Killing and letting die....
Daniel M
I had to write for three hours on the words 'killing and letting die'
yesterday and wondered what people thought...e.g........
Is there a real difference between the two? is it a morally relevant one?
which should we prefer.....
Cheers,
Dan
Jeffrey Goldberg
Is there a difference between doing your homework for you on the one hand,
and letting you get away with having your homework done for you on the
other?
There is a great deal of literature, and talk of "sins of commission" and
"sins of omission".
Psychologically there is a huge difference, to the point where good fails
to get done.
If you are walking through a park and accidently drop some litter, you
are likely to bend down and pick it up. Now suppose that it blows a few
meters away before you get to it. And you decide still to go and pick it
up. Now suppose that between you and it, there is worse litter that has
been left by someone else.
A: You could pass the worse litter and pick up your own.
B: You could pick up the the worse litter, and leave your own.
(there are of course two other options, but let us contrast these two).
B should be a better option for everyone. After B the park is cleaner
than after A. And it is easier on you to do B than to do A. So for all
concerned B dominates A. Yet many people do exactly A.
Exactly the same applies to pollution clean up. It is often cheaper and
more effective for a company to clean-up or reduce someone elses pollution
then to reduce its own further. (Eg, a chemical processing company might
find it easier to reduce SO2 going into the air by (B) buying up very old
cars in the region than to (A) further improve its scrubbers on its smoke
stacks). In such cases everyone is better off with option B, than with A.
Yet with a few rare exceptions, proposals to do things like B are
routinely rejected by policy makers and the public.
Again there is a literature on exactly this sort of thing, but I don't
have reference handy.
-j
--
Jeffrey Goldberg
Note: I am moving and changing many addresses, please see
http://www.goldmark.org/jeff/contact.html
Relativism is the triumph of convention over truth, authority over justice
Daniel M
Hi,
Thanks for the attempt, at least someone had a go. Unfortunately your
analogies were not relevant enough to the question so didn't help! I'll make
the question more specific to see if anyone on here has any opinions then:-
is there a morally relevant difference between active and passive
euthanasia? And is the idea of double effect useful in such circumstances?
I didn't want to ask the question too specifically to ethics before, since I
get the feeling no-one here has ever done any. Still I'm sure some
interesting points could be made.
Cheers,
Dan
Bill Snyder
"Daniel M" <m...@cam.ac.uk> wrote in message
news:8hibcp$dft$1...@pegasus.csx.cam.ac.uk...
> Hi,
>
> I had to write for three hours on the words 'killing and letting die'
> yesterday and wondered what people thought...e.g........
> Is there a real difference between the two? is it a morally relevant one?
> which should we prefer.....
>
killing is the undertaking of a course of action which results in a death;
while letting die is refraining from any actions which would preserve a
life.
Now is that definitional difference a real one? I think it depends on the
examples and circumstances which you choose to talk about. There certainly
is a real difference between, say, the dropping of an A-bomb on a heavily
populated area and not sending large amounts of food to the same area
knowing that without the food many will die of hunger and disease. The
differences are certainly quantitative (in the numbers that would die) and
qualitative (in the manner and certainty of death).
Is it a morally relevant difference? I am inclined to say, "No, but ...."
IF you are capable of preserving a significant number of the lives from
death by hunger and disease caused by lack of food, then to failure to
furnish the food is as morally reprehensible as just killing them. But, the
problem is that it is never that simple. To provide the food to site A,
often means ignoring site B (and C, etc.). So you are simply choosing whom
to keep alive; which raises a different moral issue, particularly if you do
not have the resources to get the food everywhere it is needed.
But take a different type of example. A physician with three different
patients. Patient A is clearly beyond help, without consciousness, and can
be kept "alive" only by a variety of mechanical aids; the physician fails to
provide the necessary "extraordinary means" and lets the patient die.
Patient B could very well recover, if it can be kept alive long enough so
that natural body functioning can be restored; the physician fails to
provide the necessary "extraordinary means" and lets the patient die.
Patient C appears to be recovering slowly from severe heart problems and
will probably be able to function decently for some years; the physician
administers a lethal dose of some medication and kills the patient. The
treatment of patients B and C appear to me to be equivalent (or nearly so)
from a moral perspective. The treatment of patient A is morally different
from either of the other two. Notice, I deliberately refrained from
attributing any motivational factors to the physician; that would introduce
different kinds of morally relevant factors and might well change one's view
of the matter. In all three examples the physician deliberately chooses a
course of action which is likely to result in the death of the patient. The
moral difference between B and C versus A arises from the likelihood that in
case A, the physician is just hastening the inevitable, while in B and C he
is deliberately ending a life which might very well continue for some time.
The equivalence of B and C arise from the fact that both are a deliberate
shortening of lives which could continue as effective lives.
Bill Snyder
Jeffrey Goldberg
> Thanks for the attempt, at least someone had a go. Unfortunately your
> analogies were not relevant enough to the question so didn't help!
Oh dear. I didn't write your essay for you. How sad.
My response was extremely relevant. If you don't see the relevance than
you are thinking about your problem at a far too superficial level.
Let me give you some hints.
(1) On a utilitarian and related views there is no difference.
(as pointed out in my message, but for a slightly different problem)
(2) Psychologically (or intuitionally) there is a huge difference
(as made very clear in my message)
(3) Moral systems are often based on intuitions. The big question is
which intuitions to use. In these cases there may be a conflict
between different "intuitions" about what makes something right.
In my message, I worked to identify and isolate one of the conflicting
psychological intuitions.
Connecting the conflict of principles to your problem is left as an
excercise to the reader.
-j
PS: Do the Cambridge mail and news admins know that you are posting
news with addresss like m...@cam.ac.uk and d...@cam.ac.uk? If you want to
put in a bogus address when posting from Cambridge, use nob...@cam.ac.uk
(unless of course they have a policy that I don't know about that does
allow you to do what you are doing, but no one has ever mentioned it to
me.)
CPK Smithies
kill and a decision not to keep alive to:
A takes a decision as a result of which B dies.
Such an analysis intuitively seems to fail to deal with the possible moral
complexity of the situation.
Imagine a situation in which B has attempted to escape from a concentration
camp. The guards call the prisoners together and say "Unless someone else
volunteers for execution, we will execute B". A could volunteer to take B's
place, but decides not to. It is correct to say that A here takes a
decision, as a result of which B will die. But clearly A is not guilty of
B's death in the same way as if he had drawn a gun and shot B.
This may not get us very far, but it may put us on our guard about allowing
too facile an analysis of the kill/keep alive decision.
Peter H.M. Brooks
"CPK Smithies" <cp...@dialstart.net> wrote:
>
> Such an analysis intuitively seems to fail to deal with the possible
moral
> complexity of the situation.
>
> Imagine a situation in which B has attempted to escape from a
concentration
> camp. The guards call the prisoners together and say "Unless someone
else
> volunteers for execution, we will execute B". A could volunteer to
take B's
> place, but decides not to. It is correct to say that A here takes a
> decision, as a result of which B will die. But clearly A is not guilty
of
> B's death in the same way as if he had drawn a gun and shot B.
>
objector (pacifist). Some 'pacifists' might join an army and kill people
on the grounds that they judge it a 'just war'. Others may refuse to
join an army even as a cook as their presence allows one other person to
fight and kill. Others may refuse to pay taxes or buy a postage stamp as
any money paid to a state that maintains an army that kills people is
money potentially spent to kill.
There are many shades of moral choice between the extremes. Since I was
presented with exactly this dilemma in my youth, I understand how
unsatisfactory almost any decision is if you hold an absolutist position
on the wrongness of deliberate killing of human beings.
--
Peter H.M. Brooks
Friday's are like blondes, though not only gentlemen prefer them.
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
Daniel M
> There are many shades of moral choice between the extremes. Since I was
> presented with exactly this dilemma in my youth, I understand how
> unsatisfactory almost any decision is if you hold an absolutist position
> on the wrongness of deliberate killing of human beings.
>
inflexible on occasion; as you say it seems only reasonable, and plausible,
that the circumstances are brought in on occasion.
Daniel M
> Imagine a situation in which B has attempted to escape from a
concentration
> camp. The guards call the prisoners together and say "Unless someone else
> volunteers for execution, we will execute B". A could volunteer to take
B's
> place, but decides not to. It is correct to say that A here takes a
> decision, as a result of which B will die. But clearly A is not guilty of
> B's death in the same way as if he had drawn a gun and shot B.
Yes I would agree with what you say.
Perhaps it could be argued that in the case of the non-volunteer, it was
another agent who decided the terms of B's death, and in a more real sense,
was the cause of A's death. With the gun, only I decide.
The closest of cause-effect is quite important here too, there is a direct
link with the bullet and the death of the person; whilst in other cases it
can be much less clear; if there are twenty people drowning in a river and i
only have time to save one, did i let the others die? Surely the water and
their non-ability to swim was the cause of their deaths.....
Also the infringement of rights is probably important here..... when I kill
B then it seems I have infringed his right to life (have 'wronged' him in
some sense), whereas it is unclear to see how I have done so if I merely let
him to die.
A related question is whether there is a morally relevant difference between
the intended consequences of an action, and the merely foreseen but
unintended question? This is often used to get around the problem of
absolutism.....
Cheers,
Dan
Daniel M
If you had read the question I posed fully - lesson number 1 in writing an
essay - you would have observed that I had already sat the paper. So you
couldn't have been writing my answer (and thank God you weren't!!)
>
> (1) On a utilitarian and related views there is no difference.
I assume you mean act utilitarianism...there are at least ten other versions
I can think of.
Additionally there can be a difference on an act-utilitarian view!
>
> (2) Psychologically (or intuitionally) there is a huge difference
> (as made very clear in my message)
yes the obvious point, but still important to make and come back to
>
> (3) Moral systems are often based on intuitions. The big question is
> which intuitions to use. In these cases there may be a conflict
> between different "intuitions" about what makes something right.
agreed; and why it may be that our intuitions differ of course
>
> PS: Do the Cambridge mail and news admins know that you are posting
> news with addresss like m...@cam.ac.uk and d...@cam.ac.uk? If you want to
> put in a bogus address when posting from Cambridge, use nob...@cam.ac.uk
> (unless of course they have a policy that I don't know about that does
> allow you to do what you are doing, but no one has ever mentioned it to
> me.)
I don't know, I'd never thought of it. I don't see why not; if I posted
under my actual address to the newsgroups, then I'd start to get loads of
junk mail from idiots. It's common practice to post to newsgroups with a
varied address to stop this. I can't see any rules on the Cambridge site to
students advising them not to do this, and I can't think why they might
object.
Jeffrey Goldberg
> > Oh dear. I didn't write your essay for you. How sad.
>
> If you had read the question I posed fully - lesson number 1 in writing an
> essay - you would have observed that I had already sat the paper. So you
> couldn't have been writing my answer
Sorry. Yes, I didn't read your original posting carefully enough.
> (and thank God you weren't!!)
Indeed. (But who knows, maybe I could have done a decent job if I cared).
> > (1) On a utilitarian and related views there is no difference.
>
> I assume you mean act utilitarianism...there are at least ten other
> versions I can think of.
Yes. And there are a variety of variants, but I expect that they all
make no distinction between sins of omission and sins of comission.
The are utilitarian views (I use that expression instead of
"utilitarianism specifically because there are many variants) are
consequentialist. And if the outcome is the same in either cases, these
views won't discriminate between the cases.
So, if we go back to my litter example we had.
A: pick up someone else's litter at lesser effort to self but
picks up more litter.
B: pick up own litter at greater effort to self and less litter
actually picked up.
In terms of consequences, A dominates B as prefered on any utilitarian
view I can imagine. Yet many people are uncomfortable with A. Exploring
why B may be preferred to A should help to identify what it is that drives
the feeling that killing is worse than letting die. Once that feeling is
understood, then we can explore whether we want moral judgements to be
based on that.
Another aspect of the feeling that killing is worse than letting die may
be an instance of some form of the naturalistic fallacy: Fate or God or
whatever wanted it that way.
> Additionally there can be a difference on an act-utilitarian view!
The problem can be set up so that there are differences, but that should
require having different outcomes. Of course -- and I already have a
track record of misunderstanding you -- I may not know or understand
correctly the "act-utilitrarian view". It is perfectly likely that my
untrained view of utilitarianism is wrong.
> > PS: Do the Cambridge mail and news admins know that you are posting
> > news with addresss like m...@cam.ac.uk and d...@cam.ac.uk?
>
> I don't know, I'd never thought of it. I don't see why not; if I posted
> under my actual address to the newsgroups, then I'd start to get loads of
> junk mail from idiots. It's common practice to post to newsgroups with a
> varied address to stop this. I can't see any rules on the Cambridge site to
> students advising them not to do this, and I can't think why they might
> object.
The problem is that you might hit upon an address that may now or in the
future be real. So some innocent victim might get that spam.
It is also not entirely clear from your choice of fake address that it is
intended to be fake. I happen to know that d...@cam.ac.uk is not the kind
of email address associated with staff or students. But most readers
won't know that, and so they can be genuinely misleading. If you want to
use a fake address that will never bother anyone if mailed to and should
be obvious to a human reader that it is not your address, try
nob...@cam.ac.uk instead.
By the way, the address in my from line is valid and will get to me, but
almost all spam address harvesting systems barf on such addresses.
Cheers,
-j
CPK Smithies
While you're at it, I think he probably needs your advice on choice of tie -
and how to knot it properly. (Since Wittgenstein, Cambridge philosophers
seem to have lost the art...)
Joking apart, however, there is very likely to be nob...@cam.ac.uk in a few
weeks' time, so I think that would be a very unsafe alternative.
CPK Smithies
Peter H.M. Brooks
--
Peter H.M. Brooks
As the brief fires of youth die in him, the ageing trendy conceives a
growing aversion to
feeling in all its forms. His fastidious distaste for kitsch becomes a
prudish fear of anything
that could - in the wrong hands - be turned into kitsch.
- Roger Scruton Aesthetics & Criticism
CPK Smithies
news:8i21j3$kcb$1...@nnrp1.deja.com...
> Oh, dear! Do you mean that Slick Willie will be back?
Uh, I thought he was an Oxford man... 8-)
CPK Smithies
absolutist and still to hold that moral rules cannot adequately be framed to
deal with the complexities of real life. In the simple sense of "It's
absolutely wrong to kill" you are quite right. But strictly this is not so
much absolutism as adherence to simplistic moral rules.
Peter H.M. Brooks
the two, though. After all, it doesn't feel like a very firm position to
say 'It is abolutely wrong to kill, unless it is euthanasia, abortion, a
just war, somebody shagging my wife...' - at least, once you start
adding all the qualifications the authority of the simple (simplistic)
moral rule is much reduced and the justification for stopping at the nth
rather than the n+1th qualification isn't that clear.
CPK Smithies
> rather than the n+1th qualification isn't that clear.
How very true. There are a very few things that I would say are absolutely
wrong (this may be lack of imagination on my part, but I find it difficult
to see what special circumstances would make genocide right); I think it is
perhaps easier to see why some things may be absolutely right.
It is very often the case that people make "wrong" moral choices because
they fail to take certain aspects of the situation into account, or
concentrate too much on certain other aspects. (This relates to Aristotle's
insight that good is that which all things seek.) And I think this is
connected to the idea that moral rules, precisely because as rules they do
not take into account all the complexities of the situation, must only be
seen as rough guidelines. Which is why I also believe moral fundamentalism
to be incoherent and non-moral.
Not much argument for these positions, but I'd be happy to enter into one if
desired!
Peter H.M. Brooks
"CPK Smithies" <cp...@dialstart.net> wrote:
> > ... the justification for stopping at the nth
> > rather than the n+1th qualification isn't that clear.
>
> How very true. There are a very few things that I would say are
absolutely
> wrong (this may be lack of imagination on my part, but I find it
difficult
> to see what special circumstances would make genocide right); I think
it is
> perhaps easier to see why some things may be absolutely right.
>
I believe, is torture. However, even in this case, it seems that a large
number of US citizens believe that their on-going genocide in Iraq is
justified.
>
> It is very often the case that people make "wrong" moral choices
because
> they fail to take certain aspects of the situation into account, or
> concentrate too much on certain other aspects. (This relates to
Aristotle's
> insight that good is that which all things seek.) And I think this is
> connected to the idea that moral rules, precisely because as rules
they do
> not take into account all the complexities of the situation, must only
be
> seen as rough guidelines. Which is why I also believe moral
fundamentalism
> to be incoherent and non-moral.
>
self-justification and rationalisation, not to mention self-deception.
If you rule out an absolutist position in favour of a situationalist one
in making law, you have either to free the mass murderer because he
provides an internally arrived at self-justification or to agree that
you are holding somebody prisoner simply because you have differing
judgements as to the weight of various moral pressurs in the particular
situation. It also means that nobody can act without fear of this
arbitary law finding them guilty. With a clear absolutist rule of law,
people do at least have some chance of avoiding being charged with
something.
>
> Not much argument for these positions, but I'd be happy to enter into
one if
> desired!
>
consequences of going for moral relativism are rather more extreme than
those of going for absolutism - if we leave out theistically inspired
fundamentalist absolutism!
CPK Smithies
of course judicial discretion can be invoked to avoid the worst effects of
the inflexibility of legal generalizations.
However, it is also true that extreme "situationalism", if generally
followed in moral discourse, would make a moral system extremely difficult
to learn. It has been pointed out that moral codes tend to evolve from very
simple, childish do-this don't-do-that rules (apodeictic) to relatively
complex laws and then on to metamoral principles
"do-as-you-would-be-done-by", and that this evolution tends to mirror the
moral evolution of the individual.
If this is true, then we have a paradoxical regard for moral laws, for they
are at once necessary (for formative and didactic purposes) and yet
provisional (they don't do justice to the complexity of the situation).
Peter H.M. Brooks
"CPK Smithies" <cp...@dialstart.net> wrote:
> Agreed. Your point is confined to legal codes as opposed to moral
codes, and
> of course judicial discretion can be invoked to avoid the worst
effects of
> the inflexibility of legal generalizations.
>
though.
>
> However, it is also true that extreme "situationalism", if generally
> followed in moral discourse, would make a moral system extremely
difficult
> to learn. It has been pointed out that moral codes tend to evolve from
very
> simple, childish do-this don't-do-that rules (apodeictic) to
relatively
> complex laws and then on to metamoral principles
> "do-as-you-would-be-done-by", and that this evolution tends to mirror
the
> moral evolution of the individual.
>
>
> If this is true, then we have a paradoxical regard for moral laws, for
they
> are at once necessary (for formative and didactic purposes) and yet
> provisional (they don't do justice to the complexity of the
situation).
>
that laws, as tools, can be used in different ways by different people.
User 1DE7
>From: "CPK Smithies" cp...@dialstart.net
>Date: 6/16/00 1:21 PM Central Daylight Time
>Message-id: <8idr53$5vg$1...@gxsn.com>
>And I think this is
>connected to the idea that moral rules, precisely because as rules they do
>not take into account all the complexities of the situation, must only be
>seen as rough guidelines. Which is why I also believe moral fundamentalism
>to be incoherent and non-moral.
>
>Not much argument for these positions, but I'd be happy to enter into one if
>desired!
A moral skeptic here, willing to discuss how people can think there can be
moral facts.
To be a fact it seems that something needs to correspond to reality.
I would hold that all reality is physical. As "moral facts" do not correspond
to anything physical, they cannot correspond to reality, and cannot really be
called moral facts.
Can anyone give examples or arguments for why anyone should believe that
non-physical things are part of reality?
