Britain in the foreseeable future will have to
fight, as a matter of necessity, either an aggressive war abroad on
its own or in alliance with another country such as the USA. What
Britain needs are armed forces which will prevent attacks on Britain
itself, guard her waters and (just conceivably) allow her to break a
blockade. Such a policy could be easily met within Britain' s present
spending, because it is always easier and cheaper to defend your own
territory than to have to invade another territory.
Having armed forces which are designed to operate only in the defence
of Britain should mean that recruitment of both regulars and
reservists becomes easier because long and frequent tours of duty
abroad would no longer be a problem. In particular, shortages of
specialists such as military medics should become a non-issue.
The policy would have the further great advantage of hamstringing
politicians. Whatever their natural inclinations, even the most
reckless politician is constrained in what he can do by simple
practicalities. If Britain has armed forces which are only equipped to
defend British territory, they cannot easily be sent to fight abroad,
even in conjunction with a power such as the US.
Equally importantly for the long term interests of Britain, if
politicians cannot engage in military action abroad, it is probable
that their ability and desire to impose draconian "anti-terror", laws
such as those which the Blair Government has been eagerly passing since
September 11, will be much diminished. Stripped of the propaganda
engine of how Britain is militarily tackling "the war on terror" and
"our boys are at war", any government would find it very difficult to
rush through authoritarian measures because opponents amongst the elite
would be more willing to speak out.
What are we guarding against?
There are three general threats to Britain, nuclear war, conventional
war/blockade/sanctions against Britain and terrorist attacks from
within and without. Nuclear war we can only deter by possessing a
credible independent deterrent, which would also deter a direct
conventional attack. As for blockades and sanctions, these can be
resisted by ensuring we are self-sufficient in necessities.
At present we have Trident and that is it for nuclear weapons. Trident
may not be under our control - Tony Benn believes that it cannot be
operated without the release of American codes because it is dependent
upon US satellites for its guidance system - and we scrapped our
freefall nuclear bombs in 2003. Britain should develop a variety of
nuclear weapons and delivery systems.
To have a potent threat below the nuclear, Britain should also pursue
the development of weapons such as the neutron bomb and lasers and any
other appropriate sub-nuclear new technology which arises. Such
technology would permit Britain to defend the Falklands with some
certainty whilst deploying little manpower.
The Navy and Airforce should be reshaped utterly. To defend Britain,
we require not giant carriers but plenty of submarines, minesweepers
and small assault ships such as destroyers to police our immediate
seas. The airforce should turn its efforts towards the development of
unmanned planes and a space programme capable of at least launching
our own satellites - at present we are entirely dependent on Nasa or
European Space Agency satellites the use of which could be denied at
any time. The space programme would be run in conjunction with general
missile development.
The regular army is large enough as it is (approximately 110,000)
provided women are excluded from the count and it is supplemented by a
decent sized TA and properly organised reservists, ie, the regular
soldiers who have completed their service and then go onto the reserve
list.
Military procurement
In the end, the only certain defence is that which a country can
provide for itself. Relying on foreign suppliers for military
equipment is self-evidently dangerous because it places us in their
hands. There is also the inability of Britain to ensure that foreign
equipment is upgraded through further development.
A country like Britain has it within its power to produce all the
weaponry and associated equipment it needs. That is especially so if
the defence of British territory is the sole concern of Britain,
because the range of equipment needed becomes much reduced, for
example, we would not need heavy tanks or aircraft carriers.
Those who doubt that Britain could go it alone in producing their own
equipment should reflect on the fact that until the early sixties
Britain produced virtually all its defence equipment, including
cutting edge planes such as the Lightning fighter and the V bombers,
when our national wealth was, in real terms, very much less than it
is today.
To those who argue for the economies of scale in joint-projects with
other countries I would simply say one word "Eurofighter".
Originally intended to enter service in the 1990s, it has still to
do so, nor is it clear when it will.
Nor is simply buying foreign a panacea. Take the case of the Apache
Helicoptors purchased from the USA. These have a rather distinctive
design fault: rockets can only be fired from the right-hand side of
helicopter because if they are fired from the left hand side debris
may hit the tail rotor which is situated on the left-hand side.
National self-sufficiency
There is more to defence than men and armaments. The more
self-sufficient a country is the less vulnerable it is to foreign
pressure. There is no point having the best equipped defence force
in the world if a country is reliant on the import of much of its
food or raw materials such as iron and energy sources such as oil.
With modern farming practices, Britain could feed herself at a pinch.
Presently, we produce approximately 60% of what we eat. In addition, we
export a substantial amount of food. We might not be able to produce
as much food as we consume today, but if we had 80% of what we
consume now - something which could be achieved by temporarily
banning exports and maximising the use of existing agricultural land
- in time of emergency we could continue to feed ourselves.
