After further though, I have identified some additional Must
requirements for a dualmode system not included in either the CEETI list or
your list. They are as follows:
1. Easy and rapid emergency escape from any stalled or burning vehicle
without external assistance for all passengers to an safe emergency walkway
and ultimately to the ground.
2. 100% effective emergency vehicle steering even in the case of loss of
complete electrical power.
3. Fault tolerant and self-healing control systems that allow any failure
to be detected and overcome to the point that the vehicle can reach a siding
where it can exit the main guideway. Such failures should be reported to
central control centers where appropriate action can be taken by human
monitors.
4. Provisions to prevent any vehicle from being blown by wind from the
guideway or derailing.
5. Capability of all vehicles to operate in reverse when necessary to clear
guideways in the event of some catastrophic failure of a vehicle or a
section of the guideway.
6. Guideway life of, at least, 100 years without need for maintenance that
would require the guideway to be shut down for more than a very few hours.
That includes that there be no need for painting or significant reapairs of
any sort. Wear items should be on the vehicle rather than the guideways.
7. Essentially silent operation to persons on the ground.
8. Resistance to guideways from being broken or collapsing during anything
other than the most severe earthquakes.
9. Normal operation under any weather conditions other than the most severe
hurricanes.
10. Desirable that standby emergency power generators be provided to enable
vehicles to be moved to stations at, at least, reduced speed and one at a
time if necessary,
11. Battery operated guideway controls and communication and communications
within vehicles to enable emergency communications at all times between
passengers in vehicles and central control center personnel.
Kirston Henderson
MegaRail®
> Jerry,
>
> After further though, I have identified some additional Must
> requirements for a dualmode system not included in either the CEETI list or
> your list.
Oops! It should read "further thought." Too early for good
proofreading.
Kirston Henderson
MegaRail®
>
> Forgive me but this list of "must requirements" sounds like it's designed
> to make MegaRail the only qualifier. I find the "walkway" requirement
> totally bogus.
The requirements that I stated were requirements that we have imposed on
all of our systems because we consider them to be required features. These
requirements were not designed to make MegaRail® the only qualifying system,
but MegaRail was designed to meet all of these requirements and many of them
were difficult to meet and required a significant design and development
effort.
With regard to emergency walkways, we would love to eliminate them from
our systems because they are a significant cost item. Unfortunately, we
have never been able to find any other fully safe means of providing for
safe escape of passengers in emergency situation. If you know of some other
fully acceptable alternate, we would be pleased to learn of it. For one
thing, you can't depend upon fire rescue personnel to be available to rescue
perhaps hundreds of thousands of stranded passengers that could occur with
some sort of massive power failure. Please don't try to suggest that each
car have enough battery power available to move it the nearest stations,
because the car may have failed for some other reason than power failure.
Thus, such an approach is not acceptable.
Kirston Henderson
MegaRail®
-----------------------------------------------------
The important question has to do with an ability
to get passengers to safety quickly, in the event
that a system-wide failure occurs. Assuming that
there would be thousands (or many more) of
vehicles stopped, it seems to me that any system
has to provide for a feasible and desirable
evacuation capability. The same is probably true of a partial system shutdown.
To me this means much, much more than a few fire
trucks and ladders which certainly could not
handle the job. How it is to be done is NOT the
issue. How can you expect to get a system
approved that could not provide for an evacuation
of thousands of people sitting in stalled,
hot/cold vehicles that, in some cases, they will
not be able to get out of - and if they do,
cannot get down to the ground easily and safely?
When I look at the apparent physical fitness
level of the population these days, I see lots of
people who I suspect would not be able to manage
to use evacuation methods that require some
reasonable levels of physical agility and
strength, including walking several miles.
Can it be proved that the probability of an event
that would shut the whole or a major part of a
system down is zero? Or, 99.9%. Or some lower
level? Maybe so. That would seem to be one
alternative - but it would take some doing to prove it.
Or would every vehicle have to carry battery
power sufficient to move it to the nearest
station or egress ramp, with the air conditioning
or heating system on, and then on to a storage
facility/area so that other vehicles could get
off the system. In the case of a dual mode
system, the egress ramps might be as much as 5 miles apart.
Or can a system recovery technique be designed
that can quick fix the problem, allowing a
system-level startup to be performed within
something like a maximum of 30 minutes, while
passengers are kept informed about progress, to avoid a panic of some short?