-User
Jeffrey Goldberg
> A moral skeptic here, willing to discuss how people can think there
> can be moral facts.
>
> To be a fact it seems that something needs to correspond to reality.
So far so good.
> I would hold that all reality is physical. As "moral facts" do not correspond
> to anything physical, they cannot correspond to reality, and cannot really be
> called moral facts.
I am not sure what you mean by "correspond to anything physical". Does
E = mc^2
correspond to anything physical? Can you point it out to me? Is it a
fact?
> Can anyone give examples or arguments for why anyone should believe that
> non-physical things are part of reality?
Is
E = mc^2
a physical thing? Is it part of reality?
-j
PS: I am taking a stab at the argument you stated. It is not necessarily
the case that I disagree with your conclusion (though I do oppose
relativism).
User 1DE7
>Date: 7/1/00 12:07 PM Central Daylight Time
>Message-id: <Pine.LNX.4.21.00070...@arpad.thegreen.private>
>I am not sure what you mean by "correspond to anything physical". Does
>
> E = mc^2
>
>correspond to anything physical?
Sure. A good way to think of physical things might anything that is the subject
of physics.
>Can you point it out to me? Is it a
>fact?
I am not sure how einstein derived the eqution, but presumably it is based on
empirical observations and measurements of physical things (energy, mass, etc),
and perhaps some logic from there. If I were a physisist I could likely point
out how that equation actualy models physical reality.
>> Can anyone give examples or arguments for why anyone should believe that
>> non-physical things are part of reality?
>
>Is
>
Is? Being seems pretty physical to me. To be is to physicaly exist.
> E = mc^2
Physical, see above.
So where do moral facts come into all of this?
>PS: I am taking a stab at the argument you stated. It is not necessarily
>the case that I disagree with your conclusion (though I do oppose
>relativism).
I'm not advocating relativism, if you take relativism to mean that moral facts
can be true or false yet are different for different people. Mine a skeptical
position, basicaly that morality has no objective existance whatsoever. It is
something humans developled in their evolution because it provided a survival
advantage.
-User
CPK Smithies
difficult to talk about, say, computer programs as entities? I might want to
say "the same computer program is running on computers all over the world".
If physical instantiation is your starting-point for reality, haven't you
got an awful lot of work to do to give an account of what I'm saying? How
would you contrast a computer program's "objective" existence (oh, I hate
that o-word) with moral s-s-s-s (I just can't say it) (non-)existence?
Nobody is trying to assimilate moral intuition to physical reality,
remember.
Bill Snyder
news:20000630195310...@ng-cg1.aol.com...
> >Subject: Re: Killing and letting die....
> >Date: 6/16/00 1:21 PM Central Daylight Time
> >Message-id: <8idr53$5vg$1...@gxsn.com>
>
> >And I think this is
> >connected to the idea that moral rules, precisely because as rules they
do
> >not take into account all the complexities of the situation, must only be
> >seen as rough guidelines. Which is why I also believe moral
fundamentalism
> >to be incoherent and non-moral.
> >
> >Not much argument for these positions, but I'd be happy to enter into one
if
> >desired!
>
> moral facts.
>
> To be a fact it seems that something needs to correspond to reality.
>
correspond
> to anything physical, they cannot correspond to reality, and cannot really
be
> called moral facts.
>
> non-physical things are part of reality?
>
Are there moral rules, which can be conformed to or not? If there are moral
rules which can be conformed to (or not), then it is possible for person A
to conform to the rules (or not). In either case, we have a fact that is
morally relevant (a moral fact?), namely that person A has behaved in
accordance (or not) with the moral rules. What would a "moral fact" be, if
it did not reflect an observance (or a non-observance) of a moral rule.
Certainly, moral rules themselves are not "facts" of any kind, any more than
natural laws are "facts". The "facts" are what validate (or invalidate)
natural laws; the "moral facts" are what justify or fail to justify moral
judgments.
Please note that I, philosophically, would prefer not to use the word 'fact'
in any of the above ways.
Bill Snyder
Jeffrey Goldberg
> >I am not sure what you mean by "correspond to anything physical". Does
> >
> > E = mc^2
> >
> >correspond to anything physical?
>
> Sure. A good way to think of physical things might anything that is
> the subject of physics.
Wow! The somewhat arbitrary and historical accidents of what became an
academic discipline define what is physical.
> >Can you point it out to me? Is it a
> >fact?
>
> I am not sure how einstein derived the eqution, but presumably it is
> based on empirical observations and measurements of physical things
> (energy, mass, etc), and perhaps some logic from there. If I were a
> physisist I could likely point out how that equation actualy models
> physical reality.
The equation may model phsyical things (though it should be noted that
the equation is not an axiom of special relativity, but derived from it)
And each *instance* of the equation is a physical thing (the one you are
reading above probably involves photons of particular wavelenghts coming
from your machine (or it might be ink on paper, or it might be waves of
air molecules if you are blind and using a text-to-speech system, etc).
Originally you said you only considered physical things facts. I still
contend that the equation E = mc^2 is a fact and is not a physical
thing. It may model an infinite class of physical things, but there is
still no physical thing E = mc^2 out there.
Now, of course you can (without admitting it) losened your definition of
fact to include any true statement in the subject of physics. And some
loosening of your original IS required.
Some other questions of facts:
(1) 2 + 2 = 4
(2) -4 + -4 = -8
(3) e^{i\pi} -1 = 0
Now you could get away with claiming that (1) models something physical
(like E = mc^2), but if it does it does so very very indirectly. You are
going to have to go even more indirect to include (2) and (3).
Let me quote you again:
> >> Can anyone give examples or arguments for why anyone should believe that
> >> non-physical things are part of reality?
That combined with your view that facts must be about reality should lead
to problems with (1-3).
As someone else pointed out in a posting, if some moral rule prescribes
some behavior, that behaviour is a physical thing. Some may comply,
others may not. But is that level of indirection to the physical world
any more than the connection of some of the aboves. (If you answer that a
moral rules is about the *rule* itself and not directly the behaviour, I
will answer that E = mc^2 is about a Law of the Universe and not directly
about the particular bits of mass and energy.)
PS: Einstein's work was pure deduction and insight, though it was based
on observations made by others. The key problem he solved was the
relationship between electricity and magnetism. While that relationship
was described by Maxwell's equations which made use of two constants, an
electrical one and a magnetic one. Each of which had been derived by
observation. There was an unexplained relationship between those
constants and the speed of light.
Einstein showed that if you took the speed of light to be a constant in
every inertial frame of reference (so Einstein's theory of relative is
*less* relative than the classical Newtonian theory), then you can derive
the fact that a moving magneting field is an electrical one, etc. You can
also derive from that simple assumption that E = mc^2.
-j
Chris Croughton
>If physical entities are to be the paradigm of reality, doesn't it become
>difficult to talk about, say, computer programs as entities? I might want to
>say "the same computer program is running on computers all over the world".
You might want to say it, but would it be correct to do so? (I just
want to say at this point "send me a million pounds", in the hope that
someone might do it; it's not a fact, though, however much I might wish
it to be one.) Is it 'really' the same program running on all those
computers? If it's on any multi-tasking system then it's almost
certainly executing at different addresses, and thus the binary code
(what is actually being executed) isn't really the same. If you go down
to the atomic level none of the programs are likely to be the same, and
have the same number of electrons at each state...
Can you necessarily justify "is running" (especially where Windows is
concerned)? If the program is in a different state of execution (or
even on disk at that point waiting to be run) is that the 'same'
program?
>If physical instantiation is your starting-point for reality, haven't you
>got an awful lot of work to do to give an account of what I'm saying? How
>would you contrast a computer program's "objective" existence (oh, I hate
>that o-word) with moral s-s-s-s (I just can't say it) (non-)existence?
>Nobody is trying to assimilate moral intuition to physical reality,
>remember.
"Nobody"? I suspect that there are many people who do connect the two,
and that's part of the problem. People who talk about "moral facts"
often do treat them as thogh they were as 'obvious' as 1 + 1 = 5 (for
sufficiently large vales of 1 and/or small values of 5) and act
surprised when other people don't see those moral ideas as absolute.
(Computer programs don't exist really, it's a myth to sell hardware. I
know, I write the things...)
Chris C
CPK Smithies
> know, I write the things...)
You write the what?! Not object-oriented, I hope?
#include <iostream>
main() {
std::cout << "Cogito ergo sum" << std::nl;
return 0;
}
- any good?
Jeffrey Goldberg
> Nobody is trying to assimilate moral intuition to physical reality,
> remember.
Just remember moral intuitions are psychological entitites, and our
psychologies are based substantially on the structure of our brains which
are organs that have evolved by natural selection.
There are some serious attempts to "naturalize" ethics. See for example
@Book{Arnhart98,
author = {Larry Arnhart},
title = {Darwinian Natural Right: The biological ethics of
human nature},
publisher = {State University of New York Press},
year = 1998,
series = {SUNY Series in Philosophy and Biology},
address = {New York}
}
Please note that while Arnhart may be wrong he is not naively committing
the "Naturalistic Fallacy".
Cheers,
CPK Smithies
our moral psychology might be conditioned by the structure of our brains is,
I should have thought, rather a difficult thing to argue for. If our brains
were structured differently in such-and-such respects, what difference would
it make? How would it affect our mathematical or logical intuitions? - But
clearly we are moving out of the ethical sphere now.
User 1DE7
>Message-id: <8jlndg$ren$1...@gxsn.com>
>If physical entities are to be the paradigm of reality, doesn't it become
>difficult to talk about, say, computer programs as entities?
I don't think so. The program itsself is simply data, which is physicaly real.
When the program operates it is simply a physical process.
A throw is not an object existing in reality. It is just what we call the
process of certain physical thing behaving in certain ways (arms, balls, etc).
Similarly, the actual running of the program is just the physical program
(represented electricly or magneticly in the computer) physicaly behaving in a
certain way.
>I might want to
>say "the same computer program is running on computers all over the world".
>If physical instantiation is your starting-point for reality, haven't you
>got an awful lot of work to do to give an account of what I'm saying?
Nope, see above. Another thing is your use of the word "same." There are lots
of ways in which that word can be used. There are simply lots of instances of
programs, represented as data, that all have the same or similar representation
(they were copied from the same source).
>Nobody is trying to assimilate moral intuition to physical reality,
>remember.
That seems to be what a moral realist has to do. You cannot derive an ought
from physical facts, so if you want your oughts to be real, and correspond to
reality, there must be some moral facts out there to derive them from, no?
-User
User 1DE7
>Message-id: <8jqijd$prb$1...@gxsn.com>
>
[responding to someone else]
>I quite take your point about Darwinian ethics; although the thought that
>our moral psychology might be conditioned by the structure of our brains is,
>I should have thought, rather a difficult thing to argue for.
Hm, it seems obvious to me.
>If our brains
>were structured differently in such-and-such respects, what difference would
>it make?
Moraly speaking, if we had evolved into loner predators, instead of social
beings, we would probably not feel immoral about killing and eating eachother.
>How would it affect our mathematical or logical intuitions?
Our mathamatical or ethical intuitions might simply be wrong. Suppose we cannot
grasp the fact that a=a, or that 1+1 = 2. Maybe we think 1 + 1 = 5, so that we
spend all of our time grouping food into pairs of 1 unit, and expecting our
total units of food to be 5, and that we can survive forever like this. A
consequence of this might be that we would die and fail to pass on our genes.
-User
Chris Croughton
<cp...@dialstart.net> wrote:
>> (Computer programs don't exist really, it's a myth to sell hardware. I
>> know, I write the things...)
>
>You write the what?! Not object-oriented, I hope?
Only when appropriate, there are many situations where data hiding,
functional structure or algorithmic code are more appropriate...
>#include <iostream>
>
>main() {
> std::cout << "Cogito ergo sum" << std::nl;
> return 0;
>}
>
> - any good?
Implicit 'int' is not allowed with ANSI Standard C++, function 'main'
must be explicitly declared as 'int main()'. (At least you realised
that it must return int and not void...)
I would also write
using namespace std;
and then just do
cout << "Cogito ergo sum" << endl;
Many compilers will do that automatically, because a lot of older
programs will break without namespace std being globally accessible,
although this can be expected to change over the next few years.
Incidentally, putting an opening brace on the same line as the function
is depreciated even in C and bad form in C++...
<g> Well, you did ask...
Chris C
User 1DE7
>Date: 7/1/00 5:56 PM Central Daylight Time
>Message-id: <8jls...@enews2.newsguy.com>
>Are there moral rules, which can be conformed to or not?
Surely they can be invented, but these moral rules do not exist as part of
reality. They are simply subjective products of our physical brains.
>If there are moral
>rules which can be conformed to (or not), then it is possible for person A
>to conform to the rules (or not).
Sure, but since we have to make up these rules ourselves, and they are not part
of reality, then we cannot say it is a fact that person B ought to do X. We can
only say that person B ought to do X, assuming [some moral system which
dictates that he do X] is true. The tricky part is coming up with some factual
justification for that assumption.
>In either case, we have a fact that is
>morally relevant (a moral fact?), namely that person A has behaved in
>accordance (or not) with the moral rules.
However, the moral rules are not facts, and therefore it is not a fact simply
that "person B ought to do X"
>What would a "moral fact" be, if
>it did not reflect an observance (or a non-observance) of a moral rule.
A moral fact would be some objective property of goodness or badness, right or
wrong. Moral facts are supposedly a real property of situations or actions. It
seems you have to be a dualist to accept that kind of moral fact.
For instance, for "Hitler was immoral" to be a moral fact, it cannot simply be
shorthand for "Hitler was immoral assuming some ethical system which has no
basis in reality." There must be some property of reality -- of hitler's
actions -- that made his actions objectively immoral. You need to have a basis
in reality for your moral assumptions for anything you derive from them to be
moral facts.
>Certainly, moral rules themselves are not "facts" of any kind, any more than
>natural laws are "facts".
But natural laws are validated by empirical evidence -- by reality. Moral rules
have to be validated by moral facts -- by reality -- in order for your analogy
to work.
>The "facts" are what validate (or invalidate)
>natural laws; the "moral facts" are what justify or fail to justify moral
>judgments.
Right, and these moral facts are what moral realists have to provide evidence
for. We need some reason to believe that these moral facts are really part of
reality, instead of just manifestations of descriptive facts about how our
brains work.
-User
Bill Snyder
that there are "moral facts" is that there are facts which are relevant to
the moral judgments which we make. I am not certain to whom you refer with
the term "moral realist", but it certainly has nothing to do with my own
position. Moral rules and standards of worth are not "facts" in ANY sense;
nor can they be justified by generalization from any facts. I thought that
that had been established early in the 20th century (if not much earlier -
say Hume or even Democritus).
Nor are such mythical entities at all necessary in order to justify the
adoption of standards of worth or rules concerning social practices. In my
own perspective, such standards and rules can only be justified by the
necessities of our existence as social beings in an organized social order.
And I do not mean the "mores" practiced in any given society; many such
mores are UNnecessary and often violate the very nature of the creatures who
are forced to live within them.
To put my point more abruptly: yammer about "moral facts" is irrelevant to
any genuine discussion of the point or usefulness of moral judment or of the
application of standards of worth. Nobody of any intelligence has been an
advocate of "moral realism" in the sense which you apparently mean since,
perhaps, the heyday of the "Intuitionism" of Ross and Carritt (1920's).
Moral rules and standards of worth are not established by appeal to certain
"moral facts"; they are established (if at all) by reflection on the human
necessities of our nature as social beings.
Bill Snyder
User 1DE7
>Message-id: <Pine.LNX.4.21.00070...@arpad.thegreen.private>
>
>
>> >I am not sure what you mean by "correspond to anything physical". Does
>> >
>> > E = mc^2
>> >
>> >correspond to anything physical?
>>
>> Sure. A good way to think of physical things might anything that is
>> the subject of physics.
>
>Wow! The somewhat arbitrary and historical accidents of what became an
>academic discipline define what is physical.
That was not a rigorous definition, I was simply giving a general idea of along
what lines to think of physical things.
>Originally you said you only considered physical things facts. I still
>contend that the equation E = mc^2 is a fact and is not a physical
>thing.
Maybe you use the word fact differenly from me. I did not mean that physical
things in themselves are facts, and certainly not that nothing else is a fact.
Whether or not you want to say "that pencil is a fact" probably does not matter
too much. When I speak of facts I am speaking about true statements about
reality.
In this sense "the pencil" is not a fact. "The pencil exists" is, provided it
exists.
Similarly, e=mc^2 is a fact if it is true. It is making an assertation about
reality. I am not physicist, but I will try to interpret it here. "If you take
the mass of a thing and multiply it by the speed of light squared, that will
equal the energy of that thing." Now I don't know if this only works for atoms
or whatnot. It is really irrelevent what the particular equation means. The
point is that it is a fact(if true).
>It may model an infinite class of physical things, but there is
>still no physical thing E = mc^2 out there.
There is no physical thing "I exist" out there, either. You seem to be using
"fact" in a strange way for some reason. Maybe I mislead you with my earlier
definition.
>Now, of course you can (without admitting it) losened your definition of
>fact to include any true statement in the subject of physics. And some
>loosening of your original IS required.
Ah, there we go. My original definition was never intended to mean that only
physical objects themselves are facts whereas statements about them cannot be.
>Some other questions of facts:
>
>(1) 2 + 2 = 4
>
>(2) -4 + -4 = -8
>
>(3) e^{i\pi} -1 = 0
>
>
>Now you could get away with claiming that (1) models something physical
>(like E = mc^2), but if it does it does so very very indirectly. You are
>going to have to go even more indirect to include (2) and (3).
I don't see this as much of a problem. Maybe it is debatable whether -4-4=-8
really is a fact. It could very well be considered not a fact, and simply true
or valid given the axioms of mathamtics.
>
>Let me quote you again:
>
>> >> Can anyone give examples or arguments for why anyone should believe that
>> >> non-physical things are part of reality?
>
>That combined with your view that facts must be about reality should lead
>to problems with (1-3).
>
Maybe I am wrong, but I don't think it is claimed, at least by mathamaticians
or physicicts, that math literaly is real. Math attempts to model reality, and
numbers and math concepts are abstractions. I have no problem saying that 1+1=2
is not a fact in the sense that it is part of reality.
>As someone else pointed out in a posting, if some moral rule prescribes
>some behavior, that behaviour is a physical thing.
Right, but the moral rule is not, and without the moral rule you cannot get to
"ought."
>Some may comply,
>others may not. But is that level of indirection to the physical world
>any more than the connection of some of the aboves. (If you answer that a
>moral rules is about the *rule* itself and not directly the behaviour, I
>will answer that E = mc^2 is about a Law of the Universe and not directly
>about the particular bits of mass and energy.)
>
They are in fact pretty different. For e=mc^2, you are reasoning inductively
from descriptive facts to a descriptive generalization. I don't think
descriptive facts are in question in this thread.
The "Law of the Universe" as you put it can be inferred from the little bits of
matter and energy.
For some moral rule, you *begin* from the moral rule, which itsself is in
question, and then go from there. There is no justification for the moral rule
that I can see anyone trying to provide.
-User
User 1DE7
>Date: 7/3/00 6:09 PM Central Daylight Time
>Message-id: <8jr6f...@enews3.newsguy.com>
>> Right, and these moral facts are what moral realists have to provide
>evidence
>> for. We need some reason to believe that these moral facts are really part
>of
>> reality, instead of just manifestations of descriptive facts about how our
>> brains work.