We also need to maintain the capacity to produce all necessities, not
necessarily at the level we now consume, but to have the ability to
manufacture them. In time of emergency the capacity could be expanded.
If no capacity exists it cannot be expanded.
Energy needs should be entirely met by the country. The only practical
way of doing this rapidly is by engaging in a nuclear power building
programme. In the longer term, other renewable energy sources can be
expanded.
Lastly, strategic stockpiles of vital raw materials should be created
by the government sufficient to provide five years working stock.
This would allow time to withstand a blockade or devise ways to evade
sanctions.
International treaties and joint defence
Mutual defence treaties are a perpetual source of mischief, providing
an ever-open door to unnecessary war. For example, in 1914 Britain
went to war ostensibly because of a treaty signed in 1839 which
committed Britain to the defence of Belgium.
Presently we are primarily tied into Nato. Around 1970, I came to the
conclusion that Nato was essentially a PR vehicle because I could not
quite bring myself to believe that the US would launch a nuclear
strike on the Soviet Union simply because the Soviet Union invaded or
attacked any part of Western Europe - which was the bottom line of
Nato. I find it even less probable that an enlarged Nato would come to
the aid of a member if it was attacked, not least because the most
likely attacker of a Nato member is another Nato member.
Whatever the utility of defence treaties in the past, nuclear weapons
have changed the rules of the game. If a country has a nuclear
capacity it is most unlikely to be attacked. Thus defence treaties
are, for nuclear powers which have no aggressive ambitions, practically
redundant. Britain should withdraw from them, together with any
other treaty, such as the Treaty of Rome, which restricts Britain's
freedom of action and control of her borders.
Let us not sleep-walk to disaster
Let Britain continue to have forces which are shaped to engage in NWO
expeditionary adventures and there will be no end to military and
political quagmires such as those which now find British troops
trapped in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the absurd but sinister "War on
Terror" will carry on indefinitely. There is no end to the madness
and peril such policies could engender. We need to remove temptation
and opportunity from politicians.
Defence cuts announced July 2004
Royal Air Force
. Four out of 17 fast jet squadrons to go by 2007, including all
of the Jaguar ground attack fleet.
. Nimrod maritime reconnaissance fleet drops from 21 to 16. Order for
new version of Nimrod down from 18 to 12. Possibility of complete
cancellation.
. RAF Coltishall to close and additional base closures to be
announced next year.
. RAF Regiment loses Rapier SAM.
. Manpower cut from 53,800 to 41,000 by April 2098. (Current strength
48,500)
Royal Navy
, Six out of 31 destroyers and frigates to go over the next two
years
.Nuclear-powered attack submarine fleet cut from 11 to eight by 2008.
. Six minesweepers to be decommissioned in next two years.
.Manpower cut from 41,300 lo 36,000. (Current strength 37,500)
Army
. Four of 40 infantry battalions to go by April 2008
.More than 80 Challenger II main battle tanks - a quarter of the total
- to be cut.
. Famous single-battalion infantry regiments to merge to form regional
multi-battalion regiments.
. Manpower cut from 107,500 to 102,000. (Current strength 103,500)
--
--
Robert Henderson
phi...@anywhere.demon.co.uk
Blair Scandal web site at http://www.geocities.com/blairscandal/
Personal web site at http://www.anywhere.demon.co.uk
anthony.j....@gmail.com
> At present we have Trident and that is it for nuclear weapons. Trident
> may not be under our control - Tony Benn believes that it cannot be
> operated without the release of American codes because it is dependent
> upon US satellites for its guidance system
Tony Benn is wrong. Trident missiles use an inertial guidance system:
Robert Henderson
anthony.j....@gmail.com writes
>Robert Henderson <Phi...@anywhere.demon.co.uk> wrote in message news:<KKCYepABDe
>NBF...@anywhere.demon.co.uk>...
>> At present we have Trident and that is it for nuclear weapons. Trident
>> may not be under our control - Tony Benn believes that it cannot be
>> operated without the release of American codes because it is dependent
>> upon US satellites for its guidance system
>
>Tony Benn is wrong. Trident missiles use an inertial guidance system:
>
>http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/slbm/d-5.htm
God help anyone in the general direction of a missile fired at long
range if that is the case. About as reliable as a 5 of November rocket.
RH H
Greg Hennessy
<Phi...@anywhere.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>In article <d7ef1ae.04090...@posting.google.com>,
>anthony.j....@gmail.com writes
>>Robert Henderson <Phi...@anywhere.demon.co.uk> wrote in message news:<KKCYepABDe
>>NBF...@anywhere.demon.co.uk>...
