Fourth of July Reading Materials

[James M. Atkinson]

Here are the first 71 paragraphs of the Complaint which spells out the
law, in a way that most non-lawyers can understand it.

It is very good to read this over the Fourth of July holiday, and to
meditate on what the government is trying to do illegally.

"All animals are equal but some animals are more equal than others." -
George Orwell, "Animal Farm"

-jma

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

CASE# 11-CV-11073-NMG
2nd AMENDED COMPLAINT

1. Comes now the Plaintiff, JAMES M. ATKINSON, who is a U.S. Citizen by
birth; a civil libertarian; a disabled U.S. Veteran with Honorable
Service; Plaintiff Atkinson hereby allege as follows:

COMPLAINT

2. This action for deprivation of civil rights under color of law, and
also challenges to various unconstitutional Massachusetts statutes in
regard to the keeping and, or of bearing arms to the extent that they
prohibit otherwise qualified private citizens from keeping or carrying
arms for the purpose of self-defense.

3. This action is also for Civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (�RICO�) violations, violations of federal wiretapping
statutes, violations of the False Claims Acts or obtain Federal Funds,
and violation of electronic communications laws, Monopolies and
Restraint of Trade violations, Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. 1831
violations, as well as criminal violation of the laws and statutes of
the United States of America and of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts by
state agents, agencies, and private entities working in concert with the
state and acting under color of law.

4. Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, actual
damages, general damages, special damages, compensatory damages,
punitive damages, attorney�s fees, costs, and other relief this court
deems appropriate.

OVERVIEW

5. The right to arms is understood by all Americans, and recognized by
law to be a right, a privilege, and/or immunity of citizenship of the
United States.

6. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the 2nd Amendment right to
keep, and to bear or carry arms applies to the States by virtue of
application of the 14th Amendment, and thus neither the Federal
Government, nor any state agency, nor agent of the state may interfere
with the unqualified right to keep and bear arms.

7. Second Amendment rights are no different then First Amendment rights,
nor the 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, or 14th Amendments, nor for that
matter any other part of the Constitution or Bill of Rights.

8. The government cannot exercise prior restraint in either matters of
the First Amendment, nor in matters of the Second Amendment.

9. The government (neither State nor Federal) may not prohibit the
possession of a high volume printing press any more then they may
prohibit a high capacity firearm magazine, a high capacity feeding
device for a firearm, a high capacity firearm, nor a high capacity or
low capacity assault weapon.

10. A high volume printing press in and of itself is no more or less
dangerous than a high capacity firearm or a high capacity firearm
magazine. In both cases, a citizen is responsible or the use or misuse
of either, but the government may not impose prior restraint on either.

11. A printing press, arms of various sorts, and holy books are all
equally protected under the Bill of Rights. Not the States, nor the
Federal Government may outlaw or license a religion, may not mandate a
certain thickness or page count of the Holy Bible, nor the scripting of
prayers by the faithful, define the size of a Prayer Rug, mandate that
Mass be spoken in High Latin or English, nor impose the desires of the
Government in regards to religion or political choices, nor may they
impose undue control or restraint on the keeping and bearing of arms, or
of the press.

12. All firearms, arms, ammunition, accessories, or attachments utilized
by law enforcement for individual defense of the officer or for entering
homes, buildings, or vehicles are suitable examples that these same or
similar weapons are well suited for defense of the home of citizens.

13. The firearm itself, the configuration of the magazines, of feeding
devices, the ammunition used, and the manner it which it is deployed by
police officers are all evidence that a weapon is well suited for home
defense of citizens.

14. By their very design, firearms are dangerous, they are supposed to
be dangerous, and they are supposed to be deadly, any fool knows this.
People train to become proficient with arms in order to use them in a
dangerous and controlled manner, and in some cases a deadly manner. Any
assertions that a particular modern arm is more or less dangerous then
another is sheer and utter lunacy.

