A Critique of Kantian Moral Philosophy

[Gandalf Grey]

Any analysis of Kant's moral views will have to deal with both formulations
of the Categorical Imperative. This essay will attempt to do that.
However, insofar as Kant's moral views are also a representative philosophy
of Direct and Indirect Duties, I will postpone more general remarks on
Duties-based [deontological] philosophies to a later time. My assumption is
that, even if we are to accept Duties-based moralities as being sound moral
systems, the Categorical Imperative is not a necessary assumption on which
to premise that belief. Indeed MOST moralities previous to the modern era
are deontic in nature in that they all are premised on moral obligations.
My conclusion on Kant's theories is that they are deontic only in an
inadvertent sense. Kant's Categorical Imperative actually moves the
individual into a realm of moral judgement that is substantively MORE than
merely deontic.

We have seen that Kant's First Formulation of the Categorical Imperative
takes the following form:

CI1. Whenever I act in a moral situation, I will act in such a way that the
rule [maxim] by which I act could be consistently willed to be a universal
natural law.

We have seen that Kant believed that it is logically inconsistent to will
the universalization of immoral acts into universal natural laws. One
problem that arises with respect to this assumption leads to a valid
question of whether or not consequences ever count? Kant uses one example
which seems to bear this question out.

THE MURDERER IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD

Imagine that you're walking down the street one night and a friend runs up
to you. Your friend tells you that a murderer is after him and that he's
going to his home to hide. He asks you not to tell the murderer where he is
and runs off. Soon after, the murderer meets you and asks you where your
friend is. Should you lie to the murderer or tell the truth?

According to Kant's interpretation of the Categorical Imperative, you must
tell the murderer the truth. If you do not, you must be able to will that
lying should become a universal rule of nature and to do so is inconsistent
with logic. Since you are a rational moral agent, you cannot so will, and
therefore it is your duty to tell the truth.

Now, plainly there is something wrong here and Kant was intelligent enough
to recognize it. Nevertheless, he had a defense. His defense was that if
you do lie to the murderer, if you tell him that your friend is not at his
home, you still cannot KNOW that your lie will accomplish a moral end. What
if your friend decides to leave his home and go find the police? The
murderer, thinking that he is not at home, will continue to search the
neighborhood and may find your friend and kill him. Kant is arguing that a
lie can't be justified regardless of its motivation, because we can never
know enough about reality to justify our lies.

Still, there is something dissatisfying about the example given. Kant is
certainly correct when he states that we cannot know all ends, but does that
serve as an argument to never lie? The problem seems to be more about a
curious reversal of the moral ends of the situation in the example. We are
asked to believe that a lie is more important as a moral act than doing
whatever is necessary to protect a friend from a murderer. Given Kant's
well-known opposition to utilitarian morality, we begin to wonder if
consequences ever matter and whether Kant's philosophy is a deliberate or
unconscious mirror image of utilitarian thought.

Consequentialist objections to one side, the internal inconsistencies of
Kant's Imperative are enough to reject the philosophy as inconsistent with
its own premises. In the case of the First Formulation, it is not
impossible to will a state of nature in which any particular rule or maxim
would be possible.

It's not hard to conceive of some culture that holds it as morally
imperative to castrate any man who bumps into another man's wife. Given
this imperative, it would not be hard to imagine the difficulty for one of
the society's members to conceive of a world in which it was not moral to
castrate men who bump into other men's wives. This being the case, Kant's
Categorical Imperative is not ITSELF universalizable across cultural
moralities and mores.

In fact, what the Categorical Imperative seems to be saying is something
about how each culture views its moral systems. When one considers that
variations on the Categorical Imperative go back as far as Confucian China
and come down to us from cultures that have had little or no cross-cultural
contamination, it becomes apparent that the Imperative is saying something
important about how each culture universalizes at least one aspect of its
own morality.

The Categorical Imperative says nothing directly about any particular moral
act, but rather about a special attitude that many cultures seem to have
about the importance of being able to generalize moral judgements. What the
Categorical Imperative appears to be saying, as well as variations on the
Golden Rule, is that moral judgements must be able to be logically
generalized across morally relevant actors. In other words, the Golden Rule
and the Categorical Imperative are ways of stating the Formal Principle of
Justice in that they all refer to the same general principle of
impartiality: they all state that an individual must not discard relevantly
similar instances of a particular moral issue merely to serve their own
interests. Moral relativists will find this of undoubted comfort, but the
need for each culture to come to an independent recognition of moral
impartiality of a kind that precedes formal law does not really argue for a
relativistic origin of normative ethics. Regardless of whether moral
systems are culture bound or not, the Golden Rule version of the Formal
Principle of Justice does seem to indicate that impartiality with respect to
moral judgements is not necessarily culturally influenced. Indeed, with
respect to impartiality, there does seem to be an element of morality that
is nearly universal and cross-cultural.

However, what is also clear by this, however, is that no statement that
justifies disparate moral systems with respect to an impartiality that
applies to all of them can be put forward as being, itself, a universal
moral principle. If we were to suppose two completely different kinds of
medical sciences, Chinese Taoist Medicine and Western Medicine, for example,
we would not conclude that a principle of "check your diagnosis twice" would
be saying something about the two medicines as medical sciences. The fact
that doctors from China and Doctors from the West both believe that they
ought to check their diagnoses twice would not make Chinese Medicine and
Western Medicine the same kind of Medicine.

Therefore, the first formulation of the Categorical Imperative may succeed
as being an indication that there may be universal elements to human
morality, but it fails in that it cannot itself be such a principle.

MEANS and ENDS

The Second Formulation of the Categorical Imperative fares just as poorly
with respect to the problem of consequences.

CI2. Human beings must always be treated as Ends-in-themselves and never
merely as Means-to-an-end.

Let's revisit our example of the murderer. Were we to lie to the murderer,
Kant states that we would be treating the murderer as an means to an end
[the salvation of our friend] and not giving the murderer the respect he is
due as a moral agent with inherent value in his own right. This obviously
leads to the same kind of problems we encountered with the first
formulation. Although inherent value might be considered as a kind of
ground-floor moral notion, against which consequences ought to be judged,
still, it seems unlikely that this inherent value can be recognized as more
important than ANY consequences regardless of how extreme.

More recently, the second formulation of the Categorical Imperative has been
put forward as a moral system in itself, championed by such normative
ethicists as Donagan, Gauthier and Downie. The system is most often called
The Ethic of Respect for Persons, [ERP] and has a number of adherents. It
could be arguably described in 'rights' language and has been formulated by
Alan Donagan as follows.

"It is impermissible not to respect every human being, oneself or any other,
as a rational creature."
---*The Theory of Morality,* Alan Donagan, University of Chicago Press,
1977.

Because Kant feels that a human being deserves to be treated as an end and
not as a means to an end BY VIRTUE of his status as a rational creature,
Donagan posits this rationality as being, in its own right, the ultimate
ground for moral 'respect,' and 'respect' as being the ultimate ground of
moral 'good.'

Donagan feels this expression of the second formulation of Kant's
Categorical Imperative sums up the salient morality of every culture.
Unquestionably, the ERP principle could have an important impact on a
doctrine of rights. I will argue in a later essay that no logically
consistent doctrine of rights can exclude such a principle on anything other
than arbitrary grounds. Whether such a principle could stand on its own as
a supreme principle of morality is another story.

Another way of formulating this theory is:

ERP1. Human beings are morally good or virtuous, and their actions morally
right, if and only if, and because they embody respect for persons as
morally good and virtuous.

This means that the principle of respect for persons, ERP, is the supreme
principle of morality.

Donagan is unfortunately rather fuzzy as to exactly how this principle might
be definable in specific circumstances. There is unquestionably a great
deal of agreement WITHIN specific cultural moralities on what constitutes
right and wrong. Donagan would like that agreement to lead in a smooth
fashion to a link between those definitions and his ERP principle.
Unfortunately, there is no logical way to show that there is such a
consistent linkage. As Donagan himself writes:

"The fundamental concept of respecting every human being as a rational
creature is fuzzy at the edges in the superficial sense that its application
to this or that species of cases can be disputed."
---Ibid.

But surely, this is what CANNOT be disputed if we are to believe that the
ERP principle could be used as a guide to action. Donagan goes on to list
what he believes are several "specificatory premises" of the rule, but goes
on to admit, in the above, that in all of these cases, it's applicability to
specific instances is disputable.

Worse, the very definition of the word "respect" is left largely to our
imaginations, leaving the door open to a fuzziness in the very definition of
the principle's main term.

"The concept of respecting a human being as a rational creature is not
usefully definable for our purposes. Thus, to define it as treating a human
being, by virtue of his rationality, as an end in itself, while perhaps
clarifying, does not furnish us with a useful substituend."
---Ibid.

Donagan's problem is the same problem all philosophers have when confronting
an ultimate statement such as Kant's second formulation. On reflection, it
is evident that moral agents do have some kind of inherent value that cannot
be reduced to the sum of their moral experiences or acts. But the
definition of exactly what that value is runs into Wittgensteinian problems
whenever we attempt to transform the idea into a morally useful concept.

In summary, Kantian ethics introduces a concept into the mix of ideas that
we will need to consider in constructing any valid principle of morality. A
recognition that morality must be more than just consequentialism is one
important outcome of Kantian moral theory. But it is clear in examining
Kant and his followers that consequences cannot be ignored entirely.
Ultimately, any moral system that seeks validity on both the level of its
effects and its principles will have to account for both human value and the
consequences of moral acts.

[Captain Compassion]

Perhaps we can use "Tortilla Flats"* logic. We can lie to the murderer
because it is in the best interest of the murderer that he not murder
someone else thus placeing more sin on his soul.

I must think on this

*"Tortilla Flats" -- John Steinbeck, 1935

----------------------------------------------------------------------
"Civilization is the interlude between Ice Ages"
--Will Durant

I have never made but one prayer to God, a very short one:
"O Lord, make my enemies ridiculous." And God granted it.
--Voltaire

"You can never really own more than you can carry with two hands while
running at full speed." -- Robert A. Heinlein

Joseph R. Darancette
res0...@verizon.net

[Scott D. Erb]

Very interesting post. Forgive me if some of my responses are
off base, I haven't had formal training in this style of
philosophy, so I'm shooting from the hip.

Therein Kant does say something important about relying on a
consequentialist logic to justify choices. Since we never can
know for sure the outcome, consequentialism can always serve as a
post-hoc rationalization for whatever we did (if I didn't
lie/cheat/steal then X would have happened than is worse that the
consequences of my act), or used beforehand as a justification
for actions to be taken. "If we don't bomb Iran, then they will
rise to become a superpower, spread Islamic fundamentalism, make
oil $200 a barrell to destroy our economy, and take over the
world."

> Still, there is something dissatisfying about the example given. Kant is
> certainly correct when he states that we cannot know all ends, but does that
> serve as an argument to never lie? The problem seems to be more about a
> curious reversal of the moral ends of the situation in the example. We are
> asked to believe that a lie is more important as a moral act than doing
> whatever is necessary to protect a friend from a murderer. Given Kant's
> well-known opposition to utilitarian morality, we begin to wonder if
> consequences ever matter and whether Kant's philosophy is a deliberate or
> unconscious mirror image of utilitarian thought.

I think, as I noted earlier, that my difficulty with Kant is in
defining
just what a moral act is. Is "lying" or volitionally telling a
falsehood THE definition of the act? What about an act of
"other-defense," or volitionally defending another person from
danger? Presumably the latter would be too abstract for Kant,
and must be brought down to direct physical action such as
hitting the person who is threatening the other, lying to them,
or helping the friend run away. But how far down do you go to
define the act? Too much abstraction, and no act is immoral (the
act of pulling a trigger alone isn't immoral, even if killing
someone is).

I would argue that lying to Nazi to defend a Jew
is an act of different moral content than lying to the IRS to
avoid taxes, not just because of the consequences but the nature
of the act -- the intent, and the moral purpose. The moral
purpose of the former is to stop an act of evil, save a life, and
insodoing not harm another. Obviously intent matters, since a
lie by definition contains an intent to mislead (it is not just
telling something that is wrong, it has to be intentional). If
intent is based not solely on the consequences (the Jewish person
will be killed), but on a moral purpose (to protect someone from
evil) then it can be a separate moral act. In that, I think, the
stark line between consequentialist and deontological ethics is a
bit blurred because can ANY act be defined without regard to some
kind of consequence it has or will have, since intent always
includes some kind of notion of a consequence?

Or am I way off here?

> Consequentialist objections to one side, the internal inconsistencies of
> Kant's Imperative are enough to reject the philosophy as inconsistent with
> its own premises. In the case of the First Formulation, it is not
> impossible to will a state of nature in which any particular rule or maxim
> would be possible.

> It's not hard to conceive of some culture that holds it as morally
> imperative to castrate any man who bumps into another man's wife. Given
> this imperative, it would not be hard to imagine the difficulty for one of
> the society's members to conceive of a world in which it was not moral to
> castrate men who bump into other men's wives. This being the case, Kant's
> Categorical Imperative is not ITSELF universalizable across cultural
> moralities and mores.

Indeed, and it raises the question of how one determines whether
or not an act can be made a universal principle without looking
at consequences at some level. What if one defines the act of
castration as immoral, since if it were done universally, then
humans could not reproduce. Is castration as a response to
another event (bumping into ones' wife) morally different than
castration done simply as a matter of course?

I'm going to end on this note because it ties into your
discussion of this very theme in the next section of your post,
which I will respond to in the near future:

It seems to me that Kant (refering back to your first piece) by
positing humans as rational moral agents and having instrinsic
value (unlike things, whose value is extrinsic), did create some
kind of opening for a universal approach cutting across
cultures. He also seems to be making it something that others
have to choose on their own, and which cannot be forced upon
them, which in extreme would make Kant a pure pacifist who
follows all rules (I believe he did not think people had a right
to revolution) and sees the moral life as an end in and of
itself. I think the real interesting moral statement by Kant was
this one (again, you quote it in the next part of the post and
deal with it there):

"Now, I saw that many and in general every rational being,
existing as an end in himself and not merely as means for
arbitrary use by this or that will; he must in all his actions,
whether they are directed t ohimself or to other rational beings
always be viewed at the same as an end."

This seems to go against a purely cultural definition of his
moral thought and suggest a nascent sense of ethical principles,
as well as rights humans should have because they are rational
moral agents, ends rather than mere means to an end. But you
have a good argument about that point too, which I'll get to
soon.

[Scott D. Erb]

Gandalf Grey wrote:
On to part two. It strikes me that Kant, who I believe lived
virtually his entire life in Koenigsberg, Prussia (now
Kaliningrad, Russia) as a mild mannered scientist had a very
German view on duty and morality. It reminds me a bit of my
Grandfather, a German Lutheran preacher, conservative and
respectful of others. Its a sense that you do what is right, and
let others make their own choices. Don't worry about the
consequences, God will be the judge of that, and each individual
makes their own choices and will be judged on their own terms.
Such an ethic can be taken to an extreme without regard to
consequences especially if one believes that there is a
supernatural force -- God, Karma, whatever -- that ultimately
makes judgement, and if the judgement is solely on the moral
content of the life lived in terms of acts themselves and not on
the consequences that came from those actions. After all, if
Christianity or most religions are right that the material world
is ultimately irrelevant, the fact a murderer kills your friend
is irrelevant to the friend's moral status -- he or she will live
eternally, perhaps be born again, but the material world is not
as important as it seems -- and the murderer will answer for his
moral act. Your refusal to act 'immorally' by lying would not be
held against you, since you are not responsible for the moral
choice of the murderer, and cannot be blamed for acting in accord
to your moral values. The problem of consequences is striking in
OUR culture since we are a consequentialist thinking people. The
future matters. In our culture the material world IS the world
that is of extreme importance, anything outside the material
world is airy fairy speculation. This shows the cultural impact
on how viable ethical systems are considered to be, but also
demonstrates that the 'common sense' reaction one has to the
consequentialist flaws of deontological ethical systems (they
seem to prevent acts that have obviously beneficial consequences)
is itself a cultural phenomenon.

Anyway...

Yes, but that can be attributed to the problem of perspective and
context, especially if context helps define the nature of acts.
That doesn't mean that the moral principle is wrong, only that
its application is not straight forward or unproblemmatic. The
principle that on the basketball court you try to score baskets
may be right, but how to do so, what strategy to pursue, etc.,
isn't clear, and varies from game to game or team to team.

> But surely, this is what CANNOT be disputed if we are to believe that the
> ERP principle could be used as a guide to action. Donagan goes on to list
> what he believes are several "specificatory premises" of the rule, but goes
> on to admit, in the above, that in all of these cases, it's applicability to
> specific instances is disputable.

Is that such a problem? Might a guide that is simple and basic
be by definition limited in how well it can apply directly to
every situation, just as the guide to the basketball player
"score more points than the opponent" also leaves specific
application unclear? In other words, couldn't the principle be
legitimate, while its application in context contestable and
without any clear cut set of criteria?

After all, we're dealing with language to discuss and understand
issues of action and thought. Language is slippery and elusive
itself, and applying language to moral principles creates the
propensity for eternal redefinitions, deconstructions, and
context shifts. Perhaps finding a basic principle and applying
it as best we can is all that one can do given the limits of
language and human cognition.

> Worse, the very definition of the word "respect" is left largely to our
> imaginations, leaving the door open to a fuzziness in the very definition of
> the principle's main term.

Quite true.

> "The concept of respecting a human being as a rational creature is not
> usefully definable for our purposes. Thus, to define it as treating a human
> being, by virtue of his rationality, as an end in itself, while perhaps
> clarifying, does not furnish us with a useful substituend."
> ---Ibid.
>
> Donagan's problem is the same problem all philosophers have when confronting
> an ultimate statement such as Kant's second formulation. On reflection, it
> is evident that moral agents do have some kind of inherent value that cannot
> be reduced to the sum of their moral experiences or acts. But the
> definition of exactly what that value is runs into Wittgensteinian problems
> whenever we attempt to transform the idea into a morally useful concept.
>
> In summary, Kantian ethics introduces a concept into the mix of ideas that
> we will need to consider in constructing any valid principle of morality. A
> recognition that morality must be more than just consequentialism is one
> important outcome of Kantian moral theory. But it is clear in examining
> Kant and his followers that consequences cannot be ignored entirely.
> Ultimately, any moral system that seeks validity on both the level of its
> effects and its principles will have to account for both human value and the
> consequences of moral acts.

I agree, but still question the separation of consequences from
the act, as if an act has substance without any regard to
consequence. As noted, if "to lie" means "intent to deceive,"
then one is assuming it is wrong because the consequence of the
action is to deceive another. I may be way off here, but I don't
think an act can be defined without some consideration of the
consequences of that act, though not necessarily in a form that
says 'the ends justify the means' or that the moral content is
measured primarily by the consequences.

My own thinking would be that in the social context we find
ourselves, we 'play the game' so to speak, trying to apply moral
principles within the cultural context and temporal flow of
events as best we can. The former means taking into account the
MEANING of action both to ourselves and to others, assuming acts
are at least to some extent given meaning by their cultural
context. The latter is to recognize that acts are part of a
tapestry of interactions that cannot be separated from their
intent or consequences, even if not purely defined by them. This
makes moral judgements inherently unclear and resistant to
specific and directly applied principles that guide one to a
particular action in all cases. By definition they remain and
must be fuzzy and subject to subjective interpretation, giving
the moral agent the responsibility not just to choose the moral
act, but determine how to judge the morality of his or her acts.

Again, I apologize for any glaring errors, this is outside of my
field, but fascinating nonetheless.

[Scott D. Erb]

Oops, the "Gandalf Grey wrote" first line refers to the part
quoted, in the post it made it look like I was saying Gandalf
started with "On to part two." That paragraph was my work.
Gandalf is quoted starting with the phrase "MEANS AND ENDS"

[Gandalf Grey]

Captain Compassion <res0...@verizon.net> wrote in message
news:3c427756...@news.verizon.net...

That's a consequentialist argument. Kant IS interested in the murderer's
soul, however, and if you're going to think on it, think on Kant's further
belief that to not punish the murderer with death constitutes a moral crime
AGAINST the murderer.

Why? Kant believed that as a rational moral agent, the murderer cannot
consistently will a world in which murder is not punished by the most
strenuous punishment that can be meted out [even as Kant perceived murder as
the greatest crime against the rational nature of man]. A moral agent also
has the right and the duty to be held accountable for any transgression
against the Categorical Imperative. To punish him with something less than
the greatest punishment we can mete out for the greatest crime any moral
agent can commit is to ignore the murderer's right to be treated with the
respect that a rational moral agent deserves.

Now, what is this respect in the case of a murderer? It is respectful to
treat him in the way he has chosen to believe people ought to be treated.
AND to treat him in such a way that respects his right and duty to be held
personally responsible for his own actions, regardless of the outcome. When
we see that a rational moral agent treats people in a certain way, he is
stating by his actions that in his judgement, this is the way people ought
to be treated. Therefore, executing a murderer is nothing more than a way
of demonstrating respect for him as a rational moral agent. That we
perceive that he is 'wrong' in his belief does not relinquish our duty to
ensure that he is held to his duties. Regardless, therefore, of whether we
believe he is correct or incorrect, death is the only possible response we
can have for the act of murder.

What about "rehabilitation?" Kant would have nothing to do with the concept
because it perverted the second formulation of the Categorical imperative.
If we even so much as 'try' to rehabilitate any criminal of any kind, what
is it that we're really doing? We are deciding that their behavior is
unacceptable and that it needs to be changed for OUR benefit. This is to
treat criminals as though they were NOT rational moral agents, and as if
they can be used as a means to our ends, not as ends in themselves.

Now IF criminals of any kind can be proven to be irresponsible people who
are incapable of controlling their behavior, even Kant would revise his
opinion of them and consider them to be more like moral patients than moral
agents. As you may recall a 'moral patient' is defined by Kant as any being
who can suffer moral wrong but who cannot perpetrate moral wrong. Animals
and children, the mentally enfeebled and the clinically insane would all
fall under such a definition by virtue of their inability to hold rational
reflective beliefs, in particular, rational moral beliefs. To the extent
that it could be proven that a criminal was a moral patient and not a moral
agent, Kant would not hold them to the Categorical Imperative. But to the
extent that, say a murderer, could be said to be demonstrably rational, the
Imperative demands that we treat them with respect owed to a moral agent.
Capital Punishment would not be an optional treatment, because it is not
optional for us to lay aside our duty to respect a moral agent as an end and
not as a means regardless of the consequences.

[Gandalf Grey]

Scott D. Erb <scot...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message
news:3C42E788...@worldnet.att.net...

The key to understanding Kant is in recognizing that he founded his
Imperative only on rational knowledge. To Kant, we can only act on that
which we can KNOW will be the case. "Supposing" that a murderer will do
thus and so is not "knowing." Since our moral acts can only be premissed on
our knowledge, consequences---which are generally suppositional---can't be
allowed to enter into moral considerations.

No. Kant's desire was to keep 'intent' to one side of the issue. Kant was
well aware of utilitarian views on this. On at least one occasion he refers
to "the serpent windings of utilitarianism." He considered Utilitarianism
as inconsistent with the dignity of human beings and believed that beyond an
'intent' to yield to ever moral agent the respect that is their due, all
intent ultimately presumes upon the rights of moral agents to make up their
own minds on moral issues.

We can see this sort of thing at work in the doctor who decides not to tell
his patient that they are dying of some incurable disease. His intent might
be to save the patient the suffering of knowing that they are doomed, but in
witholding the information the doctor also makes it impossible for the
patient to make their own decisions on how to handle that kind of
information.

>
> > Consequentialist objections to one side, the internal inconsistencies of
> > Kant's Imperative are enough to reject the philosophy as inconsistent
with
> > its own premises. In the case of the First Formulation, it is not
> > impossible to will a state of nature in which any particular rule or
maxim
> > would be possible.
>
> > It's not hard to conceive of some culture that holds it as morally
> > imperative to castrate any man who bumps into another man's wife. Given
> > this imperative, it would not be hard to imagine the difficulty for one
of
> > the society's members to conceive of a world in which it was not moral
to
> > castrate men who bump into other men's wives. This being the case,
Kant's
> > Categorical Imperative is not ITSELF universalizable across cultural
> > moralities and mores.
>
> Indeed, and it raises the question of how one determines whether
> or not an act can be made a universal principle without looking
> at consequences at some level. What if one defines the act of
> castration as immoral, since if it were done universally, then
> humans could not reproduce. Is castration as a response to
> another event (bumping into ones' wife) morally different than
> castration done simply as a matter of course?

That's one logical problem that Kant gets into by intentionally refusing to
admit the idea of consequences into his arguments. By this decision, Kant
creates a morality in which rules are disembodied concepts that can have
logical interactions with one another, but which do not necessarily
accomplish any morally significant end. In a sense, Kant attempted to take
the 'point' of morality out of morality, thinking that in so doing, he was
resting morality on a more just and impartial foundation.

Yes. One interesting aspect of Kant is this indication of a logical
universality that could be cross-cultural. Consequentialist ethics such as
those introduced by utilitarians and ethical egoists suggest possible points
on which a normative ethic might be based but Kant goes further in at least
attempting to define an 'objective' metaethical 'good.'

[Gandalf Grey]

Scott D. Erb <scot...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message

news:3C42FD1C...@worldnet.att.net...

An interesting point.

I'm of the belief that ALL moral systems are cultural phenomena. BUT, there
is nothing that logically prevents a cultural construction from having
cross-cultural application. It's plain that Kant was in some ways a product
of his culture, but it seems to me that to say this is no more than what the
psychological egoists are saying when they 'note' that all behavior seems
self-interested. Such an observation is at best non-novel and at worst
misleading. Man is of interest precisely because he seems to consistently
transcend his limitations while remaining bound to them.

Though I grant that it is very difficult to subtract cultural influences
from hypothetical moral systems, I don't believe it is a foregone conclusion
that ANY moral system must be nothing more than a reflection of local moral
concerns. In these latter days, it has become fashionable to pin statements
concerning man on a certain bias that infects all human thinking. We could
call it various things: cultural influence, subjectivity and so on. This
bias would have particular impact on fundamental metaethical concerns like
the nature and origin of 'good/bad,' 'value,' the definition and meaning of
rights and so on.

The problem with such a view is that it effectively brings us full circle.
The fact that man creates values and that he is influenced by the history of
his culture in so doing, is not so important, it seems to me, as where we
intend to go after we make that kind of statement. If we simply mean to
take it into account and precede in a careful fashion to construct the least
biased, most rational morality that we can, then I can see the value in
making such an assessment. If, however, we stop as so many seemed to at
"God is dead," wallowing, as it were, in the bog of a resultant relativism,
then I feel that such an observation is of little or no value. Beyond
statements of utimate fallibility, where we begin our moral and intellectual
endeavors is less important than where we end. Recognizing a certain
fallibility in our beginning position is less important than working to
transcend that fallibility by whatever rational and scientific tools we have
available to us.

It may well be that there are Wittgensteinian impossibilities involved in
the pursuit of a valid moral principle. Non-cognitivistic theories hold
that it will not ultimately be cultural bias that prevents a valid moral
principle, but rather, our inability to express moral concepts in
descriptive language. If that really is the case, then time and effort will
tell. The fact that we are, by virtue of our culture, inclined to be biased
should not be an argument against the effort to go beyond that bias.

> >

>
> > But surely, this is what CANNOT be disputed if we are to believe that
the
> > ERP principle could be used as a guide to action. Donagan goes on to
list
> > what he believes are several "specificatory premises" of the rule, but
goes
> > on to admit, in the above, that in all of these cases, it's
applicability to
> > specific instances is disputable.
>
> Is that such a problem? Might a guide that is simple and basic
> be by definition limited in how well it can apply directly to
> every situation, just as the guide to the basketball player
> "score more points than the opponent" also leaves specific
> application unclear? In other words, couldn't the principle be
> legitimate, while its application in context contestable and
> without any clear cut set of criteria?
>
> After all, we're dealing with language to discuss and understand
> issues of action and thought. Language is slippery and elusive
> itself, and applying language to moral principles creates the
> propensity for eternal redefinitions, deconstructions, and
> context shifts. Perhaps finding a basic principle and applying
> it as best we can is all that one can do given the limits of
> language and human cognition.

Wittgenstein noted this problem in language as well. He held that there is
a connection between the 'real' pictures that a descriptive statement makes
and the mental image that we have of the situation that the statement
describes, but that this connection cannot be itself described.

All very well and good, but a moral principle that is to be more than simply
metaethical [in the sense of merely describing and/or defining moral
entitites such as 'right' and 'wrong'] needs to be applicable to normative
ethical cases. While it is true that a valid principle should be adequate
in its scope [in which case the ERP principle appears to pass the test] it
also must be sufficiently 'precise' so that human beings not only recognize
specific instances as being instances of the morality covered by the
principle, but also can rely on the principle as being some guide as to how
to treat those specific instances.

One simple example I can come up with is the idea of sentimentality as a
moral guide. In this case the rule is "We should always be kind to our
fellow creatures." Regardless of what other problems the principle might
have, it seems to be sufficiently broad so as to fulfill the requirement of
adequate scope. That being said, we now have to ask ourselves what it means
with regard to specific cases. What does it mean to "be kind?" Is its
definition to be general or situational? Who interpretes what "kind" will
mean? Will it be the actor or the recipient of kindness who should judge?
How can we know that kindness is the intent of the actor? Will this rule
effectively ask us to read minds or is there some extraneous measure of
"kindness" that hasn't been mentioned? And so on. Although the principle
appears to be laudatory and universalizable, its lack of specificity makes
it nearly useless as a guide to moral actions in any particular situation.

That's a critical point that is nearly always missed by specific
philosophers arguing for particular moralities. It should be plainly
evident that moral acts cannot be arbitrarily separated from consequences
even though consequences do not necessarily define those acts. It is also
true that consequences cannot be arbitrarily separated from moral principles
on an ad hoc basis. Moral realism logically leads to the arbitrary
imposition of moral values regardless of consequences. Consequentialism
always leads to the effective end of creating ad hoc solutions to moral
problems. Both points of view are self defeating as valid moral principles.
They are self defeating because moral realism ignores the fact that human
beings experience and dispense situationally moral values. Consequentialism
fails because it does not recognize human beings as having a ground level
moral value that cannot be reduced to the value of their experiences or
their acts.

> This
> makes moral judgements inherently unclear and resistant to
> specific and directly applied principles that guide one to a
> particular action in all cases. By definition they remain and
> must be fuzzy and subject to subjective interpretation, giving
> the moral agent the responsibility not just to choose the moral
> act, but determine how to judge the morality of his or her acts.

Well, let us say this. SOME accounting must be made for the situational
nature of man's interactions with society. Alternatively, some accounting
must also be made for the fact that purely situational normative ethics
always run the risk of ad hoc manipulation at the expense of the very values
that morally valid principles must serve.

>
> Again, I apologize for any glaring errors, this is outside of my
> field, but fascinating nonetheless.

Thanks for your comments. Having taken a peek at two very opposed
viewpoints of morality, I think it's time to turn attention toward a few
'Realist' schools of moral thought. Ultimately, to understand the modern
view toward 'rights-doctrines' the philosophical theory of "Natural Law" as
an aspect of "Moral Realism" needs to be discussed.

