To Naomi Gayle Rivkis and those who are looking for peace.
Mohammed Sarhan
Do you know that ethnic cleansing happened in 1948 and the Zionists
did terrorise the Muslim and Christian population driving 700,000
people out to refugee camps? 386 villiges were confiscated out of 475 ones.
The Jews were invited to come from every spot in the world to come and
build the state of Israel. The victims were prevented to return.
If this is true, Can we say that Israel is an outlawed nation? sorry for
my statement, but the truth is above everyone.
If Israel is an outlawed country, and the refugees are victims, how can
we correct that without:
Allowing the victims to return.
Allowing one man one vote.
if the majority likes to call it Israel fine. If the majority wants it
to be called Palestine fine. If they want to call it Isratine or pal-eal
fine.
I do see that is the Justice. Once we accept the just solution, let us
discuss how this country can be a beautiful place for all the population,
Muslim majority, Christian and Jewish minority.
In war people talk too much and threaten too much but once a solution
based on justice, many many empty threats will disappear.
Naomi Gayle Rivkis
>Naomi:
>Do you know that ethnic cleansing happened in 1948 and the Zionists
>did terrorise the Muslim and Christian population driving 700,000
>people out to refugee camps? 386 villiges were confiscated out of 475 ones.
At this point, to be frank, I don't care. I think your "facts" are
out to lunch, as most of the people I've seen post here do -- including
a couple of Muslims -- but even if you were correct, I still wouldn't
care. Enough Palestinians have proven that they not only don't want
peace, they don't want your version of justice; all they want is the
chance to kill Jews, and they won't give that chance up no matter what
they were to get in return, that I've stopped looking for peace. And if
I've stopped looking for peace, I really don't care what you think will
accomplish it. Israel has the military strength to keep itself alive for
the present; I think it's got the strength to keep itself alive for quite
a long time, especially considering the degree to which the Arab armies
seem incapable of getting their act together. Why should I give a damn
what you think justice is?
>The Jews were invited to come from every spot in the world to come and
>build the state of Israel. The victims were prevented to return.
Whee.
>If this is true, Can we say that Israel is an outlawed nation? sorry for
>my statement, but the truth is above everyone.
By definition, it's not an outlawed nation: the other nations have not
outlawed it. Israel is still a member of the United Nations and formally
recognized by most countries of the world, even those who don't like it
very much. This is incompatible with the technical definition of "outlawed".
>If Israel is an outlawed country, and the refugees are victims, how can
>we correct that without:
>Allowing the victims to return.
>Allowing one man one vote.
>if the majority likes to call it Israel fine. If the majority wants it
>to be called Palestine fine. If they want to call it Isratine or pal-eal
>fine.
I'm no longer interested in correcting anything, since I don't believe
it can be done. I disagree that even what you're suggesting would pacify
the Palestinians with a thirst for Jewish blood, so I see no reason to
try it out, even if I didn't think it was far too high a price, which I
do.
I think it's time the people, on *both* sides, who talk about justice
or moral claims realized something: international politics is *NEVER*
decided on moral claims. It's decided on raw power and on traded value
for value if both groups prefer that to exercising raw power (which is
usually second choice, since it costs too much if trading is possible).
Therefore, I could care less about justice even if I thought you were
right about what it consisted of. I care about exactly two things in this
conflict:
(1) What Israel can get, in pure selfish wants, in exchange for giving
the Palestinians some of what *they* want, and exactly what price it will
come at
(2) Whether Israel has the raw power to get what it needs and keep it
despite the fact that other people want to take it away.
Until recently, I believed that it was possible for Israel to get enough
of what she wanted in exchange for a price she could afford that I was
an advocate of trying to trade. I didn't give a damn about justice even
then; justice isn't a factor in international politics. I've been saying
that for a long time. I simply thought it was in Israel's best interests
to make a deal.
Now, I no longer believe it's in Israel's best interests to make a deal.
The Palestinians have demonstrated that they cannot be trusted to keep
their promises, and no sane businessperson makes a contract with someone
known to break them. So now my basic concern is whether Israel has enough
power not to have to *care* whether it gets a peace agreement from anyone.
So far, it's done fairly well without one -- in fact too well according
to a lot of people; if Israel hadn't been so successful in its wars, it
wouldn't have its current headaches over the West Bank et. al. to begin
with. From the military analyses I've seen, it can probably keep going
this way for quite some time -- it'll cost them, sure, in money, effort
and lives, but it's possible, and better than making deals with the bank-
rupt. So I'm perfectly willing to see it work that way.
If you want me to listen to a proposal for the Middle East, don't give
me bullshit about justice. Tell me what's in it for Israel, what it'll
cost, and how we know we can trust the terms. I'll listen, out of self-
interest. I have no interest whatsoever in *anyone's* -- including
Israel's -- attempts, whether right or wrong, to paint a moral claim.
-Naomi
--
"They want us dead. We want to be alive. Compromise between these two
positions is not exactly easy."
-Golda Meir
Khalid Kader-1
who will continue to try- you should too!
In article <1993Dec14.0...@midway.uchicago.edu>,
Mike Medved
The reality of things is (appropriately) called "Realpolitik" - all
relations between countries are based on self-interest and not on ethics.
Anyone thinking otherwise is a romantic fool headed for disappointment.
Naomi Gayle Rivkis
>Naomi - sorry for doing this again - but I agree with everything you said.
I don't mind being agreed with. :-)
Ilyess Bdira
You and Naomi are very ignorant if you think that Muslims did not realize this
fact a long time ago. The key struggle now in the Muslim world is between
an Islamic Revival movement that wants to strengthen the Muslim countries and
Imperialist U.S/Israel/Britain/France coalition that is doing all it can
to keep Muslims dependent and weak. But I can assure you that
When the Muslims become strong and found their own United Nations, it will
be more ethical and a better alternative than your world of no morals.
The Boycott against countries (such as Sudan and Iran) who escaped from the
World Order which was designed just as an instrument in the above struggle
has no purpose but to crush any kind of resistence the Muslims show to
this oppressive order. But where will you watch? now you have Algeria and
Egypt to worry about, soon you will have a multitude of other countries.
The Masters in this international caste system do not realize that their easy
life does not help them get motivated and that their slave-countries are poor,
hangry, and, having nothing to lose, and will fight with more intensity than
is expected from them. The Europeans were a bunch of barbabric countries before
1300, it took them only 300 years to achieve their renaissance. The backward
Muslim nations might achieve their renaissance much faster than that thanks
of course to the Information explosion and the ease of transfer of strategic
technology (as simple as reading IEEE transactions in nome fields). Of course
there will be a lot of wars, but with people like Naomi ruling the world
you can't really hope for morality to stand in the way.
I hope I am wrong though.
**Note
(this being the implied fact that if you are weak you can only have the rights
that do not contradict with the "strong"'s interests).
Naomi Gayle Rivkis
>In article <1993Dec14.0...@midway.uchicago.edu> ri...@midway.uchicago.edu writes:
>
>>I think it's time the people, on *both* sides, who talk about justice
>>or moral claims realized something: international politics is *NEVER*
>>decided on moral claims. It's decided on raw power and on traded value
>>for value if both groups prefer that to exercising raw power (which is
>>usually second choice, since it costs too much if trading is possible).
>
>proceed on the assumption that you are correct and that international
>relations is entirely a power game played on the basis of conflicting
>national interests.
>
>Could you please tell us why it is in the national interest of the
>*United States* to continue to subsidize Israel to the tune of $3
>billion per year? Conceivably we could cut a deal with certain Arab
>states to meet our security arrangements in the region at much less
>cost? Remember, we're talking national interests here.
The United States made the original decision to subsidize Israel
because (a) American Jews were getting pushy at election time, so
it was in the interests of the acting politicians, (b) the Soviet
Union was helping the Arab states, and the decision was made at a
time when America tended to take whatever side of any conflict that
Russia didn't, and (c) it considered Israel more stable and more
reliable than anyone else it might have tried to work with in the
region.
Reason (b) no longer applies. Reason (a) still does. Reason (c) is
debatable. A fourth reason has been added in the intervening years,
which is that if they keep feeding Israel money, they continue to
have some influence on what Israel does with its weaponry, which is
an influence the U.S. likes to retain. It's because of this fourth
reason that I don't think it's in *Israel's* interests to keep taking
the money, but that's a different question... as is whether the reasons
given are sufficient that the U.S. should keep paying. You asked why
we do it; I told you, I didn't claim they were *good* reasons.
>[As an aside, your arguments about national interests do apply
>in the case of Israel's conflicts with Syria, Jordan, and other
>Arab states, but a lot of people think of the Israeli-Palestinian
>conflict as an internal, and not a transnational, conflict.]