There may be other alternatives that would work.
In some cases, systems carrying only freight
(e.g. perishable items) might also be required to
prove that they can handle a whole or partial system shut-down event.
The requirements for dealing with this issue
might come from a government agency or from an
insurance carrier, or both - at least in the
U.S. It might not be a problem in some other countries. Who knows?
One final point. Any evacuation scheme must also
make sure that it cannot be easily used in
reverse to insure that people cannot use it to
gain access to the elevated automated guideway,
for whatever actions that they might wish to undertake.
><<mailto:kirston....@megarail.com>kirston....@megarail.com> wrote:
>
>on 6/10/08 2:50 PM, Dennis Manning at
><mailto:john.m...@comcast.net>john.m...@comcast.net wrote:
>
> >
> > Forgive me but this list of "must requirements" sounds like it's designed
> > to make MegaRail the only qualifier. I find the "walkway" requirement
> > totally bogus.
>
> The requirements that I stated were requirements that we have imposed on
>all of our systems because we consider them to be required features. These
>requirements were not designed to make MegaRail® the only qualifying system,
>but MegaRail was designed to meet all of these requirements and many of them
>were difficult to meet and required a significant design and development
>effort.
>
> With regard to emergency walkways, we would love to eliminate them from
>our systems because they are a significant cost item. Unfortunately, we
>have never been able to find any other fully safe means of providing for
>safe escape of passengers in emergency situation. If you know of some other
>fully acceptable alternate, we would be pleased to learn of it. For one
>thing, you can't depend upon fire rescue personnel to be available to rescue
>perhaps hundreds of thousands of stranded passengers that could occur with
>some sort of massive power failure. Please don't try to suggest that each
>car have enough battery power available to move it the nearest stations,
>because the car may have failed for some other reason than power failure.
>Thus, such an approach is not acceptable.
>
>Kirston Henderson
>MegaRail®
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>--
>new contact info: <mailto:andre...@gmail.com>andre...@gmail.com
>
>
>
Sergey Prokhorenko
> I guess if you used a third rail (which you have previously stated was
> superfluous) to by-pass a disabled vehicle you wouldn't have hundreds of
> thousands of people stuck on the rails. I would also suggest that you should
> consider back-up generators like our system has so massive power failures
> wouldn't affect operations. Or you could include another of our features
> which is that the batteries are fully charged in the case there is a power
> failure.
> My point...each system has its own peculiar characteristics...Jerry
> Schneider's list needs to be an inclusive list not an exclusive list. For
> you to push the characteristics of your system as "must" items is
> inappropriate.
Jay,
If you provide enough third guideway and switches to provide the sort of
by-pass capability, you will probably have just further increased the cost
of the system by the number of switches used. You can go that way if you
like, but I suggest that you take a good look at the total cost involved.
We also provide a limited amount of back-up power generation, but I am
enough of a realist to know that even if you do that, conditions may still
arise in which that backup capability may either fail or not be useable.
We do not intend to provide batteries in our vehicles, except for the
dualmode types, and that leaves a lot vehicles without propulsion power.
Including and maintaining batteries in all vehicles increases both new and
maintenance cost.
As far as Must Requirements, do you want such a propulsion battery
requirement added? If CEETI had followed their assignment from TxDoT to
study dualmode systems, I suppose that each vehicle would have been required
to have contained some sort of self-power. In the case if our own systems
designs, we are providing for both dual and single mode vehicles so that
automatically removes our systems from consideration.
But back to the reason behind by original Must Requirement of providing
Emergency Escape Walkways, I continue to believe that such are necessary to
enable people to escape from a stalled, or perhaps, burning car. Remember
that we have seen some pretty close calls over the last few years in the
case of fires. Remember the Seattle Monorail car fire. After than, the
fire departments of both Seattle and Las Vegas that were working on more
monorail systems made emergency walkways a requirement for elevated
transportation systems. I would not be surprised to now find such a
requirement to be widespread in fire codes.
Perhaps the most sensible thing to do is to forget entirely about
attempting to set forth any set of requirements and continue to allow each
company to establish their own design requirements as has generally been the
case in the past.
Kirston Henderson
MegaRail®
> I know of one other safe alternative. How far is it straight down to the
> ground? Ships use rope ladders, approved by all marine insurers, but I dont
> think it is too hard to make a little improvement on that.