15. The �dangerousness� of any particular firearm lies in the intent of
the hands that wields it, and if those hands have evil intentions and
they lack access to one type of arm then they will turn to other weapons
and arms that are equally or more dangerous than firearms, but more
available to them.

16. Even a very small automobile or truck is dramatically more
dangerous, as a lethal weapon than a firearm, pistol, revolver, shotgun,
rifle, sniper rifle, or other related arms. The energy and mass of a
moving motor vehicle exceeds that of a bullet or pellet by many orders
of magnitude. Anybody who has professional training on arms and of the
tactical use of vehicles, or of combat driving, or protective driving
understands this well. Students at numerous government schools are
actually taught to utilize motor vehicles as readily available weapons,
and as a weapon that it dramatically more deadly than a firearm, or
other kinds of weapons or arms.

17. A high capacity magazine or feeding device is protected under the
2nd and 14th Amendment, the government may not dictate any aspect of the
arms that a person may choose for defense, not the ammunition feeding
device or magazine, nor the type of ammunition used. Yje Military and
the police routinely carry magazines with 15, 19, 20, 30, and even 40
round magazines, and there is no legitimate reason to obstruct the law
abiding public from possessing or carrying the same things. The U.S.
Supreme Court affirms this right, immunity, and privilege in both
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008), and McDonald
v. Chicago, 561 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010) decisions. Hence,
no State may restrict, control, or license either a high capacity
magazine, a high capacity feeding device, or any form of high capacity
firearm.

18. Any weapon used by a SWAT team for home or business entries of a
tactical nature and/or raids is strong evidence that the same weapon is
particularly suited for home defense. Otherwise, logically, the SWAT
Team would not be using such weapons.

19. Logically then, any and all firearms which a law enforcement
officer, or SWAT team member, would normally carry on a day to day basis
or deploy anywhere in the country, or which is endorsed for, sold for,
endorsed as, or in any way considered as a firearm suited for individual
law enforcement officers to carry or use is prima facia evidence that it
is suitable for home defense as it is generally accepted as safe for
citizens to keep, to carry, or to bear. The same holds true of any
firearm, magazine, feeding device, or ammunition in common use by law
federal, state, and local law enforcement officers, or the military, or
intelligence officers.

20. Under the equal protection clause of the Bill of Rights (14th
Amendment), the police are not entitled to any greater or lesser
protection than that of the common law abiding citizen. Nor may any law
abiding citizen be denied the ability to keep arms identical to, or
similar to those carried by the police of the military. In effect, by
application of the Equal Protections clause of the 14th Amendment the
citizens of the United States and allowed to possess arms, up to and
equally those issued to, carried by, authorized by, or used by members
of law enforcement or the various states or Federal agencies, or
Military. Thus, if a police officer or soldier is permitted to carry a
type of arm, then so are members of the public.

21. In McDonald v. Chicago, Justice Thomas states that:
�African Americans in the South would likely have remained vulnerable to
attack by many of their worst abusers: the state militia and state peace
officers. In the years immediately following the Civil War, a law
banning the possession of guns by all private citizens would have been
nondiscriminatory only in the formal sense. Any such law�like the
Chicago and Oak Park ordinances challenged here�presumably would have
permitted the possession of guns by those acting under the authority of
the State and would thus have left firearms in the hands of the militia
and local peace officers. And as the Report of the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction revealed, see supra, at 24�25, those groups were widely
involved in harassing blacks in the South.�

22. The U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Heller and in McDonald allows the
occupant of the home to determine which firearms are primarily useful
for home defense, and does not allow the government to dictate which
weapons be kept, or used in this regard. In fact, the law permits the
possession and use of not only firearms, but also that of any arms
available to the person.

23. This weapon selection is highly personal, and can range from little
more then a pointy stick, to an edged weapon, a bayonet, a sword or
cutlass, or if they so choose a firearm of the sort they feel is most
suitable.

24. Conversely, should a citizen feel strongly against the keeping, or
the bearing of arms they are well within their rights not to possess or
to carry same, but they may not impose their religious, philosophical,
and social choices regarding arms or self defense upon other citizens.