[Scott D. Erb]

Gandalf Grey wrote:
>
> Scott D. Erb <scot...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message
> news:3C42FD1C...@worldnet.att.net...

> > On to part two. It strikes me that Kant, who I believe lived

But there is something extremely important in all of this -- man
is a cultural/social creature. We build worlds and cultural
systems, that is part of our essential nature. That means that
moral systems that deny that social aspect of human behavior in
favor of a detached individualism or an acultural rationalism
miss something. Rules that cut across cultures, though, have to
have some flexibility of how they are applied in context.

BTW, it occurred to me just in passing that Kant would probably
be supportive of the Prime Directive of the Star Trek federation
of planets, even if he wouldn't like all the battles they fight
:)

> The problem with such a view is that it effectively brings us full circle.
> The fact that man creates values and that he is influenced by the history of
> his culture in so doing, is not so important, it seems to me, as where we
> intend to go after we make that kind of statement. If we simply mean to
> take it into account and precede in a careful fashion to construct the least
> biased, most rational morality that we can, then I can see the value in
> making such an assessment. If, however, we stop as so many seemed to at
> "God is dead," wallowing, as it were, in the bog of a resultant relativism,
> then I feel that such an observation is of little or no value. Beyond
> statements of utimate fallibility, where we begin our moral and intellectual
> endeavors is less important than where we end. Recognizing a certain
> fallibility in our beginning position is less important than working to
> transcend that fallibility by whatever rational and scientific tools we have
> available to us.

Definitely. I think a short nihilist phase is probably normal
for people who get what was told them true ripped out from under
them and discover the limits of knowledge and certainty, and the
possibility that all is meaningless. But hey, the world is out
there, we're here, we may as well try to make things better and
do what we can to chart the best course, even if we can never be
sure we get it right.

> It may well be that there are Wittgensteinian impossibilities involved in
> the pursuit of a valid moral principle. Non-cognitivistic theories hold
> that it will not ultimately be cultural bias that prevents a valid moral
> principle, but rather, our inability to express moral concepts in
> descriptive language. If that really is the case, then time and effort will
> tell. The fact that we are, by virtue of our culture, inclined to be biased
> should not be an argument against the effort to go beyond that bias.

I'm pretty convinced that we will not be able express moral
concepts in language in a manner that will allow them to be
applied across context and in different situation in a manner
that isn't at least somewhat fuzzy. Ultimately, I think
intuition and empathy guided by rational thought is what's
required. Rational thinking about moral concepts gets us to the
point where we can guide our empathy and intuitive understandings
to make that call, and help us dismiss emotional wishful thinking
or strong reactions, but I don't think reason or language alone
will do the job. But I'll keep an open mind on this.

I think I'm in agreement with you here. Sufficiently precise to
offer guidance is different than being a rule that simply gives
the right answer if applied.

> One simple example I can come up with is the idea of sentimentality as a
> moral guide. In this case the rule is "We should always be kind to our
> fellow creatures." Regardless of what other problems the principle might
> have, it seems to be sufficiently broad so as to fulfill the requirement of
> adequate scope. That being said, we now have to ask ourselves what it means
> with regard to specific cases. What does it mean to "be kind?" Is its
> definition to be general or situational? Who interpretes what "kind" will
> mean? Will it be the actor or the recipient of kindness who should judge?
> How can we know that kindness is the intent of the actor? Will this rule
> effectively ask us to read minds or is there some extraneous measure of
> "kindness" that hasn't been mentioned? And so on. Although the principle
> appears to be laudatory and universalizable, its lack of specificity makes
> it nearly useless as a guide to moral actions in any particular situation.

Exactly. But if you think that through, and if you explore the
principles behind it, then usually you have a *sense* of what
being kind, or treating others with respect, might mean. With
that sense, and with knowledge about a culture, other people, and
the bases of ones' moral belief, one can make a judgement call on
what kindness might mean in a given situation. For example, if
I'm a teacher I might realize that giving blanket A's and B's is
NOT being kind since it makes students less likely to study or
work hard, might harm them later in life, and not provide them
the kind of education they come to class for. But they may think
'being kind' would be to forgive their bad assignment since
things were rough this week, and a naive intuitive reaction might
be to agree. No emotional/empathy based principle seems
acceptable absent a logical/rational component. No emotional
principle can be defined outside of trying to understand its
rational place within a context.

Very well put, you have a talent at stating complex ideas in a
manner easy to follow and understand.

> > This
> > makes moral judgements inherently unclear and resistant to
> > specific and directly applied principles that guide one to a
> > particular action in all cases. By definition they remain and
> > must be fuzzy and subject to subjective interpretation, giving
> > the moral agent the responsibility not just to choose the moral
> > act, but determine how to judge the morality of his or her acts.
>
> Well, let us say this. SOME accounting must be made for the situational
> nature of man's interactions with society. Alternatively, some accounting
> must also be made for the fact that purely situational normative ethics
> always run the risk of ad hoc manipulation at the expense of the very values
> that morally valid principles must serve.

Agreed.

[Scott D. Erb]

Gandalf Grey wrote:
>
> Scott D. Erb <scot...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message
> news:3C42E788...@worldnet.att.net...
> >

> > Therein Kant does say something important about relying on a
> > consequentialist logic to justify choices. Since we never can
> > know for sure the outcome, consequentialism can always serve as a
> > post-hoc rationalization for whatever we did (if I didn't
> > lie/cheat/steal then X would have happened than is worse that the
> > consequences of my act), or used beforehand as a justification
> > for actions to be taken. "If we don't bomb Iran, then they will
> > rise to become a superpower, spread Islamic fundamentalism, make
> > oil $200 a barrell to destroy our economy, and take over the
> > world."
>
> The key to understanding Kant is in recognizing that he founded his
> Imperative only on rational knowledge. To Kant, we can only act on that
> which we can KNOW will be the case. "Supposing" that a murderer will do
> thus and so is not "knowing." Since our moral acts can only be >premissed on our knowledge, consequences---which are generally >suppositional---can't be allowed to enter into moral considerations.

Kant was a scientist, I wonder how he would take into account
pscyhological theories if he were around today.

Thanks, that clarifies it a bit. I have read some Kant and about
Kant, but mostly in terms of his foedus pacificum, and theory of
perpetual peace.

> > Indeed, and it raises the question of how one determines whether
> > or not an act can be made a universal principle without looking
> > at consequences at some level. What if one defines the act of
> > castration as immoral, since if it were done universally, then
> > humans could not reproduce. Is castration as a response to
> > another event (bumping into ones' wife) morally different than
> > castration done simply as a matter of course?
>
> That's one logical problem that Kant gets into by intentionally refusing to
> admit the idea of consequences into his arguments. By this decision, Kant
> creates a morality in which rules are disembodied concepts that can have
> logical interactions with one another, but which do not necessarily
> accomplish any morally significant end. In a sense, Kant attempted to take
> the 'point' of morality out of morality, thinking that in so doing, he was
> resting morality on a more just and impartial foundation.

Or, if I understand the previous bit right, the one consequence
that he allows is a consequence of treating another moral agent
with respect that is their due. The consequence of the doctor
withholding information is to make it impossible for the patient
to make her own decisions. The consequence of treating a moral
agent with the proper respect is to, apparently allow the moral
agent to make up their own minds with as much knowledge as
possible. That still is a type of consquence, it seems to me,
just as intent presumes a type of consequence.

And it seems to me he is on to something, even if something is
missing. The idea that you should not act in a way that prevents
another moral agent from making their own moral choices is
compelling, but the devil is in the details of what that means
and how it is applied in context. It's also interesting to hear
about this aspect of Kant's thought, as the manuscript I'm just
completing on German foreign policy is built on an argument that
Germany has developed a Kantian foreign policy identity in an
international system governed by primarily Lockean norms -- this
is based on a theory Alexander Wendt developed in "Social Theory
of international Politics," (1999) which argues that the
international system is an anarchy that can have different
logics. The application of Kantian ideals (mostly from his
argument on perpetual peace) to international relations is
imperfect (Wendt admits this) and doesn't get into this kind of
detail. Also, you may be interested in a book by Fernando Teeson
called "A Philosophy International Law," where he takes a Kantian
starting point and adjusts it (some say he mutilates it) to
essentially allow for military interventions to promote human
rights and international law.

cheers, scott

[Gandalf Grey]

Scott D. Erb <scot...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message

news:3C438F74...@worldnet.att.net...

>
>
> Gandalf Grey wrote:
> >
> > Scott D. Erb <scot...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message
> > news:3C42E788...@worldnet.att.net...
> > >
>

> > That's one logical problem that Kant gets into by intentionally refusing
to
> > admit the idea of consequences into his arguments. By this decision,
Kant
> > creates a morality in which rules are disembodied concepts that can have
> > logical interactions with one another, but which do not necessarily
> > accomplish any morally significant end. In a sense, Kant attempted to
take
> > the 'point' of morality out of morality, thinking that in so doing, he
was
> > resting morality on a more just and impartial foundation.
>
> Or, if I understand the previous bit right, the one consequence
> that he allows is a consequence of treating another moral agent
> with respect that is their due. The consequence of the doctor
> withholding information is to make it impossible for the patient
> to make her own decisions. The consequence of treating a moral
> agent with the proper respect is to, apparently allow the moral
> agent to make up their own minds with as much knowledge as
> possible. That still is a type of consquence, it seems to me,
> just as intent presumes a type of consequence.

Well, it's clear that moral attitudes have consequences. Kant would
argue---vehemently, I believe---that the point is whether or not they are
intended to some consequence or whether consequences occur due to the nature
of the principal involved. I think he would argue that any moral system has
moral consequences but that his system is not based on consequences. And
that, I think, is where Kant's system fails where it needs to succeed.

Let me give you an example. There are some who argue that one consequence
of rights doctrines is the ultimate social isolation of the members of a
society. As rights become more an more important to a morality, likenesses
between members begin to disappear and their relative isolation from one
another becomes more important as more and more rights put up barriers
between individuals. Now, this point is arguable both ways, but what is not
arguable is that a doctrine of rights could be created without such a result
being the intended goal. In fact, it's not even necessary for us to presume
that such a doctrine would be a failure. It might accomplish all of its
legal goals and they might be quite different from the practical
consequences that I mentioned and still, quite unintentionally lead to such
a consequence. Now, even though the example leads to consequences, I don't
believe that we can call such a morality consequentialist without abusing
the meaning of the word.

What I think we can get out of this is the near impossiblity of creating any
kind of consistently logical moral system that fails to take consequences
into account without such a system appearing both arbitrary and faintly
ridiculous.

Or in general.

Some philosophies are intentionally conseqeuntialist.
Some philosophies are intentionally non-consequentialist.
But ALL philosophies have consequences.

As we get into Natural Law and Inherent Rights, it will be more and more
obvious that non-consequentialist philosophies have, as their major
difficulty, their relative inability to account for unintended consequences.
At some point, most of these philosophies have to take the stand that
unintended consequences 'just aren't important.' or, worse, 'aren't really
the point.' Making real moral consequences subservient to 'higher' moral
issues is one of the weak points of most "realist" moral philosophies.

> > Yes. One interesting aspect of Kant is this indication of a logical
> > universality that could be cross-cultural. Consequentialist ethics such
as
> > those introduced by utilitarians and ethical egoists suggest possible
points
> > on which a normative ethic might be based but Kant goes further in at
least
> > attempting to define an 'objective' metaethical 'good.'
>
> And it seems to me he is on to something, even if something is
> missing. The idea that you should not act in a way that prevents
> another moral agent from making their own moral choices is
> compelling, but the devil is in the details of what that means
> and how it is applied in context.

As we saw in the Ethics of Respect for Persons or the ERP as it's called.

It's also interesting to hear
> about this aspect of Kant's thought, as the manuscript I'm just
> completing on German foreign policy is built on an argument that
> Germany has developed a Kantian foreign policy identity in an
> international system governed by primarily Lockean norms -- this
> is based on a theory Alexander Wendt developed in "Social Theory
> of international Politics," (1999) which argues that the
> international system is an anarchy that can have different
> logics. The application of Kantian ideals (mostly from his
> argument on perpetual peace) to international relations is
> imperfect (Wendt admits this) and doesn't get into this kind of
> detail. Also, you may be interested in a book by Fernando Teeson
> called "A Philosophy International Law," where he takes a Kantian
> starting point and adjusts it (some say he mutilates it) to
> essentially allow for military interventions to promote human
> rights and international law.

I'll look it up. Thanks, Scott.
>
> cheers, scott

[Gandalf Grey]

Scott D. Erb <scot...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message

news:3C438F6A...@worldnet.att.net...

>
>
> Gandalf Grey wrote:
> >
> > Scott D. Erb <scot...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message
> > news:3C42FD1C...@worldnet.att.net...
>
> >
> >

> > Though I grant that it is very difficult to subtract cultural influences
> > from hypothetical moral systems, I don't believe it is a foregone
conclusion
> > that ANY moral system must be nothing more than a reflection of local
moral
> > concerns. In these latter days, it has become fashionable to pin
statements
> > concerning man on a certain bias that infects all human thinking. We
could
> > call it various things: cultural influence, subjectivity and so on.
This
> > bias would have particular impact on fundamental metaethical concerns
like
> > the nature and origin of 'good/bad,' 'value,' the definition and meaning
of
> > rights and so on.
>
> But there is something extremely important in all of this -- man
> is a cultural/social creature. We build worlds and cultural
> systems, that is part of our essential nature. That means that
> moral systems that deny that social aspect of human behavior in
> favor of a detached individualism or an acultural rationalism
> miss something. Rules that cut across cultures, though, have to
> have some flexibility of how they are applied in context.

A very important point because it bears directly on one of the chief
arguments against rights doctrines. Both the inflexibility of rights and
the tendency of rights to isolate individuals has been used as an argument
against the moral efficacy of rights-doctrines.

>
> BTW, it occurred to me just in passing that Kant would probably
> be supportive of the Prime Directive of the Star Trek federation
> of planets, even if he wouldn't like all the battles they fight
> :)

Kant would have loved the Trek world, it would have delighted his watchmaker
soul [although, I have often felt that he would have considered Spock to be
wildly irrational].

I agree. Nihilism does seem to represent a kind of social 'phase' that
people go through. Notably, like most phases, people can also refuse to
move on from it.
Realism, Relativism and Nihilism are pretty much the only choices there are
out there.

But that's the subject of the next essay.

>
> > It may well be that there are Wittgensteinian impossibilities involved
in
> > the pursuit of a valid moral principle. Non-cognitivistic theories hold
> > that it will not ultimately be cultural bias that prevents a valid moral
> > principle, but rather, our inability to express moral concepts in
> > descriptive language. If that really is the case, then time and effort
will
> > tell. The fact that we are, by virtue of our culture, inclined to be
biased
> > should not be an argument against the effort to go beyond that bias.
>
> I'm pretty convinced that we will not be able express moral
> concepts in language in a manner that will allow them to be
> applied across context and in different situation in a manner
> that isn't at least somewhat fuzzy. Ultimately, I think
> intuition and empathy guided by rational thought is what's
> required. Rational thinking about moral concepts gets us to the
> point where we can guide our empathy and intuitive understandings
> to make that call, and help us dismiss emotional wishful thinking
> or strong reactions, but I don't think reason or language alone
> will do the job. But I'll keep an open mind on this.

Empathy is important [as long as it isn't Martin McPhillips' neo-Blavatskian
type of empathy]. Moralities cannot make us connect to others in morally
correct ways. It's a factor that is often ignored by moralists primarily
because moralists ARE involved on a fairly strenuous level to the extent
that they often presume a motivation that isn't always there. Rationality
and intuition, on the other hand, are accepted as two of the tests that any
valid moral principle needs to pass. Some kind of core moral intutition is
nearly universal in human beings, regardless of their culture. From a
purely consequentialist standpoint, it's difficult to see what the point
would be of any morality that was wholly unacceptable to our intuition. But
then, there's "Intuitionism," and that's also another essay.

You're using empathy again and that's fine. But consider this. A valid
morality is not simply something we hold ourselves to [with some exceptions
such as Buddhist Ethics]. Most moralities are devised to operate within a
culture and across a large number of individuals. If we don't KNOW what
"kindness" means, in the context of the example given, by what measure will
we judge, not our behavior, but the behavior of others? And, whether we
like it or not, morality is, in part, about judging the behavior of others.
We can all have some fuzzy concept of 'kindness,' but once it becomes part
of an established morality, I think we would be surprised at how quickly
individual interpretations became alarmingly broad and self-serving. At the
point at which a cultural morality becomes law, kindness will not have the
luxury of remaining a fuzzy term, and I think I can make a good argument
that as soon as kindness is defined, it will lose whatever appeal it had as
a morality.

Thanks. Many years of teaching while being simultaneously taught. 'To
learn, teach!' as the Romans said.

[Keynes]

Seems to me that logical consistency, if it were
ever applied in morality, would be an abomination.
People make better moral decisions every day
without looking for intellectual consistency.
If some salt is good, then more salt must be
better, and the most salt must be best.
Absurd. Logic has met it's limit in human
ethics. It would not even work if people
were in fact logical.

[Scott D. Erb]

That may be true...but the question is still worth pursuing, if
only to find the limits of logic and how it can help guide people
who otherwise would simply be reacting on an emotional spur of
the moment response.

[Gandalf Grey]

Keynes <Key...@spam.newsguy.com> wrote in message
news:nm084uofrhrcsd5dn...@4ax.com...

You're correct in that some moral philosophies seem to be logical card
houses built with little regard for anything but logic. Like most branches
of learning, Philosophy has it's high limbs and philosophers often climb out
too far on them.

You're also correct when you suggest that a too logical philosophy leads to
impractical [and even occasionally ridiculous] moralities, but moralities
that are purely intuitive lead to narrowly defined local views that are not
only prone to built-in injustices, but also [and perhaps this is worse]
prone to cynical manipulation.

A current example would be the Religious Right. If one examines Christian
ethics carefully, they will find that what currently passes for morality
among the fundamentalist Christian community in America isn't Christian at
all. It's a cynical perversion of Christian, neo-Thomist ethics that's
arbitrary and illogical. Part of the reason that Christian ethics are so
easy to pervert is that they are based primarily on individual intuition and
because what logic they are built on has serious internal flaws.

Hence, one of the duties of a sound moral philosophy emerges. It's not
enough that a morality defines right and wrong and gives some method of
resolving moral conflicts. The above represents the barest outline of what
a morality must do and it's not enough. A sound moral philosophy must be
based on reason: that is it must conform to logical constraints and
validated methods of logical proof. If it doesn't, if it remains largely 'i
rrational,' it leaves itself open to irrational redefinition by anyone who
seeks to manipulate it for any reason.

[veronica floss]

This is a sideways-off-topic response. I haven't read your
latest yet.

I have a simple but terrible question.

... if you were a College Instructor of an Intro to Philosophy
course, how would you tell your students to read, say, Aristotle
(or Kant)?

A little further: Everyone thinks they already know how to
"analyze" what they read. Actually, very few of us know how to
properly "analyze" anything that is serious or important -- we
just read it as best we can and express our opinion about it as
articulately as we can, and hope our friends and teachers are
properly snowed. This is NOT analysis.

====

What I want to know, is *What* do you look for, how do you look
for it, and *when* do you look for it, and *how* do you recognize
it when you find it?

When you read Philosophy; do you read it line by line, paragraph
by paragraph, or all at once? Do you skim it first, or just dive
right in?

Do you paraphrase the essay as you go along? Do you paraphrase it
at all?

Do you bother to compare ideas as you find them in the article
with other peoples' writings, and what might you expect to get
out of comparisons like that? What can you do if you are a smart
Freshman who has never read someone like Aristotle before and
have no one to compare him with?

How do you recognize important specialized terms you come across?
How do you figure out what they mean from the article you are
reading, especially if the writer doesn't define his/her terms in
a convenient or appropriate way?

Do you set your own opinions aside or do you bring your opinions
to bear? If you bring your opinions to bear, what to you bring
them to bear upon; since you don't know what the writer is trying
to say, until you have read it?

What else do you do, as a "Student," opposed to a Scholar?

... you get the idea. I am asking this because you obviously know
how to read and explain academic Philosophy. This makes you a
good person to ask how *I* can read academic Philosophy better
than I do.

This also makes you a good person for lots of other newsgroup
lurkers to read, who might not know how to analyze Social Science
materials, philosophy, or even a news article. Every day, we run
across people who quote the Bible and the US Constitution out of
context; who don't understand why legal precedents are important;
who don't recognize loaded judgement terms in political essays,
who make fundamental mistakes comparing political ideologies, who
commit simple fallacies without knowing it; who let their
suspicions color their logical grasp of ideas, or who have just
never heard of Mills, Locke, Hobbes, or dozens of other Political
writers who have shaped the ways we think about politics today.

Emmanuel Kant once wrote that he intentionally wrote his works
to be as obscure and hard to read as he could. He succeeded. I
just would like to know what you are doing that got you through
Emannuel Kant.

VeeVee

[Scott D. Erb]

Gandalf Grey wrote:
>
> Scott D. Erb <scot...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message

> news:3C438F74...@worldnet.att.net...

> > Or, if I understand the previous bit right, the one consequence
> > that he allows is a consequence of treating another moral agent
> > with respect that is their due. The consequence of the doctor
> > withholding information is to make it impossible for the patient
> > to make her own decisions. The consequence of treating a moral
> > agent with the proper respect is to, apparently allow the moral
> > agent to make up their own minds with as much knowledge as
> > possible. That still is a type of consquence, it seems to me,
> > just as intent presumes a type of consequence.
>
> Well, it's clear that moral attitudes have consequences. Kant would
> argue---vehemently, I believe---that the point is whether or not they are
> intended to some consequence or whether consequences occur due to the nature
> of the principal involved. I think he would argue that any moral system has
> moral consequences but that his system is not based on consequences. And
> that, I think, is where Kant's system fails where it needs to succeed.

So, for Kant a moral act cannot be judged on the basis of the
consequences of the act itself, but whether or not it is defined
as moral by the principles being followed? But those principles
can, in part, be chosen due to their general consequences for the
ability of moral agents to act as such. Is that more like it? I
can see a clear distinction between allowing consequences to
determine the morality of a given act on the one hand, and
general consequences of whether or not a set of moral principles
are followed in all circumstances on the other.

> Let me give you an example. There are some who argue that one consequence
> of rights doctrines is the ultimate social isolation of the members of a
> society. As rights become more an more important to a morality, likenesses
> between members begin to disappear and their relative isolation from one
> another becomes more important as more and more rights put up barriers
> between individuals. Now, this point is arguable both ways, but what is not
> arguable is that a doctrine of rights could be created without such a result
> being the intended goal. In fact, it's not even necessary for us to presume
> that such a doctrine would be a failure. It might accomplish all of its
> legal goals and they might be quite different from the practical
> consequences that I mentioned and still, quite unintentionally lead to such
> a consequence. Now, even though the example leads to consequences, I don't
> believe that we can call such a morality consequentialist without abusing
> the meaning of the word.

Yes, but why would one choose a rights doctrine in the first
place? Some kind of consequence seems inherent in the thinking,
even if it isn't reducible to the specific consequences of acts
taken.

> What I think we can get out of this is the near impossiblity of creating any
> kind of consistently logical moral system that fails to take consequences
> into account without such a system appearing both arbitrary and faintly
> ridiculous.

> Or in general.
>
> Some philosophies are intentionally conseqeuntialist.
> Some philosophies are intentionally non-consequentialist.
> But ALL philosophies have consequences.
>
> As we get into Natural Law and Inherent Rights, it will be more and more
> obvious that non-consequentialist philosophies have, as their major
> difficulty, their relative inability to account for unintended consequences.

That's not necessarily a difficulty for everyone (I'll expand
below).

> At some point, most of these philosophies have to take the stand that
> unintended consequences 'just aren't important.' or, worse, 'aren't really
> the point.' Making real moral consequences subservient to 'higher' moral
> issues is one of the weak points of most "realist" moral philosophies.

But again, a lot of people live with a spiritual belief that the
point is to live morally, and that this world is anything from a
temporal place you will be saved from for an eternity of bliss to
a shared illusion where we play mind games to learn lessons or
have fun. As that pacifist Jewish philosopher Jesus said
(something like): "What do you gain if you win the whole world
but lose your soul." Given Kant was a religious man, I can see
no necessary weakness in adopting a moral philosophy that
potentially could have a consequence that bad things will happen
because not everyone lives by the moral philosophy (and,
presumably, in a Kantian system IF everyone lived by his
philosophy, then the consequences would not be a problem; you
wouldn't need to protect people from murderers, lie to Nazis,
etc.) What I'm getting at, I think, is that consequences of a
sort that say "if everyone lived this way then there would be no
problem" could be defended as proper, even if not everyone would
live that way.

> It's also interesting to hear
> > about this aspect of Kant's thought, as the manuscript I'm just
> > completing on German foreign policy is built on an argument that
> > Germany has developed a Kantian foreign policy identity in an
> > international system governed by primarily Lockean norms -- this
> > is based on a theory Alexander Wendt developed in "Social Theory
> > of international Politics," (1999) which argues that the
> > international system is an anarchy that can have different
> > logics. The application of Kantian ideals (mostly from his
> > argument on perpetual peace) to international relations is
> > imperfect (Wendt admits this) and doesn't get into this kind of
> > detail. Also, you may be interested in a book by Fernando Teeson
> > called "A Philosophy International Law," where he takes a Kantian
> > starting point and adjusts it (some say he mutilates it) to
> > essentially allow for military interventions to promote human
> > rights and international law.
>
> I'll look it up. Thanks, Scott.

And, of course, given that Kant was concerned about building an
international system that could achieve perpetual peace, putting
together a plan for a Pacific Union to be governed by certain
principles that would ultimately lead to peace, he at least in
his political thought considered consequences important. After
all, why argue for perpetual peace how to get there (to be sure,
something to be chosen by states given a status akin to moral
agents, not forced on states) if you have no concern for
consequences? Here, by the way, are Kant's basic requirements
for such a system:

Kant's criteria for perpetual peace contains six preliminary
articles and three definitive articles. Preliminary articles
include: 1) No treaty of peace that tacitly reserves issues for a
future war should be held valid; 2) No independent nation, be it
large or small, may be acquired by another nation by inheritance,
exchange, purchase or gift; 3) Standing armies shall be gradually
abolished; 4) No national debt shall be contracted in connection
with the foreign affairs of the nation; 5) No nation shall
forcibly interfere with the constitution and government of
another; and 6) No nation at war with another shall permit such
acts of war as must make mutual trust possible during such future
time of peace. Three definitive articles include: 1) The civil
constitution of every nation should be republican; 2)
International law shall be based on a federation of free states;
and 3) The Cosmopolitan Law shall be limited to conditions of
universal hospitality.

[Keynes]

I have found philosophy to be dangerous to my sanity.

As he entered town, Nasrudin the fool was mistaken
for an eminent judge. So they brought a case before
him. After hearing the prosecution he blurted,
"You must be right!" The defense objected then
presented their case. Nasrudin opinned, "You
must be right!" A dignified old man rose up
and said, "They can't both be right."
Nasrudin ruled, "You must be right."

[Billy Beck]

veronica floss <vero...@hygene.org> wrote:

>I have a simple but terrible question.
>
>... if you were a College Instructor of an Intro to Philosophy
>course, how would you tell your students to read, say, Aristotle
>(or Kant)?

As if they'd never read anything before, ever.

Very often around here, we see complaints over idiosyncratic
terms. The people who moan about this stuff here in Usenet wouldn't
make it through a single chapter of Kant before they were at sea over
his terms. Reading people who wrote on these levels requires a
technical diligence that people reading Barbara Cartwright or even
David Halberstam almost never have. It calls for acute awareness of
an entire literary landscape -- developed in progress -- that's being
related in (most often) completely original form. Some years ago, we
had a dink around here foisting a quote from von Mises, from which the
implication was being drawn that the man actually endorsed Fascism --
a completely laughable insinuation on its face. It was clear to me
that he had never read the man. Anyone who has, has also come to
grips with his occasional recapitulations of opponents' positions, and
this guy was simply too dim to understand the quote he was posting.
The relation was far too subtle for him, and I suspect that he never
read the original (a very common circumstance among people who hack at
him) and therefore had no way of knowing that there was a necessary
context -- like; the whole book -- to it.

>What I want to know, is *What* do you look for, how do you look
>for it, and *when* do you look for it, and *how* do you recognize
>it when you find it?

It's easy: you go to a bookstore with a worthwhile philosophy
shelf, and spend countless hours leafing through prospects until
something makes sense to you. Personally, I spend time reading many
pages (if the jacket blurbs manage to hook me) until I'm convinced
that any given book really has the goods (which can actually be good
or bad). I don't bother with tertiary issues like linguistics, and I
bought Foucault's "The Birth of the Clinic" just for the comic value
of having that idiot on my bookshelf. He lived up to my expectations.
On the other hand, I bought Hadley Arkes's "First Things: An Inquiry
Into The First Principles Of Morals And Justice", only to discover
that he was really talking about third and fourth things, at best.
Kent Greenawalt's "Conflicts Of Law And Morality" was a lofty stab
that fell drastically short, but even a book like that has its value
in being able to point to it and say, "Look at the rubbish that
professors are publishing these days." There are must-haves: Rawls's
"A Theory Of Justice" is first-rate rubbish. If I own "The Mean
Season: The Attack On The Welfare State" (Block, Cloward, Ehrenreich &
Piven), it's because I own Mises's "Socialism"; if I own Alinsky's
"Rules For Radicals", it's because I own a fine edition of Thomas
Paine. IOW: rubbish in philosophy is not necessarily a bad thing.

>When you read Philosophy; do you read it line by line, paragraph
>by paragraph, or all at once?

It depends. Kant is hellish. He reads like driving a hundred
miles on a flat tire. Adam Smith is wonderful. With some people, one
can race right through, depending on what they're saying and how
they're doing with it. The first time I read Rand's "Objectivist
Epistemology", it took me over two weeks, and the damned thing is
barely 120 pages (including Peikoff's really good "Analytic-Synthetic
Dichotomy"), which was a record for slow-burners. That was often a
line-by-line fight to understand what she was doing with extremely
rarified material. What's important, however, is that the brain is a
muscle: it gets into shape with exercise. Read this stuff long
enough, and work at it hard enough, and you start to burn a groove
into which you can slide with relatively ease whenever you see words
like "autotelic" or "fundamental".

>Do you paraphrase the essay as you go along? Do you paraphrase it
>at all?

That only happens *after* comprehension. In my view, this is one
good test of comprehension: how well -- truthfully -- one can state
any author's position in one's own words.

>Do you bother to compare ideas as you find them in the article
>with other peoples' writings, and what might you expect to get
>out of comparisons like that?

"Truth". (Correspondence to reality.) That's what.

>What can you do if you are a smart
>Freshman who has never read someone like Aristotle before and
>have no one to compare him with?

I would not call someone like that "smart", for the reason that
he has neglected to consider comparison with the most important person
on earth.

>How do you recognize important specialized terms you come across?

Spelling, usually.

>How do you figure out what they mean from the article you are
>reading, especially if the writer doesn't define his/her terms in
>a convenient or appropriate way?

Go back up to the top of this post and think about
"idiosyncracy".