>>
>I guess that I did not make myself clear. The ONLY sense in which I think
>that there are "moral facts" is that there are facts which are relevant to
>the moral judgments which we make.
Hm, ok. I would not call those moral facts then.
>I am not certain to whom you refer with
>the term "moral realist", but it certainly has nothing to do with my own
>position.
Ok. I guess I got a skewed view of how popular moral realism was from spending
time on the objectivism forum where most everyone is a moral realist.
>Moral rules and standards of worth are not "facts" in ANY sense;
>nor can they be justified by generalization from any facts. I thought that
>that had been established early in the 20th century (if not much earlier -
>say Hume or even Democritus).
Right, they cannot be justified by descriptive facts. Only by "moral facts"
which I was saying don't exist.
>Nor are such mythical entities at all necessary in order to justify the
>adoption of standards of worth or rules concerning social practices.
I might disagree. It depends on how you mean justify. You cannot justify it
through reason, I am pretty sure. I don't know what other sort of valid
justification there is.
>In my
>own perspective, such standards and rules can only be justified by the
>necessities of our existence as social beings in an organized social order.
But you are implicitly assuming that our existance as social beings in an
organized social order is good. Where did that come from and how do you justify
it? Reason alone can't tell you that.
>To put my point more abruptly: yammer about "moral facts" is irrelevant to
>any genuine discussion of the point or usefulness of moral judment or of the
>application of standards of worth.
But these standards of worth have no reasonable justification, do they? See my
point above. They are simply whims likely influenced by our biology.
>Moral rules and standards of worth are not established by appeal to certain
>"moral facts"; they are established (if at all) by reflection on the human
>necessities of our nature as social beings.
And our necessities out to be met why? Our nature is good why?
-User
Peter H.M. Brooks
user...@aol.com (User 1DE7) wrote:
>
>
> Ok. I guess I got a skewed view of how popular moral realism was from
spending
> time on the objectivism forum where most everyone is a moral realist.
>
moral realism, then count yourself lucky!
>
> >Moral rules and standards of worth are not established by appeal to
certain
> >"moral facts"; they are established (if at all) by reflection on the
human
> >necessities of our nature as social beings.
>
> And our necessities out to be met why? Our nature is good why?
>
it is the reverse, if we were angels (forgetting lucifer), then, as
moral automata, we wouldn't need any moral rules or standards. It is
because we are not good that we need them.
If we wish to coninue as living social beings, then we need to meet the
standards. If we don't wish to, then we don't need to.
--
Peter H.M. Brooks
Beethoven was an innovator of form, Mozart an innovator of substance.
Bill Snyder
> >Subject: Re: Killing and letting die....
Snyder said:
> >Moral rules and standards of worth are not "facts" in ANY sense;
> >nor can they be justified by generalization from any facts. I thought
that
> >that had been established early in the 20th century (if not much
earlier -
> >say Hume or even Democritus).
>
User said:
> Right, they cannot be justified by descriptive facts. Only by "moral
facts"
> which I was saying don't exist.
>
> >Nor are such mythical entities at all necessary in order to justify the
> >adoption of standards of worth or rules concerning social practices.
>
> I might disagree. It depends on how you mean justify. You cannot justify
it
> through reason, I am pretty sure. I don't know what other sort of valid
> justification there is.
>
If you mean reason alone in its purity, such a thing does not exist. Reason
always needs substance to work on. We can exercise reasoned judgment with
respect to our existence as social beings, and, perhaps, arrive at some
legitimate conclusions about whether standards of conduct are necessary for
social life. Reason is merely a tool which intelligent people employ to
make sound judgments (among other uses).
> >In my
> >own perspective, such standards and rules can only be justified by the
> >necessities of our existence as social beings in an organized social
order.
>
> But you are implicitly assuming that our existance as social beings in an
> organized social order is good. Where did that come from and how do you
justify
> it? Reason alone can't tell you that.
>
I am making no such assumption. It just is; it is a "fact"; and one which
cannot be avoided. Of course, an adult can choose to try to withdraw from
any and all social organization and live in isolation from all human
contact. But for most human beings that is not a possibility which would
even be considered. So, we can attempt to exercise reasoned judgment with
respect to two questions: (1) what are the necessary standards of worth and
rules concerning conduct which enable this particular social order to
function effectively; and (2) what are the necessary standards of worth and
rules concerning conduct which would be required by any social order.
> >To put my point more abruptly: yammer about "moral facts" is irrelevant
to
> >any genuine discussion of the point or usefulness of moral judment or of
the
> >application of standards of worth.
>
> But these standards of worth have no reasonable justification, do they?
See my
> point above. They are simply whims likely influenced by our biology.
>
>
> >Moral rules and standards of worth are not established by appeal to
certain
> >"moral facts"; they are established (if at all) by reflection on the
human
> >necessities of our nature as social beings.
>
> And our necessities out to be met why? Our nature is good why?
>
If our necessities are not met, we cease to exist. Who said that our nature
is good? In my view, neither term, 'good' or 'bad', has any legitimate
application to human nature. Human nature is just what it is. An
individual human being can, I suppose, renounce its own nature as a human
being and try to live as a different kind of being. I would consider that
to be a rather whimsical approach to life. But I certainly do not consider
it a whim to accept ourselves for what we are and to ground our standards of
worth and rules of conduct on what is necessary to be what we are. Of
course, there will always be those who defy such standards; and, probably,
each of us, at times, will violate them. But that is why the rest of us for
mutual protection need to have some sort of center of power which imposes
order on those who choose to violate it. For myself, I prefer a center of
power which does as little imposing of order as is possible and still
maintain a social situation conducive to the healthy functioning of the
members of the social order. But that last judgment (not a grasp of a
"moral fact") takes off on a rather different issue from the one which you
have raised.
Bill Snyder
User 1DE7
>Date: 7/4/00 3:47 AM Central Daylight Time
>Message-id: <8js8bl$1r8$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>
>
>> Ok. I guess I got a skewed view of how popular moral realism was from
>spending
>> time on the objectivism forum where most everyone is a moral realist.
>>
>If all you got from spending time there was a skewed view of popular
>moral realism, then count yourself lucky!
I also got/get to observe lots of rationalization and evasion first-hand. It is
not really from the objectivists that I learned about moral realism though.
There are lots of non-objectivist who spend time there as well, and it seems as
though almost all of the smartest and/or most rational ones are intuitionalists
in the Rossian sense, for some reason.
>> >Moral rules and standards of worth are not established by appeal to
>certain
>> >"moral facts"; they are established (if at all) by reflection on the
>human
>> >necessities of our nature as social beings.
>>
>> And our necessities out to be met why? Our nature is good why?
>>
>There is no suggestion that our nature is, or needs to be good. In fact
>it is the reverse, if we were angels (forgetting lucifer), then, as
>moral automata, we wouldn't need any moral rules or standards. It is
>because we are not good that we need them.
Ok, it seemed as though the previous poster was saying that it was broadly in
our nature to be social being, thus we *ought* to be social. Even if you think
our nature is bad though, you don't escape the problem. Our nature does not
imply any sort of morality, whether you think it is good or bad.
>If we wish to coninue as living social beings, then we need to meet the
>standards. If we don't wish to, then we don't need to.
But aren't you assuming, if you are talking about moral standards, that "we
ought to get what we wish." Just because we wish to live in peace and harmony,
for example, does not mean that things that help achieve that end are moral
unless we just redefine morality to mean "furthering the goal of peace and
harmony."
Maybe we have to meet certain standards in order to live as social beings, but
how does this make those standards moral?
I take moral to mean "X is moral if you ought to do X."
-User
User 1DE7
>Date: 7/4/00 11:29 AM Central Daylight Time
>Message-id: <8jt3d...@enews4.newsguy.com>
>
>> >Nor are such mythical entities at all necessary in order to justify the
>> >adoption of standards of worth or rules concerning social practices.
>>
>> I might disagree. It depends on how you mean justify. You cannot justify
>it
>> through reason, I am pretty sure. I don't know what other sort of valid
>> justification there is.
>>
>If you mean reason alone in its purity, such a thing does not exist. Reason
>always needs substance to work on.
Right.
>We can exercise reasoned judgment with
>respect to our existence as social beings, and, perhaps, arrive at some
>legitimate conclusions about whether standards of conduct are necessary for
>social life.
But these could not be considered moral unless you simply define morality as
whatever satifies these standards. You can use reason to determine "The best
way to further our existance as social beings is X", but this is not a moral
claim.
>> >In my
>> >own perspective, such standards and rules can only be justified by the
>> >necessities of our existence as social beings in an organized social
>order.
>>
>> But you are implicitly assuming that our existance as social beings in an
>> organized social order is good. Where did that come from and how do you
>justify
>> it? Reason alone can't tell you that.
>>
>I am making no such assumption. It just is; it is a "fact"
What is a fact? That our existance as social beings is good? Or just that fact
that we do tend to exist that way? If the former, you sound like a moral
realist now, but I am pretty sure you meant the later. If you did mean the
later, then that fact has no moral import whatsoever.
"Humans tend to exist as social beings."
"John tends to molest children."
If you say we should just consider the first one good because it is what we do,
then by similar reasoning you could consider the second one good. I know you
know of Hume's law and whatnot, but you still seem to be sort of trying to go
from "X is the case" to "X is good."
>Of course, an adult can choose to try to withdraw from
>any and all social organization and live in isolation from all human
>contact. But for most human beings that is not a possibility which would
>even be considered.
But what does this have to do with morality? You seem to just be talking about
the whims of biological organisms.
>So, we can attempt to exercise reasoned judgment with
>respect to two questions: (1) what are the necessary standards of worth and
>rules concerning conduct which enable this particular social order to
>function effectively;
What does this have to do with morality..?
>and (2) what are the necessary standards of worth and
>rules concerning conduct which would be required by any social order.
Same comment.
>> >Moral rules and standards of worth are not established by appeal to
>certain
>> >"moral facts"; they are established (if at all) by reflection on the
>human
>> >necessities of our nature as social beings.
>>
>> And our necessities out to be met why? Our nature is good why?
>>
>If our necessities are not met, we cease to exist.
So? Where is the morality there? How can one say it is either good or bad if we
cease to exist? We simply have a biological drive to want to exist, which has
no moral import.
>Who said that our nature
>is good? In my view, neither term, 'good' or 'bad', has any legitimate
>application to human nature. Human nature is just what it is.
But you seemed to want to establish moral rules by an appeal to our nature as
social beings.
>An
>individual human being can, I suppose, renounce its own nature as a human
>being and try to live as a different kind of being. I would consider that
>to be a rather whimsical approach to life. But I certainly do not consider
>it a whim to accept ourselves for what we are and to ground our standards of
>worth and rules of conduct on what is necessary to be what we are.
Well, I won't argue with you about whether it technicaly constitutes a whim or
not, but surely you see that it does not imply any sort of *ought.* I don't see
how you think oughts are justified by what we need to do in order to survive as
social beings, unless you want to redefine "ought."
Just for the record, I am using moral to mean something like "X is moral if you
Bill Snyder
> >Of course, an adult can choose to try to withdraw from
> >any and all social organization and live in isolation from all human
> >contact. But for most human beings that is not a possibility which would
> >even be considered.
>
> But what does this have to do with morality? You seem to just be talking
about
> the whims of biological organisms.
>
> >So, we can attempt to exercise reasoned judgment with
> >respect to two questions: (1) what are the necessary standards of worth
and
> >rules concerning conduct which enable this particular social order to
> >function effectively;
>
> What does this have to do with morality..?
>
> >and (2) what are the necessary standards of worth and
> >rules concerning conduct which would be required by any social order.
>
> Same comment.
>
or some sort of absolute "ought" which commands us (two ways of saying the
same thing). But there are no absolute "oughts". I guess that means, for
you, that there is no morality. But, I would mean by morality simply that
which reasoned judgment points to as what is to be done. Morality is
nothing apart from our existence as social beings; it would have no meaning
for a human being living totally in isolation.
> >> >Moral rules and standards of worth are not established by appeal to
> >certain
> >> >"moral facts"; they are established (if at all) by reflection on the
> >human
> >> >necessities of our nature as social beings.
> >>
> >> And our necessities out to be met why? Our nature is good why?
> >>
> >If our necessities are not met, we cease to exist.
>
> So? Where is the morality there? How can one say it is either good or bad
if we
> cease to exist? We simply have a biological drive to want to exist, which
has
> no moral import.
Why can't morality be grounded, in part, in self-interest. OK, the fact
that I have a "drive" (whatever that means) to maintain myself in existence,
does not make that drive a good (or bad) thing. But given that drive then
it makes sense to say that I ought to behave in certain ways in order to
effectively achieve that end. Why seek to achieve the end? Simply because
it is part of what I am as the human being which I am. There is no "ought"
there. But, if you will the end, you also will the means. It makes sense
to say that I "ought" to act in ways which enable my nature and "ought" to
avoid ways which violate that nature. You may not regard that as a moral
"ought"; I do.
>
> >Who said that our nature
> >is good? In my view, neither term, 'good' or 'bad', has any legitimate
> >application to human nature. Human nature is just what it is.
>
> But you seemed to want to establish moral rules by an appeal to our nature
as
> social beings.
>
There is no other way to do it, other than an appeal to some absolute source
of a command (a god, for example). Granted such rules would then have no
absolute authority, only contingent authority. But I think that atheists,
like myself, are stuck with that. If there is no Unconditioned, then there
is no unconditional basis for anything to be found. If there is no god,
then all things are possible; BUT that does not mean that a resonable person
will not sort out the possibilities and select among them. There are only
contingent "oughts".
> >An
> >individual human being can, I suppose, renounce its own nature as a human
> >being and try to live as a different kind of being. I would consider
that
> >to be a rather whimsical approach to life. But I certainly do not
consider
> >it a whim to accept ourselves for what we are and to ground our standards
of
> >worth and rules of conduct on what is necessary to be what we are.
>
> Well, I won't argue with you about whether it technicaly constitutes a
whim or
> not, but surely you see that it does not imply any sort of *ought.* I
don't see
> how you think oughts are justified by what we need to do in order to
survive as
> social beings, unless you want to redefine "ought."
>
> Just for the record, I am using moral to mean something like "X is moral
if you
> ought to do X."
>
Well, I think that one ought to act in ways which enhance and develop one's
powers as a human being, in the contingent sense that failure to do so makes
one into a fool. Again, we come back to my remark above. You apparently
use the word "morality" to refer to some kind of absolute or "holy"
commands. I do not believe that there are any such things. But I do
believe that there are things which we ought to do and other things which we
ought not to do, and that if we exercise reasoned judgment it is not all
that difficult to tell the one sort from the other.
Bill Snyder
CPK Smithies
> >our moral psychology might be conditioned by the structure of our brains
is,
> >I should have thought, rather a difficult thing to argue for.
>
> Hm, it seems obvious to me.
I don't think that helps the argument.
> >If our brains
> >were structured differently in such-and-such respects, what difference
would
> >it make?
>
> Moraly speaking, if we had evolved into loner predators, instead of social
> beings, we would probably not feel immoral about killing and eating
eachother.
This is terribly speculative.
> >How would it affect our mathematical or logical intuitions?
>
> Our mathamatical or ethical intuitions might simply be wrong. Suppose we
cannot
> grasp the fact that a=a, or that 1+1 = 2. Maybe we think 1 + 1 = 5, so
that we
> spend all of our time grouping food into pairs of 1 unit, and expecting
our
> total units of food to be 5, and that we can survive forever like this. A
> consequence of this might be that we would die and fail to pass on our
genes.
I don't know what it would mean to think that 1+1=5. I don't even know what
it would mean to say that an intuition was "wrong". What do you mean by
"intuition" and "wrong"? I'm not just being awkward now. Think about
Descartes's cogito argument.
CPK Smithies
> process of certain physical thing behaving in certain ways (arms, balls,
etc).
So processes are not real? (There are those who hold that things aren't
real, only processes.)
> >I might want to
> >say "the same computer program is running on computers all over the
world".
> >If physical instantiation is your starting-point for reality, haven't you
> >got an awful lot of work to do to give an account of what I'm saying?
>
> Nope, see above. Another thing is your use of the word "same." There are
lots
> of ways in which that word can be used. There are simply lots of instances
of
> programs, represented as data, that all have the same or similar
representation
> (they were copied from the same source).
When you say "same...representation", how are you using "same" differently
from I?
> >Nobody is trying to assimilate moral intuition to physical reality,
> >remember.
>
> That seems to be what a moral realist has to do. You cannot derive an
ought
> from physical facts, so if you want your oughts to be real, and correspond
to
> reality, there must be some moral facts out there to derive them from, no?
I don't agree at all that a moral realist has to assert that because (e.g.)
genocide is "really wrong", there is some "object out there" corresponding
to that truth. It is like saying that an argument really isn't logical, or a
mathematical proof is really flawed. It simply doesn't follow that we have
to be able to hold up a lump of stuff and say "that's what I was talking
about".
Peter H.M. Brooks
user...@aol.com (User 1DE7) wrote:
>
> >If all you got from spending time there was a skewed view of popular
> >moral realism, then count yourself lucky!
>
> I also got/get to observe lots of rationalization and evasion
first-hand.
>
of observation of this nature! I have found it in tons of newsgroups.
>
> >> And our necessities out to be met why? Our nature is good why?
> >>
fact
> >it is the reverse, if we were angels (forgetting lucifer), then, as
> >moral automata, we wouldn't need any moral rules or standards. It is
> >because we are not good that we need them.
>
> Ok, it seemed as though the previous poster was saying that it was
broadly in
> our nature to be social being, thus we *ought* to be social. Even if
you think
> our nature is bad though, you don't escape the problem. Our nature
> imply any sort of morality, whether you think it is good or bad.
>
be having this discussion.
If you look at it from a strictly evolutionary perspective, then a
creature that is going to survive and produce grandchildren is going to
use a strategy that results in this. There are a number of strategies
and they depend on the structure of the society. If the society is
trustworthy and non-violent, then a psychopathic strategy works very
well. If the society is 99% psychopath, then it doesn't work so well. As
has been established in simulations, a tit for tat strategy is the most
effective; I will trust and be nice to you until you do something nasty
to me, then I will also be nasty - until you do something nice. This
boils down to the moral code 'do as you would be done by'.
>
> >If we wish to coninue as living social beings, then we need to meet
the
> >standards. If we don't wish to, then we don't need to.
>
> But aren't you assuming, if you are talking about moral standards,
that "we
> ought to get what we wish." Just because we wish to live in peace and
harmony,
> for example, does not mean that things that help achieve that end are
moral
> unless we just redefine morality to mean "furthering the goal of peace
and
> harmony."
>
No, that isn't my assumption. If you want, you can live as a hermit,
there is no ought or anything else about it, it is just an observation.
If you wish not to be a hermit, and you wish to be treated in a way that
is conducive to living long and comfortably (common goals in living
things), then you need to 'fit in' - in other words, understand and
apply, or appear to apply at least, the conventions.
>
> Maybe we have to meet certain standards in order to live as social
beings, but
> how does this make those standards moral?
>
> I take moral to mean "X is moral if you ought to do X."
>
That doesn't make sense. It may be moral to breastfeed your children,
but, as a man, there is nobody saying that I ought to do this.
User 1DE7
>Message-id: <8jtid...@enews4.newsguy.com>
>Apparently, you regard morality as some sort of semi-religious mumbo-jumbo
>or some sort of absolute "ought" which commands us (two ways of saying the
>same thing).
Well, for us to objectively *ought* to do something, that is what you need.