Rope ladders are fine for most people as long as you never have to make
the guideway higher than the length of the ropes. They are pretty useless
to a lot of very young and to many handicapped people. By the way, are
those rope ladders considered acceptable for passenger liners and if so, why
do they have such strict lifeboat and lifejacket requirements?
Kirston Henderson
MegaRail®
My guess at this stage for PRT the emphasis should be on performance, and
let the several "hows" get considered as part of competitive candidates to
meet the specs at the systems level. Thus the several approaches to rescue
that have been discussed are design options to meet a safety performance
standard.
Scanning Jerry S's original list the items are primarily performance
oriented. The "Musts" especially. The "Shoulds" are a mix. #'s 5, 6, 13, 15,
19, for example fall considrably in the design spec category.
I realize in the the real world this distinction may be trumped by some
existing requirements which were evolved over time for rather different
approaches, and very different technology. (Railroad rules applied to PRT
for example).Those will just have to be dealt with as time goes on.
Walt Brewer
----- Original Message -----
From: "Kirston Henderson" <kirston....@megarail.com>
To: <transport-...@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Wednesday, June 11, 2008 3:27 PM
Subject: [t-i] Re: Additional Dualmode Requirements
Kirston, you have it backwards....you just never make the ropes shorter
than the height of the guideway.
Jack,
Ships use fall chutes, airplanes use inflatable slides. Some time ago we tried to convince the Italian Ministry of Transport that chutes were safe for operation on elevated systems, to get rid of walkways. They objected that chutes and slides were OK if they were addressed to trained personnel like ship sailors or if a trained person was present like flight attendants. This was not the case for automated systems so the proposal was rejected
Cheers, Luca
| I am curious as to what kind of emergencies your are proposing which can not be handled by either an escape chute (the modern ladder) or simply pushing the disabled vehicle to the next station? Note that a wide area power black out is why you need a back up power source. Having all the customers exit their vehicles where they stop during a blackout is a very bad idea . --- On Wed, 6/11/08, Kirston Henderson <kirston....@megarail.com> wrote: |
From: Kirston Henderson <kirston....@megarail.com> |
| I agree.... those 6 year olds in the playground are so much more clever than any adult.... --- On Wed, 6/11/08, Luca Guala <gu...@systematica.net> wrote: |
From: Luca Guala <gu...@systematica.net> |
Michael
|
Ø I agree.... those 6 year olds in the playground are so much more clever than any adult....
In a certain way… they are, and certainly they are more hazard prone than most MOT officials. In another way, I’d like to write something about bodyweight, bone structural resistance and kinetic energy but I understand that you don’t like complicated explanations Cheers Luca |
I am curious as to what kind of emergencies your are proposing which can not be handled by either an escape chute (the modern ladder) or simply pushing the disabled vehicle to the next station? Note that a wide area power black out is why you need a back up power source. Having all the customers exit their vehicles where they stop during a blackout is a very bad idea .
----- Original Message -----
From: "Luca Guala" <gu...@systematica.net>
To: <transport-...@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Thursday, June 12, 2008 11:06 AM
Subject: [t-i] R: [t-i] Re: Additional Dualmode Requirements
>
Do you have data such as daily and peak hour ridership, capital cost,
operating cost? How long is it?
Walt Brewer
----- Original Message -----From: Kirston Henderson
| The point being that even 6 year olds can manage to use slides. It does not require "professional" knowledge. |
--- On Thu, 6/12/08, Luca Guala <gu...@systematica.net> wrote: |
Michael
|
Ø
The point being that even 6 year olds can manage to use
slides. It does not require
"professional" knowledge. Actually my 2 ½ years old daughter tackles slides very well. When I tried to follow her once, I managed to hurt an ankle and damage my jacket. Now I stay at my place, alongside the slide like all parents. A child seems capable of doing with no harm many things that would kill an adult. There is a physical explanation for this but it is not very simple. Moreover children do it for fun while people escaping a stranded vehicle probably have a different psychological attitude. The position of the Italian MOT officials is that adults may not be able to deploy the chute, and even if they do, they can easily get hurt sliding down. If a trained attendant is present to help them down, then the number of accidents will be reduced but on an automated driverless vehicle, they claimed, this is not possible. Given the risk adversity of Ministry officials, we didn’t insist further. Cheers, Luca |
| Why would an earthquake affect an on-vehicle battery back-up? Why would there ever be a fire in the passenger cabin? Sounds to me like you have a bad design. |
--- On Thu, 6/12/08, Kirston Henderson <kirston....@megarail.com> wrote: |
From: Kirston Henderson <kirston....@megarail.com> |
Jack,
Ships use fall chutes, airplanes use inflatable slides. Some time ago we tried to convince the Italian Ministry of Transport that chutes were safe for operation on elevated systems, to get rid of walkways. They objected that chutes and slides were OK if they were addressed to trained personnel like ship sailors or if a trained person was present like flight attendants. This was not the case for automated systems so the proposal was rejected
Jack
> You have to be kidding. Perhaps the people who sail ships take an hour or two of training when they are hired, but from to autopsies of accidents that I have seen it is long forgotten before they ever have to use it.
