AWACS and Pearl Harbour.
David desJardins
>[...] (The Colonel also told us that the evidence was strong that he and
>his buddies and the whole fleet had been set up for the surprise attack,
>so that Roosevelt could get us into the war. So much for another Democrat
>Party hero.
How unheard of -- the armed forces blaming politicians instead of
accepting responsibility for their mistakes! I have read extensively on
this subject, with no particular preconceptions, and I have seen nothing
that would make me believe that Roosevelt knew exactly when the Japanese
would attack, or that their fleet was sailing toward Pearl Harbor. Or
that the Japanese had developed modifications to their torpedoes which
would allow them to be used against ships at Pearl (which the military
considered essentially invulnerable).
-- David desJardins
P.S. There is a huge difference between an early experimental radar, which
might have shown a featureless blur at a range of 50 miles or so, and an
E-3 AWACS which would identify each and every plane at a substantially
greater distance. It is true, however, that it is not clear how much
would have been gained by the advance warning. Certainly substantially
greater damage to the Japanese planes, and reduced American casualties,
but probably still a Japanese victory.
Karl Kleinpaste
>In article <4...@inuxm.UUCP> ar...@inuxm.UUCP (A Andrews) writes:
>>[...] (The Colonel also told us that the evidence was strong that he and
>>his buddies and the whole fleet had been set up for the surprise attack,
>>so that Roosevelt could get us into the war. So much for another Democrat
>>Party hero.
>
> How unheard of -- the armed forces blaming politicians instead of
>accepting responsibility for their mistakes! I have read extensively on
>this subject, with no particular preconceptions, and I have seen nothing
>that would make me believe that Roosevelt knew exactly when the Japanese
>would attack, or that their fleet was sailing toward Pearl Harbor. Or
>that the Japanese had developed modifications to their torpedoes which
>would allow them to be used against ships at Pearl (which the military
>considered essentially invulnerable).
The question of *exactly when* is a good one, I suppose, but I have
what I consider to be good reason to believe that Roosevelt et al knew
it was coming. My father was an Army Captain at the time, stationed
at an eastern US base I won't bother to name. He told me a few times
during my life about the fact that, on 5 Dec 1941, the base commander
issued an order (or, more accurately, relayed an order) that all
leaves were cancelled, all personnel were due on base Right Now, and
the base's highest security level was to be implemented immediately
and maintained until further notice. No explanation. The base
remained under maximum security lockout until the evening of 6 Dec.
For some reason, it was lifted that evening at (I think he said) 8pm
eastern time. The attack came, of course, early the next morning.
Clearly, Somebody Fairly High Up knew that Something was going on.
They may not have known what it was, they may not have known exactly
when it was going to happen. But they knew Something. And they took
no chances when they found about it. But the apparent danger passed,
and security was loosened - just in time for the attack.
Something about the oxymoron, "military intelligence..."
--
Karl Kleinpaste
Paul A. Suhler
>that would make me believe that Roosevelt knew exactly when the Japanese
>would attack, or that their fleet was sailing toward Pearl Harbor.
See John Toland's _Infamy_. There were Naval sigint people happy when
they first heard the news of a Japanese attack because they had
intercepted so much information that they expected that the Navy had
been ready and waiting to ambush the attack. Why the information
never made it too Pearl Harbor is still somewhat debatable.
James R. Van Artsdalen
> How unheard of -- the armed forces blaming politicians instead of
> accepting responsibility for their mistakes!