I'll say this: a person who thinks the World Trade Center "fell
down" is either going to have a really hard time with "convenient or
appropriate way[s]" because she won't be able to sort it out from the
material at hand, or a very easy time due to a propensity for
arbitrarily making up as she goes along.

>Do you set your own opinions aside or do you bring your opinions
>to bear?

The latter. In the margins, in black ink. Copiously.

>Emmanuel Kant once wrote that he intentionally wrote his works
>to be as obscure and hard to read as he could. He succeeded. I
>just would like to know what you are doing that got you through
>Emannuel Kant.

Well, for one thing, I figured out the man's name. That was a
good start.

BIlly

VRWC Fronteer
http://www.mindspring.com/~wjb3/free/

[Jeffrey Davis]

Gandalf Grey wrote:
>
> Keynes <Key...@spam.newsguy.com> wrote in message
> news:nm084uofrhrcsd5dn...@4ax.com...
> >
> > Seems to me that logical consistency, if it were
> > ever applied in morality, would be an abomination.
> > People make better moral decisions every day
> > without looking for intellectual consistency.
> > If some salt is good, then more salt must be
> > better, and the most salt must be best.
> > Absurd. Logic has met it's limit in human
> > ethics. It would not even work if people
> > were in fact logical.
>
> You're correct in that some moral philosophies seem to be logical card
> houses built with little regard for anything but logic. Like most branches
> of learning, Philosophy has it's high limbs and philosophers often climb out
> too far on them.

I am not a professional philosopher and my last did into the
waters was around 35 years ago, but regardless, we all plod
along, eh. For me, I've developed the Ant Test. We're not
too far removed from the ant regardless of our
self-infatuation. Whenever a statement gets too la-di-da, I
picture it coming, as in a thought baloon, from an ant. If
it's ridiculous in that context, it's probably ridiculous in
ours.

About morals and ethics, the Golden Rule is a pretty good
place to begin and end. Smacking it around and exmaining it
to death is a form of ethical sloth. Just do it.

--
Jeffrey Davis <res0...@verizon.net>

[chris.holt]

veronica floss wrote:

> This is a sideways-off-topic response. I haven't read your
> latest yet.

> I have a simple but terrible question.

> ... if you were a College Instructor of an Intro to Philosophy
> course, how would you tell your students to read, say, Aristotle
> (or Kant)?

Okay, I'll give this a try. The short answer is to try to
figure out what they're trying to say, which is hard. I'll
try to expand on this below; but trying to put their words
together in such a way that they actually make good sense
is the first step, and one that seems very difficult to lots
of people. It's a bit like when you read a message on the
net; you can either try to figure out a sensible meaning for
what someone is saying, or you can pigeonhole and dismiss it.

> A little further: Everyone thinks they already know how to
> "analyze" what they read. Actually, very few of us know how to
> properly "analyze" anything that is serious or important -- we
> just read it as best we can and express our opinion about it as
> articulately as we can, and hope our friends and teachers are
> properly snowed. This is NOT analysis.

I agree that's not analysis; it's a consequence of 'educators'
trying to push people too far too fast. You can't analyze
something until you've figured out what it means in the first
place; then, you start looking into the nooks and crannies of
what is being said. But there's so much pressure to get
'meaningful' results that people are told to play syntactic
games before they actually know what they're criticizing, or
why.

> What I want to know, is *What* do you look for, how do you look
> for it, and *when* do you look for it, and *how* do you recognize
> it when you find it?

What you look for is what the person meant to say. You look
for it by trying to find intelligent meanings for their sentences.
You recognize it if you have an 'aha' experience; here's a
bright person, they've spent a lot of effort trying to give
you their insight, and you see that what they've said leads
to a serious and interesting question. You don't have to agree
with them, of course; we hardly ever do. But you should see
that there's a really substantial question there.

> When you read Philosophy; do you read it line by line, paragraph
> by paragraph, or all at once? Do you skim it first, or just dive
> right in?

That depends on the style of the writer; and it's affected by
whether it's a translation, and what language it comes from.
Me, I'm not good at skimming; I view philosophy texts much as
I do maths or physics books, where I try to make sure I see
what's going on at each stage, and I do lots of backwards
referencing to double check that I see how this comes from
that. This isn't universal.

> Do you paraphrase the essay as you go along? Do you paraphrase it
> at all?

Not consciously, but yes. When I read *anything*, I end up
knowing what was said in substance, but not how it was said
in words; this applies to everything from pop songs to
computer programs. So I'm paraphrasing it in some sense,
translating it into my internal language, because that's
the only way I understand things.

> Do you bother to compare ideas as you find them in the article
> with other peoples' writings, and what might you expect to get
> out of comparisons like that?

Not usually, except in the sense that I compare the ideas
of one philosopher against another. I know that Kant's ideas
are a kind of response to Hume, so I'll read the Critique of
Pure Reason keeping in mind the Treatise of Human Nature; but
that's a background job, as it were. I know that Heidegger
developed from Husserl, and so on; so when I read Being and
Time I try to fit it into its 'place'. But it's a bit like
looking at a large tapestry; you see how the bits relate, but
you start by looking at them on their own.

> What can you do if you are a smart

> Freshman who has never read someone like Aristotle before and
> have no one to compare him with?

Then you can't do a lot, except see what he says, and start
reading other related things (I guess The Republic would be
a good branching point from there). It's a bit like asking
suppose you study Henry VIII, but don't know anything about
Henry VII or Elizabeth I; you need to build up a framework
within which you can fit all these things.

> How do you recognize important specialized terms you come across?
> How do you figure out what they mean from the article you are
> reading, especially if the writer doesn't define his/her terms in
> a convenient or appropriate way?

Usually, they're taken from other, more primary sources; so
the best way is to read those sources, and skip a lot of
the derivative literature. I mentioned Heidegger above;
you won't understand dasein (in the way that he means it)
except by reading what he wrote. You can almost be guaranteed
that someone else's interpretation will be wrong.

> Do you set your own opinions aside or do you bring your opinions
> to bear? If you bring your opinions to bear, what to you bring
> them to bear upon; since you don't know what the writer is trying
> to say, until you have read it?

You bring your opinions to bear when you decide how much of
what they said you should take on board, accepting it as
of such worth that you should apply it for yourself. You
can't apply value judgements if you don't know what they're
talking about.

> What else do you do, as a "Student," opposed to a Scholar?

As a student, you try to figure out what other people have
said. As a scholar, you try to figure out where they went
wrong, and how you can improve things. It's not one or the
other; we all do both. One standard problem is that some
people try to be scholars before they've been students; they
try to criticize ideas they don't understand (as I mentioned
above). Another standard problem is that some people continue
to be students when they should be scholars; they are so
entranced by particular insights that they can't get past
them.

> ... you get the idea. I am asking this because you obviously know
> how to read and explain academic Philosophy. This makes you a
> good person to ask how *I* can read academic Philosophy better
> than I do.

I don't know what you've read, or how you've read it. I
started off with Descartes, many years ago, and just branched
off from there. Some people are fun to read (Nietzsche,
Wittgenstein) and some are horrible (Sartre, Quine); but it
depends what you're interested in at the time. I might give
you different answers tomorrow.

> This also makes you a good person for lots of other newsgroup
> lurkers to read, who might not know how to analyze Social Science
> materials, philosophy, or even a news article. Every day, we run
> across people who quote the Bible and the US Constitution out of
> context; who don't understand why legal precedents are important;
> who don't recognize loaded judgement terms in political essays,
> who make fundamental mistakes comparing political ideologies, who
> commit simple fallacies without knowing it; who let their
> suspicions color their logical grasp of ideas, or who have just
> never heard of Mills, Locke, Hobbes, or dozens of other Political
> writers who have shaped the ways we think about politics today.

People like that are never going to read useful philosophy;
aside from broad social issues about the awareness of the
populace, I don't see much value in trying to put them in
the same frame as someone who is interested in learning.

> Emmanuel Kant once wrote that he intentionally wrote his works
> to be as obscure and hard to read as he could. He succeeded. I
> just would like to know what you are doing that got you through
> Emannuel Kant.

For me, it was the follow-on from Hume; though the ethics
bit (The Metaphysical Elements of Justice) was separate,
and basically just happened when I was taking a philosophy
of ethics course at university. That and the Prolegamena
are short and approachable. If you want an analogous question,
ask how people decide to listen to Wagner's Ring Cycle; you
need a certain amount of background...

--

chris...@ncl.ac.uk http://www.cs.ncl.ac.uk/people/chris.holt/

[chris.holt]

Jeffrey Davis wrote:

> About morals and ethics, the Golden Rule is a pretty good
> place to begin and end. Smacking it around and exmaining it
> to death is a form of ethical sloth. Just do it.

Unfortunately, it ain't that simple. The Golden Rule has lots
of possible interpretations, and people get into lots of
disagreements about which of them is 'really' meant. They
usually involve parameterization; good for whom, in whose
eyes, at what time? If I think that you should be taught
to sink or swim (because that's what I'd prefer) am I justified
in tossing you into the deep end of a swimming pool? When you're
8? 5? 3? If I'm a masochist, should I cause you pain, on the
theory that you should also be a masochist?

--

chris...@ncl.ac.uk http://www.cs.ncl.ac.uk/people/chris.holt/

[Gandalf Grey]

veronica floss <vero...@hygene.org> wrote in message
news:MPG.16ae0439b...@ca.news.verio.net...

>
> This is a sideways-off-topic response. I haven't read your
> latest yet.
>
>
> I have a simple but terrible question.

It's a very good question. Forgive the lengthiness of the reply.

When I was young, back when dinosaurs still roamed the Earth, I read the
complete works of Plato. I was very lucky in a way, because most modern
philosophers agree that all the QUESTIONS of philosophy were asked by Plato,
nearly all of them in one book alone, The Republic. Plato's answers to
these questions are, unfortunately, another matter. Buying his answers to
the problems of philosophy requires you to buy into his particular brand of
philosophy and there are quite a few brands of philosophy.

In reading any philosopher without a background in other points of
view AND a background in philosophical logic, we tend to get caught up in
the conclusions of the philosopher we're reading. People who read Plato can
walk away as devote Platonists MERELY because they've never read the
historical criticisms of his philosophy that emerged from other philosophers
during and after his time.

For this reason and others, I would not suggest diving into a particular
philosopher as the right way to approach philosophy. There are too many
dead ends and most of those dead ends were applauded as great truths in
their time.

The best way I can think of to approach philosophy is to begin with the
standpoint of historical survey. Bertrand Russell's *A History of Western
Philosophy* is a representative work in this area, but there are many out
there. Each one of these books will present a philosopher's main ideas
along with a critical analysis of those ideas. It's the critical analysis
that one needs to study carefully. Part of
philosophy is philosophical logic. It's a way philosophy has of examining
itself for logical sense and consistency. When we employ it, we find that
many philosophies make no logical sense and that ALL philosophies have some
logical problems attached to them.

In general, another problem is that some philosophers are very difficult to
read. Historical surveys can give the reader at least some sense of what
these philosophers were trying to say, some summary of their ideas that
might be gained only after many long hours spent puzzling over their
arguments.

As a STUDENT rather than as a scholar in philosophy [recognizing that this
is a blurred distinction for some] you can best achieve a well-rounded
knowledge of philosophy by learning.

1. The main points of the most representative theories of classical
philosophy.
2. Learning the arguments against those theories.
3. Learning how those theories and their criticisms contributed to later
theories by other philosophers.

Philosophy has always been largely a game in which certain very basic
questions have been discussed by a number of poeple. Those discussions lead
to insights that are not perfectly correct, in the sense that no
philosophical theory generally leads to a conclusion that is without logical
criticism. Those criticisms lead to further theories and so on.

A good history of philosophy will also introduce the student to the various
aspects of philosophy such as metaphysics, philosophical logic, ontology,
epistemology, ethics, aesthetics and so on. Without a clear understanding
of
philosophy's various sub-categories, it's difficult to keep things ordered
in our understanding.

As far as actual books are concerned, you really should have a good
dictionary of philosophy. That's imperative. I would recommend the Penguin
Dictionary of Philosophy as being both realtively inexpensive and
exhaustive. Another important kind of book to have is an introduction to
philosophical logic. It's difficult for me to recommend a specific book in
this area. A.W. Sparks *Talking Philosophy: A Word Book* is a good
dictionary of logical terms and examples--if it's still in print--, but it
doesn't really teach logic. You should look for a book that you can read
easily on the subject. I say this because there are really two approaches
to philosophical logic, one is mathematical in origin and the other involves
critical thinking skills in the context of the written language, and the
analysis of sentences in looking at any particular argument. As a textbook,
I've had some success with William Hughes' *Critical Thinking* 3rd. edition,
Broadview Press. Nicely, Hughes talks about 'moral reasoning' which many
writers on logic ignore.

As for SURVEYS and HISTORIES of Philosophy, I've already mentioned Russell
which I would recommend that you get and read....also there is:

*The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy* Spendy but very good as a review
of the major areas.

*Philosophy 1*, *Philosophy 2* A.C. Graying, Editor is a very fine review of
the entire field.

Copleston's multi-volumed *History of Philosophy* is expensive and lengthy.

*A Short History of Philosophy* by Robert C. Solomon if you don't have the
time or money for Copleston and you want something more modern than
Russell's treatment.

If you're interested in ethics....

*Conduct and Character* Edited by Mark Timmons, gives you the opportunity to
read the original writings of ethical philosophers along with the writings
of their critics. It's a good place to get a grounding in the various
possible viewpoints toward morality and then go on to see what the problems
are with those views.

*A Companion to Ethics* Edited by Peter Singer is more expensive, harder to
find but quite complete in the basics of Western and Eastern ethical
philosophies as well as their flaws.

Some actual philosophers I would recommend reading: I do this with some
hesitation as it's obvious that a great deal of selection leads to such a
list subjectivised by my own interest in ethics. These are just, in my own
opinion, philosophers who either have something rather novel to say or who
do a good job of including the rest of philosophy in their particular
arguments.

Plato: Nearly anything he wrote is worthwhile. *The Republic* is
probably the most popular, though not necessarily his best work. Read also
*The Apology* and *The Death of Socrates.* Many of his other shorter works
are well worth reading.

Aristotle: *The Nicomachean Ethics.* It's often said that all philosophers
in
the end are either Platonists or Aristotelians. Reading just the Republic
and the Ethics will show you why.

Pre-Socratics: Any survey of the pre-Socratic schools will leave with a
complete view of ancient Greek philosophy's scope.

Rene Descartes: A Discourse on Method.

Marcus Aurelius: The Meditations. A Good place to learn about Stoicism,
also see the works of Zeno.

David Hume: Nearly anything he wrote is readable and worth reading, in
particular his *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.* For ethics,
*Treatise on Human Nature.*

Immanual Kant: Always difficult to read. His "lectures on Morality" are
far more readable than his technical work on the subject.

Bertrand Russell: Anything he wrote is well worth reading. *The Problems
of Philosophy* is a very good book that gives insight into Russell's own
philosophy as well as being a review of the unanswered questions of modern
philosophy. Russell is arguably the last of the great philosophers.
However, unless you're into mathematics and willing to study, stay away from
his joint work with Whitehead, *Principia Mathematica.*

Thomas Aquinas: Any selection of his writings for a sample of Thomist
philosophy.

Ayer, A.J.: Language Truth and Logic. An outmoded but outstanding book that
will give you some idea of where Logical Positivism was as a philosophy by
the 1940s.

G.E. Moore: *Principia Ethica*. A very readable book on modern realist
ethical theory, as well as a wonderful example of philosophical thinking.

Nietzsche. Any selection of his writings. Nietzsche is an important critic
of Western Philosophy and his writings would contribute heavily to Naziism.

Kierkgaard: Any selection of his writings.

Hegel: Try to read some of his work. Hegel is very important to later
Marxist theories of political philosophy.

Spinoza: Any selection of his writings.

Leibniz: Any selection of his writings.

Medieval Scholasticism: Any survey of this period in philosophical history.

Wisdom, A.J. *Other Minds* An excellent assessment of the modern school of
Linguistic Philosophy along with a very subtle refutation of philosophical
skepticism.

ETHICS and POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Some obvious choices.

Hobbes: *Leviathan" Early pre-liberal theories of government.

Locke: *Second Treatise on Civil Government* and *A Letter Concerning
Toleration.*

Rousseau: *The Social Contract.*

Edmund Burke: *Reflections on the Revolution in France*

John Stuart Mill: One of the greatest political philosophers in my opinion.
*On
Liberty* is must reading as well as *Utilitarianism.* For an preview of
woman's rights, read his essay *On the Subjection of Women.*

Karl Marx: *Das Kapital*

Tom Regan: *The Case for Animal Rights* This little-known book is the
finest book on ethics I've ever read. It is also one of the finest books on
philosophical thinking in general. Regan gives an honest overview of all
current ethical theories in his arguments.

John Rawls: *A Theory of Justice.* *Justice as Fairness* Rawls is the chief
philosopher for liberal theories of government.

Nozick: *Anarchy, State and Utopia* Nozick is the chief philosophical
proponent of conservative theories of government.

These are at least some places to start. Studying the history of philosophy
will excite your curiosity about specific philosophers and lead to new
ideas and new questions.

When it comes down to actually being a philosopher, using the tools and the
questions to argue and synthesize new arguments, the books I've found most
helpful have been Regan's "The Case for Animal Rights," Russell's *The Art
of Philosophizing and Other Essays,* Nozick's *Philosophical Explanation.*
and James Rachel's *The Elements of Moral Philosophy.*

I hope this helps. Many of the books listed can be found used in places
like Amazon.com and powellsbooks.com.

One last comment concerns your following question.

> When you read Philosophy; do you read it line by line, paragraph
> by paragraph, or all at once? Do you skim it first, or just dive
> right in?
>
> Do you paraphrase the essay as you go along? Do you paraphrase it
> at all?

All philosophers present at least one argument. The argument may be
rigorously stated again and again. Rawl's later work and Benthams
*Principles of Morals and Legislation* are two examples. Or the argument
may be couched in lengthy rhetorical flourishes and unsupported assertions,
such as are to be found in the work of Nietzsche and Hegel.

But the argument is always there. Sometimes its necessary to parse every
sentence until you find it, but it is always there. The argument may be
about the ultimate meaning of life or some aspect of life, such as we find
in ancient Greek philosophy. Or the argument may be more about what we are
actually saying when we ask questions like 'what is the meaning of life?: A
more modern viewpoint to be found in the work of people like Ayer, Wisdom,
Wittgenstein and Quine.

But the argument is always there. Ultimately, we fall back on the simplest
of principles. Any argument consists at last of a series of premises and a
conclusion. If the premises do not logically imply the conclusion, there's
something wrong with the argument. Arguments that are in some way
self-contradictory cannot be logically valid. Philosophies that ask us to
act in ways that lead to ends that are logically inconsistent with those
same principles are not valid philosophies.

The above is at least part of what reading philosophy is about. The rest is
searching for a common ground of experience. Not all philosophers are
interested in the building blocks of understanding. Some, like Kierkegaard,
Camus, Sartre, Russell, and others are also interested in the ways we
approach living our lives and there's a great deal we can learn from such
philosophers that cannot be reduced to rigid formal logic. They're about
examining our lives, not just reducing them to formulas.

As one of the first and greatest of all philosophers once said:

"The unexamined life is not worth living."

Good Luck.

[Gandalf Grey]

Billy Beck <wj...@mindspring.com> wrote in message
news:3c449427...@news.mindspring.com...

>
> veronica floss <vero...@hygene.org> wrote:
>
> >I have a simple but terrible question.
> >
> >... if you were a College Instructor of an Intro to Philosophy
> >course, how would you tell your students to read, say, Aristotle
> >(or Kant)?
>
> As if they'd never read anything before, ever.

Starting with this absurdity, Beck never gets more intelligible.

The "see and say" school of reading won't get you where you want to go in
philosophy and Beck's suggestion that you keep leafing through the
philosophy section until you find something that "makes sense to you" is
horridly contra-productive. It's a prescription for retaining the logical
comprehension problems you walked into the store with. Some of the worst
philosophers were the easiest to understand.

Philosophy, at some point, requires you to go along with the way the
philosopher thinks. And the only clue we have as to how he thinks is from
what he wrote, and, to a much lesser extent, what others wrote about him.
Certainly, we can rely on synopses by other more modern writers to tell us
what Kant REALLY meant, but other writers often have their own axes to
grind. This is particularly true of political philosophy where one relies
on, say, the conservative Nozsick to explain the liberal Rawls at the
expense of a prejudicial review.

Search for the argument. Get yourself a good philosophical dictionary for
another view on such terms as you'll find in the text. Sometimes it's going
to be tough going, but not as tough as elitist, pseudo-literates like Beck
would have you to believe. Once you've found the argument, you'll begin to
see that the work starts to make more sense....even if you don't agree with
the philosopher. At first, just try to see the argument and suspend your
judgement. You're not there to disagree [not yet, at any rate], but rather
to simply see the point.

[Gandalf Grey]

Scott D. Erb <scot...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message

news:3C449CDA...@worldnet.att.net...

No. For Kant, there's really only one moral principle and it flows out of
the nature of man as a rational being.

Rights doctrines emerge largely as a consequence of 'Natural Law'
philosophies and natural law philosophies [largely Thomist] were envisioned
as explanations of how believers AND non-believers could come together under
the way God originally ordered the workings of nature.

I'll get into that more in my essay on Natural Law.

> > At some point, most of these philosophies have to take the stand that
> > unintended consequences 'just aren't important.' or, worse, 'aren't
really
> > the point.' Making real moral consequences subservient to 'higher'
moral
> > issues is one of the weak points of most "realist" moral philosophies.
>
> But again, a lot of people live with a spiritual belief that the
> point is to live morally, and that this world is anything from a
> temporal place you will be saved from for an eternity of bliss to
> a shared illusion where we play mind games to learn lessons or
> have fun. As that pacifist Jewish philosopher Jesus said
> (something like): "What do you gain if you win the whole world
> but lose your soul." Given Kant was a religious man, I can see
> no necessary weakness in adopting a moral philosophy that
> potentially could have a consequence that bad things will happen
> because not everyone lives by the moral philosophy (and,
> presumably, in a Kantian system IF everyone lived by his
> philosophy, then the consequences would not be a problem; you
> wouldn't need to protect people from murderers, lie to Nazis,
> etc.) What I'm getting at, I think, is that consequences of a
> sort that say "if everyone lived this way then there would be no
> problem" could be defended as proper, even if not everyone would
> live that way.

Oh, certainly. And most philosophies have that undercurrent of presumption.
The question, though is not whether Kant's system would work if only
everyone played along. The question is whether Kant's system would work
under ANY circumstances. Ultimately, all moralities exist to help human
beings achieve the 'good' under circumstances of moral conflict. If we
don't presume that murderers, liars, cheats, and thieves exist, then there's
no need for a morality to govern human social interactions.

Kant's theory, like any normative theory of ethics, intends that, under any
moral conflict, rationally reflective human beings will come to some
convergence of view on what constitutes rightness and wrongness on the basis
of the proposed principle[s]. If all the parties to a conflict can come to
agreement on what 'ought' to be done AND, acting in accordance with the
moral principle[s] involved, actually act in such a way as to produce that
and, then the moral system can at least be said to be consistent with it's
own foundations.

Now, any moral principle or system hopes to accomplish this convergence of
agreement and decision, by both defining 'rightness' and by giving a guide
toward achieving 'rightness' in all those situations that are relevant to a
moral decision. But we have seen that Kant's system cannot account for
consequences. This is the second part of the requirement, that we are able
to DO something that we can continue to agree is 'right.' This goes beyond
some reasonable expectation that things don't always go off perfectly.
Kant's system fails because it cannot account within its own principles for
the consequences of moral acts. And it must account for them in order to
remain a valid principle of morality.

>
> > It's also interesting to hear
> > > about this aspect of Kant's thought, as the manuscript I'm just
> > > completing on German foreign policy is built on an argument that
> > > Germany has developed a Kantian foreign policy identity in an
> > > international system governed by primarily Lockean norms -- this
> > > is based on a theory Alexander Wendt developed in "Social Theory
> > > of international Politics," (1999) which argues that the
> > > international system is an anarchy that can have different
> > > logics. The application of Kantian ideals (mostly from his
> > > argument on perpetual peace) to international relations is
> > > imperfect (Wendt admits this) and doesn't get into this kind of
> > > detail. Also, you may be interested in a book by Fernando Teeson
> > > called "A Philosophy International Law," where he takes a Kantian
> > > starting point and adjusts it (some say he mutilates it) to
> > > essentially allow for military interventions to promote human
> > > rights and international law.
> >
> > I'll look it up. Thanks, Scott.
>
> And, of course, given that Kant was concerned about building an
> international system that could achieve perpetual peace, putting
> together a plan for a Pacific Union to be governed by certain
> principles that would ultimately lead to peace, he at least in
> his political thought considered consequences important.

Again, it's important to recognize the logical difference between our
intentions and the ends that our principles make possible or impossible.
Kant undoubtedly had good intentions. Few moralists are otherwise. His
inability to account for consequences in his philosophy is the problem.

> After
> all, why argue for perpetual peace how to get there (to be sure,
> something to be chosen by states given a status akin to moral
> agents, not forced on states) if you have no concern for
> consequences? Here, by the way, are Kant's basic requirements
> for such a system:
>
> Kant's criteria for perpetual peace contains six preliminary
> articles and three definitive articles. Preliminary articles
> include: 1) No treaty of peace that tacitly reserves issues for a
> future war should be held valid; 2) No independent nation, be it
> large or small, may be acquired by another nation by inheritance,
> exchange, purchase or gift; 3) Standing armies shall be gradually
> abolished; 4) No national debt shall be contracted in connection
> with the foreign affairs of the nation; 5) No nation shall
> forcibly interfere with the constitution and government of
> another; and 6) No nation at war with another shall permit such
> acts of war as must make mutual trust possible during such future
> time of peace. Three definitive articles include: 1) The civil
> constitution of every nation should be republican; 2)
> International law shall be based on a federation of free states;
> and 3) The Cosmopolitan Law shall be limited to conditions of
> universal hospitality.

Interesting stuff. Kant was an amazing man. In some ways he was blandly
predictable, but in others wildly brilliant.

[Scott D. Erb]

Gandalf Grey wrote:
>
> Scott D. Erb <scot...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message

> news:3C438F6A...@worldnet.att.net...

> >
> > But there is something extremely important in all of this -- man
> > is a cultural/social creature. We build worlds and cultural
> > systems, that is part of our essential nature. That means that
> > moral systems that deny that social aspect of human behavior in
> > favor of a detached individualism or an acultural rationalism
> > miss something. Rules that cut across cultures, though, have to
> > have some flexibility of how they are applied in context.
>
> A very important point because it bears directly on one of the chief
> arguments against rights doctrines. Both the inflexibility of rights and
> the tendency of rights to isolate individuals has been used as an argument
> against the moral efficacy of rights-doctrines.

OK. I'm not sure about the isolation argument you gave in the
last post, that didn't seem as strong as an inflexibility
argument or at least the argument that rights collide so often
and in so many ways that any doctrine trying to define them and
rule on what to do in particular circumstances would be unwieldy
and probably impossible to build.

> > BTW, it occurred to me just in passing that Kant would probably
> > be supportive of the Prime Directive of the Star Trek federation
> > of planets, even if he wouldn't like all the battles they fight
> > :)
>
> Kant would have loved the Trek world, it would have delighted his watchmaker
> soul [although, I have often felt that he would have considered Spock to be
> wildly irrational].

At the very least our fictional Vulcan friends show the limits of
logic as the prime method of living. Given that they are given
life by emotional humans, that's not surprising :)

> > Definitely. I think a short nihilist phase is probably normal
> > for people who get what was told them true ripped out from under
> > them and discover the limits of knowledge and certainty, and the
> > possibility that all is meaningless. But hey, the world is out
> > there, we're here, we may as well try to make things better and
> > do what we can to chart the best course, even if we can never be
> > sure we get it right.
>
> I agree. Nihilism does seem to represent a kind of social 'phase' that
> people go through. Notably, like most phases, people can also refuse to
> move on from it.
> Realism, Relativism and Nihilism are pretty much the only choices there are
> out there.
>
> But that's the subject of the next essay.

OK...only three options?

> > I'm pretty convinced that we will not be able express moral
> > concepts in language in a manner that will allow them to be
> > applied across context and in different situation in a manner
> > that isn't at least somewhat fuzzy. Ultimately, I think
> > intuition and empathy guided by rational thought is what's
> > required. Rational thinking about moral concepts gets us to the
> > point where we can guide our empathy and intuitive understandings
> > to make that call, and help us dismiss emotional wishful thinking
> > or strong reactions, but I don't think reason or language alone
> > will do the job. But I'll keep an open mind on this.
>
> Empathy is important [as long as it isn't Martin McPhillips' neo-Blavatskian
> type of empathy]. Moralities cannot make us connect to others in morally
> correct ways. It's a factor that is often ignored by moralists primarily
> because moralists ARE involved on a fairly strenuous level to the extent
> that they often presume a motivation that isn't always there. Rationality
> and intuition, on the other hand, are accepted as two of the tests that any
> valid moral principle needs to pass. Some kind of core moral intutition is
> nearly universal in human beings, regardless of their culture. From a
> purely consequentialist standpoint, it's difficult to see what the point
> would be of any morality that was wholly unacceptable to our intuition. But
> then, there's "Intuitionism," and that's also another essay.

My point is only that going through most days we don't have to
try to think about how to apply moral principles, we tend to know
when something is the right thing to do or not. Even someone
like Bithead caught plagiarizing seems to know it is wrong by his
reaction (non-denials meant to sound like denials -- "I don't own
the book"...) BTW, Time Magazine had a bit today by Roger
Rosenblatt about Stpehn Ambrose's problem with plagiarism. The
bit he provides as an example has considerably more changes than
the one bithead had, helping show that his "ideas can only be
worded so many ways" non-denial denial is absurd.

Anyway, intuition and empathy are shorthands for at the very
least the sum total of experiential knowledge and our own ability
to place ourselves in a situation. The former is a way our
knowledge about social mores and values we learned are quickly
'felt,' the latter almost allows for a Rawlsian ability to think
how we would feel if we were in other situations. It could be
that intuition reflects unconscious knowledge and empathy a
spiritual connection to others, but I'll bracket out that
speculation. Assuming intuition and empathy are quick internal
calculations of moral understandings, it's clear that they are
often wrong and prone to over reaction or reaction to false
perceptions of a situation. If you know someone well, like him,
and then see him make a mistake by committing a crime and get
caught, you may empathize and hope he gets off, or even help him
avoid the law. That's why these 'quick internal calculations'
cannot on their own provide the answers, we don't automatically
know what is right, and believing that we do makes error
probability increase. On the other hand, they can also guide us
to when a purely rational morality that is learned and some how
'accepted' intellectually may be wrong. We may be convinced that
the death penalty is good, but seeing another person die may
cause one to question whether or not that is appropriate. The
human reality of a situation might show us that purely
rational/logical consideration of morality as an abstraction from
direct human experience can cause us to ignore the impact of
actions on other humans. In Germany when members of the
pacifist Green party visited Bosnia in 1995 many quickly went
from wanting NO German military participation in any type of
conflict to voting to approve German involvement in Bosnia,
having seen the human suffering.