25. The state however, may not restrict the mere possession or �keeping�
of arms, nor can the state restrict the �bearing of arms� by normal law
abiding citizens, and at most may only control the manner in which they
are carried with a minimum of interference or control. The state is thus
prohibited from imposing any kind of licensing or permitting scheme to
either possess or to carry arms.

26. The state may not prohibit the keeping, carrying, or bearing arms,
but may, within very narrow considerations which involved the mode by
which the arms may be carried. The state may not mandate that firearm be
carried in an unloaded condition, as this would violate the Heller
decision. Thus, a citizen is allowed to maintain their arm, full loaded,
and readily available to use., and carried in a way that permits rapid
access and deployment. This then restricts the state into mandating is
arms may be openly carrier, or carried concealed, or carried covertly.
The State could under Heller, mandate that a High ride holster should be
used, or that a drop rig is mandate, but they may in no way restrict of
control the actually act of carrying or bearing of said arms.

27. At most the state may impose certain controls to keep arms out of
the hands of convicted felons or those who are adjudged insane, but they
may not otherwise control, license, or ban arms.

28. The Bill of Rights, and the interpretations and decisions of the
U.S. Supreme Court does not permit the state to prohibit the possession
of a Holy Bible, the Torah, or the Quran, or any other holy book which
the state may not like, but may control the retail sale of such to a
very limited extent. Nevertheless, the State cannot control or license
mere possession nor use of said holy books.

29. There is no requirement under the law to obtain a license for any
sort for a holy book of any religion or denomination, not a Bible, not a
Sermon Book, not a Prayer Book, not a Psalm book, or a Crucifix, or
prayer rug, not Statues, not candles, not high capacity church pews, not
ornate prayer rugs, not pipe organs, not grand pianos, not banners, not
musical instruments, nor Arks, not standards, not religious iconography,
not bells, not chalices, not fonts, not baptisms, not incense, not
crosses, not religious symbols, not stained glass, not wafers, not
hosts, not a hiram, not relics, not a Yarmulkah or Yarmulke, nor Chalice
Paten, nor Communion Paten, nor Ciborium, nor Host Box, nor Missal, nor
Chasuble, nor Albs, nor Altar Cloths, nor Purificator, nor Finger
Towels, nor Bread Trays, nor Cup Trays, nor Bema, nor Shulcahn, nor Ner
Tamid, nor Corporals, nor Amices, nor Palls, nor Cincture, nor Oil
Stock, nor Pyx, nor Menorah, nor Kiddush Cup, nor Vademecum, not head
dresses, not a hijab, not vestments, nor Tallit or Tallis, nor choir robes.

30. Neither is any government permission or license, or ID card (which
is a defacto license if it can be revoked) required for keeping Holy
Bibles or other religion artifacts in ones home, or to bear them up or
carry them in practice of ones chosen religion.

31. The Bill of Rights, and the interpretations and decisions of the
U.S. Supreme Court does not permit the state to prohibit the possession
of a modern printing press (or Holy Bible) which the state may not like,
but may control the retail sale of such a press should it be overly
dangerous to operate, or should the Holy Bible be printed of plastic
explosive sheets, or be in an inherently dangerous form. However, the
State cannot control or license mere possession of said printing press
(nor of the Holy Bible), nor for that matter arms of various types.

32. There is no requirement under the law to obtain a license of any
sort for a printing press ownership, not for a quill pen, not a bottle
of ink, not a fountain pen, not a sheet of paper, nor an inkjet printer,
or even a high capacity laser printer, nor high capacity word processor,
nor even a super computer. Not type faces, not type, not metal plates,
not inking pads, nor composing sticks, not type cases, nor other tools
of the printing trade.

33. Neither is any government permission or license, or ID card (which
is a defacto license if it can be revoked) required to keep arms in ones
home, or to bear them up or carry them in defense of others, or even in
defense of the State.

34. The Second Amendment �guarantee[s] the individual right to possess
and carry weapons in case of confrontation,� District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008), and is �fully applicable against the
States,� McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010).