The Palestinians would not thank you for claiming they aren't a
separate nation. Nor for claiming that it's possible to untangle
the Israeli relations with Syria, Jordan et. al. from its relations
with them. Doesn't make a difference; political groups of sufficient
size and organization to function in the international arena work
much the way nations do for all practical purposes.
Christopher Stone
>Christopher Stone writes:
>>Naomi Rivkis writes:
>|>...international politics is *NEVER* decided on moral claims. It's
>|>decided on raw power...
>>Could you please tell us why it is in the national interest of the
>>*United States* to continue to subsidize Israel to the tune of $3
>>billion per year?
>In any case, I don't think it behooves the U.S. to support the
>dictatorial regimes of the Arab states.
Oh, so suddenly our good practicioners of realpolitik are telling
us that the United States should not support Arab states because
they are dictatorial. That is, you are claiming that we should
select our alliance partners for *IDEOLOGICAL* reasons -- for
their adherence to liberal democratic values.
True practicioners of realpolitik, I am sorry to tell you, would
contend that regime type has *nothing* to do with international
politics. Shared values, be they democratic or otherwise, should
have nothing to do with our selection of alliance partners.
True realists such as Hans Morgenthau say that the Cold War had nothing
to do with communism and capitalism, but only the expansion of
Soviet power in Europe.
--
////// // // ////// // ////// Christopher Stone
// // // // // // // cst...@husc.harvard.edu
// ////// ///// // ////// (617) 493-7523
// // // // // // // 366 Lowell Mail Center
////// // // // // // ////// Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
Adam L. Schwartz
>Adam L. Schwartz writes:
|>In any case, I don't think it behooves the U.S. to support the
|>dictatorial regimes of the Arab states.
>Oh, so suddenly our good practicioners of realpolitik are telling
>us that the United States should not support Arab states because
>they are dictatorial. That is, you are claiming that we should
>select our alliance partners for *IDEOLOGICAL* reasons -- for
>their adherence to liberal democratic values.
You are putting words into my mouth. I didn't mention anything about
ideology. My belief is that dictatorships are a bad investment (e.g.
the Shah of Iran). Any form of government that does not enjoy the
support of its citizens is a bad investment because it is unstable.
On the other hand, democracies are a good investment. They are
stable forms of government, they make good trading partners, and
they don't start wars with other democracies.
--
Adam Schwartz | The opinions expressed here are my own
ad...@eecs.berkeley.edu | and those of anyone who agrees with me.
David O Hunt
>>Could you please tell us why it is in the national interest of the
>>*United States* to continue to subsidize Israel to the tune of $3
>>states to meet our security arrangements in the region at much less
>>cost? Remember, we're talking national interests here.
>
>us much. In any case, I don't think it behooves the U.S. to support the
>dictatorial regimes of the Arab states. Especially those that are opposed
>to the West for ideological reasons.
Then that's $5 billion sent overseas that we could cut from the federal budget.
David Hunt, PhD Grad. Slave | My mind is my own. So are | Towards both a
Mechanical Engineering | these ideas and opinions! | Palestinian and
Carnegie Mellon University | <<<Use Golden Rule v2.0>>> | Jewish homeland!
============ An anagram of 'Jesus Christ' is 'Sir, such jest'! ============
When in doubt, be ruthless. -- The Grand Negis
Ilyess Bdira
>
>On the other hand, democracies are a good investment. They are
Is this why the thugs in power in Algeria got 1.4 billion dollars
in grants as soon as they canceled elections and put the winning party
members in torture cells? is this why the amount of aid per capita coming
from the west is almost always proportional to how oppressive the regime is?
(I actually did a ministudy on this and found that there are only three
exceptions to that rule Iraq and Libya on one side and Israel on the other.)
but Israel is very much an oppressive regime if we include Arabs, and Iraq
and Libya are only being punished for their defiance of their masters and
not for dictatorship).
>stable forms of government, they make good trading partners, and
>they don't start wars with other democracies.
so according to you, democracy in the west only started after WWII.
Sorry it does not fly. "Democracies" did not fight each other becasue
they were allies to begin with.. All the third world countries that are
dependent to France are a hell of a lot better trading partners to France
than the U.S or Britain for only ONE REASON: they are run by dictators who are
easily bribed or blackmailed or both.
Adam L. Schwartz
>user Adam L. Schwartz@liszt.e writes:
+|>*United States* to continue to subsidize Israel to the tune of $3
+|>billion per year? Conceivably we could cut a deal with certain Arab
+|>states to meet our security arrangements in the region at much less
+|>cost? Remember, we're talking national interests here.
|>The U.S. already gives Egypt over $2 billion per year and that doesn't buy
|>us much. In any case, I don't think it behooves the U.S. to support the
|>dictatorial regimes of the Arab states. Especially those that are opposed
|>to the West for ideological reasons.
>Then that's $5 billion sent overseas that we could cut from the federal budget.
Personally, I think the money is well spent because it promotes peace
and stability. That's in America's interest.
Even if you don't agree, 80% of the money is spent here in America so
the actual monetary cost is only $1 billion---noise compared to the
federal budget which is over $1 trillion.
Stewart Clamen
David O Hunt writes:
>user Adam L. Schwartz@liszt.e writes:
+|>Could you please tell us why it is in the national interest of the
+|>*United States* to continue to subsidize Israel to the tune of $3
+|>billion per year? Conceivably we could cut a deal with certain Arab
+|>states to meet our security arrangements in the region at much less
+|>cost? Remember, we're talking national interests here.
|>The U.S. already gives Egypt over $2 billion per year and that doesn't buy
|>us much. In any case, I don't think it behooves the U.S. to support the
|>dictatorial regimes of the Arab states. Especially those that are opposed
|>to the West for ideological reasons.
>Then that's $5 billion sent overseas that we could cut from the
>federal budget.
Personally, I think the money is well spent because it promotes peace
and stability. That's in America's interest.
Even if you don't agree, 80% of the money is spent here in America so
the actual monetary cost is only $1 billion---noise compared to the
federal budget which is over $1 trillion.
The aid to Israel and Egypt was promised as part of the Camp David
Accord. Does anyone know under what conditions the US can discontinue
the aid?
--
Stewart M. Clamen Internet: cla...@cs.cmu.edu
School of Computer Science UUCP: uunet!"cla...@cs.cmu.edu"
Carnegie Mellon University Phone: +1 412 268 2145
5000 Forbes Avenue Fax: +1 412 681 5739
Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3891, USA (I accept MIME,HTML,Hyperbole,PGP)
Shaqeeqa
>The U.S. already gives Egypt over $2 billion per year and that doesn't buy
>us much. In any case, I don't think it behooves the U.S. to support the
>dictatorial regimes of the Arab states. Especially those that are opposed
>to the West for ideological reasons.
That's just it. It IS in the U.S.' interest to support the "dictorial
regimes of the Arab states", and their opposition to "the West for
ideological reasons" don't play a role in determining this. Why do
you think Saddam Hussein is still in power? And Israel has decided that
it was in its best interests to make a treaty with the PLO.
Funny, isn't it?
Shaqeeqa
Alaa Zeineldine
: Christopher Stone writes:
: >Adam L. Schwartz writes:
: >Oh, so suddenly our good practicioners of realpolitik are telling
: >us that the United States should not support Arab states because
: >they are dictatorial. That is, you are claiming that we should
: >select our alliance partners for *IDEOLOGICAL* reasons -- for
: >their adherence to liberal democratic values.
: You are putting words into my mouth. I didn't mention anything about
: ideology. My belief is that dictatorships are a bad investment (e.g.
: the Shah of Iran). Any form of government that does not enjoy the
: support of its citizens is a bad investment because it is unstable.
: On the other hand, democracies are a good investment. They are
: stable forms of government, they make good trading partners, and
: they don't start wars with other democracies.
Except that your theory collpases with the counter-example of China and
South Korea among others. You were originally right though. It is
real-politik all the way down. Sometimes it is real-foreign-politik,
in other cases it is real-domestik-politik, in others still it is
real-elektoral-politik. Among those somewhere you will find the reason
for the continuous support for Israel and explanation of why US policy
sometimes appears ideology-based, sometimes ethics-based, sometimes
economy-based, sometimes securiry-based and sometimes naught-based.
To be honest here, there seems to be one single criterion that US
policy is consistent about for better or for worse, namely requiring
allies to move towards a market-based economy, but that may be related
to real-ekonomik-politik.
Regards,
Alaa Zeineldine
PS. sorry for all the terminology.
: --
Adam L. Schwartz
>That's just it. It IS in the U.S.' interest to support the "dictorial
>regimes of the Arab states", and their opposition to "the West for
>ideological reasons" don't play a role in determining this. Why do
>you think Saddam Hussein is still in power? And Israel has decided that
>it was in its best interests to make a treaty with the PLO.
