Honestly, most people (rightly or wrongly, i suspect rightly)
don't really worry about it that much. I don't really think a
boycott is likely to be effective.
Also, the chrisbrogan.com post confuses phishing with risk of
giving an evil service your password. They aren't really the same
thing.
For example, oauth type systems are generally considered to
raise the risk of phishing happening (because they involve
jumping the user all over the place to different sites) while at
the same time (if implemented well) they can reduce the impact
of a successful phish (by giving the user and the service more
tools to control usage) They're also substantially more difficult to
implement perfectly, raising the risk of code vulnerabilities.
Lots of tradeoffs well worth discussing (it's certainly a teaching
moment) but the level of run-in-circles-scream-and-shout is getting
to the point of being unhelpful.
-cks
--
Christopher St. John
http://artofsystems.blogspot.com
What exactly is wrong with an application (for Mac OS X in this case)
asking for a user's Twitter user name and password. Storing the
password in the OS X Keychain isn't hard at all and it is encrypted.
Have I really missed something important? Does this "fever" about
apps asking for passwords apply to desktop and web apps, or just web
apps? I'd really like to know whether or not my application would
suddenly become "evil" because it asked for an account password. And
yes, my app does inform the user that the password will be stored in
the Keychain and it uses HTTPS when talking to the Twitter servers.
Reply on list or off list, which ever works best for you.
Dale
Ed and I were sort of making that argument earlier.
> Have I really missed something important? Does this "fever" about
> apps asking for passwords apply to desktop and web apps, or just web
> apps? I'd really like to know whether or not my application would
> suddenly become "evil" because it asked for an account password. And
> yes, my app does inform the user that the password will be stored in
> the Keychain and it uses HTTPS when talking to the Twitter servers.
In my opinion (I don't work for twitter or speak for them), I think 3rd
party webapps have the most to gain from going OAuth, and desktop apps
probably have the least. This is why I'm hoping Basic Auth will persist, even
if in a limited or deprecated sense. It's not much good to make a desktop
app walk the OAuth workflow because frankly an evil client application can do
many more usefully evil things than simply being naughty with an OAuth token,
and in some situations might make it impossible for that app to operate in
a useful sense. (Think of all the little Twitter bots that are basically
curl and a shell script, but still do useful monitoring work.)
However, it *is* much more useful to make a 3rd party standalone web app do
it, and that's why Twitter is going to offer it.
--
------------------------------------ personal: http://www.cameronkaiser.com/ --
Cameron Kaiser * Floodgap Systems * www.floodgap.com * cka...@floodgap.com
-- We shoulda bought a squirrel. -- "Rat Race" --------------------------------
Christopher St John's comments above accurately reflect my own
concerns. OAuth is not a security magic bullet, and it only encourages
phishing attacks. I feel bad for users that have given their
credentials to a phishing site, and we'll do everything we can to
educate them, but token-based authentication systems are not going to
fix this particular security problem.
Getting worked up into hysterics about boycotts is just, as security
expert Bruce Schenier is fond of saying, "security theater". It's the
equivalent of an apartment building's tenants telling their landlord
they refuse to use keys because someone's place got broken into.
--
Alex Payne - API Lead, Twitter, Inc.
http://twitter.com/al3x
Because your app could be evil[1], and, right now, a Twitter password
is a non-expiring full-access read/write token. And somebody could
tweet something evil while masquerading as you. Of course, you
can always just change your password, but that's inconvenient. And
there's a chance you use the same password for Twitter and
your bank account.
> Have I really missed something important? Does this "fever" about apps
> asking for passwords apply to desktop and web apps, or just web apps?
>
Logically, it's just as risky to give your password to an evil desktop
app as it is to an evil web app (since the desktop app can always
transmit the password to a remote server) However, most of the
discussion has been about web apps.
> And yes, my app does
> inform the user that the password will be stored in the Keychain and it uses
> HTTPS when talking to the Twitter servers.
>
To be fair, an evil app could just as easily say (and even do)
that.
-cks
[1] In this contect, the word "evil" must be pronounced ala Time
Bandits "Mum! Dad! It's EVIL! Don't touch it!".
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v60-qRvmzKA
Christopher,
I agree with your points. As someone else on the list asked, what is
the solution to this issue? It doesn't really seem to be a technical
issue at all, but rather a trust issue.
Unless I have missed something you need the users password to post an
update to their personal timeline. If the application doesn't ask for
this information then how will their timeline get updated? Perhaps
someone has already provided that answer. I'll dig through the
archives tomorrow.
And with it being a trust issue you can extend that to a multitude of
things in terms of computer applications (desktop and web based).
Actually the real issue is the reputation of the entity that wrote the
application. It all comes down to public relations.
For my own self, or rather for my application, I feel pretty
comfortable asking users to enter their user name and password combo.
Can I prove I won't be doing anything evil with it? Yes, if I release
the source code (which is currently under consideration). If I don't
though then obviously I can't prove I'm not doing bad things with it.
Don't you just love moral dilemmas brought up by technology? :D
Thanks to all three of you for providing answers that were free of
scare mongering.
Dale
Getting worked up into hysterics about boycotts is just, as security
expert Bruce Schenier is fond of saying, "security theater". It's the
equivalent of an apartment building's tenants telling their landlord
they refuse to use keys because someone's place got broken into.
Ah, but what people _should_ refuse to do is give out copies of their
keys to those who are essentially complete strangers just to water their
houseplants or feed their cat while on vacation.
You should only give your key to someone trusted who then acts on behalf
of the stranger to let them in, watch them water the plants or feed the
cat, then ensure they exit your apartment without doing anything else.
Yes, tenants should tell their landlord that having to give out a copy
of their key is not acceptable, especially when the break-ins occured
using a copied key that was handed out.
Still, why do we care? It's just a Twitter account being compromised -
what, do you exchange trade secrets in DMs that you wouldn't want
someone else to read? Hint: Twitter isn't a confidential and secure
messaging transport. Don't try to pretend it is.
--
Dossy Shiobara | do...@panoptic.com | http://dossy.org/
Panoptic Computer Network | http://panoptic.com/
"He realized the fastest way to change is to laugh at your own
folly -- then you can let go and quickly move on." (p. 70)
You say this like it's a bad thing. If we want to see a solution from
Twitter, there has to be a real business reason for them to fund it.
What better business reason than "our API traffic dropped by 80% in one
month and has remained at that low level for the past three months."
Let the panic continue. Either we'll see a workable solution to the
problem, or folks will just stop using the API - either way, we'll
finally have some clarity on the situation.
You are participating in hysteria.
Sent from my drmPhone
Christopher St John's comments above accurately reflect my own
concerns. OAuth is not a security magic bullet, and it only encourages
phishing attacks. I feel bad for users that have given their
credentials to a phishing site, and we'll do everything we can to
educate them, but token-based authentication systems are not going to
fix this particular security problem.
Getting worked up into hysterics about boycotts is just, as security
expert Bruce Schenier is fond of saying, "security theater". It's the
equivalent of an apartment building's tenants telling their landlord
they refuse to use keys because someone's place got broken into.
Use an open source application, then. You can verify the source yourself.
--
Julio Biason <julio....@gmail.com>
Twitter: http://twitter.com/juliobiason
That's all we are asking for. Until there is a verify mechanism, yes, no app at all ever on the planet, including my favorite TweetDeck, should be trusted. Ever.