It took the Captain of the Andrea Doria about 5 hours to figure out that his ship was sinking, and by then the list was so bad that the lifeboats on one side could no longer be launched.
Airlines require that flight attendants are trained to deploy the slide and help passengers down them. If you refer to the Andrea Doria as an example we can just as well start discussing of steam engines. That ship sunk 52 years ago. We are supposed to be a transport innovators list.
I get your point, that authotities think that slides need trained people to operate them. That is really B/S. Every kid knows how ro use a slide at age 2.
The B/S is to compare the two things only because they look similar. Firstly, children are having fun, adults escaping an airplane or elevated vehicle are most probably in panic. Have you ever seen a person in panic? I have. Not a nice sight. Secondly, an adult human weighs 5 to 10 times more than a child, if a foot or hand gets trapped, the flexure moment on the bones is 10 to 30 times greater. Yet an adult’s bones are only 2-4 times more resistant to flexure than a child’s. Junctures are even more vulnerable. Thirdly, an amusement park slide is typically 2 m high at most. An elevated transit system runs at 6-8 m or more above ground. Fourthly, children with mobility problems do not use the slides, adults with mobility problems do use transit, so do the elderly, pregnant women, obese persons, etcetera.
Just to put things in the right perspective, I am the one who tried to convince the Italian MOT that fall chutes were a safe means of escape from elevated automated, unattended transit vehicles, not the one who rejected the idea.
Cheers
Luca
> Why would an earthquake affect an on-vehicle battery back-up? Why would there
> ever be a fire in the passenger cabin? Sounds to me like you have a bad
> design.
Michael,
To answer your questions: 1, Some catastrophic event, such as a severe
earthquake could damage sections of guideway leaving cars no place to go; 2,
Fires can be started in many ways, for instance by passengers carrying some
flammable items (including items of clothing) and smoking; and 3, with
regard to your insulting remark about our design, I suggest that you get
busy and develop some perfect design.
Kirston Henderson
MegaRail®
> From a posting long ago: The quickest way to get people out of a vehicle that
> has a problem is to have it auromatically exit at the next station, which is
> less than 15 seconds down the line.
>
> Additionally, in some of our systems there is nothing to cause a fire. In
> mine, Tad's, Ed Andersons, and also in Doug Malewicki's I think, all of the
> electrical and power supplies are separate from the vehicle, and a fire in one
> of the components would not spread to the passenger compartment. I don't think
> we should spend billions to prevent something which may never happen.
If you all can get by local fire codes and fire marshals, go ahead and
build you systems as you please. As for us, we intend to play it on the
safe side.
By the way, I can recall from recent memory, fires aboard an
over-the-road bus that killed several, a near-fatal fire in a car of the
Seattle monorail, and fires in airliners. The designers of those system
probably believed that they had created safe designs.
Kirston Henderson
MegaRail®
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schwebebahn_Wuppertal
You can read the accident history - all five of them including when an
elephant went crazy.
No fires mentioned and no walkways either. Imagine that!