> > Exactly. But if you think that through, and if you explore the
> > principles behind it, then usually you have a *sense* of what
> > being kind, or treating others with respect, might mean. With
> > that sense, and with knowledge about a culture, other people, and
> > the bases of ones' moral belief, one can make a judgement call on
> > what kindness might mean in a given situation. For example, if
> > I'm a teacher I might realize that giving blanket A's and B's is
> > NOT being kind since it makes students less likely to study or
> > work hard, might harm them later in life, and not provide them
> > the kind of education they come to class for. But they may think
> > 'being kind' would be to forgive their bad assignment since
> > things were rough this week, and a naive intuitive reaction might
> > be to agree. No emotional/empathy based principle seems
> > acceptable absent a logical/rational component. No emotional
> > principle can be defined outside of trying to understand its
> > rational place within a context.
>
> You're using empathy again and that's fine. But consider this. A valid
> morality is not simply something we hold ourselves to [with some exceptions
> such as Buddhist Ethics]. Most moralities are devised to operate within a
> culture and across a large number of individuals.

Yes, though to me that creates a three level moral code. Level
one is what I hold myself to, which often is not consequentialist
and reflects certain principled beliefs I have developed. Level
two is the societal code, which I will abide by to the extent
that it doesn't cause me to violate my level one moral code. If
someone has a level one code that says taxation is wrong then one
might refuse to vote, since voting could be said to enable
taxation. But unless paying a tax is immoral, that doesn't
require one violate the societal legal code or moral norms.
Level three is my idealized version of what a societal code
should be, which, if I'm rational, will not contradict my level
one code, but might be quite different from my level two code.
I'll work to try to convince others of the level three code
(acting politically), live by my level one code, but abide by the
rules of the level two code to the extent it doesn't require
violation of my level one code.

Geez, I should be writing tax codes here, my wording is so boring
and stilted.

>If we don't KNOW what
> "kindness" means, in the context of the example given, by what measure will
> we judge, not our behavior, but the behavior of others? And, whether we
> like it or not, morality is, in part, about judging the behavior of others.

To me that's level two or three -- comparing their behavior
either to the societal code, or to what I believe would be a
"best" societal code. I will only intervene on them if my own
moral code (level one) requires intervention (e.g.,
other-defense, self-defense, or warning, etc.), or perhaps if the
societal code I abide by requires intervention, and such
intervention is not something I deem immoral.

> We can all have some fuzzy concept of 'kindness,' but once it becomes part
> of an established morality, I think we would be surprised at how quickly
> individual interpretations became alarmingly broad and self-serving. At the
> point at which a cultural morality becomes law, kindness will not have the
> luxury of remaining a fuzzy term, and I think I can make a good argument
> that as soon as kindness is defined, it will lose whatever appeal it had as
> a morality.

True, that makes turning moral principles into legal codes,
systems of rights, or whatever, a daunting task. That also of
course gets back to the language problem.

> > Very well put, you have a talent at stating complex ideas in a
> > manner easy to follow and understand.
>
> Thanks. Many years of teaching while being simultaneously taught. 'To
> learn, teach!' as the Romans said.

And if you stop learning, you can't teach. Thanks for the posts,
I think a lot of people are enjoying them and saving them.

[Scott D. Erb]

Perhaps, Gandalf, you should add pragmatist to your list of moral
possibilities (realist, relativist and nihilist).

[Martin McPhillips]

veronica floss wrote:
>
> This is a sideways-off-topic response. I haven't read your
> latest yet.
>
> I have a simple but terrible question.
>
> ... if you were a College Instructor of an Intro to Philosophy
> course, how would you tell your students to read, say, Aristotle
> (or Kant)?

I wouldn't tell the students to read anything.

The first thing I would do is to tell them to think about sitting
down to dinner with another person, where each of you orders
filet mignon, rare. When the filets come, you ask for A-1 sauce
and your dinner companion looks at you as though you were out
of your mind.

"You don't put A-1 on filet mignon!"

Right there is the first lesson that students should learn, the
difference between the object (the filet mignon) and the subject
(the person eating it). The subject has a *subjective* apprehension
of the object, but it is still an apprehension of the *object.*
The object is there. You are the subject apprehending it.

The second thing I would do is to tell the students to "bracket"
everything that they know about everything, including themselves,
to put aside every single name and relationship and idea that they
have of everything that they know and face in their lives -- not to
*end* those things, just to put them aside "in brackets," and to then
"return to the things themselves," to "turn to the object[s]."

That includes words, institutions, society, law, individual identity
(yes, they "bracket" themselves too), and everything that they
think they know. Put it all aside and pursue the "thing itself"
down to its foundation.

The third thing I would tell them is to turn that same radical
doubt back onto their own consciousness of the world *and* of
themselves and examine the "knower knowing known," so to speak.

At that point, if it takes, consciousness has been radicalized --
directed to its roots -- and with due diligence the students
should be able to handle anything, from Plato to Sartre.

[Gandalf Grey]

Martin McPhillips <jour...@nyc.rr.com> wrote in message
news:3C44D824...@nyc.rr.com...

> veronica floss wrote:
> >
> > This is a sideways-off-topic response. I haven't read your
> > latest yet.
> >
> > I have a simple but terrible question.
> >
> > ... if you were a College Instructor of an Intro to Philosophy
> > course, how would you tell your students to read, say, Aristotle
> > (or Kant)?
>
> I wouldn't tell the students to read anything.

He'd give them a lecture on turn of the century neo-theosophy.

What a bunch of jokers.

[Billy Beck]

Richard Hanson <ganda...@infectedmail.com> wrote:

>Billy Beck <wj...@mindspring.com> wrote...

>>
>> veronica floss <vero...@hygene.org> wrote:
>>
>> >I have a simple but terrible question.
>> >
>> >... if you were a College Instructor of an Intro to Philosophy
>> >course, how would you tell your students to read, say, Aristotle
>> >(or Kant)?
>>
>> As if they'd never read anything before, ever.
>
>Starting with this absurdity, Beck never gets more intelligible.
>
>The "see and say" school of reading won't get you where you want to go in
>philosophy and Beck's suggestion that you keep leafing through the
>philosophy section until you find something that "makes sense to you" is
>horridly contra-productive. It's a prescription for retaining the logical
>comprehension problems you walked into the store with. Some of the worst
>philosophers were the easiest to understand.

That has nothing to do with whether anyone else could actually
figure that out, !Dick, and that's why I'm not presuming anyone's
"logical comprehension problems"... to begin with. And "horridly
contra-productive" depends on the goal in mind. I'll let you in on
one of my presumptions: that someone interested in this stuff is going
to spend time at it. With a bit of effort, it won't be long before
someone can start sorting through it with a bit of authority. And
that effect only gets better as it goes.

>Philosophy, at some point, requires you to go along with the way the
>philosopher thinks. And the only clue we have as to how he thinks is from
>what he wrote, and, to a much lesser extent, what others wrote about him.
>Certainly, we can rely on synopses by other more modern writers to tell us
>what Kant REALLY meant, but other writers often have their own axes to
>grind. This is particularly true of political philosophy where one relies
>on, say, the conservative Nozsick to explain the liberal Rawls at the
>expense of a prejudicial review.

<groan> Yeah, but it's never true in cases of commies who "explain" a
"Fascist" like Rand, or Rothbard or anyone else they've *never even
read*. There's not much "prejudic[e]" in any of that.

Billy

VRWC Fronteer
http://www.mindspring.com/~wjb3/free/

[Gandalf Grey]

Scott D. Erb <scot...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message

news:3C44D7FA...@worldnet.att.net...

>
>
> Gandalf Grey wrote:
> >
> > Scott D. Erb <scot...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message
> > news:3C438F6A...@worldnet.att.net...
> > >
> > > But there is something extremely important in all of this -- man
> > > is a cultural/social creature. We build worlds and cultural
> > > systems, that is part of our essential nature. That means that
> > > moral systems that deny that social aspect of human behavior in
> > > favor of a detached individualism or an acultural rationalism
> > > miss something. Rules that cut across cultures, though, have to
> > > have some flexibility of how they are applied in context.
> >
> > A very important point because it bears directly on one of the chief
> > arguments against rights doctrines. Both the inflexibility of rights
and
> > the tendency of rights to isolate individuals has been used as an
argument
> > against the moral efficacy of rights-doctrines.
>
> OK. I'm not sure about the isolation argument you gave in the
> last post, that didn't seem as strong as an inflexibility
> argument or at least the argument that rights collide so often
> and in so many ways that any doctrine trying to define them and
> rule on what to do in particular circumstances would be unwieldy
> and probably impossible to build.

I'm a little surprised. I would think that you would be more open than most
to the charge that a proliferation of rights leads to social isolation.
Granted, it is primarily a legal argument and not a specifically moral
argument.....

>
>
> > > BTW, it occurred to me just in passing that Kant would probably
> > > be supportive of the Prime Directive of the Star Trek federation
> > > of planets, even if he wouldn't like all the battles they fight
> > > :)
> >
> > Kant would have loved the Trek world, it would have delighted his
watchmaker
> > soul [although, I have often felt that he would have considered Spock to
be
> > wildly irrational].
>
> At the very least our fictional Vulcan friends show the limits of
> logic as the prime method of living. Given that they are given
> life by emotional humans, that's not surprising :)

I think he would have accused Spock of being a weenie when he stated in the
First Movie that "logic is not enough."

>
> > > Definitely. I think a short nihilist phase is probably normal
> > > for people who get what was told them true ripped out from under
> > > them and discover the limits of knowledge and certainty, and the
> > > possibility that all is meaningless. But hey, the world is out
> > > there, we're here, we may as well try to make things better and
> > > do what we can to chart the best course, even if we can never be
> > > sure we get it right.
> >
> > I agree. Nihilism does seem to represent a kind of social 'phase' that
> > people go through. Notably, like most phases, people can also refuse to
> > move on from it.
> > Realism, Relativism and Nihilism are pretty much the only choices there
are
> > out there.
> >
> > But that's the subject of the next essay.
>
> OK...only three options?

Those are your three classic choices, but it's a bit more involved than
that: there's Irrealism, subjectivism, relativism, realism,
neo-intuitionism, nihilism, cognitivism, non-cognitivism, linguistic
skepticism, and a few others. I chose the three because they represent a
trinity of belief that somehow leads into every available metaethical
viewpoint.

Just as a paranthetical point: Everyone has always "known" that.
Neo-intuitionists such as Pritchard have argued that this is what morality
is all about. Unfortunately, two people can "know" very different things
about the morality of an issue. Because of that problem and a few others,
most modern philosophers accept that a valid moral system must ultimately
'appeal' to our core moral beliefs but that no valid system can be built
directly on moral intuition.

>Even someone
> like Bithead caught plagiarizing seems to know it is wrong by his
> reaction (non-denials meant to sound like denials -- "I don't own
> the book"...) BTW, Time Magazine had a bit today by Roger
> Rosenblatt about Stpehn Ambrose's problem with plagiarism. The
> bit he provides as an example has considerably more changes than
> the one bithead had, helping show that his "ideas can only be
> worded so many ways" non-denial denial is absurd.

Ah, the whitewater clowns never cease to amaze and amuse.

>
> Anyway, intuition and empathy are shorthands for at the very
> least the sum total of experiential knowledge and our own ability
> to place ourselves in a situation. The former is a way our
> knowledge about social mores and values we learned are quickly
> 'felt,' the latter almost allows for a Rawlsian ability to think
> how we would feel if we were in other situations.

Yeah, you seem to be conflating moral intuition with something a bit more
second-order. Years ago, there was an interesting paper on that by Michael
Smith. He used it as a defense of Realism. As I recall his argument was
that moral "ought" type statements are statements about desires we
rationally would believe ourselves to have were we in cool and calm
conditions under which to access our desires. This bears at least a passing
resemblance to Rawls' "veil of ignorance" condition in his 'initial
position' theory of contractarianism.

> It could be
> that intuition reflects unconscious knowledge and empathy a
> spiritual connection to others, but I'll bracket out that
> speculation. Assuming intuition and empathy are quick internal
> calculations of moral understandings, it's clear that they are
> often wrong and prone to over reaction or reaction to false
> perceptions of a situation. If you know someone well, like him,
> and then see him make a mistake by committing a crime and get
> caught, you may empathize and hope he gets off, or even help him
> avoid the law. That's why these 'quick internal calculations'
> cannot on their own provide the answers, we don't automatically
> know what is right, and believing that we do makes error
> probability increase. On the other hand, they can also guide us
> to when a purely rational morality that is learned and some how
> 'accepted' intellectually may be wrong.

Precisely. In the end, no valid system can completely disagree with our
core moral beliefs after reflection. [I think that last bit is rather
important. Core moral beliefs can be quite wrong both circumstantially and
in a wider sense----unless you're a moral relativist.]

> We may be convinced that
> the death penalty is good, but seeing another person die may
> cause one to question whether or not that is appropriate. The
> human reality of a situation might show us that purely
> rational/logical consideration of morality as an abstraction from
> direct human experience can cause us to ignore the impact of
> actions on other humans. In Germany when members of the
> pacifist Green party visited Bosnia in 1995 many quickly went
> from wanting NO German military participation in any type of
> conflict to voting to approve German involvement in Bosnia,
> having seen the human suffering.

Undoubtedly core beliefs can and do change. There was a philosopher at the
U of W a few years ago, who actually used that fact to suggest that there IS
a general moral principle that exists outside of our beliefs and that we
prove this everytime we change our mind. Obviously, he was hopelessly
muddled on this. A conman could tell you a story which you might believe.
If he then said. "I'm sorry, I was lying to you. Here's the REAL truth."
He thereupon gives you a much more plausible story and you change your mind
based on his "admission" and invest your belief in the new story. Which
story is true? Neither. What is the truth here? There is none. The fact
that we 'change our minds' is one thing, believing that there is something
extraneous out there, some self-evident truth that 'causes' us to change our
minds or in itself justifies our change of mind is another example of the
tendency philosophers have to get caught in the grip of language.

No. I see what you mean. The problem with that kind of thinking, at least
to many philosophers, is that it means that there must be some kind of
fundamental lack of connection between the personal, the social and the
ideal. That causes no end of problems with some denying that there is even
such a thing as 'the ideal,' some saying that personal morality and public
morality are the same thing, and so on.

>
> >If we don't KNOW what
> > "kindness" means, in the context of the example given, by what measure
will
> > we judge, not our behavior, but the behavior of others? And, whether we
> > like it or not, morality is, in part, about judging the behavior of
others.
>
> To me that's level two or three -- comparing their behavior
> either to the societal code, or to what I believe would be a
> "best" societal code. I will only intervene on them if my own
> moral code (level one) requires intervention (e.g.,
> other-defense, self-defense, or warning, etc.), or perhaps if the
> societal code I abide by requires intervention, and such
> intervention is not something I deem immoral.

That's okay for you, pal. But what, says Jeremy Bentham, of the society as
a whole? Personal interpretation may work out well for persons, but when
they get before the bench, pleas of "but I was just being kind after my
fashion" won't work out well. Remember always, that in any complicated
society, the moral will always end up drifting into the legal.

[Gandalf Grey]

Bill Beck, Junior <wj...@mindspring.com> wrote in message
news:3c44d42d...@news.mindspring.com...
>
> <ganda...@infectedmail.com> wrote:

> >Philosophy, at some point, requires you to go along with the way the
> >philosopher thinks. And the only clue we have as to how he thinks is
from
> >what he wrote, and, to a much lesser extent, what others wrote about him.
> >Certainly, we can rely on synopses by other more modern writers to tell
us
> >what Kant REALLY meant, but other writers often have their own axes to
> >grind. This is particularly true of political philosophy where one
relies
> >on, say, the conservative Nozsick to explain the liberal Rawls at the
> >expense of a prejudicial review.
>
> <groan> Yeah, but it's never true in cases of commies who "explain" a
> "Fascist" like Rand, or Rothbard or anyone else they've *never even
> read*. There's not much "prejudic[e]" in any of that.

Regardless of what direction prejudice comes from, it makes reading ABOUT a
philosopher more problematic than reading them directly. As for Rand, my
criticisms of her philosophy are not on political grounds at all, but on
logical principles which she consistently failed to meet. Including Rand in
a list of philosophers accomplishes nothing more than to trivialize the
term.

As usual, your remarks are utterly pointless, Junior.

[Gandalf Grey]

Scott D. Erb <scot...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message

news:3C44D8B7...@worldnet.att.net...

Did I fail to mention subjectivism?

[Martin McPhillips]

You're confused, which is to say that you can't make it to wrong.

[Jeffrey Davis]

What does worrying the notion to death resolve? Nothing. If
you want to be ethical and good, treat people the way you'd
want to be treated. If there are fringe psyches and they do
bad things by following the principle, so what? All that
proves is that people aren't syllogisms.

Pursue the good. Cultivate an honest conscience. Keep it
simple.

--
Jeffrey Davis <res0...@verizon.net>

[chris.holt]

Jeffrey Davis wrote:

> "chris.holt" wrote:
>>Jeffrey Davis wrote:

>>>About morals and ethics, the Golden Rule is a pretty good
>>>place to begin and end. Smacking it around and exmaining it
>>>to death is a form of ethical sloth. Just do it.

>>Unfortunately, it ain't that simple. The Golden Rule has lots
>>of possible interpretations, and people get into lots of
>>disagreements about which of them is 'really' meant. They
>>usually involve parameterization; good for whom, in whose
>>eyes, at what time? If I think that you should be taught
>>to sink or swim (because that's what I'd prefer) am I justified
>>in tossing you into the deep end of a swimming pool? When you're
>>8? 5? 3? If I'm a masochist, should I cause you pain, on the
>>theory that you should also be a masochist?

> What does worrying the notion to death resolve? Nothing.

It forces you to realize that an apparently simple notion
can have ramifications that aren't always easy to
resolve. On the one hand, this means that we can expect
disagreements about particular applications (as indeed
we see), so we've got a better idea of how and why they
come about, which makes the process of trying to resolve
them less fraught. On the other hand, it makes us look
a lot more carefully at the language we're using, to the
extent that we discover that when people *are* keeping
it simple, they're often engaging in tautologies via
circular definitions. For instance, "We ought to do
good", followed by "Good is defined as that which we
ought to do".

> If

> you want to be ethical and good, treat people the way you'd
> want to be treated.

I've tried to point out that that isn't good enough, as
it were. You've got to say something more like "I will
treat you the way that, if I were in your position with
your goals (as best as I can tell), I would want to be
treated, to the extent that this maintains a balance
among our interests when these compete". [The last bit
is needed to deal with situations where a martyr destroys
their own life to help someone completely selfish and
willing to take advantage of them.]

> If there are fringe psyches and they do

> bad things by following the principle, so what? All that
> proves is that people aren't syllogisms.

It shows that people who mean well can often come into
conflict through no fault of their own, and that we
need a mechanism for resolving such conflicts that
doesn't involve attaching blame. IMHO.

> Pursue the good. Cultivate an honest conscience. Keep it
> simple.

You're making an appeal to intuition here; it's a bit like
saying "Just use common sense". But this only helps when
people have the same sort of intuitions...

[Scott D. Erb]

Gandalf Grey wrote:
>
> Scott D. Erb <scot...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message

> news:3C449CDA...@worldnet.att.net...

> > So, for Kant a moral act cannot be judged on the basis of the
> > consequences of the act itself, but whether or not it is defined
> > as moral by the principles being followed? But those principles
> > can, in part, be chosen due to their general consequences for the
> > ability of moral agents to act as such. Is that more like it?
>
> No. For Kant, there's really only one moral principle and it flows out of
> the nature of man as a rational being.

OK...I am going to have to dig into Kant for more on this, I
don't want to burden you with questions about his philosophy,
especially since I have some of writings available to me. My
obvious question would be why do any moral principles flow out of

the nature of man as a rational being.

> > Yes, but why would one choose a rights doctrine in the first

> > place? Some kind of consequence seems inherent in the thinking,
> > even if it isn't reducible to the specific consequences of acts
> > taken.
>
> Rights doctrines emerge largely as a consequence of 'Natural Law'
> philosophies and natural law philosophies [largely Thomist] were envisioned
> as explanations of how believers AND non-believers could come together under
> the way God originally ordered the workings of nature.
>
> I'll get into that more in my essay on Natural Law.

OK

> > But again, a lot of people live with a spiritual belief that the
> > point is to live morally, and that this world is anything from a
> > temporal place you will be saved from for an eternity of bliss to
> > a shared illusion where we play mind games to learn lessons or
> > have fun. As that pacifist Jewish philosopher Jesus said
> > (something like): "What do you gain if you win the whole world
> > but lose your soul." Given Kant was a religious man, I can see
> > no necessary weakness in adopting a moral philosophy that
> > potentially could have a consequence that bad things will happen
> > because not everyone lives by the moral philosophy (and,
> > presumably, in a Kantian system IF everyone lived by his
> > philosophy, then the consequences would not be a problem; you
> > wouldn't need to protect people from murderers, lie to Nazis,
> > etc.) What I'm getting at, I think, is that consequences of a
> > sort that say "if everyone lived this way then there would be no
> > problem" could be defended as proper, even if not everyone would
> > live that way.
>
> Oh, certainly. And most philosophies have that undercurrent of presumption.
> The question, though is not whether Kant's system would work if only
> everyone played along. The question is whether Kant's system would work
> under ANY circumstances. Ultimately, all moralities exist to help human
> beings achieve the 'good' under circumstances of moral conflict. If we
> don't presume that murderers, liars, cheats, and thieves exist, then there's
> no need for a morality to govern human social interactions.

But if Kant were to argue (and as I understand at least his
perpetual peace theory about states he would) that rational
beings can learn to act according to moral principles in a way
that will lead to some kind of superior result, and that pain,
misery, etc., is an inability to understand those principles.
That, however, apparently is NOT the rationale Kant's moral
theory takes, even if he twists into something like that with
some of his work on a "Pacific Union" and how it can lead to
'perpetual peace' -- that Republican states can function morally
and in so doing eliminate the need for war, conflict, etc.

> Kant's theory, like any normative theory of ethics, intends that, under any
> moral conflict, rationally reflective human beings will come to some
> convergence of view on what constitutes rightness and wrongness on the basis
> of the proposed principle[s]. If all the parties to a conflict can come to
> agreement on what 'ought' to be done AND, acting in accordance with the
> moral principle[s] involved, actually act in such a way as to produce that
> and, then the moral system can at least be said to be consistent with it's
> own foundations.

Yes.

> Now, any moral principle or system hopes to accomplish this convergence of
> agreement and decision, by both defining 'rightness' and by giving a guide
> toward achieving 'rightness' in all those situations that are relevant to a
> moral decision. But we have seen that Kant's system cannot account for
> consequences. This is the second part of the requirement, that we are able
> to DO something that we can continue to agree is 'right.' This goes beyond
> some reasonable expectation that things don't always go off perfectly.
> Kant's system fails because it cannot account within its own principles for
> the consequences of moral acts. And it must account for them in order to
> remain a valid principle of morality.

Do you think it might not be an assumption, that if people acted
as according to their rational nature that they would create a
better world or society? I only ask that since he seems to have
taken that route in the "perpetual peace" approach. But this
shows I should just read more than Kant's stuff as it applies to
international relations (and in response to a poster's
recommendation two years ago, I actually purchased a book on
Kant's philosophy, so I have no excuse not to go dig into it
myself...)

> > And, of course, given that Kant was concerned about building an
> > international system that could achieve perpetual peace, putting
> > together a plan for a Pacific Union to be governed by certain
> > principles that would ultimately lead to peace, he at least in
> > his political thought considered consequences important.
>
> Again, it's important to recognize the logical difference between our
> intentions and the ends that our principles make possible or impossible.
> Kant undoubtedly had good intentions. Few moralists are otherwise. His
> inability to account for consequences in his philosophy is the problem.

But is not judging an act because of its consequences the same as
not being able to account for consequences? You can ignore that
question, I'm getting to be a pest here and I just have to dig in
for myself. He was a religious man, as I recall, so perhaps he
believed that living right was an end in and of itself,
regardless of the consequences. It's also very German to look
for the 'right way to do things.' That desire to be "right" has
helped lead them on some very nasty historical excursions when
they got some of their assumptions wrong!

> > After
> > all, why argue for perpetual peace how to get there (to be sure,
> > something to be chosen by states given a status akin to moral
> > agents, not forced on states) if you have no concern for
> > consequences? Here, by the way, are Kant's basic requirements
> > for such a system:
> >
> > Kant's criteria for perpetual peace contains six preliminary
> > articles and three definitive articles. Preliminary articles
> > include: 1) No treaty of peace that tacitly reserves issues for a
> > future war should be held valid; 2) No independent nation, be it
> > large or small, may be acquired by another nation by inheritance,
> > exchange, purchase or gift; 3) Standing armies shall be gradually
> > abolished; 4) No national debt shall be contracted in connection
> > with the foreign affairs of the nation; 5) No nation shall
> > forcibly interfere with the constitution and government of
> > another; and 6) No nation at war with another shall permit such
> > acts of war as must make mutual trust possible during such future
> > time of peace. Three definitive articles include: 1) The civil
> > constitution of every nation should be republican; 2)
> > International law shall be based on a federation of free states;
> > and 3) The Cosmopolitan Law shall be limited to conditions of
> > universal hospitality.
>
> Interesting stuff. Kant was an amazing man. In some ways he was blandly
> predictable, but in others wildly brilliant.

I still find the second part of his categorical imperative, about
not using others solely as means, to be compelling.

[Scott D. Erb]

Gandalf Grey wrote:
>
> Scott D. Erb <scot...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message

> news:3C44D7FA...@worldnet.att.net...

> > OK. I'm not sure about the isolation argument you gave in the
> > last post, that didn't seem as strong as an inflexibility
> > argument or at least the argument that rights collide so often
> > and in so many ways that any doctrine trying to define them and
> > rule on what to do in particular circumstances would be unwieldy
> > and probably impossible to build.
>
> I'm a little surprised. I would think that you would be more open than most
> to the charge that a proliferation of rights leads to social isolation.
> Granted, it is primarily a legal argument and not a specifically moral
> argument.....

Isolation, or alienation is a major problem. I do think it
emerges from sociological changes with modernism, which includes
individualism and ideas of defining rights as purely individual.
But I'm not convinced that is per se a problem, or if the problem
is more in how we define those rights and understand the social
pressures brought by modernism. But expressing a little
skepticism isn't the same as rejection. I tend to probe things
and try to be skeptical even about those arguments that I find
appealling. I may often sound more negative than I am -- in
fact, sometimes I'm MOST skeptical right before I'm convinced
about something, trying to be absolutely sure if I'm going to buy
an argument different than what I thought before.

> > At the very least our fictional Vulcan friends show the limits of
> > logic as the prime method of living. Given that they are given
> > life by emotional humans, that's not surprising :)
>
> I think he would have accused Spock of being a weenie when he stated in the
> First Movie that "logic is not enough."

LOL! I can't think of what the old Prussian equivalent for
'weenie' would be, but somehow the imagery is amusing.

> Those are your three classic choices, but it's a bit more involved than
> that: there's Irrealism, subjectivism, relativism, realism,
> neo-intuitionism, nihilism, cognitivism, non-cognitivism, linguistic
> skepticism, and a few others. I chose the three because they represent a
> trinity of belief that somehow leads into every available metaethical
> viewpoint.

Yeah, I knew you'd listed others, I always get skeptical of
categorization. Social science does it too often, and that
misleads. But I see your points, again, don't read too much into
my skepticism on some issues.

> > My point is only that going through most days we don't have to
> > try to think about how to apply moral principles, we tend to know
> > when something is the right thing to do or not.
>
> Just as a paranthetical point: Everyone has always "known" that.
> Neo-intuitionists such as Pritchard have argued that this is what morality
> is all about. Unfortunately, two people can "know" very different things
> about the morality of an issue. Because of that problem and a few others,
> most modern philosophers accept that a valid moral system must ultimately
> 'appeal' to our core moral beliefs but that no valid system can be built
> directly on moral intuition.

Agreed.

> Ah, the whitewater clowns never cease to amaze and amuse.

They used to be more effective in say 1997 or so, dominating the
newsgroup. Proof that progress is possible!

> > Anyway, intuition and empathy are shorthands for at the very
> > least the sum total of experiential knowledge and our own ability
> > to place ourselves in a situation. The former is a way our
> > knowledge about social mores and values we learned are quickly
> > 'felt,' the latter almost allows for a Rawlsian ability to think
> > how we would feel if we were in other situations.
>
> Yeah, you seem to be conflating moral intuition with something a bit more
> second-order. Years ago, there was an interesting paper on that by Michael
> Smith. He used it as a defense of Realism. As I recall his argument was
> that moral "ought" type statements are statements about desires we
> rationally would believe ourselves to have were we in cool and calm
> conditions under which to access our desires. This bears at least a passing
> resemblance to Rawls' "veil of ignorance" condition in his 'initial
> position' theory of contractarianism.

Yes, a passing resemblance.

> > It could be
> > that intuition reflects unconscious knowledge and empathy a
> > spiritual connection to others, but I'll bracket out that
> > speculation. Assuming intuition and empathy are quick internal
> > calculations of moral understandings, it's clear that they are
> > often wrong and prone to over reaction or reaction to false
> > perceptions of a situation. If you know someone well, like him,
> > and then see him make a mistake by committing a crime and get
> > caught, you may empathize and hope he gets off, or even help him
> > avoid the law. That's why these 'quick internal calculations'
> > cannot on their own provide the answers, we don't automatically
> > know what is right, and believing that we do makes error
> > probability increase. On the other hand, they can also guide us
> > to when a purely rational morality that is learned and some how
> > 'accepted' intellectually may be wrong.
>
> Precisely. In the end, no valid system can completely disagree with our
> core moral beliefs after reflection. [I think that last bit is rather
> important. Core moral beliefs can be quite wrong both circumstantially and
> in a wider sense----unless you're a moral relativist.]

Agreed.

Exactly.

> > Yes, though to me that creates a three level moral code. Level

> > one is what I hold myself to, which often is not consequentialist
> > and reflects certain principled beliefs I have developed. Level
> > two is the societal code, which I will abide by to the extent
> > that it doesn't cause me to violate my level one moral code. If
> > someone has a level one code that says taxation is wrong then one
> > might refuse to vote, since voting could be said to enable
> > taxation. But unless paying a tax is immoral, that doesn't
> > require one violate the societal legal code or moral norms.
> > Level three is my idealized version of what a societal code
> > should be, which, if I'm rational, will not contradict my level
> > one code, but might be quite different from my level two code.
> > I'll work to try to convince others of the level three code
> > (acting politically), live by my level one code, but abide by the
> > rules of the level two code to the extent it doesn't require
> > violation of my level one code.
> >
> > Geez, I should be writing tax codes here, my wording is so boring
> > and stilted.
>
> No. I see what you mean. The problem with that kind of thinking, at least
> to many philosophers, is that it means that there must be some kind of
> fundamental lack of connection between the personal, the social and the
> ideal. That causes no end of problems with some denying that there is even
> such a thing as 'the ideal,' some saying that personal morality and public
> morality are the same thing, and so on.

