the nature of truth
Bricriu
intrioductuion
to the questuion of 'if a tree falls down in central amazonia, when nobody
is within earshot
,does it make a sound', my first response was to say, of course it does, it
sends vibrations in
the surrounding air, which nobody hears because they are not nearby, but
nonetheless the vibrations have
their effect on their surroundings, which because of the butterfly effect,
have a powerful effect on
future events which are felt by all.
I still mantain this viewpoint, although now my idea of what constitutes
objective truth
is substantially modified. My reason for believing in an objective truth, is
mainly this, if I
only believed in the thinmgs which had an effect on my subjective psyche,
why would objective
laws, such as the newtonian theory of motion, have such a simplifying effect
on observed phenomena.
Surely simplification is an argument which argues for surrounding phenomena
being explainable
in the most economic means possible. It is impossible to define the world
of science, in an
economic way, if we do not accept that the evidence of others, is just as
important as that of our own.
In doing so we reject the possibility of solipsism, not on the principle of
possibility, but on the principle of economy. A simple theory is better than
a more complicated one, by it's very economy alone. Exactly
why this is true, I cannot find, although few people indeed would argue for
a more complicated theory
when a simple one would do.
On the other hand what exactly do I mean when I say that a certain
possibility, has a certain probability
of occurring. If the probability is high, then that certain probabilility
will almost certainly occur. If the probabability is low then that certain
probability is low as well.
It follows that we need a high probability, that a certain probability is
low. which is on the most
part what we get. If we get a low probability, then a certain probability
is high.
Immortalist
"Bricriu" <Bri...@ntlworld.com> wrote in message
news:7IHHa.2614$J41.2...@newsfep2-win.server.ntli.net...
Any use of probability as concerns certainty or completely justified beliefs
is problematical:
The use of probability is particularly appealing as a way to explain how one
arrives at justification concerning general information or other information
that has not been entirely collected (about the future, for example). The
specific information that we possess makes probable information which we do
not possess. On the other hand, a general belief about my competence, say in
identifying red, may help to make probable a particular belief I have, such
as that I see something red.
There is a significant initial obstacle to building an account of
justification on high probability, however. It is known as the lottery
paradox. Let us suppose that 99.9% probability is to be sufficient for
justification. (If you think it is too high or too low, pick your own
number.) Now let there be a fair lottery with 1000 tickets. All have been
sold, and one has been drawn. Given the equal probability that any one of
the tickets will win (1 in 1000, or .001), the probability that a given
ticket will lose is .999, or 99.9%. On the hypothesis that this is the
degree of probability required for knowledge, we can conclude that the
proposition that the #1 ticket is a lose is justified. But because the
probabilities for each one of the tickets' losing is the same, the
proposition that the #2 ticket is a loser is also justified.
If we apply this reasoning to each ticket, we will be justified in accepting
of every one of them that they are losers. A simple step takes us to the
conclusion that they all are losers. But we know that one of them has been
drawn and hence is the winner. So we are justified in accepting that all the
tickets are losers and that one is a winner: a paradox.
Some people have tried to disarm the paradox by rejecting the "conjunctive"
principle that I called a "simple step." A good reason for suspicion is that
each of the individual propositions is said to be justified without taking
the justification of the others into account. One starts all over in
considering each ticket. But if we keep in mind that we were just now
justified in accepting that the #1 ticket is a loser, when we consider the
#2 ticket, things are different. The probability that it is a loser is now
lower, falling below 99.9%. In that case, it is not justified. The lesson
Lehrer draws from the paradox is that high probability of propositions in
isolation is not enough. We need to take into account all the other
information we have at our disposal, which is characteristic of a coherence
theory. But development of such a theory will have to wait until Chapters 5
and 6. In the meantime, we shall examine the possibility of probability as
justification in detail.
http://www-philosophy.ucdavis.edu/phi102/tkch4.htm
#####################################
Coherence theory: "An empirical belief is realatively true if and only if it
coheres with a system of other beliefs, which together form a comprehensive
account of reality."
Stephen J. Gould, the Harvard Paleontologist, offers this definition: In
science, "fact" can only mean "confirmed to such a degree that it would be
perverse to withhold provisional assent."
Succesfully Competitive Inductive Cogency:
Depends upon the evidential and conceptual ("context") of reasoning. An
inductive argument from evidence to hypothesis is inductively cogent if and
only if the hypothesis is that hypothesis which, of all the competing
hypothesis, has the greatest probability of being true on the basis of the
evidence. Thus, whether it is reasonable to accept a hypothesis as true, if
the statements of evidence are true, is determined by whether that
hypothesis is the most probable, on the evidence, of all those with which it
competes.
Cornman, Lehrer, Papas;
Philisophical Problems & Arguments;
Page 33, Fourth Edition, 1992.
Epistemologists find a number of problems with finding an meta-justification
standard for justifying emperical beliefs.
http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/TKno/TKnoHowa.htm
1. Suppose, that there are basic empirical beliefs, that is, emperical
beliefs (a) which are epistemically justified, and (b) whose justification
does not depend on that of any further emperical beliefs.
2. For a belief to be episemically justified requires that there be a reason
why it is likely to be true.
3. A belief is justified for a person only if he is in cognitive possession
of such a reason.
4. A person is in cognitive possession of such a reason only if he believes
with justification the premises from which it follows that the belief is
likely to be true.
5. The premises of such a justifying argument must include at least one
empirical premise.
6. So, the justification of a supposed basic empirical belief depends on the
justification of at least one other empirical belief, contradicting 1.
7. So, there can be no basic empirical beliefs including completely
justified sceptical beliefs.
The 7 propositions seem to eliminate the possibility of emperical
justification of any and all emperical beliefs. But it can lead to this
untruthfullness of human beliefs in three ways which deal with the apparent
"regress" of one belief depending upon another which depends upon another
and so on:
If the regress of emperical justification does not terminate in basic
emperical beliefs, then it must either:
(1) terminate in unjustified beleifs
(2) go on infinitely (without circularity)
(3) circle back upon itself in some way.
If we think about justification moving in a linear direction, with one
proposition becomeing the justification for another we run into an viscious
regress that doesnt seem to end. It can be open ended and go on forever or
it can become circular where each support depending on the last leads to the
same supports over time. This is how scepticism defeated foundationalism. It
seems that all we were left with a hope for escape from this dilemma of no
certain knowledge is a modified version of the circular argument. Instead of
a linear regress of justifiactions we seek a nonlinear context of groups of
evidences or propositions emerging more evidence than other means of gaining
supports from evidences and propositions. Though we close the circle,
different circlular arguments, corespond to, predict, and manilulate, events
in the world, than other such arguments. If we have a competition amoungst
such partial certainties, we gain at least the best knowledge we can find.
>
>
>
Sir Frederick
>
> I have often been interested in the definition of truth. From my first
> intrioductuion
> to the questuion of 'if a tree falls down in central amazonia, when nobody
> is within earshot
> ,does it make a sound'
Of course not, "sound" is a quale, only available to proper subjective
conditions.
, my first response was to say, of course it does, it
> sends vibrations in
> the surrounding air, which nobody hears because they are not nearby, but
> nonetheless the vibrations have
> their effect on their surroundings, which because of the butterfly effect,
> have a powerful effect on
> future events which are felt by all.
"feeling by all" is not sound.
--
Best,
Frederick Martin McNeill
Poway, California, United States of America
mmcn...@fuzzysys.com
http://www.fuzzysys.com
*************************
Phrase of the week :
"They're deleting the word `gullible' from modern dictionaries,
presumably because it's too difficult a concept for the modern man or
woman to understand."
:-))))Snort!)
*************************
Moti
Srila Prabhupada first published this essay in India, in the old tabloid
version of his then-fortnightly magazine Back to Godhead (November 20,
1958). It contains the unforgettable story of "liquid beauty," in which
Srila Prabhupada dramatically exposes the underlying principle of human
sexuality. This illuminating exposition on the nature of truth and beauty is
timeless and startlingly relevant for those in search of the "inner self."
There may sometimes be arguments about whether "truth" and "beauty" are
compatible terms. One would willingly agree to express the truth, one might
say, but since truth is not always beautiful--indeed, it is frequently
rather startling and unpleasant--how is one to express truth and beauty at
the same time?
In reply, we may inform all concerned that "truth" and "beauty" are
compatible terms. Indeed, we may emphatically assert that the actual truth,
which is absolute, is always beautiful. The truth is so beautiful that it
attracts everyone, including the truth itself. Truth is so beautiful that
many sages, saints, and devotees have left everything for the sake of truth.
Mahatma Gandhi, an idol of the modern world, dedicated his life to
experimenting with truth, and all his activities were aimed toward truth
only.
Why only Mahatma Gandhi? Every one of us has the urge to search for truth
alone, for the truth is not only beautiful but also all-powerful,
all-resourceful, all-famous, all-renounced, and all-knowledgeable.
Unfortunately, people have no information of the actual truth. Indeed,
99.9 percent of men in all walks of life are pursuing untruth only, in the
name of truth. We are actually attracted by the beauty of truth, but since
time immemorial we have been habituated to love of untruth appearing like
truth. Therefore, to the mundaner "truth" and "beauty" are incompatible
terms. The mundane truth and beauty may be explained as follows.
Once a man who was very powerful and strongly built but whose character
was very doubtful fell in love with a beautiful girl. The girl was not only
beautiful in appearance but also saintly in character, and as such she did
not like the man's advances. The man, however, was insistent because of his
lustful desires, and therefore the girl requested him to wait only seven
days, and she set a time after that when he could meet her. The man agreed,
and with high expectations he began waiting for the appointed time.
The saintly girl, however, in order to manifest the real beauty of
absolute truth, adopted a method very instructive. She took very strong
doses of laxatives and purgatives, and for seven days she continually passed
loose stool and vomited all that she ate. Moreover, she stored all the loose
stool and vomit in suitable pots. As a result of the purgatives, the
so-called beautiful girl became lean and thin like a skeleton, her
complexion turned blackish, and her beautiful eyes sank into the sockets of
her skull. Thus at the appointed hour she waited anxiously to receive the
eager man.
The man appeared on the scene well dressed and well behaved and asked the
ugly girl he found waiting there about the beautiful girl he was to meet.
The man could not recognize the girl he saw as the same beautiful girl for
whom he was asking; indeed, although she repeatedly asserted her identity,
because of her pitiable condition he was unable to recognize her.
At last the girl told the powerful man that she had separated the
ingredients of her beauty and stored them in pots. She also told him that he
could enjoy those juices of beauty. When the mundane poetic man asked to see
these juices of beauty, he was directed to the store of loose stool and
liquid vomit, which were emanating an unbearably bad smell. Thus the whole
story of the beauty-liquid was disclosed to him. Finally, by the grace of
the saintly girl, this man of low character was able to distinguish between
the shadow and the substance, and thus he came to his senses.
This man's position was similar to the position of every one of us who is
attracted by false, material beauty. The girl mentioned above had a
beautifully developed material body in accordance with the desires of her
mind, but in fact she was apart from that temporary material body and mind.
She was in fact a spiritual spark, and so also was the lover who was
attracted by her false skin.
Mundane intellectuals and aesthetics, however, are deluded by the outward
beauty and attraction of the relative truth and are unaware of the spiritual
spark, which is both truth and beauty at the same time. The spiritual spark
is so beautiful that when it leaves the so-called beautiful body, which in
fact is full of stool and vomit, no one wants to touch that body, even if it
is decorated with a costly costume.
We are all pursuing a false, relative truth, which is incompatible with
real beauty. The actual truth, however, is permanently beautiful, retaining
the same standard of beauty for innumerable years. That spiritual spark is
indestructible. The beauty of the outer skin can be destroyed in only a few
hours merely by a dose of a strong purgative, but the beauty of truth is
indestructible and always the same. Unfortunately, mundane artists and
intellectuals are ignorant of this beautiful spark of spirit. They are also
ignorant of the whole fire which is the source of these spiritual sparks,
and they are ignorant of the relationships between the sparks and the fire,
which take the form of transcendental pastimes. When those pastimes are
displayed here by the grace of the Almighty, foolish people who cannot see
beyond their senses confuse those pastimes of truth and beauty with the
manifestations of loose stool and vomit described above. Thus in despair
they ask how truth and beauty can be accommodated at the same time.
Mundaners do not know that the whole spiritual entity is the beautiful
person who attracts everything. They are unaware that He is the prime
substance, the prime source and fountainhead of everything that be. The
infinitesimal spiritual sparks, being parts and parcels of that whole
spirit, are qualitatively the same in beauty and eternity. The only
difference is that the whole is eternally the whole and the parts are
eternally the parts. Both of them, however, are the ultimate truth, ultimate
beauty, ultimate knowledge, ultimate energy, ultimate renunciation, and
ultimate opulence.
Although written by the greatest mundane poet or intellectual, any
literature which does not describe the ultimate truth and beauty is but a
store of loose stool and vomit of the relative truth. Real literature is
that which describes the ultimate truth and beauty of the Absolute.
"Bricriu" <Bri...@ntlworld.com> wrote in message
news:7IHHa.2614$J41.2...@newsfep2-win.server.ntli.net...
Miller
"Bricriu" <Bri...@ntlworld.com> wrote in message
news:7IHHa.2614$J41.2...@newsfep2-win.server.ntli.net...
Many have been a witness to various sorts of religious phenomenon. Do you
always accept this sort of other's evidence?
Scott
John Jones
The model is that the tree makes vibrations but it is we who here the sound.