Dennis
----- Original Message -----
From: "Kirston Henderson" <kirston....@megarail.com>
To: <transport-...@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Friday, June 13, 2008 8:05 AM
Subject: [t-i] Re: Additional Dualmode Requirements
| If the section of guideway is damaged how are they going to be able to walk on twisted walkways? BTW, your dual beam guidway is going to suffer a lot more damage than a monobeam design in an earthquake. And, yes, there is historical pecident for that statement from earthquakes in Japan. Smoking has been banned on public conveyances in the US for many years. Smoke and it's go directly to the nearest police station. It should be very near impossible to have a fire in a well designed cab. And what ever happened to the idea of an automatic fire extinguisher system in the bogies and cabs? |
--- On Fri, 6/13/08, Kirston Henderson <kirston....@megarail.com> wrote: |
From: Kirston Henderson <kirston....@megarail.com> |
| 1) fires aboard an over-the-road bus that killed several.... I take it then your system is similar to a 64 passenger bus? 2) a near-fatal fire in a car of the Seattle monorail...... Your technology is no better than what existed in 1962? 3) fires in airliners...... I'll bet that any cabin fire started in the galley. On top of which, this simply goes to prove (as all 3 examples do) that mass transit is a very bad idea. |
--- On Fri, 6/13/08, Kirston Henderson <kirston....@megarail.com> wrote: |
From: Kirston Henderson <kirston....@megarail.com> |
Let's add the several types of computer glitches that are likely
(some software, some hardware), that might occur for a system with
several thousands of vehicles in operation and several thousands of
people making inputs and doing any number of other unusual/unexpected
things while using the system, and some possibility of people trying
various ways to vandalize, trick or subvert the system to injure it
or to avoid paying a fare or for other nefarious reasons. Tornados,
torrential downpours and severe lightning storms also come to mind.
Also, one needs to consider the problem of restarting a system with a
large number of stalled vehicles on it, many occupied with
passengers. Maybe, some of the vehicles would be in tunnels as well.
Ideally, one would need some kind of evaluation by a panel of
liability insurance experts to assess the risks - which is sort of
what the Masdar consultants are doing now with their "what could go
wrong" exercise (I think). And a deep understanding of the attributes
of the people who would be system users. What are their capabilities
and phobias and so on.
- Jerry Schneider -
Innovative Transportation Technologies
http://faculty.washington.edu/jbs/itrans
> Let's add the several types of computer glitches that are likely
> (some software, some hardware), that might occur for a system with
> several thousands of vehicles in operation and several thousands of
> people making inputs and doing any number of other unusual/unexpected
> things while using the system, and some possibility of people trying
> various ways to vandalize, trick or subvert the system to injure it
> or to avoid paying a fare or for other nefarious reasons. Tornados,
> torrential downpours and severe lightning storms also come to mind.
> Also, one needs to consider the problem of restarting a system with a
> large number of stalled vehicles on it, many occupied with
> passengers. Maybe, some of the vehicles would be in tunnels as well.
>
> Ideally, one would need some kind of evaluation by a panel of
> liability insurance experts to assess the risks - which is sort of
> what the Masdar consultants are doing now with their "what could go
> wrong" exercise (I think). And a deep understanding of the attributes
> of the people who would be system users. What are their capabilities
> and phobias and so on.
I doubt that there really any people who can anticipate or predict all
of the things that can go wrong, including starting fires. For one thing,
there is absolutely no way that I can think of to absolutely assure that a
cabin fire can not occur, even when using the very best available
technology. By the way, most of the airliner fires that I am aware of all
started with electrical wiring inside the cabin. It would be very difficult
to build any type of cabin for anything without some wires for such
functions a lighting, door operation, etc.
The matter of product and design liability is a very real issue. As a
matter of fact, I just had a conversation on this same subject with our
insurance agent today because she wanted to be sure that I was aware of the
sort of coverage we are going to need as soon as we field a system.
Kirston Henderson
MegaRail®


----- Original Message -----From: Michael Weidler
----- Original Message -----From: Jack SladeSent: Saturday, June 14, 2008 2:43 AMSubject: [t-i] Re: Additional Dualmode Requirements
Kirston: I know that fires can be fatal, at times, in existing transportation methods. I don't know of any of these machines that have really been built with the object of making them as fire-proof as possible, although you and the general public may think so.Can you name me any system that has been built with an automatic fire extinguisher in the compartment where fire can occur? I can't think of even one. Even in aircraft the fire can be burning for several minuites before the crew notices it, and deploys the extinguishers, and I know of no ground-based system that is equipped, either.I think we can do a lot better, without asking too much of existing technology.You have mentioned earthquakes. I have done a lot of thinking about that, also, and have come to the conclusion that nothing can be made totally safe when one occurs. However, burning vehicles will certainly not be the main problem. Let me know if you find experts that disagree with this opinion. The one fact that stands out is that flexibility survives better than rigid structures, but I don't know how far I can go with flexible support pillars.
Jack Slade
Kirston: I know that fires can be fatal, at times, in existing transportation methods. I don't know of any of these machines that have really been built with the object of making them as fire-proof as possible, although you and the general public may think so.
