I can understand why a network rather than a group would appeal to Stephen Downes who performs the important role of a commentator, working from a base in an academic world where being published and cited is what is rewarded.
-- Sean FitzGerald Tel: +61 (0)2 9360 3291 Mob: +61 (0)404 130 342 Skype: seamusy Second Life: Sean McDunnough Email: se...@tig.com.au Website: http://seanfitz.wikispaces.com/ If we could see the miracle of a single flower (or child) clearly, our whole life would change. -- Buddha
...before teachers can become the control freaks that "most" of them are...(hi leigh! :-))))
> And yes, I know, it says Google Groups.
>From where i'm sitting it now says Google Groups BETA, which must mean
that you guys are in ALPHA ... you dogs! i'm feeling so emasculated by
it all I think i'll go and start my own page, or add a file ... hmmm...
any podcasts of interest handy ... is this an LMS?
http://groups-beta.google.com/group/teachAndLearnOnline/
brent
I do think as Minh says there are qualitatively different ways of being
grouped. To me a networked perspective represents a lesser commitment
to time, collaboration and group identity than a community. Networks
associate and share but for me communities go beyond associations to
work together. I was taken by the term used much by Jim Gee of
"affinity groups". He prefers this term to "community" and thinks it
more aptly describes what is happening in the plethora of things people
call communities. I think if we used "affinity groups" and
"communities" as the distinctions then the picture might become clearer
for both in terms of our own participation in them.
As Leigh suggests, I too think identity is built in affinity groups and
communities but I think the one is broad where the other is deep. I
think we need both kinds of groups. Not every aspect of our identity
needs us to associate as deeply as community might require. To this
end, Etienne Wenger suggests the next big concern is not whether
community exists but how do we manage multimembership. He has described
being connected to more people than he can productively maintain
relationships with. I am a member of about 15 groups (affinity and
community) but I can rally only manage active participation in about 4
maybe 5 at any one time. The rest of the time I drop to the periphery
in the other groups and treat them as networks (loose ties and
commitment). That changes with time and different groups move up in
priority and activity. I spend a lot time being guilty that I do not or
cannot commit the time to the memberships I have. I liken this to
charities. I would love to be able to give to them all but I had to
make a decision to select two or three and support them more fully,
keep a watching brief on others and review my position regularly. So I
agree with member multimembership is the next big problem.
So the upshot of my ramblings - is something a community or an affinity
group? Maybe it's all in the perspective of the person answering the
question at the time. That's why it's so slippery.
Hiya,
I think that people misunderstand what I mean by autonomy.
It's like when I talk about learner-designed learning. People seem to
assume I
am talking about casting learners unaided into the sea to fend for
themselves.
As though they could never ask for advice. As though there would never
be
anyone willing to guide them or support them.
The same with autonomy. The presumption is that what I mean is a person
who is
an island, who does not depend in any way on others, who is ruggedly
individualistic. Some sort of weird Ayn Rand fantasy of epistemological
superhumans, a Nietzsche-inspired fantasy about people being able to
completely
determine, with no input from anyone or anything, what is true, what is
right,
what is good.
But that's not what I mean at all. Nothing close. That's why I have
included openness
and connectedness as additional criteria for epistemic
goodness. That's
why I talk about communities and networks at all. I do
believe
that the contributions of other people are important and essential. I
am well
aware how much external influences - yes, including media and
advertising - can
and should help determine our thoughts and beliefs. I would even draw
you a
picture depicting the causal relationships, how sensations effect
neural
states. Like this: http://www.mb.jhu.edu/yoshioka/media/wiring.gif
From:
http://www.mb.jhu.edu/yoshioka/somato.asp
For one thing, maintaining an opposite point of view is irrational.
Given what
we know of human cognition, there are no belief states that are
completely
independent of our experiences. We are not born (contra
Descartes and a
whole school of misled Rationalists) with ideas burned into our brain,
like
some sort of mark of the Creator. What we come to believe is caused by
what we
experience. Our mental contents are reflections, perceptual echoes, the
materials of our experiences playing back against each other, mixing
and
mashing and reforming.
In just the say way, contrasting autonomy with determinism is
irrational. When I say that somebody's contribution to a network was
'not
autonomous', I do not mean that they are under some sort of mind
control, a
robot at the whim of some Svengali. Yes, again, it is true that all
mental
states are caused by perceptions and experiences. But it does not
follow (and
should not be inferred) that all mental states are determined
by these
perceptions and experiences.
These sorts of extremes - complete independence, and complete
dependence - are
the result of what I might call a naive causal view of the world. This
is the
view (that all of use were taught as children) that the world operates
like
clockwork. That when you do something, there is a knowable and
determinate
effect. A causes B. And if there is a B, then there must be some
determinate A
that caused it. But the world isn't like that. Once events reach a
certain
level of complexity, the story about causation breaks down.