Nothing to do with how far we are from the tree.
jJ
Bricriu <Bri...@ntlworld.com> wrote in message
news:7IHHa.2614$J41.2...@newsfep2-win.server.ntli.net...
Max
> You present the wrong model.
> The model is that the tree makes vibrations but it is we who here the sound.
> Nothing to do with how far we are from the tree.
>
> jJ
What I liked about his treatment of the allegory of the falling tree
is that it transcends the usual argument ultimately pertaining to the
definition of sound (does sound have to be heard to be "sound" or is
it defined as vibrations in the air, blah blah) by referring to the
butterfly effect. The sound carries on into the universe and affects
us all; we, in fact, do hear the sound!
An unexpected flip of an old cliche.
-Max
(to reply by email, remove the year from the address)
Sally Sue
"What, then, is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and
anthropomorphisms喫n short, a sum of human relations which have been
enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and
which after long use seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people:
"truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what
they are; metaphors which are worn out and without sensuous power;
coins which have lost their pictures and now matter only as metal, no
longer as coins."
from "On Truth and Lie in an Extramoral Sense:
http://www.geocities.com/thenietzschechannel/tls.htm
sally
Jesse Nowells
On Sun, 22 Jun 2003, Sally Sue wrote:
> Nietzsche's definition seems to me the correct one: "What, then, is
> truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms
> ..."
Truth is actuality, not rhetoric about supposed actuality.
Sally Sue
Nowells <jnow...@transbay.net> wrote:
uh, the correspondence theory of truth has been dead for over 20 years
now
Miller
"Sally Sue" <x...@xyz.net> wrote in message
news:220620032103524179%x...@xyz.net...
> Nietzsche's definition seems to me the correct one:
>
> "What, then, is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and
rhetorically, and
> which after long use seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people:
>
> "truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what
> they are; metaphors which are worn out and without sensuous power;
> coins which have lost their pictures and now matter only as metal, no
> longer as coins."
>
> from "On Truth and Lie in an Extramoral Sense:
>
> http://www.geocities.com/thenietzschechannel/tls.htm
>
> sally
That Freddie! What a funny guy, eh?!
Scott
Miller
"Jesse Nowells" <jnow...@transbay.net> wrote in message
news:Pine.BSF.4.31.0306222254490.76147-100000@localhost...
Yikes! Then isn't everything Truth, then? Isn't anything concievable
"actual"? Kinda makes the whole concept pointless, doesn't it?
Scott
Philip Baker
Jesse Nowells <jnow...@transbay.net> writes
Truth is a property that propositions can have. It is not a property
of things.
--
Philip Baker
http://textual.net/link.to/amazon/critical_thinking
http://textual.net/The_Doh_of_Homer
Philip Baker
writes
I hope you are going to present an account of its replacement. One that
goes a bit further than a few quotes from Nietzsche.
Peter Ashby
max197...@hotmail.com (Max) wrote:
> "John Jones" <scoob...@btopenworld.com> wrote in message
> news:<bcr5a4$kjg$1...@sparta.btinternet.com>...
> > You present the wrong model.
> > The model is that the tree makes vibrations but it is we who here the
> > sound.
> > Nothing to do with how far we are from the tree.
> >
> > jJ
>
> What I liked about his treatment of the allegory of the falling tree
> is that it transcends the usual argument ultimately pertaining to the
> definition of sound (does sound have to be heard to be "sound" or is
> it defined as vibrations in the air, blah blah) by referring to the
> butterfly effect. The sound carries on into the universe and affects
> us all; we, in fact, do hear the sound!
Um sound does not carry on into the universe unless you have a mechanism
for transducing it into a part of the electromagnetic spectrum. Though
it does propagate around the world, although very attenuated.
Peter
--
Peter Ashby
School of Life Sciences, University of Dundee, Scotland
To assume that I speak for the University of Dundee is to be deluded.
Reverse the Spam and remove to email me.
Peter H.M. Brooks
"Peter Ashby" <p.r....@MAPS.dundee.ac.uk> wrote in message
news:p.r.ashby-782DF...@dux.dundee.ac.uk...
>
>
> Um sound does not carry on into the universe unless you have a mechanism
> for transducing it into a part of the electromagnetic spectrum. Though
> it does propagate around the world, although very attenuated.
>
--
Only very sophisticated organisms like philosophers fail to be naive
realists! - David H.M. Brooks How to Solve the Hard Problem: A Predictable
Inexplicability 1999
Brian Fletcher
"Peter Ashby" <p.r....@MAPS.dundee.ac.uk> wrote in message
news:p.r.ashby-782DF...@dux.dundee.ac.uk...
> In article <baa549eb.0306...@posting.google.com>,
> max197...@hotmail.com (Max) wrote:
>
> > "John Jones" <scoob...@btopenworld.com> wrote in message
> > news:<bcr5a4$kjg$1...@sparta.btinternet.com>...
> > > You present the wrong model.
> > > The model is that the tree makes vibrations but it is we who here the
> > > sound.
> > > Nothing to do with how far we are from the tree.
> > >
> > > jJ
> >
> > What I liked about his treatment of the allegory of the falling tree
> > is that it transcends the usual argument ultimately pertaining to the
> > definition of sound (does sound have to be heard to be "sound" or is
> > it defined as vibrations in the air, blah blah) by referring to the
> > butterfly effect. The sound carries on into the universe and affects
> > us all; we, in fact, do hear the sound!
>
> Um sound does not carry on into the universe unless you have a mechanism
> for transducing it into a part of the electromagnetic spectrum. Though
> it does propagate around the world, although very attenuated.
>
> Peter
>
There's also a lot of it about !!!
I often wonde how much Beethoven is being transmitted at any one time around
the world.
No wonder we live in exciting times ;-)
Brian
Brian
Brian Fletcher
"Miller" <chumley7...@chartermi.net> wrote in message
news:vfen3ak...@corp.supernews.com...
That would be akin to an artist saying "I have access to an ifinite variety
of colour...whats the point?
Brian
Karl Pfeifer
Sally Sue wrote:
> uh, the correspondence theory of truth has been dead for over 20 years
> now
Oh, I dunno about that. It has been refined and qualified like the other
contenders, and even in mathematical circles platonism, which assumes
mathematical truths are about real mathematical objects, ain't exactly dead.
Cheers,
KP
tellurian girl
but it hardly changes anything here. The gas density is only a few
atoms per cubic centimeter and the speed of "sound" is probably less
than half of what it is our atmosphere.
But while solar disturbances and etc. can produce gigantic waves in
it, I'm not sure to what degree anything happening down here on Earth
would be powerful enough to agitate such a bogglingly thin medium.
Astronauts certainly don't perturb it enough to produce anything the
human ear could detect, and we can only hear those huge pressure waves
from other sources by electronically compressing them.
^v^v^v^ Usha
Peter Ashby <p.r....@MAPS.dundee.ac.uk> wrote in message news:<p.r.ashby-782DF...@dux.dundee.ac.uk>...
Miller
"Brian Fletcher" <bri...@iinet.net.au> wrote in message
news:3ef8fdba$0$11...@echo-01.iinet.net.au...
There isn't any. That's why there is little meaning in stating that Truth
is actuality. The concept seems useless.
Scott
Peter Ashby
"Peter H.M. Brooks" <pe...@new.co.za> wrote:
> "Peter Ashby" <p.r....@MAPS.dundee.ac.uk> wrote in message
> news:p.r.ashby-782DF...@dux.dundee.ac.uk...
> >
> >
> > Um sound does not carry on into the universe unless you have a mechanism
> > for transducing it into a part of the electromagnetic spectrum. Though
> > it does propagate around the world, although very attenuated.
> >
> Maybe sound gets to the moon in a homopathic sense.
;-)
Max
> In article <bd9mp5$ljk$1...@ctb-nnrp2.saix.net>,
> "Peter H.M. Brooks" <pe...@new.co.za> wrote:
>
> > "Peter Ashby" <p.r....@MAPS.dundee.ac.uk> wrote in message
> > news:p.r.ashby-782DF...@dux.dundee.ac.uk...
> > >
> > >
> > > Um sound does not carry on into the universe unless you have a mechanism
> > > for transducing it into a part of the electromagnetic spectrum. Though
> > > it does propagate around the world, although very attenuated.
> > >
> > Maybe sound gets to the moon in a homopathic sense.
>
> ;-)
>
> Peter
The sound of the falling tree gets translated into the
electro-magnetic spectrum and then radiates through the emptiest of
space. (ie. the image of the nearby trembling bushes) The light from
that image, in turn, touches innumerable particles in the universe
causing physical excitations (ie. the light image is re-translated
back into sound).
Yeah, yeah.. I know that I'm talking about an effect that from our
point of view and scale is practically infitintessimal.... but let's
not get anthrocentric! :-)
-Max
Sally Sue
<ph...@thalasson.com> wrote:
> In article <Pine.BSF.4.31.0306222254490.76147-100000@localhost>,
> Jesse Nowells <jnow...@transbay.net> writes
> >
> >
> >On Sun, 22 Jun 2003, Sally Sue wrote:
> >
> >> Nietzsche's definition seems to me the correct one: "What, then, is
> >> truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms
> >> ..."
> >
> >Truth is actuality, not rhetoric about supposed actuality.
>
>
> Truth is a property that propositions can have. It is not a property
> of things.
well N also observed that:
"There are no truths, only perspectives."
and
"There are no facts, only interpretations"
these both seem factual 'truths' from my perspective
but u have ur own truth filled surface dwelling interpretational
perspectives
sally
.
Karl Pfeifer
Sally Sue wrote:
> well N also observed that:
>
> "There are no truths, only perspectives."
>
> and
>
> "There are no facts, only interpretations"
>
> these both seem factual 'truths' from my perspective
>
> but u have ur own truth filled surface dwelling interpretational
> perspectives
I woke up this morning. Maybe it's not very highfalutin' but it's the
honest unequivocal truth (or if you like, it's honestly and
unequivocally true). Now, it's certainly from within a perspective;
after all, it wasn't morning everywhere on the planet, and morning plays
no role on the surface of the sun itself. Moreover, only certain
creatures with certain sensory apparatus might arrive at and have a use
for a concept like morning; only creatures that sleep need the idea of
waking, etc. Truths involve concepts and concepts are indeed
perspectival. But it's not an either/or choice between truths and
perspectives; nor does a perspective make a truth any less objective.
And BTW, what do interpretations interpret?
Karl
Peter H.M. Brooks
"Karl Pfeifer" <pfe...@sask.usask.ca> wrote in message
news:3EFC6142...@sask.usask.ca...
morning'.
The Truth, as any blues fule kno, is that you must have 'woken up this
morning with the X blues in your head'.
Get a grip, man.
--
The happiest people on earth are those few fortunates who seem to be in a
state of mild, stable hypomania. - David Horrobin 'The Madness of Adam and
Eve' (How schizophrenia shaped humanity)
Karl Pfeifer
"Peter H.M. Brooks" wrote:
>
> The Truth, as any blues fule kno, is that you must have 'woken up this
> morning with the X blues in your head'.
>
> Get a grip, man.
"This group is called uk.philosophy.misc - not uk.horseshit.loads."
Sound familiar???
'yours,
Karl
Mr Michael Bibby
‘Truth’ comes from the Greek, meaning “that which is not obscured” Wittgenstein
said that “in order for us to tell whether a picture is true or false we must
compare it with reality.” If I am to know whether a portrait is a faithful
likeness of the original, then I must compare the image to the original: p is
true if and only if it is the case that p is true, if it is the case that p,
then p is true; we need only compare the picture with the original, if the
picture is a faithful copy of the original then the picture is a facsimile of
the original. This, of course, is beyond the scope of man, he cannot transcend
this subjective existence; he cannot step outside of the flow of his experience
and see if there is anything like them, he cannot put himself in the third
person: he is always stuck in the first person, in the praxis of living, in the
flow of experience, existing as he always has, that is, until he ceases to exist
we are like the prinsoners shackled to the wall in Platos cave allegory, chained
to our subjective existence. let there be no deception about it!
"the fact that objective reality is our goal does not gaurentee that our pursuit
of it succeeds in being anything more than an exploration and reorganisation of
the insides of our minds" nagal
"objectivity is the delusion that observations could be made without an
observer" glaserfeld
when we observe we decide just what it is that we are observing, we carve up the
world, we make certain distinctions and not others: observation doesnt inform us
of how the world is independently of us (ontologically objective), observation
informs us of how the world is TO AN OBSERVER! the objects that furnish our
perceptions are contingent upon a mind.
i cannot believe that there are still people who doubt this!
the universe being of the infinite, gives rise to a multiverse of possibilities,
a plurality of truths, universality consists in collapsing this multiverse to a
single point, delimiting what is possible, only then is truth realized. truth is
not universal, and even this, the most universal of all truths, is not
universally true in the multiverse of possiblities- the infinite and beyong.
"The faculties we have are few, and those designed by nature for the support and
pleasure of life, and not to penetrate into the inward essence and constitution
of things. Besides, the mind of man being finite, when it treats of things which
partake of infinity, it is not to be wondered at if it run into absurdities and
contradictions, out of which it is impossible is should ever extricate itself,
it being of the nature of the infinite not to be comprehended by that which is
finite" Berkeley
mickeyd
George Buyanovsky
>i cannot believe that there are still people who doubt this!
It is matter of comprehension not a believing.
> ?Truth? comes from the Greek, meaning ?that which is not obscured? Wittgenstein
> said that ?in order for us to tell whether a picture is true or false we must
> compare it with reality.? If I am to know whether a portrait is a faithful
Mr Michael Bibby
>"Mr Michael Bibby" <s403...@student.uq.edu.au> wrote in message news:<bdo9so$s5p$1...@bunyip.cc.uq.edu.au>...