Can you name me any system that has been built with an automatic fire extinguisher in the compartment where fire can occur? I can't think of even one. Even in aircraft the fire can be burning for several minuites before the crew notices it, and deploys the extinguishers, and I know of no ground-based system that is equipped, either.
You have mentioned earthquakes. I have done a lot of thinking about that, also, and have come to the conclusion that nothing can be made totally safe when one occurs. However, burning vehicles will certainly not be the main problem. Let me know if you find experts that disagree with this opinion. The one fact that stands out is that flexibility survives better than rigid structures, but I don't know how far I can go with flexible support pillars.
| Well, dang! I need to break out my Beatles albums since we seem to be stuck in the 60's. --- On Fri, 6/13/08, Eric Baumgartner <eri...@shaw.ca> wrote: |
|
----- Original Message -----From: Michael WeidlerSent: Sunday, June 15, 2008 6:29 PMSubject: [t-i] Re: Additional Dualmode Requirements
2) a near-fatal fire in a car of the Seattle monorail...... |
I wonder if anyone is aware of the details of the Seattle monorail accident. It is worth reading , as a case study. What happened caused only minor casualties. The reason for the accident was a mix of human error and outright planning stupidity. It this accident had happened to any other “ordinary” vehicle in the same circumstances, it would have had much worse consequences. The Seattle monorail was an extremely safe system, made unsafe by an alteration to the line. The criticism came from the fact that the passengers had to wait for a cherry picker before being evacuated and many panicked because there was a small fire caused by the seizure of a brake. The fire did not spread and was anything bur near fatal. Nobody got burnt nor suffered seriously from inhaling the smoke. Instead of rebuilding the line as it was before the stupid alteration, the monorail was blamed and was shut down. RegardsLuca |
2) a near-fatal fire in a car of the Seattle monorail......
Your technology is no better than what existed in 1962?
I wonder if anyone is aware of the details of the Seattle monorail accident. It is worth reading , as a case study. What happened caused only minor casualties. The reason for the accident was a mix of human error and outright planning stupidity. It this accident had happened to any other "ordinary" vehicle in the same circumstances, it would have had much worse consequences. The Seattle monorail was an extremely safe system, made unsafe by an alteration to the line. The criticism came from the fact that the passengers had to wait for a cherry picker before being evacuated and many panicked because there was a small fire caused by the seizure of a brake. The fire did not spread and was anything bur near fatal. Nobody got burnt nor suffered seriously from inhaling the smoke. Instead of rebuilding the line as it was before the stupid alteration, the monorail was blamed and was shut down.RegardsLuca
> I wonder if anyone is aware of the details of the Seattle monorail accident.
> It is worth reading , as a case study. What happened caused only minor
> casualties. The reason for the accident was a mix of human error and
> outright planning stupidity. It this accident had happened to any other
> "ordinary" vehicle in the same circumstances, it would have had much worse
> consequences. The Seattle monorail was an extremely safe system, made unsafe
> by an alteration to the line. The criticism came from the fact that the
> passengers had to wait for a cherry picker before being evacuated and many
> panicked because there was a small fire caused by the seizure of a brake.
> The fire did not spread and was anything bur near fatal. Nobody got burnt
> nor suffered seriously from inhaling the smoke.
I doubt that the people on board that day would agree. They clearly had
a close call with regard to danger of smoke inhalation. I am attaching a
copy of a news photo showing passenger laying on the floor in the open
doorway attempting to escape the smoke. There is one woman holding onto the
door jamb with one hand while she has most of her body and a small child in
the other arm holding it out away from the dense smoke. Except to the
availability and rapid response of the Seattle Fire Department, the
situation could have rapidly become far worse.
Kirston Henderson
MegaRail®
Jerry,
THAT modification which you mention, i.e. bringing the rails too close to allow passage of two cars, was done to allow rising a new large building which, incidentally, also blocked the view around the corner so that the driver of one monorail car had to rely only on a green light to know that the passage was free. I learnt that in English this is called “an accident waiting to happen” and there it was. Two monorail cars got badly stuck one against the other but incredibly, they did not derail. A train or LRT would have derailed. A derailment on an elevated track is not nice.
So the reason for that stupid modification was, as is often the case, money.