This is a wee-bit over-simplified, don't you think? If the U.S. wanted to
support Saddam Hussein I doubt we would have launched desert storm. Saddam
is still in power because he provides a counterbalance to Iran, a country
run by Islamic extremists. So we didn't want to do away with him altogether.
Plus, if we eliminated Saddam Hussein, who knows who would take his place.
Certainly not a democratically elected official!
Christopher Stone
>In article <2el0vr$r...@scunix2.harvard.edu> cst...@husc7.harvard.edu (Christopher Stone) writes:
>>In article <1993Dec14.0...@midway.uchicago.edu> ri...@midway.uchicago.edu writes:
>>
>>>I think it's time the people, on *both* sides, who talk about justice
>>>or moral claims realized something: international politics is *NEVER*
>>
>>I'm glad you brought up the point of power politics. Let's
>>proceed on the assumption that you are correct and that international
>>relations is entirely a power game played on the basis of conflicting
>>national interests.
>>Could you please tell us why it is in the national interest of the
>>*United States* to continue to subsidize Israel to the tune of $3
>>billion per year?
>The United States made the original decision to subsidize Israel
>because (a) American Jews were getting pushy at election time, so
>it was in the interests of the acting politicians
Sorry, but right there, you demonstrate that you *really* don't believe in
the theory of realpolitik. True practicioners of realpolitik contend that
domestic politics is irrelevant to international relations, that what
happens *inside* states has nothing to do with relations *between* states.
Not so, you object, IMHO correctly. I am not a believer in realpolitik.
>>As an aside, your arguments about national interests do apply
>>in the case of Israel's conflicts with Syria, Jordan, and other
>>Arab states, but a lot of people think of the Israeli-Palestinian
>>conflict as an internal, and not a transnational, conflict.
>The Palestinians would not thank you for claiming they aren't a
>separate nation.
Well, I don't think they would thank you for your arguments either.
But in any case, I do not claim they are a separate nation.
They are clearly a separate nation, IMHO. But as things stand,
they are not a separate *state*. The terms "state" and "nation"
are not synonymous; the first is a political unit, the second an ethnic
one.
For example, the Zulus are a separate nation within the state of South
Africa. The Quebecers are a separate nation within the state of Canada.
The Walloons are a separate nation within the state of Belgium.
When we look to all these examples of communal conflict, we treat them as
internal conflicts, and not transnational ones, because they take place
within the borders of a single state. And when we look at DOMESTIC
politics -- as opposed to when we look at international politics, justice
is clearly an issue. Why? International politics takes place in a milieu
of anarchy: there is no sovereign international body. Within domestic
politics, the government is presumably sovereign, although perhaps weakly
so where communal conflict exists.
Of course, in the Palestinian case, as in the other cases of communal
strife, one option is to create a state for the Palestinian nation. When
that comes to pass, then I will grant that issues of justice should be
secondary, if not eliminated altogether, for they will become
transnational in nature. All of this is perfectly consistent with
realpolitik, in which you purport to believe -- although I have my doubts
that you really believe in realpolitik, for the reasons above.
>...political groups of sufficient
>size and organization to function in the international arena work
>much the way nations do for all practical purposes.
I assume you mean "state" when you say nation. If so, the above statement
*conclusively* proves you do not believe in realpolitik. Realpolitik says
there is a substantive difference between organizations and states, as one
operates in a sovereign milieu, the other in an anarchic on.
E. Elizabeth Bartley
aald...@copper.denver.colorado.edu (Shaqeeqa) writes:
>In article <2el8s5$q...@agate.berkeley.edu>
>ad...@liszt.eecs.berkeley.edu (Adam L. Schwartz) writes:
>>The U.S. already gives Egypt over $2 billion per year and that doesn't buy
>>us much. In any case, I don't think it behooves the U.S. to support the
>>dictatorial regimes of the Arab states. Especially those that are opposed
>>to the West for ideological reasons.
>That's just it. It IS in the U.S.' interest to support the "dictorial
>regimes of the Arab states",
Why? Doesn't look that way to me.
>and their opposition to "the West for
>ideological reasons" don't play a role in determining this.
HUH?
It's in a country's best interests to see that its natural allies
(read: the countries who want the same results) are strong and that
its natural enemies (read: the countries who want the opposite of what
it wants) are weak.
--
- E. Elizabeth Bartley "I believe that Western civilization, after some
disgusting glitches, has become almost civilized. I believe it is our first
duty to protect that civilization. I believe it is our second duty to improve
it. I believe it is our third duty to extend it if we can." - P. J. O'Rourke
marwan gharaybeh
>The U.S. already gives Egypt over $2 billion per year and that doesn't buy
>us much.
Wrong ... Egypt participated in the gulf war alongside the americans while
hitting Israel was the only WINNING card saddam played. This proves not
only that Israel is both a strategic and economic burden on the US but it
also shows that the US is getting its money's worth from its arab allies.
One more thing I would like to mention is that those $2 billion were not
primarly intended to be as economic aid to a "close" US ally, rather they
were intended to relief israel from worrying about the most powerfull arab
state. So adding these $2 billion to the $4.5 billion that the US is already
paying would make a total of $6.5 billion payment to Israel, since there are
only about 4 million israelis, uncle Sam pays each citizin of the jewish state
about $1500 every new year's eve, aren't the homeless in the US more worthy
of these $1500 after this freezing christmas ?!!
--Marwan
Christopher Stone
>Christopher Stone writes:
>>Adam L. Schwartz writes:
>
>|>In any case, I don't think it behooves the U.S. to support the
>|>dictatorial regimes of the Arab states.
>
>>Oh, so suddenly our good practicioners of realpolitik are telling
>>us that the United States should not support Arab states because
>>they are dictatorial. That is, you are claiming that we should
>>select our alliance partners for *IDEOLOGICAL* reasons -- for
>>their adherence to liberal democratic values.
>
>You are putting words into my mouth. I didn't mention anything about
>ideology.
You a) talked about "dictatorial regimes," which implies a (proper)
respect for the ideology of freedom, and b) you pointificated
ant length about the virtues of human rights and lack of said rights
in the Arab states.
Well, true practicioners of realpolitik would not argue that
regime type makes an iota of difference. Dictatorial or democratic
states can both be threats, they would say. Human rights and democracy
make no difference if you practice realpolitik.
>My belief is that dictatorships are a bad investment (e.g.
>the Shah of Iran). Any form of government that does not enjoy the
>support of its citizens is a bad investment because it is unstable.
>On the other hand, democracies are a good investment.
The above implies that democracies are inherently stable, and that
dictatorships are inherently instable. However, we find numerous
examples of unstable democracies (Russia, Spain prior to 1982 or so,
E. Europe, etc.) and examples of stable dictatorships (North Korea,
the Gulf Sheikhdoms, etc). There is little correlation of the two.
In fact, prior to the intifada, one might argue that Israel, with
the conflict between Orthdox and non-observant Jews, was becoming
an unstable democracy.
marwan gharaybeh
>David O Hunt writes:
>
>>Then that's $5 billion sent overseas that we could cut from the federal
>>budget.
>
>Even if you don't agree, 80% of the money is spent here in America so
>the actual monetary cost is only $1 billion---noise compared to the
>federal budget which is over $1 trillion.
So the total goods, services and money is still $5 billion ... What is your
point? just sounds stupid that you underemphasized the 80% while
overemphasizing the 20%.
>Personally, I think the money is well spent because it promotes peace
>and stability. That's in America's interest.
Yeah right paying israel promotes peace ... Jonathan pollard probably might
have said the same thing ... Israel now has nuclear powers thanks to "loyal"
american citizins like pollard and the like, next thing you know, Israel will
direct its missiles towards New York city ... Israelis are known for biting
the hands that feed them. As an example consider how vigorously they attacked
the british ... those that were awarded the pattent for "inventing" Israel.
--Marwan
Naomi Gayle Rivkis
>>Naomi Gayle Rivkis
>>
>>The U.S. already gives Egypt over $2 billion per year and that doesn't buy
>>us much.
Get your attributions right. I didn't write this.
>--Marwan
Naomi Gayle Rivkis
>In article <1993Dec14.2...@midway.uchicago.edu> ri...@midway.uchicago.edu writes:
>>In article <2el0vr$r...@scunix2.harvard.edu> cst...@husc7.harvard.edu (Christopher Stone) writes:
>>>In article <1993Dec14.0...@midway.uchicago.edu> ri...@midway.uchicago.edu writes:
>>>
>>>>I think it's time the people, on *both* sides, who talk about justice
>>>>or moral claims realized something: international politics is *NEVER*
>>>>decided on moral claims. It's decided on raw power...