>
>>i cannot believe that there are still people who doubt this!
>
>It is matter of comprehension not a believing.
we have access to our internal states and not some external reality: maybe they
are representations of reality, but the point is we cannot check and find out-
it is nothing more than a pious hope to think that our knowledge represents
ontic reality. i dont doubt self evident truths, but i dont claim that these
truths are universally true!- there are a multiverse of possibilities out there
in the great unkown and there maybe a plurality of truths "it being of the
nature of the infinite not to be comprehended by that which is finite"- it is
pretentious of us to think that our knowledge represents ontic reality because
at the end of the day this is the yawning abyss between experience and
metaphysics which we cannot close! the is the problem of dualism, the
distinction between ideas and things-in-themselves. i call your attention to
Platos cave parable/allegory; for 'aught we know the objects that furnish our
perceptions may not at all agree with real things'.
mickeyd
Philip Baker
<s403...@student.uq.edu.au> writes
>we have access to our internal states and not some external reality
I have rather more knowledge of my immediate surroundings than my
internal state.
Peter H.M. Brooks
"Philip Baker" <ph...@thalasson.com> wrote in message
news:DCvICAAyPHD$Ew...@thalasson.com...
> In article <beb51o$14d$1...@bunyip.cc.uq.edu.au>, Mr Michael Bibby
> <s403...@student.uq.edu.au> writes
> >we have access to our internal states and not some external reality
>
> I have rather more knowledge of my immediate surroundings than my
> internal state.
>
couldn't.
--
The story of the human race is war. Except for brief and precarious
interludes there has never been peace in the world; and long before history
began murderous strife was universal and unending." - Winston Churchill
Mr Michael Bibby
>In article <beb51o$14d$1...@bunyip.cc.uq.edu.au>, Mr Michael Bibby
><s403...@student.uq.edu.au> writes
>>we have access to our internal states and not some external reality
>
>I have rather more knowledge of my immediate surroundings than my
>internal state.
>--
you missed my point entirely. all that you have access to is 'thoughts' and
'ideas'; sense-data, you dont have access to things-in-themselves. this is what
i had in mind. you may have a 'picture' of reality but for aught you know it may
not at all agree with real things. you have no way of knowing. this is usually
called the 'epistemological problem'- it is not a trivial problem.
your knowledge may seem 'about' something, but what is knowledge? it is a
subjective state 'to know', when you 'know' something is 'known', this is the
triptrite model of epistemology: the 'subject' who knows, the subjective state
of knowing, and that which is known- the 'object'. the problem is between the
'subject' and the 'object', which is to say, how do we know that we know? the
answer, becuase of the subjective state of knowledge (i.e., a feeling of
cirtitude). but this feeling of cirtitude does not ensure us that our knowledge
represents an ontic reality that exists independently of us.
mickeyd
Philip Baker
<s403...@student.uq.edu.au> writes
>
>>In article <beb51o$14d$1...@bunyip.cc.uq.edu.au>, Mr Michael Bibby
>>>we have access to our internal states and not some external reality
>>
>>I have rather more knowledge of my immediate surroundings than my
>>internal state.
>>
>
>
>'ideas'; sense-data, you dont have access to things-in-themselves. this is what
>i had in mind. you may have a 'picture' of reality but for aught you know it
>may
>not at all agree with real things. you have no way of knowing. this is usually
>called the 'epistemological problem'- it is not a trivial problem.
>
How do you know what I 'have access to'? Is there something special
about your 'picture of reality'?
Mr Michael Bibby
im sorry philip, i was misslead by your outward appearence, you see, i thought
that you are similar to myself in that we cannot transcend our subjective
existece and compare our pictures of reality with the real thing!
i am talking about the duality between 'ideas' (or 'sense-data' as it is usually
called these days) and 'material things', for example, my only access to the
keybord i am typing on is through my sense-data, through my sensory experiences
of it- i cannot step outside of the flow of my experiences and see if there is
anything like them existing in a non-thinking substance or substratum with a
material existence that is ontologically independent of me. this is the
"operational closer of cognitive aparatus" we interact with our own internal
states, or, as Peschl and Riegler put it, "the perpetually acting components of
the system respond solely to the activity of other components"- im not, however,
going to make any ontological commitments as to what these 'components' are, as
this is meant in a purely descriptive sense.
mickeyd
Philip Baker
Mr Michael Bibby
>>>>>we have access to our internal states and not some external reality
Philip Baker
>>>>I have rather more knowledge of my immediate surroundings than my
>>>>internal state.
Mr Michael Bibby
>>>you missed my point entirely. all that you have access to is 'thoughts' and
>>>'ideas'; sense-data, you dont have access to things-in-themselves. this is
>what
>>>i had in mind. you may have a 'picture' of reality but for aught you know it
>>>may
>>>not at all agree with real things. you have no way of knowing. this is
>usually
>>>called the 'epistemological problem'- it is not a trivial problem.
>>>
Philip Baker
>>How do you know what I 'have access to'? Is there something special
>>about your 'picture of reality'?
Mr Michael Bibby
>im sorry philip, i was misslead by your outward appearence,
Philip Baker
I wasn't aware we had met.
Mr Michael Bibby
> you see, i thought
>that you are similar to myself in that we cannot transcend our subjective
>existece and compare our pictures of reality with the real thing!
>
>i am talking about the duality between 'ideas' (or 'sense-data' as it is
>usually
>called these days) and 'material things', for example, my only access to the
>keybord i am typing on is through my sense-data, through my sensory experiences
>of it- i cannot step outside of the flow of my experiences and see if there is
>anything like them existing in a non-thinking substance or substratum with a
>material existence that is ontologically independent of me. this is the
>"operational closer of cognitive aparatus" we interact with our own internal
>states, or, as Peschl and Riegler put it, "the perpetually acting components of
>the system respond solely to the activity of other components"- im not,
>however,
>going to make any ontological commitments as to what these 'components' are, as
>this is meant in a purely descriptive sense.
>
Philip Baker
If I interpret you correctly, you believe you know only about your own
'internal states'. If this is so, why do you appear to believe there are other
beings like this? Are their internal states a sub-set of yours? How are you
managing to communicate with me? Must I come to the conclusion that I am
composed of some internal states of a being known as Mr Michael Bibby?
Mr Michael Bibby
if it so pleases you! what i was saying, in a nut shell, is that our only access
to the outside world is via our representations of it. these representations may
or may not be at all like the real thing. this is a difficult problem in
philosophy, it is the fundamental problem in epistemology. if we are to say that
our models of reality reflect reality we must overcome this insurmountable
problem, otherwise we have involved ourselves in scepticism! i was merely
pointing this problem out to you because you didnt seem to acknowledge it. it is
not a trivial problem im sure you'll agree. if you dont acknowledge this problem
perhaps its because your a naive realist or radical empiricist in that you
beleive the world really is how it is perceived. personally i believe that
perception is reality, which is like saying things exist *because* they are
perceived, but this is different from saying things are perceived *because* they
exist (which is essentially what locke said).
mickeyd
Philip Baker
>if it so pleases you!
Philip Baker
You are dodging the questions I asked.
Mr Michael Bibby
>what i was saying, in a nut shell, is that our only access
>to the outside world is via our representations of it. these representations may
>or may not be at all like the real thing. this is a difficult problem in
>philosophy, it is the fundamental problem in epistemology. if we are to say that
>our models of reality reflect reality we must overcome this insurmountable
>problem, otherwise we have involved ourselves in scepticism!
Philip Baker
You have described your situation. I will describe mine. I live in the
world; I am part of it - of reality. I perceive the world through my
sense organs: eyes, ears etc In saying I perceive the world I don't mean
I perceive everything. I perceive what is very likely a very small part
of it and in a very limited way, but I get by. My perception may well
involve there being representions of one type or another existing inside
my body - the retinal image at the back of eye, various type of process
inside my brain. But when I look at a tree I see the tree not these
representations that exist inside my body - I believe I might be able to
see some of these in some way but it would require special apparatus.
Mr Michael Bibby
on the contrary.
i call your attention to the distinction between primary and secondary
qualities: how do you distinquish between the two? if you *beleive* in 'primary
qualities', (direct realism, naive realism etc) then how do you extricate
yourself from incontrovertible scepticism? (i.e., "how do you know that you
know?" and "for aught we know the objects that furnish our perceptions may not
at all agree with real things")
i collapse this distinction into the direction of secondary qualities (in much
the same way as Berkeley); i dont, however, assert or deny the independent
existence of material things (*including you*).
>Mr Michael Bibby
>>what i was saying, in a nut shell, is that our only access
>>to the outside world is via our representations of it. these representations may
>>or may not be at all like the real thing. this is a difficult problem in
>>philosophy, it is the fundamental problem in epistemology. if we are to say that
>>our models of reality reflect reality we must overcome this insurmountable
>>problem, otherwise we have involved ourselves in scepticism!
>
>Philip Baker
>You have described your situation. I will describe mine. I live in the
>world; I am part of it - of reality. I perceive the world through my
>sense organs: eyes, ears etc In saying I perceive the world I don't mean
>I perceive everything. I perceive what is very likely a very small part
>of it and in a very limited way, but I get by. My perception may well
>involve there being representions of one type or another existing inside
>my body - the retinal image at the back of eye, various type of process
>inside my brain. But when I look at a tree I see the tree not these
>representations that exist inside my body
your more than entitled to your point of view, however, this direct/naive
realism is going to get you into all sorts of strife (in philosophical arguments
like these, which, for the record, i think are a wast of time anyway, i mean why
defend your p.o.v?) anyway, like i said, how are you going to avoid scepticism?
your going to have trouble convincing others of the 'truth' of your claims if
you cannot avoid this kind of hyperbolic scepticism. perhaps i am
miss-interpreting your position, if this is the case, then this ambiquity can be
resolved by dis-ambiquating your concept of 'reality' as used here (i.e., are
you talking about transcendental reality of 'things-in-themselves',
mind-independent, ontologically objective existence; or did you have someting
else in mind?). from personal experiences i have found that much confussion is
caused by the equivocation of words like 'reality'.
- I believe I might be able to
>see some of these in some way but it would require special apparatus.
not sure what you mean here, but i will say this; things like microscopes,
telescopes, fMRI scanners, bubble-chambers etc., are merely prosthetic devices,
at the end of the day, you only have your experiences to go by- how can you
transcend your experiences? sure, you glean knowledge from your experiences, but
you cannot step outside of your experiences and see if their is anything like
them! this, at least as far as i am concerned, is the heart of the matter
>--
>Philip Baker
><a href="http://textual.net/link.to/amazon/critical_thinking">http://textual.net/link.to/amazon/critical_thinking</a>
><a href="http://textual.net/The_Doh_of_Homer">http://textual.net/The_Doh_of_Homer</a>
>
>
>
mickeyd
Philip Baker
<s403...@student.uq.edu.au> writes
>you only have your experiences to go by- how can you
>transcend your experiences? sure, you glean knowledge from your experiences, but
>you cannot step outside of your experiences and see if their is anything like
>them! this, at least as far as i am concerned, is the heart of the matter
Yes I think this is the heart of the matter. But to 'step outside your
experience' is a metaphor and I believe it is a profoundly misleading
one. Try to translate 'you cannot step outside of your experiences'
into non-metaphorical language. I would be interested to see what you
come up with.
Mr Michael Bibby
><s403...@student.uq.edu.au> writes
>>you only have your experiences to go by- how can you
>>transcend your experiences? sure, you glean knowledge from your experiences, but
>>you cannot step outside of your experiences and see if their is anything like
>>them! this, at least as far as i am concerned, is the heart of the matter
>
>
>Yes I think this is the heart of the matter. But to 'step outside your
>experience' is a metaphor and I believe it is a profoundly misleading
>one. Try to translate 'you cannot step outside of your experiences'
>into non-metaphorical language. I would be interested to see what you
>come up with.
>--
>Philip Baker
? i am not so sure what you mean when you say "metaphorical langauge"- what else
do we have? before you respond to that rhetorical question, heres a quote from
jeremey benthem; "to langauge... and langauge alone- it is that fictitious
entities owe their existence" and this quote by Einstein "physical concepts are
free creations of the human mind". the apophatic theologians, in the 4th century
B.C. believed that no human concpet could ever comprehend what God is, and
Berkeley said "the mind of man, being of the finite, when it treats things that
partake of infinity, it is not to be wondered at if it run into absurdities and
contradictions, out of which it is impossible it should ever extricate itself,
it being of the nature of the infinite not to be comprehended by that which is
finite." Newton reflected a similar sentiment in his 'Principia' concerning the
*cause* of the property of gravity, Kant in his 'Critique' and even more
recently, Searle in his 'the social construction of reality', when he said
"their is no Gods-eye-view". the point is, we have a point of view, and we use
human specific constructs to describe the manifiold specticle spread out before
us. if you want me to paraphrase what i said, then i will say this; objectivity
is the delusion that observations could be made without observers -all i have is
a subjectivity 'point of view', it is not a gods-eye-view, a 'view from
nowhere', it is a 'view from somewhere' though i know not from where!
i may have gone off on a tangent, but hopefully my message gets accross
Peter H.M. Brooks
"Mr Michael Bibby" <s403...@student.uq.edu.au> wrote in message
news:bf57t1$v8e$1...@bunyip.cc.uq.edu.au...
that you can't 'step outside your experience' [in other words everything is
subjective, a truism that leaves out the interesting interaction between the
subjective and the world], Philip is saying that it doesn't even make sense
to say that you 'step outside your experience' [because 'step outside' is a
metaphor from walking and houses that suggests that experience is somehow a
house that we can leave by the front door - which it isn't because, as you
say, everything is subjective, there is no front door].