I see your point, but look at it this way (my social science
background coming through). We have a world, reality. Reality
may be multidimensional as string/quark theory says, a creation
of the Gods, or whatever. It's there. It's real. It's
objective. We, however, cannot grasp that reality except through
our perceptual tools, which are imperfect (at the very least they
only perceive a small subset of reality, even the reality we
directly encounter), and our interpretations. So we have
subjective reality. It's a different reality, at one level,
though obviously it is constructed from our interaction with
objective reality. Finally, as we interact with others and build
socially shared beliefs and understandings, we construct a social
reality. It reflects our subjective realities, which reflect
objective reality, but is at least two steps away, based on
agreements reached by subjects acting socially. With morality
I'm seeing that there may be an ideal; I can subjectively try to
understand that ideal, and I work to construct moral systems with
others, based on agreements and shared understandings.

> > To me that's level two or three -- comparing their behavior
> > either to the societal code, or to what I believe would be a
> > "best" societal code. I will only intervene on them if my own
> > moral code (level one) requires intervention (e.g.,
> > other-defense, self-defense, or warning, etc.), or perhaps if the
> > societal code I abide by requires intervention, and such
> > intervention is not something I deem immoral.
>
> That's okay for you, pal. But what, says Jeremy Bentham, of the society as
> a whole? Personal interpretation may work out well for persons, but when
> they get before the bench, pleas of "but I was just being kind after my
> fashion" won't work out well. Remember always, that in any complicated
> society, the moral will always end up drifting into the legal.

For my personal choices I will follow my moral code, simply
because I'm responsible for my life, and if I'm going to leave my
mark and make choices, they will be my choices. In that, I'm an
individualist. But, from what I wrote two things emerge beside
that: a) respect for legal and social norms if they do not
require me to violate my personal moral code -- and only very
rarely in a democracy like ours does that happen; and b) a
political responsibility to act with others to construct moral
systems by taking ethics seriously in social affairs.

I'm trying to connect the social and the individual, or in social
science terms, deal with the agent structure problem by
privileging neither the agent nor the structure (the individual
or society), but instead see a role for each.
cheers, scott

[Jeffrey Davis]

Not intuition, exactly. An acknowledgment of human
limitations. Define morality? Determine all its ambiguities?
That sounds like it fails my Ant Test. The Golden Rule is a
good one. The simplest person capable of self-determination
(not insane or brain damaged) can understand what it means
(roughly) and what it means to run afoul of it (again
roughly). There will always be grey areas. Because of the
necessary incompleteness of our understandings and the
approximate nature of language, burrowing into moral issues
as an intellectual actiivity will always have an element of
the absurd about it. If a necessarily slap-dash, "intuitive"
morality fails, it won't fail -- if applied in good faith --
through malice. What more can we ask?
--
Jeffrey Davis <res0...@verizon.net>

[Gandalf Grey]

Scott D. Erb <scot...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message

news:3C45F3C1...@worldnet.att.net...

>
>
> Gandalf Grey wrote:
> >
> > Scott D. Erb <scot...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message
> > news:3C449CDA...@worldnet.att.net...
> > > So, for Kant a moral act cannot be judged on the basis of the
> > > consequences of the act itself, but whether or not it is defined
> > > as moral by the principles being followed? But those principles
> > > can, in part, be chosen due to their general consequences for the
> > > ability of moral agents to act as such. Is that more like it?
> >
> > No. For Kant, there's really only one moral principle and it flows out
of
> > the nature of man as a rational being.
>
> OK...I am going to have to dig into Kant for more on this, I
> don't want to burden you with questions about his philosophy,
> especially since I have some of writings available to me. My
> obvious question would be why do any moral principles flow out of
> the nature of man as a rational being.

Well, to believe that they do, you have to be a moral realist and a Kantian.
Most moral
philosophers believe that what makes man capable of being a moral creature
is his rationality. I.e., his ability to engage in beliefs ABOUT his
beliefs. This is the basis for most normative ethics, those systems
primarily interested in how we feel about such things as morality and how we
ought to treat one another morally. Kant went one step further. He not
only subscribed to that belief but posited that morality is defined by and
defined AS human rationality. This is a metaethical argument that states
something about what morality IS and not just HOW to act morally. Kant felt
that morality is not only invented by human reason, but in a sense IS human
reason. He made human reason his "good." His sole moral principle flows
out of respect for the only thing in life that he felt could define or be
moral--human reason.

You have an IF statement here that didn't go anywhere.

> That, however, apparently is NOT the rationale Kant's moral
> theory takes, even if he twists into something like that with
> some of his work on a "Pacific Union" and how it can lead to
> 'perpetual peace' -- that Republican states can function morally
> and in so doing eliminate the need for war, conflict, etc.

Kant suffered from the same affliction that most of us suffer from. The
inability to see the logical difference between a philosophical theory and
reality is often divorced from our innate ability to see the practical
difference between a philosophical theory and reality. A philosophical
genius like Kant could argue all day long about why his philosophy SHOULD
work due to its fundamental 'soundness' as a logical argument. But he could
also turn right around and go out and act as though the idea was effectively
impractical. This is why I often sound fussy about the distinction between
moral intuition and 'common sense.' They are very close to being the same
thing, but they are not the same thing. Our moral intuition often says
'amen!' when faced with a high-minded principle, but our common sense kicks
in whenever we're faced with the practical realities of social life and it
often contradicts our logic and our moral intuition. The most devoted
utilitarian in the world when faced with breaking a promise that would, if
he broke it, on the whole lead to the greatest happiness, will still often
turn his back on his entire philosophy with nothing more momentous than the
statement 'well, I DID promise after all.'

>
> Do you think it might not be an assumption, that if people acted
> as according to their rational nature that they would create a
> better world or society? I only ask that since he seems to have
> taken that route in the "perpetual peace" approach. But this
> shows I should just read more than Kant's stuff as it applies to
> international relations (and in response to a poster's
> recommendation two years ago, I actually purchased a book on
> Kant's philosophy, so I have no excuse not to go dig into it
> myself...)

Good luck in your reading! Kant has left himself very little room for such
niceties as what he might have intended. We might intend to use our reason
to accomplish certain ends. Some of them could be short term and some of
them might be long term. There might not be a clear agreement between the
consequences of short term goals and the consequences of long term goals.
So much is quite understandable and in principle, acceptable. What is not
acceptable is that a system based on reason AS the sole determiner of moral
worth and good should have a built in disconnect between the consequences of
short and long-term effects, or, worse, consequences as having a moral
meaning at all. We have seen that the consequences of the Categorical
Imperative are not just unfortunate side effects. They are built-in effects
that are mechanically impossible to avoid. Whenever we adhere to the
Categorical Imperative we are saying 'consequences cannot matter.' We are
saying this because in Kant's theory "the good" has NOTHING to do with
consequences. While its true that the imperative demands that we consider
our actions willed into universal laws there is nothing about that act of
reason that implies consequences.

At some point, I hope to write a short essay on the Ethic of "Direct
Duties." What is wrong with Kant's Imperative is largely what is wrong with
all Direct Duties moralities, and it has a direct effect on rights doctrines
because of this failure to recognize that consequences are 'moral entities'
and not just 'things that happen.'

One final point on this. It's possible for anyone to argue, about any moral
principle, that in some fashion consequences must be important to the
principle. After all, isn't happiness and goodness what morality is all
about? On a semantic level, such an argument is irrefutable. But it's
important to keep our attention on the fact that moral systems don't just
demand certain actions in order to achieve moral ends such as happiness or
goodness. Moral principles often attempt, in a metaethical sense, to DEFINE
what goodness is. When goodness or rightness is defined soley as adherence
to a principle, the idea of happiness is effectively turned on its head.
Suddenly we aren't living in such a way as to be happy, 'Happiness" as it's
defined by the principle is forcing us to live in certain ways that might
not equate to any common sense recognition of happiness.

> >
> > Again, it's important to recognize the logical difference between our
> > intentions and the ends that our principles make possible or impossible.
> > Kant undoubtedly had good intentions. Few moralists are otherwise. His
> > inability to account for consequences in his philosophy is the problem.
>
> But is not judging an act because of its consequences the same as
> not being able to account for consequences?

When I use the word "account" I mean that Kant's philosophy is not able to
define consequences in morally significant terms. In any philosophical
argument, large or small, accounting is a matter of defining what things are
important, what the meaning of those things are and how they relate to each
other, and how and why those things figure into the conclusion. It's a
cold-hearted way of saying it, but in a philosophical argument, entities
such as good/bad, 'consequences,' death, misery and so on are simply 'terms'
much as numbers are in a mathematical equation. As I hope I made a little
plainer above, the Categorical Imperative is the sole definition of good in
Kant's moral philosophy. Because of this, the notion of good/bad
consequences are logically unaccounted for by the principle. Kant may be
personally concerned about them, but his philosophy is not concerned about
them. He seemed to be aware of that problem to the effect that he tried to
argue his way out of it, but not concerned enough to actually change his
mind on the subject.

> You can ignore that
> question, I'm getting to be a pest here and I just have to dig in
> for myself. He was a religious man, as I recall, so perhaps he
> believed that living right was an end in and of itself,
> regardless of the consequences.

That much is probably quite true.

So do I. It will become more important as time goes on. The important
thing to remember about it is that Kant's believing that the second
formulation, we'll call it the Respect Principle, of the Categorical
Imperative was simply another way of stating the First Formulation does not
in fact make it just another way of restating the First Formulation. Kant's
believing this to be the case does not oblige us to agree. There is no
logical reason why jettisoning the First Formulation should entail that we
must also discard the Respect Principle if they are not, in fact, logically
connected. Kant believed that the Second Formulation is true if and only if
the First Formulation is true. There are significant arguments against that
conclusion.

I hope to show a bit later that the Respect Principle holds up quite well
for reasons that Kant never considered.

[Scott D. Erb]

Gandalf Grey wrote:
>
> Scott D. Erb <scot...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message

> news:3C45F3C1...@worldnet.att.net...

> > OK...I am going to have to dig into Kant for more on this, I
> > don't want to burden you with questions about his philosophy,
> > especially since I have some of writings available to me. My
> > obvious question would be why do any moral principles flow out of
> > the nature of man as a rational being.
>
> Well, to believe that they do, you have to be a moral realist and a Kantian.
> Most moral
> philosophers believe that what makes man capable of being a moral creature
> is his rationality. I.e., his ability to engage in beliefs ABOUT his
> beliefs.

Yes, without reflective ability we'd simply act on stimuli.

>This is the basis for most normative ethics, those systems
> primarily interested in how we feel about such things as morality and how we
> ought to treat one another morally. Kant went one step further. He not
> only subscribed to that belief but posited that morality is defined by and
> defined AS human rationality. This is a metaethical argument that states
> something about what morality IS and not just HOW to act morally. Kant felt
> that morality is not only invented by human reason, but in a sense IS human
> reason. He made human reason his "good." His sole moral principle flows
> out of respect for the only thing in life that he felt could define or be
> moral--human reason.

One book I've wanted to read and only got barely into (though
when in Germany I picked it up in a book store there and paged
through, thinking that Kant might actually be EASIER in German
than English) was Kant's critique of pure reason. I'm now
intrigued...but geez, I want to read about this, about Buddhism,
about the civil war...I also need to study Russian before a trip
this summer.

Too much time, too little to do.
Check that. Reverse it.

> > But if Kant were to argue (and as I understand at least his
> > perpetual peace theory about states he would) that rational
> > beings can learn to act according to moral principles in a way
> > that will lead to some kind of superior result, and that pain,
> > misery, etc., is an inability to understand those principles.
>
> You have an IF statement here that didn't go anywhere.

:) Then there seems to be some set of assumed consequences.

> > That, however, apparently is NOT the rationale Kant's moral
> > theory takes, even if he twists into something like that with
> > some of his work on a "Pacific Union" and how it can lead to
> > 'perpetual peace' -- that Republican states can function morally
> > and in so doing eliminate the need for war, conflict, etc.
>
> Kant suffered from the same affliction that most of us suffer from. The
> inability to see the logical difference between a philosophical theory and
> reality is often divorced from our innate ability to see the practical
> difference between a philosophical theory and reality. A philosophical
> genius like Kant could argue all day long about why his philosophy SHOULD
> work due to its fundamental 'soundness' as a logical argument. But he could
> also turn right around and go out and act as though the idea was effectively
> impractical. This is why I often sound fussy about the distinction between
> moral intuition and 'common sense.' They are very close to being the same
> thing, but they are not the same thing. Our moral intuition often says
> 'amen!' when faced with a high-minded principle, but our common sense kicks
> in whenever we're faced with the practical realities of social life and it
> often contradicts our logic and our moral intuition. The most devoted
> utilitarian in the world when faced with breaking a promise that would, if
> he broke it, on the whole lead to the greatest happiness, will still often
> turn his back on his entire philosophy with nothing more momentous than the
> statement 'well, I DID promise after all.'

But I can't help but think that Kant's approach has some merit in
that at least he's recognizing that humans will rationalize
anything, knowledge is imperfect (especially about consequences)
and therefore moral principles need to be based on something
other than consequences. Though I agree with you that denying
consequences is, so to speak, throwing the baby out with the
bathwater.

I see what you mean. Perhaps because my experience with Kant has
been with his more 'practical' piece setting the framework for
political idealism in international relations, I'm looking at his
arguments more on the lines of "what did he mean, how was he
thinking, how did his culture influence him." You, as is proper,
are following the logical implications of his argument.

> One final point on this. It's possible for anyone to argue, about any moral
> principle, that in some fashion consequences must be important to the
> principle. After all, isn't happiness and goodness what morality is all
> about? On a semantic level, such an argument is irrefutable. But it's
> important to keep our attention on the fact that moral systems don't just
> demand certain actions in order to achieve moral ends such as happiness or
> goodness. Moral principles often attempt, in a metaethical sense, to DEFINE
> what goodness is.

An excellent point.

>When goodness or rightness is defined soley as adherence
> to a principle, the idea of happiness is effectively turned on its head.
> Suddenly we aren't living in such a way as to be happy, 'Happiness" as it's
> defined by the principle is forcing us to live in certain ways that might
> not equate to any common sense recognition of happiness.

> > But is not judging an act because of its consequences the same as

> > not being able to account for consequences?
>
> When I use the word "account" I mean that Kant's philosophy is not able to
> define consequences in morally significant terms. In any philosophical
> argument, large or small, accounting is a matter of defining what things are
> important, what the meaning of those things are and how they relate to each
> other, and how and why those things figure into the conclusion. It's a
> cold-hearted way of saying it, but in a philosophical argument, entities
> such as good/bad, 'consequences,' death, misery and so on are simply 'terms'
> much as numbers are in a mathematical equation. As I hope I made a little
> plainer above, the Categorical Imperative is the sole definition of good in
> Kant's moral philosophy. Because of this, the notion of good/bad
> consequences are logically unaccounted for by the principle. Kant may be
> personally concerned about them, but his philosophy is not concerned about
> them. He seemed to be aware of that problem to the effect that he tried to
> argue his way out of it, but not concerned enough to actually change his
> mind on the subject.

I see your point now.

> > You can ignore that
> > question, I'm getting to be a pest here and I just have to dig in
> > for myself. He was a religious man, as I recall, so perhaps he
> > believed that living right was an end in and of itself,
> > regardless of the consequences.
>
> That much is probably quite true.

-snip-

> > I still find the second part of his categorical imperative, about
> > not using others solely as means, to be compelling.
>
> So do I. It will become more important as time goes on. The important
> thing to remember about it is that Kant's believing that the second
> formulation, we'll call it the Respect Principle, of the Categorical
> Imperative was simply another way of stating the First Formulation does not
> in fact make it just another way of restating the First Formulation. Kant's
> believing this to be the case does not oblige us to agree. There is no
> logical reason why jettisoning the First Formulation should entail that we
> must also discard the Respect Principle if they are not, in fact, logically
> connected. Kant believed that the Second Formulation is true if and only if
> the First Formulation is true. There are significant arguments against that
> conclusion.
>
> I hope to show a bit later that the Respect Principle holds up quite well
> for reasons that Kant never considered.

Thanks again for this effort!

[Tristan]

I just thought I'd post some musings on moral philosophy because I thought
they might be relevant for this thread:

Frankly, I find moral relatavism obscene. Unfortunately, it is the
intellectual trend of the
age: a trend warmly embraced by the modern day postmodern 'pseudo-left' -
those people
who have redefined the 'left' by rejecting the old metanarratives of
equality and struggle in
favour of relatavism and the refusal to make judgements.

The consequence of this position is that all 'progress' is seen as an
illusion. The
metanarrative of modernisation with its themes of 'progress' is exposed as a
tale of cultural
colonisation and imperialism. But this, of course, creates a paradox - for
while Imperialism
is viewed as 'wrong' and 'oppressive' by the trendy pseudo-left, their own
moral relativism
expressly forbids judgement. At the very best it holds that no judgement is
'better' or 'more
correct' than others. By this reckoning, if the issues are treated
consistently, Imperialism
and all other forms of domination are merely expressions of culture, and
thus are to be
considered morally relative and not subject to judgement.

The result is utter hypocricy. More 'trendy' struggles, such as that of the
women's
movement are in practice treated as if they are absolutes while the old
metanarratives of
class struggle are rejected for their 'totalising' tendencies. An arbitary
hierarchy of identity
based struggles is established, with some being treated as absolutes while
others are all but
rejected to 'the dustbin of history'. Everything associated with Western
civilisation is
subject to the severest criticism but other cultures are adored in the name
of relativism
without any call for moral judgement.. Diversity is usually praised as an
end in itself
although confusion arises when the 'rights' of a particular culture conflict
with the 'rights'
of the more 'trendy' identity groups.

If we were to take moral relatavism seriously, we would have to conclude
that no
'progress' had been made in the United States since the Civil War. The
abolition of slavery
would not be viewed as an advancement because all such things would be
considered
'relative' and not subject to judgement. If the position were consistent -
that is, without the
contradictions that arise with the coexistence of moral relativism and
identity politics - we
would not consider that any 'progress' had been made in the field of women's
rights either.
Female suffrage, like everything else, would be considered a 'relative'
achievement, and the
judgement of prior, patriarchal, non democratic societies would be expressly
forbidden.

The reality is that we need foundations for moral judgements if we are to
take the question
of moral judgement seriously. And the foundations of our moral codes need to
be taken as
if they comprise 'moral law'. By my reckoning, the intermediate foundations
of any 'Good'
morality need to include:

* freedom from domination - as might be expressed in slavery, arbitary
social hierarchy
and other forms of oppression.

* freedom of thought and expression

* Mutual care and compassion: the existence of a social contract which
ensures the needs
of a dignified existence, and mutual support ensuring quality of life.

If such foundations are scrutinised to their MOST fundamental level, then we
discover
that the practice of 'good' morality arises from basically intuitive
impulses of compassion -
of caring for the Other. In other words, 'Good' at its most fundamental is
the same as
'compassionate' and 'altruistic' love. This 'love' is, at the same time, one
of the most
fundamental forms of knowing. It is the firm foundation of moral sentiment:
that which
makes moral judgement possible.

Now, one could argue that morality itself has foundations outside of moral
sentiment,
compassion and intuition. Morality, by this reckoning, is transcendant -
rooted outside of
the phenomenal world. But if this is the case, we can never ABSOLUTELY KNOW
transcendant morality. The best we can do is to make moral judgements which
arise
through the motivation of our intuitions, and other forms of phenomenal
experience.

Tristan

[Gandalf Grey]

Tristan <Tris...@bigpond.com> wrote in message
news:bit18.73648$HW3....@newsfeeds.bigpond.com...

>
> I just thought I'd post some musings on moral philosophy because I thought
> they might be relevant for this thread:

And very relevant they are. I just want to enlarge on two points. It's
ironic that relativism originally sought to defend cultures AGAINST
imperialistic moralities coming from outside of the culture. An example
would be what the British did in colonizing India. Moral relativism was
seen as an argument against imperialistic moralities. As such, I think it
was well-motivated, but mistaken both logically and consequentially.

Secondly, you're very right when you point out that relativism undercuts THE
BASIS for views on progress in a society. When all moralities are correct,
there effectively isn't such a thing as 'worse' because everything is, by
definition, acceptable as is. All conceptions of progress must be based on
the idea that things could be BETTER. Relativism removes all basis for
claims of better/worse, good/bad.

I think we have to remember that one aspect of moralism, the recognition
that cultures do have their own moralities is important. A recognition that
people believe in their own cultures and their own moralities puts a logical
break on the presumption that when we disagree WE have to be the ones who
are right or that our disapproval means something in itself.

But the additional assumption that everyone is different and everyone is
CORRECT is neither logical nor practical. It effectively removes the right
to comment at all on moral matters. With respect to this, your comment that
all progress is seen as an illusion is very apt.

I appreciate your taking the time to make this post. These essays are to be
the basis for a textbook on Moral Philosophy and I consider your comments to
be very relevant to the kind of issues the book will have to address.

[Gandalf Grey]

Scott D. Erb <scot...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message

news:3C45F754...@worldnet.att.net...

>
>
> Gandalf Grey wrote:
> >
> > Scott D. Erb <scot...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message
> > news:3C44D7FA...@worldnet.att.net...
>
> > > OK. I'm not sure about the isolation argument you gave in the
> > > last post, that didn't seem as strong as an inflexibility
> > > argument or at least the argument that rights collide so often
> > > and in so many ways that any doctrine trying to define them and
> > > rule on what to do in particular circumstances would be unwieldy
> > > and probably impossible to build.
> >
> > I'm a little surprised. I would think that you would be more open than
most
> > to the charge that a proliferation of rights leads to social isolation.
> > Granted, it is primarily a legal argument and not a specifically moral
> > argument.....
>
> Isolation, or alienation is a major problem. I do think it
> emerges from sociological changes with modernism, which includes
> individualism and ideas of defining rights as purely individual.
> But I'm not convinced that is per se a problem, or if the problem
> is more in how we define those rights and understand the social
> pressures brought by modernism. But expressing a little
> skepticism isn't the same as rejection.

Certainly. Rights are an odd subject. In a sense they are morality, but in
a sense they are pure politics. Skepticism is a critical concern in
weighing any argument that contains political ideas. Political arguments
are nearly always motivated by ends that are not clear in the context of the
argument itself and so we must not only be on guard against the contents of
the argument, but of what we're NOT hearing in the argument.

> I tend to probe things
> and try to be skeptical even about those arguments that I find
> appealling. I may often sound more negative than I am -- in
> fact, sometimes I'm MOST skeptical right before I'm convinced
> about something, trying to be absolutely sure if I'm going to buy
> an argument different than what I thought before.
>
> > > At the very least our fictional Vulcan friends show the limits of
> > > logic as the prime method of living. Given that they are given
> > > life by emotional humans, that's not surprising :)
> >
> > I think he would have accused Spock of being a weenie when he stated in
the
> > First Movie that "logic is not enough."
>
> LOL! I can't think of what the old Prussian equivalent for
> 'weenie' would be, but somehow the imagery is amusing.

We tend to use a lot of intentionally humorous, shock-terms in this era of
'post-skepticism.' Kant would probably not see the joke. He was an
extremely solid-citizen. It is said that his daily walks in the village
were so punctual that citizens actually set their watches by him. Still, it
amuses me to wonder what some of the great philosophers might have thought
of our fictional and cinematic creations. I fear that Wittgenstein, the
last great philosopher, would have thought far too highly of Spock, a
tribute to Wittgenstein's own unhappy life of intentional isolation and
insistence that his entire existence be constrained to the cruel dictates of
logic. Socrates would have fared the best, a tireless logician, he was
still happy with life itself, utterly human in every way. I would have
given a good deal to know how Plato's works were received on Vulcan.

Spock is really a caricature of philosophical man. Gifted with the ability
to reason, he is plagued with human desire and contradiction. Like all of
us, Spock wrestles with his 'human' side, but tragically chooses to deny it.
Socrates saw no reason to wrestle and nothing to wrestle against. Socrates,
like the Buddha is proof that there isn't a contradiction in us that we
don't put there ourselves.

>
> > Those are your three classic choices, but it's a bit more involved than
> > that: there's Irrealism, subjectivism, relativism, realism,
> > neo-intuitionism, nihilism, cognitivism, non-cognitivism, linguistic
> > skepticism, and a few others. I chose the three because they represent
a
> > trinity of belief that somehow leads into every available metaethical
> > viewpoint.
>
> Yeah, I knew you'd listed others, I always get skeptical of
> categorization. Social science does it too often, and that
> misleads. But I see your points, again, don't read too much into
> my skepticism on some issues.

Trust me when I say that the essays are largely a matter of deciding what to
leave out rather than what to include. There are far too many 'isms' out
there. I am trying to include only those philosophies that might shed some
light on the doctrine of rights. Even at that, I'm forced to leave out
quite a few.

>
> > > My point is only that going through most days we don't have to
> > > try to think about how to apply moral principles, we tend to know
> > > when something is the right thing to do or not.
> >
> > Just as a paranthetical point: Everyone has always "known" that.
> > Neo-intuitionists such as Pritchard have argued that this is what
morality
> > is all about. Unfortunately, two people can "know" very different
things
> > about the morality of an issue. Because of that problem and a few
others,
> > most modern philosophers accept that a valid moral system must
ultimately
> > 'appeal' to our core moral beliefs but that no valid system can be built
> > directly on moral intuition.
>
> Agreed.
>
> > Ah, the whitewater clowns never cease to amaze and amuse.
>
> They used to be more effective in say 1997 or so, dominating the
> newsgroup. Proof that progress is possible!

The cyclical nature of politics and the nature of the political right. For
nearly seventy years, the right wing has required an enemy to give it life
for a variety of reasons. "Issues" have always been the right's downfall
and they tend to marginalize themselves whenever issues come to the center
stage.

Certainly what you describe is quite true. One thing I always taught my
students is that when you're all done learning as much as you can about
logic and philosophy, when you think you're as close to 'the answer' as you
ever can be, it's time to stop and make one last admission.

Wittgenstein spent his whole life trying to completely dismantle all of
philosophy and rebuild it into something that would make sense. His
greatest work, the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* did just that. In one
stroke he solved most of the logical problems of philosophy and moved
philosophy into the modern age. At the end of the work, he stated that
everything he had written was false.

What did he mean? We tend to get caught up in the logical games we play.
We forget that our rational faculty invents value, that apart from us and
our ability to invent value, no value exists. All of philosophy and ethics
and society and law is an invention of mankind, made up solely out of reason
and imagination. If we forget that, we run the risk of falling into the
grip of our own theories, or as Wittgenstein would put it, becoming
"bewitched" by language. We make up rules of thought and social realities
like the rules for a game of Monopoly, forgetting that the rules and the
game are fictions. All of philosophy, science, art, literature, society
itself are nothing more than houses of cards built on the clouds.

And yet they are all REAL. We must weave our way through them from the day
we learn to speak to the day we die. When we lose the objectivity, the
wisdom to see this contradictory relationship of man, nature and society,
some of the seasoning goes out of our lives. Politics, society, progress,
law, rights, liberty....all are tremendously important and all of them have
no importance at all. Buddhism sees this most clearly. Everything is an
illusion. In the end, even the illusion is an illusion.

Donovan turned a little Zen koan into a song that illustrates it perfectly.

"First there is a mountain.
Then there is no mountain.
Then there is."

Once we make our way through the morass of human thought we hopefully
achieve a point where we realize that all of our learning means nothing.
Once we've seen that, we can return to that same world and pick up that
train of thought and utilize it better for having seen its true nature.

[Gandalf Grey]

Scott D. Erb <scot...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message

news:3C464B6C...@worldnet.att.net...

>
>
> Gandalf Grey wrote:
> >
> > Scott D. Erb <scot...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message
> > news:3C45F3C1...@worldnet.att.net...
>
>

> One book I've wanted to read and only got barely into (though
> when in Germany I picked it up in a book store there and paged
> through, thinking that Kant might actually be EASIER in German
> than English) was Kant's critique of pure reason. I'm now
> intrigued...but geez, I want to read about this, about Buddhism,
> about the civil war...I also need to study Russian before a trip
> this summer.
>
> Too much time, too little to do.
> Check that. Reverse it.

Not a problem, Mr. Wonka <:) Pick up Kant's *Lectures on Morality* He was
at his best when he lectured and not when he wrote. Kant could be a
charming and persuasive thinker but not generally when he wrote. His most
important ethical work is "Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals.* It is
not an easy book to read and nearly every issue raised is dealt with more
coherently in *The Lectures.* Remember that the use of the word *Critique*
is specialized. It means "investigation" and not "criticism."

>
> > > But if Kant were to argue (and as I understand at least his
> > > perpetual peace theory about states he would) that rational
> > > beings can learn to act according to moral principles in a way
> > > that will lead to some kind of superior result, and that pain,
> > > misery, etc., is an inability to understand those principles.
> >
> > You have an IF statement here that didn't go anywhere.
>
> :) Then there seems to be some set of assumed consequences.

LOL.

>

>
> But I can't help but think that Kant's approach has some merit in
> that at least he's recognizing that humans will rationalize
> anything, knowledge is imperfect (especially about consequences)
> and therefore moral principles need to be based on something
> other than consequences. Though I agree with you that denying
> consequences is, so to speak, throwing the baby out with the
> bathwater.

Absolutely! No one presented a more necessary picture of the need for a
morality to based in reason than Immanual Kant. We see here the reason that
philosophy is more than just a bunch of quaint old arguments that always
seem to have some fatal flaw. Each philosopher moved us forward in some
important way.

It's my strength and my weakness as has pointed out to me several times over
the last thirty years by my wife. She's often predicted that I'll come back
from the grave to argue the finer points of theology at my own funeral.

Thanks for continuing to read these little essays. It's much appreciated.

[Tristan]

"Gandalf Grey" <ganda...@infectedmail.com> wrote in message
news:a25ru3$dcd$1...@slb1.atl.mindspring.net...

Thanks for your comments - if you're interested, I may as well leave some of
the other contributions I've made on different message boards. None of it
is really original, so I'm told (and I don't doubt that), but I did come to
the ideas involved of my own accord. Anyway, I spent a lot of time writing
the messages I'm about to post - it's just nice to think I might be able use
them again rather than just forgetting them. :)

****

Language is a social construct. (even though probably one founded on
biology - thus an
apriori capacity) All concepts expressed in language are socially
constructed through
language - through the relations of the language system, and also that
language system's
relation to the world.
Importantly, however, as noted, language does relate to the real world:
words signifying
real phenomena we experience through our senses and our imagination.
When we refer to something as 'good' or 'evil' we refer to at least
partially socially
constructed standards and concepts expressed through lanuage: concepts about
which
lanuage attempts to develop a social consensus.

In relation to physical and mathematical laws, language more or less
succeeds in its object
of creating the consensus which helps facilitate communication. While there
is
philosophical room for the kind of skepticism advocated by Hume, most people
accept
that through continuous observation and experimentation we may discover the
workings
of Natural Law. (although, in reality, this is always a process of induction
rather than
deduction) Knowledge of Natural Law is arrived at through empirical
observation.
Skepticism here is logical (and therefore knowledge is imperfect)- but
usually it is
impractical. There is room for doubt just as there is logical room for
Solipsism - but it is
more practical to assume that we have accessed 'truth', even though logic
demands room
be left for our doubts.