>>>
>>>I'm glad you brought up the point of power politics. Let's
>>>proceed on the assumption that you are correct and that international
>>>relations is entirely a power game played on the basis of conflicting
>>>national interests.
>
>>>Could you please tell us why it is in the national interest of the
>>>*United States* to continue to subsidize Israel to the tune of $3
>>>billion per year?
>
>>The United States made the original decision to subsidize Israel
>>because (a) American Jews were getting pushy at election time, so
>>it was in the interests of the acting politicians
>
>Sorry, but right there, you demonstrate that you *really* don't believe in
>the theory of realpolitik. True practicioners of realpolitik contend that
>domestic politics is irrelevant to international relations, that what
>happens *inside* states has nothing to do with relations *between* states.
>
>Not so, you object, IMHO correctly. I am not a believer in realpolitik.
I believe in *realism*. This is not a doctrine, it's simple recognition
that people do what's best for themselves most of the time, whether indi-
vidually or in groups, and that the most effective way of getting them to
do something which you want them to do is not to appeal to their moral
sensitivities, but to see to it that it is in their self-interest to do
so, and then to illustrate to them how this is so. I was *not* the one
to mention "realpolitik"; somebody else brought in that.
>Of course, in the Palestinian case, as in the other cases of communal
>strife, one option is to create a state for the Palestinian nation. When
>that comes to pass, then I will grant that issues of justice should be
>secondary, if not eliminated altogether, for they will become
>transnational in nature. All of this is perfectly consistent with
>realpolitik, in which you purport to believe -- although I have my doubts
>that you really believe in realpolitik, for the reasons above.
I never "purported" anything of the kind. Please go back and reread
the thread. I *never* call myself an adherent of any specific political
doctrine aside from very rare cases when I still don't mean it but it's
politically useful to do so. Someone else attributed the term to me; I
didn't fight it because I had neither the time nor the interest.
Bob Another beer, please Christ
Ah ha, now proof postive that there's a Zionist conspiracy to take
over the media in this country!
Where's Jack Schmidling when you need him?
Bob "Let's see how many I hook with this one" Christ
---
This person is currently under going electric shock therapy at Agnews
Developmental Center in San Jose, California. All his opinions are
static, please ignore him.
Thank you, Nurse Ratched
Gabriel Etinzon
> Naomi wrote something about taking the article to her journalism class.
>
> Ah ha, now proof postive that there's a Zionist conspiracy to take
> over the media in this country!
>
The conspiracy ended formally the 5th November 1992. The elders decided that
the task was finished successfully. Only some of the big chiefs stayed to
make sure that it never fells again to the hands of unclean goyim.
Eric S. Perlman
>>
>>The U.S. already gives Egypt over $2 billion per year and that doesn't buy
>>us much.
>
>Wrong ... Egypt participated in the gulf war alongside the americans while
>hitting Israel was the only WINNING card saddam played. This proves not
>only that Israel is both a strategic and economic burden on the US but it
>also shows that the US is getting its money's worth from its arab allies.
This argument is so laughable it deserves to make Saturday night Live.
Iraq's attacking Israel was a *winning* card? Do you realize how much
restraint Israel used in staying out of the war? And only one person
died from all those missile attacks. By attacking Israel, Saddam
wanted to achieve 2 things. (1) To bring Israel into the war so as to
swing the Arab countries which had allied themselves with the coalition
to his side. and (2) To kill as many Israelis as possible. He failed
miserably in the first, and he only killed ONE, yes 1, Israeli with his
dozens of attacks.
>One more thing I would like to mention is that those $2 billion were not
>primarly intended to be as economic aid to a "close" US ally, rather they
>were intended to relief israel from worrying about the most powerfull arab
>state.
Utter, complete Bull puckey, exactly what the net has come to expect
from Marwan Gharaybeh.
> So adding these $2 billion to the $4.5 billion that the US is already
>paying would make a total of $6.5 billion payment to Israel, since there are
>only about 4 million israelis, uncle Sam pays each citizin of the jewish state
>about $1500 every new year's eve, aren't the homeless in the US more worthy
>of these $1500 after this freezing christmas ?!!
Your logic here is faulty. It has been proven faulty so many ways that
I won't repeat them again. As usual, Gharaybeh is full of it.
--
"How sad to see/A model of decorum and tranquillity/become like any other sport
A battleground for rival ideologies to slug it out with glee." -Tim Rice,"Chess"
Eric S. Perlman <per...@qso.colorado.edu>
Center for Astrophysics and Space Astronomy, University of Colorado, Boulder
Adam L. Schwartz
> [same idiotic banter which we discussed only a couple of weeks ago]
Tsk, tsk. Marwan, your not going to get me to waste my time rehashing the
exact same arguments we just had. You lost badly last time. Why do you
want to start again?
Serdar Argic
>This argument is so laughable it deserves to make Saturday night Live.
Well, well, well. Look, who is back? 'perlmanian the pathological liar'.
First you SDPA crook discuss your non-existent literature tastes, then
your B.S. and fantasies, and now your choices of entertainment. Have you
considered just turning on the 'arromdian' TV and leaving those of us
who aren't brain dead to continue to discuss the Armenian genocide
of the Muslim people? You "wieneramus" even deny the obvious.
Source: Stanford J. Shaw, on Armenian collaboration with invading Russian
armies in 1914, "History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (Volume
II: Reform, Revolution & Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975)."
(London, Cambridge University Press 1977). pp. 315-316.
"In April 1915 Dashnaks from Russian Armenia organized a revolt in the city
of Van, whose 33,789 Armenians comprised 42.3 percent of the population,
closest to an Armenian majority of any city in the Empire...Leaving Erivan
on April 28, 1915, Armenian volunteers reached Van on May 14 and organized
and carried out a general slaughter of the local Muslim population during
the next two days."
>
The SUNDAY TIMES 8 March 1992
>
Morgues fill as Azeris head for all-out war
-------------------------------------------
>
Thomas Goltz, the first to report the massacre by Armenian soldiers in
the worst violence since the breakup of the Soviet Union, reports from
Agdam
------
>
Khojaly used to be a barren town, with empty shops and treeless dirt
roads. Yet it was still home to thousands of people who, in happier
times, tended fields and flocks of geese. Last week it was wiped off
the map.
>
.......
>
As sickening reports trickled in to the Azerbaijani border town of
Agdam, and the bodies piled up in the morgues, there was little doubt
that Khojaly and the stark foothills and gullies around it had been
the site of the most terrible massacre since the Soviet Union broke
apart.
.......
>
I was the last Westerner to visit Khojaly. That was in january and
people were predicting their fate with grim resignation. Zumrut Ezoya,
a mother of four on board the helicopter that ferried us into the
town, called her community "sitting ducks, ready to get shot". She and
her family were among the victims of the massacre on February 26.
.......
>
"The Armenians have taken all the outlying villages, one by one, and
the government does nothing." Balakisi Sakikov, 55, a father of five,
said. "Next they will drive us out or kill us all," said Dilbar, his
wife. The couple, their three sons and three daughters were killed in
the assault, as were many other people I had spoken to.
......
>
"It was close to the Armenian lines we knew we would have to cross.
There was a road, and the first units of the column ran across then
all hell broke loose. Bullets were raining down from all sides. we had
just entered their trap."
>
The azeri defenders picked off one by one. Survivors say that Armenian
forces then began a pitiless slaughter, firing at anything moved in
the gullies. A video taken by an azeri cameraman, wailing and crying
as he filmed body after body, showed a grizzly trail of death leading
towards higher, forested ground where the villagers had sought refuge
from the Armenians.
>
"The Armenians just shot and shot and shot," said Omar Veyselov, lying
in hospital in Agdam with sharapnel wounds. "I saw my wife and
daughter fall right by me."
>
People wandered through the hospital corridors looking for news of the
loved ones. Some vented their fury on foreigners: " Where is my
daughter, where is my son ?" wailed a mother. "Raped. Butchered. Lost."
>
Azerbaijan has said as many as 1,000 refugees were killed as they
tried to flee.
.......
>
<<These Crusaders left in their wake new 'blood libel' and 'desecration
of host' passions which in turn led to later attacks on the surviving
Jewish communities wherever there was even the slightest rumor which
provided a pretext and rallying cry. The spread of the Black Death
throughout Western Europe, particularly between 1348 and 1350, provided
a new pretext to blame Jews for catastrophe, in this case with the story
that they poisoned water supplies to cause the plague and wipe out
Christianity, with the hope that by persecuting them its spread would be
checked [8]. Many Jews who survived were ultimately allowed to resettle
in their old homes, but invariably in worse terms than before [9]. The
Black Death and the resulting pogroms not only caused deaths and
destruction of homes and shops of thousands of Jews, thus, but also
intensified the popular Christian stereotypes of the Jews, many of which
have remained the basis for anti-semitism in modern times.