Philip Baker
<s403...@student.uq.edu.au> writes
> objectivity
>is the delusion that observations could be made without observers -all i have is
>a subjectivity 'point of view', it is not a gods-eye-view
Quite so. But what are you observing, your 'internal states' or
something else? What is, or would be, a God's-eye-view, a view of
'things-in-themselves'? But if there is no God's-eye-view then there is
nothing against which your picture of reality falls short.
Mr Michael Bibby
>In article <bf57t1$v8e$1...@bunyip.cc.uq.edu.au>, Mr Michael Bibby
><s403...@student.uq.edu.au> writes
>> objectivity
>>is the delusion that observations could be made without observers -all i have is
>>a subjectivity 'point of view', it is not a gods-eye-view
>
>Quite so. But what are you observing, your 'internal states' or
>something else? What is, or would be, a God's-eye-view, a view of
>'things-in-themselves'? But if there is no God's-eye-view then there is
>nothing against which your picture of reality falls short.
>--
>Philip Baker
Wittegnstein said; "in order to tell whether a picture is true or false we must
compare it with reality" -this is precisely what we cannot do! it seems we are
in agreement here, i think. however, when you say' "...But what are you
observing, your 'internal states' or something else?..." im not sure what you
are saying. you seem to be implying that our internal states are of something,
that they 'represent' something, that they are 'intentional', that they have an
'aboutness', they have an 'object'. but we have absolutely no way of knowing
whether the objects we isolate in our expeirences at all agree with 'real
things' (we cannot compare the portrait with the origonal and see if it
correponds to something that exists independently of what we think and do). the
objects we isolate in perception maybe only 'phantom and vain chimera' they may
be mere artifacts of perceptual aparatus, the point is that their is absolutely
no way of nothing 'from within'. this is a major epistemological problem which
was attacked head on by the rationalists and empiricists of the 17th and 18th
century, unfortunatly many philosphers these days think that the issue has been
resolved, and they concern themselves with vacous analytic arguments (i.e., the
'chinese room thought experiment', the problem of 'mary' the neuroscientists,
the problem of the 'inverted spectrum', the 'framing problem' so on and so
forth). the real problems that philosophers must again adress are the problems
concerning human knowing.
mickeyd
Peter H.M. Brooks
>
>
> Wittegnstein said; "in order to tell whether a picture is true or false we
must
> compare it with reality" -this is precisely what we cannot do!
>
external reality with which it can be compared [since a picture is a real
thing]. If you don't accept an external reality then you can't accept the
picture either. In either case Wittgenstein is not wrong, in the one case he
is making a sensible, everyday non-solopsistic remark, in the other case he
is making a statement that is a tautology - if you want to tell if something
real is true or false you must compare it with something real - you can't
object to that, it is contingent upon accepting the premise that something
real exists, if it does, then it can be considered.
--
Only very sophisticated organisms like philosophers fail to be naive
realists! - David H.M. Brooks How to Solve the Hard Problem: A Predictable
Inexplicability 1999
Mr Michael Bibby
i think that was how Kant described the problem of transcendence in his critique
of pure reason which is a marvolous piece of literature, unfortunately for Kant,
however, he seems to forget that he is doing the very thing he says cannot be
done; he is using reason to reason about reason (cf "reason can only comprehend
what she herself has brought forth according to her design") but yes, that is a
good characterization of the problem i think. i keep bringing these issues up
becuase so many philosophers these days seem intent with concerning themselves
with inane logical arguments instead of redressing the problems of human
knowledge, for example, i recently spoke to david chalmers after a guest lecture
that was held at my university and he didnt see any need or reason to challange
our epistemological assumptions and metaphysical pretentions (personally i think
this attitude, in the context of what he says, is very arrogant because his
whole notion of 'third-person data' is predicated upon a very naive realist view
which he seems to think is self-justified), i also spoke to the head of the
philosophy department of the university of UCLA recently and he reflected a
similar attitude towards epistemology. 'truth' comes from the greek meaning
'that which is not obscured', but often we obscure from ourselves how little we
know by concerning ourselves with what we *think* we know! ill step of my
high-horse now.
mickeyd
Peter H.M. Brooks
is that you can discuss epistemiology in isolation from other matters - so,
when you are, for example, discussing consciousness, like Chalmers, then the
presupposition is that we are not solipsists. There is a different place to
discuss solipsism and it detracts from, rather than adding to, the
discussion at a higher level.
The naive realistic view is what we use every day to deal with buying food,
flying on aeroplanes and not being too rude to our mothers-in-law. Why
should we desert it when we deal with matters philosophical? Unless, of
course, we wish to deal with the question of reality in particular.
It is a matter of reduction, really. If you wish to learn to drive a car it
isn't helpful to discuss the action valves and pistons in the internal
combustion engine - if, on the other hand, you are training an engine
mechanic then that is exactly what you will wish to discuss if you are
dealing with cars old enough to have carburettors. So you select the
appropriate level of reduction for your discussion. That is why you find
people dismissive of your questions - you are not making it clear why you
think it necessary to bring the matter up. So, for example, if you were
teaching somebody to drive and they said, 'How do I drive so as to put the
least possible strain on the engine', then it would be appropriate to talk
about how the engine works so as to explain why gears are used to keep the
engine speed fairly constant and go on from there. If you don't explain that
you are going to a lower level of reduction for this purpose your pupil will
say 'I don't want to know about all that internals stuff, just teach me to
drive'.
Mr Michael Bibby
i agree with much of what you say on the one hand, but on the other i
emphatically disagree. problems of epistemology are becoming increasingly more
and more relavent in the social sciences (i am a student of pscyhology);
chalmers was trying to do nothing short of bringing consciousness into emprical
inquirey, he outlined many problems this presents and offered some tentative
solutions. he completely ignored the problem of epistemology which undercuts his
whole enterprize. these issues are relavent, and are becoming increasingly so,
but yes, inspite of these rather 'theoretical problems' we do need to teach the
next generation of scientists. i suppose we will have to wait and see,
personally i think these issues arent going to go away, they were brought to
light by many post-modern thinkers, but post modernism has fallen by the way
side. i do read extensive literature in the natural and social sciences, and
have noticed that these problems are not going away as many academics would like
to think. post modernism wasn't just a bad dream that threatened the privaliged
position of academics, it wont go away. most of the literature i read is
grounded in constructivists epistemology, whether or not this 'replaces' the
classic 'representationalist epistemology' remains to be seen, but it does have
a good prima faci case. you've probably heard about 'reflexive
methodologies'such as social constructionism, discursive analysis,
deconstructionism, radical constructivism, second order cybernetics etc., many
of these approaches are predicated upon constructivist epistemology which has
many advantages over and above the classical approaches which have become deeply
entrenched modern thought.
put simply, it is no longer the 17th century! it is the 21st century, we need an
epistemology that reflects our social and historical context. the epistemic
battle that came to a head in the 17th century hasnt been won! what it did
suceed in doing was overthrowing the monopoly of knowledge held by the church
and did provide a basis for science to progress, but the assumptions upon which
science rests can no longer support the weight of its claims! we are not
'standing upon the shoulders of giants' but rather loosing oursleves in their
shadows, cleaning up the mess they left behind, thats their legacy to us.
mickeyd
Mr Michael Bibby
>
>"Mr Michael Bibby" <s403...@student.uq.edu.au> wrote in message
>news:bf5h55$hvr$1...@bunyip.cc.uq.edu.au...
>>
>>
>> Wittegnstein said; "in order to tell whether a picture is true or false we
>must
>> compare it with reality" -this is precisely what we cannot do!
>>
>Not really. If you accept that the picture exists then you accept an
>external reality with which it can be compared [since a picture is a real
>thing]. If you don't accept an external reality then you can't accept the
>picture either.
what? this i cant make sense of, try as i might. i do accept that a picture is
real enought, thats why i say 'perception is reality'; however, saying that
something exists *because* i percieve it, is different to saying i perceive it
*because* it exists!!!!
In either case Wittgenstein is not wrong, in the one case he
>is making a sensible, everyday non-solopsistic remark, in the other case he
>is making a statement that is a tautology - if you want to tell if something
>real is true or false you must compare it with something real - you can't
>object to that, it is contingent upon accepting the premise that something
>real exists, if it does, then it can be considered.
>
>
>--
>Only very sophisticated organisms like philosophers fail to be naive
>realists! - David H.M. Brooks How to Solve the Hard Problem: A Predictable
>Inexplicability 1999
>
>
>
>
>
mickeyd
Peter H.M. Brooks
>
> >
> >"Mr Michael Bibby" <s403...@student.uq.edu.au> wrote in message
> >news:bf5h55$hvr$1...@bunyip.cc.uq.edu.au...
> >>
> >>
> >> Wittegnstein said; "in order to tell whether a picture is true or false
we
> >must
> >> compare it with reality" -this is precisely what we cannot do!
> >>
> >Not really. If you accept that the picture exists then you accept an
> >external reality with which it can be compared [since a picture is a real
> >thing]. If you don't accept an external reality then you can't accept the
> >picture either.
>
>
> what? this i cant make sense of, try as i might. i do accept that a
picture is
> real enought, thats why i say 'perception is reality'; however, saying
that
> something exists *because* i percieve it, is different to saying i
perceive it
> *because* it exists!!!!
>
some reason] 'I do accept that a picture is real enough' - that is all you
need to say to establish that you accept reality since there is at least one
real thing, apart from you, the picture itself. The rest all follows from
that, perception is irrelevant - you agreed that it is real.
Peter H.M. Brooks
>
>
>
> i agree with much of what you say on the one hand, but on the other i
> emphatically disagree. problems of epistemology are becoming increasingly
more
> and more relavent in the social sciences (i am a student of pscyhology);
>
corpses still move, but that is all.
Sociobiology (now called Evolutionary Psychology by many) replaces both
since it uses evolution as a theoretical basis (before there was no
theoretical basis, only bullshit).
>
> chalmers was trying to do nothing short of bringing consciousness into
emprical
> inquirey, he outlined many problems this presents and offered some
tentative
> solutions. he completely ignored the problem of epistemology which
undercuts his
> whole enterprize. these issues are relavent, and are becoming increasingly
so,
>
Oh, yes, why? For that matter, how are you suggesting thta epistemiologal
matters 'undercut his whole enterprise' - you seem pretty sure so a simple
answer must be possible.
Postmodernism is indeed dead, it started off that way really, apart from in
the arts where it has the nice ring of pomposity that some like.
Philip Baker
<s403...@student.uq.edu.au> writes
>
>Wittegnstein said; "in order to tell whether a picture is true or false we must
>compare it with reality" -this is precisely what we cannot do! it seems we are
>in agreement here, i think. however, when you say' "...But what are you
>observing, your 'internal states' or something else?..." im not sure what you
>are saying. you seem to be implying that our internal states are of something,
>that they 'represent' something, that they are 'intentional', that they have an
>'aboutness', they have an 'object'. but we have absolutely no way of knowing
>whether the objects we isolate in our expeirences at all agree with 'real
>things' (we cannot compare the portrait with the origonal and see if it
>correponds to something that exists independently of what we think and do). the
>objects we isolate in perception maybe only 'phantom and vain chimera' they may
>be mere artifacts of perceptual aparatus, the point is that their is absolutely
>no way of nothing 'from within'.
As regards Wittgenstein you should read the Philosophical
Investigations.
Perceptions (sensations, immediate experience) aren't knowledge.
They form the basis, in part, for knowledge but we don't experience
our experiences. Don't ask me how this development of knowledge from
experience comes about since introspection can't tell us. That would
be like trying to look at one of our own eyes through a telescope.
There is no reason to suppose that the things we learn about from
everyday experience are representations of an occult world of things
existing behind the scenes.
There is a problem with all these kinds of discussion since words
like 'experience', 'perception', 'sensation', 'knowledge' are being
abstracted from their contexts of normal usage and we are trying to
make general statements with them. I tend to the view that if we
refer back to how these words are actually used in ordinary
(non-philosophical) discourse many of these issues would evaporate.
Michael R Henson
similar assertions relating to the imagination. When we do not merely
imagine, and have some objective distraction in sense or reason, can
we impute a passive imagination in the categorisation between the two?
Your wind question seems rather rudimentary relative to that. The
Quantum self, of course, is the unanswered self. Certainly passivity
in that context can possess no attributes. It is important that we do
not worship the vegetable within!
On Tue, 17 Jun 2003 17:53:12 +0100, "Bricriu" <Bri...@ntlworld.com>
wrote:
Mr Michael Bibby
>
>"Mr Michael Bibby" <s403...@student.uq.edu.au> wrote in message
>news:bf5rd4$32a$1...@bunyip.cc.uq.edu.au...
>>
>>
>>
>> i agree with much of what you say on the one hand, but on the other i
>> emphatically disagree. problems of epistemology are becoming increasingly
>more
>> and more relavent in the social sciences (i am a student of pscyhology);
>>
>I'd change fields if I were you. Psychology is dead, as is sociology, the
>corpses still move, but that is all.
>
>Sociobiology (now called Evolutionary Psychology by many) replaces both
>since it uses evolution as a theoretical basis (before there was no
>theoretical basis, only bullshit).