>>> At present we have Trident and that is it for nuclear weapons. Trident
>>> may not be under our control - Tony Benn believes that it cannot be
>>> operated without the release of American codes because it is dependent
>>> upon US satellites for its guidance system
>>
>>Tony Benn is wrong. Trident missiles use an inertial guidance system:
>>
>>http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/slbm/d-5.htm
>
>God help anyone in the general direction of a missile fired at long
>range if that is the case. About as reliable as a 5 of November rocket.
>RH H
Nonsense. Inertial Navigation has been used on ballistic missiles for over
50 years.
Range is irrelevant for inertial guidance given the short time of flight.
42 years ago, the one and only live firing of a Polaris SLBM sent a 600 KT
warhead over 1000 miles to within 2000 yards of its aim point using
inertial navigation.
The technology has improved a mite since then with laser ring gyroscopes
etc.
The D5 has a published CEP of 100 metres for USN service.
As usual, Tony Benn is talking uninformed bollocks.
greg
--
Felicitations, malefactors! I am endeavoring to misappropriate
the formulary for the preparation of affordable comestibles.
Who will join me?!
Alan G
wrote:
Surely you mean Robert Henderson?
And Tony Ben, as a cabinet minister at the time he stated that the UK
needed US permission to launch an ICBM from a submarine, was certainly
more informed than the general public or even a low level tax
collector.
Greg Hennessy
>And Tony Ben, as a cabinet minister at the time he stated that the UK
>needed US permission to launch an ICBM from a submarine,
1. When and on what date did he make this claim while a cabinet minister.
2. I never realised that operational matters relating to launching Polaris
missiles carrying UK designed and built warheads extended to the Postmaster
general.
3. I am also curious to find out what position he served in Thatchers
cabinet considering that the purchase and deployment of Trident happened on
her watch.
4. How exactly would the US give this alleged permission in a crisis
situation in those critical seconds before a UK PM loses the ability to
order a launch.
Any answer implying the positioning of USN personnel on an RN SSBN will be
disregarded as the arrant nonsense it is.
Alan G
wrote:
>On Fri, 03 Sep 2004 17:31:16 +0100, Alan G <m...@privacy.net> wrote:
>
>
>>And Tony Ben, as a cabinet minister at the time he stated that the UK
>>needed US permission to launch an ICBM from a submarine,
>
>1. When and on what date did he make this claim while a cabinet minister.
In one of his diaries.
I don't have the time to look it up.
There are rather a lot of volumes
>
>2. I never realised that operational matters relating to launching Polaris
>missiles carrying UK designed and built warheads extended to the Postmaster
>general.
>
You live and learn
>3. I am also curious to find out what position he served in Thatchers
>cabinet considering that the purchase and deployment of Trident happened on
>her watch.
I can't recall him ever commenting on the situation in the thatcher
administration
>
>4. How exactly would the US give this alleged permission in a crisis
>situation in those critical seconds before a UK PM loses the ability to
>order a launch.
>
You need to ask Tony Benn
>
Greg Hennessy
>>>And Tony Ben, as a cabinet minister at the time he stated that the UK
>>>needed US permission to launch an ICBM from a submarine,
>>
>>1. When and on what date did he make this claim while a cabinet minister.
>
>In one of his diaries.
>I don't have the time to look it up.
>There are rather a lot of volumes
How would he know exactly ?
Especially considering that the Labour govt of the day managed finance the
multi billion pound Chevaline upgrade of Polaris completely unbeknownst to
him.
As a member of CND, he was a risk to national security, so the notion that
he would be a 1st hand party to *anything* related to the operation of the
deterrent is laughable.
>>3. I am also curious to find out what position he served in Thatchers
>>cabinet considering that the purchase and deployment of Trident happened on
>>her watch.
>
>I can't recall him ever commenting on the situation in the thatcher
>administration
He's asserting that the UK deterrent cannot be launched without US
authorisation. Occams razor says he's talking bollocks.
>
>>
>>4. How exactly would the US give this alleged permission in a crisis
>>situation in those critical seconds before a UK PM loses the ability to
>>order a launch.
>>
>You need to ask Tony Benn
>
So no supporting evidence then.
David Platt
Greg Hennessy wrote:
> How would he know exactly ?
>
> Especially considering that the Labour govt of the day managed finance the
> multi billion pound Chevaline upgrade of Polaris completely unbeknownst to
> him.
>
> As a member of CND, he was a risk to national security, so the notion that
> he would be a 1st hand party to *anything* related to the operation of the
Far more interesting is the question how would you know?
A former cabinet minister is more likely to have a grasp of such
matters, unless you would care to explain how you seem to be in
posession of such detailed and sensitive information?
Chris X
"David Platt" <pl...@mail.com> wrote in message
news:4138E460...@mail.com...