There often were massacres, as for example in Frankfurt in 1241, Munich
in 1285-6 [10] and Amleder in 1336 [11]. Expulsions had been carried out
in earlier centuries, but they always had been limited both in time and
area. But now as royal authority extended more widely in each kingdom,
so also did the expulsions become more permanent and extensive. Now there
were sudden and violent deportations, sometimes for very long periods of
time. They began in England, strangely enough the last country of Western
Christandom to admit Jews, starting with the decree of Edward I issued
on 18 July 1290, which was enforced for almost four centuries, until
1650 [12]. In France, Louis IX (1226-1270) enforced the decrees of the
Fourth Lateran Council with great severity, decreeing the expulsion of all
Jews from his kingdom as he left for the first Crusade in 1249. Philip the
Fair (1285-1314) ordered all French Jews to be arrested (July 1306),
following this up with a decree condemning them to expulsion and
confiscation of their property, though this later was revoked by his
successor. Charles IV expelled the Jews again in 1322, and it was only
due to a financial crisis in 1359 that they were admitted again. In 1380
and 1382 there were riots against the Jews in Paris, and starting in 1394
they were expelled again, this time not to return for centuries, in some
areas not until the start of the French Revolution four centuries later[13].
Jews were excluded from Russia from the fifteenth century until 1772,
when masses of Jews were included as a result of the Russian annexation
of Poland and Lithuania. They were banned from Hungary after 1376 [14],
from Naples in 1510-1511, and from almost anywhere in Germany in the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, though in some cases because of its
lack of unity these deportations were temporary and local at best, with
Jews simply going from one locality to another, and then ultimately
returning to their original homes as time passed and the deportation
decrees were annulled or forgotten by political and religious leaders
who saw their own incomes falling in the absence of their Jewish advisors.
Thing were no better in Byzantium. Byzantine Jews were nominally free to
follow their own faith, but just as the Romans had reduced Jews to no more
than subject status, so also Byzantines excluded Jews from rights of full
citizenship. The motives of Romans were mainly political; but Byzantines
were moved also by religious reasons as well. From their absolute
conviction, taught by the Greek Orthodox Church, that the Jews were
condemned by God for rejecting his Word and for the Unforgivable Crime
of killing Jesus Christ, it was logical to conclude that the Jews ought to
be punished by God's new chosen people, the Christians, by being subjected
to various restrictions.>>
[8] 'France', EJ VII, 16. 'Germany', EJ VI, 468.
[9] J. Trachtenberg, The Devil and the Jews (1961), 97-108. P. Ziegler,
Black Death (1969). 'Black Death', EJ IV, 1063-1068.
[10] 'Germany', EJ VI, 467. The Jewish Encyclopedia: New Edition III
(New York, 1925), 266. Zunz, Synagogale Poesie des Mittelalters, 33.
Mom.Germ. XI. 210, 872, XVII, 415. A. M. Hebermann, ed., Sefer
Gezerot Ashkenaz ve-Zarefat (1946), 199. 'Blood-libel', EJ (Jerusalem,
1972) IV, 1122. Stobbe, Die Juden in Deutschland, 282.
[11] 'Germany', EJ VI, 468.
[12] 'England', EJ VI, 751-752.
[13] S.A. Rozanes, History of the Jews in Turkey (in Hebrew) (2nd edition,
Sofia, 1930-38), 11, 128; Barisa Krekic, Dubrovnik in the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Centuries (Norman, Oklahoma, 1972), 30. 'France',
EJ VII, 17.
[14] EJ [Encyclopaedia Judaica] VI, 469.
Serdar Argic
'We have never denied the Armenian crime of
genocide inflicted upon 2.5 million Muslim
people between 1914 and 1920.' (Agop Zahoryan)
'In Soviet Armenia today there no longer exists
a single Turkish soul.' (Sahak Melkonian)
Serdar Argic
>Tsk, tsk. Marwan, your not going to get me to waste my time rehashing the
>exact same arguments we just had. You lost badly last time. Why do you
>want to start again?
Given your level of understanding, why not? Besides, if you
don't see the 'subject line/content', then you are suffering
from a severe case of myopia at best. The Armenians sorely
feel a missing glory in their background. Armenians have
never achieved statehood and independence, they have
always been subservient, and engaged in undermining schemes
against their rulers. They committed genocide against the
Muslim population of x-Soviet Armenia and Eastern Anatolia
before and during World War I and fully participated in the
extermination of the European Jewry during World War II.
Belligerence, genocide, back-stabbing, rebelliousness and
disloyalty have been the hallmarks of the Armenian history.
To obliterate these episodes the Armenians engaged in tailoring
history to suit their whims. In this zeal they tried to cover
up the cold-blooded genocide of 2.5 million Muslim people in
x-Soviet Armenia and Eastern Anatolia between 1914 and 1920.
And, you don't pull nations out of a hat.
During the First World War and the ensuing years - 1914-1920,
the Armenian Dictatorship through a premeditated and systematic
genocide, tried to complete its centuries-old policy of
annihilation against the Turks and Kurds by savagely murdering
2.5 million Muslims and deporting the rest from their 1,000 year
homeland.
The scenario and genocide staged by the Armenians against 2.5 million
Muslim people 78 years ago in X-Soviet Armenia and Eastern Anatolia
is being reenacted again - this time in Azerbaijan. There are remarkable
similarities between the plots, the perpetrators, and the underdogs.
In addition, Nakhicevan and its Azeri population of about 300,000 have
been under virtual siege since 1988. Armenians exterminated 204,000 Azeri
people between 1988 and 1992 and 10% of Azeri soil is now occupied by the
fascist x-Soviet Armenian Government. Moreover, Armenians are in the process
of exterminating the entire Muslim population of Karabag.
Milliyet, March 4 1992, p. 1, by Altan OYMEN
IT'S INHUMANE TO IGNORE THIS VIOLENCE
The stories of survivors of Karabag massacre are in Milliyet today.
69 year old Hatin Nine telling:
-''My Twin grandchildren were cut to pieces in front of my eyes. They told
me: We won't kill you. But the babies have to die in front of your eyes.''
72 year old Huseyin Ibrahimoglu:
- ''Our Turkish village in Khojalu Town was blown up in two hours.
While killing children and babies mercilessly they said: You are
Turks, you must die.''
28 year old Gulsum Huseyin:
- ''They bayonetted my 3 year old daughter in her stomach in front of
my eyes.''
Are these stories lies? Have the eye-witnesses been day-dreaming?
Were these stories forged by Turkish journalists in the region?
The nonsense of such a claim is clear from the writings of British
Journalists, too. Two days before we had quoted from a Sunday Times
article. They[British] reported the events in Karabag even before
Turkish journalists. What is more here are the pictures. Pictures
of people who were bayonetted, whose eyes were gouged, ears cut off.
Even the Armenian Radio couldn't claim these "lies." They are saying
"exaggeration." That means ''somethings'' have happened but the
situation is not as bad as reported. Perhaps that village of Khojalu
town was destroyed in 4 hours, instead of 2... Or Gulsum Huseyin's
3 year old daughter was bayonetted in her chest instead of stomach...
The massacre is clearly seen with all its dimensions. The effects of
this massacre on Karabag and environs cannot be reduced by any word.
Some of the western press', led by some French Newspapers, ability
to ''close their eyes'' is nothing but complicity in this massacre.
Yesterday we gave samples from Le Figaro. Until yesterday's print
no news about the real events in Karabag were printed. So were the
French TV channels.. The subject they considered related to Karabag
was ''The necessity of protecting Armenians against Azeri attacks.''
The age we are living in is termed a human rights age. There are lots
of organizations such as United Nations and CSCE(Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe), and rules, all designed to fight against human
rights violations. International reactions must be made with international
cooperation. With support of everybody and every organization claiming
to be civilized.
Could there be a more serious human rights violation than that of the
right to live -and with such levels of barbarity and cruelty-? Where
is the cooperation? Where are the reactions? And the intellectuals,
journalists, writers, TV stations of certain western countries such
as France who are fast to claim leadership of "human rights?"
Where are you?
Christopher Stone
>I think it's time the people, on *both* sides, who talk about justice
>or moral claims realized something: international politics is *NEVER*
>decided on moral claims. It's decided on raw power and on traded value
>for value if both groups prefer that to exercising raw power (which is
>usually second choice, since it costs too much if trading is possible).
I'm glad you brought up the point of power politics. Let's
proceed on the assumption that you are correct and that international
relations is entirely a power game played on the basis of conflicting
national interests.