>>
>> chalmers was trying to do nothing short of bringing consciousness into
>emprical
>> inquirey, he outlined many problems this presents and offered some
>tentative
>> solutions. he completely ignored the problem of epistemology which
>undercuts his
>> whole enterprize. these issues are relavent, and are becoming increasingly
>so,
>>
>Oh, yes, why? For that matter, how are you suggesting thta epistemiologal
>matters 'undercut his whole enterprise' - you seem pretty sure so a simple
>answer must be possible.
im sure you have no doubt read Chalmers, he makes an important distinction
between what he calls 'first-person data' which refers to the qualiatatively
distinct aspects of consciousness, the 'what its like' aspects of concsiousness;
and 'third-person data' which refers to the data gleaned from the natural and
social sciences. his approach is to somehow intergrate these two perspectives.
having made this distinction, however, he fails to give an account of how third
person data is possible for conscious agents who are stuck in the 'first-person'
(it simply 'begs the question'!). and to that criticism, he could say absolutely
nothing, he simply agreed with me when i said that this distinction obviously
reflects his undying faith in objectivity.
>Postmodernism is indeed dead, it started off that way really, apart from in
>the arts where it has the nice ring of pomposity that some like.
post-modernism, like 'humanism', has become a dirty word. it did, however, shake
the bed rock of modern empiricism and threaten the privaliged position of many
academics. but on the other hand, i think that it was destined to 'fail' simply
because it could not provide a viable alternative. the situation has changed
somewhat in the post-post-post modern era, and many post-post-post modern
writers are developing alternative methods and methodologies. one of the biggest
movements is called, after glasersfeld, 'radical constructivism' which is slowly
filtering its way into main stream scientific literature and discursive
practices. this perspective is focused on avoiding scepticism and challanging
the pious notion that our theories reflect reality. it has raised many
devastating arguments that scientist can no longer ignore (cf 'the radical
constructivist view of science'- Earnst Von Glasersfeld; this is available on
the web).
lets not obscure the issue here, post-modernism is many things to many people,
but essentially it was a reaction against the prevailing view that our world is
knowable.
>--
>The happiest people on earth are those few fortunates who seem to be in a
>state of mild, stable hypomania. - David Horrobin 'The Madness of Adam and
>Eve' (How schizophrenia shaped humanity)
>
>
>
mickeyd
Mr Michael Bibby
>
>"Mr Michael Bibby" <s403...@student.uq.edu.au> wrote in message
>news:bf5rkm$b29$1...@bunyip.cc.uq.edu.au...
>>
>> >
>> >"Mr Michael Bibby" <s403...@student.uq.edu.au> wrote in message
>> >news:bf5h55$hvr$1...@bunyip.cc.uq.edu.au...
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Wittegnstein said; "in order to tell whether a picture is true or false
>we
>> >must
>> >> compare it with reality" -this is precisely what we cannot do!
>> >>
>> >Not really. If you accept that the picture exists then you accept an
>> >external reality with which it can be compared [since a picture is a real
>> >thing]. If you don't accept an external reality then you can't accept the
>> >picture either.
>>
>>
>> what? this i cant make sense of, try as i might. i do accept that a
>picture is
>> real enought, thats why i say 'perception is reality'; however, saying
>that
>> something exists *because* i percieve it, is different to saying i
>perceive it
>> *because* it exists!!!!
>>
>I'm not even talking about perception. You have said [in all lower case for
>some reason] 'I do accept that a picture is real enough' - that is all you
>need to say to establish that you accept reality since there is at least one
>real thing, apart from you, the picture itself. The rest all follows from
>that, perception is irrelevant - you agreed that it is real.
i should clarify my position. i *am* talking about perception, the objects that
i isolate in perception, say this computer screen in front of me, are 'pictures'
of something (that is, they are 'intentional', they have an 'aboutness', they
'refers to something') however, in saying this, i am not saying that this
'picture' is a picture of some ontologically objective reality that exists
independently of what i think and do, i am saying that there is no way for me to
know, i cannot compare 'ideas' and 'things' to see if there is a one to one
correspondence between the two (i am talking about 'ideas' and 'things' in the
17th century sense). for ought i know that objects that furnish my perceptions
may not at all agree with *real* things (by 'real' things i am talking about
'things-in-themselves'). i cannot transcend the domain of my experiences. i am
saying that this computer screen exists *because* i perceive it, but its
existence is contingent upon a mind, it is not 'mind-independent existence' in
the ontologically objective sense.
>Only very sophisticated organisms like philosophers fail to be naive
>realists! - David H.M. Brooks How to Solve the Hard Problem: A Predictable
>Inexplicability 1999
>
>
>
mickeyd
Mr Michael Bibby
that is what i am attempting to do, not get lost in abstractions of thought and
refinements of logic or, worst of all, semantic debates. the point is this, if
you try and tell me that 'you are right and i am wrong' i am going to say 'there
is no such thing as universal right and wrong', truth is a relative word; what
is true for you need not be true for me. your knoweledge is gleaned from your
experience, my knowledge is gleaned from mine. many people, scientists in
particular, come to feel that they have privaliged access to reality (through
their methods and methodologies), a reality that necessitates the truth of their
claims, a reality which 'authoritizes' their truth claims. this is
unsatisfactory, i am merely trying to develop a prima faci case against the
pious notion that our theories reflect ontologically objective reality.
keep it real
>--
>Philip Baker
Peter H.M. Brooks
>
>
>
> i should clarify my position. i *am* talking about perception, the objects
that
> i isolate in perception, say this computer screen in front of me, are
'pictures'
> of something (that is, they are 'intentional', they have an 'aboutness',
they
> 'refers to something') however, in saying this, i am not saying that this
> 'picture' is a picture of some ontologically objective reality that exists
> independently of what i think and do, i am saying that there is no way for
me to
> know, i cannot compare 'ideas' and 'things' to see if there is a one to
one
> correspondence between the two (i am talking about 'ideas' and 'things' in
the
> 17th century sense). for ought i know that objects that furnish my
perceptions
> may not at all agree with *real* things (by 'real' things i am talking
about
> 'things-in-themselves'). i cannot transcend the domain of my experiences.
i am
> saying that this computer screen exists *because* i perceive it, but its
> existence is contingent upon a mind, it is not 'mind-independent
existence' in
> the ontologically objective sense.
>
it unless you believe that you are the centre of the universe and create
objects only as hallucinations.
Peter H.M. Brooks
>
>
>
> im sure you have no doubt read Chalmers, he makes an important distinction
> between what he calls 'first-person data' which refers to the
qualiatatively
> distinct aspects of consciousness, the 'what its like' aspects of
concsiousness;
> and 'third-person data' which refers to the data gleaned from the natural
and
> social sciences. his approach is to somehow intergrate these two
perspectives.
> having made this distinction, however, he fails to give an account of how
third
> person data is possible for conscious agents who are stuck in the
'first-person'
> (it simply 'begs the question'!). and to that criticism, he could say
absolutely
> nothing, he simply agreed with me when i said that this distinction
obviously
> reflects his undying faith in objectivity.
>
clear statement and one quite close to the one I made earlier. Concerns
about epistemiology and the possibility of solipsism are simply irrelevent
at the level of the discussion - so accepting objectivity [having undying
faith if you prefer to call it that] is a sensible route.
--
Red Strawman
superstitous than in the Middle Ages. Why? Because we accept so much on
trust. We know an electric light works because of electricity. To us this
seems self evident, but can you touch or smell electricity?We know that to
touch it can be fatal so we know that something exists. However, what if we
defined this something as "magic". Magic can be dangerous, as many people
believe, so what if this thing we call electricity is in fact magicand your
vacuum cleaner is powered by invisible spirits. Can most people prove
otherwise? In this case how do we distinguish between the "subjective" and
the "objective" when in fact the nature of the universe as "objective" truth
changes according to the latest scientific theory or discovery. In fact, is
truth nothing more than concensus?
"Michael R Henson" <mic...@hencam.fsnet.co.uk> wrote in message
news:3f1724c9...@news.freeserve.net...
tomca...@yanospamhoo.com
> The author George Orwell asserted that in the 20th Century people were more
> superstitous than in the Middle Ages. Why? Because we accept so much on
> trust. We know an electric light works because of electricity. To us this
> seems self evident, but can you touch or smell electricity?We know that to
> touch it can be fatal so we know that something exists. However, what if we
> defined this something as "magic". Magic can be dangerous, as many people
> believe, so what if this thing we call electricity is in fact magicand your
> vacuum cleaner is powered by invisible spirits. Can most people prove
> otherwise? In this case how do we distinguish between the "subjective" and
> the "objective" when in fact the nature of the universe as "objective" truth
> changes according to the latest scientific theory or discovery. In fact, is
> truth nothing more than concensus?
One difference is that you write up a magic spell for electricity and
it works. Conjuring spirits doesn't work.
Peter H.M. Brooks
<tomca...@yaNOSPAMhoo.com> wrote in message
news:bf9gau$847$3...@news1.radix.net...
tomca...@yanospamhoo.com
>> One difference is that you write up a magic spell for electricity and
>> it works. Conjuring spirits doesn't work.
>>
> You haven't had the pleasure of single malts then.
There is still some truth for me to learn ...
Red Strawman
<tomca...@yaNOSPAMhoo.com> wrote in message
news:bf9gau$847$3...@news1.radix.net...
That may be true, but my point is that although we can know and use
electricity most of us take it on trust as to how it actually works.
Jack
at length that a lampost does not exist, walk straight up to it, and attempt
to walk through it.
The lampost can be explained to some extent using language. Philosophically,
it can be explained away. But come-on guys, if it looks like a lampost,
feels like lampost (and a bump on my head), then it probably is a lampost.
Now you can get pedantic and try to say that it was a gas powered lampost,
an electric lampost, or just my imagination (if that exists), or ask me what
kind of picture of reality it was that hit me, or did I hit it? And we end
up arguing in perpetuity.
Thing is, nothing is achieved apart from bellowing about one's agility in
verbal arguments. The existence of lamposts is unproven. Yet I can walk out
my door, turn left, close my eyes and thump.
J.
"Mr Michael Bibby" <s403...@student.uq.edu.au> wrote in message
news:beij1j$ild$1...@bunyip.cc.uq.edu.au...
>
> >In article <beb51o$14d$1...@bunyip.cc.uq.edu.au>, Mr Michael Bibby
> ><s403...@student.uq.edu.au> writes
> >>we have access to our internal states and not some external reality
> >
> >I have rather more knowledge of my immediate surroundings than my
> >internal state.
> >--
>
>
> you missed my point entirely. all that you have access to is 'thoughts'
and
> 'ideas'; sense-data, you dont have access to things-in-themselves. this is
what
> i had in mind. you may have a 'picture' of reality but for aught you know
it may
> not at all agree with real things. you have no way of knowing. this is
usually
> called the 'epistemological problem'- it is not a trivial problem.
>
> your knowledge may seem 'about' something, but what is knowledge? it is a
> subjective state 'to know', when you 'know' something is 'known', this is
the
> triptrite model of epistemology: the 'subject' who knows, the subjective
state
> of knowing, and that which is known- the 'object'. the problem is between
the
> 'subject' and the 'object', which is to say, how do we know that we know?
the
> answer, becuase of the subjective state of knowledge (i.e., a feeling of
> cirtitude). but this feeling of cirtitude does not ensure us that our
knowledge
> represents an ontic reality that exists independently of us.
>
> mickeyd
Philip Baker
<Jac...@blueyonder.co.uk> writes
>Could it be that sometimes words just simply aren't enough? Sure, I can talk
>at length that a lampost does not exist, walk straight up to it, and attempt
>to walk through it.
>
>The lampost can be explained to some extent using language. Philosophically,
>it can be explained away. But come-on guys, if it looks like a lampost,
>feels like lampost (and a bump on my head), then it probably is a lampost.
>Now you can get pedantic and try to say that it was a gas powered lampost,
>an electric lampost, or just my imagination (if that exists), or ask me what
>kind of picture of reality it was that hit me, or did I hit it? And we end
>up arguing in perpetuity.
>
>Thing is, nothing is achieved apart from bellowing about one's agility in
>verbal arguments. The existence of lamposts is unproven. Yet I can walk out
>my door, turn left, close my eyes and thump.
Samuel Johnson would agree with you.
"After we came out of the church, we stood talking for some time
together of Bishop Berkeley's ingenious sophistry to prove the
non-existence of matter, and that every thing in the universe is
ideal. I observed, that though we are satisfied his doctrine is not
true, it is impossible to refute it. I never shall forget the
alacrity with which Johnson answered, striking his foot with mighty
force against a large stone, till he rebounded from it, 'I refute it
thus'."
Boswell's Life of Johnson (6th August 1763)
--
Philip Baker
http://textual.net/access.gutenberg/Samuel.Johnson
http://textual.net/access.gutenberg/James.Boswell
http://textual.net/access.gutenberg/George.Berkeley
http://textual.net/link.to/amazon/critical_thinking
http://textual.net/The_Doh_of_Homer
Mr Michael Bibby
No. i never said the 'screen doesnt exist'; people often missinterpret this
position as solipsism. i am making no ontological commitments about what is or
is not there independent of me; i neither assert or deny the exitence of
'things-in-themselves'. i simply cannot know. the point is, however, that there
is no a-priori distinction between perception and hallucinations.
mickeyd
Mr Michael Bibby
yes, a naive realist approach to science is sensible in that it gets the job
done, however, 'objectivity'- (what i like to call 'intersubjective
cooboration'; i.e., sharing an observational langauge and standard criterion)
presents us with a number of *ethical* problems in that it confers
responcibility of our observational models onto some 'ontologically objective
reality' (we see these models as true representations of reality instead of just
usefull conceptual structures which are built by us for us, which is precisely
what they are- instruments); since all observations are made by some observer,
the observer must be included in the model for it to be complete, especially
when the very process of model-building effects the phenomena being modelled
(this is especially pertinent in the social sciences where i work).
mickeyd
Mr Michael Bibby
>Could it be that sometimes words just simply aren't enough? Sure, I can talk
>at length that a lampost does not exist, walk straight up to it, and attempt
>to walk through it.