35. However, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts steadfastly refuses to
update the statutes of Massachusetts to reflect either the District of
Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. Chicago U.S. Supreme Court decisions.

36. The Commonwealth continues to arrogantly, and illegally ignore both
the Constitution of the United States, the Bill of Rights, and the
decisions of the Supreme Court, to the level that the Commonwealth
exhibits an attitude, and conducts legal matters related to firearm with
utter disregard for the civil rights of the citizens, complete, willful
arrogance in regards to the 2nd and 14th Amendments, and even bolder
affront to the U.S. Supreme Court, and even the Constitution of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, whereby the Commonwealth now chooses
merely to ignore the ruling by this nations highest court, and to
harass, molest, arrest, charge, indict, and incarcerated citizens who
are lawfully in possession of arms.

37. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts further demonstrates their evil
intentions by foisting a ruse of various licensing scheme that exists
for no reason but to deprive law abiding citizens of defensive arms in
their home or businesses.

38. As if this arrogance of the Commonwealth could not run more afoul of
the U.S. Constitution; the Bill of Rights; Freedmen�s Bureau Act of 1866
(which acknowledged the existence of the unqualified right of all
citizens to keep, carry, or bear arms); the various rulings of the U.S.
Supreme Court; and Massachusetts Constitution, Part The First, Article
XVII, the Commonwealth continues to unlawfully and with ill and criminal
intent forcibly and with deceit enter law abiding businesses, and homes
of citizens who are fully qualified by law to possess arms, and to take
those arms away by force and by deception in direct violation of Federal
law, and they do so with the approval of the Attorney General of the
Commonwealth, and with a approval of the District Attorneys, who then
empanel Grand Juries, so that the Attorney General and District
Attorneys are �making law� and trying to illegally force precedent, and
misusing the Grand Jury system for political power and social controls,
instead of obeying the law themselves. In some cases, the police or the
district attorneys will trick a Judge or Magistrate into issuing a
search warrant or an arrest warrant, even when it is prohibited by law.

39. The Commonwealth encourages law enforcement officers to lie and to
perjure himself or herself in order to gain arrest or search warrants,
and to confect a gross deception on the court system. These law
enforcement officers do this knowing that neither the District Attorneys
nor the Attorney General will prosecute then, even when they are caught
in this state sponsored deception and perjury.

40. Plaintiff seeks to establish that the recognition and incorporation
of the Second Amendment � the right to possess and carry weapons in case
of confrontation � renders the State�s present regulatory choice
unconstitutional. Whatever the contours of a constitutional scheme might
be, the Second Amendment renders a ban on the keeping and, or carrying
or arms, or firearms impermissible.

41. Plaintiff seeks immediate declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

42. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ��
1331, 1343, 2201, 2202; 42 U.S.C. � 1983; 18 U.S.C. �� 1961-1968, 31
U.S.C. �� 3729�3733, 47 U.S.C. �� 2.1-1305, and 18 U.S.C. �� 2510-2522.

43. This Court has personal jurisdiction over each of the Defendants
because, inter alia, they acted under the color of laws, policies,
customs, and/or practices of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and
political sub-divisions, and/or within the geographic confines of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

44. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. � 1391 because virtually all
of the Defendants may be found in this district, and because the events
and omissions giving rise to this action are State laws enacted in the
State capital of Boston.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
AND PRIOR CASE LAW

45. The Constitution of the United States was adopted on September 17,
1787, by the Convention in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and ratified by
conventions in each U.S. state in the name of "The People." The
Constitution has been amended twenty-seven times; the first ten
amendments are known as the �Bill of Rights.�

46. The Constitution of the United States was ratified by the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts on February 6, 1788, with a vote of 187
for, and 168 against, and thus became law.

47. The Bill of Rights was introduced by James Madison to the 1st United
States Congress in 1789 as a series of legislative articles and came
into effect as Constitutional Amendments on December 15, 1791, through
the process of ratification by three-fourths of the States.