Could you please tell us why it is in the national interest of the
*United States* to continue to subsidize Israel to the tune of $3
billion per year? Conceivably we could cut a deal with certain Arab
states to meet our security arrangements in the region at much less
cost? Remember, we're talking national interests here.
[As an aside, your arguments about national interests do apply
in the case of Israel's conflicts with Syria, Jordan, and other
Arab states, but a lot of people think of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict as an internal, and not a transnational, conflict.]
Christopher Stone
>The reality of things is (appropriately) called "Realpolitik" - all
>relations between countries are based on self-interest and not on ethics.
>Anyone thinking otherwise is a romantic fool headed for disappointment.
There are serious arguments in international relations theory against
realpolitik. However, let us proceed on the assumption that you
are correct and that all international relations is decided on the
basis of realpolitik and competing national interests.
1) Kindly explain to us how it lies in the national interest of the
United States to continue to send large amount of foreign aid
to Israel, especially after the end of the Cold War;
2) Explain how you classify the Israel-Palestinian dispute as
a transnational conflict, rather than an internal, communal
conflict similar to communal conflict in the former Soviet Union,
Nigeria, South Africa, and elsewhere. Again, I agree that the
Israel-Syrian dispute, and disputes between Israel and other Arab
states are transnational conflicts, but I'm not sure we can classify
the Israel-Palestinian dispute as such, as they both count
the same territory as their homeland.
Adam L. Schwartz
>Naomi Rivkis writes:
>
|>I think it's time the people, on *both* sides, who talk about justice
|>or moral claims realized something: international politics is *NEVER*
|>decided on moral claims. It's decided on raw power and on traded value
|>for value if both groups prefer that to exercising raw power (which is
|>usually second choice, since it costs too much if trading is possible).
>Could you please tell us why it is in the national interest of the
>*United States* to continue to subsidize Israel to the tune of $3
>billion per year? Conceivably we could cut a deal with certain Arab
>states to meet our security arrangements in the region at much less
>cost? Remember, we're talking national interests here.
The U.S. already gives Egypt over $2 billion per year and that doesn't buy
us much. In any case, I don't think it behooves the U.S. to support the
dictatorial regimes of the Arab states. Especially those that are opposed
to the West for ideological reasons.
--
Christopher Stone
>>Sorry, but right there, you demonstrate that you *really* don't believe in
>>the theory of realpolitik. True practicioners of realpolitik contend that
>>domestic politics is irrelevant to international relations, that what
>>happens *inside* states has nothing to do with relations *between* states.
>I believe in *realism*. This is not a doctrine,
Wrong-O. It is in fact a very well codified doctrine, written by people
such as Hans Morgenthau, practiced by people such as Metternich,
Churchill, and Kissenger. And below, you say that realism "is a simple
reocgition that people do what's best for themselves most of the time,
whether individually or in groups." That presupposes, does it not, that
states can sit down and rationally analyze what is in their best
interests? In fact -- as you recognized by pointing out the influence
that groups such as AIPAC exert on the policymaking process here in the
USA -- we *don't*, on the state level, decide what's best by a strict
cost-benefit analysis of interests. Rather, different groups *within* a
given state compete to have their preferences satisfied, and what emerges
does not necessarily coincide with what would be best, strategically, for
both sides.
There are other plausible -- I won't be so bold as to insist they are
correct -- paradigms for international politics than realism. I've
mentioned one above, but I'm not writing a book here, so if you want to
know more, you'll have to do some reading. :)
And another thing: let us assume that you are right about realism.
Please explain to us how realism is even applicable to the situation we
have been discussing -- the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. That conflict
is not a interstate conflict, as it takes place within the boundaries of a
single political unit, Israel. Presumably the doctrine of realism cannot
apply when communal conflict takes places within a single political unit.
Why? Realism presupposes international anarchy -- the lack of any
sovereign, worldwide institution. Within a given state, however,
presumably the state is sovereign and therefore anarchy does not exist.
(Admittedly, its sovereignty over the group in question may extend only to
a limited degree, but I would argue it is still sovereign at least to a
minimal level.)
>it's simple recognition
>that people do what's best for themselves most of the time, whether indi-
>vidually or in groups,
The problem here is that you are anthropomorphizing the state -- assigning
it qualities which realy can be found only in individuals. As autonomous
actors, individuals can rationally decide what they believe is in their
interests. States cannot, because they are composed of many individuals,
many of whom will have competing ideas of what les in the best interest of
the state. (AIPAC and George Bush probably have different ideas about
what lies in the best interests of the USA, for example.) The final
outcome, foreign policy-wise, depends on which group prevails within the
domestic political system. For more info, see Graham Allison's famous
paper "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis."
Also, the above assumes that individuals are always capable of defining
what is in their best interests, which is a questionable assumption.
Misperception lurks everywhere, particularly when we have a lack of
reliable information.
and that the most effective way of getting them to
>do something which you want them to do is not to appeal to their moral
>sensitivities, but to see to it that it is in their self-interest to do
>so, and then to illustrate to them how this is so. I was *not* the one
>to mention "realpolitik"; somebody else brought in that.
I think you are playing semantic games if you say that realism is not the
same as realpolitik. If it looks like a duck and quacks like a duck...
>I never "purported" anything of the kind [believing in realpolitik].
>Please go back and reread
>the thread. I *never* call myself an adherent of any specific political
>doctrine aside from very rare cases when I still don't mean it but it's
>politically useful to do so. Someone else attributed the term to me; I
>didn't fight it because I had neither the time nor the interest.
Sorry, but if you ascribe to the doctrine of realism, which IMHO is
synonymous with realipolitik, you are accepting certain assumptions which
have been well codified by political scientists. Hell, you even delineate
these assumptions for us: the stuff about national interests. Implicit in
the assumptions about national interests are assumptions about the way
states work and so on, which I will not hash out once again.
You have also completely dropped my points about interstate versus
intrastate conflicts.
Adam L. Schwartz
>You have also completely dropped my points about interstate versus
>intrastate conflicts.
My perception was that this point was sufficiently irrelevant that it needn't
be responded to. So what if the Palestinians are not a separate "state".
They are a separate interest group and Naomi was arguing that groups make
ultimately make decisions based on their aggregate self-interest.
Jake Livni
>In fact, prior to the intifada, one might argue that Israel, with
>the conflict between Orthdox and non-observant Jews, was becoming
>an unstable democracy.
Is the unstable Israeli democracy before the Intifada something like
the unstable American democracy before the Democrats ousted the
Bible-bashing, homophobic, anti-abortion Repubicans from the White
House? Or are you being all wrong again?
Religious and philosophical differences in democracies such as exist
in Western Europe or North America or Israel are not nearly as
destabilizing as they are in autocracies and dictatorships such as
exist throughout the Arab world.
--
Jake Livni "Imagine: Palestineans were taught to hate from childhood.
ja...@bony1.bony.com That was seen as good for the national interest.
My opinions only - In fact, it was rather negative; a lot of violence
- employer has no opinions. took place." - The Dalai Lama, NY Times 93/11/28
Christopher Stone
>In article <2eovlf$b...@scunix2.harvard.edu> cst...@husc8.harvard.edu (Christopher Stone) writes:
>
>>In fact, prior to the intifada, one might argue that Israel, with
>>the conflict between Orthdox and non-observant Jews, was becoming
>>an unstable democracy.
>
>Is the unstable Israeli democracy before the Intifada something like
>the unstable American democracy before the Democrats ousted the
>Bible-bashing, homophobic, anti-abortion Repubicans from the White
>House? Or are you being all wrong again?
Please tell me when I have been wrong before :)
No, I am using measurable criteria to account for variables such as
stability. I voted for Bill Clinton, but it ought to be obvious that the
U.S. was a stable democracy under Reagan and has been ever since the Civil
War, except perhaps for African-Americans in the South until the Voting
Rights Act. We can define a democracy as "a political system in which
leaders are chosen by competitive and fair elections in which a large
percentage of the adult population is eligible to vote."
We thus have two criteria by which to measure democracy: participation and
competition. In Saudi Arabia, for instance, there is low participation
and low compettition. In apartheid South Africa, there was competition,
but low participation. In the USSR, there was lots of participation, but
no competition.
Within democratic states, we can determine which states are more
democratic than others: Scandinavia probably comes out on top, followed by
parts of Europe, the USA, states such as Italy, Israel, Japan, Latin American
democracies, and so on.
I think stability is a bit harder to measure (and please remember it is
distinct from democracy), but signs of low stability in democratic
states would include a proliferation of political parties, some of which
advocate fascism or nationalism; national unity governments; and low
levels of rights accorded to groups engaged in communal conflicts.