>
>The lampost can be explained to some extent using language. Philosophically,
>it can be explained away. But come-on guys, if it looks like a lampost,
>feels like lampost (and a bump on my head), then it probably is a lampost.
>Now you can get pedantic and try to say that it was a gas powered lampost,
>an electric lampost, or just my imagination (if that exists), or ask me what
>kind of picture of reality it was that hit me, or did I hit it? And we end
>up arguing in perpetuity.
>
>Thing is, nothing is achieved apart from bellowing about one's agility in
>verbal arguments. The existence of lamposts is unproven. Yet I can walk out
>my door, turn left, close my eyes and thump.
of course! do you *doubt* your own experiences? of course not! neither do i- i
am just questioning the way in which we make sense of our experiences, i am not
questioning experiences themselves. (this is analogous to Johnsons criticism of
Berkelian Idealism where he said "I refute you thus!"- having kicked a stone to
'prove' its material existence)
mickeyd
Peter H.M. Brooks
'sciences'. Worse than that, actually, since they have not (until the advent
of sociobiology) had a sound theoretical basis the models have been
arbitrary and generally wrong.
Peter H.M. Brooks
didn't claim that you said that it didn't exist. There is no mistake.
Mr Michael Bibby
how can you say such a thing. sociobiologist study the biological basis of
social behaviour- they decontextualize behaviour from what might have
occassioned it and study it in isolation in a biological framework. the
situation with sociobiology is no different, their models of social behaviour
are no better than other models of social behaviour, they still propose
hypothetical mechanisms which they cannot possibly prove, useful they may be,
but they are, non the less, models and we should treat them as such- the
'context' is the recursion of the systems within which the system we study is
embedded instead of being the statistical epiphenomena generated by our attempts
to study it. further to this, sociobiology is, like all practices, situated in a
social and political context and cannot be deemed to be free of these
considerations- sociobiology is 'action orientated', they 'apportion blame' by
placing responcibility on the genes.
mickeyd
Mr Michael Bibby
"Solipsism is sometimes expressed as the view that 'I am the only mind which
exists', or 'My mental states are the only mental states'"- from 'the internet
encyclopedia of philosophy'. i cannot 'know' that my mind is the only mind just
as i cannot 'know' that my mind is one amoung many. my comments concern 'doing'
and *not* 'being'.
mickeyd
Peter H.M. Brooks
>
> > >That has indeed been one of the more glaring problems with the social
> >'sciences'. Worse than that, actually, since they have not (until the
advent
> >of sociobiology) had a sound theoretical basis the models have been
> >arbitrary and generally wrong.
>
>
> how can you say such a thing. sociobiologist study the biological basis of
> social behaviour- they decontextualize behaviour from what might have
> occassioned it and study it in isolation in a biological framework.
>
'decontextualize', lovely!
Of course sociobiology doesn't do that! Behaviour happens in an environment
and must be considered in that context.
>
> the
> situation with sociobiology is no different, their models of social
behaviour
> are no better than other models of social behaviour, they still propose
> hypothetical mechanisms which they cannot possibly prove, useful they may
be,
> but they are, non the less, models and we should treat them as such- the
> 'context' is the recursion of the systems within which the system we study
is
> embedded instead of being the statistical epiphenomena generated by our
attempts
> to study it. further to this, sociobiology is, like all practices,
situated in a
> social and political context and cannot be deemed to be free of these
> considerations- sociobiology is 'action orientated', they 'apportion
blame' by
> placing responcibility on the genes.
>
Tripe! Entertaining tripe, but tripe nevertheless.
Who is doing this deeming of political freedom? You make it sound like
something out of the cultural revolution.
You are quite wrong in suggesting that the mechanisms of evolution can't be
established, the whole point of a proper scientific investigation is to
produce testable hypotheses and test them, then have them peer reviewed and
then have them duplicated by independent investigators. That is the
scientific method and why, unlike sociology and psychology, sociobiology has
something concrete and important to offer. Try reading Baker and Bayliss
'Human sperm competition' for example.
Mr Michael Bibby
>
>"Mr Michael Bibby" <s403...@student.uq.edu.au> wrote in message
>news:bfd4pq$6b6$1...@bunyip.cc.uq.edu.au...
>>
>> > >That has indeed been one of the more glaring problems with the social
>> >'sciences'. Worse than that, actually, since they have not (until the
>advent
>> >of sociobiology) had a sound theoretical basis the models have been
>> >arbitrary and generally wrong.
>>
>>
>> how can you say such a thing. sociobiologist study the biological basis of
>> social behaviour- they decontextualize behaviour from what might have
>> occassioned it and study it in isolation in a biological framework.
>>
>There's an old fashioned word I haven't heard bandied about for a while
>'decontextualize', lovely!
>
>Of course sociobiology doesn't do that! Behaviour happens in an environment
>and must be considered in that context.
of course, however, if we model behaviour in a context we must model the
context! here in lies the problem.
>> the
>> situation with sociobiology is no different, their models of social
>behaviour
>> are no better than other models of social behaviour, they still propose
>> hypothetical mechanisms which they cannot possibly prove, useful they may
>be,
>> but they are, non the less, models and we should treat them as such- the
>> 'context' is the recursion of the systems within which the system we study
>is
>> embedded instead of being the statistical epiphenomena generated by our
>attempts
>> to study it. further to this, sociobiology is, like all practices,
>situated in a
>> social and political context and cannot be deemed to be free of these
>> considerations- sociobiology is 'action orientated', they 'apportion
>blame' by
>> placing responcibility on the genes.
>>
>Tripe! Entertaining tripe, but tripe nevertheless.
>
>Who is doing this deeming of political freedom? You make it sound like
>something out of the cultural revolution.
this is a discursive pscyhology orientation, this perspective focuses on the
'action orientation' of 'situated practices'. perhaps the first 'discursive
psychologists' was michel Foucault who developed a discursive analysis of
insanity in the age of reason. In his seminal text "madness and civilization" he
argues that 'insanity' is a social construction designed to justify the
effective elimination, confinement and treatment of uncontrollable social
behaviour that threatened the status quo. there is no doubt that our society
demands answers to many questions, and that these 'answers' are used to do many
things- these social and political pressures often precipitate extensive
research in science and the research results are often used to do many things
(for example, the research conducted under Loftus into eye witness testimony was
used, and still is used, in court rooms around the world to undermine eye
witness testimony) this is just one example, but im sure that you would agree
that science is a human enterprise that is applied to human affairs- "NO
POSITION OR VIEW THAT HAS ANY RELEVANCE IN THE DOMAIN OF HUMAN RELATIONS CAN BE
DEEMED FREE FROM ETHICAL AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS, NOR CAN A SCIENTISTS
CONSIDER HIMSELF ALIAN TO THESE IMPLICATIONS" maturana and varels. where
ecologists and bionomicians distribute responcibility for social behaviour over
the social melieu, and cognitivist place responcibility upon the shoulders of
the 'agent' and Behaviourists place responcibility on the environment;
Sociobiologists 'blame the genes'. of course there work is of enormous use to
us, but the hypothetical mechanisms they propose to give an account of how
social behaviour might arise through biological processess which are themsleves
nothing more than hypotheical mechanisms: we should treat our models like
models, "free creations of the human mind" (Einstein), and not like descriptions
of an objective state of affairs (especially when the process of model building
effects the very thing being modelled!). further more, they depend upon the
diagnostics of clinicians in making diagnosis of certain forms of pathology,
this is done with the aid of a criteria (namely the DSM 4R), however, it all
comes down to a subjective apprasail of the clinician upon the basis of his or
her unique experience, there are many examples of 'trouble cases' where
clinicians have been unable to make a definitive diagnosis. further to this,
psychological dissorders are just as complex as people!.
>You are quite wrong in suggesting that the mechanisms of evolution can't be
>established, the whole point of a proper scientific investigation is to
>produce testable hypotheses and test them, then have them peer reviewed and
>then have them duplicated by independent investigators. That is the
>scientific method and why, unlike sociology and psychology, sociobiology has
>something concrete and important to offer. Try reading Baker and Bayliss
>'Human sperm competition' for example.
>
>
>--
>The happiest people on earth are those few fortunates who seem to be in a
>state of mild, stable hypomania. - David Horrobin 'The Madness of Adam and
>Eve' (How schizophrenia shaped humanity)
>
>
>
mickeyd
Mr Michael Bibby
>>You are quite wrong in suggesting that the mechanisms of evolution can't be
>>established, the whole point of a proper scientific investigation is to
>>produce testable hypotheses and test them, then have them peer reviewed and
>>then have them duplicated by independent investigators. That is the
>>scientific method and why, unlike sociology and psychology, sociobiology has
>>something concrete and important to offer. Try reading Baker and Bayliss
>>'Human sperm competition' for example.
i just realized i didnt reply to this passage. you seem to be saying that
sociobiology and evolutionary psychology are one in the same, but this is not
entirely accurate. there are many many problems with evolutionary psych, for
example, the 'machiavallian' theory of human intelligence is based on two main
observations; one on comparative psychology and the other on human rationality
and reasoning. the latter are usually researched under the 'deductive paradigm'
which uses deductive logic as the normative standard against which human
reasoning is measured (i.e., the most cited example is Watsons selection task).
the problem with this approach is that the deductive logic may not be the
appropriate normative standard against which to measure performance, and is
often critisized for this reason. further to this, where many evolutionary psych
see the conceptual-perceptual aparatus as subserving the bioloigical machinary
of the body, it may be the other way around! related to this, and perhaps most
importantly, evolutionary pscyh is most often criticised because of its exploits
of teleological arguments; they 'infer' what 'purpose' certain behavoiurs may
have served throughout our phylogenic development. teleological arguments,
strickly speaking, have no place in science becuase they are not subject to
empirical testing (this is why they are sometimes compared with 'metaphysics').
and yes, i know that we deduce testible hypothesis from these hypothetical
mechanisms, predictions about what is likely to occur under certain
preconditions, but even our interpretation of the obseravational data is itself
within an interpretive framework (a fact is only a fact in a theoretical
framework), without such an interpretive framework we would have no way of
picking and choosing between competing interpretations of the observational
data; this problem is usually called 'the underdetermination of the theory by
the observational data' by physicists, this is why Einstein said that theories
are "free creations of the human mind" and compared the situation of the
scientists to that of someone who is trying to discover the mechanisms of a
closed watch which they cannot open- if they are "ingenious enough" he says,
they may be able to construct hypothetical mechanisms to explain how phenomena
might arise, but they are, non the less, HYPOTHETICAL MECHANISMS. i have often
iterated this point to science students (and science lecturers and practioners)
who seem to think that the instrumentality of their theories is a function of
the extent to which they approximate reality- this is a matter of *faith* and
not of demonstratable reason.
mickeyd
Peter H.M. Brooks
>
> > >Tripe! Entertaining tripe, but tripe nevertheless.
> >
> >Who is doing this deeming of political freedom? You make it sound like
> >something out of the cultural revolution.
>
> this is a discursive pscyhology orientation, this perspective focuses on
the
> 'action orientation' of 'situated practices'. perhaps the first
'discursive
> psychologists' was michel Foucault
>
about 'context'.
Peter H.M. Brooks
>
> > they may be able to construct hypothetical mechanisms to explain how
phenomena
> might arise, but they are, non the less, HYPOTHETICAL MECHANISMS. i have
often
> iterated this point to science students (and science lecturers and
practioners)
> who seem to think that the instrumentality of their theories is a function
of
> the extent to which they approximate reality- this is a matter of *faith*
and
> not of demonstratable reason.
>
of what is essentially solipsism. You can enjoy that sort of thing for
first year debates, but that's all its useful for.
Mr Michael Bibby
>
>"Mr Michael Bibby" <s403...@student.uq.edu.au> wrote in message
>news:bffq7e$map$1...@bunyip.cc.uq.edu.au...
>>
>> > they may be able to construct hypothetical mechanisms to explain how
>phenomena
>> might arise, but they are, non the less, HYPOTHETICAL MECHANISMS. i have
>often
>> iterated this point to science students (and science lecturers and
>practioners)
>> who seem to think that the instrumentality of their theories is a function
>of
>> the extent to which they approximate reality- this is a matter of *faith*
>and
>> not of demonstratable reason.
>>
>This is simply post-modernist relativism, a recent continental remodelling
>of what is essentially solipsism. You can enjoy that sort of thing for
>first year debates, but that's all its useful for.
??? it is what it is- give it a name if it makes you happy. it is *not*
solipsism in the ontological sense but it is solipsism purely in the
epistemological sense- there is a difference! the latter see's the conceptual
aparatus as being 'operationally closed', all knoweldge is a system-relative
representation. it is not a solipsim in the ontological sense. first-year
debates? i fail to see what it is you are saying but have a feeling of what you
are implying and consider that a bit didactic (and ad hominine)- these are
important issues which, as i said previously, are becoming increasingly more
pertinent. scientific realism has received a barrage of attacks, yet for some
strange reason, science is still taught at many universities the world over in
this way. this is unsatisfactory, as Feyerband said "scientific facts are being
taught at high school through to university in much the same way as religious
facts where taught less than a century ago".
mickeyd
Mr Michael Bibby
>
>"Mr Michael Bibby" <s403...@student.uq.edu.au> wrote in message
>news:bffnhg$9q2$1...@bunyip.cc.uq.edu.au...