Intuitive knowledge and knowledge of Ideal systems are different matters
still... Certain
systems of Ideas are SELF-REFERENTIAL and exist INDEPENDANTLY OF
EXPERIENCE. The word 'Football Stadium' only makes sense through experience
and
social context. A geometric shape or a number occupies a distinct place in a
self referential
system, however, regardless of our knowledge of it. Knowledge acquired
through
experience might always be doubted - for we find philosophical reason to
doubt our
senses, and to doubt our induction of Natural Law - but being
self-referential - such
systems of Ideas might be apprehended as PERFECT TRUTH. The statement 'a
triangle
has three sides', for instance is objectively true, as no other conclusion
is possible within
the self referential system of Geometry.

Lastly, we come to Intuitive knowledge and apriori knowledge. At first it
might be
objected that intuition is just another form of experience. The importance
of intuition,
however, is the the faculties of intuition exist apriori - before social
mediation.
As stated previously, I believe we DERIVE our concepts of Good and Evil,
Justice and
Injustice from our intuitive faculties of love and compassion. This
intuition is in itself a
form of knowledge. This does not mean that Good and Evil cannot exist as
ideals outside
of our intuitive comprehension, but even where are intuitions are exercised
in harmony
with - indeed, as part of - our Reason, Reason cannot penetrate the noumenal
world.
Our intuitive faculties lead to our moral SENTIMENTS which, in turn, give
rise to our
moral codes. In a way, our intuitively derived ethics are the closest we
come to bridging
the gap between the phenomenal and the noumenal: through the intuition of
compassion
we strain against the boundaries imposed by our egoistic selves, moving
towards a
disposition that is truly 'living FOR the Other'.

However, as this intuition is SOCIALLY MEDIATED it becomes IMPURE. We become
distanced from the intuitive source as our notions of Good and Evil are
mediated through
IDEOLOGY - become warped through the influence of custom, tradition,
perceived
authority - that is, as opposed to the authenticity of the original
intuitive ethical impulse.

Now, there are many different concepts of Good and Evil that find expression
through
language. Most all of these relate to something REAL and something EXTERNAL,
but
given the unstable nature of laguage - of its system of signs - what
language refers to when
speaking of Good and Evil depends on social context, interpretation etc. The
task for us is
to rediscover the BEST understandings of Good and Evil - and those, I
believe, are those
that relate directly to the original intuitive ethical impulse.

Good and Evil as detached Ideals are inaccessible to us. At best, they are
things in
themselves that we cannot apprehend. This much we have already discussed.
The closest
we can get is through our intuition, and through our experience of such
emotions as love,
sympathy and hate. We know that these are the best ways of apprehending Good
and Evil
- for they bring our understanding back to its foundations.. (rather than
being 'free floating'
- ie: groundless)

Simply because we cannot penetrate Ideals or things-in-themselves, however,
does not
mean we have not accessed TRUTH. The statement 'people play football in
football
stadiums' makes no sense at all outside of a socially constructed context.
But it is
nevertheless ENTIRELY true. Indeed, even though it relies on social
construction, it is
OBJECTIVELY true. (would anyone like to claim that that statement is NOT
objectively
true?????) When we trace our NOTIONS of and EXPERIENCE of Good and Evil
(ie: as
opposed to the Ideals of Good and Evil) back to their intuitive, ethical
foundations, we
have even more reason to be confident of such truth. Intuitive impulses and
judgements,
the capacity for which exists apriori, comprise some of the most fundamental
ways of
KNOWING we have access to. If we cannot trust these as representing truth,
then we
cannot trust anything. I, personally, am not ready to embrace solipsism.

[Tristan]

"Gandalf Grey" <ganda...@infectedmail.com> wrote in message
news:a25ru3$dcd$1...@slb1.atl.mindspring.net...

> I think we have to remember that one aspect of moralism, the recognition

> that cultures do have their own moralities is important. A recognition
that
> people believe in their own cultures and their own moralities puts a
logical
> break on the presumption that when we disagree WE have to be the ones who
> are right or that our disapproval means something in itself.
>
> But the additional assumption that everyone is different and everyone is
> CORRECT is neither logical nor practical. It effectively removes the
right
> to comment at all on moral matters. With respect to this, your comment
that
> all progress is seen as an illusion is very apt.

When dealing with cultural/moral relatavists, one example that's always
sprang to mind has been the Hindu caste system. The problem with most
'trendy pseudo leftists' these days is that they like to have their cake and
eat it to.
While subscribing to all the fashionable liberal democratic principles of
Rights, Duties and Freedoms, they then turn around and claim that we cannot
judge other cultures in the name of relativity. Cultural pluralism without
discrimination is posited as an end in itself. (remember, discrimination
does not just refer to bigotry - it might also refer, for instance, to the
act of discriminating between facism and democracy - ie: some discrimination
is good) True, we should be SENSITIVE when judging other cultures, and we
should always be conscious of the limitations of our Reason: that and the
necessarily arbitary prejudices we will bring to our judgements unless we
exercise EXTREME care. But let's face it. Either you believe Rights and
Duties are a good thing given a particular context, or you do not. Either
you believe respect for the principle of Autonomy is a good thing, or you do
not. Either you belive equality before the Law is a good thing, or you do
not. That being the case, when you confront a culture which condemns
MILLIONS to the status of wretched, reviled untouchables, you HAVE to make a
moral judgement. You might be sensitive to the extent of realising that the
prejudices of the culture in question are so thoroughly enmeshed in its
system of spiritual beliefs as to make its unravelling all but impossible..
Here it is important to remember that people are often complicit in their
own oppression through their internalisation of the dominant ideology. That
said. YOU CANNOT FORCE PEOPLE TO BE FREE. Nor should you try. That,
however, does not mean you should refrain from making judgements, or from
urging people to confront the real conditions of their existence with sober
senses, that they might struggle for their freedom, their security and their
dignity.

That said, I was going to post most little articles in this thread, but upon
consideration I've concluded that I'd just be repeating myself. I guess,
therefore, I'll just sit back and respond to any new material that crops up.

Tristan

[Keynes]

I agree with your foundations of morality.
Since we agree, we must be right. LOL

As far as progress goes, it is an illusion.
There *is* change, but every advance is
also a retreat. "Good and bad arise together."
There are always unintended consequences.
Things are changing faster now than they
ever have in history. We are leaping into
the unknown. I would like to see more
justice in the world, but I would hate to
see a police power to achieve it.

We have more labor saving devices than
ever before yet we have no time. Women
are not only able to work now, but most of
them have to. A slave owner had an investment
to protect, so he cared if slaves lived or died.
There is no such care for workers today.
People used to walk to work. Now they spend
useless hours in traffic. Modern industrial
society gives us trinkets and toys but it
poisons the air and the water. I have never seen
any *real* progress, just refreshing changes
that soon get stale and bothersome, and
need their own correcting.

The bedcover is too small - pull it here and
your feet get cold. Pull it there and your
chest gets cold.

As far as moral relativism goes, I prefer it
to the moral certainty of the Taliban,
foreign or domestic.

[Tristan]

"Gandalf Grey" <ganda...@infectedmail.com> wrote in message

news:a25ve7$o2s$1...@slb1.atl.mindspring.net...

Political arguments
> are nearly always motivated by ends that are not clear in the context of
the
> argument itself and so we must not only be on guard against the contents
of
> the argument, but of what we're NOT hearing in the argument.

Yes - think, for a moment, of society as a pyramid. Society is dominated by
INTERESTS, and those interests imprint the logic of their struggles onto
civil society and the state. The state and civil society, therefore, are
never IDEAL entities - they are always a reflection of interest and
struggle. Some interests, however, are higher up the pyramid than others.
Indeed, said interests are so obscure that most average citizens could not
conceive of their existence. Nevertheless, said interests colonise every
corner of the state and civil society. Movements which properly ought arise
as spontaneous reactions to social conditions are colonised to the point of
becoming tools. The clash of ORDINARY social interests and ideologies is
but the surface. The problem, however, is that only those towards the top
of the pyramid know anything exists below the surface, or even have any
reason to conceive of it as such. Indeed, only these people know the
pyramid exists at all. The end result: almost every struggle is futile -
the movements in which they find expression becoming pawns in powerplays
most people cannot conceive. As for those who can conceive of such things -
well, there are ways of dealing with such people.

> We tend to use a lot of intentionally humorous, shock-terms in this era of
> 'post-skepticism.' Kant would probably not see the joke. He was an
> extremely solid-citizen. It is said that his daily walks in the village
> were so punctual that citizens actually set their watches by him.

Actually, I've read the same about Kant... but I've also read the his real
motivation was not so much his craving for order and routine, but rather his
health - that and the very real fear that he may not live to complete his
work should his health fail. That, at least, is the speculation that one
interpreter of Kant has given.

> logic. Socrates would have fared the best, a tireless logician, he was
> still happy with life itself, utterly human in every way. I would have
> given a good deal to know how Plato's works were received on Vulcan.
>
> Spock is really a caricature of philosophical man. Gifted with the
ability
> to reason, he is plagued with human desire and contradiction. Like all of
> us, Spock wrestles with his 'human' side, but tragically chooses to deny
it.
> Socrates saw no reason to wrestle and nothing to wrestle against.
Socrates,
> like the Buddha is proof that there isn't a contradiction in us that we
> don't put there ourselves.

Hmm - there isn't always a contradiction.. but sometimes there is.. I'll
repost a little contribution of mine to illustrate the point:

*****

Now, all languages are socially constructed.. The very words 'morality' and
'ethics' are
socially constructed - but the point is that that which they were
constructed to indicate
comprise an objective reality. An example of the logic of these ethics might
go as follows:

a) We experience compassion as the feeling of care and solidarity with our
fellow human
beings, often in response to their suffering.
From this compassion we DERIVE notions of 'Right', 'Good', 'Evil' and
'Justice'.

b) Notions of 'Good' and 'Evil' arise depending on social context through
the application of
our Reason, of which intuitive compassion is part. This does not
necessarily means that
Good and Evil do not exist as Ideals, even if we cannot know them.

c) Often there is no contradiction in the application of our faculties of
compassion to a
particular social context. Since we derive our sense of 'Right' from our
compassion, we
may conclude that certain acts and dispositions are objectively 'Good' and
'Evil' according
to our understanding of the terms. Regardless of how those terms may be
redefined/reconstructed, the understanding in question refers to an
objective reality we
experience through our compassion and Reason. Our sense of Right is always
strongest
where Compassion and Reason MERGE.

d) Sometimes, however, our Faculties of Reason and Compassion fall into
contradiction.
Utilitarian and non-Ultilitarian ethics,for instance, may be widely
divergent - but they may
both seem equally in accordance with what intuitive knowledge of Good and
Evil we
access through our reason and compassion. For instance, it could be judged
that if three
men sacrifice their lives to save the life of a dear friend that this is a
noble and good act. It
is often said that right and wrong cannot simply be thought of in
quantitative terms, and
often this is the outlook of the most committed altruists. On the other
hand, a utilitarian
may hold that those three lives ought never have been sacrificed for but one
life, and his
sense of 'Right' might be equally grounded in his sense of compassion for
those concerned.

Ethics, therefore, are at once objective AND contradictory. Sometimes only
one possible
response will appear 'Right' in keeping with our intuitive knowledge.
Sometimes two or
more, sometimes contradictory, paths or dispositions will appear 'Right' in
keeping with
the knowledge of those same faculties.
The point, here, is that the faculty of compassion from which we derive our
sense of
'Right' is objectively real reardless of social context or contradiction.

All of this is off the cuff so I hope mny reasoning seems ok to most of
you...

*****

> > > Neo-intuitionists such as Pritchard have argued that this is what
> morality
> > > is all about. Unfortunately, two people can "know" very different
> things
> > > about the morality of an issue. Because of that problem and a few
> others,
> > > most modern philosophers accept that a valid moral system must
> ultimately
> > > 'appeal' to our core moral beliefs but that no valid system can be
built
> > > directly on moral intuition.

Yes, but moral intution is the most authentic kind of morality we can KNOW.
It is the most authentic kind of morality we can EXPERIENCE. All other
forms of morality rely on IDEALS which are inaccessible to us.
That's not to say we shouldn't THINK such ideals,and build moral
philosophical systems on them.. It is, however, to say that we ought
recognise the limits of our KNOWLEDGE, and respect the most authentic moral
knowledge/experience accessible to us. What is more, although many of us
have different intutions, there is still the possibility of judging which
intuitions are preferable over others. We can make a Reasoned choice,
therefore, that the intuition of compassion is superior to the intuition of
hate. What is more, if we disentangle the 'Good' intuition of compassion
from the distortions of imposed Ideology, the moral response is all the more
authentic, and most likely, all the more desirable.

>
> The cyclical nature of politics and the nature of the political right.
For
> nearly seventy years, the right wing has required an enemy to give it life
> for a variety of reasons. "Issues" have always been the right's downfall
> and they tend to marginalize themselves whenever issues come to the center
> stage.

Well, I wish this was true - but remember, the Right's wildcard is POPULISM.
POPULISM is usually shallow and dependant on prejudice. Nevertheless,
populism relates directly to ISSUES: military expenditure, foreign policy,
immigration. (just look at the refugee situation in Australia if you want
an example) By this reckoning, issues are hardly the Right's weakpoint. The
Right's greatest weakness is that its ideology does not stand up to Reason
or the intuition of compassion. That said, it seems so many people are so
thoroughly complicit in the dominant ideologies (event hose by which they
are oppressed) that, for the Right, this tends to prove to beno problem at
all....

[Scott]

We have a world, reality. Reality
> > may be multidimensional as string/quark theory says, a creation
> > of the Gods, or whatever. It's there. It's real. It's
> > objective. We, however, cannot grasp that reality except through
> > our perceptual tools, which are imperfect (at the very least they
> > only perceive a small subset of reality, even the reality we
> > directly encounter), and our interpretations. So we have
> > subjective reality. It's a different reality, at one level,
> > though obviously it is constructed from our interaction with
> > objective reality. Finally, as we interact with others and build
> > socially shared beliefs and understandings, we construct a social
> > reality. It reflects our subjective realities, which reflect
> > objective reality, but is at least two steps away, based on
> > agreements reached by subjects acting socially. With morality
> > I'm seeing that there may be an ideal; I can subjectively try to
> > understand that ideal, and I work to construct moral systems with
> > others, based on agreements and shared understandings.

[Tristan]

Yes - I agree with this absolutely.. This reflects my own views on the
matter exactly. In fact, I'm kind of disapponted I didn't get to say it
myself. :-)

[Gandalf]

> And yet they are all REAL. We must weave our way through them from the
day
> we learn to speak to the day we die. When we lose the objectivity, the
> wisdom to see this contradictory relationship of man, nature and society,
> some of the seasoning goes out of our lives. Politics, society, progress,
> law, rights, liberty....all are tremendously important and all of them
have
> no importance at all. Buddhism sees this most clearly. Everything is an
> illusion. In the end, even the illusion is an illusion.
>

I'm not sure what you're saying, Gandalf. First you say there is no
contradiction, then you say existence is essentially contradictory. Or
maybe you were talking about different things.. I'm responding a bit
quickly here, so please clarify if I've misunderstood anything. Scott has
really already put this at least as well as I'll good, but I'll try to lend
my own slant to the issue, even if only briefly. We inhabit a world that is
real: a world were matter truly exists: where things exist in themselves.
What is more, we might postulate that things exist in themselves other than
matter: laws, Ideals etc. Nevertheless, as Kant insists, while we can THINK
about the noumenal world we can only KNOW the phenomenal world. Therefore
knowledge is based on experience - ie: it is empirically grounded.

The world we experience, therefore, is a world of perceptions. (ie: -
PERCEPTIONS - NOT ILLUSIONS.) To put it simply, perceptions are a reality
in themselves. Perception and LIFE is ALL that we have. It is all we can
know. That said, I believe it is to devalue life to claim that all
experience and perception is illusory. (and presumably unimportant) Life is
precious because it is all we have. It is an end in itself and a reality in
itself. Being an objectivist and a realist, I believe that circles, squares
and triangles exist independantly of our ability to perceive them..
Geometric and mathematical laws, as well as the laws of logic exist
independantly of human understanding. Before we could fathom them, these
laws existed, and we know this because they could be no other way. No-one,
for instance, can prove that 2+2=5 - that is, short of altering the presumed
meaning of the signs - which is not really to change the ESSENTIAL meaning
of the statement. They are predetermined - perfect, not contingent. And
even if we cannot understand its ultimate meaning (if indeed there is one)
life, also, is real. It is the only reality we know, and we must defend it
with all our strength.

Tristan

[veronica floss]

In article <a22fm2$ans$1...@slb1.atl.mindspring.net>,
ganda...@infectedmail.com says...

[snip]

Thanks a lot for this response. The skill of analysis is a big
topic, and probably deserves more (and better) consideration than
most University Instructors give it -- at least where I went to
school.

The problem with long posts like this, is that they take a while
to digest. I think Scott has said as much, when he's posted that
he'd have to think about what you'd just written before he
replied. I have to think about it even more.

So if you don't see many replies, it doesn't matter. We're
probably all off reading.

VeeVee

PS: Was Kant the one who said that a person has a duty to act
according to what he knows to be true in a given situation?

[Tristan]

"Keynes" <Key...@spam.newsguy.com> wrote in message

> As far as progress goes, it is an illusion.
> There *is* change, but every advance is
> also a retreat. "Good and bad arise together."
> There are always unintended consequences.
> Things are changing faster now than they
> ever have in history. We are leaping into
> the unknown. I would like to see more
> justice in the world, but I would hate to
> see a police power to achieve it.

I'm not going to quote everything you wrote - but yes, you seem to have the
gist of how society works - or, more particularly,how modernity works.
Modernisation results in a higher technical division of labour. This
technical division of labour feeds into greater alienation in many
instances, but at the same time is part of that process by which we enjoy
higher material standards of living. Modernity creates societies of greater
and greater scale. A certain freedom is offered by the ensuing anomynity -
but a loss of community and social security is experienced as well. What is
more, this anomynity operates only at certain levels, for at other levels
the invasive powers of the stateand other interests become greater and
greater. Public life is thoroughly colonised, corrupted, co-opted by
interests.

But does modernity HAVE to be like this? In some respects, yes- in others,
no. Modernity will always generate problems associated with
scale,complexity and alienation. We can, however, struggle for an
alternative modernity which seeks to minimise alienation through workplace
democracy, empower community by funding community organisations and local
government, and empower civil society by providing forums for critical
discussion. What is more, a modern paradigm beyond capitalism as we know
it is imaginable, even though few would be so confident as to presume
markets could (or even should) be abolished as was once thought by some on
the left. Certainly a paradigm beyond that of PURE GROWTH is possible.
Certainly, it is possible to IMAGINE a society where the economy is
accountable to polity which, in turn, is accountable to the citizenry - and
in which citizenship finds meaningful expression through a full blooded
civil society.

Yes - in some ways we have gone forward,and in other ways we have gone
backward. Nevertheless, it is possible to imagine a modern society where
the balance sheet looks much more favourable, and that society is certainly
worth working for regardless of the odds.

> As far as moral relativism goes, I prefer it
> to the moral certainty of the Taliban,
> foreign or domestic.

The example of the Taliban does little to absolve theories of moral
relatavism. According to moral relativism, for instance, the oppression of
women under the Taliban would not be judged as all such phenomena would be
considered 'relative' according to Afghan culture.
Only as a moral objectivist can you judge in favour of the rights of Afghan
women, regardless of the relative assumptions and social mores of Islam.

regards,

Tristan

[Tristan]

"veronica floss" <vero...@hygene.org> wrote in message

> PS: Was Kant the one who said that a person has a duty to act
> according to what he knows to be true in a given situation?

From what I've read, Kant believe we ought act as if our actions could form
the basis of a universal Moral Law.

What is more he believed in the principle of Autonomy, maintaining agency
and free will against mecahnistic, pure materialist philosophies. Finally,
he believed that we ought treat our fellow human beings not merely as MEANS,
but as ENDS in themselves. By this reckoning there was an essential value
in human life and individual autonomy which warranted respect.

Of course, I'm an utter novice when it comes to Kant. I'm sure Gandalf or
Scott could give you a better answer than me.

regards,

Tristan

[Scott D. Erb]

Tristan wrote:
>
> I just thought I'd post some musings on moral philosophy because I thought
> they might be relevant for this thread:
>
> Frankly, I find moral relatavism obscene. Unfortunately, it is the
> intellectual trend of the
> age: a trend warmly embraced by the modern day postmodern 'pseudo-left' -
> those people
> who have redefined the 'left' by rejecting the old metanarratives of
> equality and struggle in
> favour of relatavism and the refusal to make judgements.

As a point of fact, in at least academic circles outside literary
criticism and art (where post-modernism plays an important role),
post-modern approaches and moral relativism of the sort that is
nihilistic in nature has been mostly rejected, especially by the
left.

A few right wing propagandists try to claim that such ideas
somehow rule academia and color the way the left understands the
world, but those charges are wrong. Many so-called
post-modernists also approach issues in a non-nihilist sense,
taking seriously politics as a moral enterprise. Their methods
often do show real problems with existing theories and
approaches. As such they are a useful subset of academic
thought, but mostly on the fringes and certainly not defining the
left.

[Scott D. Erb]

Tristan wrote:

BTW, you guys are having a good discussion. I'm saving the posts
and will read them more carefully later on -- right now I'm too
hurried to give them their due. But I do have one comment.

One of the best arguments at least politically for a mild
relativism is what one might call the Star Trek 'prime directive'
argument. We can see the caste system, the treatment of women in
other cultures, and often believe it indefensible. The trouble
is that going in and trying to change it often upsets the
balance. In Africa western ideals actually hurt women in many
societies because traditional 'counter balances' to their
apparently subservient role were wiped away along with other
traditions. Their culture did not move by choice, but foreign
ideas were injected, often with unintended consequences.

Don't get me wrong, it's not that I disagree with the gist of
what you say, but that intervention out of moral indignation is a
second question: when should you intervene when other cultures
engage in practices that we believe clearly immoral? Even
rejecting cultural relativism, that is still a thorny issue, and
there are good arguments for keeping such intervention minimal or
slow. All for now, I'm looking forward to digging more into all
the fine posts in these threads later. Thanks you all for upping
the intellectual content around here!

[Keynes]

You are making a judgement of 'absolute' moral truth.
That's the same way the Taliban works. They are
certain that Allah wants all infidels dead in hell.
Some of those fanatics are otherwise good hearted
people, but the absolute nature of their morals
demands they kill us all. It is the best of men
who become the martyrs and fanatics.
Absolutism perverts our better nature.

I too believe women deserve better than the treatment
they recieved from the Taliban, but I don't assume
that my judgement is 'absolute'. It is those who
believe in the absolute truth of the bible, the koran,
or mein kampf that do the worst things for the
'best' reasons.

>regards,
>
>
>Tristan
>
>
>

[Tristan]

> You are making a judgement of 'absolute' moral truth.
> That's the same way the Taliban works. They are
> certain that Allah wants all infidels dead in hell.
> Some of those fanatics are otherwise good hearted
> people, but the absolute nature of their morals
> demands they kill us all. It is the best of men
> who become the martyrs and fanatics.
> Absolutism perverts our better nature.
>
> I too believe women deserve better than the treatment
> they recieved from the Taliban, but I don't assume
> that my judgement is 'absolute'. It is those who
> believe in the absolute truth of the bible, the koran,
> or mein kampf that do the worst things for the
> 'best' reasons.

What do you think Bush (Snr) was doing when he talked about 'Good and Evil',
'Right and Wrong' during the Gulf War? As if the war was about anything
other than geopolitics and oil... It's not just religions that make
absolute moral judgements - sometimes those judgements are right, sometimes
they're not....In the case of the Gulf War we might be talking more about
shades of grey than black and white, but that is not to say that 'Absolute
Right' does not exist. (or Absolute wrong for that matter) Would you
deny, for instance, that the Holocaust was anything other than 'absolutely
wrong'? Somehow, I think not. Or would you claim that 'killing human
beings purely for pleasure' is anything other than evil - ie: absolutely
wrong? Of course, I know that you couldn't possibly think either instance
is anything OTHER than absolutely wrong. You're just living a
contradiction - which is ok in a way - as most of us do it every day....

BTW - I'd appreciate it if you have any views on my writings on modernity.
That's of particular interest to me.
Thanks for your reply. :)

Tristan

[Tristan]

"Scott D. Erb" <scot...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message

news:3C46B8A8...@worldnet.att.net...

>
> As a point of fact, in at least academic circles outside literary
> criticism and art (where post-modernism plays an important role),
> post-modern approaches and moral relativism of the sort that is
> nihilistic in nature has been mostly rejected, especially by the
> left.
>
> A few right wing propagandists try to claim that such ideas
> somehow rule academia and color the way the left understands the
> world, but those charges are wrong. Many so-called
> post-modernists also approach issues in a non-nihilist sense,
> taking seriously politics as a moral enterprise. Their methods
> often do show real problems with existing theories and
> approaches. As such they are a useful subset of academic
> thought, but mostly on the fringes and certainly not defining the
> left.

Dear Scott,

Actually, I realise that postmodern discourse is far more varied and complex
than my caricature would suggest. Bauman, for instance, has many
interesting things to say - especially on ethics - from a postmodern
perspective, and even Lyotard maintains the critical importance of
judgement. My problem is really with the shallow 'pop-postmodernism' which,
to me, appears to have become the latest political fashion, especially
amongst 'trendy' erstwhile leftist intellectuals. Now, your experience
might be different than mine, but I have seen these people wreak havoc upon
the Left I once knew and loved. If it's different where you live than over
here then I suppose we can be thankful and count our blessings. :)

regards,

Tristan

[chris.holt]

Jeffrey Davis wrote:

> "chris.holt" wrote:
>>Jeffrey Davis wrote:

[...]

>>>Pursue the good. Cultivate an honest conscience. Keep it
>>>simple.

>>You're making an appeal to intuition here; it's a bit like
>>saying "Just use common sense". But this only helps when
>>people have the same sort of intuitions...

> Not intuition, exactly. An acknowledgment of human
> limitations. Define morality? Determine all its ambiguities?
> That sounds like it fails my Ant Test. The Golden Rule is a
> good one. The simplest person capable of self-determination
> (not insane or brain damaged) can understand what it means
> (roughly) and what it means to run afoul of it (again
> roughly).

Yes, and if you want a bumper-sticker summary of how
we ought to behave I don't object to it. But I think
we should expect more of a theory of ethics. I don't
say that we can come up with definitions of morality
that are both precise and accurate, or that we can
resolve all ambiguities. But we can find better and
worse ways of looking at things; we can see the traps
that people fall into, both conceptual and linguistic,
and avoid them.

If a libertarian or objectivist is seduced by a kind
of social reductionism into thinking that all duties
are essentially contractual, we have to find ways of
showing that this is mistaken. If one person thinks
of moral judgements in terms of praise and blame,
while another believes in some mystical Natural Law,
we have to find ways to evaluate the relative merits
of these views.

> There will always be grey areas. Because of the

> necessary incompleteness of our understandings and the
> approximate nature of language, burrowing into moral issues
> as an intellectual actiivity will always have an element of
> the absurd about it. If a necessarily slap-dash, "intuitive"
> morality fails, it won't fail -- if applied in good faith --
> through malice. What more can we ask?

I think we can ask a lot more. I'm against malice;
but that's effectively another word for ill-will, and
doesn't get us much further; it adds another word to
the daisy-chain of definitions I mentioned earlier.
We need to find ways of asking the right questions, so
that in cases of moral uncertainty we at least know
we're addressing the important issues, and aren't just
ignorantly going down the road to hell.

A couple of examples from our culture, which pervade
people's sense of how to evaluate moral decisions:

In Doc Smith's Lensman series (fun comfort reading),
there's a time when Admiral Haynes and Dr. Lacey put
Kimball Kinnison through misery, because they think
it will be good for him (in this case, make him
decide to get married). We accept that this is often
true for children; but to what extent is 'being
cruel to be kind' justified when dealing with adults?
We can't say never, because there are always going to
be counter-examples; but just waving our arms and
saying "leave it up to people's intuitions" seems a
very weak answer.

In Dolly Parton's song Jolene, she's making a plea
that Jolene respect third party rights (i.e. hers)
when deciding whether or not to have an affair, and
this is basically ethical in nature (looked at one
way, anyway). To what extent are we obligated to
consider such effects, to take such consequences into
account when making moral choices? Again, just
saying "leave it up to people's intuitions" leaves
an awful lot unsaid...

[chris.holt]

Gandalf Grey wrote:

[...]

> Secondly, you're very right when you point out that relativism undercuts THE
> BASIS for views on progress in a society.

I don't think so; I think you're talking about a particular *kind*
of moral relativism, and that there are other varieties that don't
suffer from the deficiencies you're thinking about.

> When all moralities are correct,

> there effectively isn't such a thing as 'worse' because everything is, by
> definition, acceptable as is.

Moral relativism doesn't have to imply that all moralities are
correct. In fact, it's quite possible to say that it's not
helpful to think in terms of correctness when talking about a
morality. This isn't to say that moralities can't be *incorrect*,
in the sense of containing logical errors and confusions; but
just because we can show that something is wrong doesn't have
to imply that we can show something else is right, in a
cross-cultural manner.

> All conceptions of progress must be based on

> the idea that things could be BETTER. Relativism removes all basis for
> claims of better/worse, good/bad.

No, it doesn't; and this is a common error when talking about
relativism. What we can do is add back the hidden parameters
that linguistic shorthands have removed; we can say "better,
in my opinion, as a product of this culture, for those people
in their culture". There's no need for a universal "better"
that we can expect everyone to agree on (which they won't);
what we need to provide a convincing argument is a set of
shared assumptions, and these generally arise from our
surrounding culture. As we become aware of this, we also
have to become responsible for our moral judgements, and
not just fob them off on some external, mythical absolute.
I am perfectly able to say "This is wrong, in my opinion"
and *act on that basis*, without having to try to say
"Everyone should think this is wrong".

> I think we have to remember that one aspect of moralism, the recognition
> that cultures do have their own moralities is important. A recognition that
> people believe in their own cultures and their own moralities puts a logical
> break on the presumption that when we disagree WE have to be the ones who
> are right or that our disapproval means something in itself.

Very true; we have to be very cautious when evaluating
other cultures, because it's all too easy to mistakenly
assume we know all the relevant factors.

> But the additional assumption that everyone is different and everyone is
> CORRECT is neither logical nor practical.

Nor is it necessary, in the sense you're using 'correct'.

[chris.holt]

Tristan wrote:

> "Keynes" <Key...@spam.newsguy.com> wrote

>>As far as moral relativism goes, I prefer it
>>to the moral certainty of the Taliban,
>>foreign or domestic.

> The example of the Taliban does little to absolve theories of moral
> relatavism. According to moral relativism, for instance, the oppression of
> women under the Taliban would not be judged as all such phenomena would be
> considered 'relative' according to Afghan culture.

Only for your view of moral relativism. I can make a
moral judgement from my culture about an act in another
culture with respect to that culture. You may complain
that then I'm not certain that I'm right; but we have
to deal with uncertainty all the time.

> Only as a moral objectivist can you judge in favour of the rights of Afghan
> women, regardless of the relative assumptions and social mores of Islam.

A moral objectivist achieves certainty by claiming
an assumed universality; but the reason for that
assumption is to disclaim personal responsibility
for one's moral judgements.

[chris.holt]

Gandalf Grey wrote:

> Wittgenstein spent his whole life trying to completely dismantle all of
> philosophy and rebuild it into something that would make sense. His
> greatest work, the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* did just that.