48. On March 2, 1792, Massachusetts became the 12th state to ratify the
Bill of Rights, which included provisions for the public to be allowed
to keep, and the bear or carry arms.

49. The Second Amendment of the Constitution (the Bill of Rights) provides:
�A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.� - U.S. Constitution Amendment II.

50. The Second Amendment guarantees individuals a fundamental right to
carry operable arms in all non-sensitive public places for the purpose
of self-defense.

51. The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified and passed into law on July 9,
1868. Thus the 14th Amendment was accepted by the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts as law.

52. Under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Bill of Rights
(including the 2nd Amendment), must be obeyed by the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, and others, and forbids the making or enforcing any law
which infringed on any immunities or privileges of citizenship:
�All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.�

53. The Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the requirements of the Second
Amendment against the States and their units of local government, and
political sub-divisions. McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct.
3020, 3042 (Jun. 28, 2010).

54. Thus, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts is prohibited from making or
enforcing any law, which abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens to keep, carry, and to bear arms of their choosing (with
extremely narrow limitations). Thus, any such laws are automatically
null and void, and an infringement of the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States.

55. In explaining why examining the history of the right to bear arms in
England was necessary, the Heller Court stated that

"it has always been widely understood that the Second Amendment, like
the First and Fourth Amendments, codified a pre-existing right.''

And, in further describing the scope of the Second Amendment, the Court
again pointed to the First Amendment for several direct analogies, all
indicating similarities rather than differences between the two
provisions: Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2791-2792
�Just as the First Amendment protects modern forms of communications ...
the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that
constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the
time of the founding. The First Amendment contains the freedom-of-speech
guarantee that the people ratified, which included exceptions for
obscenity, libel, and disclosure of state secrets, but not for the
expression of extremely unpopular and wrong-headed views. The Second
Amendment is no different. �

�There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and history, that
the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear
arms. Of course the right was not unlimited, just as the
First Amendment's right of free speech was not.... Thus, we do not read
the Second Amendment to protect the right of citizens to carry arms for
any sort of confrontation, just as we do not read the First Amendment to
protect the right of citizens to speak for any purpose. �

56. If those passages were not enough, the Heller Court also quotes
approvingly from an 1825 Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court opinion
and an 1868 constitutional law treatise that make the direct analogy
between the right to bear arms and the freedom of the printing press:
Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304, 313-14 (1825))
�The liberty of the press was to be unrestrained, but he who used it was
to be responsible in cases of its abuse; like the right to keep
firearms, which does not protect him who uses them for annoyance or
destruction.�

�The [Second Amendment] clause is analogous to the one securing the
freedom of speech and of the press. Freedom, not license, is secured;
the fair use, not the libelous abuse, is protected.�

57. The States retain the ability to regulate the manner of carrying
handguns within constitutional parameters; to prohibit the carrying of
handguns in very specific, narrowly defined sensitive places; to
prohibit the carrying of arms that are not within the scope of Second
Amendment protection; and, to disqualify specific, particularly
dangerous individuals (convicted criminals and the adjudged mentally
insane) from carrying handguns.

58. The States may not ban, nor compel a license to possess or carry
handguns or other arms for self defense, may not deny individuals the
right to carry handguns or other arms in non-sensitive places, may not
deprive individuals of the right to carry handguns in an arbitrary and
capricious manner, or impose regulations on the right to carry handguns
or other arms, or impose any licensing scheme of any sort which that are
inconsistent with the Second Amendment.