Cheers
Luca
Da: transport-...@googlegroups.com [mailto:transport-...@googlegroups.com] Per conto di Jerry Roane
Inviato: lunedì 16 giugno 2008
19.28
A: transport-...@googlegroups.com
Oggetto: [t-i] Re: R: [t-i] Re:
Additional Dualmode Requirements
-----Messaggio originale-----
Da: transport-...@googlegroups.com
[mailto:transport-...@googlegroups.com] Per conto di Kirston
Henderson
Inviato: lunedì 16 giugno 2008 20.53
A: transport-...@googlegroups.com
Oggetto: [t-i] Re: R: [t-i] Re: Additional Dualmode Requirements
on 6/16/08 5:41 AM, Luca Guala at gu...@systematica.net wrote:
A fire on a vehicle appears to be a scenario to be taken into account
for any system (no matter how well you do your engineering).
Robbert
Luca Guala schreef:
Jerry,
THAT modification which you mention, i.e. bringing the rails too close to allow passage of two cars, was done to allow rising a new large building which, incidentally, also blocked the view around the corner so that the driver of one monorail car had to rely only on a green light to know that the passage was free. I learnt that in English this is called "an accident waiting to happen" and there it was. Two monorail cars got badly stuck one against the other but incredibly, they did not derail. A train or LRT would have derailed. A derailment on an elevated track is not nice.
So the reason for that stupid modification was, as is often the case, money.
Cheers
Luca
Da: transport-...@googlegroups.com [mailto:transport-...@googlegroups.com] Per conto di Jerry Roane
Inviato: lunedì 16 giugno 2008 19.28
A: transport-...@googlegroups.com
Oggetto: [t-i] Re: R: [t-i] Re: Additional Dualmode Requirements
Luca
money. The only noticeable flaw I saw was the windshield sections on the corners had been fabricated with some waves in them but other than that they looked good. The person driving the car was just a regular worker looking person. I asked lots of questions and tried to snag a monorail trinket or two. This monorail goes right down the middle of a busy downtown street at second story window level of some major department stores and I did not hear one complaint from the locals about visual intrusion. The locals don't ride it because they don't live at the space needle and shop at the wharf but tourists do during tourist season. The re-route was simply mind numbingly moronic. Whoever thought that one up should be sent to moron prison. It is unbelievable that they would build two tracks too close together for the cars to pass each other on that short section of track. Crazy does not start to explain that one. They certainly did not ask an engineer. If anyone knows the person who authorized that modification to the guideway I would be curious to know what went wrong in the room that that was decided. They certainly did not ask me I would have given them that one for free. duh!
This story is taken from Sacbee / Opinion.
More than three years ago, the city of Elk Grove introduced with much fanfare one of the nation's first fleets of hybrid gasoline-electric buses.
The city sidelined all 21 of its hybrid buses last fall. Elk Grove officials say the decision was made after four of them actually caught fire and another 25 to 30 other "thermal incidents" were reported.
With the clarity of hindsight, it's easy to conclude that the city's decision to buy an untested new technology was a mistake. But does that mean that the city also made a mistake when it broke away from Regional Transit and started its own transit service? The clarity of hindsight makes this an easy call as well. The answer is an emphatic "no."
No matter how you measure it, Elk Grove's transit service, known locally as e-tran, has been a success.
Bus ridership has soared from 565,000 in 2005, the year e-tran began service in Elk Grove, to more than 1 million riders in 2007 – nearly double the number of riders in just three years.
When RT provided exclusive bus service in Elk Grove, 25 percent of residents lived within a half mile of a bus stop, the distance transit officials say people are willing to walk to take a bus. Today, 90 percent of Elk Grove residents live within a half mile of a bus stop.
E-tran's fleet of commuter buses whisks Elk Grove residents not just to their jobs in downtown Sacramento but to job centers in Rancho Cordova as well.
The transit success in Elk Grove is not Elk Grove's success alone. Regional Transit has been an active and necessary partner. E-tran buses use RT's bus stops and fueling stations, and both transit operators honor the other's transfers.
The benefits of e-tran go beyond Elk Grove as well. It has been a boon for the entire region. More bus riders in Elk Grove means fewer cars on freeways we all use and less pollution in the air we all breathe.
Untested hybrid gasoline-electric buses failed Elk Grove but, clearly, e-tran has not.
Go to: Sacbee / Back to story
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Phone: (916) 321-1000
We are trained as kids here to drop and crawl in case of a fire so the passengers were doing the right thing to stay low under the smoke. They were doing what they were supposed to do but again the moron in charge putting the tracks too close together I guess skated free. I did not hear of any jail time for that genius move.