Consider, for example, a bolt of lightning. We have all (I presume)
seen
lightning, and know that it occurs during a thunderstorm. We are told
that the
cause of the lightning is the buildup of electrical charge in the
thundercloud.
The thundercloud, in turn, is caused by the buildup of water droplets
in the
air, condensation caused by the interaction of a warm and humid air
mass with a
cold front, this cold front in turn caused by the rotation of the Earth
and the
uneven heating of the Sun.
I remember once, one hot July night in Edmonton,
returning home from the Power Plant, mad at the world and just wanting
to get
away, I saw the lightning flashing south of the city and jumped into my
car to
go chase it. A couple hours later I was out on the flat prairie, the
lightning
bolds shooting straight down, huge, towering, overwhelming bolts from
the sky.
I got out of my car and walked around the field, feeling the rain pelt
against
my face, watching the bolts streak down, one after the other, feeling
so
terrified by the storm I was at the same time one with it, part of it.
And I asked myself, had I been struck by lightning at that point, what
would
have been the cause of it? Would it have been the dismissive behaviour
of those
around me in the bar? Would it have been some irrational perception on
my part?
Would it have been my foolish walk around the field in a thunderstorm?
Would it
have been the buildup of an electrical charge in a cloud? Would it have
been
the uneven heating of the Earth by the Sun? What would have caused that
bolt
to have that impact at that time? And the answer is:
nothing.
That when we say this thing caused that thing we are placing an
interpretation,
based on some gross oversimplification, on the state of affairs.
There is no contradiction between saying that our thoughts and
experiences are
caused, and saying that we make choices. This becomes especially the
case when
we see that our choices in turn result in new thoughts and experiences.
What we
are is that entity (that amorphous assemblage of neural connections
that, when
thought of as a unit, can be seen as recognizing input and creating
output)
that recognizes certain states of affairs as states of
affairs -
as things, as causes, as Herman from next door.
So when I am talking about one thing being autonomous from others, I am
not
talking about the one thing being free from the causal influence of
others, but
rather, I am telling a story about how it is that the input of that one
thing
to the network as a whole is determined, and more accurately, how it
should be seen
as determined, how it should be regarded as determined, how -
were we
building a network of some sort - it should be enabled or permitted
to be determined. When I say something is 'determined' or 'not
determined' I am
talking about, not some essential state of nature, where all things are
one of
These or one of Those, but rather, how we should consider that
thing to
be.
What was the cause of the lightning? If it was determined, then
something made
it strike at that time in that place. If it was undetermined, then the
storm decided
to hurl a lightning bolt at that time (neither wording really satisfied
- and
yet these are the words we have to work with, because our bias toward a
naive
causal view of the world is built into the language). What I want us to
do,
with respect to humans, is to take the attitude that the storm
decided
to hurl the lightning bolt. Not as an uncaused completely indeterminate
event
(because obviously it's not) but rather, seen this way, as a grounded,
meaningful event (indeed, the source of meaning).
What does that mean in practice? It means that we ascribe to ourselves
the
possibility of choice (in fact, Gestalt alternatives,
oscillating
ways of seeing the world, the decision to perceive a duck rather than a
rabbit), that this choice will be ascribed as the cause of our
external
actions, including especially our contributions to the network, in the
sense
that "When I say 'A' it is me that is saying 'A', and not some
other person saying 'A' through me." In other words, we are saying that
we
see the origin of 'A' as being located inside ourselves rather than
external to
ourselves. It would be like saying that the cause of the lightning bolt
is in
the storm - it isn't some direct consequence of warm and cold air
masses, and
it wasn't in some sense 'drawn out' by some foolish person walking in a
field
tempting fate.
What this means in practice is that there ought not be an
identifiable
dependence (that is, an explainable correlation) between what someone else
says
or does, and what you say or do.
Think of it as akin to the distinction between being told to do
something, and having someone suggest that you do something.
These two
circumstances may be perceptually indistinct. In each case, a person
leans over
to you and says, say, "You should vote no." And then you utter
the words, "I vote no." The difference between the two states is one
of interpretation, one where we decide as observers or as participants
to apply
one frame to it, as opposed to another. The difference between thinking
to
ourselves, on hearing the words, 'I have no choice' as opposed to 'I
have a
choice'.
In order for it to be possible for a person to rationally say that 'I
have a
choice' there must, in fact, be a choice. It much be possible
for
the person to have uttered some statement other than the one that was
suggested. This implies, first, that some sort of consideration or
processing
of the suggestion occurs, and second, that as part of that
consideration,
alternative actions emerge as genuine possibilities. So that
you could,
as a rational person, see two possible and acceptable states of
affairs, one
where you said 'I vote no' and one where you said 'I vote yes' (and
even one
where you decline to vote at all).
What would prevent you from having that choice? First, your input might
be in
some way circumvented. For example, when somebody purports to express
your vote
for you, but substitutes their own point of view for yours. Second,
your input
might be coerced. For example, when the consequences of uttering 'I
vote yes'
are so horrible that it cannot be considered as a viable alternative.