59. Another reason that the Heller decision is appropriate for the Court
to consider in free press cases is that Heller's approach is, in fact,
very similar to how the Court has already discussed the Free Press
Clause, in those relatively few cases in which the history of the Free
Press Clause has come up. The Supreme Court has recognized that a
prepublication licensing requirement-a prior restraint-is a violation of
the First Amendment," reminiscent of the history of abuses of the
British Crown under the notorious Printing Acts. As Justice Scalia
explained: Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 320 (2002)

�The First Amendment's guarantee of "the freedom of speech, or of the
press" prohibits a wide assortment of government restraints upon
expression, but the core abuse against which it was directed was the
scheme of licensing laws implemented by the monarch and Parliament to
contain the "evils" of the printing press in 16th- and 17th-century
England. The Printing Act of 1662 had "prescribed what could be printed,
who could print, and who could sell.�

60. The States also may not restrict, or license the possession of
firearms, pistols, rifles, revolvers, swords, foils, daggers, or other
useful arms that the citizen selects as being most suited to their own
defense, and which have been historically useful in defending the home
or business.

61. The States are not allowed to dictate which weapons may or may not
be kept within the home, only that certain overly unstable or overly
dangerous firearms (by reason of a design flaw). For example, a large
carriage-mounted, decrepit, badly corroded and cracked cannon would be
most unsuited for defense inside the home; however, any modern shotgun,
rifle, pistol, revolver, or edged or impact weapons or other weapons
this is in good repair and/or commonly used by the police or the
military would be well suited to home, business, and property defense.

62. In Archuleta v. Wagner, 523 F.3d 1278, 1282 (10th Cir. 2008)
�[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are
granted a qualified immunity and are shielded from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.� Id. at 1282-83 (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609
(1999)). �Once the qualified immunity defense is asserted, . . . the
plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant�s actions violated a
constitutional or statutory right� and that �the constitutional or
statutory rights the defendant allegedly violated were clearly
established at the time of the conduct at issue.�

63. In determining whether a constitutional right was clearly
established, we look at the specific context of the case. Bowling v.
Rector, 584 F.3d 956, 964 (10th Cir. 2009).
�A plaintiff can demonstrate that a constitutional right is clearly
established by reference to cases from the Supreme Court, the Tenth
Circuit, or the weight of authority from other circuits. There need not
be precise factual correspondence between earlier cases and the case at
hand, because general statements of the law are not inherently incapable
of giving fair and clear warning. The right must only be sufficiently
clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing
violates that right.�

64. Further in Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 700 (10th Cir. 1990) the
court states.
�The requisite causal connection is satisfied if the defendant set in
motion a series of events that the defendant knew or reasonably should
have known would cause others to deprive the plaintiff of her
constitutional rights.�

�Any official who �causes� a citizen to be deprived of her
constitutional rights can also be held liable.� Snell, 920 F.2d at 700
(quotation omitted).

65. The 10th Cir. Court has demonstrated causation by showing an
affirmative link between the constitutional deprivation and the
officer�s or government officials exercise of control or direction.

66. The Supreme Court has already ruled on this matter, and poses the
first question of conduct in Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999);
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998); Siegert v.
Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991). The threshold inquiry is whether the
plaintiff's allegations, if true, establish a constitutional violation.
Hope v. Pelzer, 122 S. Ct. 2508, 2513 (2002); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.
194, 201 (2001); Siegert, 500 U.S. at 232. In the first question, The
right to keep and bear arms is a defacto �Constitutional Right� under
the 2nd and 14th Amendments, and any infringement or deprivation attempt
by any government official or government agency �pierces and rips
asunder the veil� of either absolute immunity, qualified immunity,
prosecutorial, and even judicial, or immunities of any other types or
descriptions. Hence, any government officer, employee, or agent that
violates, or attempts to violate a citizen�s Constitutional right does
so at the cost of forfeiting all forms of immunity of their office or
position, and hence they stand naked and vulnerable before the court,
with no immunity of any form whatsoever.

67. The second question by the Supreme Court is whether the right was
clearly established before the time of the alleged violation. That
question is necessary because those acting under color of authority
should be on notice that their conduct is unlawful before they are
subject to suit. Hope, 122 S. Ct. at 2516-18; Anderson v. Creighton, 483
U.S. 635, 638-40 (1987). On the second Question by the Supreme Court is
that if the right being �clearly established� in that the right is
understood by the common man, is well ingrained into the training of any
member of the military or law enforcement, and in fact is taught in most
High School civics and government courses. In short, the question is
that is it a commonly understood, and commonly accepted civil right. The
answer in this case is that indeed, most high school graduates would
recognize the right, as would any member of the military, most college
graduates, and as would all police officers in the Town of Rockport, or
elsewhere. The question of whether a right is clearly established is an
issue of law for the court to decide. Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510,
516 (1994), but it can be assumed that the state actors were well aware
that the right was indeed �clearly established� or � well understood� by
them.