> Kirston
> We seem to agree on everything: I wrote nobody got burnt or suffered
> seriously from inhaling smoke. As far as I know there were no casualties nor
> serious harm. You do not seem to imply the contrary. You add that this was
> mainly thanks to the quick response of the fire brigade. Clearly the people
> on board would have much liked to have an escape walkway but after the
> accident the vehicle was recovered and repaired proof that the situation did
> not really get much worse.
It was not long after that that both the Seattle and Las Vegas fire
departments placed hard requirements the future monorails have escape
walkways. The Las Vegas system was nearing completion and they were forced
to essentially retrofit walkways to the monorails beams.
I have receive a lot of flack from various members of this discussion
group in recent days because of MegaRail'® provision of escape walkway in
the center of our guideways. I believe that is important at this point to
say that these same walkways also serve as work platforms for workers during
final assembly of the system in the air and provide an important barrier to
prevent objects, including chunks of ice, from becoming deadly missiles to
people below for high-speed versions. By the way, in our case the cost of
these walkways is less than 1/2% of the installed cost of the guideway. I
consider that to be a very small price for the increased safety.
I have seen some recent chat about PRT vehicles on fire being directed
to the nearest station. That doesn't work well for high-speed cross-country
versions where stations may be ten to 15 miles apart. Furthermore, all of
vehicles will be equipped with passenger operated emergency stop buttons to
call for on-line stops when essential.
Kirston Henderson
MegaRail®
| Care to bet that they were TOLD to get on the floor to avoid the smoke? In case you didn't know, smoke rises. |
--- On Mon, 6/16/08, Kirston Henderson <kirston....@megarail.com> wrote: |
| Ummm... how does a bus have a "spontaneous fire"? What exactly caused these fires? --- On Mon, 6/16/08, rob...@2getthere.eu [2getthere] <rob...@2getthere.eu> wrote: |
From: rob...@2getthere.eu [2getthere] <rob...@2getthere.eu> |
Après bien d'autres, j'ai identifié quelques Doit
exigences d'un système dualmode soit pas inclus dans la liste ou CEETI
votre liste. Ils sont comme suit:
1. Facile et rapide d'évacuation d'urgence à partir de n'importe quel véhicule en panne ou de brûlure
sans aide extérieure pour tous les passagers d'une passerelle de sécurité d'urgence
et, finalement, à la terre.
2. Efficace à 100% des véhicules d'urgence de direction, même dans le cas de la perte de
compléter l'énergie électrique.
3. Tolérance de pannes et d'auto-guérison des systèmes de contrôle qui permettent de tout manquement
à détecter et à surmonter au point que le véhicule peut atteindre une voie d'évitement
où il peut sortir de la principale guidage. Ces défaillances doivent être signalés à
centres de contrôle central, où des mesures appropriées peuvent être prises par l'homme
moniteurs.
4. Dispositions pour empêcher tout véhicule d'être soufflé par le vent de la
de guidage ou de déraillement.
5. Capacité de tous les véhicules à fonctionner en sens inverse lorsque cela est nécessaire pour effacer
guidage en cas de défaillance catastrophique d'un véhicule ou d'un
de la section de guidage.
6. De guidage de la vie, au moins, 100 ans, sans nécessité d'entretien
il faudrait le chemin de guidage à être arrêté pendant plus de quelques heures.
Cela comprend qu'il n'y ait pas besoin de peinture ou des reapairs de
aucune sorte. Porter des objets devrait être sur le véhicule plutôt que le guidage.
7. Essentiellement, un fonctionnement silencieux à des personnes sur le terrain.
8. Résistance à la rupture de guidage ou de quoi que ce soit lors de l'effondrement
autres que les plus graves tremblements de terre.
9. Fonctionnement normal, en vertu de tout autre que les conditions météorologiques les plus sévères
ouragans.
10. Souhaitable que les générateurs de puissance de veille d'urgence être fournies pour permettre
véhicules pour être déplacé à des stations à, au moins, une vitesse réduite et à un
temps, si nécessaire,
11. Piles de guidage de contrôles et de la communication et de la communication
dans les véhicules afin de permettre les communications d'urgence en tout temps entre
passagers dans les véhicules et le centre du centre de contrôle personnel.
Kirston Henderson
MegaRail ®