I've long suspected Hennessy is posting from Thames House. Brilliant
article by the way, Robert.
Greg Hennessy
>Far more interesting is the question how would you know?
Do your own homework pratt.
>A former cabinet minister is more likely to have a grasp of such
>matters,
Oh really. What part of he knew nothing about Chevaline are you having
problems comprehending my little wingnut.
>unless you would care to explain how you seem to be in
>posession of such detailed and sensitive information?
It's in the public domain idiot.
David Platt
Greg Hennessy wrote:
> On Fri, 03 Sep 2004 14:38:40 -0700, David Platt <pl...@mail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
>>Far more interesting is the question how would you know?
>
>
> Do your own homework pratt.
WHat, you mean waste my valuable time tracing your internet connection?
You aren't worth the trouble.
>>A former cabinet minister is more likely to have a grasp of such
>>matters,
>
>
> Oh really. What part of he knew nothing about Chevaline are you having
> problems comprehending my little wingnut.
And what part of, is greg Henessey an employee of HM govt or is he not.
If not, then certainly Tony Benn is going to know infinitely more about
defense matters and moron usenet fucktard Greg Hennessey.
>>unless you would care to explain how you seem to be in
>>posession of such detailed and sensitive information?
>
>
> It's in the public domain idiot.
It's in the public domain therefore Toss pot Hennessey speands every
waking hour researching recent cold war history to the extent of
aquiring detailed knowledge of missile guidance systems.
Hmm, I don't think so.
Fucking government spook.
David Platt
Chris X wrote:
> I've long suspected Hennessy is posting from Thames House. Brilliant
> article by the way, Robert.
I'd say he's likely to be a low level civil service bod of some sort
who reads Jane's and has delusions of grandeur.
Paul Hyett
:
>
>Range is irrelevant for inertial guidance given the short time of flight.
>
>42 years ago, the one and only live firing of a Polaris SLBM sent a 600 KT
>warhead over 1000 miles to within 2000 yards of its aim point using
>inertial navigation.
Unless you're behind 6ft of reinforced concrete, 2000 yards is close
enough to make no difference when nukes are concerned!
--
Paul Hyett, Cheltenham
Greg Hennessy
>>>Far more interesting is the question how would you know?
>>
>>
>> Do your own homework pratt.
>
>
>WHat, you mean waste my valuable time tracing your internet connection?
A stereotypical non sequitur.
>You aren't worth the trouble.
Translation : I wouldn't know how.
>>>A former cabinet minister is more likely to have a grasp of such
>>>matters,
>>
>>
>> Oh really. What part of he knew nothing about Chevaline are you having
>> problems comprehending my little wingnut.
>
>And what part of, is greg Henessey an employee of HM govt or is he not.
This is where pratt starts baying at the full moon.
>If not, then certainly Tony Benn is going to know infinitely more about
>defense matters
That would be willfully ignoring the fact that by Benns own admission he
knew nothing about the Chevaline program.
As with your 'expertise' on the ethnic origins of trainers at bury boxing
club and the size of the Iraqi economy, one can treat your assertions with
the due seriousness they deserve.
> and moron usenet fucktard Greg Hennessey.
yadda yadda yadda
>
>>>unless you would care to explain how you seem to be in
>>>posession of such detailed and sensitive information?
>>
>>
>> It's in the public domain idiot.
>
>
>It's in the public domain therefore Toss pot Hennessey speands every
>waking hour researching recent cold war history to the extent of
>aquiring detailed knowledge of missile guidance systems.
>
>Hmm, I don't think so.
You don't think period.
>Fucking government spook.
Of course pratt,
A conspiracy by HMG just to make you post incoherent inanity to uk.p.m.
greg
Cue the inevitable babbling attempt at a rejoinder.
Greg Hennessy
wrote:
>>42 years ago, the one and only live firing of a Polaris SLBM sent a 600 KT
>>warhead over 1000 miles to within 2000 yards of its aim point using
>>inertial navigation.
>
>Unless you're behind 6ft of reinforced concrete,
At 2000 yards, it would require rather more than 6 feet.
Plumbing 0.6 megatons into
http://www.stardestroyer.net/Empire/Science/Nuke.html
gives the following figures
Thermal radiation radius (3rd degree burns) : 9.5 kilometres
Air blast radius (widespread destruction) : 6.1 kilometres
Air blast radius (near-total fatalities) : 2.3 kilometres
Ionizing radiation radius (500 rem) : 2.8 kilometres
Fireball duration : 3.6 seconds
Fireball radius (minimum) : 350 metres
Fireball radius (airburst) : 430 metres
Fireball radius (ground-contact airburst : 570 metres
>2000 yards is close
>enough to make no difference when nukes are concerned!