Hence we see that the former USSR is very unstable. Israel is slightly
unstable (I distinctly remember, for example, a suggestion in the
Jerusalem Post in 1987 that if the Orthodox-secular split were not resolved,
it could lead to civil war). The USA is extremely stable, and Scandinavia
even more so.
>Religious and philosophical differences in democracies such as exist
>in Western Europe or North America or Israel are not nearly as
>destabilizing as they are in autocracies and dictatorships such as
>exist throughout the Arab world.
Regimes in Europe and North America are more stable than the regime in
Israel (with the important exception of Italy). There are no national
unity governments in European states, for example, as there was in Israel
prior to 1988. Israel is clearly more stable than lots of Arab regimes,
such as Saddam Hussein's, Mubarak's, and King Hussein's. I hypothesize
that Israel slightly less stable, and more democratic, than some of the
Gulf Sheikhdoms and Saudi Arabia.
I am wondering what causal linkages you propose might prompt philosophical
and religious conflict to be more dangerous in dictatorships than in
democracies.
Dorin Baru
>No, I am using measurable criteria to account for variables such as
>stability. I voted for Bill Clinton, but it ought to be obvious that the
>U.S. was a stable democracy under Reagan and has been ever since the Civil
>War, except perhaps for African-Americans in the South until the Voting
>Rights Act.
I agree with you, however I do not understand why you have to tell us, in
this context, that you voted for Clinton; Sounds deffensive, like you would
like to make your case stronger.
>Regimes in Europe and North America are more stable than the regime in
>Israel (with the important exception of Italy)
It depends. In a way, Italy was the most stable for the last 50 years (Europe),
the same political party having the majority in the government (no matter
how often the prime minister was changed). Italy was very stable (entertaining
also).
Dorin
Richard D Thorne
prelude to silly statements on stable democracies deleted:
>
> There is little correlation of the two.
>In fact, prior to the intifada, one might argue that Israel, with
>the conflict between Orthdox and non-observant Jews, was becoming
>an unstable democracy.
>--
> ////// // // ////// // ////// Christopher Stone
Anyone who could think that horse trading of Israeli democracy made
Israeli politics so "unstable" as to threaten it's democratic structures
is without even the slightest shred of inteligence. Why don't you just
print a lie, it would be more honest.
Richard
asia z lerner
>
>We thus have two criteria by which to measure democracy: participation and
>competition. In Saudi Arabia, for instance, there is low participation
>and low compettition. In apartheid South Africa, there was competition,
>but low participation. In the USSR, there was lots of participation, but
>no competition.
>
>Within democratic states, we can determine which states are more
>democratic than others: Scandinavia probably comes out on top, followed by
>parts of Europe, the USA, states such as Italy, Israel, Japan, Latin American
>democracies, and so on.
>
Care to explain why Israel comes after US in either participation OR
competition? Do you HAVE the figures for Scandinavia, or is it an assumption
that people there participate / compete more?
>I think stability is a bit harder to measure (and please remember it is
>distinct from democracy)
Certainly - it's opposed to competition, which you earlier used to define
democracy by.
, but signs of low stability in democratic
>states would include a proliferation of political parties, some of which
>advocate fascism or nationalism;
Spoken as a true two-party chauvinist. If there are lots of parties but
no instability in terms of turn-over of the groups in authority, than
clearly a large number of parties is NOT a sign of instability. It is
clearly a positive sign for compettion, however.
national unity governments;
This is illogical to the extreme - in no way shape or form is there
any connection between the notion of instability and national unity
government. Indeed, I could very well claim that such a government
is, if anything a sign of stability.
Israel is slightly
>unstable (I distinctly remember, for example, a suggestion in the
>Jerusalem Post in 1987 that if the Orthodox-secular split were not resolved,
>it could lead to civil war).
An article in a newspaper is a rather slight evidence for grand claims
of instability.
The USA is extremely stable, and Scandinavia
>even more so.
>
Kindly present figures on competition and participation in Scandinavia
and US.
>>Religious and philosophical differences in democracies such as exist
>>in Western Europe or North America or Israel are not nearly as
>>destabilizing as they are in autocracies and dictatorships such as
>>exist throughout the Arab world.
>
>Regimes in Europe and North America are more stable than the regime in
>Israel (with the important exception of Italy). There are no national
>unity governments in European states, for example, as there was in Israel
>prior to 1988.
A national government has no percievable connection to instability.
Israel is clearly more stable than lots of Arab regimes,
>such as Saddam Hussein's, Mubarak's, and King Hussein's.
Actually, King Hussein's regime is damn stable, as many found out to
their chagrine. Your criteria for stability is...
I hypothesize
>that Israel slightly less stable, and more democratic, than some of the
>Gulf Sheikhdoms and Saudi Arabia.
>
Hmmm. My hypothesis is that Israel is lots more democratic that
Saudi Arabia, but of course that's just a hypothesis.
>I am wondering what causal linkages you propose might prompt philosophical
>and religious conflict to be more dangerous in dictatorships than in
>democracies.
DEmocracies have ways to resolve such conflictes embeded in the system,
for what that's worth.
Asia
Christopher Stone
>In article <2f5hkt$6...@scunix2.harvard.edu> cst...@husc8.harvard.edu (Christopher Stone) writes:
>>Within democratic states, we can determine which states are more
>>democratic than others: Scandinavia probably comes out on top, followed by
>>parts of Europe, the USA, states such as Italy, Israel, Japan, Latin American
>>democracies, and so on.
>Care to explain why Israel comes after US in either participation OR
>competition? Do you HAVE the figures for Scandinavia, or is it an assumption
>that people there participate / compete more?
Actually I do. See Ronald Dahl's book "Polyarchy." I believe it's in the
first chapter and especially in the second chapter, "Does Poliarchy
Matter?" In fact much of what I have been writing is based on
what I liked about his work. My main complaint is that I think a third
axis for measuring democracy should be respect for individual rights,
whereas he thinks that "competition" subsumes individual rights. See also
Samuel Huntington's "The Third Wave," again in one of the introductory
chapters. This book is not only excellent from a theoretical standpoint,
but offers an impressive complilation of data. In fact, had I been
writing a formal academic paper, I would have cited these two authors in
an explicit footnote; I had thought that in the informal environment of
the net, that was not necessary. Perhaps that was an error in judgement
on my part.
>>I think stability is a bit harder to measure (and please remember it is
>>distinct from democracy)
>
>Certainly - it's opposed to competition, which you earlier used to define
>democracy by.
On the contrary, competition and stability are entirely compatible. In
fact, competition can help engender stability, as Adam Smith pointed out
two hundred years ago. Of course, competition assumes that all parties
have accepted the rules of the game, and that fringe groups attract only
minimal support from the voting public. However, competition is not
necessarily opposed to democracy, as it can have a moderating influence
and co-opt people into *supporting* the rules of the game. Stability and
democracy, then, are two distinct things.
>...signs of low stability in democratic
>>states would include a proliferation of political parties, some of which
>>advocate fascism or nationalism;
>
>Spoken as a true two-party chauvinist.
Well, you are right, to some extent. I think there's a lot to be said for a
two-party system, because the winner in an election usually has garnered a
majority of support, as opposed to a mere plurality, in elections under a
two-party system. He or she therefore has more legitimacy. (Look at all
the folks on alt.fan.rush-limbaugh who like to attack Clinton on the basis
that he only captured a plurality of votes thanks to Perot's presence in
the 1992 race.) I therefore think that two-party systems are slightly
more stable than multi-party ones (though the number of parties is not the
only criterion for stability), although the difference between stability
in the USA and, say, Canada may be negligible. Also, other criteria might
indicate Canada is more stable than the USA, again with the differences
being negligible. Another reason why two-party systems could indicate
stability is that one party has a distinct majority in the legislature and
does not need to form a coalition to govern.
However, notice I said a *proliferation* of parties, not two parties. I
hardly think that having three or four major parties constitutes a
proliferation of parties. I am talking about phenomena such as the
presence of several *hundred* parties in Poland -- they call them "sofa"
parties, because all of their members can fit on a single sofa!
>If there are lots of parties but
>no instability in terms of turn-over of the groups in authority, than
>clearly a large number of parties is NOT a sign of instability. It is
>clearly a positive sign for compettion, however.
>
>>national unity governments;
>
>This is illogical to the extreme - in no way shape or form is there
>any connection between the notion of instability and national unity
>government. Indeed, I could very well claim that such a government
>is, if anything a sign of stability.
National cohesion, I hope we can agree, contributes to stability.
However, national cohesion is probably strongest when it is taken for
granted, when it is an axiomatic background condition of society.