>>
>> > >Tripe! Entertaining tripe, but tripe nevertheless.
>> >
>> >Who is doing this deeming of political freedom? You make it sound like
>> >something out of the cultural revolution.
>>
>> this is a discursive pscyhology orientation, this perspective focuses on
>the
>> 'action orientation' of 'situated practices'. perhaps the first
>'discursive
>> psychologists' was michel Foucault
>>
>Oh, dear, the pomo affliction. I rather suspected as much with this nonsense
>about 'context'.
what is the point of engaging people in their ideas in an open forum such as
this if your only going to criticize them with ad hominine attacks and leave
their arguments alone? all that i have said still stands to reason.
mickeyd
Peter H.M. Brooks
>
> Feyerband said "scientific facts are being
> taught at high school through to university in much the same way as
religious
> facts where taught less than a century ago".
>
science even if it is true.
--
"The pure and simple truth is rarely pure and never simple." - Oscar Wilde
Peter H.M. Brooks
lack of argument. The problem with pomo arguments is that, even on their own
terms, they are unarguable, they are really just declarations of belief, so,
apart from pointing out that there is nonsense, there is little point
engaging with them. I have, in the past, for fun mainly, actually engaged
with an intelligent supporter of pomo - it was simply like wading in
treacle, it wasn't possible to advance forward logically as everything was
simply referred off somewhere else - it was entertaining for a while, but,
intellectually utterly pointless.
Mr Michael Bibby
?????????? what! sounds like youve got me pegged, or put into a box i should
say. we are discussing, if im not very much mistaken, the nature of truth. i
consider this a very important philosophical issue. we went off on a tanget,
both of us, should you like to bring the discussion back to the fore, then i
would be more than willing to continue this discussion. i dont understand what
you mean by 'pomo' but if you care to critically engaged any of the ideas i have
put forth then by all means do. i was attacking scientific realism and the pious
notion that scientific theories reflect reality. i was also arguing that
objectivity is impossible as we cannot transcend the domain of our own
experiences. i was also saying that our metaphysical assumptions cannot support
the weight of our truth claims. i was challanging the 'representationalist'
notion of truth and advocating a 'constructivist' orientation to human knowing.
if you are a critical philosopher, as you seem to believe, then i challenge you
to criticise any of the above corrolaries that i have put forth. if you are a
critical philosopher, then please explain to me how you have avoided hyperbolic
scepticism?! if you havent avoided hyperbolic scepticism then you have probably
convinced yourself that scepticism is irrelevent to us living our lives (as you
said 'naive realism helps us to do whatever it is we do in the doing of what we
do'- i agree, we think, act and operate as if the objects that furnish our
perceptions corresponded to real things and an objective state of affairs),
however, like i said previously, this view has important ethical implications-
we use the 'truth' to authoratize our claims, therefore, if such a truth is
impossible, it is irresponcible to rhetorically authoratize your 'truth' claims
and say things which you are in no position to know- i dont consider that to be
irrelevant.
>
mickeyd
Mr Michael Bibby
>
>"Mr Michael Bibby" <s403...@student.uq.edu.au> wrote in message
>news:bfftk2$p0$1...@bunyip.cc.uq.edu.au...
>>
>> Feyerband said "scientific facts are being
>> taught at high school through to university in much the same way as
>religious
>> facts where taught less than a century ago".
>>
>Yes, he may have said that, but that is a criticism of pedagogy, not of
>science even if it is true.
>
in context, i was saying that science has become as oppressive as the ideologies
it once fought. many scientists beleive that scientif truth is somehow universal
and that accepting it is not so much a matter of faith but rather facing up to
reality: this is tantamount to saying that the bible is gods will and that there
is only one true interpretation of it- where clerics once had a monopoly of
knowledge, today that monopoly is held by specialty scientists with PhDs. we are
being fee scientific facts in much the same way as we were once feed religious
facts (i.e., the big bang theory of the origins of the universe and the
east-side story of phylogenic development replaces the creationists cosmogany
and cosmology). i was simply trying to put things into perspective.
micekyd
Peter H.M. Brooks
>
> >
> >"Mr Michael Bibby" <s403...@student.uq.edu.au> wrote in message
> >news:bfftk2$p0$1...@bunyip.cc.uq.edu.au...
> >>
> >> Feyerband said "scientific facts are being
> >> taught at high school through to university in much the same way as
> >religious
> >> facts where taught less than a century ago".
> >>
> >Yes, he may have said that, but that is a criticism of pedagogy, not of
> >science even if it is true.
> >
>
> in context, i was saying that science has become as oppressive as the
ideologies
> it once fought.
>
Science is self-correcting, not always immediately and not always perfectly
since it is a human enterprise. It is, however, continually testing itself
and its models against reality and correcting hypotheses and underlying
theories where necessary. That is the nature of the beast. As a result it is
pretty good at being self-consistent and pretty good at predicting what
happens in the world.
Post-modernism (pomo) uses the laziness of relativism to try to claim that
it is at the same level as invented, unexamined and arbitrary things like
religion, sociology and economics (much of economics anyway). It simply is
not. What is good enough for French plebvision chat-shows is not good enough
for reasoned debate.
Mr Michael Bibby
i was unable to post a reply, i think that my reply was too big, so i sent you
an email- hope you dont mind- post a reply on this forum if you wish
mickeyd
Peter H.M. Brooks
From: "Mr Michael Bibby" <s403...@student.uq.edu.au>
To: <pe...@new.co.za>
Sent: Wednesday, July 23, 2003 9:07 AM
Subject: forward post, re the nature of truth and scientific realism
> i> >to try to claim that it is at the same level as invented, unexamined
and >arbitrary things
> >like religion, sociology and economics (much of economics anyway).
>
> Invented? your implying that scientists are 'discoverers', once again you
seem to be taking a somewhat scientific realist stance here, you seem to be
of the mind that scientists are the 'cartographers of reality' and that with
each theory that is thrown upon the ever growing scrap heap of discarded
theories they are taking one step closer towards unquestionable truth
(indeed, you seem to be implying that their is such a thing as 'universal
truth' and that ontologically objective reality is 'knowable'), that
scientists are explorers penetrating into the internal consitition of things
and reverse engineering the very mechanics of nature and the nature of man
himself!- this is tantamount to saying that the Bible is Gods will and that
there is only one true interpretation of it! are you saying this? if you
are, let there be no deception about it, this is a matter of *faith* and not
demonstratable reason! it is nothing short of a leap of *faith* to *believe*
that scientific theor
> ies 'reflect' or 'approximate' an objective state of affairs! if they
'reflect' anything, it is ourselves, the ends for which they are but a mere
means.
>
No doubt you never fly on aeroplanes as their operation relies only on
faith, not on reality. To you a magic carpet would do just as well.
Fine. There is indeed no argument against solipsism, if you are happy with
it that is indeed your affair.
I suppose that you have been led to this position by psychology - where,
until the advent of sociobiology, you could indeed pick and choose from a
vast array of 'theories' all of them wrong in different ways. I was amused
by the study of psychoanalysis (one rational part of psychology where, at
least the practitioners were driven by the appeal of monetary gain) that
showed that applying any of the methods derived from Freudianism,
Jungianism, Behaviorlism, etc. etc. etc. worked no worse than simply leaving
the patient alone. If that is all you have been exposed to then you can be
forgiven for catching a bad dose of relativism.
Philip Baker
<s403...@student.uq.edu.au> writes
> i was attacking scientific realism and the pious
>notion that scientific theories reflect reality. i was also arguing that
>objectivity is impossible as we cannot transcend the domain of our own
>experiences. i was also saying that our metaphysical assumptions cannot support
>the weight of our truth claims. i was challanging the 'representationalist'
>notion of truth and advocating a 'constructivist' orientation to human knowing.
>if you are a critical philosopher, as you seem to believe, then i challenge you
>to criticise any of the above corrolaries that i have put forth. if you are a
>critical philosopher, then please explain to me how you have avoided hyperbolic
>scepticism?! if you havent avoided hyperbolic scepticism then you have probably
>convinced yourself that scepticism is irrelevent to us living our lives (as you
>said 'naive realism helps us to do whatever it is we do in the doing of what we
>do'- i agree, we think, act and operate as if the objects that furnish our
>perceptions corresponded to real things and an objective state of affairs),
>however, like i said previously, this view has important ethical implications-
>we use the 'truth' to authoratize our claims, therefore, if such a truth is
>impossible, it is irresponcible to rhetorically authoratize your 'truth' claims
>and say things which you are in no position to know- i dont consider that to be
>irrelevant.
Have you read "Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius" by Borges? You seem
to be an inhabitant of Tlön.
There is a copy on the Web of the Spanish text at:
http://www.ciudadseva.com/textos/cuentos/esp/borges/tlon.htm
I can't find a complete English translation on the Web.
--
Philip Baker
http://textual.net/link.to/amazon/borges
http://textual.net/link.to/amazon/critical_thinking
http://textual.net/The_Doh_of_Homer
Mr Michael Bibby
your forgeting that i am not challanging the instrumentality of scientific
theories, what i am doing, however, is challanging the view that the
instrumentality of our theories is a function of their capacity to approximate
reality- this is a matter of faith and not demonstratible reason. i know our
models are useful, indeed, they are used to do many things.
>Fine. There is indeed no argument against solipsism, if you are happy with
>it that is indeed your affair.
once again i am forced to jump on you here because the position that i maintain
is not solipsism, like i said, it is epistemological solipsism but not
ontological solipsism. this is important because if you believe that i am a
solipsist then you have grossly miss interpreted my postition. i dont resort to
Berkelian idealism and deny the existence of material things, nor do i postulate
the existence of material things; i am merely saying that the mind of man is an
operationally closed system, and that knowledge consists of system-relative
constructions which are themselves 'gleaned' from system-relative constructions.
this is not solipsism.
>I suppose that you have been led to this position by psychology - where,
>until the advent of sociobiology, you could indeed pick and choose from a
>vast array of 'theories' all of them wrong in different ways.
"....lead to this position by psychology...." yes and no. i also study a lot of
philosophy and philosophy of science; but unfortunatly this orientation is not a
very popular one in mainstream psychology. Psychology is usually taught as a
science, therefore, your statement; "....psychology - where, until the advent of
sociobiology, you could indeed pick and choose from a vast array of 'theories'
all of them wrong in different ways..." doesnt make a lot of sense. the science
of pscyhology is just as 'bad' or 'good' as the science of biology- the
situation in biological science is no better than the situation in pscyhological
science, the same problem applies as the observational data *always*
underdetermines the theory that will describe it, therefore, the problem of
'picking and choosing' between competing explainations and interpretations of
the observational data still applies.
I was amused
>by the study of psychoanalysis (one rational part of psychology where, at
>least the practitioners were driven by the appeal of monetary gain) that
>showed that applying any of the methods derived from Freudianism,
>Jungianism, Behaviorlism, etc. etc. etc. worked no worse than simply leaving
>the patient alone. If that is all you have been exposed to then you can be
>forgiven for catching a bad dose of relativism.
there have been a number of such studies, using independent groups designs, and
the results are quite mixed. yes, the therapeudic results of pscyhoanalysis
(along with other forms of pscyhotherapy) can be attributed, to a large extent,
by demand characteristics (the expectency set of the patient/client); however,
various studies have also shown that for specific conditions certain forms of
pscyhotherapy regulary out perform all others (i.e., systematic desensitization
or CBT, is effective for the elimination of most phobias). the consensus is that
some form of therapy is better in most cases than non at all, and that certain
forms of therapy are *significantly* more effective in certain cases than other
forms of therapy.- but you have to remember that pscyhologists are the ones
conducting these experiments!
what on earth do you mean by this; "....If that is all you have been exposed to
then you can be forgiven for catching a bad dose of relativism...", im not so
sure what you are implying, but it seems to me to be a disparaging remark. by
the way, your more than welcome to defend realism, as apposed to continually
criticizing relativism without levelling any real arguments upon it.
>"The pure and simple truth is rarely pure and never simple." - Oscar Wilde
>
>
>
>
mickeyd
Peter H.M. Brooks
>
>
> >>
> >No doubt you never fly on aeroplanes as their operation relies only on
> >faith, not on reality. To you a magic carpet would do just as well.
>
> your forgeting that i am not challanging the instrumentality of scientific
> theories, what i am doing, however, is challanging the view that the
> instrumentality of our theories is a function of their capacity to
approximate
> reality- this is a matter of faith and not demonstratible reason. i know
our
> models are useful, indeed, they are used to do many things.
>
then ipso facto you have a good approximation to reality.
>
> sociobiology, you could indeed pick and choose from a vast array of
'theories'
> all of them wrong in different ways..." doesnt make a lot of sense. the
science
> of pscyhology is just as 'bad' or 'good' as the science of biology- the
> situation in biological science is no better than the situation in
pscyhological
> science, the same problem applies as the observational data *always*
>
based on inconsistent and inadequate theories of mind so have really been ad
hoc back of a fag packet ideas. Biology has been well in advance of this -
particularly because huge amounts of taxonomic work have been available, as
well as a sound theoretical basis for hypotheses, evolution. The're like
chalk and cheese.
The fact that you wish to argue that they are the same shows the weakness in
your argument.