Quite, much improved CEP is why today's deterrent carries warheads
yielding a fraction the size of what was deployed previously.
Robert Henderson
<m...@privacy.net> writes
>42 years ago, the one and only live firing of a Polaris SLBM sent a 600 KT
>warhead over 1000 miles to within 2000 yards of its aim point using
>inertial navigation.
Scarcely adequate data on which to base a confident claim of
reliability . And what if the distance is much greater than 1000 miles?
RH
Greg Hennessy
<Phi...@anywhere.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>Scarcely adequate data on which to base a confident claim of
>reliability.
More than adequate.
That was the only *live* firing of a SLBM, which demonstrated that a 2000
yard CEP was possible over 40 years ago.
Since then, there have been 100s if not 1000s of test firings of inertial
guided SLBMs and ICBMs carrying ballast in lieu of a warhead.
The US has a dedicated facility at Vandenberg precisely for such testing,
the aim point is 5000 miles away in the southern pacific. Missiles are
picked at random out of the stockpile and test fired.
The RN has used the Atlantic ranges @ Cape Canaveral to test fire both
Polaris and Trident.
Reliability and terminal accuracy are *not* an issue. If they were, today's
missiles would not be carrying warheads with yields a fraction of what was
deployed previously.
greg
Alan G
<Phi...@anywhere.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>In article <e2rgj05tilc0bmi1p...@4ax.com>, Greg Hennessy
><m...@privacy.net> writes
>>42 years ago, the one and only live firing of a Polaris SLBM sent a 600 KT
>>warhead over 1000 miles to within 2000 yards of its aim point using
>>inertial navigation.
>
>Scarcely adequate data on which to base a confident claim of
>reliability . And what if the distance is much greater than 1000 miles?
>RH
I'd be quite happy to get a 50 megatonne warhead within 4000 yards of
you.
anthony.j....@gmail.com
> In article <d7ef1ae.04090...@posting.google.com>,
> anthony.j....@gmail.com writes
> >Robert Henderson <Phi...@anywhere.demon.co.uk> wrote in message news:<KKCYepABDe
> >NBF...@anywhere.demon.co.uk>...
> >> At present we have Trident and that is it for nuclear weapons. Trident
> >> may not be under our control - Tony Benn believes that it cannot be
> >> operated without the release of American codes because it is dependent
> >> upon US satellites for its guidance system
> >
> >Tony Benn is wrong. Trident missiles use an inertial guidance system:
> >
> >http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/slbm/d-5.htm
>
> God help anyone in the general direction of a missile fired at long
> range if that is the case. About as reliable as a 5 of November rocket.
Not with mid-flight correction using stellar observation. Not that you
seem to know anything about how a ballistic missile system works in
practice.
No nation would ever build a strategic weapons system that was
dependant on satellites for guidance. Such a system would be
vulnerbale to enemy jamming or direct attack on the satellites
themselves as satellites are easily detectable, especially if they are
broadcasting, which makes a nonsense of the main advantage of the
submarine as a launch platform.
Tony Benn is well into "Black Helicopter" territory here if he really
believes that Trident works this way. As nobody has actually provided
a reference to where he says this I suspect that Bobbie's imagination
has been working overtime again.
Robert Henderson
>> >
>> >http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/slbm/d-5.htm
>>
>> God help anyone in the general direction of a missile fired at long
>> range if that is the case. About as reliable as a 5 of November rocket.
>
>Not with mid-flight correction using stellar observation. Not that you
>seem to know anything about how a ballistic missile system works in
>practice.
>
>No nation would ever build a strategic weapons system that was
>dependant on satellites for guidance. Such a system would be
>vulnerbale to enemy jamming or direct attack on the satellites
>themselves as satellites are easily detectable, especially if they are
>broadcasting, which makes a nonsense of the main advantage of the
>submarine as a launch platform.
>
>Tony Benn is well into "Black Helicopter" territory here if he really
>believes that Trident works this way. As nobody has actually provided
>a reference to where he says this I suspect that Bobbie's imagination
>has been working overtime again.
It doesn't really matter whether Benn is right or not about these
details. Answer this question: is it likely that the US would supply a
particularly nuclear weapons system to a foreign power and not retain
some practical control over its use? The answer has to be no. That
control may be codes to allow the missiles to start up or the arming of
the bombs or any number of other things, but they will have it.
There is also a general problem with knowing what the Trident system
is: its specifications are officially top secret. Anything Janes MIssile
systems comes up with is speculation and guesswork. RH
Greg Hennessy
<Phi...@anywhere.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>It doesn't really matter whether Benn is right or not about these
>details.
Oh but it does matter. As on other matters Benns credibility is lacking.
> Answer this question: is it likely that the US would supply a
>particularly nuclear weapons system to a foreign power and not retain
>some practical control over its use?