Either it can come from some omnipotent god, which I don't find too reasonable,
or rightness and wrongness can be an objective property of actions. It doesn't
have to "command" you. The fact that your action is wrong doesn't exert some
physical force and hinder you because it is wrong. It is just allegedly
objective wrong, if you want morals to be real.
>But there are no absolute "oughts". I guess that means, for
>you, that there is no morality.
Right. No objective morality, that is. I am not sure what you mean by
"absolute" there, as there is nothing wrong with moral rules being flexible or
conditional. They just need to be real, as in part of reality.
>But, I would mean by morality simply that
>which reasoned judgment points to as what is to be done.
But reasonsed judgement alone doesn't point to anything. I think you said that
yourself earlier. Reason needs material to work with. If one goal is to achieve
human happiness, then you can use reason to try to do so. If a goal is to go
around smashing babies with mallets, then you can use reason to try to do so.
Neither of these two goals are more "reaonable" than the other. You don't use
reason to arrive at them, they are simply subjective preferences.
>> So? Where is the morality there? How can one say it is either good or bad
>if we
>> cease to exist? We simply have a biological drive to want to exist, which
>has
>> no moral import.
>
>Why can't morality be grounded, in part, in self-interest. OK, the fact
>that I have a "drive" (whatever that means) to maintain myself in existence,
>does not make that drive a good (or bad) thing. But given that drive then
>it makes sense to say that I ought to behave in certain ways in order to
>effectively achieve that end.
But it does not say that you ought to achieve that end. Morality is not just
about how most effectively to achieve your ends. If you want to define it that
way then you seem to be redefining it. If you redefine to mean something other
than what you ought to do, such as "what to do to effectively achieve your
goal" then the question becomes "Why ought you to achieve your goal?"
You seem to be saying "Ok, there is no objective ought, but, let us just assume
that since we really really really want to live, that we ought to further our
life, and then procede from there."
It sounds sort of objectivist-ish.
>Why seek to achieve the end? Simply because
>it is part of what I am as the human being which I am. There is no "ought"
>there.
Right, there is certainly no ought.
>But, if you will the end, you also will the means. It makes sense
>to say that I "ought" to act in ways which enable my nature and "ought" to
>avoid ways which violate that nature.
Ought to do that in order to what? You aren't talking about a moral ought here,
because to do that you'd need to show that your nature was good. You can't
simply redefine "X ought to do Y" to mean "Y is in X's nature", or else we'd
just come up with a new term for the real definition of ought and you'd face
the same problem.
>You may not regard that as a moral
>"ought"; I do.
In what sense ought you to act in your nature? Where does that ought come from?
What does it mean and why is it a valid reason to compell someone to do
something? And why would you think it is moral? What exactly do you mean when
you say "moral" if it is something other than what one ought to do?
>> But you seemed to want to establish moral rules by an appeal to our nature
>as
>> social beings.
>>
>There is no other way to do it, other than an appeal to some absolute source
>of a command (a god, for example). Granted such rules would then have no
>absolute authority, only contingent authority.
Physical facts could have what you are calling "contingent authority", no? Yet
there is no god, so how is that? Lots of moral intuitionalists view moral facts
as having the same status as physical facts in that sense.
>If there is no god,
>then all things are possible; BUT that does not mean that a resonable person
>will not sort out the possibilities and select among them.
In what sense is aiming to respect others rights and such more reasonable than
aiming to kill others?
>> Just for the record, I am using moral to mean something like "X is moral
>if you
>> ought to do X."
>>
>Well, I think that one ought to act in ways which enhance and develop one's
>powers as a human being, in the contingent sense that failure to do so makes
>one into a fool.
What do you mean by "fool"? Surely it does not make someone stupid. If B
decides to go on a murderous rampage, he will still be as smart as ever. And it
is not like only stupid people fail to "act in ways which enhance and develop
one's powers.." Many serial-killers are quite smart. Hitler was smart. Lots of
dictators and people who do moraly wrong things are smart, so hopefuly you
don't mean fool in that sense.
What it seems like you mean is just a generic form of disaproval. As in "X is a
fool" = "boo for X."
>Again, we come back to my remark above. You apparently
>use the word "morality" to refer to some kind of absolute or "holy"
>commands.
They neither have to be absolute or holy, they just have to be real and
objective. And for something to be immoral needs to mean that you ought not to
do X. That is my criteria for objective morality.
>But I do
>believe that there are things which we ought to do and other things which we
>ought not to do, and that if we exercise reasoned judgment it is not all
>that difficult to tell the one sort from the other
So hopefuly you'll be able to tell me how it is more reasonable for me to
respect others rights tomorrow than it would be to go on a murderous rampage.
-User
User 1DE7
>Date: 7/4/00 10:06 PM Central Daylight Time
>Message-id: <8ju8mq$102$1...@gxsn.com>
>> >I quite take your point about Darwinian ethics; although the thought that
>> >our moral psychology might be conditioned by the structure of our brains
>is,
>> >I should have thought, rather a difficult thing to argue for.
>>
>> Hm, it seems obvious to me.
>
>I don't think that helps the argument.
Right, just general commentary.
>
>> >If our brains
>> >were structured differently in such-and-such respects, what difference
>would
>> >it make?
>>
>> Moraly speaking, if we had evolved into loner predators, instead of social
>> beings, we would probably not feel immoral about killing and eating
>eachother.
>
>This is terribly speculative.
It is speculative, but it is a very reasonable conclusion if you hold that our
moral sense is a product of our evolution. We have our current moral sense
because cooperating and living as social creatures and not being violent with
eachother benefitted those of our ancestors who survived to pass on their
genes, and their moral sense, to us.
Now suppose early humans had to survive by eating eachother. Those humans who
felt hesitant about killing other humans and eating them likely would not have
survived as well as those who enjoyed it and gave it a 100% effort, so the ones
who didn't mind it would be selected for over time.
>> >How would it affect our mathematical or logical intuitions?
>>
>> Our mathamatical or ethical intuitions might simply be wrong. Suppose we
>cannot
>> grasp the fact that a=a, or that 1+1 = 2. Maybe we think 1 + 1 = 5, so
>that we
>> spend all of our time grouping food into pairs of 1 unit, and expecting
>our
>> total units of food to be 5, and that we can survive forever like this. A
>> consequence of this might be that we would die and fail to pass on our
>genes.
>
>I don't know what it would mean to think that 1+1=5.
I can immagine it. Immagine walking alone with a sack picking berries and
putting one in, then another, and then looking in your sack and being confused
that there are only two berries there.
Now, surely having 5 berries after putting 2 in doesn't model how the world
works, so it seems horribly illogical to us, and it is sort of weird to think
about it, but that is because as humans we evolved to be able to understand
simple math concepts quite naturaly.
>I don't even know what
>it would mean to say that an intuition was "wrong". What do you mean by
>"intuition" and "wrong"? I'm not just being awkward now. Think about
>Descartes's cogito argument.
Never heard descartes' cogito argument. Well, I was referring to mathatical and
logical intuitions. It may not be best to call them intuitions. Maybe "ideas"
or something. Anyway, a logical idea would be wrong, for instance, if you
thought that B implies C also meant that C implies B. Hopefuly this wrong idea,
or "intuition", is not as outlandish to you as the 1+1=5 one, and you can
actualy immagine it being held.
-User
User 1DE7
>Message-id: <8ju924$npk$1...@gxsn.com>
>> A throw is not an object existing in reality. It is just what we call the
>> process of certain physical thing behaving in certain ways (arms, balls,
>etc).
>
>So processes are not real? (There are those who hold that things aren't
>real, only processes.)
>
Sure processes are real, but only specific instances of them have existance.
There is no abstract platonic form for a throw. When an arm moves a certain way
while holding a ball, propelling the ball off somewhere, it is an instance of
real throw. However, this throw was not an instance of some platonic form for
throws.
>> >I might want to
>> >say "the same computer program is running on computers all over the
>world".
>> >If physical instantiation is your starting-point for reality, haven't you
>> >got an awful lot of work to do to give an account of what I'm saying?
>>
>> Nope, see above. Another thing is your use of the word "same." There are
>lots
>> of ways in which that word can be used. There are simply lots of instances
>of
>> programs, represented as data, that all have the same or similar
>representation
>> (they were copied from the same source).
>
>When you say "same...representation", how are you using "same" differently
>from I?
Two uses of same: Immagine that we both have a copy of a Jose Canseco baseball
card. Suppose the picture on them is the same and they are from the same year
and were printed by the same machine at the same company, and look more or less
identical. That is the sense of sameness that I am referring to.
If someone says to me "Do you have the same card as CPK?" Then I'd say yes if I
was using same in that sense. Or, we could mean same to mean that a thing can
only be the same as itsself, and not the same as anthing else. In that sense I
have a different card than you, cause it literaly is not the same card.
Now when some people talk about programs or processes or whatever, sometimes
they think that they are the same abstract form for the process, in the later
sense in which I used same. That is the sort of same that I thought you were
referring to, but maybe you weren't.
I was using same in the first sense.
>> That seems to be what a moral realist has to do. You cannot derive an
>ought
>> from physical facts, so if you want your oughts to be real, and correspond
>to
>> reality, there must be some moral facts out there to derive them from, no?
>
>I don't agree at all that a moral realist has to assert that because (e.g.)
>genocide is "really wrong", there is some "object out there" corresponding
>to that truth.
No one is saying there is an object out there. No one is saying moral facts are
physical. I am saying there needs to be an objective property of a situation,
likely non-physical, that could be "rightness" or "wrongness" or "goodness",
etc.
> It is like saying that an argument really isn't logical, or a
>mathematical proof is really flawed.
I don't think this is a good analogy, amybe you could elaborate more.
>It simply doesn't follow that we have
>to be able to hold up a lump of stuff and say "that's what I was talking
>about".
Right, no one is claiming that we have to find anything of the sort. Here is
what does follow, if morality is objective:
There has to be a real objective property of actions/situations/choices that is
a moral property.
For X to be immoral has to mean in some sense that you ought not to do X.
Barring that, it doesn't seem like you can escape moral
skepticism/subjectivism.
-User
User 1DE7
>Message-id: <8jul1j$l5c$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>
>
>If you look at it from a strictly evolutionary perspective, then a
>creature that is going to survive and produce grandchildren is going to
>use a strategy that results in this. There are a number of strategies
>and they depend on the structure of the society. If the society is
>trustworthy and non-violent, then a psychopathic strategy works very
>well. If the society is 99% psychopath, then it doesn't work so well. As
>has been established in simulations, a tit for tat strategy is the most
>effective;
But this has nothing to do with *ought*. Because a behavior furthers the
evolution of some species does not mean that the behavior *ought* to be done.
>I will trust and be nice to you until you do something nasty
>to me, then I will also be nasty - until you do something nice. This
>boils down to the moral code 'do as you would be done by'.
Right, maybe you could justify it as a moral code, instead of justifying it
simply as a strategy for benefitting yourself.
>> But aren't you assuming, if you are talking about moral standards,
>that "we
>> ought to get what we wish." Just because we wish to live in peace and
>harmony,
>> for example, does not mean that things that help achieve that end are
>moral
>> unless we just redefine morality to mean "furthering the goal of peace
>and
>> harmony."
>>
>No, that isn't my assumption. If you want, you can live as a hermit,
>there is no ought or anything else about it, it is just an observation.
>If you wish not to be a hermit, and you wish to be treated in a way that
>is conducive to living long and comfortably (common goals in living
>things), then you need to 'fit in' - in other words, understand and
>apply, or appear to apply at least, the conventions.
But what you are saying has nothing to do with ought. "If you want to do Y,
then you ought to do X", does not imply that you ought to do X unless we assume
that you ought to do what you want. Your above desciption is completely devoid
of any oughts, and hence of morality. It simply describes what actions are
nessesary for a certain result.
>> Maybe we have to meet certain standards in order to live as social
>beings, but
>> how does this make those standards moral?
>>
>> I take moral to mean "X is moral if you ought to do X."
>>
>That doesn't make sense. It may be moral to breastfeed your children,
>but, as a man, there is nobody saying that I ought to do this.
Yes, it makes sense, you just weren't very generous in your interpretation. To
rephrase "Your doing X is moral if you ought to do X."
Now, it is not true that you ought to breastfeed, because that is impossible
for you, or at least impossible for the baby to get any nutrience from it
provided you don't have nutritional buildup on your nipples. You can't say that
someone ought to do the impossible, it does not make sense. Even if it were
possible, and you did give milk, it still might not be true that you ought to
breastfeed just because some other people ought to breastfeed. Suppose you
didn't have a child, and there were no children in need of people to breastfeed
them.
Ask yourself "ought I, personaly, to do this?" If so, then it is moral.
Ought you personaly to breastfeed? No. It makes perfect sense.
-User
Peter H.M. Brooks
user...@aol.com (User 1DE7) wrote:
>
> >If you look at it from a strictly evolutionary perspective, then a
> >creature that is going to survive and produce grandchildren is going
to
> >use a strategy that results in this. There are a number of strategies
> >and they depend on the structure of the society. If the society is
> >trustworthy and non-violent, then a psychopathic strategy works very
> >well. If the society is 99% psychopath, then it doesn't work so well.
As
> >has been established in simulations, a tit for tat strategy is the
most
> >effective;
>
> But this has nothing to do with *ought*. Because a behavior furthers
the
> evolution of some species does not mean that the behavior *ought* to
be done.
>
that would be making the mistake of considering it to be the objective
of the individual, the dreaded group selection.
What I have argued is that there is an evolutionary planted impulse in
all creatures to reproduce, so they are generally happy, satisfied or
however you wish to describe it, when they succeed in so doing. So, in
order to achieve this utilitarian end, the strategy I mention above,
ought to be followed.
>
> >I will trust and be nice to you until you do something nasty
> >to me, then I will also be nasty - until you do something nice. This
> >boils down to the moral code 'do as you would be done by'.
>
> Right, maybe you could justify it as a moral code, instead of
justifying it
> simply as a strategy for benefitting yourself.
>
I wasn't suggesting it as a benefit for me, simply as a generally
applicable strategy that is behind moral codes - the utiliarian aim of
the greatest good to the greatest number, notwithstanding the various
problems that can lead one into, it is a pragmatic yardstick.
> >No, that isn't my assumption. If you want, you can live as a hermit,
> >there is no ought or anything else about it, it is just an
observation.
> >If you wish not to be a hermit, and you wish to be treated in a way
that
> >is conducive to living long and comfortably (common goals in living
> >things), then you need to 'fit in' - in other words, understand and
> >apply, or appear to apply at least, the conventions.
>
> But what you are saying has nothing to do with ought. "If you want to
do Y,
> then you ought to do X", does not imply that you ought to do X unless
we assume
> that you ought to do what you want. Your above desciption is
completely devoid
> of any oughts, and hence of morality. It simply describes what actions
are
> nessesary for a certain result.
>
Not quite. The result holds whatever individual follows it - even though
each individual follows it for his own selfish ends. So it is a workable
moral code that benefits the society that consists of individuals that
follow it. So, if you wish to have a coherent society (or if an existing
coherent society wishes to remain so) then it ought to encourage its
members to believe that they ought to follow the code.
>
> >> Maybe we have to meet certain standards in order to live as social
> >beings, but
> >> how does this make those standards moral?
> >>
> >> I take moral to mean "X is moral if you ought to do X."
> >>
> >That doesn't make sense. It may be moral to breastfeed your children,
> >but, as a man, there is nobody saying that I ought to do this.
>
> Yes, it makes sense, you just weren't very generous in your
interpretation. To
> rephrase "Your doing X is moral if you ought to do X."
>
> Now, it is not true that you ought to breastfeed, because that is
impossible
> for you, or at least impossible for the baby to get any nutrience from
it
> provided you don't have nutritional buildup on your nipples.
>
I think all you need is oestrogen suppliments, actually.
>
>You can't
say that
> someone ought to do the impossible, it does not make sense. Even if it
were
> possible, and you did give milk, it still might not be true that you
ought to
> breastfeed just because some other people ought to breastfeed. Suppose
you
> didn't have a child, and there were no children in need of people to
breastfeed
> them.
>
> Ask yourself "ought I, personaly, to do this?" If so, then it is
moral.
>
> Ought you personaly to breastfeed? No. It makes perfect sense.
>
I do understand your fixation on the word 'ought'. You wish to have an
external authority to which you can appeal. In fact, if we are well
brought up in a stable society, then this authority is internalised as
ones conscience. So, if you do what you wish, constrained only by your
conscience, then you will be doing what you ought to do as a moral
member of the society in which you were brought up.
Bill Snyder
> >Subject: Re: Killing and letting die....
> So hopefuly you'll be able to tell me how it is more reasonable for me to
> respect others rights tomorrow than it would be to go on a murderous
rampage.
>
I forego comment or earlier material, since we have both been merely
repeating ourselves for the last few posts and comment on the above. If I
choose to act in ways that prevent me from relating to my fellow human
beings in ways which are mutually advantageous, I am choosing a form of
self-destruction. There might be some (few) human beings for whom that
choice is reasonable (e.g., the person who does not have the guts to commit
suicide, and so acts in ways to get others to kill her or him). For most of
us though it is a quite unreasonable choice, since we do not will the end of
self-destruction or of living in a chaotic world. For most of us then, to
adopt practices which lead to conflict, mutual disadvantage, and mutual
destruction is quite unreasonable.
It is also quite reasonable for those of us who wish to live in a balanced,
safe, relatively peaceful world to take concerted action to prevent those
whose ends are in conflict with that from achieving those ends, and, so, to
impose our will on them or to exclude them from participation in our world.
Now, I am NOT assuming that our ends are GOOD; they are simply the ends
which we pursue. As Aristotle pointed our some millennia ago, we deliberate
about means not about ends. When we appear to deliberate about ends, it is
because some ends are means to further ends. But it makes no sense to raise
the question of whether a "final" end of human action (if there is one) is
good or bad. It just is (if it is). (So on that point I disagree with
Aristotle; it really makes no sense to call "eudemonia" GOOD; if it is what
all human beings seek, then that is just what it is).
Let me be plain, in the sense in which you use the word 'moral', there is no
moral ought. It is a silly idea, which serious philosophical inquirers
have left behind. I fully agree with Nietzsche's treatment of morality in
that sense (in Beyond Good and Evil and The Genealogy of Morals). So,
having left that crap behind, I no longer have any need for unconditional
(which is what I mean by absolute) imperatives; I am quite content with my
conditional and conditioned existence and with the necessities which grow
out of it. Morality in the sense which you appear to mean is fundamentally
a remnant of religious mythology (with its unconditional commands of a god
or gods). For me, reasoning and thought are tools or instruments which we
humans can employ for shaping our lives both individually and socially; they
have no unconditional value. In fact, I would go so far as to claim that
terms like "unconditioned good", "good for its own sake", "unconditional
ought" (your moral ought) and the rest of the apparatus of absolutism are
meaningless terms, not just empty ones. They all rest on the false
assumption that there is something to be found, either within or outside of
the forms of experience, which is unconditioned. Remove that assumption and
your "objective" morality collapses into emptiness.
But why do we need that kind of silliness in order to use reasoned judgment
as a tool which enables us to live our lives more fully and completely? And
what else can a finite, fallible creature like a human being do?
Bill Snyder
User 1DE7
>Date: 7/6/00 3:59 PM Central Daylight Time
>Message-id: <8k2s0...@enews4.newsguy.com>
>> So hopefuly you'll be able to tell me how it is more reasonable for me to
>> respect others rights tomorrow than it would be to go on a murderous
>rampage.