Well, no.

> In one

> stroke he solved most of the logical problems of philosophy and moved
> philosophy into the modern age.

And in Philosophical Investigations, he effectively shredded
everything he'd done in the Tractatus, because he realized
that while the Tractatus was precise, it wasn't accurate.
Natural language and human experience cannot be so easily
modelled; any such naive formal construction necessarily
contains so many errors that it's questionable whether it
helps any kind of understanding.

> At the end of the work, he stated that

> everything he had written was false.

> What did he mean? We tend to get caught up in the logical games we play.

Certainly true.

> We forget that our rational faculty invents value, that apart from us and
> our ability to invent value, no value exists. All of philosophy and ethics
> and society and law is an invention of mankind, made up solely out of reason
> and imagination.

And accident, and unconscious evolution, adapting to changing
physical and social circumstances.

> If we forget that, we run the risk of falling into the

> grip of our own theories, or as Wittgenstein would put it, becoming
> "bewitched" by language. We make up rules of thought and social realities
> like the rules for a game of Monopoly, forgetting that the rules and the
> game are fictions. All of philosophy, science, art, literature, society
> itself are nothing more than houses of cards built on the clouds.

And here I thought they were castles built on shifting sands. :-)

[Scott D. Erb]

Gandalf Grey wrote:
>
> Scott D. Erb <scot...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message

> news:3C464B6C...@worldnet.att.net...

> > One book I've wanted to read and only got barely into (though
> > when in Germany I picked it up in a book store there and paged
> > through, thinking that Kant might actually be EASIER in German
> > than English) was Kant's critique of pure reason. I'm now
> > intrigued...but geez, I want to read about this, about Buddhism,
> > about the civil war...I also need to study Russian before a trip
> > this summer.
> >
> > Too much time, too little to do.
> > Check that. Reverse it.
>
> Not a problem, Mr. Wonka <:)

I figured you'd catch the reference.

> Pick up Kant's *Lectures on Morality* He was
> at his best when he lectured and not when he wrote. Kant could be a
> charming and persuasive thinker but not generally when he wrote. His most
> important ethical work is "Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals.* It is
> not an easy book to read and nearly every issue raised is dealt with more
> coherently in *The Lectures.* Remember that the use of the word *Critique*
> is specialized. It means "investigation" and not "criticism."

Thanks for the recommendation.

-snip-

> > But I can't help but think that Kant's approach has some merit in
> > that at least he's recognizing that humans will rationalize
> > anything, knowledge is imperfect (especially about consequences)
> > and therefore moral principles need to be based on something
> > other than consequences. Though I agree with you that denying
> > consequences is, so to speak, throwing the baby out with the
> > bathwater.
>
> Absolutely! No one presented a more necessary picture of the need for a
> morality to based in reason than Immanual Kant. We see here the reason that
> philosophy is more than just a bunch of quaint old arguments that always
> seem to have some fatal flaw. Each philosopher moved us forward in some
> important way.

-snip-

> > I see what you mean. Perhaps because my experience with Kant has
> > been with his more 'practical' piece setting the framework for
> > political idealism in international relations, I'm looking at his
> > arguments more on the lines of "what did he mean, how was he
> > thinking, how did his culture influence him." You, as is proper,
> > are following the logical implications of his argument.
>
> It's my strength and my weakness as has pointed out to me several times over
> the last thirty years by my wife. She's often predicted that I'll come back
> from the grave to argue the finer points of theology at my own funeral.

> Thanks for continuing to read these little essays. It's much >appreciated.

I'm enjoying it!

[Scott D. Erb]

Tristan wrote:
>
> "Gandalf Grey" <ganda...@infectedmail.com> wrote in message
> news:a25ve7$o2s$1...@slb1.atl.mindspring.net...

> Yes - think, for a moment, of society as a pyramid. Society is dominated by

> INTERESTS, and those interests imprint the logic of their struggles onto
> civil society and the state. The state and civil society, therefore, are
> never IDEAL entities - they are always a reflection of interest and
> struggle. Some interests, however, are higher up the pyramid than others.
> Indeed, said interests are so obscure that most average citizens could not
> conceive of their existence. Nevertheless, said interests colonise every
> corner of the state and civil society. Movements which properly ought arise
> as spontaneous reactions to social conditions are colonised to the point of
> becoming tools. The clash of ORDINARY social interests and ideologies is
> but the surface. The problem, however, is that only those towards the top
> of the pyramid know anything exists below the surface, or even have any
> reason to conceive of it as such. Indeed, only these people know the
> pyramid exists at all. The end result: almost every struggle is futile -
> the movements in which they find expression becoming pawns in powerplays
> most people cannot conceive. As for those who can conceive of such things -
> well, there are ways of dealing with such people.

The issue becomes one of power. Who has power, how do they use
it, how transparent is the use of power, etc. Interests are
important too, though like languages, interests are socially
constructed (note that social construction doesn't deny the acts
of individual agents, society isn't an amorphous blob that
constructs) and reflect identity (also containing a subjective
component).

Power permeates all relations, and that is something a lot of
people miss, especially the anti-government folk who mix a very
just and necessary mistrust of the centralized power of the state
with a naive belief that absent government power will not be
abused, as if power only arises when given legal mandate.

> > We tend to use a lot of intentionally humorous, shock-terms in this era of
> > 'post-skepticism.' Kant would probably not see the joke. He was an
> > extremely solid-citizen. It is said that his daily walks in the village
> > were so punctual that citizens actually set their watches by him.
>
> Actually, I've read the same about Kant... but I've also read the his real
> motivation was not so much his craving for order and routine, but rather his
> health - that and the very real fear that he may not live to complete his
> work should his health fail. That, at least, is the speculation that one
> interpreter of Kant has given.

BTW, I've read that Thomas Hobbes had this weird habit of
running, even after he got old. In a day where they thought
using your body would wear it out, his dedication to exercise was
perplexing, and also helped grant him a long life. Not bad for a
man whose most famous quote is "life is nasty, brutish, and
short."

-snip-

> Yes, but moral intution is the most authentic kind of morality we can KNOW.
> It is the most authentic kind of morality we can EXPERIENCE. All other
> forms of morality rely on IDEALS which are inaccessible to us.
> That's not to say we shouldn't THINK such ideals,and build moral
> philosophical systems on them.. It is, however, to say that we ought
> recognise the limits of our KNOWLEDGE, and respect the most authentic moral
> knowledge/experience accessible to us. What is more, although many of us
> have different intutions, there is still the possibility of judging which
> intuitions are preferable over others. We can make a Reasoned choice,
> therefore, that the intuition of compassion is superior to the intuition of
> hate. What is more, if we disentangle the 'Good' intuition of compassion
> from the distortions of imposed Ideology, the moral response is all the more
> authentic, and most likely, all the more desirable.

I agree with that. There is something
real about experience; in fact that might be all we can
justifiably label as knowably real (I'll get into that below).
The tricky question is what to make of recognition of the limits
of our knowledge. A post-modernist takes that to a nihilist
extreme, using the arguments from proponents of reason to justify
not trusting moral intuition, and using skepticism to not trust
morality based on reason. To me it's a question of balance, I'm
tempted to say living a moral life is more like a work of art
than something that can be built according to paint by number
instructions.

> > The cyclical nature of politics and the nature of the political right.
> For
> > nearly seventy years, the right wing has required an enemy to give it life
> > for a variety of reasons. "Issues" have always been the right's downfall
> > and they tend to marginalize themselves whenever issues come to the center
> > stage.
>
> Well, I wish this was true - but remember, the Right's wildcard is POPULISM.
> POPULISM is usually shallow and dependant on prejudice. Nevertheless,
> populism relates directly to ISSUES: military expenditure, foreign policy,
> immigration. (just look at the refugee situation in Australia if you want
> an example) By this reckoning, issues are hardly the Right's weakpoint. The
> Right's greatest weakness is that its ideology does not stand up to Reason
> or the intuition of compassion. That said, it seems so many people are so
> thoroughly complicit in the dominant ideologies (event hose by which they
> are oppressed) that, for the Right, this tends to prove to beno problem at
> all....

What's weird is that the right is a mixture of traditional
conservatism, stressing common shared values, duty, honor, and
nationalism, with Lockean liberalism and capitalism, which
emerged as a challenge to traditional conservatism. Conservatism
is collectivist and statist at the core, yet the modern right
considers itself anti-statist and individualist. Conservatism
was skeptical of capitalism, wanting to protect the elites; but
the modern right is ultra-capitalist. Yet they still mix some of
the conservative stuff in there, an irrational mix at times which
creates both practical splits (e.g., Jeffords vs. Lott) and the
kind of ideological incoherence we recognize in these groups.
Populism is the only way to try to paper over these problems, and
appeal to emotions. Unfortunately, that can work very well
sometimes.

> [Scott]
>
> We have a world, reality. Reality
> > > may be multidimensional as string/quark theory says, a creation
> > > of the Gods, or whatever. It's there. It's real. It's
> > > objective. We, however, cannot grasp that reality except through
> > > our perceptual tools, which are imperfect (at the very least they
> > > only perceive a small subset of reality, even the reality we
> > > directly encounter), and our interpretations. So we have
> > > subjective reality. It's a different reality, at one level,
> > > though obviously it is constructed from our interaction with
> > > objective reality. Finally, as we interact with others and build
> > > socially shared beliefs and understandings, we construct a social
> > > reality. It reflects our subjective realities, which reflect
> > > objective reality, but is at least two steps away, based on
> > > agreements reached by subjects acting socially. With morality
> > > I'm seeing that there may be an ideal; I can subjectively try to
> > > understand that ideal, and I work to construct moral systems with
> > > others, based on agreements and shared understandings.
>
> [Tristan]
>
> Yes - I agree with this absolutely.. This reflects my own views on the
> matter exactly. In fact, I'm kind of disapponted I didn't get to say it
> myself. :-)

Whew, I won that race!

> [Gandalf]
>
> > And yet they are all REAL. We must weave our way through them from the
> day
> > we learn to speak to the day we die. When we lose the objectivity, the
> > wisdom to see this contradictory relationship of man, nature and society,
> > some of the seasoning goes out of our lives. Politics, society, progress,
> > law, rights, liberty....all are tremendously important and all of them
> have
> > no importance at all. Buddhism sees this most clearly. Everything is an
> > illusion. In the end, even the illusion is an illusion.
> >
>
> I'm not sure what you're saying, Gandalf. First you say there is no
> contradiction, then you say existence is essentially contradictory. Or
> maybe you were talking about different things.. I'm responding a bit
> quickly here, so please clarify if I've misunderstood anything. Scott has
> really already put this at least as well as I'll good, but I'll try to lend
> my own slant to the issue, even if only briefly. We inhabit a world that is
> real: a world were matter truly exists: where things exist in themselves.
> What is more, we might postulate that things exist in themselves other than
> matter: laws, Ideals etc. Nevertheless, as Kant insists, while we can THINK
> about the noumenal world we can only KNOW the phenomenal world. Therefore
> knowledge is based on experience - ie: it is empirically grounded.
>
> The world we experience, therefore, is a world of perceptions. (ie: -
> PERCEPTIONS - NOT ILLUSIONS.) To put it simply, perceptions are a reality
> in themselves.

I'm not exactly sure what Gandalf means by illusion here, and how
far he would take it, but I'll give my read.

Perception is a type of experience, and experience is real. I
know I go into fiction too often here, but think about the Star
Trek episodes where they are on a holodeck (or even better, when
they discover holographic computer generated life forms who don't
realize that they aren't really a life form). Now, whether all
that stuff could be done is debatable, but it does illustrate
that one could live in a world where all is an illusion, though
the illusions could be basis of experience. Someone on
psychadelic drugs experiences illusions; those perceptions and
experiences are real.

Matter is real, but we experience it differently than its
essential form. This computer contains mostly empty space,
zillions of protons, electrons, and neutrons, all made up of
subatomic particles, held together by invisible forces, my body
is the same way...yet I'm experiencing it as a solid thing I can
type on and communicate with others through. Wow! What that
means for discussions of morals and ethics, though, I'm not quite
sure :)

> Perception and LIFE is ALL that we have. It is all we can
> know.

Yeah, we're on the same wavelength here, though I'd use the term
'experience' over 'life.'

>That said, I believe it is to devalue life to claim that all
> experience and perception is illusory. (and presumably unimportant)

I'm not sure he'd say illusion = unimportant, though one could
make the argument that illusions make it harder to recognize
importance. For instance, I remember reading a book once called
"Illusions" by Richard Bach (who wrote Jonathan Livingston
Seagull), where the protagonist learned that the material world
was all an illusion, and reality rested in our thoughts and
beliefs. In that sense the illusionary nature of reality hide
from people their ability to understand what really mattered, and
in fact people would get lost in illusions and lose sight of
their own ability to control their lives. It's sort of like when
you're dreaming and you suddenly realize its a dream. You can
control it, make beautiful women appear, fly, etc. Yet still,
it's easy to slip out of dream awareness (I guess the proper word
is lucidity, for those studying such dreams) and get lost in
whatever is going on around you. I don't buy into all these
arguments, but I consistently have such 'lucid' dreams that seem
real, and often when I wake up I wonder if this reality is really
any more real than what I just experienced. I perceived and
experienced in the dream, even if the rules of that reality were
governed by my mind, and this world seems governed by much
stricter laws. All of that is a really rambly way of saying that
a concept of illusions doesn't necessarily contradict what you're
saying, but it of course depends on what Gandalf means here.

> Life is
> precious because it is all we have. It is an end in itself and a reality in
> itself. Being an objectivist and a realist, I believe that circles, squares
> and triangles exist independantly of our ability to perceive them..
> Geometric and mathematical laws, as well as the laws of logic exist
> independantly of human understanding. Before we could fathom them, these
> laws existed, and we know this because they could be no other way. No-one,
> for instance, can prove that 2+2=5 - that is, short of altering the presumed
> meaning of the signs - which is not really to change the ESSENTIAL meaning
> of the statement. They are predetermined - perfect, not contingent.

How dare you base-ten imperialists try to impose your ideals on
we from the base 4 culture. We do not recognize that 5 even
exists! Blasphemy! :)

Actually, delving into pop culture again, I remember Calvin and
Hobbes strip where Calvin complains something like, "look at
this, they say 3+2 = 5, 2+2 = 4...they don't say why, I just have
to believe it. It's a religion. As a math atheist I refuse to
study."

> And
> even if we cannot understand its ultimate meaning (if indeed there is one)
> life, also, is real. It is the only reality we know, and we must defend it
> with all our strength.

That's still a subjective call, at least in how that phrase can
be interpreted. Life is real, but what is life? (Now I've got
that George Harrison tune in my head). Does life end with
material death? If you believe that, its hard to argue against
you, though a moral argument could certainly be made for
self-sacrifice for the greater good. Almost everyone seems to be
willing to risk their life and limb in some cases, and we all
undertake acts that are risky to our life in order to achieve
some other goal. Often that takes the form of risky sports like
hang gliding or rock climbing, or even unnecessary trips on our
dangerous highways. And, of course, alluding to George Harrison
above, he accepted death out of a deep belief that life was more
than material existence. If that's the case, defending our lives
(now I have that Meryl Streep movie in my head -- a good one, to
be sure) has more of a meaning than defending our material
bodies.

But perhaps that's not exactly what you mean either.

Interesting posts!

[Scott D. Erb]

Agreed. Caricatures of thought be 'leftwing' 'rightwing'
'post-modern' etc. are common on the net, and usually wrong.

BTW, I have had time (taken too much time, perhaps) to respond to
some of the posts, but I still have your long one on language and
knowledge that I'll need to mull over a bit more.
ciao, scott

[Scott D. Erb]

Yes. Beyond the posts I reply to, I read yours and others in
these threads, and really wish I had time to reply to more. In
fact, I saved your post to Gandalf in order to give my ideas, but
have yet to get to it, and am not sure anything I would write
would add to what has been said. Or, as you note, lack of a
reply doesn't mean someone isn't thinking about and appreciating
what is posted!

[Scott D. Erb]

Credit where credit is due...

This expresses similar sentiments to what I wrote in response to
Gandalf, and you beat me to it (turnabout is fairplay). I'm
still going to send what I wrote (I'm working on these things
piecemeal over the day, taking short breaks from my 'real' work)
since, gee, it took time to write and my take is different in
some ways. But if I beat you to the bit about subjective,
objective, and social reality, you beat me to the bit about
modernism and what it means and can means!

> Yes - in some ways we have gone forward,and in other ways we have gone
> backward. Nevertheless, it is possible to imagine a modern society where
> the balance sheet looks much more favourable, and that society is certainly
> worth working for regardless of the odds.

Agreed.

> > As far as moral relativism goes, I prefer it
> > to the moral certainty of the Taliban,
> > foreign or domestic.
>
> The example of the Taliban does little to absolve theories of moral
> relatavism. According to moral relativism, for instance, the oppression of
> women under the Taliban would not be judged as all such phenomena would be
> considered 'relative' according to Afghan culture.
> Only as a moral objectivist can you judge in favour of the rights of Afghan
> women, regardless of the relative assumptions and social mores of Islam.

There I'd have to disagree. A moral relativist could argue that
he chooses a morality where he will fight for the rights of women
against those who would oppress them. A moral relativist doesn't
have to respect the moral choices of others unless he chooses
to. The idea of moral relativism being prevented from
intervening out of a moral mandate would make it less relativist.

[Gandalf Grey]

veronica floss <vero...@hygene.org> wrote in message

news:MPG.16b043cbb...@ca.news.verio.net...

> In article <a22fm2$ans$1...@slb1.atl.mindspring.net>,
> ganda...@infectedmail.com says...
>
> [snip]
>
> Thanks a lot for this response. The skill of analysis is a big
> topic, and probably deserves more (and better) consideration than
> most University Instructors give it -- at least where I went to
> school.

Most of my philosophy professors fell into two camps. They either assigned
a few books and spent most of their class time actually making arguments
[philosophizing]---those were my favorites---or they saw themselves as
glorified librarians who did nothing but assign readings. Of course they
did real work behind the scenes, when not in class, writing their own papers
attempting to get published. But they saw their students as being
ultimately unworthy of dealing with except through the indirect medium of
books, lecture notes and teaching assistants. None of them ever said things
like "Hegel isn't particularly easy to understand," or warned the students
that Plato is fun and easy to read but never tells you what he's doing, what
he's actually arguing and why. To that extent, they weren't even decent
librarians. Ultimately I learned that most professors do not know how to
teach. Some would cheerfully admit it, others showed utter disdain for it,
treating the students as so much flotsam.

Some of the students did not survive this aspect of college. It wasn't that
they weren't intelligent. They just never saw the point, and in some of
their classes there really wasn't one. The professor would hand out the
same reading list every quarter and administer the same three tests he'd
been giving for thirty years, lecturing occasionally---if at all---from
notes he'd made in the Truman Administration. The students were largely an
obstacle to research time. Later, when I went on to teach myself, this
served as the basis for many lively arguments between myself and my peers,
resulting in lifelong enmity in some cases. As someone once remarked,
academic arguments tend to be ferocious precisely because there's so little
at stake.

College is tough and I expect it will always be tough with respect to this
problem at least. When you add this general inability to teach to the other
problems, the enormous expense, inevitable love affairs, and the temptation
to follow peer pressure into fratboy limbo in your first year, it's
remarkable that anyone ever graduates. I was lucky, not only because I came
to college as [more or less] of an adult, but because all my good drinking
buddies and girlfriends flunked out in the first term of the second year of
my degree. It was after that second term professor told the class that he
considered it his duty to see how many students he could flunk out of that
class that I experienced my own ephiphany. I suddenly realized I could
reasonably expect either no help at all or active opposition. I learned to
study, ultimately I learned that learning was its own reward.

> The problem with long posts like this, is that they take a while
> to digest. I think Scott has said as much, when he's posted that
> he'd have to think about what you'd just written before he
> replied. I have to think about it even more.
>
> So if you don't see many replies, it doesn't matter. We're
> probably all off reading.

I appreciate your reading them at all.

>
> VeeVee
>
> PS: Was Kant the one who said that a person has a duty to act
> according to what he knows to be true in a given situation?

I'm not conversant with enough Kant to say. It doesn't, by my memory, occur
in the *Foundation for a Metaphysic of Morals* or in his *Lectures.* Kant
would disagree with the comment to the extent that he would insist that we
always know the 'moral' thing to do, that this knowledge springs out of our
rationality itself and that it can always be expressed as a duty. As you
express it, it sounds almost anti-Kantian. Kant's philosophy is based on
direct duty and direct duty has very little to do with what's true in a
given situation.

In a direct duty morality we have, for example, the direct duty not to lie.
It is a characteristic of Direct Duty moralities that they have a great deal
to do with negative duties and very little to do with positive duties.
Direct Duties are largely things we may NOT do under any circumstances. It
may well be that in a particular circumstance or situation that what we KNOW
to be the case is that we need to be honest and forthright. Direct Duties
do not require this. There is no injunction to tell the truth, the whole
truth and nothing but the truth. There is only a duty not to lie. The
Direct Duty moralist tends to look at all situations to see whether or not
they fall, in a general way, into the realm of a handful of Direct Duties
not to do something. If they do not, they don't count as 'moral'
situations. As one modern Direct Duty philosopher has put it, "after we
know the very few things we must NOT do, there remains the infinitude of
what we MAY do."

Therefore, the quote sounds more utilitarian or at least consequentialist.
Consequentialists need to know the true nature of any situation because
they're looking at what will really HAPPEN if we act in a certain way.
>

[Gandalf Grey]

chris.holt <chris...@ncl.ac.uk> wrote in message
news:3C470B22...@ncl.ac.uk...

> Gandalf Grey wrote:
>
>
> > Wittgenstein spent his whole life trying to completely dismantle all of
> > philosophy and rebuild it into something that would make sense. His
> > greatest work, the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* did just that.
>
>
> Well, no.
>
> > In one
>
> > stroke he solved most of the logical problems of philosophy and moved
> > philosophy into the modern age.
>
>
> And in Philosophical Investigations, he effectively shredded
> everything he'd done in the Tractatus, because he realized
> that while the Tractatus was precise, it wasn't accurate.

Absolutely true. I'm so pleased to find someone who's actually read
Wittgenstein. He did! Quite unheard of. First he blows them away, then he
says "forget it!" With the exception of Russell himself [although
Wittgenstein had his doubts there too] hardly anyone in the 'community' even
understood what he was talking about at the time. Then he had the audacity
to say 'forget it. It doesn't make any difference whether you understand
it. It's not REALLY true anyway."

I could be working from one of Kuhn's outmoded paradigms < : }

[Gandalf Grey]

chris.holt <chris...@ncl.ac.uk> wrote in message

news:3C47080...@ncl.ac.uk...

> Tristan wrote:
>
> > "Keynes" <Key...@spam.newsguy.com> wrote
>
> >>As far as moral relativism goes, I prefer it
> >>to the moral certainty of the Taliban,
> >>foreign or domestic.
>
> > The example of the Taliban does little to absolve theories of moral
> > relatavism. According to moral relativism, for instance, the oppression
of
> > women under the Taliban would not be judged as all such phenomena would
be
> > considered 'relative' according to Afghan culture.
>
>
> Only for your view of moral relativism. I can make a
> moral judgement from my culture about an act in another
> culture with respect to that culture. You may complain
> that then I'm not certain that I'm right; but we have
> to deal with uncertainty all the time.

Unless you're a strict normative relativist. In which case, you're
necessarily acting in a fashion that's inconsistent with the principles of
the philosophy. There's no logical provision embedded within normative
relativism for one culture's having a logical basis to criticize another
culture's morality.

>
>
> > Only as a moral objectivist can you judge in favour of the rights of
Afghan
> > women, regardless of the relative assumptions and social mores of Islam.
>
>
> A moral objectivist achieves certainty by claiming
> an assumed universality; but the reason for that
> assumption is to disclaim personal responsibility
> for one's moral judgements.

Or at least, shall we say, the effective consequence is to disclaim personal
responsibility.
>
>
>

[Gandalf Grey]

chris.holt <chris...@ncl.ac.uk> wrote in message

news:3C470656...@ncl.ac.uk...

> Gandalf Grey wrote:
>
> [...]
>
>
> > Secondly, you're very right when you point out that relativism undercuts
THE
> > BASIS for views on progress in a society.
>
>
> I don't think so; I think you're talking about a particular *kind*
> of moral relativism, and that there are other varieties that don't
> suffer from the deficiencies you're thinking about.

Normative Relativism.

It's an interesting point. I would submit that your statement says nothing
more than the original statement "this culture could progress" or "this
culture could be better." And that is not normative relativism. A
'universal' better could be nothing more than the local recognition of local
ability to progress from one social state to another. But to suggest that
this can only "arise from our surrounding culture" is to suggest too much, I
think. The slave-culture of the antebellum South could not extract it's
idea of moral progress from itself. Nor could any original slave-culture do
the same. Such ideas necessarily came from outside, either forcibly or
through some form of persuasion and yet few would argue that slave-cultures
were in some moral sense 'right' in any sense of the word 'moral.' Even if
such ideas arise purely through chance and imagination, they are not
normatively relativistic in nature.

>
>
> > I think we have to remember that one aspect of moralism, the recognition
> > that cultures do have their own moralities is important. A recognition
that
> > people believe in their own cultures and their own moralities puts a
logical
> > break on the presumption that when we disagree WE have to be the ones
who
> > are right or that our disapproval means something in itself.
>
>
> Very true; we have to be very cautious when evaluating
> other cultures, because it's all too easy to mistakenly
> assume we know all the relevant factors.
>
>
> > But the additional assumption that everyone is different and everyone is
> > CORRECT is neither logical nor practical.
>
>
> Nor is it necessary, in the sense you're using 'correct'.

I'll try to put together a more coherent critique of normative relativism in
the very near future.

Thanks for commenting.
>
>
>

[chris.holt]

Gandalf Grey wrote:

> veronica floss <vero...@hygene.org> wrote...

>>PS: Was Kant the one who said that a person has a duty to act
>>according to what he knows to be true in a given situation?

> I'm not conversant with enough Kant to say. It doesn't, by my memory, occur
> in the *Foundation for a Metaphysic of Morals* or in his *Lectures.* Kant
> would disagree with the comment to the extent that he would insist that we
> always know the 'moral' thing to do, that this knowledge springs out of our
> rationality itself and that it can always be expressed as a duty. As you
> express it, it sounds almost anti-Kantian. Kant's philosophy is based on
> direct duty and direct duty has very little to do with what's true in a
> given situation.

> In a direct duty morality we have, for example, the direct duty not to lie.
> It is a characteristic of Direct Duty moralities that they have a great deal
> to do with negative duties and very little to do with positive duties.
> Direct Duties are largely things we may NOT do under any circumstances. It
> may well be that in a particular circumstance or situation that what we KNOW
> to be the case is that we need to be honest and forthright. Direct Duties
> do not require this. There is no injunction to tell the truth, the whole
> truth and nothing but the truth. There is only a duty not to lie. The
> Direct Duty moralist tends to look at all situations to see whether or not
> they fall, in a general way, into the realm of a handful of Direct Duties
> not to do something. If they do not, they don't count as 'moral'
> situations. As one modern Direct Duty philosopher has put it, "after we
> know the very few things we must NOT do, there remains the infinitude of
> what we MAY do."

I don't know if this helps, but from my copy of The Metaphysical
Elements of Justice (trans. John Ladd) (Introduction to The
Metaphysics of Morals, 222-5):

-----
Obligation is the necessity of a free action under a
categorical imperative of reason.

An imperative is a practical rule through which an action,
in itself contingent, is made necessary.
...
An action is allowed (licitum) if it is not opposed to
obligation, and this freedom that is not limited by any
opposing imperative is call competence (facultas moralis).
...
Duty is that action to which a person is bound. It is
therefore the content (Materie) of obligation.
...
A conflict of duties (collisio officiorum s. obligationum)
would be that relationship between duties by virtue of
which one would (wholly or partially) cancel the other.
Because, however, duty and obligation are in general
concepts that express the objective practical necessity
of certain actions and because two mutually opposing
rules cannot be necessary at the same time, then, if it
is a duty to act according to one of them, it is not
only not a duty but contrary to duty to act according
to the other. It follows, therefore, that a conflict
of duties and obligations is inconceivable (obligationes
non colliduntur). It may, however, very well happen
that two grounds of obligation (rationes obligandi),
one or the other of which is inadequate to bind as a
duty [Verpflichtung] (rationes obligandi non obligantes)
are conjoined in a subject and in the rule that he
prescribes to himself, and then one of the grounds
is not a duty.
...
The agreement of an action with the law of duty is
its legality (legalitas); that of the maxim of the
action with the law is its morality (moralitas). A
maxim is the subjective principle of action that the
subject adopts as a rule for himself (namely, how he
wants to act). On the other hand, the basic principle
of duty is that which reason absolutely and therefore
objectively commands (how he should act).
-----

[Gandalf Grey]

Tristan <Tris...@bigpond.com> wrote in message
news:8fw18.73771$HW3....@newsfeeds.bigpond.com...

>
> "Gandalf Grey" <ganda...@infectedmail.com> wrote in message
> news:a25ru3$dcd$1...@slb1.atl.mindspring.net...
>
> > I think we have to remember that one aspect of moralism, the recognition
> > that cultures do have their own moralities is important. A recognition
> that
> > people believe in their own cultures and their own moralities puts a
> logical
> > break on the presumption that when we disagree WE have to be the ones
who
> > are right or that our disapproval means something in itself.
> >
> > But the additional assumption that everyone is different and everyone is
> > CORRECT is neither logical nor practical. It effectively removes the
> right
> > to comment at all on moral matters. With respect to this, your comment
> that
> > all progress is seen as an illusion is very apt.
>
>
>
> When dealing with cultural/moral relatavists, one example that's always
> sprang to mind has been the Hindu caste system. The problem with most
> 'trendy pseudo leftists' these days is that they like to have their cake
and
> eat it to.

Unfortunately, that particular kind of cake eating crosses party lines.

> While subscribing to all the fashionable liberal democratic principles of
> Rights, Duties and Freedoms, they then turn around and claim that we
cannot
> judge other cultures in the name of relativity. Cultural pluralism without
> discrimination is posited as an end in itself. (remember, discrimination
> does not just refer to bigotry - it might also refer, for instance, to the
> act of discriminating between facism and democracy - ie: some
discrimination
> is good) True, we should be SENSITIVE when judging other cultures, and we
> should always be conscious of the limitations of our Reason: that and the
> necessarily arbitary prejudices we will bring to our judgements unless we
> exercise EXTREME care.

That's the essential difference between moral relativism and normative moral
relativism. Normative moral relativists are, essentially, those individuals
who have adopted "everyone has a right to their own opinion" as a creed. I
have found as many conservatives as liberals who take that position in
important aspects of their moral/social lives. Each side of that equation,
the right and the left, uses it as a standpoint to rant against either the
permissiveness or the overly-judgemental qualities of the other. Hence, we
move in a very straightforward way, from the realm of philosophy to the
realm of politics.

Personally, I prefer both my politics and my philosophy straight up.
Philosophical arguments should stand or fall on thier own without benefit of
hidden agendas. And politics cannot be judged on a purely logical basis as
it consists of 90% propaganda. Political stances on such things as morality
nearly always conceal far more than they reveal.