In the case of the UK the answer is yes.
> That control may be codes to allow the missiles to start up or
Nonsense.
Delivered by *whom* from where Robert.
May I suggest figuring out what the real world problems are when it comes
to communicating with a submerged submarine.
Now translate that into wartime where every Russian SSK is out hunting for
the 3 UK missile boats on patrol.
>the arming of the bombs
Those would be UK built bombs Robert.
> or any number of other things, but they will have it.
Nonsense.
The RAF & RN had 200 odd UK built WE177s in service for over 30 years.
Are you going to suggest that the US had a veto on that part of the
deterrent also ?
anthony.j....@gmail.com
> It doesn't really matter whether Benn is right or not about these
> details.
Well that's a matter of opinion. Given the amount of information on
Trident that's readily available it seems obvious that he is wrong and
that anyone who wants to be taken seriously on the matter would do
well to do their own research before quoting Benn. Five minutes work
on Google and it becomes obvious that TB doesn't have a clue what he's
talking about.
> Answer this question: is it likely that the US would supply a
> particularly nuclear weapons system to a foreign power and not retain
> some practical control over its use?
In the case of the UK and Israel it does seem to be likely that
technical control of the weapons system would be left in the hands of
the purchaser, especially as the warheads themselves were locally
developed.
> The answer has to be no.
Again that is an opinion asserted as a fact. The flipside of your
assertion is for us to believe that UK governments have been buying
weapons systems over which they have no control. Not very likely.
> That control may be codes to allow the missiles to start up or the arming of
> the bombs or any number of other things, but they will have it.
Again you present assertions as fact without any evidence. As the
warheads were developed at the AWE there is no question of the arming
codes being under US control. A moment's thought on your part and you
would have realised that.
> There is also a general problem with knowing what the Trident system
> is: its specifications are officially top secret.
So here are the specifications direct from the U.S. Navy:
http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/factfile/missiles/wep-d5.html
Much has been released into the public domain.
Robert Henderson
<m...@privacy.net> writes
>
>>It doesn't really matter whether Benn is right or not about these
>>details.
>
>Oh but it does matter. As on other matters Benns credibility is lacking.
>
You are missing the point. RH
>> Answer this question: is it likely that the US would supply a
>>particularly nuclear weapons system to a foreign power and not retain
>>some practical control over its use?
>
>In the case of the UK the answer is yes.
>
>
And your basis for this certainty? RH
>> That control may be codes to allow the missiles to start up or
>
>Nonsense.
>
>Delivered by *whom* from where Robert.
>
To launch from Trident submarines. RH
>May I suggest figuring out what the real world problems are when it comes
>to communicating with a submerged submarine.
>
I would not imagine that is beyond the wit of modern technology. RH
>Now translate that into wartime where every Russian SSK is out hunting for
>the 3 UK missile boats on patrol.
>
>>the arming of the bombs
>
>Those would be UK built bombs Robert.
>
That was just one suggestion. RH
>> or any number of other things, but they will have it.
>
>Nonsense.
>
>The RAF & RN had 200 odd UK built WE177s in service for over 30 years.
>
>Are you going to suggest that the US had a veto on that part of the
>deterrent also ?
>
There is a difference between equipment supplied to Britain and that
which Britain develops herself. RH
>
>greg
Robert Henderson
>PBF...@anywhere.demon.co.uk>...
>
>> It doesn't really matter whether Benn is right or not about these
>> details.
>
>Well that's a matter of opinion. Given the amount of information on
>Trident that's readily available it seems obvious that he is wrong and
>that anyone who wants to be taken seriously on the matter would do
>well to do their own research before quoting Benn. Five minutes work
>on Google and it becomes obvious that TB doesn't have a clue what he's
>talking about.
>
You miss the point. The importance of Benn's statement is that eh doubts
Britain's control of the weapon. RH
>> Answer this question: is it likely that the US would supply a
>> particularly nuclear weapons system to a foreign power and not retain
>> some practical control over its use?
>
>In the case of the UK and Israel it does seem to be likely that
>technical control of the weapons system would be left in the hands of
>the purchaser, especially as the warheads themselves were locally
>developed.
>
>> The answer has to be no.
>
>Again that is an opinion asserted as a fact.
It is unlikely. That is all I said. RH
> The flipside of your
>assertion is for us to believe that UK governments have been buying
>weapons systems over which they have no control. Not very likely.
>
>> That control may be codes to allow the missiles to start up or the arming of
>> the bombs or any number of other things, but they will have it.
>
>Again you present assertions as fact without any evidence. As the
>warheads were developed at the AWE there is no question of the arming
>codes being under US control. A moment's thought on your part and you
>would have realised that.