Conversely, when national cohesion is overtly referred to over and over
again, it probably means that in fact national unity is in doubt. Now,
when a government is formed explicitly as a "national unity" government,
it suggests that in fact the nation is united about very little in the
first place. (I exclude wartime governments such as the 1967 Israeli
national unity government from this analysis.)
Since you don't like my criteria, might I ask what standards you would use
to compare stability amongst various democratic regimes?
>Israel is slightly
>>unstable (I distinctly remember, for example, a suggestion in the
>>Jerusalem Post in 1987 that if the Orthodox-secular split were not resolved,
>>it could lead to civil war).
>
>An article in a newspaper is a rather slight evidence for grand claims
>of instability.
I hardly think that such an article in a maintstream publication would
have appeared had its claims not been being discussed in other sectors of
society at the same time. Moreover, there were other ways I suggested to
measure instability as well.
Let me make one thing clear. I am not suggesting that the Israeli
government is about to implode tomorrow. I think there was a slight
danger of that in 1986-87, with the Orthodox-secular conflict and with the
militancy of the Gush Emunim, but national cohesion increased markedly in
response to the intifada. Nor am I suggesting that Israel is less stable
than its neighboring Arab states; that would be ludicrous. I am merely
saying that not all democracies are equally stable, and amongst stable
democracies Israel is one of the less stable; it is clearly more stable
than Russia or Poland, for instance.
> The USA is extremely stable, and Scandinavia
>>even more so.
>Kindly present figures on competition and participation in Scandinavia
>and US.
Not to nit-pick, but competition and participation measure democracy,
not stability. See my references above.
>> Israel is clearly more stable than lots of Arab regimes,
>>such as Saddam Hussein's, Mubarak's, and King Hussein's.
>
>Actually, King Hussein's regime is damn stable, as many found out to
>their chagrine.
If so, then clearly stability is no reason for the US to ally with Israel!
You are right that King Hussein's government is more stable than most
people gave it credit for; it did reasonably well in "elections" against
the Islamists, if I remember correctly (and I don't remember whether these
were the long-anticipated national elections, whether they went off, or
whether these were some kind of local elections.) The Islamic opposition
still exists, however, so I judge it less stable than Israel.
>>I hypothesize
>>that Israel slightly less stable, and more democratic, than some of the
>>Gulf Sheikhdoms and Saudi Arabia.
>>
>Hmmm. My hypothesis is that Israel is lots more democratic that
>Saudi Arabia, but of course that's just a hypothesis.
Of course it's lots more democratic. The hypothesis is that it're more
stable. You are playing semantic games here, which is a favorite tactic
on this newsgroup, I admit.
Hypotheses can be wrong. Lots of people said Iran under the shah was
highly stable. That is why they are hypotheses. Still, I see no chance
for regime changes in Saudi right now, and a slight chance that folks such
as Kahane's party (I forget the name right now) could one day do well in
Israeli elections. Hence I say that Saudi is slightly more stable than
Israel, although we can reasonably disagree on this point and I might be
persuaded otherwise. Stability, to repeat, is not the same as democracy.
>>I am wondering what causal linkages you propose might prompt philosophical
>>and religious conflict to be more dangerous in dictatorships than in
>>democracies.
>
>DEmocracies have ways to resolve such conflictes embeded in the system,
>for what that's worth.
This is plausible, although I'd suggest that *stable* democracies have
ways to resolve such conflicts embedded in the system, whereas unstable
democracies such as Russia do not. Hence, it is tautological to say that
"stable democracies are inherently stable, as they can resolve conflicts
better than other governments."
asia z lerner
>In article <1993Dec23.2...@midway.uchicago.edu> azle...@midway.uchicago.edu writes:
>>
>
>>...signs of low stability in democratic
>>>states would include a proliferation of political parties, some of which
>>>advocate fascism or nationalism;
>>
>>Spoken as a true two-party chauvinist.
>
>Well, you are right, to some extent. I think there's a lot to be said for a
>two-party system, because the winner in an election usually has garnered a
>majority of support, as opposed to a mere plurality, in elections under a
>two-party system. He or she therefore has more legitimacy. (Look at all
>the folks on alt.fan.rush-limbaugh who like to attack Clinton on the basis
>that he only captured a plurality of votes thanks to Perot's presence in
>the 1992 race.) I therefore think that two-party systems are slightly
>more stable than multi-party ones (though the number of parties is not the
>only criterion for stability), although the difference between stability
>in the USA and, say, Canada may be negligible. Also, other criteria might
>indicate Canada is more stable than the USA, again with the differences
>being negligible. Another reason why two-party systems could indicate
>stability is that one party has a distinct majority in the legislature and
>does not need to form a coalition to govern.
>
WEll, perhaps, but one really doubts whether two parties are really ever
enough to represent an any realistic way the opinions that the population
has about the running of the country. Two is a rather confining number.
>However, notice I said a *proliferation* of parties, not two parties. I
>hardly think that having three or four major parties constitutes a
>proliferation of parties. I am talking about phenomena such as the
>presence of several *hundred* parties in Poland -- they call them "sofa"
>parties, because all of their members can fit on a single sofa!
>
Israel isn't there yet.
>>If there are lots of parties but
>>no instability in terms of turn-over of the groups in authority, than
>>clearly a large number of parties is NOT a sign of instability. It is
>>clearly a positive sign for compettion, however.
>>
>>>national unity governments;
>>
>>This is illogical to the extreme - in no way shape or form is there
>>any connection between the notion of instability and national unity
>>government. Indeed, I could very well claim that such a government
>>is, if anything a sign of stability.
>
>National cohesion, I hope we can agree, contributes to stability.
>However, national cohesion is probably strongest when it is taken for
>granted, when it is an axiomatic background condition of society.
??? I think that you are confusing some kind of psychologcal state
of "national cohesion" with a political reality - the two simply aren't
the same. Neither is it possible to assume from the absence of national
unity government the presence of national cohesion.
>Conversely, when national cohesion is overtly referred to over and over
>again, it probably means that in fact national unity is in doubt.
Again, this is plain strange. If a state can actually bring forth
a national unity government, it is a clear sign of unity, rather
than disunity - the ability to agree on common interests, goals
and means.
Now,
>when a government is formed explicitly as a "national unity" government,
>it suggests that in fact the nation is united about very little in the
>first place. (I exclude wartime governments such as the 1967 Israeli
>national unity government from this analysis.)
>
On the contrary, it obviously suggests that the country is united
about what should be done.
>Since you don't like my criteria, might I ask what standards you would use
>to compare stability amongst various democratic regimes?
>
Wow - this is rather large, and I actually do not feel that I can
do justice to this question. But once again, I thing that your
notion about the presence of "national unity government" as proof
of absence of unity not really justified.
>
>Let me make one thing clear. I am not suggesting that the Israeli
>government is about to implode tomorrow. I think there was a slight
>danger of that in 1986-87, with the Orthodox-secular conflict and with the
>militancy of the Gush Emunim,
Hmm. This actually isn't what the Orthodox-secular conflict is about,
leastwise, not for most Israelis. I think this is the way that it is
often misunderstood in US.
but national cohesion increased markedly in
>response to the intifada. Nor am I suggesting that Israel is less stable
>than its neighboring Arab states; that would be ludicrous.
Again, depends on the neighbour - I think that Saudi Arabia is quite
stable.
I am merely
>saying that not all democracies are equally stable, and amongst stable
>democracies Israel is one of the less stable; it is clearly more stable
>than Russia or Poland, for instance.
>
Well, your proof, as I saw it was:
1) National Unity government - don't agree with it at all
2) Orthodox-secular : clearly a problematic area, but it really
failed to manifest, so far, in ways that would justify making it a
serious danger for Isreali society.
>>> Israel is clearly more stable than lots of Arab regimes,
>>>such as Saddam Hussein's, Mubarak's, and King Hussein's.
>>
>>Actually, King Hussein's regime is damn stable, as many found out to
>>their chagrine.
>
>If so, then clearly stability is no reason for the US to ally with Israel!
Certainly not the only reason.
>Hypotheses can be wrong. Lots of people said Iran under the shah was
>highly stable.
Yep. Stability is VERY deseptive. Before 1985, Soviet Union looked as
stable as a rock.
That is why they are hypotheses. Still, I see no chance
>for regime changes in Saudi right now, and a slight chance that folks such
>as Kahane's party (I forget the name right now)
Kach
could one day do well in
>Israeli elections.
At the moment, they are barred from elections.
Hence I say that Saudi is slightly more stable than
>Israel, although we can reasonably disagree on this point and I might be
>persuaded otherwise. Stability, to repeat, is not the same as democracy.
>
No. I don't even have much impulse to argue about Saudi Arabia - in general,
non-democratic regimes are not necessarily less stable than democratic ones.
Asia