In short: there's a security issue with OAuth, and the major OAuth
providers are working together to patch the vulnerability before
information about the issue is publicly released. That information
will be available at http://oauth.net/ at midnight, PST.
In cooperation with this consortium of other OAuth providers
(including Yahoo!, Google, Netflix, etc.), we agreed not to disclose
the nature of the vulnerability, nor even that a vulnerability
existed, until all members of the group agreed to do so. I apologize
for what must have seemed unnecessarily tight-lipped communication
around this issue, but please understand that we and the other
companies involved are trying to mitigate the impact of this
vulnerability as much as possible.
Please also note that our OAuth support is in beta, albeit public
beta. We have not suggested to developers that they rely solely on
OAuth until our support of the standard leaves beta. I know that some
companies practice a policy of "perpetual beta", but at Twitter, we do
not. For us, "beta" really means "still in testing, not suitable for
production use".
Thanks for your patience and understanding.
--
Alex Payne - API Lead, Twitter, Inc.
http://twitter.com/al3x
Can you at least disclose whether OAuth _consumers_ who leave their
OAuth callback endpoints up are exposing themselves to risk?
--
Dossy Shiobara | do...@panoptic.com | http://dossy.org/
Panoptic Computer Network | http://panoptic.com/
"He realized the fastest way to change is to laugh at your own
folly -- then you can let go and quickly move on." (p. 70)
--
Perfect, thanks.
Maybe something that could confuse users to give their user
credentials to a third party and not the real OAuth provider when they
think they are authorizing the consuming app.
The other idea is a possible man in the middle attack. I made a proof
of concept for something like that but it was to many steps to setup
to think anyone could ever deploy it.
Interested to hear what it is.
Zac Bowling
http://twitter.com/zbowling
We have to balance the reality of testing a new technology in our
stack with encouraging that technology's adoption. OAuth will provide
the Twitter developer community with a number of benefits, and that's
the direction in which we want to move, even while there are kinks to
work out.
--
Chris Latko
www.latko.org
... and it's still busted, thus Twitter and other OAuth providers
_yanking_ their OAuth support until they can fix it.
At least this will raise awareness of OAuth's existance - it's finally
made it to the mainstream media.
Still waiting for a good explanation of how to use OAuth in a
console-only, no-browser environment. Until then, I see that Basic
Auth should remain active.
--
Julio Biason <julio....@gmail.com>
Twitter: http://twitter.com/juliobiason
Thanks,
@dougw
--
Sent from my mobile device
Doug Williams
Twitter API Support
http://twitter.com/dougw
s/GMail/*.google.com/
--
------------------------------------ personal: http://www.cameronkaiser.com/ --
Cameron Kaiser * Floodgap Systems * www.floodgap.com * cka...@floodgap.com
-- The whippings shall continue until morale improves. ------------------------
This is _absolutely_ NOT true! An attacker can't get in the middle of
an application communicating to Twitter using HTTP Basic Auth. but they
can in an OAuth flow.
It's only "safer" in that you're not handing credentials to an otherwise
questionable third-party application. However, if you do trust a
third-party application and it uses OAuth, there is a non-zero chance
that an attacker can gain access to your Twitter account, without
needing your username or password, through the OAuth flow of your use of
the trusted application.
"Web 2.0: It's Beta."
(Forgive the pun, it's still early in the day ...)
WRONG. Anyone doing any sort of packet sniffing could easily get
user/pass combos at will. Wireless promiscuous mode + WireShark =
instant account hacking. This, of course, holds true only for http
transactions (and not https transactions), but there are a good number
of clients/apps that don't use the https endpoints.
Man in the middle attacks are certainly possible with Basic Auth as
well. They just eat the original request, steal the user/pass combo,
and do whatever they want with it.
-Chad
Packet sniffing as an attack vector is significantly more difficult to
achieve than the OAuth attack is. Defend against the more likely
threats before worrying about the less likely ones.
> Man in the middle attacks are certainly possible with Basic Auth as
> well. They just eat the original request, steal the user/pass combo,
> and do whatever they want with it.
This is a standard phishing attack, and standard advice for
anti-phishing applies here.
I wholeheartedly disagree. Sit in a tech conference room with a
laptop and sniff away at least a hundred accounts in under 5 minutes.
I'm not saying I've done it, but I'm not saying I haven't, either....
>
>> Man in the middle attacks are certainly possible with Basic Auth as
>> well. They just eat the original request, steal the user/pass combo,
>> and do whatever they want with it.
>
> This is a standard phishing attack, and standard advice for anti-phishing
> applies here.
No, phishing != man-in-the-middle. If I hack a router to intercept
all traffic headed toward twitter.com and then grok out the
credentials, this is has nothing to do with social engineering or
phishing... I've just screwed your account, and you have no idea how.
Obviously there are attack vectors with both methods, but I contend
that Basic Auth is much much much easier to attack than OAuth (even in
its current state, and even moreso when it is upgraded/patched to deal
with this new vector).
-Chad
Well, my *console*, *non-graphical* application is connected to the
internet, yes. Also, if that makes it clear, think about a headless
install.
> So are you just saying that you never want to
> have to display an HTML page?
If Lynx can display, so can I. But remember that there is no
copy'n'paste or anything of sorts in there.
--
Julio Biason <julio....@gmail.com>
Twitter: http://twitter.com/juliobiason