>
>
> what on earth do you mean by this; "....If that is all you have been
exposed to
> then you can be forgiven for catching a bad dose of relativism...", im not
so
> sure what you are implying, but it seems to me to be a disparaging remark.
by
> the way, your more than welcome to defend realism, as apposed to
continually
> criticizing relativism without levelling any real arguments upon it.
>
You are arguing a relativistic case. Biology is 'just as good or bad' as
psychology. The normal basis for this, and, though you deny it, the clearest
one from what you say, is solipsism.
Relativism is a trap for the lazy thinker - hence its appeal to the
post-modernist and continental 'philosophy' crew.
To claim that the ''same problem appears in obervational data always' is not
true. Mensuration has a number of dimensions. Resolution, repeatability,
scale and independent verification are criteria that can be used to
distinguish between the reliability and closeness to reality of a particular
observation or measurment. Indirect measurement (like triangulation, for
example, or x-ray crystallography) can be as precise, or indeed, much more
precise than direct measurement. Under the guidance of a sound theory,
measurements can be taken to support or to exclude hypotheses to a very high
degree of certainty.
--
"We pride ourselves on our peace and stability" - Zimbabwean President
Robert Mugabe
Mr Michael Bibby
>
>"Mr Michael Bibby" <s403...@student.uq.edu.au> wrote in message
>news:bfnmv9$9fm$1...@bunyip.cc.uq.edu.au...
>>
>>
>> >>
>> >No doubt you never fly on aeroplanes as their operation relies only on
>> >faith, not on reality. To you a magic carpet would do just as well.
>>
>> your forgeting that i am not challanging the instrumentality of scientific
>> theories, what i am doing, however, is challanging the view that the
>> instrumentality of our theories is a function of their capacity to
>approximate
>> reality- this is a matter of faith and not demonstratible reason. i know
>our
>> models are useful, indeed, they are used to do many things.
>>
>That is simply silly. If aerodynamics can give you an aeroplane that flies
>then ipso facto you have a good approximation to reality.
O.k., this is definitely a 'scientific realist' position. Now, first things
first; if you *believe* that the instrumentality of our theories is a function
of the extent to which they approximate reality this is purely a matter of
*faith*. thats quite o.k., of course you can beleive what ever you want,
however, this conclusion cannot be necessitated by a reasoned argument (if you
think it can, then go right ahead and demonstrate the logicality of this claim).
i only need to sight some obvious examples to demonstrate the prima facie
reasons for questioning this assertion; i.e., take a look at 'astrology',
astrology (long before copernican and aristotal) was a systematic theory which
was used to model the seasonal changes in whether and predict these seasonal
variations. this system proved very instrumental for horticulture and
agreculture for centuries, yet today is consider 'wrong'. "to know is not to
possess true descriptions of reality but to possess ways and means of thinking
and acting that allows one to acheive the goals one happens to have chosen"-
whether it be to launch a geostationary sattelite into orbit or avoid getting
hit by a truck when crossing the road.
>> sociobiology, you could indeed pick and choose from a vast array of
>'theories'
>> all of them wrong in different ways..." doesnt make a lot of sense. the
>science
>> of pscyhology is just as 'bad' or 'good' as the science of biology- the
>> situation in biological science is no better than the situation in
>pscyhological
>> science, the same problem applies as the observational data *always*
>>
>Nonsense! Psychology fails to be scientific because its hypotheses have been
>based on inconsistent and inadequate theories of mind so have really been ad
>hoc back of a fag packet ideas.
yes, i more or less agree with you here, however, not so long ago biology was in
a similar situation. further to this, perhaps the biggest scandel in biology is
the complete and utter lack of a comprehensive model of self-organising,
self-determining processess which characterize biological phenomena. biological
models are useful, they are used to develop diagnostics tests and tools and so
on, but that is all they are 'models'- they are not 'true descriptions of an
objective state of affairs'- not by any stretch of the imagination! if you think
they are, then you have just involved yourself in scepticism!!!!!!
Biology has been well in advance of this -
>particularly because huge amounts of taxonomic work have been available, as
>well as a sound theoretical basis for hypotheses, evolution.
o.k., like i said, we have models of cellular processess, functional anatomy and
so on and so forth. but that is all they are, models. and just what is a 'sound
theoretical basis'? i have already highlighted many of the problems inherrent
with 'evolutionary biology' and 'evolutionary pscyhology'.
The're like
>chalk and cheese.
>
>The fact that you wish to argue that they are the same shows the weakness in
>your argument.
first of all, i dont use logically valid deductive argument, as these are purely
analytic and not synthetic, i use corollaries. secondly, psychological science
and biological science are not the same, but the criticisms i have raised
applies equally to both of them. further to this, biologial psyhology is an
important part of pscyhology, so their are many overlaps between the two.
>> what on earth do you mean by this; "....If that is all you have been
>exposed to
>> then you can be forgiven for catching a bad dose of relativism...", im not
>so
>> sure what you are implying, but it seems to me to be a disparaging remark.
>by
>> the way, your more than welcome to defend realism, as apposed to
>continually
>> criticizing relativism without levelling any real arguments upon it.
>>
>You are arguing a relativistic case.
more or less yes, but that is not all that i am doing.
Biology is 'just as good or bad' as
>psychology. The normal basis for this, and, though you deny it, the clearest
>one from what you say, is solipsism.
im not so sure you understand me correctly. i am an epistemological solipsist,
not an *ontological* solipsist- this is an important distinction, i am merely
saying that 'knowledge' consists of system-relative constructions, and not
'representations of an objective state of affairs' (because we all know that the
latter opens up the 'object' 'subject' dichotomy, that is, the distinction
between the 'object' and the 'representation' which invites scepticism).
>Relativism is a trap for the lazy thinker - hence its appeal to the
>post-modernist and continental 'philosophy' crew.
once again, 'realism is a trap for the lazy thinker- hence its appeal to the
modernist thinker'.
>To claim that the ''same problem appears in obervational data always' is not
>true. Mensuration has a number of dimensions. Resolution, repeatability,
>scale and independent verification are criteria that can be used to
>distinguish between the reliability and closeness to reality of a particular
>observation or measurment.
o.k. i am going to sink my teeth in here. first of all, "man is the measure of
all things", that is, *we* construct measurement units- when we see a needle
pointing to a unit of measurement on some peice of equipment, we decide just
what it is we are measuring. secondly, observations are heavily theory laden,
that is, when we observe *we* decide just what it is we are observing- this is
usually done through operational definitions where we fix the empirical meaning
of observational entities in an a-priori theoretical framework (i.e., how could
we possibly make observations let alone make sense of our observations without
possessing certain categories a-priori!).
Indirect measurement (like triangulation, for
>example, or x-ray crystallography) can be as precise, or indeed, much more
>precise than direct measurement. Under the guidance of a sound theory,
>measurements can be taken to support or to exclude hypotheses to a very high
>degree of certainty.
... degrees of certainty, sounds a lot like 'degrees of truth'. yes, scientific
theories account for many 'phenomena' with great pricision. again, what is a
'sound theory'?
>
>--
> "We pride ourselves on our peace and stability" - Zimbabwean President
>Robert Mugabe
>
>
>
mickeyd
Mr Michael Bibby
>To claim that the ''same problem appears in obervational data always' is not
>true.
i just realized that you seemed to have missconstrued my presentation of the
'underdetermination of the theory by the observational data' thesis. this thesis
states that any given data set (collections of observations etc.) can be
'explained' by a number of theories, therefore, theory choice is *undetermined*
by the observational data alone. this is also why many people criticise the idea
that theories are inferred from 'facts'- theory construction, like i said, is a
complex process and no one is in agreement as to what processess and mechanisms
are involved. for simplicity, many say that it involves 'reflection' and
'abstraction' of the observational data into existing theoretical frameworks
(this furthermore undermines the positivists distinction between 'fact' and
'theory').
also, i should like to note that many of the arguments raised in support of
scientific realism are arguments against anti-realism, however, i am not an
antirealist just as i am not a realist (the two positions are essentially
logically equivalent in much the same way as Lockian Materialism and Berkelian
Idealism; that is, it is logically equivalent to either assert or deny the
existence of material things, i am agnostic about such metaphysical claims). my
position is a *constructivists* position, and is not predicated upon the
cartesian dualism between ideas and things. in this perspective, the objects we
isolate in experiences are not 'objectivised', that is, they are not seen as
representations of an objective state of affairs, instead, they are
'subjectivised' in that they are brought forth by the agent himself, that is,
they are system-relative presentations (as apposed to 'representations') of a
state of affairs constructed upon the basis of other system-relative
presentations; that is, the mind is an 'operationally closed system' such that
mental activity is the result of other mental activity -ad infinitum. this is my
epistemological corollary, and i make no metaphysical pretensions, therefore, i
am *not* a solipsist in the ontological sense that is usually implied by that
word.
mickeyd
Peter H.M. Brooks
>
>, the mind is an 'operationally closed system' such that
> mental activity is the result of other mental activity -ad infinitum.
>
environmental factors - heat, radiation, cold, anoxia and so forth. The
brain also changes its structure as it grows as a direct result of
experiences - musicians or painters develop their brains differently from
others and their thoughts are consequently different. Whilst here we may as
well mention that male and female brains have quite different structures and
support different modes of thought.
So the brain is not a closed system by any stretch of the imagination. It is
simply nonsense to claim that it is.
Mr Michael Bibby
>
>"Mr Michael Bibby" <s403...@student.uq.edu.au> wrote in message
>news:bfo65e$f91$1...@bunyip.cc.uq.edu.au...
>>
>>, the mind is an 'operationally closed system' such that
>> mental activity is the result of other mental activity -ad infinitum.
>>
>This is not true. The brain is influenced by the senses, diet and other
>environmental factors - heat, radiation, cold, anoxia and so forth. The
>brain also changes its structure as it grows as a direct result of
>experiences - musicians or painters develop their brains differently from
>others and their thoughts are consequently different. Whilst here we may as
>well mention that male and female brains have quite different structures and
>support different modes of thought.
your saying all this through recourse to models on neurophysiology and cognitive
neuropsychology; and yes, these models provide a usefull way of conceptualizing
various cognitive processess, however, we have absolutely no way of knowing
whether or not they are correct. my epistemological corollary is not predicated
upon such a model because such a model rests upon assumptions we cannot possibly
prove. what this corollary is saying is that when you consider what i now say,
you do so upon consideration of your own experinces, as these are all you have
access to (do you really doubt that!)- i usually express this by quoting
shelley; "there can thus be no deception, we ourselves being the depositories of
the evidence of the subject which we consider"- whensoever we consider a
subject, whatsoever that subject may be (including what i now say) we only have
recourse to our own experiences and upon consideration of those experiences make
an apprasal.
further to this, from within the operational closure of your own mind you have
absolutely no way of making a-priori distinctions between perceptions and
hullicinations; that is, appearences that are the result of internal dynamics
(i.e., artefacts of neuronal processing- i.e., 'colours' are a likely candidate)
and external dynamics (i.e., effects which have their causes in the envirnment-
the most often cited candidates are things like spatiality, extension, mass and
so on).
but, as i always say, at the end of the day; THE MIND IS THE MINDS GREATEST
MYSTERY, it always has been and always will be- personally i dont doubt that
because i am always stuck in the first person and cannot 'objectivise' myself by
placing myself in the third person. Foerster once said; "it takes a brain (mind)
to write a theory of the brain (mind); any theory, if it is ever to be taken
seriously, must be able to account for itself, and, even more bizzare, the
person who actually wrote it"
>So the brain is not a closed system by any stretch of the imagination. It is
>simply nonsense to claim that it is.
many neurologists talk about 'sensory sufaces' and usually conceptualize
neuronal activity as being the transduction of environmental information (i.e.,
sensory neurons, hypercollums and so on), this is grossly missleading as every
neuron has sensory and effectory surfaces! i personally tend to conceptualize
the nervous system as a self-organized, self-determined, self-referential or
'autopoetic' system in a state of perpetual equilibriam- a dynamic system that
is 'perturbed' by events in its environment.
but, at the end of the day, the brain is a concept of the mind, in saying that
the mind is a operationally closed system this does not imply that the brain is
a operationally closed system- i make no such claims apart from what i say
above.
>--
> "We pride ourselves on our peace and stability" - Zimbabwean President
>Robert Mugabe
>
>
>
mickeyd
Peter H.M. Brooks
>
i personally tend to conceptualize
> the nervous system as a self-organized, self-determined, self-referential
or
> 'autopoetic' system in a state of perpetual equilibriam- a dynamic system
that
> is 'perturbed' by events in its environment.
>
--
The decades-long debate over the consistency of personality and the
existense of character traits has now been settled. - Race, Evolution and
Behavour p22 J. Phillippe Rushton 1995
Mr Michael Bibby
has it? i was unaware that it was! as i always say; "there are as many
dimensions of personality as there are constructs used to measure it"
mickeyd
Peter H.M. Brooks
>
> >
> >"Mr Michael Bibby" <s403...@student.uq.edu.au> wrote in message
> >news:bfo8ig$hvl$1...@bunyip.cc.uq.edu.au...
> >>
> > i personally tend to conceptualize
> >> the nervous system as a self-organized, self-determined,
self-referential
> >or
> >> 'autopoetic' system in a state of perpetual equilibriam- a dynamic
system
> >that
> >> is 'perturbed' by events in its environment.
> >>
> >Yes, well, that's nice for you, dear.
> >
> dimensions of personality as there are constructs used to measure it"
>
You are remarkably consistent for a relativist.