>
You are assuming that there is no secret agreement between Britain and
Moronica for Moronica to have control. RH
>> There is also a general problem with knowing what the Trident system
>> is: its specifications are officially top secret.
>
>So here are the specifications direct from the U.S. Navy:
>
>http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/factfile/missiles/wep-d5.html
>
>Much has been released into the public domain.
That is what they want you to know. What they don't want you to know
they won't make public. RH
Joe Hutcheon
.
>
> That is what they want you to know. What they don't want you to know
> they won't make public. RH
A strong contender for this year's 'statement of the bleedin' obvious'
award!
Greg Hennessy
<Phi...@anywhere.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>In article <0qoqj0tiamje79kfm...@4ax.com>, Greg Hennessy
><m...@privacy.net> writes
>>
>>>It doesn't really matter whether Benn is right or not about these
>>>details.
>>
>>Oh but it does matter. As on other matters Benns credibility is lacking.
>>
>
>You are missing the point. RH
No Robert, I am not playing semantic games.
Benns posturing and lack of knowledge on this and other matters is part of
the public record.
>>In the case of the UK the answer is yes.
>>
>>
>And your basis for this certainty? RH
>
Occams razor & information which is freely available in the public domain.
>>> That control may be codes to allow the missiles to start up or
>>
>>Nonsense.
>>
>>Delivered by *whom* from where Robert.
>>
>To launch from Trident submarines. RH
That doesn't answer the question Robert.
Who is going to deliver these alleged codes to a submerged submarine
'somewhere' out there.
From where are they going to deliver them.
What are they going to use them to deliver them with.
>>May I suggest figuring out what the real world problems are when it comes
>>to communicating with a submerged submarine.
>>
>
>I would not imagine that is beyond the wit of modern technology. RH
Modern technology doesn't change the laws of physics and the use of VLF.
>There is a difference between equipment supplied to Britain and that
>which Britain develops herself. RH
Rubbish. Mr Cunningham has skewered that nonsense succinctly.
"The flipside of your assertion is for us to believe that UK governments
have been buying weapons systems over which they have no control. Not very
likely."
It also ignores the real world fact that the UK has designed, tested and
has currently deployed low yield 'sub strategic' warheads specifically for
Trident.
Something which would be a nonsensical option if a foreign power had a veto
over use.
greg
anthony.j....@gmail.com
> In article <d7ef1ae.04090...@posting.google.com>,
> anthony.j....@gmail.com writes
> >Robert Henderson <Phi...@anywhere.demon.co.uk> wrote in message news:<QNpuvnBkKJ
> >PBF...@anywhere.demon.co.uk>...
> >
> >> It doesn't really matter whether Benn is right or not about these
> >> details.
> >
> >Well that's a matter of opinion. Given the amount of information on
> >Trident that's readily available it seems obvious that he is wrong and
> >that anyone who wants to be taken seriously on the matter would do
> >well to do their own research before quoting Benn. Five minutes work
> >on Google and it becomes obvious that TB doesn't have a clue what he's
> >talking about.
> >
>
> You miss the point. The importance of Benn's statement is that eh doubts
> Britain's control of the weapon. RH
You miss the point that Benn's reason for doubting the control is
based on a fundemental misunderstanding of how the weapones work.
Without any real evidence we must assume that the weapons are
independantly controlled.
> >> Answer this question: is it likely that the US would supply a
> >> particularly nuclear weapons system to a foreign power and not retain
> >> some practical control over its use?
> >
> >In the case of the UK and Israel it does seem to be likely that
> >technical control of the weapons system would be left in the hands of
> >the purchaser, especially as the warheads themselves were locally
> >developed.
> >
> >> The answer has to be no.
> >
> >Again that is an opinion asserted as a fact.
>
> It is unlikely. That is all I said. RH
More assertion without any factual basis. It is highly unlikely that
the UK would purchase a strategic platform that was under another
country's control.
> >Again you present assertions as fact without any evidence. As the
> >warheads were developed at the AWE there is no question of the arming
> >codes being under US control. A moment's thought on your part and you
> >would have realised that.
> >
>
> You are assuming that there is no secret agreement between Britain and
> Moronica for Moronica to have control. RH
Occam's Razor in action. Bring forward some evidence that such an
agreement exists and we will consider it.
>
> >> There is also a general problem with knowing what the Trident system
> >> is: its specifications are officially top secret.
> >
> >So here are the specifications direct from the U.S. Navy:
> >
> >http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/factfile/missiles/wep-d5.html
> >
> >Much has been released into the public domain.
>
> That is what they want you to know. What they don't want you to know
> they won't make public. RH
Again we must proceed on the basis of the information in the public
domain. Everything else is speculation.