68. The third question is whether a reasonable agent of the state,
acting under color of law, similarly situated, would understand that the
challenged or prohibited conduct violated that established right. Swain
v. Spinney, 117 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1997). On the third question, the
reasonableness inquiry is also a legal determination, although it may
entail preliminary factual determinations if there are disputed material
facts (which should be left for a jury). Swain, 117 F.3d at 10.

69. �[T]he concept of due process is equivalent to �fundamental
fairness.�� Newman v. Massachusetts, 884 F. 2d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 1989)
(citation omitted). Due process requires that impacted individuals be
�entitled to the Constitutional minimum of �some kind of hearing� and
�some pre termination opportunity to respond.�� O�Neil v. Baker, 210 F.
3d 41, 47-78 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting Cleveland Bd. Of Educ. v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (footnote omitted). �The ubiquity
of the �notice and opportunity to be heard� principle as a matter of
fundamental fairness is deeply engrained in our jurisprudence.� Oakes v.
United States, 400 F. 3d 92, 98 (1st Cir. 2005) citations omitted.

70. In Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 105 (1934), the Court
spoke of rights that are �so rooted in the traditions and conscience of
our people as to be ranked as fundamental.� As the Supreme Court has
found in the McDonald, and Heller decisions, the right to keep and bear
arms, particularly within the sanctity of one�s home, is an ordered
liberty of United States citizenship fundamental and beyond the pale of
discretionary, subjective regulations by the States.

71. Plaintiff Atkinson, respectfully submits that any statutory scheme
which invades the fundamental liberty right of self defense within the
home by enacting any scheme which attempts to regulate the possession
and/or storage of any firearm(s) providing a basis to interfere in any
way or attempt to revoke or impinge upon such a right without the barest
of fundamental fairness and due process such as a Loudermill type
hearing, is fatally flawed and wholly prohibited under the application
of the Second Amendment to all of the States in light of the newly
decided authority contained herein. Under the present status of
jurisprudence, in light of newly decided authorities, it is respectfully
submitted that without a prior showing cloaked with the fairness of a
Loudermill type hearing that an individual is either a convicted felon
or legally and previously adjudged insane, any interfere with a
Massachusetts citizen�s unqualified right to keep arms within the
sanctity of the citizen�s home is per se unreasonable and prohibited.

72. Although McDonald�s five Justice majority reached the conclusion
that the right to keep and bear arms is a protected liberty interest
under the Second Amendment in different ways, under either the Due
Process Clause or Privileges or Immunities Clause, a majority confirmed
that �the Second Amendment right is fully applicable to the States.�
McDonald at 3026. Where a �fourteenth amendment liberty interest is
implicated�the state therefore must adhere to rigorous procedural
safeguards.� Valdivieso Ortiz v. Burgos, 807 F. 2d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1986);
see also Kuck v. Danaher, 600 F. 3d 159, 165 (2d Cir. 2010) (same).

73. The Supreme Court�s prior restraint doctrine mandates higher standards:
�It is settled by a long line of recent decisions of this Court that an
ordinance which� makes the peaceful enjoyment of freedoms which the
Constitution guarantees contingent upon the uncontrolled will of an
official � as by requiring a permit or license which may be granted or
withheld in the discretion of such official � is an unconstitutional
censorship or prior restraint upon the enjoyment of those freedoms.�

[snip]

--
James M. Atkinson
President and Sr. Engineer
"Leonardo da Vinci of Bug Sweeps and Spy Hunting"
Granite Island Group
jm...@tscm.com
http://www.tscm.com/
(978) 546-3803