[Gandalf Grey]

Scott D. Erb <scot...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message

news:3C471002...@worldnet.att.net...

Sounds Hebbesian. "A power irresistable...."

>
> What's weird is that the right is a mixture of traditional
> conservatism, stressing common shared values, duty, honor, and
> nationalism, with Lockean liberalism and capitalism, which
> emerged as a challenge to traditional conservatism. Conservatism
> is collectivist and statist at the core, yet the modern right
> considers itself anti-statist and individualist. Conservatism
> was skeptical of capitalism, wanting to protect the elites; but
> the modern right is ultra-capitalist.

So they're still protecting the elites.

But the discussion is going well, eh?

We live in a world of real entities and we can postulate other entities such
as philosophies, societies, governments and so on. What world do we live
in, really. The empirical world of physical facts or the reason-based world
of social, ethical structures. That's the basis of the illusion and the
reason for the illusion being 'real.' As a social being, man's values are
more real than the empirical world he built them on. Certainly, the 'real'
world can come down on a man's head with the finality of a lightening strike
or the reality of a fatal car collision. But does that end Man? Man is the
inventor of values he goes on to live in as matters of effective fact.

>
> > Perception and LIFE is ALL that we have. It is all we can
> > know.
>
> Yeah, we're on the same wavelength here, though I'd use the term
> 'experience' over 'life.'

But much of what we call "life" is of our own invention.

>
> >That said, I believe it is to devalue life to claim that all
> > experience and perception is illusory. (and presumably unimportant)

Illusion is extremely important, both as a way of life and in recognizing
that it is ultimately illusion. To look at it another way, if we're going
to play a game of Monopoly, it's important to understand the rules
thoroughly, but on a greater level, it's also important to understand that
the rules of the game even the game itself is nothing more than a game---a
game as a notion, as it were. Understanding the notion of a game is
extremely important, I think, to understanding the significance of man as a
social and rational creature. Even the fact that we play games at all is an
extremely significant fact, for to play a game is to willingly suspend our
disbelief and to create or adhere to a new set of beliefs. To play a game
by the rules is to pretend that it is not a game, to pretend that an
arbitrary list of guidelines momentarily defines the parameters of our
desires and our beliefs. The connection between this ability and social
strictures, moral guidelines, rights, laws, prohibitions, permissions,
institutions, religions, political creeds, ideologies, and philosophies is
extremely important to understanding how man creates and adopts value.

[Scott D. Erb]

Gandalf Grey wrote:
>
> Scott D. Erb <scot...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message
> news:3C471002...@worldnet.att.net..

-snip-

> > What's weird is that the right is a mixture of traditional
> > conservatism, stressing common shared values, duty, honor, and
> > nationalism, with Lockean liberalism and capitalism, which
> > emerged as a challenge to traditional conservatism. Conservatism
> > is collectivist and statist at the core, yet the modern right
> > considers itself anti-statist and individualist. Conservatism
> > was skeptical of capitalism, wanting to protect the elites; but
> > the modern right is ultra-capitalist.
>
> So they're still protecting the elites.

LOL! I hadn't thought of it that way.

An interesting way to put it. Or as Berger and Luckmann put it
in their class "Social Construction of Reality" back in 1967
(when I was in 2nd grade), man is by nature a world builder.
That, and a few biological constants, is all they really saw as
reflecting human nature.

> > > Perception and LIFE is ALL that we have. It is all we can
> > > know.
> >
> > Yeah, we're on the same wavelength here, though I'd use the term
> > 'experience' over 'life.'
>
> But much of what we call "life" is of our own invention.

True.

> > >That said, I believe it is to devalue life to claim that all
> > > experience and perception is illusory. (and presumably unimportant)
>
> Illusion is extremely important, both as a way of life and in recognizing
> that it is ultimately illusion. To look at it another way, if we're going
> to play a game of Monopoly, it's important to understand the rules
> thoroughly, but on a greater level, it's also important to understand that
> the rules of the game even the game itself is nothing more than a game---a
> game as a notion, as it were. Understanding the notion of a game is
> extremely important, I think, to understanding the significance of man as a
> social and rational creature. Even the fact that we play games at all is an
> extremely significant fact, for to play a game is to willingly suspend our
> disbelief and to create or adhere to a new set of beliefs. To play a game
> by the rules is to pretend that it is not a game, to pretend that an
> arbitrary list of guidelines momentarily defines the parameters of our
> desires and our beliefs. The connection between this ability and social
> strictures, moral guidelines, rights, laws, prohibitions, permissions,
> institutions, religions, political creeds, ideologies, and philosophies is
> extremely important to understanding how man creates and adopts value.

And sometimes its OK to decide we don't want to play the game
that everyone else is playing. What we can't do is demand to
take the ball and go home unless everyone else changes the rules
to our whim (that's sort of the Beckian approach).

Well written and interesting paragraph...I'll have to think about
it.

[Scott D. Erb]

OK, I'll try to give my reactions to this. It's very
interesting, and I agree with most of what you say...though I
have some quibbles here and there (what fun would this be if that
weren't the case?)

Tristan wrote:
>
> "Gandalf Grey" <ganda...@infectedmail.com> wrote in message

> news:a25ru3$dcd$1...@slb1.atl.mindspring.net...
>
> Thanks for your comments - if you're interested, I may as well leave some of
> the other contributions I've made on different message boards. None of it
> is really original, so I'm told (and I don't doubt that), but I did come to
> the ideas involved of my own accord. Anyway, I spent a lot of time writing
> the messages I'm about to post - it's just nice to think I might be able use
> them again rather than just forgetting them. :)
>
> ****
>
> Language is a social construct. (even though probably one founded on
> biology - thus an
> apriori capacity)

I guess all human acts, including building sky scrapers (the
things we do to build them) can be traced to biology. Language
is clearly a social construct, I agree.

>All concepts expressed in language are socially
> constructed through
> language - through the relations of the language system, and also that
> language system's
> relation to the world.

With the mediating factor of subjectivity. I like the term
'intersubjective,' since language implies intersubjective
understandings about reality shared by people, even if their
subjective experience and understanding of the communication may
be different. The quality of communication requires that
subjective understandings be as close as possible (hence
philosophy and science need precise definitions and measures,
while political debate often goes in wild directions of
misunderstandings and abused terms).

> Importantly, however, as noted, language does relate to the real world:
> words signifying
> real phenomena we experience through our senses and our imagination.
> When we refer to something as 'good' or 'evil' we refer to at least
> partially socially
> constructed standards and concepts expressed through lanuage: concepts about
> which
> lanuage attempts to develop a social consensus.

Or people use language to act politically/socially to persuade
others and develop a consensus.

> In relation to physical and mathematical laws, language more or less
> succeeds in its object
> of creating the consensus which helps facilitate communication. While there
> is
> philosophical room for the kind of skepticism advocated by Hume, most people
> accept
> that through continuous observation and experimentation we may discover the
> workings
> of Natural Law.

Wasn't it HUme who pounded a table and said, well it's here. I
can feel it. Sort of pragmatic you can't be sure about things,
but you may as well go with it.

The idea of this as a path to natural law is a bit rockier, I
think.

> (although, in reality, this is always a process of induction
> rather than
> deduction) Knowledge of Natural Law is arrived at through empirical
> observation.
> Skepticism here is logical (and therefore knowledge is imperfect)- but
> usually it is
> impractical.

But we have to be careful to what extent skepticism is
impractical. It is impractical for most day to day things like
driving a car. If one were to doubt the continued existence of
the road or car, that would lead to disaster. But in abstract
concept of good, evil, natural law, morality, and things with no
direct experiential impact that can generate agreement, knowledge
is not only imperfect, it is very vague, and skepticism of any
claim becomes not only more 'practical,' but even necessary.
I've many times seen people try to respond to that kind of
skepticism by comparing it to skepticism of directly experienced
physical phenomena, and I don't think that analogy holds.

> There is room for doubt just as there is logical room for
> Solipsism - but it is
> more practical to assume that we have accessed 'truth', even though logic
> demands room
> be left for our doubts.

Again, the level of doubt varies depending on the issue and the
evidence.

> Intuitive knowledge and knowledge of Ideal systems are different matters
> still... Certain
> systems of Ideas are SELF-REFERENTIAL and exist INDEPENDANTLY OF
> EXPERIENCE. The word 'Football Stadium' only makes sense through experience
> and
> social context. A geometric shape or a number occupies a distinct place in a
> self referential
> system, however, regardless of our knowledge of it. Knowledge acquired
> through
> experience might always be doubted - for we find philosophical reason to
> doubt our
> senses, and to doubt our induction of Natural Law - but being
> self-referential - such
> systems of Ideas might be apprehended as PERFECT TRUTH. The statement 'a
> triangle
> has three sides', for instance is objectively true, as no other conclusion
> is possible within
> the self referential system of Geometry.

OK, though that doesn't really lead to any profound insights.
Humans can construct truth by defining terms in a way that makes
a certain usage of those terms true. Tautologies and the like
aren't starting points of a deep philosophy, but language games
of a sort.

> Lastly, we come to Intuitive knowledge and apriori knowledge. At first it
> might be
> objected that intuition is just another form of experience. The importance
> of intuition,
> however, is the the faculties of intuition exist apriori - before social
> mediation.

Perhaps related to a kind of instinct? Still, while it may exist
subjectively, intuition also gets 'contaminated' by social
mediation as one grows, something you note below. A lot of what
we 'intuit' reflects social customs and socially learned
behavior. Determining what is purely intuitional and socially
learned would be a tough call.

> As stated previously, I believe we DERIVE our concepts of Good and Evil,
> Justice and
> Injustice from our intuitive faculties of love and compassion. This

I agree with you here. I can't prove it, of course, and for
philosophical and scientific discussion I can suspend that belief
to analyze other theories, and perhaps its more than 'just'
intuition, but yeah, I think you're right on that point.

> intuition is in itself a
> form of knowledge. This does not mean that Good and Evil cannot exist as
> ideals outside
> of our intuitive comprehension, but even where are intuitions are exercised
> in harmony
> with - indeed, as part of - our Reason, Reason cannot penetrate the noumenal
> world.
> Our intuitive faculties lead to our moral SENTIMENTS which, in turn, give
> rise to our
> moral codes. In a way, our intuitively derived ethics are the closest we
> come to bridging
> the gap between the phenomenal and the noumenal: through the intuition of
> compassion
> we strain against the boundaries imposed by our egoistic selves, moving
> towards a
> disposition that is truly 'living FOR the Other'.

Again, I agree with you on this point, though when challenged I
can't see how we can defend this as anything more than an
assumption or belief based on our interpretation of experience.
That won't satisfy those who don't share that belief, and have a
different understanding of their experiences.

I'm reminded of the Yoda quote: fear leads to anger, anger leads
to hate, hate leads to suffering. (You CANNOT get by any post
from me without some reference to pop culture). I've always
thought that the inability some have to express love/compassion
comes from a number of psychological blocks, most prominent fear,
which could be fear of not being respected or liked -- low
self-esteem, or fear of different ideas, ways of doing things,
etc. In foreign policy study I read an interesting book by Lloyd
Etheredge about how foreign policy decision makers reflect a
hardball personality type which makes poor decisions more likely
-- this type tends to see the world as dog eat dog, everyone out
for themselves, and if they don't play the game that way, they'll
get eaten. They have an inability to love, tend to use people as
means for their own ends, cannot laugh at themselves but love to
make jokes at the expense of others, have trouble forming real
relationships, and use power as an ersatz for self-esteem,
drawing them into government (or other powerful societal
positions). We're not getting much into psychology in these
discussions, focused as we are on philosophy, but if what you
write is true, then intuition opens the door for psychology being
a factor in understanding how we come to our moral stances.

> However, as this intuition is SOCIALLY MEDIATED it becomes IMPURE. We become
> distanced from the intuitive source as our notions of Good and Evil are
> mediated through
> IDEOLOGY - become warped through the influence of custom, tradition,
> perceived
> authority - that is, as opposed to the authenticity of the original
> intuitive ethical impulse.

That is probably inevitable, and part of being a social creature.

> Now, there are many different concepts of Good and Evil that find expression
> through
> language. Most all of these relate to something REAL and something EXTERNAL,
> but
> given the unstable nature of laguage - of its system of signs - what
> language refers to when
> speaking of Good and Evil depends on social context, interpretation etc. The
> task for us is
> to rediscover the BEST understandings of Good and Evil - and those, I
> believe, are those
> that relate directly to the original intuitive ethical impulse.
>
> Good and Evil as detached Ideals are inaccessible to us. At best, they are
> things in
> themselves that we cannot apprehend. This much we have already discussed.
> The closest
> we can get is through our intuition, and through our experience of such
> emotions as love,
> sympathy and hate. We know that these are the best ways of apprehending Good
> and Evil
> - for they bring our understanding back to its foundations.. (rather than
> being 'free floating'
> - ie: groundless)

The principle I tend to think of is to see all of humanity as
somehow linked, that while we have separate identities, we are at
some other kind of level, perhaps spiritual, connected in ways
that we don't comprehend. That's pure speculative belief on my
part, done to make ethical principles easier for me to apply in
the real world (a pragmatic belief in some ways). So for me true
love and compassion is to not just think of it as a golden rule,
but to think in terms of what would be good for the whole as well
as the parts. That accomplishes some of what Gandalf talks about
when he mentions the 'good of society,' and I don't think it
contradicts my own individualist strain (I think I come off
stressing individualism more than he does). Even if we are
connected (again, only a speculative belief) we still have
individual identities and must make individual choices.

> Simply because we cannot penetrate Ideals or things-in-themselves, however,
> does not
> mean we have not accessed TRUTH. The statement 'people play football in
> football
> stadiums' makes no sense at all outside of a socially constructed context.
> But it is
> nevertheless ENTIRELY true. Indeed, even though it relies on social
> construction, it is
> OBJECTIVELY true. (would anyone like to claim that that statement is NOT
> objectively
> true?????) When we trace our NOTIONS of and EXPERIENCE of Good and Evil
> (ie: as
> opposed to the Ideals of Good and Evil) back to their intuitive, ethical
> foundations, we
> have even more reason to be confident of such truth. Intuitive impulses and
> judgements,
> the capacity for which exists apriori, comprise some of the most fundamental
> ways of
> KNOWING we have access to. If we cannot trust these as representing truth,
> then we
> cannot trust anything. I, personally, am not ready to embrace solipsism.

This year I'm convinced the Minnesota Vikings, whatever they were
doing, were NOT playing football in their stadium ;)

Thanks for the interesting post.

[Scott D. Erb]

Gandalf Grey wrote:
>
> Scott D. Erb <scot...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message

> news:3C45F754...@worldnet.att.net...

-snip-

> > I see your point, but look at it this way (my social science
> > background coming through). We have a world, reality. Reality

> > may be multidimensional as string/quark theory says, a creation
> > of the Gods, or whatever. It's there. It's real. It's
> > objective. We, however, cannot grasp that reality except through
> > our perceptual tools, which are imperfect (at the very least they
> > only perceive a small subset of reality, even the reality we
> > directly encounter), and our interpretations. So we have
> > subjective reality. It's a different reality, at one level,
> > though obviously it is constructed from our interaction with
> > objective reality. Finally, as we interact with others and build
> > socially shared beliefs and understandings, we construct a social
> > reality. It reflects our subjective realities, which reflect
> > objective reality, but is at least two steps away, based on
> > agreements reached by subjects acting socially. With morality
> > I'm seeing that there may be an ideal; I can subjectively try to
> > understand that ideal, and I work to construct moral systems with
> > others, based on agreements and shared understandings.
>

> Certainly what you describe is quite true. One thing I always taught my
> students is that when you're all done learning as much as you can about
> logic and philosophy, when you think you're as close to 'the answer' as you
> ever can be, it's time to stop and make one last admission.

>
> Wittgenstein spent his whole life trying to completely dismantle all of
> philosophy and rebuild it into something that would make sense. His

> greatest work, the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* did just that. In one

> stroke he solved most of the logical problems of philosophy and moved

> philosophy into the modern age. At the end of the work, he stated that

> everything he had written was false.
>
> What did he mean? We tend to get caught up in the logical games we play.

> We forget that our rational faculty invents value, that apart from us and
> our ability to invent value, no value exists. All of philosophy and ethics
> and society and law is an invention of mankind, made up solely out of reason
> and imagination.

That is on the one hand very obvious, but at the same time
profound.

> If we forget that, we run the risk of falling into the
> grip of our own theories, or as Wittgenstein would put it, becoming
> "bewitched" by language. We make up rules of thought and social realities
> like the rules for a game of Monopoly, forgetting that the rules and the
> game are fictions. All of philosophy, science, art, literature, society
> itself are nothing more than houses of cards built on the clouds.

Perspective. That is what we lose when we forget that. I used
the analogy of dreams the other day - how when you are aware you
are dreaming and can control your dream, it's still so easy to
fall back into forgetting its just a dream. That more than
anything else (in my twenties I was fascinated with such 'dream
awareness' which I later learned was called 'lucid dreaming' that
I kept a dream journal and recorded over 1000 dreams) helped give
me perspective on life. We can't control this 'reality' like a
dream, but at least we can be awake and recognize that we're
dealing with constructs of thought and mind.

> And yet they are all REAL. We must weave our way through them from the day
> we learn to speak to the day we die. When we lose the objectivity, the
> wisdom to see this contradictory relationship of man, nature and society,
> some of the seasoning goes out of our lives.

We lose perspective. We go "hypnotised" through life, living in
response to stimuli or isms we've learned, but somehow not really
being able to stand aside.

> Politics, society, progress,
> law, rights, liberty....all are tremendously important and all of them have
> no importance at all. Buddhism sees this most clearly. Everything is an
> illusion. In the end, even the illusion is an illusion.

I wrote a poem when I was 18 called "One day closer to death."
Sounds morbid, but I thought it rather liberating. We're going
to die, everything we do and believe in will fade away, the sun
will someday go nova, the universe will expand into dispersed
energy...at least, that's the way scientists tell it. So really,
what is there to lose. Live. Place your bets. Follow your
heart. Try to learn and understand it, but take control and
enjoy it.

> Donovan turned a little Zen koan into a song that illustrates it perfectly.
>
> "First there is a mountain.
> Then there is no mountain.
> Then there is."

I remember his song "Atlantis." But otherwise he was a bit
before my time. Just a bit.

> Once we make our way through the morass of human thought we hopefully
> achieve a point where we realize that all of our learning means nothing.
> Once we've seen that, we can return to that same world and pick up that
> train of thought and utilize it better for having seen its true nature.

Another poem, written by a 23 year old working in Washington DC
reflecting on his trip home:

On a warm grey winter evening
Before the sun goes down
the rain falls on the taxis
the buildings, the monuments of this town
As well dressed men and women
Head to their homes
Silent in the streets
In a crowd, yet alone
In their hearts.

Splashing through the dirty water
They ignore the "don't walk" signs
Turning their heads away
They avoid each other's glance
Trying to impress
They put on a show
They know its just the way things go
But I stand here on the corner
My hair wet from the rain
Laughint at their three ring show
Such a silly game
And still they pass by me
In a different world
A world that I don't see
But I guess I shouldn't fight
After all, they may be right

I look at a wino
Wet and sick from the rain
The street lights turn on
This downtown has changed
A collage of people, all passing by
Looking for something, looking to get by
The rich and the poor, where are they going
They seem so sure, they say they understand it
But still it seems like a dream to me
I don't want these games, I just want to be free
The rain keeps falling
It's just the rain that seems real
No one seems to understand how I feel
But I guess I shouldn't fight
After all, they may be right

[Gandalf Grey]

Scott D. Erb <scot...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message

news:3C48EC2C...@worldnet.att.net...

Precisely. The power that our constructed world has over us is the constant
believe that we feed it. Just recognizing that much is the beginning of
perspective. And perspective is the real key to happiness.

>
> > And yet they are all REAL. We must weave our way through them from the
day
> > we learn to speak to the day we die. When we lose the objectivity, the
> > wisdom to see this contradictory relationship of man, nature and
society,
> > some of the seasoning goes out of our lives.
>
> We lose perspective. We go "hypnotised" through life, living in
> response to stimuli or isms we've learned, but somehow not really
> being able to stand aside.

Yep. Knee-jerking our way through life. We're all more or less
self-programmed that way. Getting mad at the same taunts, getting upset at
the same baseless fears.

>
> > Politics, society, progress,
> > law, rights, liberty....all are tremendously important and all of them
have
> > no importance at all. Buddhism sees this most clearly. Everything is
an
> > illusion. In the end, even the illusion is an illusion.
>
> I wrote a poem when I was 18 called "One day closer to death."
> Sounds morbid, but I thought it rather liberating. We're going
> to die, everything we do and believe in will fade away, the sun
> will someday go nova, the universe will expand into dispersed
> energy...at least, that's the way scientists tell it. So really,
> what is there to lose. Live. Place your bets. Follow your
> heart. Try to learn and understand it, but take control and
> enjoy it.

That's the whole purpose behind much of Buddhist and Taoist teaching.
Living each day as if it were your last is definitely part of it.

[Scott D. Erb]

Before getting to the response, have you ever read the
political/theoretical work of Roberto M. Unger?

Gandalf Grey wrote:
>
> Scott D. Erb <scot...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message

> news:3C48EC2C...@worldnet.att.net...
> >

> > > If we forget that, we run the risk of falling into the
> > > grip of our own theories, or as Wittgenstein would put it, becoming
> > > "bewitched" by language. We make up rules of thought and social
> realities
> > > like the rules for a game of Monopoly, forgetting that the rules and the
> > > game are fictions. All of philosophy, science, art, literature, society
> > > itself are nothing more than houses of cards built on the clouds.
> >
> > Perspective. That is what we lose when we forget that. I used
> > the analogy of dreams the other day - how when you are aware you
> > are dreaming and can control your dream, it's still so easy to
> > fall back into forgetting its just a dream. That more than
> > anything else (in my twenties I was fascinated with such 'dream
> > awareness' which I later learned was called 'lucid dreaming' that
> > I kept a dream journal and recorded over 1000 dreams) helped give
> > me perspective on life. We can't control this 'reality' like a
> > dream, but at least we can be awake and recognize that we're
> > dealing with constructs of thought and mind.
>
> Precisely. The power that our constructed world has over us is the constant
> believe that we feed it. Just recognizing that much is the beginning of
> perspective. And perspective is the real key to happiness.

...

> > We lose perspective. We go "hypnotised" through life, living in
> > response to stimuli or isms we've learned, but somehow not really
> > being able to stand aside.
>
> Yep. Knee-jerking our way through life. We're all more or less
> self-programmed that way. Getting mad at the same taunts, getting upset at
> the same baseless fears.

I think you're right on on these points. It also flows out of
many of the philosophical discussions and relates the temptation
of nihilism on the one hand and strong religious/ideological
fervor on the other. Perspective necessitates acceptance that we
have to take responsibility and live our own lives, without an
'answer key' or a specific set of certain proven rules. That
realization can lead one to say, "I can't figure out the answer
key, it's impossible for one to exist in fact, life has no
meaning" and take the nihilist route, or to find a belief and an
answer and just believe it completely. Despite the claims by the
"right" on these political groups that liberals and leftists
aren't concerned about personal responsibility, these
philosophical ideas lead to the conclusion that it is necessary
to take responsibility for our own lives, we can't be happy
otherwise. That responsibility could in fact be the point of
individual identities in a social world.

> > I wrote a poem when I was 18 called "One day closer to death."
> > Sounds morbid, but I thought it rather liberating. We're going
> > to die, everything we do and believe in will fade away, the sun
> > will someday go nova, the universe will expand into dispersed
> > energy...at least, that's the way scientists tell it. So really,
> > what is there to lose. Live. Place your bets. Follow your
> > heart. Try to learn and understand it, but take control and
> > enjoy it.
>
> That's the whole purpose behind much of Buddhist and Taoist teaching.
> Living each day as if it were your last is definitely part of it.

Or at least to live and savor each day or moment, I'd say. After
all, if one really thought a day was their last, they'd likely
max out the credit cards, ignore the diet, and stay awake until
they couldn't move any more. :) But perhaps a Buddhist or Taoist
would say such a reaction lacks perspective.

[Gandalf Grey]

Billy Beck <wj...@mindspring.com> wrote in message
news:3c4a21c8...@news.mindspring.com...
>
> Richard Hanson <ganda...@infectedmail.com> wrote:
>
> >Wm. J. Beck, Jr. <WMJ...@webtv.net> wrote in message
> >news:4591-3C4...@storefull-134.iap.bryant.webtv.net...
> >
> >
> > I don't suppose I could
> > prevail upon you to
> > describe in a little detail
> > this "Beckian approach"
> > to which you refer.
> > And do you think you
> > could brief it to a para-
> > graph or two?
>
> >If you don't like your name being associated with the idiot positions of
> >Billy, get him to change his name or get him to shut up.
>
> That might be the single most flagrant confession of outright
> programmed mendacity that this group has ever seen: Hanson make it
> clear that he will hold one man responsible for another's convictions
> and statements.

That might be the single most flagrant example of outright bullshit this
group has ever seen. Poppa Beck thinks that no one should use the Beck name
as a synonym of stupidity but he thinks nothing of Bill Junior making an
idiot of himself.

Live with it, Junior. If you make the Beck name reek with your rancid
ideas, live with the consequences.

[Gandalf Grey]

johnz~ <johns...@removethishome.net> wrote in message
news:johnsabotta-4949...@news.attbi.com...
> In article <a2dajp$2f4$1...@nntp9.atl.mindspring.net>,
> "Gandalf Grey" <ganda...@infectedmail.com> wrote:
>
> > johnz~ <johns...@removethishome.net> wrote in message
> > news:johnsabotta-F8B8...@news.attbi.com...
> > > In article <a2d384$7is$1...@slb4.atl.mindspring.net>,
> > > "Gandalf Grey" <ganda...@infectedmail.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > > If you don't like...
> > >
> > > (snip)
> > >
> > > Hey, Gandalf.
>
> I didn't write "Gandalf." I wrote "Gandalf".
>
> Do you really think that fools anyone?

What's the matter, Slobotta. The cadavers just not putting out lately? Did
they lock the morgue on you again?

>
> > >
> > > Fuck off and die, you little Portland jerk.
> >
> > Hey, Sabotta.
> >
> > Put down that corpse you're banging and come put your money where your
mouth
> > is.
> >
>
> You're a coward, Gandalf,

Said the premier netcoward of them all.

>and you feel perfectly safe spewing forth
> slander and malign hatred from behind what you think is the shield of
> "Gandalf Grey".

I always feel perfectly safe, Slob. Especially from little netcowards like
you.

>
> But the fact is that you're Gandalf Grey. You're also
> a liar, a plagiarist and a coward.

If you think so, come and get some, Sabotta. Get off your cowardly,
necrophilic ass and come and get some.

[johnz~]

In article <a2ddr1$lol$1...@nntp9.atl.mindspring.net>,
"Gandalf Grey" <ganda...@infectedmail.com> wrote:

> johnz~ <johns...@removethishome.net> wrote in message
> news:johnsabotta-4949...@news.attbi.com...
> > In article <a2dajp$2f4$1...@nntp9.atl.mindspring.net>,
> > "Gandalf Grey" <ganda...@infectedmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > > johnz~ <johns...@removethishome.net> wrote in message
> > > news:johnsabotta-F8B8...@news.attbi.com...
> > > > In article <a2d384$7is$1...@slb4.atl.mindspring.net>,
> > > > "Gandalf Grey" <ganda...@infectedmail.com> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > If you don't like...
> > > >
> > > > (snip)
> > > >
> > > > Hey, Gandalf.
> >
> > I didn't write "Gandalf." I wrote "Gandalf".
> >
> > Do you really think that fools anyone?
>
> What's the matter, Slobotta. The cadavers just not putting out lately? Did
> they lock the morgue on you again?
>
>
> >
> > > >
> > > > Fuck off and die, you little Portland jerk.
> > >
> > > Hey, Sabotta.
> > >
> > > Put down that corpse you're banging and come put your money where your
> mouth
> > > is.
> > >
> >
> > You're a coward, Gandalf,
>
> Said the premier netcoward of them all.

I'm not the one hiding behind a pseudonym, "Gandalf".

You're Richard Hanson. But you're too terrified to admit it.

>
> >and you feel perfectly safe spewing forth
> > slander and malign hatred from behind what you think is the shield of
> > "Gandalf Grey".
>
> I always feel perfectly safe, Slob. Especially from little netcowards like
> you.
>
> >
> > But the fact is that you're Gandalf Grey. You're also
> > a liar, a plagiarist and a coward.

You're forging posts. And you're doing it because you're afraid.

>
> If you think so, come and get some, Sabotta. Get off your cowardly,
> necrophilic ass and come and get some.

Tough talk from a snivelling little creep who hides behind a fake name.

JS

>

--
A Short History Of The United States of America:

"Laugh all you want...I'm the one goin' down in history
as the Thomas Jefferson of squirrels."

http://www.redmeat.com/redmeat/meatwagon/index.html

[Gandalf Grey]

johnz~ <johns...@removethishome.net> wrote in message

news:johnsabotta-298F...@news.attbi.com...

> In article <a2ddr1$lol$1...@nntp9.atl.mindspring.net>,
> "Gandalf Grey" <ganda...@infectedmail.com> wrote:
>
> > johnz~ <johns...@removethishome.net> wrote in message
> > news:johnsabotta-4949...@news.attbi.com...
> > > In article <a2dajp$2f4$1...@nntp9.atl.mindspring.net>,
> > > "Gandalf Grey" <ganda...@infectedmail.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > > johnz~ <johns...@removethishome.net> wrote in message
> > > > news:johnsabotta-F8B8...@news.attbi.com...
> > > > > In article <a2d384$7is$1...@slb4.atl.mindspring.net>,
> > > > > "Gandalf Grey" <ganda...@infectedmail.com> wrote:

> >
> > If you think so, come and get some, Sabotta. Get off your cowardly,
> > necrophilic ass and come and get some.
>
> Tough talk from a snivelling little creep who hides behind a fake name.

But YOU KNOW who I am, don't you, Slob? More importantly, you know WHERE I
am! According to you, we're virtually next door neighbors. So stop your
cringing chicken-shit whining about it and DO something. Put that cadaver
you're fondling back in the casket and get off your sniveling whining ass
and finally get behind all that tough garbage you like to spew.

Anytime you want to show up at my door, I've got a big welcome waiting for
you, cadaver-lover.

[kodiak]

<merciful summary>

gandalf > (discussion of Kantian Moral Philosophy)

John Sabotta > Fuck off and die
John Sabotta > coward
John Sabotta > netcoward
John Sabotta > hiding
John Sabotta > You're also a liar, a plagiarist and a coward
John Sabotta > spewing forth slander and malign hatred
John Sabotta > snivelling little creep

</merciful summary>

I had no idea that an abstract discussion on abstract discussions
could get soooo down and dirty. I've been missing out.

Two things I get; are that 1) John Sabotta, whoever he is,
doesn't know the first thing about ethics or morality, and 2)
seems to be a GOPoholic JingoLoon who can't even fake a discusson
on the subject.

He must have choked on a pretzel.

kodiak

[Gandalf Grey]

kodiak <kod...@uak.edu> wrote in message
news:MPG.16b5094d6...@ca.news.verio.net...

You caught him on one of his good days!