Robert Henderson
<m...@privacy.net> writes
>On Tue, 7 Sep 2004 15:02:12 +0100, Robert Henderson
><Phi...@anywhere.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>
>>In article <0qoqj0tiamje79kfm...@4ax.com>, Greg Hennessy
>><m...@privacy.net> writes
>>>
>>>>It doesn't really matter whether Benn is right or not about these
>>>>details.
>>>
>>>Oh but it does matter. As on other matters Benns credibility is lacking.
>>>
>>
>>You are missing the point. RH
>
>No Robert, I am not playing semantic games.
>
>Benns posturing and lack of knowledge on this and other matters is part of
>the public record.
>
This is irrelevant to the point at issue, namely, can the Moronicans
stop us launching the weapon? RH
>>>In the case of the UK the answer is yes.
>>>
>>>
>>And your basis for this certainty? RH
>>
>
>Occams razor
What does that have to do with this question? Occam is about the economy
of reaching a conclusion. RH
> & information which is freely available in the public domain.
>
>>>> That control may be codes to allow the missiles to start up or
>>>
>>>Nonsense.
>>>
>>>Delivered by *whom* from where Robert.
>>>
>>To launch from Trident submarines. RH
>
>
>That doesn't answer the question Robert.
>
>Who is going to deliver these alleged codes to a submerged submarine
>'somewhere' out there.
>
>From where are they going to deliver them.
>
>What are they going to use them to deliver them with.
>
>>>May I suggest figuring out what the real world problems are when it comes
>>>to communicating with a submerged submarine.
>>>
>>
>>I would not imagine that is beyond the wit of modern technology. RH
>
>Modern technology doesn't change the laws of physics and the use of VLF.
>
Nuclear subs can receive and send messages while submerged. Even Polaris
could do that. RH
>>There is a difference between equipment supplied to Britain and that
>>which Britain develops herself. RH
>
>Rubbish. Mr Cunningham has skewered that nonsense succinctly.
>
The difference is political: what you don't supply you can't be held
liable for. RH
>"The flipside of your assertion is for us to believe that UK governments
>have been buying weapons systems over which they have no control. Not very
>likely."
>
>
>It also ignores the real world fact that the UK has designed, tested and
>has currently deployed low yield 'sub strategic' warheads specifically for
>Trident.
>
>Something which would be a nonsensical option if a foreign power had a veto
>over use.
>
Not at all. They need to do so to give the impression they are in
control of the weapon. RH
>
>
>greg
Greg Hennessy
<Phi...@anywhere.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>>Benns posturing and lack of knowledge on this and other matters is part of
>>the public record.
>>
>
>This is irrelevant to the point at issue,
I am not the one quoting him as an authorative source.
>namely, can the Moronicans
>stop us launching the weapon? RH
Mr Cunningham has more than skewered that silly notion.
>>Occams razor
>
>What does that have to do with this question?
>Occam is about the economy of reaching a conclusion. RH
Are you suggesting that the simplest explanation is not the correct one in
this instance ?
>>>I would not imagine that is beyond the wit of modern technology. RH
>>
>>Modern technology doesn't change the laws of physics and the use of VLF.
>>
>
>Nuclear subs can receive and send messages while submerged. Even Polaris
>could do that. RH
Exceedingly slowly (~1 bit/sec) and only down to a depth of around 20
metres.
An SSBN at periscope depth towing a several KM long VLF aerial is a big fat
target which says 'sink me'.
Considering that by the time an RN SSBN comes to that depth to receive its
daily update, global nuclear Armageddon may be 12-24 hours old and every
allied VLF station on the planet is hot radioactive slag.
By what mechanism do you propose that the Americans relay these alleged
'activation codes' to an RN SSBN running for its life from soviet SSKs &
surface vessels ?
>
>The difference is political: what you don't supply you can't be held
>liable for. RH
Nonsense, you supply what you're contracted by treaty to deliver.
>>Something which would be a nonsensical option if a foreign power had a veto
>>over use.
>>
>Not at all. They need to do so to give the impression they are in
>control of the weapon. RH
Don't talk rubbish Robert.
anthony.j....@gmail.com
> >>And your basis for this certainty? RH
> >>
> >
> >Occams razor
>
> What does that have to do with this question? Occam is about the economy
> of reaching a conclusion. RH
Indeed it is. You have put forward the notion that there exists some
mechanism by which the Americans can prevent the launch of Trident
missiles. In the absence of any proof of such a mechanism Occam's
Razor demands that we disgard the assumption. You might as well claim
that Trident is no use because the Americans have secretly filled the
missile tubes with custard.
Joe Hutcheon
news:d7ef1ae.04091...@posting.google.com...
> Trident is no use because the Americans have secretly filled the
> missile tubes with custard.
How did you know that? It's classified information! (Besides it's Instant
Whip rather than custard).