>>
>I forego comment or earlier material, since we have both been merely
>repeating ourselves for the last few posts and comment on the above.
Sounds good.
> If I
>choose to act in ways that prevent me from relating to my fellow human
>beings in ways which are mutually advantageous, I am choosing a form of
>self-destruction.
Yes you are. Just for the record, at each point in which I break in, I will let
it be known if anything you have said implies an ought. Thus far you have
commented on how actions of type X are self-desctructive. Still no oughts
implied.
>There might be some (few) human beings for whom that
>choice is reasonable
I will take reasonable here to mean "A reasonable way to achieve your ends",
still without any ought.
>(e.g., the person who does not have the guts to commit
>suicide, and so acts in ways to get others to kill her or him).
Or a mobster who robs and kills because it is fun and gives them a feeling of
power that they enjoy.
>For most of
>us though it is a quite unreasonable choice, since we do not will the end of
>self-destruction or of living in a chaotic world.
An unreasonable way to further our ends, yes. Still no oughts to be found.
>For most of us then, to
>adopt practices which lead to conflict, mutual disadvantage, and mutual
>destruction is quite unreasonable.
For those of us whose goals it hinders, this is an unreasonable method of
attaining those goals. Still no oughts.
>It is also quite reasonable for those of us who wish to live in a balanced,
>safe, relatively peaceful world to take concerted action to prevent those
>whose ends are in conflict with that from achieving those ends, and, so, to
>impose our will on them or to exclude them from participation in our world.
This is a reasonable way to achieve our ends, yes. Still no oughts.
>Now, I am NOT assuming that our ends are GOOD; they are simply the ends
>which we pursue. As Aristotle pointed our some millennia ago, we deliberate
>about means not about ends. When we appear to deliberate about ends, it is
>because some ends are means to further ends. But it makes no sense to raise
>the question of whether a "final" end of human action (if there is one) is
>good or bad. It just is (if it is).
Okay, then we have no disagreement. You are not talking about oughts. You seem
to think of morality as objectivists do, somewhat like "X is good if it
furthers your ultimate goal."
Since you seem to agree that it is not reasonable to say that hitler ought not
to have killed millions, or that Joe ought not to molest children if that is
really what he wants to do, then we seem to have cleared up our
misunderstanding.
>Let me be plain, in the sense in which you use the word 'moral', there is no
> moral ought. It is a silly idea, which serious philosophical inquirers
>have left behind.
I agree it is silly, and it is also silly that anyone thinks that moral
arguments are ultimately founded in reason, or that being kind and good is any
more reasonable a goal than torturing children, since we know that oughts are
not a real property of things.
>But why do we need that kind of silliness in order to use reasoned judgment
>as a tool which enables us to live our lives more fully and completely?
We don't, just don't say that we ought to. When Joe molests a child, don't say
that he ought not to have done it in any real sense, and you'll be fine.
>And
>what else can a finite, fallible creature like a human being do?
He can realize that his "morals" simply reflect his subjective passions, and
are objectively no more right or good than those of a serial killer or
child-rapist, and hopefuly go on with his life with an appreciation of the
limits of his morality.
-User
User 1DE7
>Message-id: <8k1a0e$f6m$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>
>I haven't argued for the furtherance of the evolution of the species -
>that would be making the mistake of considering it to be the objective
>of the individual, the dreaded group selection.
>
>What I have argued is that there is an evolutionary planted impulse in
>all creatures to reproduce, so they are generally happy, satisfied or
>however you wish to describe it, when they succeed in so doing. So, in
>order to achieve this utilitarian end, the strategy I mention above,
>ought to be followed.
Right, you've argued that X is nessesary for Y. Nothing more.
>> But what you are saying has nothing to do with ought. "If you want to
>do Y,
>> then you ought to do X", does not imply that you ought to do X unless
>we assume
>> that you ought to do what you want. Your above desciption is
>completely devoid
>> of any oughts, and hence of morality. It simply describes what actions
>are
>> nessesary for a certain result.
>>
>Not quite. The result holds whatever individual follows it - even though
>each individual follows it for his own selfish ends. So it is a workable
>moral code that benefits the society that consists of individuals that
>follow it. So, if you wish to have a coherent society (or if an existing
>coherent society wishes to remain so) then it ought to encourage its
>members to believe that they ought to follow the code.
Again, your cleaim is clearly "X is nessesary for/beneficial to Y". Nothing
more.
>> Ought you personaly to breastfeed? No. It makes perfect sense.
>>
>I do understand your fixation on the word 'ought'.
Without it morality is impotent.
>You wish to have an
>external authority to which you can appeal.
Well, that would be nice, but I don't really wish for it as I know my wishes
aren't going to change the fact that morality is subjective.
>In fact, if we are well
>brought up in a stable society, then this authority is internalised as
>ones conscience. So, if you do what you wish, constrained only by your
>conscience, then you will be doing what you ought to do as a moral
>member of the society in which you were brought up.
You won't be doing what you ought to do, you'll be doing what your conscience
tells you to do. There is no reasonable argument for why you ought to follow
your conscience. If you simply meant "You'll be doing what your society's moral
standards tell you to do" then that is true, but again that doesn't help us at
all.
From your comments you are indistinguishable from a moral subjectivist/skeptic.
All evidence points that way, even if you conceal it a bit, so I don't think
further discussion is nesesary.
-User
Bill Snyder
> >Subject: Re: Killing and letting die....
judgment
> >as a tool which enables us to live our lives more fully and completely?
>
> We don't, just don't say that we ought to. When Joe molests a child, don't
say
> that he ought not to have done it in any real sense, and you'll be fine.
>
> >And
> >what else can a finite, fallible creature like a human being do?
>
> He can realize that his "morals" simply reflect his subjective passions,
and
> are objectively no more right or good than those of a serial killer or
> child-rapist, and hopefuly go on with his life with an appreciation of the
> limits of his morality.
>
unless one means that there is some sort of unconditional right and wrong
existing somewhere which we can experience and hence ground our
unconditional claims to know what each person ought unconditionally to do.
I can see no rational justification for such a claim. 'Ought' has always
had a multiplicity of uses; why should we stop using a useful word?
(2) Even if you are not claiming that we ought not to use the word, you
certainly seem to be extremely eager to convince us to stop doing so.
Perhaps that has to do with your subjective hang-up more than with anything
to do with the traditional uses of the word 'ought'. You apparently think
that the chief use of the word 'ought' is to condemn (or praise) people of
whose behavior you disapprove (or approve), and that people who do that are
claiming that the person who behaves contrary to the "ought" is somehow
objectively evil. I do not even know what that latter part means, and it
certainly is not involved in my use of the word 'ought' (whatever it means).
I suspect that you have some more significant agenda behind your quibbling
over the use of the word 'ought' and that that is rooted in your own
"subjective passions'.
(3) Several of your examples seem to be concerned with condemnation of
those who violate the laws and rules which human societies have adopted for
mutual self-protection (like your serial rapist or your child-torturer).
The issue in dealing with such people is, in my judgment, a legal issue, not
a moral one. The decision as to whether they are guilty of certain crimes
and are, hence, to be punished, is totally unrelated to some
pseudo-objective moral judgment about the state of their "souls". I realize
that there are many people who seek to import such considerations into legal
proceedings; but that has little to do with the nature of moral judgment,
and a lot to do with their befuddled minds.
(4) Finally, I do not think that it is the business of any of us to go
around judging the inner being of any other human being in any
unconditional, objective sense. That appears to be what you take morality
to be all about. That is your problem, not mine. I am too much of a
pragmatist (in the philosophical sense) to see that to be of any real value;
actually in the area of Ethics, I am really fundamentally an Aristotelian,
i.e., a pre-Christian pagan. It follows that I consider the objective,
cosmic guilt trip that was brought into philosophy by the Western religious
traditions to be little more than a silly dead-end that I long ago had done
with. I suggest that you do the same.
Bill Snyder
User 1DE7
>Message-id: <8k5i5...@enews3.newsguy.com>
>(1) You almost sound as if you are saying that one ought not to say "ought"
>unless one means that there is some sort of unconditional right and wrong
>existing somewhere which we can experience and hence ground our
>unconditional claims to know what each person ought unconditionally to do.
>I can see no rational justification for such a claim. 'Ought' has always
>had a multiplicity of uses; why should we stop using a useful word?
I think my usage is pretty standard, but there are others, and I did not mean
to say people shouldn't use the word in the other ways, just that they
shouldn't use it in the way that I mean. No one has said oughts have to be
unconditional. There is a difference between real/objective and unconditional.
If someone says "You ought to come down to the store later", it could mean
either "If you want to achieve some goal of yours, then coming down to the
store may help you achieve them", or "I want you to come down to the store
later." These two are not in the sense that I am saying ought shouldn't be
used, or at least shouldn't be literaly used.
>(2) Even if you are not claiming that we ought not to use the word, you
>certainly seem to be extremely eager to convince us to stop doing so.
Not really the word, just the idea behind it. The kind of ought I refer to must
be behind all moral statements if moral statements are supposed to be
compelling or be about what you should or should not do. If you claim that
moral statements aren't about what people should or should not do, then that is
sort of odd, but I can't make you use words in their conventional sense.
>Perhaps that has to do with your subjective hang-up more than with anything
>to do with the traditional uses of the word 'ought'. You apparently think
>that the chief use of the word 'ought' is to condemn (or praise) people of
>whose behavior you disapprove (or approve)
No, where did I say this? The chief use of ought, especialy in moral
philosophy, is to talk about how people should behave. That is how I am using
it.
>(3) Several of your examples seem to be concerned with condemnation of
>those who violate the laws and rules which human societies have adopted for
>mutual self-protection (like your serial rapist or your child-torturer).
>The issue in dealing with such people is, in my judgment, a legal issue, not
>a moral one.
While their actions were illegal, that was not the issue raised by my examples.
The issue was whether or not it could be true or reasonable to say that they
should not have done such things, that is all. Since you appearantly don't
think there is anything unreasonable about their actions, or that they
shouldn't have done them, then we don't seem to have any disagreement.
>(4) Finally, I do not think that it is the business of any of us to go
>around judging the inner being of any other human being in any
>unconditional, objective sense.
The existance or rightness or wrongness does not imply at all that we ought to
judge people.
>That appears to be what you take morality
>to be all about.
No, morality is about how people should behave. Some might say it is only how
they should behave toward eachother.
>I am too much of a
>pragmatist (in the philosophical sense) to see that to be of any real value;
>actually in the area of Ethics, I am really fundamentally an Aristotelian,
>i.e., a pre-Christian pagan. It follows that I consider the objective,
>cosmic guilt trip that was brought into philosophy by the Western religious
>traditions to be little more than a silly dead-end that I long ago had done
>with. I suggest that you do the same.
There is nothing cosmic or guilt-trip-ish inherant in objective morality.
Anyhow, that is irrelevent, since I do agree that such things are silly, and
that is what I have been saying.
What I have said is that how people "should" behave is completely arbitrary,
not able to be supported by reason, etc. Not how they -do- behave, but how they
should. Since you seem to agree, however grudgingly, then like I have said we
have no disagreement.
-User
CPK Smithies
that is
> a moral property.
Yes, but does it have to be anything other than a moral property? Can it be?
What are you asking for?
You seem to be asking for something non-moral to act as proof that something
is good/bad. But I would hold that that is a mistake. Are you trying to say
that we have to find something more "basic" than "good" or "evil"? But why
should there be anything more "basic"?
I am troubled by your use of "real, objective" and "subjective". You seem to
know what they mean. I susspect they are imprecise words with fuzzy concepts
lurking behind them.
CPK Smithies
social
> >> beings, we would probably not feel immoral about killing and eating
> >eachother.
> >
> >This is terribly speculative.
>
> It is speculative, but it is a very reasonable conclusion if you hold that
our
> moral sense is a product of our evolution.
Only reasonable because you are "concluding" on the basis of your initial
premiss, namely that our moral sense is a product of evolution. But why
should I accept that initial premiss?
> >I don't know what it would mean to think that 1+1=5.
>
> I can immagine it. Immagine walking alone with a sack picking berries and
> putting one in, then another, and then looking in your sack and being
confused
> that there are only two berries there.
I can imagine being confused. I can imagine misunderstanding "1+1=5". But I
cannot imagine, knowing what it means to say "1" and "5" and "+", that
"1+1=5". This is something different.
Bill Snyder
> >Subject: Re: Killing and letting die....
> What I have said is that how people "should" behave is completely
arbitrary,
> not able to be supported by reason, etc. Not how they -do- behave, but how
they
> should. Since you seem to agree, however grudgingly, then like I have said
we
> have no disagreement.
>
After all of that, and you claim that we agree! Absolutely not. In my
view, moral judgements and claims are grounded in the application of moral
rules. Moral rules are grounded in the social practices necessary for the
effective functioning of the social order, as are appropriate laws. The
fundamental difference between a moral rule and a law is that state coercion
(by a criminal justice system) is not justified in the case of moral rules
and is justified in the case of law. I said this at the very beginning; you
largely ignored it, but did say that no "ought" is involved. From my view
that is quite sufficient to say that one "ought" to live in accordance with
moral rules. And if one chooses not to then one also chooses the negative
consequences of that choice. I see no reason whatsoever for the claim that
no "ought" is involved. The "ought" is simply a function of our social
nature; no other justification is needed. And certainly no appeal to some
sort of imaginary "moral facts" is needed, just the application of reasoned
judgment in reflecting on what our social nature necessarily involves.
Bill Snyder
User 1DE7
>Date: 7/7/00 6:46 PM Central Daylight Time
>Message-id: <8k5q46$f2t$1...@gxsn.com>
>
>> There has to be a real objective property of actions/situations/choices
>that is
>> a moral property.
>> There has to be a real objective property of actions/situations/choices
>that is
>> a moral property.
>
>Yes, but does it have to be anything other than a moral property? Can it be?
>What are you asking for?
A moral property? When I began this discussion I asserted that reality was
purely physical, and no one objected. If you think there are objective moral
properties of things, (for intsance, that a certain action can be wrong with
the same objective certainty of physical facts) then my comments do not pertain
to you.
>You seem to be asking for something non-moral to act as proof that something
>is good/bad.
I asserted that there were no non-physical things, and those who responded
seemed to accept this. Then I just applied Hume's maxim to show that there is
no right or wrong that can be grounded in reason, or that is objective.
-User
User 1DE7
>Message-id: <8k6ufb$qrl$1...@gxsn.com>
>> It is speculative, but it is a very reasonable conclusion if you hold that
>our
>> moral sense is a product of our evolution.
>
>Only reasonable because you are "concluding" on the basis of your initial
>premiss, namely that our moral sense is a product of evolution. But why
>should I accept that initial premiss?
Because humans and everything about them are a product of their biological
evolution. When I first started this topic I asserted that there was nothing
real that was non-physical, and people seemed to accept that. If you think
there are non-physical things that are real, such as objective moral laws, then
my comments do not apply to your views.
>>
>> I can immagine it. Immagine walking alone with a sack picking berries and
>> putting one in, then another, and then looking in your sack and being
>confused
>> that there are only two berries there.
>
>I can imagine being confused. I can imagine misunderstanding "1+1=5". But I
>cannot imagine, knowing what it means to say "1" and "5" and "+", that
>"1+1=5". This is something different.
It is very difficult to immagine. Maybe I picked an example that was too far
outside of human's ability to immagine. Try this one instead. Immagine thinking
that [A implies B] implies that [B implies A]. In this case, if someone
immagined that, their logical intuitions would be wrong, and they might die if
their survival depended on recognizing their belief was false. They would then
not pass on their genes, thus evolution would be expected to select for people
who can understand math and logic concepts and reality in general, and who do
not have false beliefs about these things.
-User
User 1DE7
>Date: 7/8/00 12:15 PM Central Daylight Time
>Message-id: <8k7nl...@enews4.newsguy.com>
>> What I have said is that how people "should" behave is completely
>arbitrary,
>> not able to be supported by reason, etc. Not how they -do- behave, but how
>they
>> should. Since you seem to agree, however grudgingly, then like I have said
>we
>> have no disagreement.
>>
>After all of that, and you claim that we agree! Absolutely not.
Hm, ok. We established all of the nessesary premises for the above to be true,
yet you still maintain that you disagree. We will see if you have some good
reasons:
>In my
>view, moral judgements and claims are grounded in the application of moral
>rules.
Ok, so there needs to be some reason why moral rules should be followed, if
that "should" or "ought" is not contained in the definition of moral itsself.
We will see if you achieve this.
>Moral rules are grounded in the social practices necessary for the
>effective functioning of the social order, as are appropriate laws.
Well, this certainly doesn't solve anything. You don't seem to give a reason
why the social order should function effectively. Thus, if your other oughts
are contingent upon this ought, then your other oughts have no reasonable
foundation.
>The
>fundamental difference between a moral rule and a law is that state coercion
>(by a criminal justice system) is not justified in the case of moral rules
>and is justified in the case of law.
Right, but here you seem to be taking moral laws for granted. As we saw earlier
you still need to justify them. Maybe you justify them later in your post.
>I said this at the very beginning; you
>largely ignored it, but did say that no "ought" is involved.
Ingored it? Pointing out that no ought or should is involved is all that is
needed to dispense with what you said.
Your entire theory seems to rest on blind acceptance, without reason, of the
idea that society should function effectively.
>From my view
>that is quite sufficient to say that one "ought" to live in accordance with
>moral rules.
See, you keep asserting that you have shown some sort of ought, but you never
give an argument. I have plainly shown that up to this point, all you had said
to this point was that something that you call "moral rules" were grounded in
some arbitrary goal (effective functioning of society) which you might as well
hav ejust pulled from a hat. You certainly didn't give reasons why we ought to
persue this goal.
Here is an exercise for you: Try to write our your argument in
premise-conclusion format, and it will likely become clearer that your argument
doesn't work.
>And if one chooses not to then one also chooses the negative
>consequences of that choice. I see no reason whatsoever for the claim that
>no "ought" is involved.
What do you think ought means?
>The "ought" is simply a function of our social
>nature; no other justification is needed
You are claiming that we ought to do what is in our social nature?
This seems to be what your theory rests upon. However, we seemed to agree that
no non-physical facts existed, so if you claim the above ought is true, or
valid, or even reasonable in any way, then it must be reducable to physical
facts. I am still waiting for this reduction.
-User
Bill Snyder
position; there is little point in attempting that, since you take a
position which makes that impossible. I do not agree with your fundamental
claim: "if you claim the above ought is true, or valid, or even reasonable
in any way, then it must be reducable to physical facts." That would short
circuit all of science and all of mathematics; AND it assumes that "facts"
are "physical" things, whereas a "fact" is, in fact :), a carving out by the
intellect of features of the flux and flow revealed in sensory data which we
wish to attend to for our own particular purposes. But leave that aside.
The issue between us seems to be that you regard the fact that we are social
beings and the fact that our social nature orders our choices to be
"arbitrary" in some sense of the word. On the other hand, I regard it as
completely arbitrary and capricious to attempt to live one's life in
disregard of those facts. There is NOTHING arbitrary in living one's life
in such a manner as to fulfill and complete one's nature as the particular
human being which one is (and that includes one's social nature). You may
say that no "ought" is implicit in those facts; but that is your problem,
not mine. If the facts themselves do not compel reasoned assent to what
they require, nothing else could.
As always, the skeptic can always play the game in ways that appear to carry
the day. But the issue here is not whether one can "prove" that moral
principles do have a proper place in ordering one's conduct; one cannot
prove that, anymore that one can prove that the "facts" are what they are.