Third,
you might fail to consider or process the request. For example, you way
respond
automatically because you have been conditioned or hypnotized in some
way.
Now again, it is important to keep in mind, what these scenarios
describe are ways
of seeing a situation, as opposed to three ontologically distinct
types of
entities. This is not some sort of taxonomy that I am offering (I don't
offer
taxonomies). These are three vectors you can consider to be more or
less the
case such that, when the preponderance of the interpretation is in one
direction, the choice was non-autonomous, and when the preponderance of
the
interpretation is in the other direction, we say the choice was
autonomous.
And these vectors are very much matters of point of view. To take the
most
obvious case, what constitutes 'so horrible that it cannot be
considered as a
viable alternative'? This clearly will vary depending on the person's
point of
view. Some people may be prepared to tolerate anything but death or
dismemberment. Others would not fear the same being done to themselves,
but
with fold at the thought of it happening to a loved one. Others would
not
consider expulsion or exclusion by a group to be tolerable. Being
singled out
as the lone dissenter might be unbearable for some. These circumstances
- what
counts as too horrible - is a matter of interpretation.
So when a person, acting as a node in a network, wishes to participate autonomously
in a network, what this means is that this person would prefer
that, on
the whole, (a) their utterances be expressed to other members of the
network
accurately, (b) that there not be sanctions or punishments for making
certain
utterances, and (c) the be afforded the time and the capacity to
consider
matters in their own light before making an utterance.
So when a person, building or designing a network, wishes the
participants to
participate autonomously, what this means is that they would
tend to (a)
ensure each member's voice is communicated accurately and completely,
(b)
create a space or mechanism for that person such that they are shielded
from
sanctions or retributions, and (c) ensure they are presented with
information in a timely manner and given the tools (including the
education and
the background knowledge necessary) to make informed decisions.
These considerations explain why I tend to disfavour small groups. See
also
Konrad Glogowski, 'To Ungroup a Class'.
http://www.teachandlearn.ca/blog/2006/10/03/to-ungroup-a-class/ Small
groups
tend to fail on all three counts. First, when the decision of a group
is reported,
the view expressed is often the reporter's (and there are no mechanisms
in place to prevent that). Second, for some people (namely, me) small
groups
create greater pressure to conform (especially when the group
is given a
task to perform or an outcome to produce). And third, the process is
often
constructed in such a way as to prevent consideration of the matter at
hand -
wither there is no time to present such considerations, or the
considerations
are overwhelmed by group members who have not taken the time to
consider.
I haven't talked here about why autonomy is necessary in
well-functioning networks. The long story is probably the subject for
another
day. But in a nutshell, the response is this: better decisions are made
when
more perspectives and more variables are taken into account. Each
person in a
network brings new perspectives and variables to the table. This,
increasing
the number of people in the network improves the functioning of the
network.
If, however, their participation is not autonomous, then the impact
of
those perspectives and variables are never brought into play. They are
overridden by whatever entity is creating the non-autonomous behaviour.
This
weakens the network, because of the missing perspective, and worse, it disguises
this weakening because the individual entity may be perceived as
autonomous,
even when not.
Explicitly knowing that we are interdependent informs my notion of autonomy.
Data collected | Indicators of “good health” |
List membership at end of month | Increase or stability depending on stage of community development (new or mature) |
Number of new members during the month | A steady or increasing number of new members indicates good health |
Number of members left (and reasons if known – members were automatically sent an email if they unsubscribed, asking for reasons) | Generally lower than the new members and for reasons of natural attrition rather than dissatisfaction |
Number of messages posted | More is not necessarily better! Over time an optimum level of traffic became apparent. This would not necessarily be the same for all communities. Some people become intolerant of too much traffic |
Number of individuals posting messages (raw number and as percentage of membership) | Ideally there will be contributions from a range of people |
Number of individuals posting 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or more messages | Multiple postings may indicate ongoing active engagement (desirable) but too may indicated an overly dominant member. |
Number of messages posted by list facilitator (raw number and as percentage of total number of messages) | The facilitator ought not to be overly dominant. However, there may be a level of direct stimulus needed to sustain quality activity. |
Deepest thread – topic and number of messages | Generally, the deeper the thread, the higher the quality of debate and engagement |
Most popular topics | This often informed the choice of structured activities as a response to self identified needs |
Top 10 posters | Ideally not always the same 10 people! |
[Source:http://globalsummit.educationau.edu.au/globalsummit/papers/jbowes.htm]
... another pebble lands in the pool!
Cheers,
Irena
* I could not provide a URL for
Stephen Downes' New Zealand 'unfconference' groups/networks whiteboard
model - the only reference I can give is to suggest searching on Google
for 'stephen downes oldaily groups networks new
zealand' - I could not get to this page by using the search bars on
www.downes.ca)
rgrozdanic <rgroz...@gmail.com>
Sent by: teachAndL...@googlegroups.com 15/10/2006 02:22 PM
|
|