I agree Roosevelt did not know exactly when the Japanese were to attack,
but the politicians do not escape blame for everything. Cutting off the
Japanese oil supplies was a major blunder if one assumes that Roosevelt did
not want war then. My personal opinion is that Roosevelt *did* want the
war then and not later: he had to have been aware of the political realities
of cut off the Japanese oil supply. That act essentially forced Japan into
war: they had to have fuel. It would probably have happened eventually
anyway, but my assumption is that Roosevelt wanted to force things to an early
conclusion. Not that he wanted a war, but he wanted it while Britain was
still afloat, and cutting off Japan's oil supply was the best way of
"innocently" bringing it about. If this was his line of thought I would agree
with it, although it ultimately proved that the War Department was not ready
for a war, and probably did not realize the impact of the oil cut-off. He
should have realized that cutting the oil supply would put an end to the
posturings and so forth and given his commanders real reason to believe
that the next "War Warning" wasn't just another cry of "Wolf". Clearly the
military was at fault, but I would blame all of them together, as they were
all too complacent. In particular Kimmel should not have been used as the
scapegoat, and he might have saved the men at Wake. American naval
commanders did not go down with their ships as the Japanese tended to because
they were too valuable to lose, and the same philosophy should have been used
to save Kimmel for a chance to redeem himself.
> might have shown a featureless blur at a range of 50 miles or so, and an
> E-3 AWACS which would identify each and every plane at a substantially
> greater distance. It is true, however, that it is not clear how much
> would have been gained by the advance warning. Certainly substantially
> greater damage to the Japanese planes, and reduced American casualties,
> but probably still a Japanese victory.
I'll use this chance to clarify something in my previous message: the reason
I thought that US casualties might have been even higher if the US Fleet
sailed was that the action would have been in deep water, away from shore.
I know nothing about the rescue efforts at the time, but I have to assume that
they were substantially aided by the fact the boats were basically tied up
at the docks. I'm not sure how much Japanese plane losses would have
increased: there was a second air strike later on that met a hot reception
from the various ships and installations, but there were still few Japanese
losses in spite of the fire (sorry, I don't have references at hand). There
would have been factors either way... Now of course, it the new navy ship
"Bunker Hill" were with that AWACS... :-)
PS. Yes, I realize that the Bunker Hill has an electrically steerable radar
and probably doesn't need an AWACS to help...
--
James R. Van Artsdalen ...!ut-ngp!utastro!osi3b2!james Live Free or Die
Richard A. Levin
I can't quote a source for this but I recall reading
somewhere that the japanese pilots later commented on
the AA at pearl coming up very quickly after the attack
started. Considering that the aaf planes were set up to
be less vulnerable to a sabotage attack (unfuelled, no
ammmo, etc.) another hour may not have made any difference.
If the warning were several days (intellegence, say) the
navy would undoubtedly have moved the fleet to the open ocean.
then they could manouver (sp?) to avoid attacking planes, but:
one interesting fact about pearl harbor is that all the major
ships (arizona excepted) were (as I recall) salvaged. I don't
know about the little ships (dds and such). In the open ocean
as ship that sinks is sunk. One could argue that the bbs didn't
matter that much anyway....
sorry about the grammer, spelling and such. I hate vi.
RAL
"The only knowledge man can obtain absolutely
is that life is meaningless. -tolstoy (???)
me14...@newton.berkeley.edu
levin2@ucbcmsa
Oded Feingold
attack, and let it happen by surprise so we'd take a serious defeat in
the first attack. The US might not get behind getting into the war if
we weren't seriously provoked, and an unsuccessful or only partially
successful attack on Pearl Harbor might not do it.
My informants tell me he was fairly satisfied with the result. Note
that he and the navy top brass made sure the carriers were out of town
when the shit hit the fan - it's not like he was expecting to give the
whole store away.
--
Oded A. Feingold MIT AI Lab 545 Tech Square Cambridge, Mass. 02139
{allegra|ihnp4!mit-eddie}!mit-vax!oaf O...@OZ.AI.MIT.EDU 617-253-8598
Chuck Forsberg WA7KGX
was quite aware of the Japanese fleet approaching Pearl. There were radio
intercepts from ships of the fleet itself in addition to the U.S. rading
Japanese secret traffic. Pearl Harbor was purposely not warned because FDR
didn't wish the Japanese attack to be called off. The resulting coverup
makes WaterGate look like child's play. Go ahead and read the book.