Reason must have a material to work on; in the case of moral principles that
material is human nature. In the case of "facts", it is sensory data,
including sensory data which are relevant to the nature of human beings.
Bill Snyder
User 1DE7
>Message-id: <8k87k...@enews3.newsguy.com>
>Sigh...! I was attempting to make plain our disagreement, not argue for my
>position; there is little point in attempting that, since you take a
>position which makes that impossible. I do not agree with your fundamental
>claim: "if you claim the above ought is true, or valid, or even reasonable
>in any way, then it must be reducable to physical facts."
If we agree that there are no physical facts, and we seemed to do that earlier.
> That would short
>circuit all of science and all of mathematics
How so? Math is just contingent on the axioms we define, no? Math statements
are not true in the same sense as "there is a rock over there", they are sait
to be true when they follow from the established axioms of math and such, no?
And how would science suffer? The scientific method is not a "fact", it is a
process that we use to discover facts, in the sense that I am using facts, no?
> AND it assumes that "facts"
>are "physical" things, whereas a "fact" is, in fact :), a carving out by the
>intellect of features of the flux and flow revealed in sensory data which we
>wish to attend to for our own particular purposes.
Ok, I didn't mean to imply that facts were things. And even if I did mean to
imply that, as some people do, it doesn't mean they are physical. Dualists like
to think of facts and truth as part of some non-physical, mental sphere of
existance.
>The issue between us seems to be that you regard the fact that we are social
>beings and the fact that our social nature orders our choices to be
>"arbitrary" in some sense of the word.
They aren't arbitrary in that they have specific reasons and causes and such.
But they are arbitrary in a "should" sense. It is ethicaly arbitrary to claim
that since it is in our nature to do X, we should do X in a moral sense.
> On the other hand, I regard it as
>completely arbitrary and capricious to attempt to live one's life in
>disregard of those facts.
Of course, either of them is arbitrary. Trying to be noble by some kantian or
utilitarian standard is equaly as arbitrary as being a mass-murderer. As a
practical matter though, most humans would be happier and feel less guilty, and
spend less time in prison doing the former, so they'd tend to choose it over
the latter.
>There is NOTHING arbitrary in living one's life
>in such a manner as to fulfill and complete one's nature as the particular
>human being which one is (and that includes one's social nature).
There is nothing arbitrary about it if you mean arbitrary as "without reason",
but it is purely arbitrary if you mean "without moral reason."
>You may
>say that no "ought" is implicit in those facts; but that is your problem,
>not mine.
I wouldn't say it is my problem, it is simply true.
>If the facts themselves do not compel reasoned assent to what
>they require, nothing else could.
Well, facts along with at least one moral premise could. What you seem to call
reasoned assent seems to actualy be mean "The facts taken along with my hidden
moral premises" such as "We ought to do what is in our nature." Or "Society
functioning effectively is good." You cannot give reasonsed for those premises,
so I don't know why you call them reasonable. They are probably just hardwired
into you.
>As always, the skeptic can always play the game in ways that appear to carry
>the day. But the issue here is not whether one can "prove" that moral
>principles do have a proper place in ordering one's conduct; one cannot
>prove that, anymore that one can prove that the "facts" are what they are.
One can prove things relative to certain premises. I was asking for you to
bring forth what you thought were reasonable premises to support your argument.
It seems like you are disputing Hume's maxim here. It is just part of a more
general rule stating "If none of your premises refer to X in any way, then you
cannot derive a conclusion about X." To hold the position that you do, it seems
like you'd have to dispute this. If you do, I'd like to see an example.
>Reason must have a material to work on; in the case of moral principles that
>material is human nature.
But premises about human nature are not moral premises, and hence you cannot
derive moral conclusions from them. Again, are you not familiar with Hume's
law?
-User
Bill Snyder
> >Subject: Re: Killing and letting die....
> But premises about human nature are not moral premises, and hence you
cannot
> derive moral conclusions from them. Again, are you not familiar with
Hume's
> law?
>
I am quite familiar with Hume. If you bother to read the whole Treatise,
you will find that my position and Hume's are very similar. There are
differences but they mainly have to do with aspects of social life which are
emphasized in Dewey and other pragmatists (and actually have their origin in
Hegel).
PS: There is no such thing as "Hume's Law". Again, if you read the whole
of the Treatise, Hume's point is that Custom (in Hume's sense) grounds both
"judgments of fact" and "judgments of moral worth". BOTH kinds of
judgments are dependent on inferences guided by habit and custom. There is
no essential difference between the two. You have read the whole of the
Treatise? That position is what really upset Kant and awoke him from his
"dogmatic slumbers".
PPS: I suggest that you do not try playing games with me concerning the
history of western philosophy (and some eastern). I have been working with
it for some 50 years and have taught most segments of it (not Medieval) on
and off during that career. I did not cite my views haphazardly as
Aristotelian (mediated by Pierce, Dewey, and James). Fundamentally,
Aristotle said almost all that needs to be said on the subject of Ethics.
Bill Snyder
User 1DE7
>Date: 7/8/00 7:31 PM Central Daylight Time
>Message-id: <8k8h5...@enews1.newsguy.com>
>
>> But premises about human nature are not moral premises, and hence you
>cannot
>> derive moral conclusions from them. Again, are you not familiar with
>Hume's
>> law?
>>
>I am quite familiar with Hume. If you bother to read the whole Treatise,
>you will find that my position and Hume's are very similar.
Maybe the moral conclusions you reach are, but if I remember, and as you say
below, didn't Hume say morality was founded on things without moral import such
as custom and habit?
>PS: There is no such thing as "Hume's Law".
Well, I have heard that it is sometimes referred to as that.
>Again, if you read the whole
>of the Treatise, Hume's point is that Custom (in Hume's sense) grounds both
>"judgments of fact" and "judgments of moral worth".
If true, they'd both seem to be without reason, (not cause, but no reasonable
justification), however I would disagree on the judgements of facts point, and
also I am not too read up on Hume's exact definition of "custom." However, none
of this is terribly important. Hume's personal beliefs are irrelevent to the
validity of his law, or maxim, and what follows from it.
>There is
>no essential difference between the two. You have read the whole of the
>Treatise?
Nope, only read about it.
>
>PPS: I suggest that you do not try playing games with me concerning the
>history of western philosophy (and some eastern). I have been working with
>it for some 50 years and have taught most segments of it (not Medieval) on
>and off during that career. I did not cite my views haphazardly as
>Aristotelian (mediated by Pierce, Dewey, and James). Fundamentally,
>Aristotle said almost all that needs to be said on the subject of Ethics.
Well, fortunately this thread isn't about the hostory of western philosophy or
I would be in trouble. I'd still be interested in either
(a) Some reasoned argument as to why hume's maxim in addition to only physical
reality existing can allow for one moral theory to somehow be more "reasonable"
or "better" than another, (so far I truly have not seen any argument presented
by you, only assertations) or
(b) Some example showing that hume's maxim is false.
-User
CPK Smithies
course your universe will not contain values. I think your position would
only become interesting if you found a new way to make it plausible that
"things" were the only reality.
CPK Smithies
reason",
> but it is purely arbitrary if you mean "without moral reason."
What, for you, would count as a "moral reason"? I think if you are prepared
to say that something isn't one, you ought to give an account of what is.
User 1DE7
>Date: 7/10/00 7:38 PM Central Daylight Time
>Message-id: <8kdqag$1tk$1...@gxsn.com>
>
A new way? I thought we agreed at the outset that the only reality was
physical, descriptive reality. Non-descriptive things were not real.
As in:
X is real if X exists in spacetime OR x is a property of spacetime OR x is a
coordinate of spacetime.
Now, the above is a pretty good description of what it is to be physical, it
seems. Can you tell me something that exists besides what qualifies for the
above?
-User
User 1DE7
>Message-id: <8kdqmv$sps$1...@gxsn.com>
The only sensical account of valid moral reasons I am aware of are those of
intuitionalists, although I think their view is false.
An example of these is briefly summarized here:
http://www.daviddfriedman.com/Libertarian/My_Posts/My_View_of_Oughts.html
Basicaly, because of Hume's maxim, all moral theories have to be based on part
on some sort of moral axioms. Where it seems these must come from are moral
intuitions, leaving aside those who think they come directly from God. Those
who claim their moral intuitions are simply products of culture and
conditioning are really not talking about how people ought to behave, but
simply how people feel they ought to behave. The only way you can conherantly
claim that morality is real seems to be if you think your moral intuitions are
perceptions of moral facts, sort of like your sight percieves physical facts.
My earlier link gives an example.
-User
CPK Smithies
assimilate the moral universe to some other, as if it should have "facts"
like the physical universe, or "axioms" like the mathematical one. Then, you
can show that such assimilation won't work, and morality will obligingly
disappear in a puff of logic.
I don't at all see why moral judgments should be "based on axioms". It would
be interesting to see if we could set up some axioms, but I don't think
anything would follow from failure in such an endeavour.
Views as to whether claims to a moral insight are "coherent" will probably
depend on one's criteria for coherence. If you are saying that the
intuitionist position is coherent, then I think I'd agree, but not
necessarily for reasons which you would endorse.
CPK Smithies
and "exists". If you define these terms so that only physical objects (or
their properties) qualify, then there seems little point, because by your
definition only physical objects (or their properties) can qualify.
Certainly I think that reality encompasses far more than your narrow sense
of "real" and "exists", but I'm not prepared to be trapped into subscribing
to that narrow sense. So I don't see how we can meaningfully take this
discussion further.
User 1DE7
>Message-id: <8kideu$gki$1...@gxsn.com>
>
>
>I don't at all see why moral judgments should be "based on axioms". It would
>be interesting to see if we could set up some axioms, but I don't think
>anything would follow from failure in such an endeavour.
>
What are they based on then? Tradition? Our biological desires? Both of those
are simply descriptive.
-User
User 1DE7
>Message-id: <8kidp1$qk7$1...@gxsn.com>
>I cannot answer your question without understanding what you mean by "real"
>and "exists".
I forget what my question was, and you did not quote it, so...
Anyway, exist is fairly primary, I don't know how well I can define it. "To be"
>If you define these terms so that only physical objects (or
>their properties) qualify, then there seems little point, because by your
>definition only physical objects (or their properties) can qualify.
>Certainly I think that reality encompasses far more than your narrow sense
>of "real" and "exists", but I'm not prepared to be trapped into subscribing
>to that narrow sense. So I don't see how we can meaningfully take this
>discussion further.
Well, if you don't want to be trapped by my narrow definitions all you have to
do is give me an example of something outside my definition. If my definition
is so narrow and whatnot it should be pretty easy.
Tell me something that exists that is not in spacetime, is not a property of
spacetime, and is not a coordinate of space-time.
Or, if you don't like the word "exists", just tell me about something that
isn't included in the above description, even if you cant say it exists.
-User
Des
"User 1DE7" <user...@aol.com> wrote in message
>
> Well, if you don't want to be trapped by my narrow definitions all you
have to
> do is give me an example of something outside my definition. If my
definition
> is so narrow and whatnot it should be pretty easy.
>
> Tell me something that exists that is not in spacetime, is not a property
of
> spacetime, and is not a coordinate of space-time.
Sorry to butt in.
I'm not sure that you can use the human concept of space-time as a good
envelope for the physical world.
Space-time co-ordinates are relative and I don't see how you can use
relative co-ordinates to define an absolute reality.
For example, what are the co-ordinates of a photon in space-time?
Does a photon exist within space-time even?
More importantly, where do mathematical truths exist within space-time?
Des
CPK Smithies
It is a curious prejudice, that judgments have to be based on something.
It's not a prejudice I hold. In most cases where people claim to base
judgments on something more "basic", it turns out that these more basic
principles are abstracted from judgments that people actually make (rather
in the same way that we extrapolate scientific laws from the way that things
happen). Just because we observe regularities in the way things are done, it
does not follow that the way things are done are "based on" or in some way
"obedient" to the regularities.
CPK Smithies
of
> spacetime, and is not a coordinate of space-time.
"A property of spacetime" is extremely broad. There are all sorts of
properties.
Is a schema a property of spacetime? A moral judgment? A logical axiom? A
pain? A memory?
Peter H.M. Brooks
somebody's subjective judgement, then it is reasonable to try and
understand how it was arrived at - the general method is to appeal to
these regularities. Of course, most of the time (if not all the time),
the judgements are actually made intuitively and the justification made
for them is a post hoc facto rationalisation. We prefer not to believe
this, however, as understanding this exposes the fact that our
judgements are frequently based on self-interest. That is direct
self-interest tempered by the self-interested desire to appear just,
good, rational and so forth.
In the light of the above, it is reasonable for people to expect that,
when a judgement is questioned or the judge is asked to explain himself,
it will be by means of appeal to 'natural law' and other regularities as
you put it, not to the actual reasons for the judgement which are often
ignoble and not half as disinterested as the judge would have you
believe.
--
Peter H.M. Brooks
Beethoven was an innovator of form, Mozart an innovator of substance.
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
User 1DE7
>Date: 7/12/00 3:57 PM Central Daylight Time
>Message-id: <963435991.18966.0...@news.demon.co.uk>
>
>Sorry to butt in.
>
>I'm not sure that you can use the human concept of space-time
I was not talking about a concept of spacetime, I was talking about spacetime
itsself, even if it is slightly different than our current model.
>Space-time co-ordinates are relative and I don't see how you can use
>relative co-ordinates to define an absolute reality.
They are relative to given frames. The frame acts sort of like a 5th
coordinate(or maybe better, variable). There really is no problem here. Our
current theory of spacetime, and general relativity, can tell you how
space-time will be for any given frame.
>For example, what are the co-ordinates of a photon in space-time?
Measuring from earth they could be specified, at least on a macroscopic level.
>Does a photon exist within space-time even?
Of course, why wouldn't it?
>More importantly, where do mathematical truths exist within space-time?
Mathamatical truths are simply properties of spacetime. Or, truths about the
nature of spacetime. No?
-User
User 1DE7
>Date: 7/13/00 12:30 PM Central Daylight Time
>Message-id: <8kkub5$kfq$1...@gxsn.com>
>> Tell me something that exists that is not in spacetime, is not a property
>of
>> spacetime, and is not a coordinate of space-time.
>
>"A property of spacetime" is extremely broad. There are all sorts of
>properties.
Right, I am trying to include all of physical reality, so I need to be broad.
>
>Is a schema a property of spacetime?
Not sure what that is.
>A moral judgment?
I wouldn't call that a property of spacetime. It exists within spacetime as
electro-chemical activity in the brain.
>A logical axiom?
Probably.
>A
>pain?
Same as for moral judgement. It is an organisms reaction to stimuli. It is not
a property of spacetime but an event within it.
>A memory?
>
Same as for pain.
So all that you've mentioned has been within my definition.
-User
User 1DE7
>Message-id: <8kku3p$kcf$1...@gxsn.com>
>
>> What are they based on then?
>
>It is a curious prejudice, that judgments have to be based on something.
>It's not a prejudice I hold.
Judgements? I'd say they do. Does everything have to be based on something? No,
but that is another matter.
In making a judgement, it is presumed that you have options, and can judge
things in more than one way, and each of these ways is immaginable and logicaly
possible. To put the same question differently, how should we decide which
judgement to make, given that we have options?
If you give reasons, then the judgement is based on something. If you don't
give reasons, then I suppose you could still maintain your position that such
judgements don't have to be based on anything, but that would also entail that
there arent reasons against other judgements, so you're back to moral
skepticism.
>In most cases where people claim to base
>judgments on something more "basic", it turns out that these more basic
>principles are abstracted from judgments that people actually make
Right, but in this case I'd say the judgements are themselves based on some
moral intuition.
> Just because we observe regularities in the way things are done, it
>does not follow that the way things are done are "based on" or in some way
>"obedient" to the regularities.
>
No one is saying moral judgements have to be based on grand moral theories. I
am saying they are based on specific moral intuitions, such as "When my
neighbor shot my dog for no reason, he acted wrongly"
-User
Des
> >Subject: Re: Killing and letting die....
> >Date: 7/12/00 3:57 PM Central Daylight Time
> >Message-id: <963435991.18966.0...@news.demon.co.uk>
> >
>
> >Sorry to butt in.
> >
> >I'm not sure that you can use the human concept of space-time
>
> I was not talking about a concept of spacetime, I was talking about
spacetime
> itsself, even if it is slightly different than our current model.
Space-time is a mathematical construct that we humans use to establish
relationships between objects in the physical world. Space-time itself is 4d
manifold endowed with a Lorentzian metric - it exists only in the world of
mathematics.
>
> >Space-time co-ordinates are relative and I don't see how you can use
> >relative co-ordinates to define an absolute reality.
>
> They are relative to given frames. The frame acts sort of like a 5th
> coordinate(or maybe better, variable). There really is no problem here.
Our
> current theory of spacetime, and general relativity, can tell you how
> space-time will be for any given frame.
General relativity is a local field theory. There is no one way in which to
extend a local frame of reference to cover the whole of space-time. In
addition, GR breaks down at singularities such as black holes and the
big-bang.
Worse still it's a classical field theory so it doesn't provide an accurate
model of the physical world at the microscopic level or in situations where
there is significant quantum coherence or entanglement.
>
> >For example, what are the co-ordinates of a photon in space-time?
>
> Measuring from earth they could be specified, at least on a macroscopic
level.
>
> >Does a photon exist within space-time even?
>
> Of course, why wouldn't it?
The problem is that the photon (like any particle) has both a wave and a
particle nature. It isn't really that meaningful to talk about the
space-time co-ordinates of a photon only of the events that mark its
observed emission and absorption. To accurately model quanta such as photons
requires the assumption that they are everywhere (in space and in time) when
they are "in flight".
My real point however is that the closer you examine it the more the "real"
physical world evaporates under your gaze. It's just like a rainbow in some
respects, it only exists because you're there to see it (or at least one
aspect of it).
I really do believe it's time that we re-examined these antiquated notions
of a real hard physical world in the light of 20th century physics.
>
> >More importantly, where do mathematical truths exist within space-time?
>
> Mathamatical truths are simply properties of spacetime. Or, truths about
the
> nature of spacetime. No?
>
No.
Mathematical truths are much more fundamental than any one particular
instance of a physical world. Indeed, mathematical truths allow for the
existence of all manner of consistent physical universes - only some of
which may be able to support "life".
Mathematical truths can be explored in a manner which is wholly equivalent
to the manner in which we explore the physical world. Now whether your
absolute moral framework can be found in the world of mathematical truths is
another matter.
Des
User 1DE7
>Message-id: <963606342.17184.0...@news.demon.co.uk>
>> I was not talking about a concept of spacetime, I was talking about
>spacetime
>> itsself, even if it is slightly different than our current model.
>
>Space-time is a mathematical construct that we humans use to establish
>relationships between objects in the physical world. Space-time itself is 4d
>manifold endowed with a Lorentzian metric - it exists only in the world of
>mathematics.
Doesn't this "4d manifold endowed with a Lorentzian metric" actualy model
something in the real world? It seems like you think we just arbitrarily pulled
it out of a hat. Hey, if this space-time thing exists only in the human mind,
then why don't we all simply agree to think of physics in a strictly newtonian
sense and it will be that way? Then we can forget about all these messy
canclations with sending things into space or launching missles or whatever
engineers use general relativity for. I checked into #physics on IRC and
started asking around, and the consensus seems to be that "spacetime" does
actualy attempt to refer to reality.
>> They are relative to given frames. The frame acts sort of like a 5th
>> coordinate(or maybe better, variable). There really is no problem here.
>Our
>> current theory of spacetime, and general relativity, can tell you how
>> space-time will be for any given frame.
>
>General relativity is a local field theory. There is no one way in which to
>extend a local frame of reference to cover the whole of space-time. In
>addition, GR breaks down at singularities such as black holes and the
>big-bang.
>Worse still it's a classical field theory so it doesn't provide an accurate
>model of the physical world at the microscopic level or in situations where
>there is significant quantum coherence or entanglement.
Maybe you're right there. When I say spacetime I simply assume spacetime will
be the arena of the grand unified theory, or the theory of everything.
>The problem is that the photon (like any particle) has both a wave and a
>particle nature. It isn't really that meaningful to talk about the
>space-time co-ordinates of a photon only of the events that mark its
>observed emission and absorption. To accurately model quanta such as photons
>requires the assumption that they are everywhere (in space and in time) when
>they are "in flight".
>
Okay, if they fill all of spacetime, that is fine. They are still within
spacetime and work with the definition of what is real.
>My real point however is that the closer you examine it the more the "real"
>physical world evaporates under your gaze. It's just like a rainbow in some
>respects, it only exists because you're there to see it (or at least one
>aspect of it).
What exactly is like that? What exists because it is being observed? I think
now you're just being silly. Sure physics gets weird on the QM level, and sure
relativity is weird, but I don't see how it implies the "things only exist
becase we observe them" stuff you are saying now. Maybe you can explain.
>
>No.
>Mathematical truths are much more fundamental than any one particular
>instance of a physical world. Indeed, mathematical truths allow for the
>existence of all manner of consistent physical universes - only some of
>which may be able to support "life".
>
But must all universes adhere to these mathamatical truths that you speak of?
>
>Mathematical truths can be explored in a manner which is wholly equivalent
>to the manner in which we explore the physical world. Now whether your
>absolute moral framework can be found in the world of mathematical truths is
>another matter.
>
Wholely equivilant? You sure? It is my impression that math simply defines a
few axioms as true (even if they seem to model reality perfectly, like a=a),
then just simply uses deductive reasoning to derive other truths. Certainly the
deductive/inductive thing is a big difference.
-User
CPK Smithies
self-interest out of it. I agree that as a matter of fact lots of people
dress self-interested decisions up as moral decisions most of the time. But
I'm not sure that that "justifies" the quest for an impartial general
standard. It is interesting to speculate why so many people think that an
_ad hominem_ argument is an argument. If there really were general
principles, from which our moral intuitions were really deductions, then I
don't think that people would (even naively) make that mistake.
(I like your new strap-line about Mozart & Beethoven, by the way. Damned if
I'd know how to argue about it, though!)
Des
Einstein's field equations are indeed a marvel of mathematical symmetry and
elegance. I find it hard to believe that they do not reflect some deep truth
about the universe. However that truth is ultimately a mathematical truth.
Consider the equation for a circle or a sphere (or a hypersphere). These are
essentially abstract mathematical truths which are only ever approximated in
the physical world - just like the field equations and just like Plato's
forms.
>
> Maybe you're right there. When I say spacetime I simply assume spacetime
will
> be the arena of the grand unified theory, or the theory of everything.
>
Hopefully not. It would be a bit disappointing if we had to assume a
background space-time in order to derive the GUT. Several approaches are
being taken to develop a background free theory. What is really fascinating
is that currrent high energy theoretical physics is being driven as much by
mathematical elegance as be experimental data (because it isn't available
yet). Considerations of symmetry and simplicity are replacing the need to
agree with observation. It will indeed be interesting to see how the results
compare with the observations expected from the next generation of super
colliders.
> >The problem is that the photon (like any particle) has both a wave and a
> >particle nature. It isn't really that meaningful to talk about the
> >space-time co-ordinates of a photon only of the events that mark its
> >observed emission and absorption. To accurately model quanta such as
photons
> >requires the assumption that they are everywhere (in space and in time)
when
> >they are "in flight".
> >
>
> Okay, if they fill all of spacetime, that is fine. They are still within
> spacetime and work with the definition of what is real.
>
They might be within your definition of what is real but I find these
phenomenon very perplexing. It would be easier to believe in gods and angels
than fit an understandable view of reality around what is abserved.
> >My real point however is that the closer you examine it the more the
"real"
> >physical world evaporates under your gaze. It's just like a rainbow in
some
> >respects, it only exists because you're there to see it (or at least one
> >aspect of it).
>
> What exactly is like that? What exists because it is being observed? I
think
> now you're just being silly. Sure physics gets weird on the QM level, and
sure
> relativity is weird, but I don't see how it implies the "things only exist
> becase we observe them" stuff you are saying now. Maybe you can explain.
>
Be careful now. If you go to far with your view of objective reality then
you'll find it hard to discount fairies and goblins. I mean just because you
never see them doesn't mean they don't exist does it? Seriously, this is a
difficult area, however I think there is some justification for saying that
the view we have of the universe is essentially a human view, space and time
are human experiences as are particles and events. Taken as a whole, the
universe retains the original symmetry it had at the big bang - it just is.
It's we humans with our minds and individuality that break this symmetry and
select out particlular views and call them reality.
> >Mathematical truths can be explored in a manner which is wholly
equivalent
> >to the manner in which we explore the physical world. Now whether your
> >absolute moral framework can be found in the world of mathematical truths
is
> >another matter.
> >
>
> Wholely equivilant? You sure? It is my impression that math simply defines
a
> few axioms as true (even if they seem to model reality perfectly, like
a=a),
> then just simply uses deductive reasoning to derive other truths.
Certainly the
> deductive/inductive thing is a big difference.
I'm pretty sure. At least I can't think of any way to break the symmetry
that exists between the physical and mathematical worlds.
Whilst there is no reason to believe that there is a finite number of
mathematical axioms that can be discovered, it is often true that a huge
apparent complexity can flow out of a small number of simple mathematical
axioms. Exactly the same as an apparently complex universe can flow from the
interactions of a few relatively simple fields.
The human mind is confronted with two worlds that it can explore
(mathematical/logical and physical/real). Both worlds are clearly external
to the mind and will yield the same truths to any enquiring mind. Why then
assign one a higher ontological status than the other? Of course once you
accept that not everything has to be located within the physical world then
all sorts of other possibilities arise. Which is probably why modern
philosphers have chosen not to grasp this particular nettle.
Des
User 1DE7
>Message-id: <963678659.8822.0...@news.demon.co.uk>
>
>> Doesn't this "4d manifold endowed with a Lorentzian metric" actualy model
>> something in the real world? It seems like you think we just arbitrarily
>pulled
>> it out of a hat. Hey, if this space-time thing exists only in the human
>mind,
>> then why don't we all simply agree to think of physics in a strictly
>newtonian
>> sense and it will be that way? Then we can forget about all these messy
>> canclations with sending things into space or launching missles or
>whatever
>> engineers use general relativity for. I checked into #physics on IRC and
>> started asking around, and the consensus seems to be that "spacetime" does
>> actualy attempt to refer to reality.
>
>Einstein's field equations are indeed a marvel of mathematical symmetry and
>elegance. I find it hard to believe that they do not reflect some deep truth
>about the universe. However that truth is ultimately a mathematical truth.
>Consider the equation for a circle or a sphere (or a hypersphere). These are
>essentially abstract mathematical truths which are only ever approximated in
>the physical world - just like the field equations and just like Plato's
>forms.
>
Well, obviously they must reflect some deeper truth about the universe, or else
why are our calculations more correct than using newtonian physics when using
them? Anyway, I am solely referring to what the mathamatical model actualy
models, not the model itsself.
>>
>> Maybe you're right there. When I say spacetime I simply assume spacetime
>will
>> be the arena of the grand unified theory, or the theory of everything.
>>
>
>Hopefully not. It would be a bit disappointing if we had to assume a
>background space-time in order to derive the GUT.
Not sure what you mean. Surely space is real, and surely time is real, and
surely they are not independant of eachother, no?
In fact it seems common to refer generaly to the fabric of reality as
spacetime, and that is how I was using it.
>Be careful now. If you go to far with your view of objective reality then
>you'll find it hard to discount fairies and goblins. I mean just because you
>never see them doesn't mean they don't exist does it?
I don't see how this follows. It is generaly not a good stretegy to assume
things that you have no evidence for, if your goal is truth. The criteria is
not whether or not you can detect things with the naked eye, but whether or not
there is evidence for things of any type.
>Seriously, this is a
>difficult area, however I think there is some justification for saying that
>the view we have of the universe is essentially a human view, space and time
>are human experiences as are particles and events.
Sounds silly to me.
>Taken as a whole, the
>universe retains the original symmetry it had at the big bang - it just is.
Not sure how you are using symmetry here. Doesn't seem to make sense.
>It's we humans with our minds and individuality that break this symmetry and
>select out particlular views and call them reality.
Still hard to parse what you're trying to say. I don't see humans being
significant enough to break any consmic symmetry.
>> >Mathematical truths can be explored in a manner which is wholly
>equivalent
>> >to the manner in which we explore the physical world. Now whether your
>> >absolute moral framework can be found in the world of mathematical truths
>is
>> >another matter.
>> >
>>
>> Wholely equivilant? You sure? It is my impression that math simply defines
>a
>> few axioms as true (even if they seem to model reality perfectly, like
>a=a),
>> then just simply uses deductive reasoning to derive other truths.
>Certainly the
>> deductive/inductive thing is a big difference.
>
>I'm pretty sure. At least I can't think of any way to break the symmetry
>that exists between the physical and mathematical worlds.
>Whilst there is no reason to believe that there is a finite number of
>mathematical axioms that can be discovered
Discovered? Are you a platonist? There are lots of systems of mathamatics that
we can define, with different axioms, that model reality. Math comes about
because we abstract things from reality -- things that don't exist in
themselves.
>The human mind is confronted with two worlds that it can explore
>(mathematical/logical and physical/real).
I'd say your first catagory is simply abstracted from properties of the first
by beings that are capable of abstraction. They exist in the minds of humans,
though what they model is part of the fabric of reality. There is one world
that really exists, and then there are our abstract models.
>Both worlds are clearly external
>to the mind and will yield the same truths to any enquiring mind. Why then
>assign one a higher ontological status than the other?
See above.
>Of course once you
>accept that not everything has to be located within the physical world then
>all sorts of other possibilities arise. Which is probably why modern
>philosphers have chosen not to grasp this particular nettle.
I don't think there is any good reason to accept such a thing.
-User
Des
> >Subject: Re: Killing and letting die....
> >From: "Des" d...@removegrenfell.demon.co.uk
> >Date: 7/15/00 10:39 AM Central Daylight Time
> >Message-id: <963678659.8822.0...@news.demon.co.uk>
> >
>
> >Consider the equation for a circle or a sphere (or a hypersphere). These
are
> >essentially abstract mathematical truths which are only ever approximated
in
> >the physical world - just like the field equations and just like Plato's
> >forms.
> >
>
> Well, obviously they must reflect some deeper truth about the universe, or
else
> why are our calculations more correct than using newtonian physics when
using
> them? Anyway, I am solely referring to what the mathematical model
actually
> models, not the model itsself.
Sounds good.
>
> >>
> >> Maybe you're right there. When I say spacetime I simply assume
spacetime
> >will
> >> be the arena of the grand unified theory, or the theory of everything.
> >>
> >
> >Hopefully not. It would be a bit disappointing if we had to assume a
> >background space-time in order to derive the GUT.
>
> Not sure what you mean. Surely space is real, and surely time is real, and
> surely they are not independant of eachother, no?
>
> In fact it seems common to refer generaly to the fabric of reality as
> spacetime, and that is how I was using it.
Space and time owe their existence to the human mind that experiences them -
they are only as real as the conscious mind that experiences them.
Theoretical physicists are approaching the problem of GUTs from many
different angles. Some start with a flat space-time, others assume a quantum
foam of topologies, others assume various special classes of convoluted
multidimensional manifolds.
>
>
>
> >Be careful now. If you go to far with your view of objective reality then
> >you'll find it hard to discount fairies and goblins. I mean just because
you
> >never see them doesn't mean they don't exist does it?
>
> I don't see how this follows. It is generaly not a good stretegy to assume
> things that you have no evidence for, if your goal is truth. The criteria
is
> not whether or not you can detect things with the naked eye, but whether
or not
> there is evidence for things of any type.
Exactly. We shouldn't make the mistake of believing that the external world
is limited to that part of it which we can currently (or even potentially)
observe. Indeed, we can construct a superbly accurate mathematical model of
the quantum world by assuming that the unobserved physical world is
infinitely more complete than the observed one. How we actually interpret
this in terms of ontological status is an open question.
>
>
>
> >Seriously, this is a
> >difficult area, however I think there is some justification for saying
that
> >the view we have of the universe is essentially a human view, space and
time
> >are human experiences as are particles and events.
>
> Sounds silly to me.
That's generally a good sign in matters concerning quantum reality.
>
> >Taken as a whole, the
> >universe retains the original symmetry it had at the big bang - it just
is.
>
> Not sure how you are using symmetry here. Doesn't seem to make sense.
>
> >It's we humans with our minds and individuality that break this symmetry
and
> >select out particular views and call them reality.
>
> Still hard to parse what you're trying to say. I don't see humans being
> significant enough to break any consmic symmetry.
We break the symmetry everytime we make an observation, every time we
register an event. It doesn't necessarily make us any more significant than
anything else in the universe - I'm not a solipsist or anything.
When the universe was at the Big Bang stage it was completely symmetric and
undifferentiated - a singularity. Somehow or other that initial symmetry got
broken and different phases of matter condensed out until finally we arrived
on the scene. But the point is that the universe at the time of the Big Bang
was far too simple to contain the complexity we see around us now. This
complexity has arisen spontaneously, indeterminately. It does not have any
root in the Big Bang. All of our physics says that that symmetry must still
be there somewhere - where did it go? One explanation may lie in the many
worlds idea, another is that of quantum decoherence, yet another is
gravitational state reduction. The point is that most physicists believe the
symmetry is still out there in some form. Though they might argue about the
status of it's reality, they still need to put it into their mathematics.
> >I'm pretty sure. At least I can't think of any way to break the symmetry
> >that exists between the physical and mathematical worlds.
> >Whilst there is no reason to believe that there is a finite number of
> >mathematical axioms that can be discovered
>
> Discovered? Are you a platonist? There are lots of systems of mathamatics
that
> we can define, with different axioms, that model reality. Math comes about
> because we abstract things from reality -- things that don't exist in
> themselves.
I do have Platonist leanings yes - is that rather unfashionable these days?
However you want to internalise it, the fact is that mathematics and logic
are as external and independent of the human mind as the physical world is.
Both can be accessed by a conscious mind and both will reveal consistent
truths which are largely independent of the particular machinery that
supports the conscious mind. Both can be reduced to a relatively small
number of simple rules or laws which in combination can unfold to a large if
not infinite degree of complexity.
>
> >The human mind is confronted with two worlds that it can explore
> >(mathematical/logical and physical/real).
>
> I'd say your first catagory is simply abstracted from properties of the
first
> by beings that are capable of abstraction. They exist in the minds of
humans,
> though what they model is part of the fabric of reality. There is one
world
> that really exists, and then there are our abstract models.
But mathematics can model realities which may or may not exist. Mathematics
is not constrained by physics.
What do you mean by the minds of humans - what is this human mind that you
are referring to?
Where exactly is mathematics contained within the physical world?
User 1DE7
>Message-id: <963846006.21132.0...@news.demon.co.uk>
>
>> In fact it seems common to refer generaly to the fabric of reality as
>> spacetime, and that is how I was using it.
>
>Space and time owe their existence to the human mind that experiences them -
>they are only as real as the conscious mind that experiences them.
You're saying that if humans did not exist there would be no such thing as
space and time? What evidence do you have for this?
Other organisms require time to evolve, but according to the above, there was
no such thing as time and thus other organisms could not have evolved and thus
humans could not have evolved. I refute your position thus, then: human beings
evolved from non-human beings.
>> >Be careful now. If you go to far with your view of objective reality then
>> >you'll find it hard to discount fairies and goblins. I mean just because
>you
>> >never see them doesn't mean they don't exist does it?
>>
>> I don't see how this follows. It is generaly not a good stretegy to assume
>> things that you have no evidence for, if your goal is truth. The criteria
>is
>> not whether or not you can detect things with the naked eye, but whether
>or not
>> there is evidence for things of any type.
>
>Exactly. We shouldn't make the mistake of believing that the external world
>is limited to that part of it which we can currently (or even potentially)
>observe.
And neither should we make the mistake of believing that the external world is
NOT limited to the part of it that we can observe.
>> Still hard to parse what you're trying to say. I don't see humans being
>> significant enough to break any consmic symmetry.
>
>We break the symmetry everytime we make an observation, every time we
>register an event. It doesn't necessarily make us any more significant than
>anything else in the universe - I'm not a solipsist or anything.
>
>When the universe was at the Big Bang stage it was completely symmetric and
>undifferentiated - a singularity. Somehow or other that initial symmetry got
>broken and different phases of matter condensed out until finally we arrived
>on the scene.
>But the point is that the universe at the time of the Big Bang
>was far too simple to contain the complexity we see around us now.
Well, it must have, somehow, otherwise the complexity wouldn't be there.
Hawking says it could have come about due to the no boundry condition for the
universe coupled with the uncertainty principle.
>> Discovered? Are you a platonist? There are lots of systems of mathamatics
>that
>> we can define, with different axioms, that model reality. Math comes about
>> because we abstract things from reality -- things that don't exist in
>> themselves.
>
>I do have Platonist leanings yes - is that rather unfashionable these days?
Yes.
>However you want to internalise it, the fact is that mathematics and logic
>are as external and independent of the human mind as the physical world is.
They model things that are, yes.
>Both can be accessed by a conscious mind and both will reveal consistent
>truths which are largely independent of the particular machinery that
>supports the conscious mind.
Assuming axioms are chosen which seem to resemble basic facts of reality.
>> >The human mind is confronted with two worlds that it can explore
>> >(mathematical/logical and physical/real).
>>
>> I'd say your first catagory is simply abstracted from properties of the
>first
>> by beings that are capable of abstraction. They exist in the minds of
>humans,
>> though what they model is part of the fabric of reality. There is one
>world
>> that really exists, and then there are our abstract models.
>
>But mathematics can model realities which may or may not exist. Mathematics
>is not constrained by physics.
Right, just like we can abstract the general characteristics of animals that
exist and come up with a wide variety of immaginary animals. So to can we
abstract basic properties from our reality and use them to come up with very
different fictional realities.
>What do you mean by the minds of humans - what is this human mind that you
>are referring to?
The process of their biological brain operating.
>Where exactly is mathematics contained within the physical world?
Math concepts -- numbers for example -- do not exist as nouns. There are two
chickens, but "two" does not exist, etc, as platonists seem to think it does.
Where is math contained? Math describes properties that reality must have, and
possible properties that any possible reality must have. Mathamatical
properties are contained in the fabric of relaity.
If I say something is white, then whitness is a property of that thing but
there is no abstract form for whiteness that exists by itsself.
-User
Des
> You're saying that if humans did not exist there would be no such thing as
> space and time? What evidence do you have for this?
>
> Other organisms require time to evolve, but according to the above, there
was
> no such thing as time and thus other organisms could not have evolved and
thus
> humans could not have evolved. I refute your position thus, then: human
beings
> evolved from non-human beings.