BTW, I think history shows FDR did the right thing. Had we not entered the
war when we did, Germany could have completed their atomic bomb and V-9.
David desJardins
>You guys have it all wrong. Roosevelt knew the Japanese were about to
>attack, and let it happen by surprise so we'd take a serious defeat in
>the first attack. The US might not get behind getting into the war if
>we weren't seriously provoked, and an unsuccessful or only partially
>successful attack on Pearl Harbor might not do it.
>
>My informants tell me he was fairly satisfied with the result. Note
>that he and the navy top brass made sure the carriers were out of town
>when the shit hit the fan - it's not like he was expecting to give the
>whole store away.
This is what even the armchair historians call "unsubstantiated innuendo."
Not to mention insulting to "you guys" (may I presume that I am included in
this illustrious group?). No doubt "you guys" refers to those dolts who
have wasted time studying the history of the subject.
-- David desJardins
George Robbins
>John Toland's "Infamy" (Pearl Harbor and its aftermath) details how the U.S.
>was quite aware of the Japanese fleet approaching Pearl. There were radio
>intercepts from ships of the fleet itself in addition to the U.S. rading
>Japanese secret traffic. Pearl Harbor was purposely not warned because FDR
>didn't wish the Japanese attack to be called off. The resulting coverup
>makes WaterGate look like child's play. Go ahead and read the book.
The book is an interpretation of available historical data. It may or may
not represent the situation as seen by FDR and his Cabinet. Some analysts
see the American side of the envents leading up to Pearl Harbour as a failure
in communications and lack of understanding of the Japanese, others see it as
intentional.
I think Toland's books are pretty good, and would recommend them for one
perspective, but there is no shortage of other good material on the war years.
Anyway, the interesting issues are not how we got into the war, but how we
got out of it, and made the transition to the current miserable state of the
world.
--
George Robbins - now working for, uucp: {ihnp4|seismo|caip}!cbmvax!grr
but no way officially representing arpa: cbmvax!g...@seismo.css.GOV
Commodore, Engineering Department fone: 215-431-9255 (only by moonlite)
Baba ROM DOS
What a recall as being publicly acknowledged was that the Japanese codes
used to transmit the orders for the attack on Pearl Harbor had been broken
or compromised well before the attack, and that Japanese radio traffic was
monitored. The carriers were ordered out of Pearl, but no alarm was given.
Innuendo, certainly, but it's not entirely unsubstantiated.
Baba
Phil Ngai
>
>What a recall as being publicly acknowledged was that the Japanese codes
>used to transmit the orders for the attack on Pearl Harbor had been broken
>or compromised well before the attack, and that Japanese radio traffic was
>monitored. The carriers were ordered out of Pearl, but no alarm was given.
>Innuendo, certainly, but it's not entirely unsubstantiated.
What you say seems to be true but it is not truthful. According to
_The Code Breakers_ by David Kahn, the US was routinely reading
PURPLE, the most secret Japanese system, and the cipher in which the
message that Japan was breaking off negotiations with the US was
transmitted. This final msg was sent to the Japanese embassy in
Washington DC at 1:37 AM, Dec 7. It was intercepted and decoded by 5
AM, Washington time. However, it was in Japanese and had to be
translated, which took until 9 AM. Because it was a Sunday and many
people were out, it wasn't delivered to the White House until 10:45.
General Marshall read the msg about 11:30 and ordered a warning sent
out to American forces in the Pacific. This warning had to be encoded,
taking more precious time. The msg was finally received at 7:33 AM
Honolulu time. At 7:55 AM, the first bombs fell.
--
In Arizona they brag about how much water it takes to maintain their
lawns and golf courses. Can you say "aquifer overdraft"?
Phil Ngai +1 408 749 5720
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ARPA: amdcad!ph...@decwrl.dec.com