>
No that's not exactly what I'm saying What I'm saying is that time and
space represent intervals along a path within this thing we are calling
space-time (which we may be interpreting differently). If you take out the
human minds (or any type of conscious mind) then you remove the significance
of any path and you lose the meaning of space and time. Taken as a whole the
universe just is. Einstein's field equations allow us to predict how a
metric (space-time) will vary within that universe either along a path or
an area or a volume or whatever.
Imagine a dense 2D grid of points. It contains any number of paths and areas
and shapes and whatever. It isn't until someone or something traces one of
the many potential paths out that it becomes significant.
Now instead of a grid of points consider a grid of configurations. These
configurations range from the (single) configuration where nothing is
distinguishible (the Big Bang) to the almost infinite number of
configurations in which everything is distinguishible (the potential "end"
states of the universe). We live in an intermediate zone of complexity
between these two extremes of simplicity and chaos. Some biological (and non
bilogical) systems correspond to configurations which are far more numerous
than others. If you "move" from the simple state to the chaotic state then
your path through the eras of complexity will appear as an evolutionary
journey. Time itself however, along with space are simply in the eye of the
mind which takes that particular path.
If you doubt this consider why you think time moves forward and not back or
sideways? Time's arrow is simply the direction from simplicity to chaos -
the direction of increasing entropy.
> >> >Be careful now. If you go to far with your view of objective reality
then
> >> >you'll find it hard to discount fairies and goblins. I mean just
because
> >you
> >> >never see them doesn't mean they don't exist does it?
> >>
> >> I don't see how this follows. It is generaly not a good stretegy to
assume
> >> things that you have no evidence for, if your goal is truth. The
criteria
> >is
> >> not whether or not you can detect things with the naked eye, but
whether
> >or not
> >> there is evidence for things of any type.
> >
> >Exactly. We shouldn't make the mistake of believing that the external
world
> >is limited to that part of it which we can currently (or even
potentially)
> >observe.
>
> And neither should we make the mistake of believing that the external
world is
> NOT limited to the part of it that we can observe.
Right, we shouldn't confuse what we know with what is. However we can make
educated guesses and speculation - this has been a standard scientific
technique since the year dot. At present our fundamental theories have
outstripped our observations and so we're running blind to some extent. In
these circumstances we're relying heavily on the elegance of the maths to
make progress - we're making the guess that the universe is consistent and
symmetric. The next generation of super colliders will prove if we were
right.
Now one of the most promising theories at present is that of super-string
theory and that is based on 10/11 dimensional manifolds - of which we only
see 4. It has also been (purely) speculated that the "invisible" dimensions
(which are very tightly curled) might contain their own universes and that
new universes might be formed within black-holes. It's all academic now but
it might prove possible to intereact with these "other universes" in the
future. I put "other universe" in quotes because if we interact with them,
they essentially become part of our universe.
> >When the universe was at the Big Bang stage it was completely symmetric
and
> >undifferentiated - a singularity. Somehow or other that initial symmetry
got
> >broken and different phases of matter condensed out until finally we
arrived
> >on the scene.
> >But the point is that the universe at the time of the Big Bang
> >was far too simple to contain the complexity we see around us now.
>
> Well, it must have, somehow, otherwise the complexity wouldn't be there.
>
> Hawking says it could have come about due to the no boundry condition for
the
> universe coupled with the uncertainty principle.
Hawking's no-boundary boundary condition takes the idea of the an simple
big-bang to its limit - you have a complete ideal singularity with absolutey
no structure at all.
>
> >
> >I do have Platonist leanings yes - is that rather unfashionable these
days?
>
> Yes.
Well I never was a follower of fashion - which is why I'd probably never be
any good at pure philosophy.
>
> >However you want to internalise it, the fact is that mathematics and
logic
> >are as external and independent of the human mind as the physical world
is.
>
> They model things that are, yes.
Right, our mathematics and logic corresponds to an interaction with
something external to our mind in the same way that our feelings and
sensations correspond to interactions with an external physical world.
>
> >Both can be accessed by a conscious mind and both will reveal consistent
> >truths which are largely independent of the particular machinery that
> >supports the conscious mind.
>
> Assuming axioms are chosen which seem to resemble basic facts of reality.
Do you really think the natural numbers are somehow arbitrary and man-made.
I don't mean the symbols - but the concept of being able to distinguish,
enumerate, order and put in association.
> >But mathematics can model realities which may or may not exist.
Mathematics
> >is not constrained by physics.
>
> Right, just like we can abstract the general characteristics of animals
that
> exist and come up with a wide variety of immaginary animals. So to can we
> abstract basic properties from our reality and use them to come up with
very
> different fictional realities.
It's very often the case that pure mathematics precedes its use by physics.
>
> >What do you mean by the minds of humans - what is this human mind that
you
> >are referring to?
>
> The process of their biological brain operating.
Of course the mind is tied to the biological brain that it inhabits, but do
you think a machine which was functionally the same as a human would also be
conscious? Could consciousness exist within a sufficiently advanced
programmable computer? Be careful how you respond!
And where will we find mathematical truths within the human brain. Where for
example is the truth or falsity of the following statement located within
the brain - 1234234578967241 is a prime?
>
> >Where exactly is mathematics contained within the physical world?
>
> Math concepts -- numbers for example -- do not exist as nouns. There are
two
> chickens, but "two" does not exist, etc, as platonists seem to think it
does.
> Where is math contained? Math describes properties that reality must have,
and
> possible properties that any possible reality must have. Mathamatical
> properties are contained in the fabric of relaity.
Why does reality have to have numerical properties? Why does there have to
be anything distinguishible at all in reality - modern physics tends to
treat reality in terms of continuous fields. Particles only arise when we
make an observation.
On the contrary, I believe that numbers and logic have determined properties
(truths) which are every bit as real as the physical world. I can see no
reason why in principle other physical worlds might not exist which do not
overlap ours in any way. I can see no reason why the concepts of numbers and
logic might not allow these physical to be quite different from the one we
inhabit.
Physical worlds are as dependent on the concept of numbers as numbers are
on a physical world. You can't have (or at least experience) one without the
other.
>
> If I say something is white, then whitness is a property of that thing but
> there is no abstract form for whiteness that exists by itsself.
Not at all, "that thing" is just as dependent on its properties (including
its whiteness) to make it real as its properties are on a physical
instantitiation to make them real. How real would something be without its
properties? But properties such as whiteness or sweetness or redness are
analogous to the appreciation of mathematical truths rather than the
mathematical truths themselves and require the addition of a third element
into the framework - the conscious mind.
Mathematical truths themselves retain their internal patterns and
consistency whether or not they are discovered by a mind or realised in a
physical world - they just are.
Des
Des
User 1DE7
>Message-id: <963928413.10917.0...@news.demon.co.uk>
>
>No that's not exactly what I'm saying What I'm saying is that time and
>space represent intervals along a path within this thing we are calling
>space-time (which we may be interpreting differently). If you take out the
>human minds (or any type of conscious mind) then you remove the significance
>of any path and you lose the meaning of space and time.
Well, I wouldn't call them "significant" now in any real manner. And "meaning"
by definition is dependant on organisms capable of meaning things or
understanding meaning. You may lose the *meaning* of space and time, but you do
not lose the *referrent.* This is just like the tree falling in the forest with
no one to hear it thing.
>Imagine a dense 2D grid of points. It contains any number of paths and areas
>and shapes and whatever. It isn't until someone or something traces one of
>the many potential paths out that it becomes significant.
>
>Now instead of a grid of points consider a grid of configurations. These
>configurations range from the (single) configuration where nothing is
>distinguishible (the Big Bang) to the almost infinite number of
>configurations in which everything is distinguishible (the potential "end"
>states of the universe). We live in an intermediate zone of complexity
>between these two extremes of simplicity and chaos. Some biological (and non
>bilogical) systems correspond to configurations which are far more numerous
>than others. If you "move" from the simple state to the chaotic state then
>your path through the eras of complexity will appear as an evolutionary
>journey. Time itself however, along with space are simply in the eye of the
>mind which takes that particular path.
I think this is confusing having to be interpreted by the mind versus only
existing in the mind.
>If you doubt this consider why you think time moves forward and not back or
>sideways? Time's arrow is simply the direction from simplicity to chaos -
>the direction of increasing entropy.
Right, but this does not cause me to believe that the direction of increasing
entropy is only "in my mind", just because I need a mind to recognize it.
>> >Both can be accessed by a conscious mind and both will reveal consistent
>> >truths which are largely independent of the particular machinery that
>> >supports the conscious mind.
>>
>> Assuming axioms are chosen which seem to resemble basic facts of reality.
>
>Do you really think the natural numbers are somehow arbitrary and man-made.
They are not arbitrary, no, because they were chosen to model reality. Man
made? Suppose you have a collection of objects and you must use them to
complete a collection of tasks . There is only one common theme that you must
utilize in order to solve all of the problems. I think numbers are "man-made"
in the same way as the general theme to this puzzle is "man-made." I wouldn't
call it man-made, but I also wouldn't say that the *theme*, or the *numbers*
have objective existance, even though they may be the only objectively correct
way to model reality.
>Of course the mind is tied to the biological brain that it inhabits, but do
>you think a machine which was functionally the same as a human would also be
>conscious? Could consciousness exist within a sufficiently advanced
>programmable computer? Be careful how you respond!
I an not sure. I don't think anyone really understands conscoiusness. It is
possible that a machine could have it.
>And where will we find mathematical truths within the human brain. Where for
>example is the truth or falsity of the following statement located within
>the brain - 1234234578967241 is a prime?
That is not likely floating around in the average person's brain the same way
as the concept of twoness is. A person would have to employ simpler concepts in
order for that particular one to reside in their brain. But the truth/falsity
is contained in how mathamatics is defined, which models reality.
>> Where is math contained? Math describes properties that reality must have,
>and
>> possible properties that any possible reality must have. Mathamatical
>> properties are contained in the fabric of relaity.
>
>Why does reality have to have numerical properties? Why does there have to
>be anything distinguishible at all in reality - modern physics tends to
>treat reality in terms of continuous fields. Particles only arise when we
>make an observation.
I don't see how this conflicts with reality having properties that can be
modeled with mathamatics. What is so bad about continuity?
>>
>> If I say something is white, then whitness is a property of that thing but
>> there is no abstract form for whiteness that exists by itsself.
>
>Not at all, "that thing" is just as dependent on its properties (including
>its whiteness) to make it real as its properties are on a physical
>instantitiation to make them real.
I thought platonists held that universals, including numbers, existed apart
from any representation of them. If you are saying that whiteness is only real
insofar as something is white, then I would agree.
>But properties such as whiteness or sweetness or redness are
>analogous to the appreciation of mathematical truths rather than the
>mathematical truths themselves and require the addition of a third element
>into the framework - the conscious mind.
>Mathematical truths themselves retain their internal patterns and
>consistency whether or not they are discovered by a mind or realised in a
>physical world - they just are.
I don't think I really disagree with this. Most of my issues occur when people
try to say things like the number 4 objectively exists, but maybe the resulting
disagreement is just because of the lack of precise language, and that there
are multiply kinds of existance. My above example with the solution to the
collection of puzzles summarizes my position best I think, without too much
relying on our individual meanings of the word "exist."
-User
@varty.greatxscape.net JCV
towers (academic "high brow" philosophical perspective and "Richard
Dawkinsist" - and resolve this issue. ) I have learnt that academia is a
barrier to communication, but is should not be .... . If you are cut out for
what you are - then you should be able to transfer your intellectual
knowledge to "laymen's terms" - this is truly the gift of intellectual
persuasion. . . .
Please continue . . . . .
I think, from Mr / Ms anonymous "User 1DE7" reply, that they are somewhat
hiding behind some intellectual jargon (I do not understand it - although I
will verify with my philosophy doctorate friend next week). I would like to
see mr / ms "user ide7" give their perspective in a meaningful context -
even if this is a philosophical newsgroup - philosophy should still be
relevant to the real world.
Regards
John.
User 1DE7 <user...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:20000706210925...@ng-cg1.aol.com...
> >Subject: Re: Killing and letting die....
> >From: Peter H.M. Brooks pe...@psyche.demon.co.uk
> >Date: 7/6/00 1:46 AM Central Daylight Time
> >Message-id: <8k1a0e$f6m$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>
>
> >I haven't argued for the furtherance of the evolution of the species -
> >that would be making the mistake of considering it to be the objective
> >of the individual, the dreaded group selection.
> >
> >What I have argued is that there is an evolutionary planted impulse in
> >all creatures to reproduce, so they are generally happy, satisfied or
> >however you wish to describe it, when they succeed in so doing. So, in
> >order to achieve this utilitarian end, the strategy I mention above,
> >ought to be followed.
>
> Right, you've argued that X is nessesary for Y. Nothing more.
>
>
>
> >> But what you are saying has nothing to do with ought. "If you want to
> >do Y,
> >> then you ought to do X", does not imply that you ought to do X unless
> >we assume
> >> that you ought to do what you want. Your above desciption is
> >completely devoid
> >> of any oughts, and hence of morality. It simply describes what actions
> >are
> >> nessesary for a certain result.
> >>
> >Not quite. The result holds whatever individual follows it - even though
> >each individual follows it for his own selfish ends. So it is a workable
> >moral code that benefits the society that consists of individuals that
> >follow it. So, if you wish to have a coherent society (or if an existing
> >coherent society wishes to remain so) then it ought to encourage its
> >members to believe that they ought to follow the code.
>
> Again, your cleaim is clearly "X is nessesary for/beneficial to Y".
Nothing
> more.
>
> >> Ought you personaly to breastfeed? No. It makes perfect sense.
> >>
> >I do understand your fixation on the word 'ought'.
>
> Without it morality is impotent.
>
> >You wish to have an
> >external authority to which you can appeal.
>
> Well, that would be nice, but I don't really wish for it as I know my
wishes
> aren't going to change the fact that morality is subjective.
>
>
> >In fact, if we are well
> >brought up in a stable society, then this authority is internalised as
> >ones conscience. So, if you do what you wish, constrained only by your
> >conscience, then you will be doing what you ought to do as a moral
> >member of the society in which you were brought up.
>
> You won't be doing what you ought to do, you'll be doing what your
conscience
> tells you to do. There is no reasonable argument for why you ought to
follow
> your conscience. If you simply meant "You'll be doing what your society's
moral
> standards tell you to do" then that is true, but again that doesn't help
us at
> all.
>
> From your comments you are indistinguishable from a moral
subjectivist/skeptic.
> All evidence points that way, even if you conceal it a bit, so I don't
think
> further discussion is nesesary.
>
> -User
@varty.greatxscape.net JCV
disciplines . . . . I might just get the old "Daenecken" book out again and
start reading about the "lost city of Atlantis" - blub - blur - "new age",
ignorance, "UFO's" . . . . . . " - leading to the inevitable - forth Reich
.. Oooooooo. .. .. .
John ;-)
User 1DE7 <user...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:20000714152525...@ng-md1.aol.com...
> >Subject: Re: Killing and letting die....
> >From: "CPK Smithies" cp...@dialstart.net
User 1DE7
>Date: 8/3/00 8:50 PM Central Daylight Time
>Message-id: <8md7h6$16$1...@news8.svr.pol.co.uk>
>
>No! this is not good enough - both of you need to climb down from your ivory
>towers (academic "high brow" philosophical perspective and "Richard
>Dawkinsist" - and resolve this issue. )
I think I am speaking pretty plainly. If you hae specific questions, just ask.
>I think, from Mr / Ms anonymous "User 1DE7" reply, that they are somewhat
>hiding behind some intellectual jargon (I do not understand it - although I
>will verify with my philosophy doctorate friend next week).
If you go to the library and read Hume on morals, that should be all you need.
> I would like to
>see mr / ms "user ide7" give their perspective in a meaningful context -
>even if this is a philosophical newsgroup - philosophy should still be
>relevant to the real world.
My position seems very clear and lay-man like to me. All I have been saying is
that the morals are not founded in reason nor can there be any objective reason
to prefer one set of morals over the other. If you have specific questions,
just ask.
-User
Steve H
> My position seems very clear and lay-man like to me. All I have been saying is
> that the morals are not founded in reason nor can there be any objective
> reason
> to prefer one set of morals over the other. If you have specific questions,
> just ask.
Two questions.
1) What do you mean that morals are not founded in reason?
2) How to you define objective reason?
Steve...
User 1DE7
>Date: 8/15/00 8:54 AM Central Daylight Time
>Message-id: <150820001454272546%sjho...@mac.com>
>> My position seems very clear and lay-man like to me. All I have been saying
>is
>> that the morals are not founded in reason nor can there be any objective
>> reason
>> to prefer one set of morals over the other. If you have specific questions,
>> just ask.
>
>Two questions.
>
>1) What do you mean that morals are not founded in reason?
The same thing as if I had said that reason is not the foundation of any
preference. It is not any more or less reasonable to prefer blueberry icecream
over strawberry. Reason needs material to work with. If you have a goal, you
can apply your reason to discover how best to achieve your goal. If you take
something as good axiomaticly, then you can use reason to derive other
statements of goodness or badness. However, axioms(assuming they are not
contradictory) are in themselves no more reasonable than any other.
For instance, suppose you say that hitler was immoral.
I say that hitler is moral.
You say "but he killed millions, which is immoral"
I say "but there is nothing wrong with killing, killing is moral."
What causes most people to prefer the position that killing is immoral here is
not reason, it is simply a preferrnce.
>2) How to you define objective reason?
The term was "an objective reason." For instance, in mroal system A, moral
system B is immoral. In moral system B, moral system A is immoral. Yet outside
of either moral system, there is no rational justification to prefer one system
over the other, and in this sense moral systems are not objective. Objective
means "in the object", in this case it can also mean "in the action." So
whether or not something is moral or not is not contained within the action, it
is simply dependant on the arbitrary moral system that you are judging from.
-User
CPK Smithies
Note that logic and mathematics, not just morality, are therefore open to a
similar charge of arbitrariness.
> For instance, suppose you say that hitler was immoral.
>
> I say that hitler is moral.
>
> You say "but he killed millions, which is immoral"
>
> I say "but there is nothing wrong with killing, killing is moral."
>
> What causes most people to prefer the position that killing is immoral
here is
> not reason, it is simply a preferrnce.
User seems to assume that in order to avoid being "arbitrary", a moral
principle must be deductively provable from some indubitable axiom or
axioms. This analysis fails to distinguish between moral questions and
questions of taste.
>
> >2) How to you define objective reason?
>
> The term was "an objective reason." For instance, in mroal system A, moral
> system B is immoral. In moral system B, moral system A is immoral. Yet
outside
> of either moral system, there is no rational justification to prefer one
system
> over the other, and in this sense moral systems are not objective.
For an interesting discussion of this position, which is known as
"conceptual relativism", see Roger Trigg's excellent _Reason & Commitment_.
This book takes the whole debate to a much more interesting level.
User 1DE7
>Date: 8/16/00 7:53 PM Central Daylight Time
>Message-id: <8nfd1s$7t9$1...@gxsn.com>
>Note that logic and mathematics, not just morality, are therefore open to a
>similar charge of arbitrariness.
Right, it cannot be said to be reasonable to assume the axioms that math or
logic are based on. However it is impossible for humans (so far as I know) to
even imagine a scenario in which some of the more basic ones are false.
.
>User seems to assume that in order to avoid being "arbitrary", a moral
>principle must be deductively provable from some indubitable axiom or
>axioms.
Not so. I will accept any sort of agument, inductive ones too.
If someone feels they have some argument showing how morality is based on
reason, let them present it in premise-conclusion format.
-User